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


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


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
HISTORY

of the

INDIAN EMPIRE



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THE
INDIAN EMPIRE:

HISTORY, TOPOGRAPHY, GEOLOGY, CLIMATE, POPULATION, CHIEF CITIES AND PROVINCES; TRIBUTARY AND PROTECTED STATES; MILITARY POWER AND RESOURCES; RELIGION, EDUCATION, CRIME; LAND TENURES; STAPLE PRODUCTS; GOVERNMENT, FINANCE, AND COMMERCE.

WITH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE

MUTINY OF THE BENGAL ARMY; OF THE INSURRECTION IN WESTERN INDIA; AND AN EXPOSITION OF THE ALLEGED CAUSES.

BY R. MONTGOMERY MARTIN,

AUTHOR OF THE "HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COLONIES," ETC.

ILLUSTRATED WITH MAPS, PORTRAITS, AND VIEWS.

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
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ERRATA.—VOL. II.

- Page 4, Col. 1, inverted commas placed in line 8, instead of line 1, where quotation begins.
- " 17, " 2, line 25, for *made*, read *rendered*.
- " 18, " 1, lines 9 and 10, for *at once*, read *both*.
- " 65, " 2, line 23, for *secluded*, read *private*.
- " 69, " 2, line 53, for *exordium*, read *exhortation*.
- " 72, " 2, note, line 5, for *wrote*, read *written*.
- " 112, " 1, transfer reference † from line 42, to line 37.
- " 118, " 1, line 25, for *Captain*, read *Lieutenant Battye*.
- " 118, " 2, line 10, and note, † for *Freere*, read *Frere*. Same error twice in following column, p. 119.
- " 169, " 2, line 15, instead of *on the morning of the 19th*, read *at a much later period*.
- " 208, " 2, line 26, for *Hissar*, read *Hansi*.
- " 210, " 2, note §, for *Ratton*, read *Rotton*.
- " 234, heading: for *Bainie Madhoo*, read *Madhoo Sing*.
- Page 249, Col. 2, line 47, instead of an *English officer*, read an *English traveller*.
- " 301, " 1, note *, line 1, for *thatched*, read *thatch*.
- " 326, " 1, line 34: *the friendly thakoor native*, omit the word *native*.
- " 336, " 2, for *Rajah of Baupore*, read *Rajah of Banpore*: same error recurs in the column.
- " 360, " -1, line 13, for *Haringford*, read *Harington*.
- " 426, " 2, line 30—31, for *at length assumed a prominent place*, read *was believed to have assumed a place*.
- " 435, " 1, note, for *suspected*, read *accused*.
- " 450, " 1, line 12, for *61st regiment found in holes*, read *61st regiment found dead in holes, &c.*
- " 456, " 1, line 37, for *takes it character*, read *takes its character*.
- " 484, note §, for 366, read 336.
- " 495, col. 1, line 26, for *severely wounded*, read *nearly surrounded*.



ALFRED HERBERT, G.C.B.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

HISTORY OF THE MUTINY OF THE SEPOY TROOPS.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

ALLEGED CAUSES OF DISCONTENT—OPPRESSIVE AND PAUPERISING TENURE OF LAND—INEFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE—EXCLUSION OF NATIVES FROM ALL SHARE IN THE GOVERNMENT—IGNORANCE OF THE LANGUAGES, AND AVERSION EVINCED TOWARDS THE NATIVES—EDUCATION, RELIGION, AND MISSIONARY OPERATIONS—CASTE—FREE PRESS—DEFECTIVE CURRENCY—OPIUM MONOPOLY—NEGLECT OF PUBLIC WORKS—REPRESSION OF BRITISH ENTERPRISE—RECENT ANNEXATIONS—INFRACTION OF THE HINDOO LAW OF INHERITANCE—EXTINCTION OF NATIVE STATES—SATTARA, NAGPOOR, CARNATIC, TANJORE, JHANSI, OUDE, Etc.—STATE OF THE BENGAL ARMY; RELAXED DISCIPLINE; REMOVAL OF REGIMENTAL OFFICERS TO STAFF AND CIVIL EMPLOYMENTS; PAUCITY OF EUROPEAN TROOPS; SEPOY GRIEVANCES; GREASED CARTRIDGES—MOHAMMEDAN CONSPIRACY—FOREIGN INTRIGUES; PERSIAN AND RUSSIAN.

NEVER, perhaps, was the condition of British India deemed more fair and promising than at the conclusion of 1856. The new governor-general, Lord Canning, who arrived in the spring of that year, had seen no reason to question the parting declaration of his predecessor, Lord Dalhousie—that India was “in peace without and within,” and that there appeared to be “no quarter from which formidable war could reasonably be expected at present.”*

The British and Anglo-Indian press, adopting the same tone, declared “the whole of India” to be “profoundly tranquil.”† The conviction seems to have been general amid all ranks and classes, from the viceregal palace at Calcutta, to the smallest and most distant English post; and thus it happened that the vessel of the state pursued her course with all sail set, in the full tide of prosperity, till a series of shocks, slight at first, but rapidly increasing in strength and frequency, taught a terrible lesson of the necessity for careful steering amid the sunken rocks, the shoals, and quicksands,

heretofore so feebly and faintly traced in those famous charts and log-books—the voluminous minutes and correspondence of the East India Company.

The sky had been carefully watched for any indication of the storms of foreign invasion; but the calm waters of our “strong internal administration,” and the full current of our “unparalleled native army,” had so long borne the stately ship in triumph on their bosom, that few attempts were made to sound their depths. Those few excited little attention, and were, for the most part, decidedly discouraged by the authorities both in England and in India. The consequence has been, that at every step of the revolt, we have encountered fresh proofs of our ignorance of the first conditions on which rested the general security of the empire, and the individual safety of every European in India.

Our heaviest calamities, and our greatest advantages, have come on us by surprise: we have been met by foulest treachery in the very class we deemed bound to us by every tie of gratitude and self-interest, and we have found help and fidelity among those whom we most distrusted. We have failed where we confidently looked for

* Minute by the Marquis of Dalhousie, 28th February, 1856.—Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 16th June, 1856; pp. 6—8.

† The *Times*, 9th December, 1856.

triumph; we have succeeded where we anticipated failure. Dangers we never dreamed of, have risen suddenly to paralyse our arms; and obstacles which seemed well-nigh insurmountable, have vanished into thin air before us. Our trusted weapons have proved worthless; or worse—been turned against us; and, at the outset of the struggle, we were like men whose pistols had been stolen from their holsters, and swords from their scabbards, while they lay sleeping; and who, starting up amazed and bewildered, seized the first missiles that came to hand to defend themselves against a foe whose numbers and power, whose objects and character, were alike involved in midnight darkness.

Very marvellous was the presence of mind, the self-reliance, the enduring courage displayed by English men and women, and many native adherents, in their terrible and unlooked-for trial; and very comforting the instances of Christian heroism which adorn this sad and thrilling page of Anglo-Indian history: yet none will venture to deny, that it was the absence of efficient leaders on the part of the mutineers; and not our energy and foresight, which, under Providence, was the means of enabling us to surmount the first overwhelming tide of disaster. Nothing can be more contradictory than the opinions held by public men regarding the immediate object of the mutineers. Some deny that the sepoys acted on any "prearranged plan;" and declare, that "their primary and prevailing motive was a panic-terror for their religion."* Others regard the revolt as the issue of a systematic plot, which must have taken months, if not years, to organise; and compare the outbreak to the springing of a mine, for which the ground must have been hollowed, the barrels filled, the train laid, and the match fired, before the explosion.† A third party assert, that our own impolicy had gathered together masses of combustibles, and that our heedlessness (in the matter of the greased cartridges) set them on fire.

It is quite certain that the people of India labour under many political and social evils, resulting from inefficient administration. Human governments are, at best,

fallible and weak instruments. In Christian England, after so many centuries of freedom, kept and strengthened by unceasing effort, we all acknowledge how far the condition of the masses falls short, in reality, of what in theory we might have hoped for. How, then, can we doubt, that there must be in India much greater scope for oppression, much greater need for watchfulness. We have seen, in Ireland, a notable example of the effects of absentee proprietorship; but here is a case of absentee sovereignty, in which the whole agency is systematically vested in the foreign delegates of a foreign power, few of whom have ever acquired any satisfactory insight into the habits, customs, or languages of the people they were sent to govern.

It is easier to account for the errors committed by the Company than for the culpable neglect of Parliament. We know that an Indian question continued to be the "dinner-bell" of the House of Commons, notwithstanding the revelations of the Torture Committee at Madras, until the massacres of Meerut and Cawnpore showed that the government of India was a subject which affected not only the welfare of the dark-coloured millions from whom we exacted tribute, but also the lives of Englishmen, and the honour of Englishwomen—the friends or relatives, it might be, of the heretofore ignorant and listless legislators.

A right understanding of the causes of the revolt would materially assist all engaged in framing measures for the restoration of tranquillity, and for a sounder system of administration. The following enumeration of the various causes, distant and proximate, which are asserted by different authorities to have been concerned in bringing about the present state of affairs, is therefore offered, with a view of enabling the reader to judge, in the course of the narrative, how far events have tended to confirm or nullify these allegations.

Land-tenure.—The irregular, oppressive, and generally pauperising tenure of land, has been set forth in a preceding section: and since every sepoy looks forward to the time when he shall retire on his pension to live in his own cottage, under his own fig-tree, the question is one in which he has a clear and personal interest. Irrespective of this, the manner in which the proprietary rights of the inhabitants of the Ceded and Conquered provinces have been dealt with,

* See *Indophilus* (Sir Charles Trevelyan's) *Letters to the Times*. Republished by Longman as a pamphlet: p. 37.

† See Sir E. Bulwer Lytton's speech at the Herts Agricultural Society, October, 1857.

is a matter of history with which the land-owners in native independent states are sure to make themselves acquainted; and the talookdars and hereditary chiefs of Oude, could not but have remembered with alarm, the grievous breach of faith committed against the proprietors of the soil in the North-Western Provinces.

A general allusion to this disgraceful procedure has been already made;* but the following detail is given on the authority of various papers drawn up by Mr. Henry St. George Tucker. The views of Mr. Tucker were, it should be premised, utterly opposed to any system "founded on the assumption of the government being the universal landlord;" which sweeping assumption he regarded "as a virtual annihilation of all private rights."

The Ryotwar Settlement made by Munro, in Madras, he thought tended to the impoverishment of the country, the people, and the government itself; and was, in fact, a continuation of the policy of Tippoo Sultan, who drove away and exterminated the proprietors; his object being to engross the rents as well as revenues of the country.

The landowners of the North-Western Provinces—including Delhi, Agra, Bareilly, and the cessions from Oude in 1801—have, however, peculiar and positive grievances to complain of. In 1803, under the administration of the Marquis Wellesley, a regulation was passed, by which the government pledged themselves, "that a permanent settlement of the Ceded provinces would be concluded at the end of ten years;" and proclaimed "the proprietary rights of all zemindars, talookdars, and other descriptions of landholders possessing a right of property in the lands comprising their zemindari, talooks, or other tenures, to be confirmed and established under the authority of the British government, in conformity to the laws and usages of the country." In 1805, a regulation was passed by the same government, in nearly corresponding terms, declaring that a permanent settlement would be concluded with the zemindars and other landholders in the Conquered provinces, at the expiration of the decennial leases. But, in 1807, the supreme government being anxious to extend to the land-

owners of our newly-acquired territory those advantages which had been conferred on the zemindars of the Lower Provinces, by fixing the land-tax in perpetuity, a new regulation was enacted, appointing commissioners for superintending the settlement of the Ceded and Conquered provinces; and notifying "to the zemindars, and other actual proprietors of land in those provinces, that the jumma which may be assessed on their estates in the last year of the settlement immediately ensuing the present settlement, shall remain fixed for ever, in case the zemindars shall now be willing to engage for the payment of the public revenue on those terms in perpetuity, and the arrangement shall receive the sanction of the Hon. Court of Directors."† Far from objecting to the pledge given to the landholders in those regulations; far from contending against the principle of a fixed assessment, either on the ground of policy or of justice, the Court expressed their approbation of the measure contemplated, and gave it their unreserved sanction. To as late a period as 1813, not even a doubt was expressed in the way of discouragement; and the government of India had every reason to presume that they were proceeding in this great work with the full concurrence and approbation of the controlling authorities in this country. Mr. Edmonstone, in his able and instructive letters to the Court (of 31st July, 1821), has shown most conclusively, that the plans and proceedings of the government abroad received an ample confirmation. "Unhappily," says Mr. Tucker, "different views were adopted at a subsequent period; and since 1813,‡ the whole tenor of the Court's correspondence with the supreme government, has not only discountenanced the idea of a permanent settlement of the lands in the Ceded and Conquered provinces, but peremptory injunctions have been issued to that government, prohibiting the formation of such settlement at any future period." The pledge so formally given to the landholders in 1803, and 1805, and 1807, has accordingly remained unredeemed to the present day; temporary settlements have been concluded, in various ways, with different classes of persons; some of the principal talookdars have been set aside, and deprived of the management of their estates; and the great object seems to have been, to introduce the system of revenue administration§ which obtains in

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 579.

† Calcutta Records—Regulation X. of 1807; sec. 5.

‡ See Letter of Court of Directors to Bengal, 16th March, 1813.

§ The Ryotwar: see *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 575.

the territory of Fort St. George. I (in 1827) was a party to the introduction of leases for thirty years in the Western Provinces, by way of compromise for violating the pledge which had been given to the landholders in 1803 and 1805, to confirm the settlement then made with them in perpetuity. "I trust that this long term will operate as some compensation for their disappointment, and that it will, in a great degree, answer the ends proposed by a permanent settlement; but, as a principle, I still maintain, that permanency of tenure, and a limitation of the public demand upon the land, were boons bestowed under the dictates of a just and enlightened policy, and that Lord Cornwallis is to be regarded as the greatest benefactor of India."*

The measure referred to by Mr. Tucker, which I had myself the satisfaction of assisting to procure, was, however, partial in its extent, as well as temporary in its operation. It can hardly be called a compromise; it was simply a sop thrown by the stronger party who broke the bargain, to certain members of the weaker party, who had no resource but to accept it. The public pledge of a permanent settlement with the whole Conquered and Ceded, or, as they are now styled, North-Western Provinces, remains unredeemed. Moreover, even supposing the landholders could forget the manner in which that great boon was freely promised and arbitrarily withheld, they would still have reason to complain of the irregular and often oppressive assessments to which they were and are subjected. There is abundant evidence on this head; but none of greater authority than that of Colonel Sleeman, the resident at Lucknow; who, being commissioned by Governor-general Dalhousie to inquire into the state of Oude, became incidentally acquainted with the results of our fifty years' government of the half of Oude, ceded to us by the treaty of 1801.

"The country was then divided into equal shares, according to the rent-roll at the time. The half made over to the British government has been ever since yielding more revenue to us; while that retained by the sovereign of Oude has been yielding less and less to him: and ours now yields, in land revenue, stamp-duty, and the tax on spirits, two crore and twelve lacs [of rupees]

a-year; while the reserved half now yields to Oude only about one crore and thirty-three lacs. Under good management, the Oude share might, in a few years, be made equal to ours, and perhaps better; for the greater part of the lands in our share have been a good deal impoverished by over-cropping; while those of the Oude share have been improved by long fallows." Colonel Sleeman would seem to attribute the greater revenue raised from our territories, to that obtained by the native government, simply to our "good management;" for he adds, that "lands of the same natural quality in Oude, under good tillage, now pay a much higher rent than they do in our half of the estate."† Yet, in another portion of his Diary, when describing the decided aversion to British rule entertained by the landed aristocracy of Oude, he dwells on our excessive assessments, as co-operating with the cost and uncertainty of the law in civil cases, in causing the gradual decay of all the ancient families. "A less and less proportion of the annual produce of their lands is left to them in our periodical settlements of the land revenue; while family pride makes them expend the same sums in the marriage of their children, in religious and other festivals, personal servants, and hereditary retainers. They fall into balance, incur heavy debts, and estate after estate is put up to auction, and the proprietors are reduced to poverty. They say, that four times more of these families have gone to decay in the half of the territory made over to us in 1801, than in the half reserved by the Oude sovereign; and this is, I fear, true. They named the families—I cannot remember them."‡

To Mr. Colvin, Lieutenant-governor of the N.W. Provinces, the Colonel writes, that on the division of Oude in 1801, the landed aristocracy were equal in both portions. "Now (28th Dec., 1853) hardly a family of this class remains in our half; while in Oude it remains unimpaired. Everybody in Oude believes those families to have been systematically crushed."§

The correspondence in the public journals, regarding the progress of the mutiny, affords frequent evidence of the heavy rate of assessment in the North-West Provinces. For instance, the special correspondent of the *Times* (Mr. Russell), writing from the

* See *Memorials of Indian Government*; a selection from the papers of H. St. G. Tucker, edited by J. W. Kaye; pp. 106—137.

† *Journey through Oude, in 1849-50*, by Colonel Sir W. Sleeman; vol. i., p. 169.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 169.

§ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 416.

camp at Bareilly, speaks of the "indigent population" of Rohilkund; and asserts, on the authority of Mr. Donalds, a settler and planter there, that the Company's land-tax on certain districts was not less than sixty-six per cent.*

It is to be hoped that a searching and unprejudiced inquiry will be instituted wherever decided and general disaffection has been manifested—wherever such statements are made as that from Allahabad; in which it is asserted, that "one, and only one, of the zemindars has behaved well to us during the disturbances here."†

An exposition of the working of the "model system" in Southern India, is given by Mr. Bourdillon, secretary to the government at Madras, in the revenue department, in a pamphlet published in 1852, in which he showed that, in the year 1848-'9, out of a total of 1,071,588 leases (excluding joint holdings in the fourteen principal ryotwarree districts), no fewer than 589,932 were each under twenty shillings per annum; averaging, in fact, only a small fraction above eight shillings each: 201,065 were for amounts ranging from twenty to forty shillings; averaging less than 28s. 6d. each: and 97,891 ranged between forty and sixty shillings; averaging 49s. 6d. each. Thus, out of 1,100,000 leases, 900,000 were for amounts under sixty shillings each, the average being less than 19s. 6d. each per annum. Mr. Bourdillon thus describes the condition of several million‡ of people subject to the Crown of England, and under its complete jurisdiction in some parts for more than half a century:—"Now it may certainly be said of almost the whole of the ryots paying even the highest of these sums, and even of many holding to a much larger amount, that they are always in poverty, and generally in debt. Perhaps one of this class obtains a small amount out of the government advances for cultivation; but even if he does, the trouble he has to take, and the time he loses in getting it, as well as the deduction to which he is liable, render this a questionable gain. For the rest of his wants he is dependent on the bazaar-man. To him his crops are generally hypothecated before they are reaped; and it is he who redeems them from the possession of the

village watcher, by pledging himself for the payment of the kist (rent claimed by government.) These transactions pass without any written engagements or memoranda between the parties; and the only evidence is the chetty's (bazaar-man) own accounts. In general, there is an adjustment of the accounts once a year; but sometimes not for several years. In all these accounts interest is charged on the advances made to the ryot, on the balance against him. The rate of interest varies with the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the borrower: it is probably seldom, or never, less than twelve per cent. per annum, and not often above twenty-four per cent. Of course the poorest and most necessitous ryots have to pay the highest. A ryot of this class of course lives from hand to mouth; he rarely sees money, except that obtained from the chetty to pay his kist: the exchanges in the out-villages are very few, and they are usually conducted by barter. His ploughing cattle are wretched animals, not worth more than seven to twelve shillings each; and all the rest of his few agricultural implements are equally primitive and inefficient. His dwelling is a hut of mud walls and thatched roof, far ruder, smaller, and more dilapidated than those of the better classes of ryots above spoken of, and still more destitute, if possible, of anything that can be called furniture. His food, and that of his family, is partly thin porridge, made of the meal of grain boiled in water, and partly boiled rice with a little condiment; and generally, the only vessels for cooking and eating from, are of the coarsest earthenware, much inferior in grain to a good tile or brick in England, and unglazed. Brass vessels, though not wholly unknown among this class, are rare. As to anything like education or mental culture, they are wholly destitute of it."

Mr. Mead, who resided several years at Madras, and who visited other parts of India, declares, that by the system which the British government have pursued, "the native aristocracy have been extinguished, and their revenues lost equally to the rulers and the multitude. The native manufacturers are ruined; and no corresponding increase has taken place in the consumption of foreign goods. Not a fourth of the land is taken up for tillage; and yet 200,000 men annually leave these shores, to seek employment on a foreign soil. The taxation of all kinds, and the landlord's rent,

* The Times, July 6th, 1858.

† Parl. Papers, 4th February, 1858.

‡ According to Mr. Mead, "18,000,000 souls, in Madras, have only a penny a-week each to subsist on."—(p. 3.)

amount to but 5s. per head; and yet the surplus production of 23,000,000 is but 2s. 7d., and the imports but 1s. 6d., each person."*

The people of the North-West Provinces are being rapidly reduced to the condition of those of Southern India; and it is asserted, that they would rejoice at any change which promises relief from a "system" calculated to weigh down, with unceasing pressure, the energies of every man who derives his subsistence from the cultivation of the soil.

The Inefficient Administration of Justice is an admitted evil; the costliness, the procrastination, above all, the perjury and corruption for which our civil and criminal, our Sudder and Adawlut courts, are notorious. Shortly before the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr. Halliday, the lieutenant-governor of Bengal, urged, in the strongest language, the necessity for measures of police reform, which should extend to "our criminal judicatories as well as to the magistracy and constabulary organisation." He adds, after referring to the evidence brought forward in Mr. Dampier's elaborate reports—"I have myself made much personal inquiry into this matter during my tours. Whether right or wrong, the general native opinion is certainly that the administration of criminal justice is little better than a lottery, in which, however, the best chances are with the criminals; and I think this, also, is very much the opinion of the European mofussil [country] community. * * * Often have I heard natives express, on this point, their inability to understand the principles on which the courts are so constituted, or so conducted, as to make it appear in their eyes as if the object were rather to favour the acquittal, than to insure the conviction and punishment of offenders; and often have I been assured by them, that their anxious desire to avoid appearing as prosecutors, arose in a great measure from their belief that prosecution was very likely to end in acquittal, even, as they imagined, in the teeth of the best evidence; while the acquittal of a revengeful and unscrupulous ruffian, was known by experience to have repeatedly ended in the most unhappy consequences to his ill-advised and imprudent prosecutor. That this very general opinion is not ill-founded, may, I think, be proved from our own records."†

The youth and inexperience of the ma-

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*; p. 313. (Routledge, 1858.)

† Minute to Council of India, 30th April, 1856.

gistrates, which contributes so largely to the inefficiency of the courts over which they preside, arises out of the numerical inadequacy of the covenanted service to supply the number of officers required by the existing system. The Hon. A. Kinnaird stated, in the House of Commons, June 11th, 1857, that in Bengal, there were but seventy covenanted and uncovenanted magistrates, or one to 460,000 persons; and that there were three or four cases of a single magistrate to more than a million souls. It is terrible to think of the power such a state of things must throw into the hands of the native police, and this in a country where experience has taught us, that power, thus delegated, has invariably been employed as a means of extorting money. No wonder, then, that "from one end of Bengal to the other," the earnest desire and aim of those who have suffered from thieves or dacoits, should be, "to keep the matter secret from the police, whose corruption and extortion is so great, as to cause it to be popularly said, that dacoity is bad enough, but the subsequent police inquiry very much worse."

The frequent change, from place to place, and office to office, is urged as another reason for the inefficiency of our system. In the district of Dacca, for instance, the average time of continuance in the magistrate's office, has been, for the last twenty years, not ten months. The extent of the evil may be understood by looking over the register of civil servants, and their appointments. The *Friend of India* quotes the case of a well-known name among Indian officials—Henry Lushington—who arrived in India on the 14th of October, 1821, and, by the 9th of May, 1842, had filled no less than twenty-one offices—a change every year. But during this time he returned to Europe twice, and was absent from India four years and a quarter: his occupancy of each office, therefore, averages scarcely nine months. The journalist adds—"Thousands of miles of country, inhabited by millions of people, would have neither justice nor protection, were it not for the illegally assumed power of the planter and zemindar. There are districts in which the magistrate's court is sixty miles away; and in one case, I know of a judge having to go 140 miles to try a case of murder—so wide does his jurisdiction extend. This very district contains upwards of two millions of people; yet to

govern it there are just two Europeans; and one of these spends a considerable portion of his time in sporting, shooting wild animals, and hunting deer."*

The diminished numbers and impaired efficiency of the rural police, or village chowkeedars, during the last twenty years, is another reason why "our magistracy is losing credit and character, and our administration growing perceptibly weaker." They are, says lieutenant-governor Halliday, so inadequately and uncertainly paid, as to be kept in a permanent state of starvation; and though, in former days, magistrates battled for them with unwilling zemindars and villagers, and were encouraged by government to do so, they are now declared to have no legal right to remuneration for service, and have themselves become too often the colleagues of thieves and robbers. The measures suggested by Mr. Halliday as indispensable to the effectual improvement of the Bengal police, were—the improvement of the character and position of the village chowkeedars, or watchmen; the payment of adequate salaries, and the holding forth of fair prospects of advancement to the stipendiary police; the appointment of more experienced officers as covenanted zillah magistrates; a considerable increase in the number of the uncovenanted or deputy magistrates; an improvement in our criminal courts of justice; and, lastly, the establishment of sufficient means of communication with the interior of districts: because no system could work well while the police-stations and the large towns and marts in the interior continued to be cut off from the chief zillah stations, and from one another, by the almost entire absence of roads, or even (during a large part of the year) of the smallest bridle-roads or footpaths.

The proposer of the above reforms added, that they would involve an increased expenditure of £100,000 a-year on the magistracy and police of Bengal; and this statement, perhaps, furnishes an explanation of the little attention excited by a document full of important but most unpalatable assertions. The onus cannot, however, be allowed to rest solely on the local authorities. The consideration of the House of

Commons has been urgently solicited, by one of its own members,† to the report of the lieutenant-governor; and the fact of such flagrant evils being alleged, by a leading functionary, to exist in the districts under the immediate eye of the supreme government, is surely a sufficient warning, not merely of the necessity of promptly redressing the wrongs under which the Bengalees laboured, but also of investigating the internal administration of the distant provinces. It is unaccountable that the judicial part of the subject should have been so long neglected, after the unreserved condemnation of the system, pronounced by Lord Campbell in the House of Lords in 1853. In reply to the complaint of the Duke of Argyll regarding the strong expressions used in a petition for relief, presented on behalf of the people of Madras, his lordship adverted to the mode in which "ingenuous youths" were dispatched from the college at Haileybury, with, at best, a very imperfect acquaintance with the languages of India, and were made at once judges. Even the advantage of only acting in that capacity was withheld, the same youth being one day a judge of civil cases, the next a collector of revenue, and the next a police magistrate. Speaking from experience derived from the appeals which had come before him as a member of the judicial committee of the Privy Council, he thought, "as far as regarded the administration of justice in the inferior courts, no language could be too extravagant in describing its enormities."‡

The testimony borne by Mr. Halliday, in Bengal, entirely accords with that given by other witnesses regarding the administration of justice in the North-Western Provinces. Colonel Sleeman, writing in 1853, declared—"There is really nothing in our system which calls so much for remedy." He says, that during his recent tour through Oude, he had had much conversation with the people generally, and with many who had sojourned in our territory in seasons of disturbance. They were all glad to return, rather than remain in our districts and endure the evils occasioned by "the uncertainties of our law, the multiplicity and formality of our courts, the pride and negligence of those who preside over

tors, have been disregarded; and the consequence of this neglect has been to leave too great power in the hands of the zemindars.—(*Ibid.*, p. 6.)

† By the Hon. A. Kinnaid, June 11th, 1856.

‡ *Hansard's Debates*, vol. cxxiv., p. 647.

* Quoted by Mr. Kinnaid, in *Bengal, its Landed Tenure and Police System*. (Ridgway, 1857; p. 14.) The series of measures provided by Lord Cornwallis, to protect the cultivator under the Permanent Settlement from oppression on the part of the proprie-

them, and the corruption and insolence of those who must be employed to prosecute or defend a cause in them, and enforce the fulfilment of a decree when passed." Colonel Sleeman cites the statements made to him by the Brahmin communities of two villages, invited back by the native authorities from the Shahjehanpore district, and resettled on their lands; "a mild, sensible, and most respectable body, whom a sensible ruler would do all in his power to protect and encourage; but these are the class of landholders and cultivators whom the reckless governors of districts under the Oude government most grievously oppress. They told me:—

"Your courts of justice are the things we most dread; sir; and we are glad to escape from them as soon as we can, in spite of all the evils we are exposed to on our return to the place of our birth."

* * * The truth, sir, is seldom told in these courts. There they think of nothing but the number of witnesses, as if all were alike; here, sir, we look to the quality. When a man suffers wrong, the wrongdoer is summoned before the elders, or most respectable men of his village or clan; and if he denies the charge and refuses redress, he is told to bathe, put his hand upon the peepul-tree, and declare aloud his innocence. If he refuses, he is commanded to restore what he has taken, or make suitable reparation for the injury he has done; and if he refuses to do this, he is punished by the odium of all, and his life becomes miserable. A man dare not put his hand upon that sacred tree and deny the truth—the gods sit in it, and know all things; and the offender dreads their vengeance. In your Adaw-luts, sir, men do not tell the truth so often as they do among their own tribes or village communities: they perjure themselves in all manner of ways, without shame or dread; and there are so many men about these courts, who understand the 'rules and regulations' (aen and kanoon), and are so much interested in making truth appear to be falsehood, and falsehood truth, that no man feels sure that right will prevail in them in any case. The guilty think they have just as good a chance of escape as the innocent. Our relations and friends told us, that all this confusion of right and wrong, which bewildered them, arose from the multiplicity of the 'rules and regulations,' which threw all the power into the hands of bad men, and left the European gentlemen helpless!"*

The comment made on the above assertions, tends to establish their accuracy. Colonel Sleeman says—"The quality of testimony, no doubt, like that of every other commodity, deteriorates under a system which renders the good of no more value, in exchange, than the bad. The formality

of our courts here, as everywhere else, tends to impair, more or less, the quality of what they receive. The simplicity of courts composed of little village communities and elders, tends, on the contrary, to improve the quality of the testimony they get; and, in India, it is found to be best in the isolated hamlets and forests, where men may be made to do almost anything rather than tell a lie. A Mahratta pundit, in the valley of the Nerbudda, once told me, that it was almost impossible to teach a wild Gond of the hills and jungles the occasional value of a lie. It is the same with the Tharoos and Booksas, who are almost exclusively the cultivators of the Oude Turace forest, and with the peasantry of the Himalaya chain of mountains, before they have come much in contact with people of the plains, and become subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. These courts are, everywhere, our weak points in the estimation of our subjects; and they should be everywhere simplified, to meet the wants and wishes of so simple a people."†

The Exclusion of the Natives from all Share in the Government, has been acted on as necessary to our retention of India. Yet many leading authorities agree in viewing the degraded state in which they have been held as a great defect in our system. "We exclude them," said Sir Thomas Munro, "from every situation of trust and emolument. We confine them to the lowest offices, with scarcely a bare subsistence. * * * We treat them as an inferior race of beings. Men who, under a native government, might have held the first dignities of the state; who, but for us, might have been governors of provinces, are regarded as little better than menial servants, and are often not better paid, and scarcely permitted to sit in our presence."

Lord Metcalfe, Lord William Bentinck, and others, have taken the same tone; and the opinions of the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Glenelg, are sufficiently evidenced in the 87th clause of the Charter Act of 1833, which declares the natives eligible to all situations under government, with certain exceptions. This clause,‡ so generously intended, has

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 68.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 168; vol. ii., p. 415.

‡ The clause runs as follows:—"That no natives of said territories, nor any natural born subject of her majesty resident therein, shall by reason only of

his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company." Mr. Cameron, a gentleman long and intimately acquainted with India, writing in 1853, says—"During the

proved a cruel mockery, by exciting expectations which have been frustrated by the conditions attached to it, and the determined opposition of the Court of Directors, even when those conditions, including the voyage to England, have been fulfilled.

The monopoly of commerce was the worst feature of the E. I. Company, as regarded the British nation; the monopoly of patronage is its worst feature as regards the Indian population, and not its best as regards that of England. Lord William Bentinck stated the case very ably in his evidence before the select committee on steam communication with India in 1837. "The bane of our system is not solely that the civil administration is entirely in the hands of foreigners, but that the holders of this monopoly, the patrons of these foreign agents, are those who exercise the directing power at home; that this directing power is exclusively paid by the patronage; that the value of this patronage depends exactly upon the degree in which all the honours and emoluments of the state are engrossed by their clients, to the exclusion of the natives. There exists, in consequence, on the part of the home authorities, an interest in respect to the administration precisely similar to what formerly prevailed as to commerce, directly opposed to the welfare of India; and, consequently, it will be remarked without surprise, that in the two renewals of the charter that have taken place within the last twenty-five years, in the first, nothing was done to break down this administrative monopoly; and in the second, though a very important principle was declared, that no disability from holding office in respect to any subjects of the Crown, by reason of birth, religion, descent, or colour, should any longer continue, still no provision was made for working it out; and, as far as is known, the enactment has remained till this day a dead letter."*

The number of natives employed in the administration, notwithstanding the large accessions of territory between the years 1851 and 1857 (inclusive), has actually decreased from 2,910 to 2,846. Of the latter number, 856 receive less than £120 per

twenty years that have [since] elapsed, not one of the natives has been appointed to any office except such as they were eligible to before the statute." Mr. Henry Richard, commenting on this policy, remarks—"In adopting this course, and treating the natives as a conquered and inferior race, on no account to be admitted to political and social equality with ourselves, we are not only violating the dic-

annum; 1,377 from £120 to £240 per annum; and only eleven receive above £840.† These figures, when compared with the increased numbers and high salaries of the European covenanted and uncovenanted servants, can hardly fail to suggest a reason why the Hindoos—who frequently filled the chief positions in Indo-Mohammedan states, and almost invariably that of Dewan (or chancellor of the exchequer)—may think the rule of power-loving, money-getting Englishmen, worse for them than that of the indolent Moslem, who, though he sometimes forcibly destroyed the caste of thousands, yet never withheld from their race the honours and emoluments of high office. Rajpoots led the forces of Delhi; Rajpootnies (though that they affected to consider a degradation) sat within its palaces in imperial state—the wives and mothers of emperors: Brahmins filled every revenue office, from that of the treasurer-in-chief to the lowest clerk; all the financial business being transacted by them. The Great Moguls, the minor Mohammedan sovereigns, and their chief retainers, were spendthrifts rather than hoarders: they won kingdoms with their swords; and, like all conquerors, looked to reap where they had not sown; but avarice, or the love of money for its own sake, was very rare among them. They sat on their silver howdahs, on the backs of their elephants, and threw rupees, by bagful, among the people, who always benefited, at least indirectly, by the lavish expenditure for which they furnished the means.

The modern Brahmins (whatever their ancestors may have done) certainly evince more acquaintance with, and predilection for, the practice of the rules of Cocker, than for the abstract study of the Vedas, and the geographical and astronomical absurdities of the Shastras. They are born diplomatists, as well as financialists. Our greatest statesmen have acknowledged their remarkable ability. The despatches, especially the supplementary ones, of the late Duke of Wellington, abound with evidence of this: and when describing the character of Talleyrand, the duke could find no better comparison than that he was "like Eitel Punt (the tates of justice and of Christian morality, but we are disregarding all that the experience of the past has taught us to be wise policy with a view to permanent success."—(*Present and Future of India under British Rule*, p. 37.)

* Parl. Papers, 26th April, 1858; p. 201.

† Parl. Paper (House of Commons), 16th April, 1858.

Brahmin minister of Sindia); only not so clever."* Such men as these can hardly be expected to endure, without resentment, treatment which keeps the promise to the ear, yet breaks it to the sense.

In England we have grown used to the assertion, that there is no such thing as public opinion or discussion among the natives: but this is a mistake, and only proves that we have overlooked its rise and progress. The public meetings held in every presidency, the numerous journals, and, still more, the political pamphlets published by natives, attest the contrary. Of the latter class one now lies before me, written in English—fluent, grammatical English—with just a sufficient tinge of Orientalism to give internal evidence of the veritable authorship. The writer, after admitting the protection afforded by British rule from external violence and internal commotion, adds—"But it has failed to foster the growth of an upper class, which would have served as a connecting link between the government and the mass of the people. The higher order of the natives have, ever since its commencement, been shut out of all avenues to official distinction. They may acquire colossal fortunes in commercial and other pursuits, or obtain diplomas and honours in colleges and universities, but they cannot be admitted into the civil service, or the higher grades in the military service, without undertaking a voyage to England, and complying with other equally impracticable conditions. The highest situations to which they can aspire, are deputy-magistrateships and Sudder ameenships."†

Ignorance of the Languages, and the Aversion evinced towards the Natives, are the causes alleged by Baboo Shew Purshad (inspector of schools in the Benares division), for the "unpopularity of the government, and, consequently, of all the miseries under which the country labours." The reluctance of the English functionaries to mix with the natives, has prevented their acquiring that thorough knowledge of their sentiments and capabilities, social and moral condition, internal economy, wants, and prejudices, which are essential to successful government. "In England," says

the writer just quoted, "you have only to pass good acts, and draw good rules, and people will take upon themselves to see that they are worked in the right way, and for their benefit, by the local authorities; but here the case is otherwise: the best regulations can be turned into a source of the worst oppression by an unscrupulous and exacting magistrate; and if you give us a good magistrate, he can keep us happy without any regulation at all. The Punjab owes its happiness more to Sir John Lawrence and Messrs. Montgomery and Macleod, than to any system or regulation. * * * It is owing to these few officers, who come now and then to the lot of some districts, that people have not yet despaired and risen in a body. * * * The government will feel, no doubt, stronger after the suppression of the mutiny than they ever were. If the hatred of their countrymen towards the natives increases in ratio to the increase of power, as hitherto, the disaffection of the people, and the unpopularity of the government, will increase also proportionally. The consequences are obvious: and, be assured, the country will be desolated and ruined."‡

Englishmen, generally, have no gift for languages; and this has been always one of their weak points as rulers of India, where it is of the first importance that all functionaries, whether civil or military, should be—not first-rate Grecians, or versed in black-letter lore—but able to converse, in the vernacular dialect, with the men over whom they bear rule. Had such knowledge been at all general, warnings would, in all human probability, have been received of the combinations (such as they were) which preceded the massacres of Meerut, Cawnpore, and Jhansi. It is a serious defect in the system (springing, no doubt, from the monopoly of patronage), that so little trouble has been taken to promote the efficiency of the servants of the Company, as administrators of a delegated despotism. Lord Wellesley strove earnestly for this end; but his efforts were coldly received, and are even now insufficiently appreciated.

So far as the natives are concerned, sending out "incapables" to bear rule over them, manifests a shameful indifference to

* *Kaye's Life of Malcolm*, vol. i., p. 241.

† *The Mutinies, the Government, and the People*; by A Hindoo; p. 36. (Printed at Calcutta, 1858.)

‡ *Thoughts of a Native of Northern India on the Rebellion, its Causes and Remedies* (Dalton, Cock-

spur-street, 1858): with a Preface, written at Calcutta, and signed "M. W."—initials which suggest the name of a well-known member of the Bengal (uncovenanted) service. The Dedication to H. C. T., Esq., is similarly suggestive.

their interests, and is inflicting a wrong, of which we cannot hope to escape the penalty. "It is suicidal to allow India to be a refuge, as it is at present to a great extent, for those of our youth who are least qualified to make their way in their own country; and it is such an insult to the natives, who are full of intelligence, and are making great progress in European knowledge of all kinds, that if anything could excuse them for rebelling, it would be this."

This is plain speaking from an authority like Indophilus; and what he adds with regard to young officers is equally applicable to civilians:—"It should not be left, as it is at present, to the decision of a young man whether he will pass in the native languages or not. The power of understanding his men, and of rendering himself intelligible to them, should be considered an indispensable qualification; and those who cannot, or will not, acquire this necessary accomplishment, should be removed from the service. Every officer should be presumed to understand the language of his soldiers."*

The change which has taken place in Anglo-Indian society, has, without doubt, been a painful one for the natives. The very large increase in the proportion of Englishwomen who now accompany their husbands, fathers, and brothers to India, has tended to decrease the association with the native gentry; and these are becoming yearly less able to vie with the Europeans. One branch of the intercourse of former days has greatly diminished; the conventionalities have become more stringent; the temptations have decreased; the shameless profligacy described by Clive† no longer exists; and a dark-coloured "beebee" (lady), the mother of a large family of Eurasians, would not now be considered a fit head for the household of a distinguished military or civil servant. How far any radical reform has taken place, or whether the great "social evil" has only changed its hue, it is hard to say; but several trustworthy witnesses assert as an evident fact, that the Europeans and natives of all classes associate far less than they used to do, and that many of the former have adopted a supercilious tone towards the latter, which is equally impolitic, unjust, and inconsistent

with the usual refining and softening effect of legitimate domestic intercourse.

The repeated use of the word "niggers" in recent books of Indian memoirs, and in the correspondence published in the public journals,‡ is itself a painful and significant symptom. An American traveller asks, how we can reconcile our denunciation of the social inequality of the negro and white races in America with our own conduct to the East Indians? "I allude," he says, "to the contemptuous manner in which the natives, even those of the best and most intelligent classes, are almost invariably spoken of and treated. The tone adopted towards the lower classes is one of lordly arrogance; towards the rich and enlightened, one of condescension and patronage. I have heard the term 'niggers' applied to the whole race by those high in office; with the lower order of the English it is the designation in general use."§

Sir Charles Napier considered, that nothing could be worse than the manners of Englishmen in India towards natives of all ranks. Therefore, when endeavouring to bring into operation the resources of Sind, he refused British officers a passage on board his merchant steamers, knowing that "if granted, they would go on board, occupy all the room, treat my rich merchants and supercargoes with insolence, and very probably drink and thrash the people."||

Religion and Education.—Missionary operations are alleged to have had their share in jeopardising the permanence of our power; while, on the contrary, the advocates of religious enterprise assert, that had the messengers of the glad tidings of universal peace and good-will been suffered to have free way in India, as in every other dependency or colony of the British empire, such an exposition of the tenets of Protestant Christianity would long since have been afforded to the intelligent and argumentative Hindoos, as would have rendered it impossible for the most artfully-concocted rumours, founded on the most unfortunate combination of circumstances, to persuade them (in the teeth of a hundred years' experience to the contrary), that force and fraud would ever be used to compel the

Nov. 23rd, 1857.) It is much to be regretted, that such mischievous and exceptional opinions as these should find unqualified expression in a journal which circulates largely throughout India.

§ Taylor's *Visit to India, &c.*, in 1853; p. 273.

|| *Life*, by Sir William Napier; vol. iii., p. 473.

* Letter to the *Times*, September 25th, 1857.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 307.

‡ A writer in the *Times*, "who has passed his life in India," asserts, that "the white and the dark man are no more equal, and no more to be governed by the same rules, than the man and the ape."—"H."

adoption of a creed which appeals to the reason, and requires the habitual exercise of the free-will of every disciple.

With some few and partial exceptions, the policy of the home and local government has been steadily and even sternly repressive of all attempts for the extension of Christianity; and every concession made has been wrung from them by the zeal of influential individuals, supported by public opinion. It needs not to establish this fact on evidence, or to remind the reader that English missionaries were not even tolerated in India until the year 1813; that Marshman and Carey were compelled to take up their residence without the British frontier, in the Danish settlement of Serampoor; that Judson and his companions were actually deported; and that Robert Haldane's munificent and self-sacrificing intention of expending £40,000 on the formation of an effective mission for Benares, was frustrated by the positive prohibition of government, despite the efforts of Wilberforce and others.

An Indian director is said to have declared, that "he would rather a band of devils landed in India than a band of missionaries;"* and his colleagues acted very much as if they shared his conviction.

Secular education was long viewed by the East India Company as a question in which they had no concern; and the efforts made by the Marquis Wellesley and others, were treated with an indifference amounting to aversion. At length public opinion became decided on the subject; and, in 1813, the sum of £10,000 was, by the determination of parliament, decreed to be annually appropriated, out of the revenues of India, for the cultivation of exclusively Hindoo and Mohammedan lore.

In 1824, Mr. Mill (the historian, who entered the service of the Company after writing his famous exposition of the worst features of their rule) was ordered to prepare a despatch on the subject of education. He did so, and in it boldly laid down the principle of inculcating sound truth, in opposition to the absurd fictions of the Shastras. The directors accepted his *dictum*, and founded English schools and colleges for exclusively secular instruction. Lord W. Bentinck, in 1834, pursued a similar course; and a few thousand youths (including Nana Sahib) learned to talk English fluently,

to quote Shakespeare, Pope, Addison, and Byron, instead of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, Hafiz or Sadi; and to jeer with the flippancy of superficial scepticism at the ignorance of their parents and countrymen, in asserting that the earth rests on eight elephants, a serpent, a turtle, and such like;† and at the Mussulmans, for believing in Mohammed's journey to the moon. After all, such instruction was a direct and tangible interference with the religious views of the people. No greater would have been committed, had we placed before them a frank and full exposition of our own creed, choosing Moses rather than Milton to narrate the origin and fall of the whole human race, and trusting to the equally inspired record of the evangelists, to impart, with resistless power, the divinely revealed mystery of man's redemption.

We have taught the whole truth as regards material things—that the earth is round, for instance, and that the ocean is everywhere the same; in opposition to the Brahminical doctrine, that the earth consists of seven continents, divided by seas composed respectively of salt-water, wine, sugar-cane juice, clarified butter, curds, milk, and fresh-water. Spiritual truth we have not ventured to set forth; and the conquerors who represent a nation which applauds itself for the maintenance in strict union of church and state, have become the voluntary exponents of a neutral system which closely resembles practical infidelity. And practical infidelity is the cause to which alone our conduct is attributed by the more intelligent class of the natives. They know that the government is firm even to obstinacy in the maintenance of its convictions, and they utterly discredit the reality of a belief which can co-exist with the temporising and cowardly half measures employed by those who are in all other things habitually positive and outspoken.

The Anglo-Indian authorities were not, however, all blind or indifferent to the workings of the "Godless colleges." In Madras, a strong feeling grew up in favour of the teaching of the Bible in government schools. The Marquis of Tweeddale, then governor, shared and ably expressed this opinion, declaring, that "it required a more solid foundation than is to be found in the Hindoo or Mohammedan faith, to bear the change which learning operates on the mind of those who emerge out of a state of ignorance, and attain those mental

* Quoted by the Hon. A. Kinnaid—Exeter Hall, Jan. 5th, 1858.

† Arthur's *Mysoor*, p. 91.

acquirements which enlarged education gives. * * * Nor do I see how native society itself can safely and permanently advance except upon this basis. I would therefore adopt the rule proposed by the council, which recognises the Bible as a class-book in the government schools, but at the same time leaves it free to the native student to read it or not, as his conscience may dictate, or his parent may desire.”*

The Court of Directors refused to comply with Lord Tweeddale's recommendation, and persevered in their previous resolve, despite the remonstrances of the Madras council, and their clear exposition of the mistaken view on which that determination was founded. An able pen wrote a denunciation of the system, which now reads like a prophecy:—"The government does not know what it is doing. No doubt it is breaking down those superstitions, and dispersing those mists, which, by creating weakness and disunion, facilitated the conquest of the country; but, instead of substituting any useful truth, or salutary principles, for the ignorance and false principles which they remove, they are only facilitating the dissemination of the most pernicious errors, and the most demoralising and revolutionary principles. I have been appalled by discovering the extent to which atheistical and deistical writings, together with disaffection to the British government and hatred to the British name, have spread, and are spreading, among those who have been educated in government schools, or are now in the service of government. The direction of the government system of education is rapidly falling into the hands of astute Brahmins, who know how to take advantage of such a state of things, and at the same time to strengthen themselves by an alliance with Parsee and Musulman prejudices; while the European gentlemen who still remain nominally at the head of the system, know nothing of the under-currents which pervade the whole, or consider themselves as bound, either by principle or policy, not to make any exertions in favour of Christian truth; while the professed object of the government is to give secular instruction only."†

* See Lord Tweeddale's Minute, August 24th, 1846, and reply thereto.—Sixth Report of House of Lords, 1853; pp. 189; 162.

† Testimony of Professor Henderson, of the Bombay Government Schools, dated 31st October, 1803; published in a Discourse upon his death, by Dr. Wilson president of the Bombay Literary Society.

In April, 1847, an order was issued by the Court of Directors to the governor-general, requiring, that the principle which had been "uniformly maintained, of abstaining from all interference with the religion of the natives of India," should be rigidly enforced. A paragraph in a previous despatch (to Madras, 21st May, 1845), declared it to be "the duty of government, and not less of its officers, to stand aloof from all missionary labours, either as promoting or as opposing them." At this time, it was well-known that many of the most esteemed officials, civil and military, were, and had been for years past, members of committees of Bible and Missionary societies. A public demand for "specific instructions" regarding the meaning of the directors, was made by their servants; and this, together with the privately expressed opinions which reached the governor-general (Lord Hardinge), induced him to withhold the despatch and recommend its suppression; in which the directors concurred, because its publication "might give rise to discussion on a subject on which it is particularly desired that the public mind should not be excited."‡

In the year 1849, a native of high-caste, occupying a responsible position in the Calcutta college, publicly embraced Christianity, and was immediately dismissed by the English authorities.§

The government pursued the system of excluding the Bible from its schools, while the missionaries persisted in making it the foundation of theirs; and the opinion of the natives was evidenced in the large voluntary contributions made by them to the latter. The statistics of 1853 gave the following result:—Government schools, 404; scholars, 25,362: Christian Mission schools, 1,668; scholars, 96,177. The returns showed some singular facts: among others, that the only school at Bangalore in which Brahmin youths were found, was a missionary one.

In 1854, the duty of adopting measures for the extension of education, was avowed in a despatch by Sir Charles Wood; and the doctrine of grants in aid for the support of all schools, without reference to the religious doctrine taught therein, was plainly set forth.

‡ Parl. Papers (House of Commons), 12th February, 1858; pp. 3, 5, 11.—*Letter from a Layman in India*; pamphlet, published by Dalton, Cockspur-street, 1858; pp. 11, 12.—Speech of Rev. W. Chalmers, Exeter Hall, January 5th, 1858.

§ *Christian Education for India in the Mother-Tongue*, p. 15.

A minister of public instruction for India was appointed, with a salary of £3,000 a-year; four inspectors, with salaries varying from £1,500 down to £750; and a large number of sub-inspectors: but no single vernacular school* was established, neither was any attempt made to frame and circulate tracts on agriculture and mechanics, or to convey, in the native languages, the more elementary and practical portions of the knowledge generally availed of in Europe for the furtherance of various branches of trade and manufacture.†

The extensive scale on which preparations were made surprised the natives, and the unauthorised and improper statement of some of the officials, that "it was the order of government that people should now educate their children,"‡ created much anxiety. Yet proselytising was neither contemplated nor desired. The Calcutta Bible Society requested permission of the Council of Education to place a copy of the Bible, in English and the vernacular, in the library of each government school and college. It was notorious that the Koran and the Shastras were there; yet the council declined to give the Bible a place beside them, because it would be a breach of "neutrality."§

In England, and even in India, the authorities generally seem to have had no misgivings as to the result of purely secular teaching. Some few, however, deprecated education of any kind to any extent; and this party included a late governor-general, Lord Ellenborough, who declared his belief of its incompatibility with the maintenance of British dominion in India—a conviction, the ground of which is explained by a subsequent statement made by his lordship in his place in parliament (in 1852), that "no intelligent people would submit to our government."||

With such views, it is not surprising that Lord Ellenborough, when addressing the House of Lords on the 9th of June, 1857, on the recent tidings of the mutiny of the Bengal army, should have adverted with extreme astonishment to a statement which he could "scarcely believe to be true," though he had seen it "distinctly stated in the papers, that the governor-general himself,

Lord Canning, subscribed largely to a missionary society, which has for its object the conversion of the natives." The reply of Lord Lansdowne was, that if "Lord Canning had so acted as to give countenance to such belief as the noble earl inferred, he would no longer deserve to be continued in his office." These, and similar expressions of opinion, have done good by affording unmistakable evidence of the feelings entertained by men of high talent and position. A cry arose for "Christian emancipation," and several public meetings took place. On one of these, held at Exeter Hall on the 5th of January, 1858, the *Times* commented in the following terms:—"We have made a great mistake in India. The religious policy pursued by the government of that country, has made us, as one of its own servants declared, 'cowards in the eyes of men, and traitors in the eyes of God.' * * *

A stranger to the question, after reading the noble chairman's speech on that occasion, might well imagine that the Hindoos were the conquerors, and we the subjects; that we had been tyrannically debarred, for more than a century, from the free exercise of our religion; and that we were at length seizing a favourable moment to demand relief from these unjust disabilities. All that his lordship, and those who followed him, asked for, was Christian emancipation; * * * and that, under a government acknowledging faith in Christ Jesus, the profession of the Gospel should no longer be visited with penalties of civil disqualification. These are literally the conditions to which our policy has driven us. * * * We were never really neutral; we made ourselves partisans; but, unfortunately, in our anxiety to escape the charge of favouring Christianity, we actually favoured heathenism. * * * All this must now end, if not for truth's sake, for the sake of government itself. Our policy has broken down utterly, and proved destructive to its own objects. There is no mistaking the results of the experiment. Where, asked Lord Shaftesbury, did the insurrection break out? Was it in Madras, where Christians are most numerous, and where Christianity has been best treated? Was it in Bombay, where caste was scouted,

* A Vernacular Society is now being organised in London. It is much needed; for, as its chief promoter, Mr. Tucker, truly says, no people have ever been Christianised through a foreign language.

† Report of Public Meeting for the Formation of

a Christian Vernacular Education Society, 20th May, 1858; p. 8.

‡ Parl. Papers, 13th April, 1858; p. 2.

§ Letter from a Layman, p. 13.

|| Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, p. 117.

and Hindoos taught that government could pay no heed to such pretensions? No; it was in Bengal, where idolatry and caste received the greatest reverence; and in the Bengal army, which represented the most pampered class of the whole population."

One last incident, illustrative of the anti-Christian policy of the Indian government, remains to be quoted. The Sonthals—a wild tribe, resembling our gipsies—were driven into rebellion in 1856, by the misconduct of some railway contractors, the exactions of native bankers, and the outrages committed by the native police. The missionaries materially aided in restoring tranquillity, and succeeded in obtaining the confidence of these poor savages, who were without the pale of Hindoo caste; and the Calcutta authorities entered into arrangements with the Church Missionary Society for the establishment of schools of religious and industrial instruction among them, and specially among the females.* When the measure became known in England, the home government refused its sanction, and ordered the establishment of schools on its own plan, the teachers of which were to be "most strictly enjoined to abstain from any attempt to introduce religious subjects in any form."†

It is interesting to learn, from one of the Hindoos themselves, the view taken by them of our so-called neutrality. Shew Purshad says—"It is absurd to think that the English are hated by the Hindoos on account of their religion. * * * It is not religion, but the want of religion, which has brought so much evil to this country. The people know that the government is a Christian one. Let it act openly as a true Christian: the people will never feel themselves disappointed; they will only admire it. * * * Education must be carried on upon a

sounder principle, and religion must be fostered. Don't turn India from idolatry to atheism. * * * Who can detest 'religion?' It is the order of their own Shastras‡ that every man is to revere his own religion. You may have a thousand missionaries to preach, and another thousand as masters of the schools, at the expense of the government, or distribute a thousand Bibles at the hands of the governor-general. The people will not murmur out a single syllable, though they may laugh and jeer; but take care that you do not interfere with their caste—you do not force them to eat the food cooked by another in the gaols,§ or thrust grease down their throats with the cartridges made by Europeans. * * * Difference of caste must vanish, with many other offsprings of folly and ignorance, when its proper time comes. To try to exterminate it now must end in bloodshed."||

Mr. Henry Carre Tucker, the son of the late chairman of the East India Company (and himself no mean authority¶), confirms the statement, from long personal experience—that so long as we scrupulously abstain from any direct interference with the ceremonial observances of caste, we may teach Christianity as much as we please, adding—"This view is strengthened by the fact, that during the late mutiny, those large military stations have escaped the best where the governors were most zealous for Christianity." He proceeds to instance Peshawur, under Herbert Edwardes; and Lahore, under "those brave Christian men, John Lawrence and Robert Montgomery:" but here we cannot follow him without anticipating the subsequent narrative. His conclusions, however, are too important to be omitted: they are—"That we ought to assume a bolder position as a Christian gov-

in March, 1858, a valedictory address was presented to him, signed by all the principal inhabitants—expressing sorrow at the termination of their official connection, a "deep sense of admiration of his enlarged spirit of philanthropy and almost boundless benevolence," and "gratitude for his zealous exertions in extending the benefits of education." In token of their sense of the manner in which he had employed his few leisure hours in furthering "the welfare, here and hereafter, of those committed to his charge," the subscribers to the address collected among themselves 6,000 rupees, for the obtainment of a full-length portrait of their friend, to be placed in the Benares college; and with the balance, after defraying the cost of the picture, they propose to found a scholarship to commemorate his name. Certainly the Hindoos know how to appreciate Christian disinterestedness when they meet with it.

* See Mr. J. M. Strachan's *Letter to Captain Eastwick*. (Seeley, 1858.)

† Parl. Papers (Commons), 24th Aug., 1857; p. 2.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 46.

§ "Active resistance to the recently introduced messing system in the gaols of Bengal and the N.W. Provinces, has produced bloodshed."—Col. Sykes' *Letter to the Times*, October 8th, 1857.

|| *Thoughts of a Native*, &c., pp. 18—34.

¶ Mr. Tucker was connected with the Benares district for twenty-five years: during this period he avowed and acted up to his own high standard of Christian duty, at the risk of being deemed a dangerous fanatic; the more so because the "Holy City" of Benares is the stronghold of the Brahmins, and holds a somewhat similar position, in the estimation of the Hindoos, to what Mecca does in that of the Moslems. Yet, on his departure for Europe

ernment; that it is quite feasible to Christianise our education; and that, instead of causing alarm and disaffection, those dangerous points have, through God's blessing, been the most quiet where Christian exertion has been the greatest. Oude, destitute of all missionary effort, and the sepoy, to whom Christian instruction was closed, were the worst of all."*

The ignorance displayed by the sepoy, and that large part of the Indian population connected with the army, regarding Christianity, is remarkable, even after making every possible allowance for the rigid exclusion of missionary teaching, and the absolute prohibition of proselytism among their ranks.† The cause is obvious—not simply to the minds of earnest Christians, but to the class who have least sympathy with anything approaching religious enthusiasm.

The *Times*,‡ in one of its leading articles, is constrained to admit, that it is because the superior beneficence and purity of our religion have not been vividly and transparently exhibited in practice, that we "have not converted the people who have witnessed the every-day life of British gentlemen and ladies—we will not say to an acceptance of our religion, but even to any high regard for it. * * * We ought to have stood high in that land of many religions, as a consistent, believing, just, kind, and holy people. That we have not even done this, and that we are regarded simply as unbelievers, with little religion except a few negative tenets, which we find convenient for political purposes, must be deemed a shortcoming in our practice. It must be our fault that we Christians stand so much lower in the religious scale of India than we did in the scale of ancient paganism."

While (according to the above impartial testimony) we have not taught Christianity either by precept or example, and while among the sepoy the Bible has remained a

sealed book, no such embargo has ever been laid on the Koran. The Mōhammedans, themselves essentially propagandists, have remained masters of the situation. Wrapped in a complacent belief of their own superiority, as believers in a revelation more recent and complete than that of their conquerors, the followers of the False Prophet adopt their own classification of "Jews, English, infidels, and heretics;" and really viewing us (in a certain sense) as we do the Jews, have taken pains to communicate this impression to the Hindoos.

Indeed, who will venture to defend from the charge of practical atheism, a government that causes such sentences as "God is a Spirit," to be expunged from its school-books;§ being apparently ignorant that this fundamental truth is the very essence of all that is sound in Mohammedanism, and is acknowledged, at least in theory, by every Brahmin and Buddhist in India.

Caste, and the panic-terror which the idea of its violation may have occasioned, constitute a social and political, even more than a religious question.|| Sir Charles Napier well defined the difference when he said, that what the natives dreaded, was "not conversion, but contamination." Caste is no universal, immutable law: it is a pure convention; but one which, by the nature of our position, we are bound to respect to a certain reasonable extent.

The traditional four castes¶ have merged into innumerable others. Human passions have proved too strong for the strongest fetters ever forged by a wily priesthood. Intermarriages have taken place between every variety of caste; and the result is, the general division of the Hindoo population into high-caste (consisting of Brahmins who compose the priest and scholar class, and the Rajpoots, who are hereditary soldiers), low-caste (in which all the Mahrattas, and

* It would seem as if the government had feared the influence of Christianity among the English soldiery; for it is only very recently that chaplains have been appointed to accompany expeditions. No provision of the kind was made in the Cabool war; and Sir Charles Napier loudly complained of a similar deficiency among his force in Sinde.

† Witness the case of Purrub-deen Pandeh, a high-caste Brahmin (a naik in the 25th regiment), who, though "previously much esteemed in the corps," was summarily removed for having received Christian baptism. This occurred at Meerut in 1819.—(Parl. Papers, 8th February, 1858.)

‡ October 6th, 1857.

§ See *London Quarterly Review*, October, 1857:

article on the "Sepoy Rebellion," by the Rev. W. Arthur; p. 259.

|| No European can form, though they ought to form, a correct idea of the difference between the prejudices of caste and those of religion. Give a couple of gold mohurs to a pundit, and he will cheerfully compose a book in refutation of his own religion; but give him a glass of water openly touched by you, even through the medium of a stick a hundred feet long, and he will not drink it, though you offer him a thousand gold mohurs. Secretly, perhaps, he may not have objection to do anything either to please you or satiate his own passions.—(*Thoughts of a Native*, &c.; p. 18)

¶ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 14.

most of the remaining native princes, are included), and, thirdly, out-caste—a section diffused all over India, and forming a large proportion of the entire population. The Abbé Dubois maintained, that they were, in his time, one in five; but an able writer of our own day suggests one in ten as nearer the truth: adding—"Even in this proportion the Indian out-castes would be twenty millions of human beings, or more than the population of all England."*

This class includes the aborigines, or at least the predecessors of the Hindoos, the Gonds, Bheels, Sonthals, &c., who have never accepted caste; and, indeed, could not by Brahminical law find place in it. The barrier is equally impassable for the Mussulmans, whose observance of certain caste rules is worthless in the sight of the Hindoos. No man can venture to foretell how much longer the system may endure, or how soon it may be thrown to the winds. The Jains have caste; the Buddhists (who still linger in India) have none. Then there are the Seiks, originally a peaceable, religious sect, founded by a Hindoo, whose creed was derived from the Vedas and the Koran. Caste was suddenly abolished among them by Govind, their tenth "Guru," or spiritual chief; converts were gladly welcomed from all quarters, and admitted to a perfect equality.†

A similar change may come over the mass of the Hindoos; and as the teaching of St. Paul produced the simultaneous conversion of two thousand persons, so here, whole communities may be led at once to renounce the error which has so long enthralled them. Or, the work may be more gradual—individual enlightenment may be the thin edge of the wedge: but in either case, Christian civilisation is the instrument which alone can prosper in our hands—the only one that affords any rational prospect of leading to the voluntary renunciation of caste. This renunciation does not necessarily accompany conversion to Christianity; though it would seem to be an inevitable consequence.

Some of the Hindoo pamphleteers, however, declare that caste can hardly be deemed incompatible with Christianity, when it exists so evidently, although under peculiar forms, among the English. They ask, whether we do not treat all men whose skins are darker than our own, as if of quite

another caste or *breed*? Whether half-caste is not our contemptuous term for an Eurasian? They point to the whole framework of Anglo-Indian society, to its "covenanted" service, to the rigid exclusiveness produced by patronage alike in the military and civil service, in confirmation of their assertion. High-caste, low-caste, and out-caste, with their various subdivisions, are, they say, pretty clearly defined in our practice, however forcibly we may repudiate such distinctions in theory.

To return: the Indo-Mohammedans have, to a certain extent, imitated Brahminical practices as conventional distinctions, and are interested in inciting the Hindoo sepoys to maintain a system which enables them to dictate to their officers the what, when, how, and where, in a service in which unhesitating and unquestioning obedience is otherwise exacted. The natives are perfectly aware that caste is a great inconvenience to the Europeans, and that it materially impedes their efficiency as soldiers and servants. It is this which made them so watchful of every measure of government that might infringe on the caste monopoly of privileges and immunities, which we had unwisely made their "Magna Charta," and which we, strangely enough, took no pains to investigate or define. The consequence of our ignorance of its theory and regulations has been, that we have been perpetually falling into opposite errors—vacillating between absurd deference to pretended scruples, and real infraction of the first and most invariable observances. Persecution on the one hand, undue concessions on the other, have been our Scylla and Charybdis; but it is our ignorance that has made them so.

In considering the operation of caste in India, we must bear in mind that it is a thing hard to preserve intact, and easily destroyed, either by force or fraud. Many comparatively recent instances of both are on record; and Tippoo Sultan especially delighted in compelling Brahmins to forfeit their privileges by destroying kine. The natives know us too well to fear any such ebullitions of insane barbarity or fierce zeal; but it is quite possible they may anticipate our desiring the annihilation of caste on the score of policy, and dread our attempting it by a *coup d'état*. It is alleged that articles in the public journals, regarding the need of soldiers experienced by England in carrying out the Russian, Persian, and Chi-

* *Sepoy Rebellion in India*: by the Rev. W. Arthur.—*London Quarterly Review*, October, 1857.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 154.

nese wars, gave rise to rumours which were circulated among the sepoys, of the anxiety of government to get rid, at once and for ever, of the shackles which prevented the Indian troops from being sent across the Calapani, or Black water, to fight our battles in foreign climes.* A Hindoo would naturally cling to the system which was at once his reason and excuse for avoiding expatriation, which he fears worse than death; and his suspicions would easily be roused on the subject.

The readiest way of destroying caste, is by forcing or tempting the party concerned to taste anything prepared by unclean hands—that is, by persons of an inferior, or of no caste; or which contains the smallest particle of the flesh of kine. The Mohammedans abstain as rigidly from tasting the flesh of the impure hog, as the Hindoos from that of the sacred cow. The motive differs, but the result is the same. In both cases, the abstinence respectively practised is one of the first and most generally recognised of their rules. The Indian government could scarcely have been ignorant, when issuing a new description of fire-arms to the sepoys, that to bite a cartridge greased with cows' or pigs' fat, was more to Hindoos and Indo-Mohammedans, than "eating pork to a Jew, spitting on the Host to a Roman Catholic, or trampling on the Cross to a Protestant."† To the Hindoos it was indeed much more, so far as temporal welfare was concerned; for it involved practical outlawry, with some of the pains and penalties specially attached to conversion to Christianity. It is clear, that if it had been necessary to distribute greased cartridges, to be bitten by the troops, not only the greatest care ought to have been taken that no contaminating material should be used in the manufacture, but also that an explicit assurance should have been given to this effect. Yet, the inspector-general of ordnance has stated, that "no extraordinary care appears to have been taken to ensure the absence of any objectionable fat."‡ So that, so far from endeavouring to remove all suspicion from the minds of the sepoys, of any intention to inflict on them the calamity they most dreaded, we did not even guard against its perpetration.

The issue of the greased cartridges, under

such circumstances, was unquestionably a gross blunder, and is viewed by many as the exciting cause of the mutiny.

The *Free Press*, and the so-called *Gagging Act* of Lord Canning, have given rise to discussions which bring to mind Dr. Johnson's remark, that opinions formed on the efficacy of a certain branch of scholastic discipline, are apt to be materially influenced by the fact, "of which end of the rod falls to one's share." The evils alleged to have been produced by unrestricted publication, are too circumstantially stated by official authorities to be omitted in the present category; and it becomes necessary to show, if possible, the two sides of the question—that is, the case of those who wield, and those who wince under, the rod of censorship. It is now little more than twenty years since complete freedom of the press was bestowed by Sir Charles Metcalfe.§ The measure was sudden and startling: it was scarcely in accordance with his own previous views; and it was in decided opposition to the opinions which the Court of Directors had from time to time enunciated.

A recapitulation of the restrictive measures adopted in the three presidencies, from 1799 to 1819, is given in an important communication made by "the Chairs"|| to the president of the India Board, on the 17th of January, 1823. Among other evidence in support of the necessity for a rigid censorship, they quoted the following Minute, written in 1807, by Lord William Bentinck (then governor of Madras), regarding a charge delivered by one of the judges of the Supreme Court (Sir Henry Gwillim) to the grand jury:—

"It is necessary, in my opinion, for the public safety, that the press in India should be kept under the most rigid control. It matters not from what pen the dangerous matter may issue; the higher the authority the greater the mischief. We cannot prevent the judges of the Supreme Court from uttering, in open court, opinions, however mischievous; but it is in our power, and it is our duty, to prohibit them from being circulated through the country by means of the press. Entertaining strongly this sentiment, I would recommend that the order of government may be given to all proprietors of printing-presses, forbidding them, upon pain of the utmost displeasure of the governor in council, to print any paper whatever without the previous sanction of the governor in council, communicated by the chief secretary."¶

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 37. (Routledge and Co.: London, 1858.)

† *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 33.

‡ Parl. Papers (by command), 1857; p. 7.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 431.

|| The chairman and deputy-chairman of the E. I. Company (J. Pattison and W. Wigram.)

¶ Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858.

The opinion pronounced by Sir Thomas Munro, regarding the revolution which a free press would produce throughout the native army, is next quoted; and the writers proceed to express similar and very decided views on the subject:—

"A free press is a fit associate and necessary appendage of a representative constitution; but in no sense of the terms can the government of India be called a free, a representative, or a popular government; the people had no voice in its establishment, nor have they any control over its acts. * * * Can it be doubted that the respect of the natives for our authority would be greatly diminished, and the energy of the government impaired, by a free press? * * * It is impossible to suppose that a foreign government, however strong and beneficent its character, should not be obnoxious in some degree to those who live under it. It is humbling to the pride of the people; and where they differ, as in India, in religion, in language, in manners, in colour, and in customs from those who administer the government, there cannot be much sympathy or attachment between them. Though the situation of the large body of the people may now be greatly better, on the whole, than it was under their native governments, there are not a few, particularly among the Mohammedans, who have suffered from the change. These, we may be sure, will always be ready to avail themselves of any opportunity of retrieving their fortunes, and we know not that they could desire a more efficient auxiliary than a licentious press, labouring daily to extinguish all respect for our character and government in the minds of their countrymen. The tendency and effect of our system, too, has been to beget in the minds of the people at large a respect for themselves, and notions of their own importance, which makes the task of governing them a more difficult one than it was when they first came under our rule. But the delicacy of our situation in India cannot be well understood without special advertence to the circumstance of the government being dependent in a great degree for its security on a native army, which, though better paid, with reference to the wages of labour, than any other army in the world, contains in its organisation some elements of discontent. The exclusion of the natives from its higher ranks must necessarily be a source of heart-burning to men of family and ambition; and when a sense of mortification is united with a spirit of enterprise, their joint workings are not easily daunted or repressed. It may be difficult to retain the fidelity of men of this description, with all the care and caution that can be exercised; but it would appear to be either a lamentable infatuation, or unpardonable rashness, to allow them to be goaded on to revolt, by means over which we possess or may obtain control. Whatever English newspapers are published at the presidencies will naturally find their way to the principal military stations. Many of the native officers can read and understand English; and by means of the native servants of the European officers, it will not be difficult for them to obtain the perusal of those papers, containing a perhaps exaggerated representation of their grievances or an inflammatory incentive to rebellion, which, from their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments, they have better means of concerting than any other portion of the population."*

* Parl. Papers, 4th May, 1858; pp. 20—23.

The degree of severity with which the restrictions enacted to control the press were enforced, depended of course materially on the character of those by whom the supreme authority was wielded. Lord Amherst used his power as governor-general in such wise as entirely to stifle all public discussion; and Lord William Bentinck, his successor (in 1828), was so impressed by the mischievous effect of this policy, that though, as has been shown, very ready to repress, in the most summary fashion, any real or imagined excess on the part of journalists, he, nevertheless, deemed it necessary to issue a notice inviting suggestions from any quarter for the improvement of public measures, and the development of the resources of the country; and the result was the publication of letters from various quarters, written with much ability and freedom; among which, the first and most important were those afterwards embodied by the Hon. Frederick Shore, in his *Notes on Indian Affairs*.

Lord William Bentinck quitted India in 1835; Lord Auckland came out as his successor in the same year; and it was during the brief provisional sway of Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, that the important measure was adopted of giving complete freedom to the press. In explaining the difference between his own opinions and those of his predecessor, Sir Charles says—

"His lordship, however, sees further danger in the spread of knowledge and the operations of the press. I do not, for my own part, anticipate danger as a certain consequence from these causes. I see so much danger in the ignorance, fanaticism, and barbarism of our subjects, that I rest on the spread of knowledge some hope of greater strength and security. * * * The time is past when the operations of the press could be effectually restrained. Even if that course would be any source of safety (which must be very doubtful), nothing so precarious could in prudence be trusted to. If, therefore, increase of danger is really to be apprehended from increase of knowledge, it is what we must cheerfully submit to. We must not try to avert it; and, if we did, we should fail."†

Lord Elphinstone (the present governor of Bombay), in commenting on this passage, truly says, that Lord Metcalfe "considers the freedom of the press, and the diffusion of knowledge, as convertible terms;" and expresses his surprise that a statesman who entertained such alarming notions of the insecurity and unpopularity of our rule, should have been the man to abolish the

† *Selections from the Metcalfe Papers*, p. 197.

few remaining restrictions deemed indispensable by his predecessor.*

In 1841, Lord Auckland revoked an order passed in 1826, prohibiting public servants from being connected with newspapers as editors or proprietors. Next came Lord Ellenborough; who found his tranquillity so disturbed by the "abuse" of the press, that after three months' residence in India, he ceased "to read a word that appeared in the newspapers."† The commander-in-chief, Lord Gough, is alleged to have avowed with yet more stoical philosophy, that "for his part, he never read any paper but the *Tipperary Journal*." The governor-general deemed it the most judicious course to treat all attacks on his administration with silent contempt; and, in 1843, he issued an order of opposite tenor to that of Lord Auckland; which, by enforcing strict secrecy regarding all information officially obtained, neutralised the power which had been freely exercised under the express sanction of the three previous rulers.

"Lord Ellenborough's general order," says Indophilus, "and the disposition which was shown to place a strict interpretation upon it, effectually restrained the pens of the Company's servants; and no government could stand such pounding and kicking, and bedaubing and besmearing, as ensued." Statements, however false, put forth in ignorance or from malice prepense, were left to be copied into the native papers; and no denial, no antidote in any shape, was offered. For instance, a paragraph went the round of the newspapers, that it was intended to annex the Rajpoot states; and although great disquiet was thereby occasioned throughout Rajpootana, no contradiction was ever published.‡

The Afghan war, and the annexation of Sind, were subjects on which the authorities were perhaps wise in preferring to

submit to comments which they might treat as calumnious, rather than engage in controversy; but sometimes leading officials, more sensitive or less discreet than their superiors, broke all bounds, and declaimed against the press in terms of unmeasured invective. The brave, testy, inconsistent general, Sir Charles Napier, who came to India at sixty years of age with five pounds in his pocket, for the sake of providing for his family,§ and who did provide for them magnificently, by what he termed that "very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality," the seizure of Sind;||—this man (who was as ready with his pen as with his sword, and, in either case, fought ever without a shield) fairly flung himself into a hornet's-nest by his reckless and indiscriminate abuse of those "ruffians,"¶ whom he boasted of taking every public opportunity of calling "the infamous press of India."** One of them excited his special displeasure by taking part against him in the Outram controversy—Dr. Buist, of the *Bombay Times*, whom Sir Charles alternately threatened with a law-suit and a horse-whipping, and of whom he spoke at a public dinner as that "blatant beast;"†† a *mot* which he duly records, and which Sir William has not thought it derogatory to his brother's fame to publish.

With such personal feelings as these, it is not to be wondered that Sir Charles should regard the public statements of the journalists with jealous aversion, and should accuse them of desiring to excite mutiny among the troops; of inciting the hostile tribes to rise against them; of glorying in the sufferings of their countrymen; and many similar accusations in which the fiery old warrior gave vent to his irrepressible belligerence. His is not fair testimony concerning the operation of a free press; and it is necessary to turn to more impartial witnesses. Sir Charles Trevelyan

* Minute of 24th June, 1858. Parl. Papers (House of Commons), 4th May, 1858; pp. 52, 53.

† Debate, 27th Dec., 1857.—*Times* report.

‡ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 48.

§ *Life*, vol. iii., p. 194. || *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 218.

¶ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 305. Dr. Buist (editor of the *Bombay Times*, and sheriff of Bombay), in a pamphlet entitled, "Corrections of a Few of the Errors contained in Sir William Napier's Life of his Brother, in so far as they affect the Press of India," gives some valuable statements regarding the Indian newspapers; of which he says there were, in 1843, about thirty; costing close on £100,000 a-year for their maintenance—deriving their chief support, and nearly all their intelligence from officers of the

British army. The *Englishman* (Calcutta) was conducted by Captain McNaughton (Bengal Army) and Mr. (now Sir Ronald McDonald) Stevenson, projector and engineer of the great Bengal railway: *Hurkaru*—Mr. John Kaye, Bengal artillery, now of the India House (author of the *History of the Afghan War*): *Calcutta Star* and *Morning Star*—Mr. James Hume, barrister, now police magistrate of Calcutta: *Friend of India*—the well-known Mr. John Marshman: *Bombay Courier*, by Mr. W. Crawford, barrister, now senior magistrate of police: and *Bombay Gentleman's Gazette*, by Mr. P. J. McKenna.—(p. 15.)

** *Life*, by Sir William Napier, vol. iii., p. 124.

†† *Ibid.*, vol. iii., p. 294.

asserts, that it has been, "on the whole, highly beneficial:" and that—

"There cannot be a greater evil than that public officers should be exempted from the control of public opinion. In Lord William Bentinck's, Lord Metcalfe's, and Lord Auckland's time, the press was held in wholesome respect by the public functionaries at the most remote stations, and it acted as a sort of moral preventive police. * * * We used to call it the Parliament of the Press. It may safely be said, that there was not a single good public measure which was not powerfully aided by it. As regards the native press, some newspapers were conducted in a creditable manner in the English language, by and for the natives, who had received an English education; others were published in the native language by the missionaries: and it must not be supposed that the remainder, which were written by natives in the native languages, did nothing but preach sedition. Their standard, both of intelligence and morality, was, no doubt, below that of the English newspapers; but they opened the minds of the natives to an interest in general topics, and taught them to think, from which every thing else might be expected."*

Sanscrit literature proves that the Hindoos were a thoughtful people before the English set foot in India; but the spread of European and "non-religious" theories, has been certainly likely to teach them to reason in an entirely different fashion. We know that Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and Condorcet gave currency to ideas which took a very practical form in the French Revolution. These writers, with the English infidel, Tom Paine, have found imitators and admirers in India, and their doctrines are flung abroad like firebrands by the native press. A blind, unreasoning distrust of all governments—a fierce disaffection towards all constituted authorities—thirst for license under the name of freedom; such are the fruits of the tree of knowledge, apart and contra-distinguished from the tree of life. A saying, attributed to the Duke of Wellington, is often cited against the danger attendant on promoting education without religion—that of making men "clever devils." No better illustration of this need be adduced than the terrible scenes enacted by the Bengal sepoys, among whom native newspapers of the worst class have freely circulated. The utter indifference so long evinced by government, regarding the number, tone,

and character of the native journals, is almost incredible;† indeed, that complete freedom should have been accorded even to the European press, is strangely at variance with the general policy of the Company.

In 1857, the adult male European population scattered throughout India, not in the service, was estimated at only 4,000.‡ The journals must, therefore, to a great extent, have been maintained by officials. Some of them, especially the *Madras Athenæum*, uniformly deprecated annexation; and thus its supporters contributed with their purses, and sometimes with their pens, to oppose the very acts which, in their official capacity, they were bound to enforce.§ It was impossible that the natives should not take a lively interest in discussions which immediately affected them. Even a child, hearing its own name often repeated, would listen; and the natives have done so to some purpose.

Five years ago, one of the ablest and most disinterested advocates for the necessity of Indian reform, as the sole means of averting the blow which has since fallen, wrote:—

"The free press is doing its work in India: the Parsee merchants, the zemindars, the native heads of castes, are beginning to feel their power, to combine, and to ask for redress of grievances; some of them are violent, and these do not alarm me; but some are remarkably temperate; and I confess, that knowing the strength of their case, I fear the men who begin so temperately, and have reason on their side."||

Sir Charles Metcalfe, in establishing, and Lord Auckland in confirming, the freedom of the press, especially insisted that the boon thus granted might be withdrawn, in the event of its proving injurious in operation. "Should the safety of the state ever demand such a course, in a single hour a law may be passed to stop or to control every press in India: nothing has been lost of useful power."¶

In the middle of June, 1857, when the mutiny was at its height, the supreme government deemed it necessary to pass an act, which, for the space of the succeeding twelvemonth, was intended to replace the press in the position it occupied

* *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 45.

† On application to the East India House for some additional details to those given in the *Indian Empire* (vol. i., p. 523), the writer was informed that the directors had no information on the subject.

‡ Dr. Buist's *Corrections of Sir W. Napier*, p. 40.

§ The *Edinburgh Review* speaks of the Anglo-Indian press as exclusively representing "the opin-

ions of European settlers in the country, or half-castes not in the Company's service," whom it describes as a class bitterly hostile to government. (October, 1847.) Mr. Mead, on the contrary, affirms, that "six out of seven of the whole body of subscribers are in the Company's service."—*Sepoy Revolt*, p. 183.

|| Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, p. 20.

¶ Minute, by Lord Auckland, 8th August, 1836.

in 1835, before the removal of all restrictions by Sir Charles Metcalfe. The authorities were unanimous regarding the necessity of the measure, which involved the re-institution of the licensing system, together with a rigid censorship. The act was passed by the governor-general in council in a sitting; and Lords Harris and Elphinstone, the governors of Madras and Bombay, expressed their entire acquiescence. No distinction was made between the English and the native press, the government being desirous to avoid drawing invidious distinctions between European and native subjects. They add, moreover—

"We do not clearly see how any distinction of the sort could be really carried into effect, for there are now more than one newspaper in the English language written, owned and published by natives, almost exclusively for circulation amongst native readers; and although we have no reason to fear that treasonable matter would be designedly published in any English newspaper, we have to guard in these times against errors, indiscretion, and temper, as well as against international sedition. * * * To show that the necessity of controlling the English as well as the native press, is not merely imaginary, it will be enough to state, that the treasonable proclamation of the king and mutineers of Delhi—cunningly framed so as to influence the Mohammedan population as much as possible against the British government, and ending with the assurance, that the multiplication and circulation of that document would be an act equal in religious merit to drawing the sword against us, was published by a respectable English newspaper of this town without comment. For doing the very same thing, with comments having the outward form of loyalty, the publishers of three native Mohammedan papers in Calcutta, have been committed to the Supreme Court, to take their trial for a seditious libel."*

Lord Harris went further than this, and declared "the larger portion of the British press throughout the country," and particularly in the Madras presidency, to be "disloyal in tone, un-English in spirit, wanting in principle, and utterly regardless of correctness in statement."† He complained especially of the seditious matter circulated among the sepoys by a newspaper entitled the *Examiner*, "the mouth-piece of the Roman Catholic priests."‡ Lord Elphinstone considered the unrestricted liberty of the press incompatible with the continuance of British rule. "Systematic abuse of the government," he writes, "mis-

* Despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 4th July, 1857. Signed—Canning, Dorin, Low, Grant, and Peacock. Parl. Papers (Commons), 28th August, 1857; pp. 4, 5.

† Minute, by Lord Harris, dated "Fort St. George, 2nd May, 1857"—*Ibid.*, p. 11.

‡ Minute, 22nd June, 1857—*Ibid.*, p. 13.

representation of its acts, and all attempts to create ill-feeling between the different classes of the community, especially between the European officers and the native soldiery, must be prevented."§ The home authorities confirmed the act, declaring that they felt no doubt of its necessity.||

The first English paper threatened with the revoke of its licence, was the well-known *Friend of India*, which, in an article entitled "The Centenary of Plassy," censured the mammon-worship of the East India Company, and declared that "only the intense greediness of traders could have won for us the sovereignty of the country." Mohammedan princes and Hindoo rajahs were spoken of as a class that would speedily die out; and in conclusion, the writer held forth a hope that the second centenary of Plassy might be "celebrated in Bengal by a respected government and a Christian people."

The secretary to government (Mr. Beadon) officially informed the publisher, that the circulation of such remarks, in the existing state of affairs, was dangerous "not only to the government, but to the lives of all Europeans in the provinces not living under the close protection of British bayonets." This communication was published in the *Friend of India*, with satirical comments, which the authorities considered so offensive, that the licence would have been withdrawn but for the resignation of Mr. Mead, who was acting as provisional editor during the absence of the proprietor, Mr. Marshman.¶

The *Bengal Hurkaru* (Messenger) was warned for its exaggerated echo of the vengeance-cry of the London *Times*; a writer, styling himself "Militaire," denouncing the just and wise recommendation of government not needlessly to "embitter the feelings of the natives," and urging that, "for every Christian church destroyed, fifty mosques should be destroyed, beginning with the Jumma Musjid at Delhi; and for every Christian man, woman, and child murdered, a thousand rebels should bleed."***

Ten days later, another article appeared, which contained the following passage:—

§ Minute, 24th June, 1857. Parl. Papers (Commons), 4th May, 1858; p. 53.

|| Letter of Court of Directors, 26th August, 1857—*Ibid.*, p. 30.

¶ Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, pp. 42—46. Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, pp. 359—376.

*** *Bengal Hurkaru*, 5th September, 1857.

"There are many good, honest, simple people in Calcutta, who are both surprised and disappointed that popular indignation has not boiled up to a higher pitch. They are astounded at finding that Lord Canning has not been already ordered home in irons, and that Mr. Beadon has not been sentenced to be tarred and feathered, and ridden upon a rail, previously to being placed in some extremely uncovenanted situation under a native superior. We are very far from saying that these proceedings would not be appropriate in the cases in question; but we would say to our enthusiastic friends, 'My dear sirs, you are too impatient. All in good time.'"

The licence of the *Hurkaru* was revoked; but the editor (Mr. Blanchard) having resigned, a new licence was issued to the proprietor. Other English papers have been warned for transgressing the conditions of their licences; but the native editors generally do not appear to have incurred censure.

The existing difficulty seems to be, the course to be adopted with regard to the republication of articles from English papers. The following, for instance, is styled by Mr. Frere (commissioner of Sind), "a very mischievous perversion of an Indian debate, which, in quieter times, might be amusing." A summary of grievances could hardly be deemed amusing at any moment. At the present crisis, it is not only humiliating, but alarming, to find such statements circulating in Hindoostan on the authority of British parliamentary debates; for the so-called perversion is really a summary of the leading arguments advanced by members of both houses against the East India Company, more especially by the Marquis of Clanricarde, whose speech, it was predicted at the time, would occasion great excitement among the natives of India.

"The *Jam-i-Jamsibid* of Meerut relates, that in durbar of —, the Marquis of Clanricarde complained much of the Indian government; that a vast amount of rupees was expended among the home authorities in the way of pay, they knowing little of the circumstances of the country; that the nobles and great men of Hindoostan were becoming extinct; and the middle classes gradually suffering damage, and poor people being ruined. It would be proper that the country should be so governed, that the people do not suffer. Some zillahs require a decrease of taxation, and the salt-tax is very wrong. In whatever countries there was fitting management, the latter impost had been abolished. Beside

this, in Hindoostan, the system of justice was defective. Moreover, on this account, the English name suffered; and, in Hindoostan, amid ten judges, nine are Hindoostanees, but their pay and position was unimportant and inconsistent with their duties. And the heads of the E. I. Company say, that amid fourteen crore (million) of Hindoostanees, not one is worthy of rank or trust; a very sad and distressing statement, enough to break the hearts of the people of Hindoostan, and cow their spirits. Besides which, he said many more things; in answer to which, the Duke of Argyll was unable to advance any clear argument."

It would be difficult to know on what ground an editor could be warned for the republication of the above statements, unless it were on the strength of the now repudiated axiom, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel!"

In another case—that of a Persian newspaper, edited in Calcutta by one Hafiz Abdul Kadir—the insurrectionary views of the writer were undisguised. The licence was, of course, revoked; and the press and printing materials seized. It would have been madness to suffer such effusions as the following to go forth:—

"Now, when the drum of the power of the English is sounding so loudly, it is in every one's mouth that the state of Travancore also is to be annexed to the British dominions upon the ground of maladministration. It is also said that the principality of Ulwar will be *confiscated*† by government. But at present the progress of *confiscation* is *arrested* by the government of the Almighty Ruler.

"The government should first *arrest* the progress of the disturbances and disorders which are raging in all parts of the country, and then address itself to these confiscations again. I formed a design of going to Worms. But the "worms"§ unexpectedly eat off my head. He (God) is Almighty. He does what he will. He makes a world desert in a breath.

"Everybody knows, and now perhaps it has become quite clear to the *lords of annexation*, what kind of mischief the confiscation of Lucknow has done, causing ruin to thousands of their own friends.

• • • Come what may, in these degenerate days, the men of Delhi must be celebrated as sons of Rustum, and very Alexanders in strength. Oh! God destroy our enemies utterly, and assist and aid our sovereign (Sultan)."

With the above characteristic extract this section may fitly conclude, without any attempt to hazard conclusions on so difficult a subject as the degree of control necessary to be exercised for the maintenance of a despotic government, in a crisis so arduous and unprecedented as the present.

Persia, also signifies "worms." The conceit can thus be rendered into English. The whole tone of the article, in the original, is highly sarcastic.—*Goolshun Nowbahar*, 27th June, 1857. *Parl. Papers* (Commons), 4th May, 1858; pp. 46, 47.

* *Bengal Hurkaru*, 14th September, 1857.

† *Parl. Papers* (Commons), 4th May, 1858. p. 48.

‡ All the *italicised* words are exactly rendered from the Persian by their English synonyms.

§ Kirman, the name of a town and province in

*Currency.**—An ill-regulated and insufficient currency has long pressed heavily on the people, and has exercised a singular influence in the present crisis. Until recently there was only one public bank (that of Bengal) in all India: with much difficulty two others, also under the control of government, were established at Bombay and Madras; but the amount of notes issued by them is insufficient for the requirements of even these cities. Three or four joint-stock banks have been lately formed; but the government has continued, up to the present time, to rely on a bulky and indivisible coin, the silver rupee (worth about two shillings), for its standard circulating medium. The exclusive use, by the state, of metallic money, has occasioned the accumulation of treasure, amounting, sometimes, to fourteen millions sterling, in thirty or forty treasuries, scattered all over the country. Forty to fifty thousand sepoys have been annually employed in escorting money from one district to another, an employment properly belonging to a police force; which has occasioned much discontent, and tended to the relaxation of discipline, and general demoralisation of the soldiery. A paper currency would have answered every purpose of local taxation and payments to the troops: it would have been far more easily transmissible, and it would not have offered so tempting a bribe to native cupidity. In several instances, it is evident that the sepoys were stimulated to the commission of crime by the hope of plundering the local treasuries of much larger sums than were ever allowed to remain in them.

The *Times*† has recently published the following forcible remarks on the subject:—

"Regiments that held Company's paper were faithful until they had exchanged it for gold; regiments that had pay in arrear were faithful until the arrears were paid up. The Company's gold has never received credit for the part it played in the mutiny. Yet it had often been pressed upon the authorities at Calcutta, that a paper currency would be a boon to India. Those who wished for this, probably thought little of the danger of carrying bullion in bullock-trunks or palkies through the jungle, or storing it in exposed places; their object was, in all probability, the extension of commerce and the development of the resources of the country. The policy of the Company was, is, and ever must

be, to discourage all independent enterprise within their territories, and they were consistent in refusing to listen to any such suggestions. Now, however, when we are commencing a new era—if, indeed, we are commencing, or are about to commence a new era—this subject must be reconsidered. There can be no good reason why India should not in monetary facilities be placed upon a level with England. There is excellent reason why the troops should be paid in paper money. The absence of the gold is the absence of a powerful temptation, and the bank-note is a guardian of the fidelity of the man in whose pocket it lies."

The *Opium Monopoly*, with its concomitant grievances—the forced cultivation of the poppy, and the domiciliary right of search—ranks among the causes of popular disaffection. The Company obtain opium from the ryots at a very low price, by a system of advances, and sell it for the contraband China trade, at a very high one.‡ An official authority declares, that the peasants in the opium districts of Patna and Benares, are compelled to give up fixed portions of their lands for the production of the poppy. The forced cultivation of this poisonous drug brings on the wretched cultivators the persecuting surveillance of the police; the probability that they may be retaining some portion for private sale, exposing them to every sort of ingenuity which spies, authorised and unauthorised, can imagine, as the means of inflicting fines and extorting bribes.§ The deteriorating influence on the consumer cannot be doubted. In China we have notoriously returned evil for good; exporting ship-loads of their refreshing herb to combat our own spirit-craving propensities; and importing, in defiance of the laws of God and man, millions of pounds' worth of a stimulant which we know to be, when once resorted to, almost invariably persevered in, to the destruction of the body, and, it would seem, of the soul even, of its miserable victim. In India we found the debasing indulgence general among certain classes. Baber and his successors, with the exception of Aurungzebe, were all its habitual consumers; and the able historian of Rajast'han, Colonel Tod, attributes the loss of independence by the Rajpoots, their general deterioration, and the diminished productiveness of the country, chiefly to the same suicidal practice.

bay, £2,362,510.—(Parliamentary Papers, April 20th, 1858.)

† June, 1858.

‡ J. Passmore Edwards' *Evils of the Opium Trade*, p. 18.

§ See *Iniquities of the Opium Trade*; by Rev. A. A. Thelwell.

* The cash balances in the different Indian treasuries, varied from twelve to fourteen millions sterling. In 1856, the amount was £12,043,334: of this sum, there was in Bengal, £5,117,553; in the N. W. Provinces, £2,251,904 = £7,369,457. The Madras presidency had £2,311,365; and the Bom-

But though the East India Company did not originate the use or cultivation of opium in all their vast dominions, they have done so in some. It is argued, that the very taxation is itself a discouragement to the cultivation; and this would be the case in a free country; but is not true in India, where there are so many means of compelling the peasant to toil like a serf at any labour for a bare subsistence. That the Company have been voluntarily instrumental in increasing the production, stands on the face of their own records.

On the cession of Malwa by the Mahrattas, measures were taken to raise from that province a revenue similar to that obtained in the Bengal presidency. A powerful impulse was given to the growth of the poppy; but the cost of cultivation was found so far to exceed that of Bahar or Benares, and the transport was likewise so much more difficult, that the excessive production obtained in Central India, scarcely afforded sufficient nett profit to atone for the injury done to the Bengal monopoly. The utmost efforts were made to remedy this, and to prevent diminished cultivation in the old provinces. "Premiums and rewards," says a late chairman of the East India Company, "have been held out; new offices and establishments have been created; the revenue officers have been enlisted in the service; and the influence of that department has been brought into action to promote the production. * * * The supreme government of India, too, have condescended to supply the retail shops with opium, and have thus added a new feature to our fiscal policy. I believe that no one act of our government has appeared, in the eyes of respectable natives, both Mohammedan and Hindoo, more questionable than the establishment of the Abkarry, or tax on the sale of spirituous liquors and drugs. Nothing, I suspect, has tended so much to lower us in their regard. They see us derive a revenue from what they deem an impure source; and when they find the pollution of public-houses spreading around them, they cannot understand that our real object is to check the use of the noxious article which is sold, or to regulate those haunts of the vicious with a view to objects of police. And have we succeeded in pro-

moting these objects? Will any man be so hardy as to maintain, that the use of spirituous liquors and drugs has been diminished by the operation of the tax, or that it has not been everywhere extended? * * * But even if we admit that these objects have been kept in view, or that it is becoming, in the present state of the country, to regulate the vend of spirits and drugs, was it becoming in a great government to exhibit itself as the purveyor of opium to publicans, or—in the words of the Regulation—"to establish shops, on the part of government, for the retail sale of the drug?" Is it desirable that we should bring it to the very door of the lower orders, who might never otherwise have found the article within their reach, and who are now tempted to adopt a habit alike injurious to health and to good morals?"*

Not content with stimulating to the utmost the production of opium in our own territories, we voluntarily extended the curse in the Mahratta districts of Central India, in the Afghan state of Bhopal, in Oodipoor, Kotah, Boondi, and other Rajpoot principalities, by negotiations and treaties, "such as are not, I believe (says Mr. Tucker), to be paralleled in the whole history of diplomacy;" whereby we have bound ourselves to the payment of large annual sums on account of opium. "We make it the interest of the chiefs to increase the growth of the poppy, to the exclusion, in some instances, of sugar-cane, cotton, and other products which constitute the riches of a country, and which ought to minister to the comforts of the people."

These statements are very important, coming from one whose official position, Indian experience, and personal character, give his opinions threefold weight. He adds a brief warning, which, read by the blaze of the incendiary fires of 1857, is pregnant with meaning. "The Rajpoot, with all his heroic bravery and other good qualities, requires very skilful management. The same may be said of the Afghan of Rohilcund, who is still more restless and impatient of control; and if there were not other and better reasons, I should say that it is not safe, with either race—Rajpoot or Afghan—to supply the means of habitual excitement, which must render them more turbulent and ungovernable."†

Sir Stamford Raffles, another acknowledged authority, indignantly denounced the conduct of the European government in

* *Memorials of Indian Government*; a selection from the papers of H. St. George Tucker; edited by Mr. Kaye: pp. 152—134.

† *Ibid.*, p. 156.

overlooking every consideration of policy and humanity, and allowing a paltry addition to their finances to outweigh all regard to the ultimate prosperity of the country. Unfortunately, the financial addition* is paltry only when viewed in connection with the amount of evil which it represents, and which has increased in proportion to the extended cultivation. An experienced authority† states, that wherever opium is grown it is eaten; and considers that "one-half of the crimes in the opium districts, murders, rapes, and affrays, have their origin in opium-eating." Major-general Alexander uses the most forcible language regarding the progressive and destructive course of intoxication by opium and ardent spirits throughout India, appealing to the returns of courts-martial and defaulters' books for testimony of the consequent deterioration of the sepoys; and to the returns of the courts and offices of judges, magistrates, and collectors, for that of the mass of the natives. Under this view of the case, and remembering also the example set by the notorious tendency to drunkenness which disgraces the British troops, there is something terribly significant in the fact, that the fiercest onslaughts and worst brutalities which our countrymen and countrywomen have endured, were committed under the influence of the hateful drugs by which we have gained so much gold, and inflicted so much misery.

The *Neglect of Public Works* must take its place among the indirect causes of revolt; for it has materially impeded the development of the resources of the country, and furnished the people with only too palpable reason for discontent. It was a subject which ought always to have had the special attention of the Anglo-Indian authorities. They should have remembered, that the people over whom they ruled were literally as children in their hands; and should have taken care to exercise a far-seeing, providential, and paternal despotism. Under Mohammedan and Hindoo governments, the princes and nobles have ever delighted in associating their names with some stately edifice, some great road or canal, some public work of more or less

utility. It was a fashion which those who made for themselves a fortune and a name, especially delighted in following; and the fact is so well known that it needs no illustration. Every book of travel affords fresh instances. Foreign adventurers have adopted the same beneficent custom: witness the Martinière college at Lucknow. Very few Englishmen, however, have thought of spending on, or in India, any considerable portion of the wealth they made there; the noble Sir Henry Lawrence and others, whose names are easily reckoned, forming the exceptions.

It would occupy too much space to offer anything like an enumeration of our shortcomings in this respect: able pens have already performed the ungracious task; and it needs but a few hours' attentive study of the admirably condensed exposition given by Lieutenant-colonel Cotton (chief engineer of Madras), and of the pamphlets published by Mr. Dickinson and other members of the Indian Reform Society, to be convinced how unjust and impolitic have been our omissions in this important branch of government.

Sir Charles Napier says, that "in India, economy means, laying out as little for the country and for noble and useful purposes as you can; and giving as large salaries as you can possibly squeeze out of the public to individuals, adding large 'establishments.'"[‡] The force of this remark is painfully apparent, when the immense number of "collectors," and the extent and enormous expense of the revenue establishment, are compared with the number of engineers, and the cost of the department for public works. The contrast between what is taken from, and what is spent upon India, becomes still more glaring when the items of expenditure are examined, and a division made between the works undertaken on behalf of the government—such as court-houses, gaols, &c.—and those immediately intended for the benefit of the people, such as roads, canals, and tanks.

The injustice of this procedure is surpassed by its impolicy. Colonel Cotton says—

"Certainly, without any exaggeration, the most astonishing thing in the history of our rule in India is, that such innumerable volumes should have been written by thousands of the ablest men in the service on the mode of collecting the land revenue, while the question, of a thousand times more importance, how to enable the people to pay it, was literally never touched upon; and yet, even the

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 582.

† Mr. Andrew Sym, who had charge of the Company's opium agency at Goruckpoor. See pamphlets on the *Opium Trade*: by Major-general Alexander and Mr. W. S. Fry.

‡ *Life*, vol. ii., p. 428.

question of the amount of taxation was utterly insignificant in comparison with that. While we have been labouring for a hundred years to discover how to get twenty lacs out of a district which is not able to pay it, not the least thought has been bestowed on the hundreds of lacs it was losing from the enormous cost of transit, which swallowed up all the value of the ryot produce, if they raised it. * * * If we take the whole loss to India, from want of communication, at only twenty-five million sterling, it is twelve times as great a burthen as the interest of the [Indian] debt. * * * Public works have been almost entirely neglected in India. The motto hitherto has been—'do nothing, have nothing done, let nobody do anything.' Bear any loss, let the people die of famine, let hundreds of lacs be lost in revenue for want of water, rather than *do* anything. * * * Who would believe, that without half-a-dozen miles of real turnpike-road, with communications generally in the state that they were in England two centuries ago—with periodical famines and a stagnant revenue—the stereotyped answer to any one who urges improvement is, 'He is too much in a hurry—he is too sanguine—we must go on by degrees;' and this, too, in the face of the fact that, almost without exception, money laid out upon public works in India, has yielded money returns of one hundred, two hundred, and three hundred per cent., besides innumerable other advantages to the community. * * * We have already all but lost one century, to the great damage of our finances and the greater injury of the people."[†]

It is terrible to think of the amount of suffering occasioned by the ignorant apathy of the nation to whom it has pleased Providence to entrust the government of India. "The neglect of public works" is a vague, unmeaning sound in British ears: no nation blessed with free institutions can appreciate its full intent; and no people under the despotism of a single tyrant, but would rise, and cut off the Pharaoh who demanded the tale of bricks, yet withheld the straw. Nothing but the complicated system of our absentee sovereignty, can account for such strange persistence in errors which have repeatedly brought the Company to the verge of bankruptcy, and inflicted on the mass of the people chronic poverty and periodical famine.

In England, we are occasionally horror-struck by some case of death from actual destitution; and we know, alas! that large portions of our working population, with difficulty obtain the necessaries of life; but we are also aware that public and individual benevolence is incessantly at work to diminish the sufferings inseparable, at least to some extent, from an over-populated

and money-worshipping country. When Ireland was scourged with famine, the whole British empire, even to its farthest colony, poured forth, unsolicited, its contributions in money or in food with eager haste. Is, then, human sympathy dependent on race or colour? No; or the West Indies would still be peopled with slaves and slave-drivers. The same springs of action which, once set in motion, worked incessantly for the accomplishment of negro emancipation, would, if now touched on behalf of the Hindoos, act as a lever to raise them from the deep wretchedness in which they are sunk. The manufacturers of Manchester and of Glasgow are surely blind to their own interests, or long ere this they would have taken up the subject of roads, canals, and tanks for India, if only to encourage the growth of cotton in the country in which it is an indigenous product, and to diminish their dangerous dependence on America. Had they done so, they would have had their reward. But the active and enterprising philanthropical class, which includes many "successful merchants" in its ranks, perhaps requires to be told, that the subject of public works for India is at once a great call for national justice and individual charity; that there is no conceivable means of fulfilling on so large a scale the unquestionable duty of giving bread to the hungry, as by initiating measures to rescue hundreds of thousands of British subjects from probable starvation.

The frightful massacres of Meerut and Cawnpore have not banished from our minds the recollection of that terrible "Black Hole," where 123 persons perished, some from suffocation, and others in the maddening agonies of thirst; and this not from any purpose of fiend-like cruelty, but simply because the young Nawab, Surajah Dowlah, did not know the size of the prison-chamber of the English garrison in which he had directed his prisoners to be secured; and none of his officers cared to disturb his sleep, to procure a change of orders. When he awoke the door was opened, and the few weak, worn survivors, on whose frames some hours of agony had done the work of years, tottered forth, or were dragged out from amid the already putrefying corpses of their companions.[†]

Surajah Dowlah paid, with his throne and life, the forfeit of his apathetic ignorance; and his people were happily delivered from that crowning curse—despotic inca-

* *Public Works in India*; by Lieutenant-colonel Cotton, 1854; p. 8. † *Ibid.*, pp. 294, 295.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 273.

pacify. His fate ought to have served as a warning of the effects of mere neglect. Has it done so; or has the evil been multiplied a thousand-fold under a Christian government? Can it, or can it not, be proved by public records, that, for every single Englishman who perished while the Indian nawab lay sleeping, many thousand natives have fallen victims to an apathy no less criminal, manifested by the representatives of the E. I. Company? This is the meaning, or at least a part of the meaning, of the "neglect of public works in India;" and the only excuse offered for it is the poverty of the government. It is asserted, that the drain consequent on perpetual wars, which directly enriched and often indirectly ennobled the individuals concerned, occasioned so wide a destruction of native property, created such an unceasing drain on the state revenues, and so increased and complicated the labours of the collectors, that the one-engrossing anxiety of the authorities, how to meet current expenses, unavoidably superseded every other consideration.

The peculiar system of the Company has likewise contributed to induce a selfish and short-sighted policy. The brief period of administration allotted to each governor-general, whatever its advantages, has had the great drawback of rarely sufficing for the initiation, organisation, and carrying through of any large measure of general benefit; and it is, of course, seldom that a new-comer, fresh from England, has the ability or the generosity to appreciate and cordially work out the plan of his predecessor. The consequence has been a lamentable want of any consistent policy for the development of the resources of India. Lord Dalhousie, it is true, exerted himself zealously and successfully in the furtherance of certain great undertakings, in connection with which his name may well be gratefully remembered. The Ganges canal, the Bengal railway, the electric telegraph, are works of undoubted utility; and the good service they have rendered to the supreme government in its hour of need, must be calculated in lives rather than in money. But a few great and costly achievements cannot excuse the general neglect manifested by the non-appropriation of a certain portion of the revenue of every district to meet its own peculiar and urgent requirements. From the absence of any adequate provision, the vast reservoirs, sometimes many miles square, constructed by native princes

centuries ago, have been allowed, to a considerable extent, to go to decay, and are now sources of disease instead of fertility, being covered with rank weeds.*

The East India Company have added the tax levied by their Mohammedan or Hindoo predecessors for annual repairs, to their general assessments, but have suffered many of the tanks to go to ruin; while, according to a recent writer (1858), "in many cases they still exact the same money-revenue from the cultivators, amounting, at the present day, to fifty, sixty, and seventy per cent. of the gross produce of the soil, as if the tanks were kept in perfect repair, and the cultivators received the quantity of water required to grow a full crop of produce."†

Water, water! is the primary want of the Indian farmer; yet, according to Colonel Cotton, it is undoubted that, in the worst year that ever occurred, enough has been allowed to flow into the sea to have irrigated ten times as much grain as would have supplied the whole population.‡ The case is put in the clearest light in an extract from a private letter, hastily written, and not meant for publication, addressed by "one of the most distinguished men in India," to Mr. Dickinson, and published by him, under the idea that it was better calculated than any laboured statement, to carry conviction to an unprejudiced mind. The writer, after declaring that the perpetual involvements of the Company had originated in their having omitted not only to initiate improvements, but even to keep in repair the old works upon which the revenue depended; adds—"But this is not the strongest point of the case. *They did not take the least pains to prevent famine.* To say nothing of the death of a quarter of a million of people in Guntoor, the public works' committee, in their report, calculate that the loss in money by the Guntoor famine, was more than two millions sterling. If they could find money to supply these losses, they could have found a hundredth part of the sum to prevent them.

"Lord — thinks it would be better not to blame the government; how can we possibly point out how improvement can be made without proving that there has been neglect before? * * * Lord — won-

* Macleod Wylie's *Bengal a Field of Missions*, p. 241.

† *Lectures on British India*; by John Malcolm Ludlow; vol. ii., p. 317.

‡ Quoted in the Madras Petition of 1852.

ders at my vehemence about public works: is he really so humble a man as to think no better of himself, than to suppose he could stand unmoved in a district where 250,000 people had perished miserably of famine through the neglect of our government, and see it exposed every year to a similar occurrence? If his lordship had been living in the midst of the district at the time, like one of our civilians, and had had every morning to clear the neighbourhood of his house of hundreds of dead bodies of poor creatures who had struggled to get near the European, in hopes that there perhaps they might find food, he would have realised things beyond what he has seen in his —shire park.*

What excuse, even of ignorance, can be offered for a government that turns a deaf ear to statements so appalling as these, made by their own servants? Such impenetrable apathy affords a confirmation of the often-repeated assertion, that nothing but the continual pressure of public opinion in England, will ensure anything being effected in India. Would that this power might be at once exerted! Even now, in the midst of battles, we ought to be doing something to avert the consequences of past neglect, or the scourge of war will be followed by the yet more fatal visitations of famine, and its twin-sister, pestilence.

We may not be able to do much, or anything, in some of the most disturbed districts; but in the great majority, where comparative quiet prevails, a vigorous effort ought at once to be made for the introduction of a better system; that is, one designed to benefit the mass of the people, instead of being exclusively framed to suit the convenience of the European officials. Had this been earlier attempted, we might have had fewer great works to talk about in parliament or at the India House (though that is hardly possible, considering that we are Anglo-Saxons of the nineteenth century): but certainly India would not now be so generally destitute of the means of cheap carriage; neither would it be necessary to urge "the clearing-out of this poisonous old tank; the repairing of that embankment; the metalling of this mud-track through the jungle; the piercing, by a cheap canal of irrigation, of that tongue of land, of a few miles, between two rivers;"†

* Dickinson's *India under a Bureaucracy*, pp. 87—90.

† Ludlow's *Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 320.

the preservation of bridges; and such-like cheap, homely, obscure labours, as are now urgently needed throughout the length and breadth of the peninsula.

Cheap transit by land and water is a point only secondary in importance to irrigation, as a means of preventing famine, by enabling one part of the country to help another in the event of the failure of local rains. Major-general Tremeneere, in his recent evidence before parliament (May, 1858), when adverting to the brief intervals which have elapsed between the years of scarcity in the present century, forcibly states the necessity for affording the greatest facilities for the transport of produce, as the true remedy for these oft-recurring famines.‡ The evidence of subsequent witnesses before the same committee, shows that, in a country where easy transit is essential to the preservation of life during periodical visitations of dearth, there exists the most remarkable deficiency of means of intercommunication ever heard of under a civilised government.

"There are no roads to connect even Calcutta with any of the great cities of the interior. No road to Moorshedabad; no road to Dacca; none to Patna; no such roads as parish roads in England, to connect villages and market-towns in the interior. Consequently, in the rainy season, every town is isolated from its neighbours, and from all the rest of the country. Besides roads, bridges are wanted: there are hardly any bridges at all in the country; their place is partially supplied by ferries. The grand trunk-road, within the Lower Provinces, is only partially bridged; and half the bridges, I believe, have been washed away from defects of construction."§

In Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, the maintenance of good roads is a duty to which the government are alleged to be specially pledged; for, in making the decennial settlement (on which the permanent one was subsequently grounded), a separate tax for the purpose was inserted in the rent-roll, but was afterwards merged in the general assessment, and not applied to the roads. The native land-owners have remembered this breach of faith; and when urged, some years ago, to make fresh provision for the maintenance of highways, they objected, on the ground of the misappropriation of their actual yearly payments. Happily for them, their interests are closely allied with those of the British settlers. Both classes are equally without the pale of privilege and patronage, dignities and immunities,

‡ First Report of the Select Committee on the Colonization and Settlement of India, p. 6.

§ *Ibid.* Evidence of W. Theobald, Esq., p. 74.

with which the East India Company has fenced round its covenanted service; but the storm which has disturbed the immigrant planters in their peaceable avocations, has contributed to procure for them the opportunity of laying before a parliamentary committee, and consequently before the nation at large, the obstructions which impede all attempts to earn an honourable livelihood by developing the resources of India.

Several witnesses declare the want of internal communication to be peculiar to the administration of the East India Company, who have attempted nothing except for military or governmental purposes, and even then very imperfectly; while, under Hindoo and Mohammedan dynasties, the peninsula was intersected with roads, the remains of which are still traceable.* The planters, to some extent, make roads in their immediate vicinity, suitable to their own necessities; but these do not answer for purposes of general traffic, which requires continuous lines. The native land-owners understand road-making, but want the means, not the will, to carry it on extensively. Mr. Dalrymple, an indigo and sugar planter, and silk manufacturer, resident in India upwards of thirty years, adduces, as an instance of the feeling of the natives on this subject, that he has known one of them make a road for a hundred miles from a religious motive.†

For the neglect of many duties, and especially of this one, we are paying a severe penalty; and the hardships so long suffered by the natives, in having to carry their articles of produce or merchandise on their heads, along paths impassable for beasts of burden, now fall with tenfold weight on our heavily-laden soldiery. Individual suffering, great as that has been (including the long list of victims to "solar apoplexy," on marches which, by even good common roads or by canals, would have been short and comparatively innocuous), forms but the inevitable counterpart of the public distress, occasioned by the present insurmountable impediments to the rapid concentration of military force on a given point. Facilities for the movement of troops are important in every seat of war; but particularly so in India, where the

extent of country to be maintained exceeds beyond all proportion the number of European troops which can at any sacrifice be spared to garrison it.

The upholders of "a purely military despotism" have not been wise even in their generation, or they would have promoted, instead of opposing, the construction of railways between the chief cities, as a measure of absolute necessity. If only the few already projected had been completed, Delhi could hardly have fallen as it did—a rich, defenceless prize—into the hands of the mutineers, nor afforded them the means of establishing a rallying-point for the disaffected, and doing incalculable damage to European *prestige*, by setting an example of temporarily successful defiance. As it was, the contrast was most painful between the lightning-flash that brought the cry for help from stations surrounded by a seething mass of revolt, and the slow, tedious process by which alone the means of rescue could be afforded. Thus, the appeal of Sir Henry Lawrence for reinforcements for Cawnpore, received the gloomy response, that it was "impossible to place a wing of Europeans there in less time than twenty-five days." The bullock-train could take a hundred men a-day, at the rate of thirty miles a-day:‡ this was all that could be done; and, with every effort, at an enormous cost of life and treasure, the troops arrived only to be maddened by the horrible evidences of the massacre they were too late to avert.

"Indophilus" views the railroad system as the basis of our military power in India; and considers it "so certain that railways are better than regiments, that it would be for the interest of England, even in a strictly economical point of view, to diminish the drain upon her working population, by lending her credit to raise money for the completion of Indian railways."§ The urgency of the requirement has become so evident as a measure of expediency, for the maintenance of our sovereignty, that it scarcely needs advocating: on the contrary, it seems necessary to deprecate the too exclusive appropriation of Indian revenue to railroads (especially costly ones, in which speed is apt to be made a primary requisite),|| to the neglect of the far cheaper means of transit which might be opened by single

* Second Report—Evidence of Mr. J. T. Mackenzie, p. 88.

† Second Report, p. 67.

‡ Telegram of the governor-general to Sir Henry

Lawrence, May 24th, 1857.—Parl. Papers on the Mutiny; Appendix, p. 315.

§ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 12.

|| See Colonel Cotton's *Public Works*, p. 184.

rail, by tram-roads, by the formation of canals for steam navigation, and by the opening and improving of rivers. Measures of this kind must be taken, if we would enable the people to bear the expenses attendant on our system of government.* Labour thus wisely employed and directed, would produce capital; the now insuperable difficulty of raising a sufficient revenue without oppressing the masses, would be removed; and their rulers, relieved from pecuniary pressure, might dare to be just by renouncing opium smuggling, and to be humane by abandoning the less criminal but still obnoxious salt† monopoly, which, as at present conducted, acts as an irregular poll-tax—falling heaviest on those who have farthest to fetch it from the government depôts.

The *Repression of British Enterprise* is closely connected with the neglect of public works; for had European planters been allowed to settle in any considerable numbers, and to give free expression to their opinions, they would certainly have agitated the subject in a manner which no government could have wholly withstood.

The Company, from their earliest days, strove with unremitting care to guard their chartered privileges against the encroachments of their countrymen, and adopted a tone of lofty superiority which was scarcely consistent with their own position as "merchant adventurers." Had there not been in America, the West Indies, and other colonies and dependencies of the British crown, abundant outlet for capital and enterprise, the Indian monopoly would probably have been soon broken through: as it was, the "interlopers" were comparatively few, and easily put down, if they proved in the least refractory, by the strong

measure of deportation. Gradually the exclusive system was greatly modified by the effects of the parliamentary discussions which accompanied each renewal of the Company's charter, together with the disclosures of mismanagement involved in the perpetually recurring pecuniary embarrassments, from which they sought relief in the creation and augmentation of an Indian national debt. In 1813 their trade with India ceased entirely: it had long been carried on at an actual loss; the traffic with China, and the Indian territorial revenues, supplying the deficit. Yet, notwithstanding the opening up of the Indian trade to all British subjects (followed by a similar procedure with that of China in 1833), the Company were slow in abating their jealous hostility towards "adventurers," and did their utmost to prevent European enterprise from gaining a footing in India. They do not seem to have recognised the change of policy incumbent on them when, ceasing to be traders, they became sovereigns of a vast empire, and were thereby bound to renounce class interests and prejudices, and merge all meaner considerations in the paramount obligation of promoting the general good.

Of course, colonization, in the ordinary sense of the term, is neither practicable nor desirable in a country already well and generally densely peopled, and where land is the most dearly prized of all possessions. Even in certain favoured localities, where outdoor employment can be best undertaken by Europeans, there is no product which they could cultivate on the spot, in which they would not be undersold by the natives. Indeed, it would be manifestly absurd to attempt to compete, as labourers, with men who can support themselves on wages ranging from 1½d. to 4½d. a-day.‡ It is as the pio-

* The salaries of Englishmen in India are all on a very high scale. The average annual salary received by civilians is estimated at £1,750.—(See article on "British India"—*Quarterly Review*, August, 1858; p. 237.) A Queen's officer, directly he embarks for India, has double pay. The fees of the lawyers and solicitors at Calcutta, are more than double what they are in English courts. No tradesman in Calcutta would be satisfied with the English rate of profit; and, in fact, all European labour is much more highly remunerated in India than elsewhere.—(First Report of Colonization Committee. Evidence of Major-general Tremenhare; p. 36.) It was found necessary to raise the scale of salaries of English functionaries, as a means of preserving them from corruption; and, to a great extent, the measure has succeeded. Even-handed justice re-

quires, that the same experiment should be tried with the natives of the country from which the funds are levied, and it will then be seen whether improved efficiency and integrity may not equally be the result. "A native judge, who has any prospect of promotion, hardly ever is known to be corrupt."—Raikes.

† The difference in the price of salt, between Calcutta and Benares, amounts to 100 per cent. Rice, which sells at a seaport at 2s. a bushel, is quoted at an average of 5s. 1d. per bushel in the Punjab, the Trans-Indus, and the Cis-Sutlej territories; the distance of these states from a seaport being from 800 to 1,200 miles.—Third Report of Colonization Committee, dated July 12th, 1858. Evidence of W. Balston, Esq.; p. 65.

‡ Evidence of R. Baikie, Esq.—First Report of Colonization Committee, 6th May, 1858; p. 52.

neers of skill and capital that Europeans must look to find remuneration and useful employment in India. In that sense the field is wide enough, and the need great indeed; for the native products and manufactures have, in many instances, actually diminished in extent and in value under the sway of the East India Company. Every child knows that calico takes its name from Calicut, whence it was first brought to England; yet domestic manufacture has been overwhelmed by the cheap, coarse fabrics of the Manchester steam-power looms; nor has the encouragement been given which might have opened for them a lucrative market in luxurious England for their own more delicate and durable productions. The Dacca muslin—the famous “woven wind,” which, when wet, lay on the grass like the night-dew—this, also, has become almost a thing of the past. Yet, if only a market were assured, the cotton could be grown as before, and the same exquisite manipulation would be as cheaply obtainable.

Much important information regarding the present state of affairs, has been laid before the select committee lately appointed to inquire into questions affecting the settlement of India. Well-informed persons declare, that labour is cheap and abundant almost everywhere throughout India;* that the natives are very tractable; and yet, despite their readiness to learn, and long intercourse with Europeans, the knowledge of agriculture is in about the same position as at the time of Alexander's invasion.† This is in itself a discreditable fact, considering the effects produced by the application of science to agriculture in Europe: and the apathy manifested in India is especially blamable and impolitic, on the part of a government which has virtually usurped the position of landlord over a large portion of the country, more than one-half of the revenues of which, that is to say, £15,500,000 out of £28,000,000, is derived by rents from the land; while four-fifths of the annual exports, namely, £17,500,000 out of £21,500,000, are the direct produce of the soil.‡

* Second Report of Select Committee on Colonization and Settlement of India, 10th June, 1858.—Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise; p. 40.

† First Report, 6th May, 1858.—Evidence of Major-general Tremenneere; p. 29.

‡ Second Report.—Evidence of Major-general Tremenneere; pp. 28, 29.

§ *Ibid.*—Evidence of Mr. J. T. Mackenzie; p. 83.

|| Evidence of Captain J. Ouchterlony.—Third Re-

While the system pursued has not improved under the rule of the Company, the cultivators themselves have absolutely deteriorated; the better class of farmers are alleged to have become generally impoverished, and to live in less comfort than they used to do under the Hindoo and Mohammedan dynasties; while very many of the ryots are hopelessly in debt.§ Impaired fertility is the natural consequence of overcropping, and the native tenant has no means of counteracting this; his poverty being so great, that he cannot afford to keep up a farming establishment of sufficient strength, especially as regards cattle, to admit of the due production of manure, or of those requirements which are considered indispensable, in England, to the cultivation of the commonest arable land.|| The native agriculturist, if he borrow from a native banker and capitalist, pays, it is alleged, from fifty to seventy-five per cent. interest.¶ Usury thrives by sucking the life-blood, already scanty, of tillage and manufacture, and rivets the fetters of that system of advances which is truly described as the curse of India.**

The existence of the prevailing wretchedness above indicated, goes far to prove that the Company, in opposing the settlement of their fellow-countrymen, have not been actuated by a disinterested solicitude for the welfare of the natives. In fact, the fear of an influx of Europeans was almost a monomania with the Court of Directors; and every measure which could in any manner, however indirectly, facilitate the anticipated irruption, met with opposition avowedly on that account. Thus, the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company, when advocating the enforcement of rigid restrictions on the press in 1823, adverted especially to the possibility of its “affording amusement or occupation to a class of adventurers proceeding clandestinely to India, to encourage whom would be a departure from the policy hitherto observed.”††

Lord William Bentinck granted to Englishmen the privilege of holding lands in the interior of India, contrary to the in-

port, 12th July, 1858; p. 4. Another witness says, the charge for money advances is from fifty to a hundred per cent.; “but when the lenders advance in grain, they generally charge from one to two hundred per cent., because they have to be repaid in kind.”—Mr. Mackenzie. Second Report, p. 83.

¶ Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise.—*Ibid.*, p. 41.

** Evidence of Mr. Fowler.—Third Report, p. 54.

†† Parl. Papers, 4th May, 1858; p. 19.

structions of the Company; and his reasons for so doing are recorded in the minutes in council, of the years 1829 and 1830. At this period the question of settlement in India excited a good deal of interest in England; and a clause was inserted in the East India Charter Act of 1833, giving permission to all British subjects by birth, to purchase land and reside in India; and an enactment, in conformity with this clause, was passed by the local legislature in 1837.

Sir Charles Metcalfe was one of the leading advocates for a change of policy, as indispensable to the continuance of the Anglo-Indian empire; but he held that this change could never be effected until the government of the Crown should be formally substituted for that of the Company. The opinion is remarkable as coming from one of the most distinguished servants of the latter body—one who, trained in the close preserve of the covenanted civil service, rose, under the fostering care of Lord Wellesley, from occupying a clerk's desk, through intermediate grades of office, to the highest place in the council-chamber, and exercised, in a most independent fashion, the supreme authority provisionally entrusted to his care in 1835. His views would lose much of their force if conveyed in terms less full and unequivocal than his own; but, in reading the following extracts, it is necessary to remember that the word colonization has here a very limited application, and that the immigration required is not general; but must, to be beneficial to either of the parties concerned—the natives or the immigrants—consist of the capitalist class; in fact, of precisely those who find in overstocked Europe no field for the development of their resources, and who are deterred from the colonies by the high rate of wages, which constitute their chief attraction to the labouring masses.

“It is impracticable, perhaps [he writes as early as 1814], to suggest a remedy for the general disaffection of our Indian subjects. Colonization seems to be the only system which could give us a chance of having any part of the population attached to our government from a sense of common interests. Colonization may have its attendant evils; but with reference to the consideration above-stated, it would promise to give us a hold in the country which we do not at present possess. We might now

be swept away in a single whirlwind. We are without root. The best-affected natives could think of a change of government with indifference; and in the N.W. Provinces there is hardly a man who would not hope for benefit from a change. This disaffection, however, will most probably not break out in any general manner as long as we possess a predominant power.” In 1820, he declares—“As to a general reform of our rule, that question has always appeared to me as hopeless. Our rulers at home, and councillors abroad, are so bigoted as to precedent, that I never dream of any change unless it be a gradual declension from worse to worse. Colonization, without being forced or injudiciously encouraged, should be admitted without restraint. * * * I would never agree to the present laws of exclusion with respect to Europeans, which are unnatural and horrible.” In 1836, he says—“The Europeans settled in India, and not in the Company's service, and to these might be added, generally, the East Indians of mixed breed, will never be satisfied with the Company's government: well or ill-founded, they will always attach to it the notion of monopoly and exclusion; they will consider themselves comparatively discountenanced and unfavoured, and will always look with a desire to the substitution of a King's government. For the contentment of this class, which for the benefit of India and the security of our Indian empire ought greatly to increase in numbers and importance, the introduction of a King's government is undoubtedly desirable. * * * It must be doubted whether even the civil service will be able to retain its exclusive privileges after the extensive establishment of European settlers. * * * The necessity of employing unfit men in highly important offices, is peculiar to this service, and demands correction.”*

The evidence laid before parliament, after an interval of twenty-five years, forms a singular counterpart to the above statements. The persons examined speak from long and intimate experience; and their testimony, though varying in detail, coincides for the most part in its general bearing. They denounce the obstructive policy pursued towards them; and the majority distinctly declare, that permission to settle has not been availed of, because the protection of life and property, common to every other part of the British empire, is not afforded in India to any but the actual servants of government; the interests of all other subjects, European and native, being habitually disregarded. One witness alleges, that, “at this present time” (May, 1858), there are fewer Englishmen settled in the interior of India than there were twenty years ago, government servants excepted.†

* *Metcalfe Papers*, pp. 144; 150; 164; 171. It is, however, only fair to remind the reader, that Lord Metcalfe is declared by his biographer, Mr. Kaye, to have subsequently greatly modified his opinions. Seeing that government by the Crown

would be, in fact, government by a parliamentary majority; he said, if that were applied to India, our tenure would not be worth ten years' purchase.—*Papers*, p. 165.

† Mr. G. Macnair.—Second Report, p. 2.

Another gentleman gives a clear exposition of similar convictions; stating, that—

"The real serious impediment to the settlement of Englishmen in India, is to be found in the policy of the system under which our Indian possessions have been hitherto, and, unfortunately, up to the present day, are still governed;—that policy which, giving certain extensive and exclusive privileges to a corporation established for trading purposes, and gradually formed into a governing power, originally shut out the spirit of enterprise, by excluding from the country Englishmen not servants of the Company. Although the extreme severity of this original policy has been somewhat modified and gradually relaxed, its spirit has remained but little changed; and its effects have been to keep the people of this country very ignorant of the resources and great value of India, and of the character, condition, and wants of the natives. Moreover, it is a matter of notoriety, that there has been, and is at the present time, a constant antagonism between the official and non-official Anglo-Indian communities; and that exactly as the adventuresome Englishman, who is called an interloper, with difficulty obtained his admission in the country, so even now he maintains his position in a continuous but unequal struggle with the local government, which he, in turn, regards as an obstacle between himself and the Crown and constitution to which he owns allegiance, and looks for protection in his own country. Then again, the departments of administration, police, the judicial system, both civil and criminal, are notoriously so wretchedly inefficient, oppressive, and corrupt, that they deter the peaceful and industrious from living within their influence, or risking their lives and property under their operations. I believe that even the comparatively few gentlemen settled in the interior of the country, would willingly withdraw, if they could do so without a ruinous sacrifice of property; for little or no heed has been given to their complaints, nor indeed of the natives; while the evils which have been pointed out for many years past are greatly on the increase. The present constitution of the legislative council has made matters worse than they were before; and that body has certainly not the confidence either of Europeans or natives. With the exception of two judges taken from the Supreme Court of Calcutta, it is composed of salaried and government officials, who have been such from the age of twenty, who have really nothing at stake in the country, and who are not likely to live under the operation and influence of the laws which they pass; while those who are directly interested in the well-being of the country, both Europeans and natives, are entirely excluded from any voice in the laws by which they are to be ruled and governed. * * * At present, you have in India a series of antagonisms which works most injuriously for all classes, and completely prevents that union amongst the governing people which appears to me to be essential to the well-being, not only of ourselves, but of the millions of people our subjects, taken under our care and protection avowedly for their own good, and enlightenment, and advancement in civilisation. At present there is an antagonism in the army, by

the distinction of two services; and a worse antagonism between the Queen's courts and the Company's courts; between the laws administered in the presidency towns and in the interior; between the covenanted service, who have a monopoly of the well-paid appointments, and the upper, or educated portion of the uncovenanted service, who think themselves most unjustly excluded from advancement: and, finally, between almost every Englishman (I speak of these as facts, not as matters of opinion) not in the service of the Company, and the local government and covenanted service, who not only represent but carry out the policy of the East India Company, so as to shut out the direct authority of the Crown, the intervention of parliament, and the salutary and most necessary influence of public opinion in England. You cannot disconnect the European and the native. If you legislate simply with the idea of what is suitable to the English, without referring to the native and redressing the grievances of the native, there will be that unhappy antagonism between them that will effectually bar Europeans from going out to India."*

The exorbitant rate of interest (from fifteen to eighteen per cent.) charged on advances of money made to an indigo-planter, silk producer, or any settler occupied in developing the resources of the country (though not to be compared with that exacted from the native borrower), is urged by "an English zemindar"† resident some twenty-five years in Bengal, as another proof of the insecurity of property in the mofussil, or country districts, compared with that situated within the Calcutta jurisdiction, where large sums can be readily raised at from six to seven per cent. interest.‡ He enumerates the grievances already set forth in preceding sections, and points to the successful cultivation extensively carried on by European settlers in Ceylon, as a consequence of the perfect security and encouragement to capitalists, afforded by the administration and regulations of that island.§

Another witness declares that, in some parts of India, the land-revenue system actually excludes European capitalists. He instances the Madras presidency, and some portions of that of Bombay, where the Ryotwarree settlement is in force, where the government is the immediate landlord, and is represented in its transactions with its wretched tenants by the revenue police, an ill-paid and rapacious army of some 60,000 men, whose character was pretty well exposed in the Madras Torture Report. The settlement makes no provision for the

* Evidence of Mr. J. G. Waller.—Second Report, pp. 169, 170.

† Evidence of Mr. John Freeman.—First Report, pp. 112; 119; 139.

‡ The fixed legal maximum of interest in Bengal is twelve per cent.; other commissions bring it up to eighteen per cent.—Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise. Second Report, p. 54.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

introduction of an intermediate class of landlords; and the pauperised labourers emigrate in tens of thousands, to the Mauritius and elsewhere, leaving their own waste lands, to obtain subsistence in better governed countries.

In Bengal, both European and native capital and skill find employment under the permanent settlement, the value of which the natives generally perfectly understand, and call the "Great Charter of Bengal." The same witness adds—"It is invaluable to them and to us too; for it has saved Bengal from insurrection."*

This one great advantage possessed by Bengal, cannot, however, compensate for its other drawbacks; among which, the British settlers especially dwell on the lamentable deficiency of commercial roads, and the contrast thereby offered to the beautiful pleasure-drives for civilians and their ladies, which surround the chief stations. A settler engaged in growing rice, sugar, tobacco, and vegetables, for the Calcutta market, on an estate situated only forty miles from the great English metropolis, describes the difficulty of transit as so great, that the men who come to take the sugar away are obliged to do so upon bullocks' backs, each animal carrying about two maunds (about $1\frac{1}{2}$ cwt. English), and treading warily along the lines separating one rice-field from another, which are generally about a foot in breadth, somewhat elevated above the field, acting also as ledges to keep the water in the fields: but, adds this witness, "some distance from there, where there is a little bit of road, they will take twenty or twenty-five maunds of produce with a cart and a couple of bullocks."†

Despite all discouragements, the British settlers claim to have done good service to their country and to India; and they affirm, "that wherever Europeans have been settled during the late convulsion, those parts have been less disturbed."‡ Their enterprise has been imitated by the

native merchants; and many in Calcutta have, during the last twenty years, become large shippers of produce, and send orders for manufactured goods direct to England.§

Articles of great importance have been principally discovered and worked by the "interlopers." The coal-beds found by them after years of research, now give beneficial employment to several associations, including the Bengal Company, which alone pays about £2,000 per month to the railway, for the transit of coal from Raneegunge to Calcutta. The supply furnished by them has proved invaluable to the government during the mutiny; and the fleets of inland steamers belonging to the General Steam Navigation and Ganges Companies, have rendered vital service in the conveyance of the British troops, the naval brigade, and military ammunition and stores. Their efficiency would have been much greater had the authorities heeded the arguments previously addressed to them regarding the want of a canal to Rajmahal, or kept open one of the Nuddea rivers from Nuddea to the Ganges.||

The British settlers were the first to establish direct steam communication between Calcutta and Suez: through their instrumentality the transit through Egypt was carried out, and the first steamer placed on the Nile: they introduced the river steam-tugs, used to facilitate the intricate and dangerous navigation between Calcutta and the pilot station; and they established the horse-carriages, by which Sir Colin Campbell and hundreds of officers and soldiers hastened to the seat of war. Silk, and other valuable and easily-transportable products, such as indigo, the hateful drug opium, together with jute, hemp, tobacco and linseed, have considerably increased in quantity, and improved in quality, under the influence of British capital and energy. The settlers succeeded in growing good tea before it was discovered to be indigenous in so many places

* Evidence of Mr. Theobald.—First Report, pp. 61, 62; 85.

† Evidence of Mr. J. Freeman.—First Report, p. 119. (See further testimony to the same effect—First Report, pp. 114; 157. Second Report, pp. 31; 40; 52; 108. Third Report, pp. 64, 65.)

‡ Evidence of Mr. J. P. Wise.—Second Report, p. 36.

§ Evidence of Mr. Freeman.—First Report, p. 114.

|| The "Nuddea Rivers" is the name given to the network of channels which traverse the country be-

tween the Ganges and the Hooghly. These channels are supplied partly from the Ganges and partly from the drainage of the country, and are sometimes all but dry. The general opinion is, that one of them might be kept open for the country-boats and for steamers all the year round, instead of five months, if proper engineering skill were applied to the task; by which means a circuitous and even dangerous route of five hundred miles would be avoided.—First Report. Evidence of Mr. W. Theobald, p. 75.

in the Himalayas; and were beginning the cultivation so successfully in Assam and Kumaon, that, in 1856, 700,000lbs. were exported to England. The Neilgherry coffee is alleged to have obtained an excellent name in the London market, as that of Tellicherry has done long ago. Beer has been brewed on the Neilgherries, and sold at 9d. per gallon, which the soldiers preferred to the ordinary description, retailed there at 1s. and 1s. 2d. per quart bottle.*

During the Russian war, there was an export of grains and oil seeds (forming, in 1856, a large item) from the interior of India to England; but it ended on the conclusion of peace, because war prices, or canal irrigation and carriage, were essential conditions of remuneration. The same thing occurred with wheat. At the commencement of the war there was a first export of twenty quarters, which rose to 90,963 quarters in 1856, and fell with declining prices to 30,429 quarters in 1857. Rice is exported largely under any circumstances, because it is produced in great abundance on the coast, and is not subject to the cost of inland carriage.† This, and much similar testimony, tends to corroborate the unqualified declaration previously made by Colonel Cotton, that "India can supply England fully, abundantly, cheaply with its two essentials, flour and cotton; and nothing whatever prevents its doing so but the want of public works."‡

The evidence of British settlers is very satisfactory regarding the possibility of cultivating cotton of good quality to an almost unlimited extent. One witness predicts, that the first three or four large canals (for irrigation as well as transit) made in India, would drive the American cotton entirely out of the market, from the much lower cost of production in India. American cotton costs 6d. per pound at the English ports: Indian, of equal quality, might, it is alleged, be delivered there from any part of India at a cost of 1½d. per pound.§

Even supposing this representation to be somewhat sanguine and highly-coloured, it is most desirable that a vigorous effort should be made to restore the ancient staple product of India, by making one grand experiment—whether slave labour may not be beaten out of the market by the cheapest

and most abundant supply of free labour which could possibly be desired. In the cultivation and manufacture of cotton, all the requirements of England and of India (national and individual) are combined: capital, skill, and careful superintendence, would find remunerative exercise on the one side; and, on the other, large masses of people, now half-starved, would be employed; and men, women, and even children could work together in families—an arrangement always much desired in India.

Neither is there any reason why the manufacture of the finer fabrics—of gold-wrought and embroidered muslins—should not be resumed as an article of export. They are quite peculiar to India, and must remain so. The temperature of the country; the delicate touch of the small supple native fingers; the exquisite, artistic tact in managing the gorgeous colouring: all these points combine in producing effects which have been strangely undervalued in England. The barbaric pearl and gold, the diamonds of Golconda, the emeralds and pearls, have led us to overlook the incomparable delicacy of Indian manufactures.

Shawls are almost the only exceptional article amid general neglect. The French, always discriminating in such matters, have shown more appreciation of the value of native manipulation. Several factories, called "filatures," have been for many years established in their settlement at Pondicherry, and where, properly organised and superintended by practical men, the profit yielded is stated at no less than thirty per cent. per annum on the capital invested. A parliamentary witness says, if three times the amount could have been spun, it would have found ready purchasers.|| It is, however, asserted, that the assessments are not half as high in Pondicherry as in the neighbouring British territory.

The point long doubtful, whether the English constitution could ever bear permanent residence and active occupation in India, appears to be solved by the concurrent testimony of the planters, whose evidence before a committee of the House of Commons, has been so largely quoted. Their stalwart frames and healthy appearance, after twenty, and even thirty years' experience, went far to confirm their statements, that

* Evidence of Captain Ouchterlony.—Third Report, p. 4.

† Third Report.—Evidence of Mr. W. Balston, pp. 64; 98.

‡ *Public Works*, p. 29.

§ Evidence of Mr. W. Balston.—Third Report, p. 98.

|| Evidence of Captain Ouchterlony.—Third Report, pp. 13; 37.

out-door employment in the more temperate localities, was, even in India, favourable rather than detrimental to health. It is still an open question, how far their children or grandchildren may thrive there; and to what extent early transplantation to schools in the sanatoria afforded by the Neilgherries and other hilly tracts, may operate in preventing physical deterioration.

The chief attractions to "merchant adventurers" in India, are as prominent now as in the days when good Queen Bess granted the first charter to her subjects; the field for capital and enterprise is quite as wide, and even more promising. Merchants, money-lenders, and government stipendiaries, are the only wealthy natives at present in India; and many of these—some by fair and highly creditable means, others by intrigue and usury—have become possessed of fortunes which would enable them to take rank with a London millionaire.

India is, in truth, a mine of wealth; and if we are permitted to see the sword of war permanently sheathed, it may be hoped that we shall take a new view of things; especially, that the leaders of our large manufacturing towns—Birmingham and Manchester, Glasgow and Belfast—will take up the question of good government for India, and convince themselves, by diligently comparing and sifting the evidence poured forth from many different sources, of the necessity for developing the resources and elevating the condition of their fellow-subjects in Hindoostan. Poverty, sheer poverty, is the reason why the consumption of our manufactures is so small; and its concomitants—the fear of extortion; and personal insecurity, induce that tendency to hoarding, which is alleged to operate in causing the annual disappearance of a considerable portion of the already insufficient silver currency.

This, and other minor evils, are effects, not causes; they are like the ailments which inherent weakness produces: strengthen the general frame, and they will disappear. The temptation of profitable and secure investments, such as urgently-required public works may be always made to offer by a wise government, would speedily bring forth the hoarded wealth (if there be such) of India, and would assuredly attract both European and native capital, which, thus employed, might be as seed sown. The British settlers, and some public-

spirited native merchants (such as the well-known Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeeboy, of Bombay, with others in each presidency), have shown what individual effort can accomplish. It is now for the government to follow their example, and prepare for a rich harvest of material and moral progress.

Annexation, and Infraction of the Indian Laws of Inheritance.—The system of subsidiary alliances, established by Lord Wellesley, in the teeth of many and varied difficulties, has, without doubt, been the means of quietly and effectively establishing the supremacy of England over the chief part of the Indian peninsula. It has likewise greatly conduced to the general tranquillity, by compelling the native governments to keep peace with one another. It might have done much more than this, had subsequent governors-general entered into the large and generous policy of its promoter, and viewed it as a protective measure calculated to prolong the existence of native states, and regulate the balance of power. Lord Wellesley had no passion for annexation; he did not even say with Clive, "to stop is dangerous, to recede is ruin:"* on the contrary, he believed that the time had arrived for building up a barrier against further extension; and for this very purpose he bent every energy of his mind to frame the system which has been perverted by his successors, and warped by circumstances, into a preliminary to absorption and extinction.

He desired to preserve the independence of the Rajpoot principalities; and thus, rather than by exterminating wars, to keep in check the then alarmingly turbulent and aggressive Mahratta powers. His plans were perfected, and fairly in operation when he quitted India. Unhappily, his whole policy was, for a little while, misrepresented and misunderstood. Its reversal was decreed, and unswerving "non-intervention" was to be substituted for protective and defensive alliances. In theory, this principle seemed just and practicable; in action, it involved positive breach of contract with the weaker states, with whom, in our hour of peril, we had formed treaties, and whom we were pledged to protect against their hereditary foes.

Mistaken notions of economy actuated the authorities in England; and, unfortunately, Sir George Barlow, on whom the

* *Metcalf's Papers*, p. 5.

charge of the supreme government devolved by the sudden death of Lord Cornwallis, was incapable of realising, much less of forcibly deprecating, the evil of the measures he was called upon to take. Lord Lake, the commander-in-chief, felt his honour so compromised by the public breach of faith involved in the repudiation of treaties which he had been mainly instrumental in obtaining, that he resigned, in disgust, the diplomatic powers entrusted to him.*

No less indignation was evinced by the band of rising statesmen, whose minds had been enlarged and strengthened by participation in the views of the "great little man," who, "from the fire of patriotism which blazed in his own breast, emitted sparks which animated the breasts of all who came within the reach of his notice."† One of these (Charles Metcalfe) drew up a paper on the policy of Sir George Barlow, of remarkable interest and ability. He says—

"The native powers of India understand the law of nations on a broad scale, though they may not adhere to it; but they are not acquainted with the nice quirks upon which our finished casuists would draw up a paper to establish political rights. Our name is high, but these acts must lower it; and a natural consequence is, that we shall not again be trusted with confidence.

"Sir George Barlow, in some of his despatches, distinctly states, that he contemplates, in the discord of the native powers, an additional source of strength; and, if I am not mistaken, some of his plans go directly, and are designed, to foment discord among those states. * * * Lord Wellesley's desire was to unite the tranquillity of all the powers of India with our own. How fair, how beautiful, how virtuous does this system seem; how tenfold fair, beautiful, and virtuous, when compared with the other ugly, nasty, abominable one."‡

All the members of the Wellesley school imbibed the same tone; and though they differed widely on many points, and subsequently became themselves distinctive leaders, yet Elphinstone and Malcolm, Adams and Jenkins, Tucker and Edmonstone, consistently maintained the rights of native states, and regarded any disposition to take advantage of their weakness or promote strife, as "ugly, nasty, and abominable."

When the non-intervention system proved absolutely impracticable, the authorities fell back on that of subsidiary alliances; but instead of proceeding on the broad basis laid down by Lord Wellesley, and organ-

ising such relations of mutual protection and subordination between the greater and the minor states, as might be necessary for the preservation of general tranquillity, a system of minute and harassing interference was introduced into the affairs of every petty state. "We established," writes Sir Charles Metcalfe in 1830, when a member of the supreme council, "a military police throughout Central India, with a view to maintain order in countries belonging to foreign potentates."§ The arrangements made were costly, clumsy, and inefficient; and, in the end, have worked badly for all parties.

The British contingents, which have now joined the rebel Bengal army, were, for the most part, forced on the native princes, and their general tendency has been to foster the inherent weakness, corruption, and extortion of the states in which they have been established. The benefit of exemption from external strife, has been dearly purchased by increased internal oppression; the arm of the despot being strengthened against his subjects by the same cause which paralysed it for foreign aggression. Then has arisen the difficult question—how far we, as the undoubted supreme power, were justified in upholding notoriously incapable and profligate dynasties, even while the cruel wrongs of the people were unceasingly reported by the British residents at the native courts? As is too frequently the case, the same question has been viewed from different points of view at different times, and, at each period, the decision arrived at has run the risk of being partial and prejudiced.

In the time of Warren Hastings, Sir John Shore, and Lord Wellesley, the increase of territory was deprecated by the East India Company and the British nation in general, as equally unjust in principle and mistaken in policy. The fact that many of the Hindoo, and nearly all the Mohammedan, rulers were usurpers of recent date, ruling over newly-founded states, was utterly ignored; and their treacherous and hostile proceedings against us, and each other, were treated as fictitious, or at least exaggerated. At length a powerful reaction took place; people grew accustomed to the rapid augmentation of our Anglo-Indian empire, and ceased to scrutinise the means by which it was accomplished. The rights of native princes, from being over-estimated, became as unduly disregarded.

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 406.

† *Metcalfe Papers*, p. 10.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

The system of annexation recently pursued, which has set at nought the ancient Hindoo law regarding the succession of adopted sons and female representatives, is alleged to have been a special cause of the revolt.* From time immemorial, the adoption of heirs in default of natural and legitimate issue, has been the common custom of the Hindoos. If a man have no son, it is an imperative article in his religious belief that he should adopt one; because it is only through the ceremonies and offerings of a son, that the soul of the father can be released from *Put*—which seems to be the Brahminical term for purgatory. The adopted child succeeds to every hereditary right, and is treated in every respect as if lawfully begotten. Lord Metcalfe has expressed a very decided opinion on the subject. After pointing out the difference between sovereign princes and jagheerdars—between those in possession of hereditary sovereignties in their own right, and those who hold grants of land, or public revenue, by gift from a sovereign or paramount power—he adds, that Hindoo sovereign princes have a right to adopt a successor, to the exclusion of collateral heirs; and that the British government is bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it be regular, and not in violation of Hindoo law. “The supposed reversionary right of the paramount power,” Lord Metcalfe describes “as having no real existence, except in the case of the absolute want of heirs; and even then the right is only assumed in virtue of power; for it would probably be more consistent with right, that the people of the state so situated should elect a sovereign for themselves.”†

Many of our leading statesmen have concurred not only in deprecating the use of any measures of annexation which could possibly be construed as harsh or unjust, but also in viewing the end itself, namely, the absorption of native states, as a positive evil. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who has probably had more political intercourse with the highest class of natives than any other individual now living, has always continued to entertain the same views which he set forth as interpreter to Major-general Wellesley, in the memorable conferences held to negotiate the treaties of Surjee Anjen-

gaum and Deogaum, in 1803, with Sindia and the rajah of Berar;‡ when he described the British government as uniformly anxious to promote the prosperity of its adherents, the interests of such persons being regarded as identified with its own.

Many years later, Mr. Elphinstone wrote—“It appears to me to be our interest as well as our duty, to use every means to preserve the allied governments: it is also our interest to keep up the number of independent powers: their territories afford a refuge to all whose habits of war, intrigue, or depredation, make them incapable of remaining quiet in ours; and the contrast of our government has a favourable effect on our subjects, who, while they feel the evils they are actually exposed to, are apt to forget the greater ones from which they have been delivered.”

Colonel Wellesley, in 1800, declared, that the extension of our territory and influence had been greater than our means. “Wherever we spread ourselves,” he said, “we increase this evil. We throw out of employment and means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded, or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies, at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionately decreased.”§

Marquis Wellesley, in 1842, wrote—“No further extension of our territory is ever desirable in India, even in the event of war for conquest, if that could be justified or were legal, as the law now wisely stands.”||

Lord Ellenborough (despite the annexation of Sind) advised, that even “what are called rightful occasions of appropriating the territories of native states,” should be avoided; because he considered, that the maintenance of those states, and “the conviction that they were considered permanent parts of the general government of India, would materially strengthen our authority. I feel satisfied, that I never stood so strong with my own army as when I was surrounded by native princes; they like to see respect shown to their native princes. These princes are sovereigns of one-third of the population of Hindoostan;

* *Vide Rebellion in India*; by John Bruce Norton.

† *Metcalfe Papers* (written in 1837); p. 318.

‡ *Supplementary Despatches of F. M. the Duke of Wellington*; edited by the present Duke: vol. iii.

§ *Wellington Despatches*. Letter to Major Munro, dated 20th August, 1800.

|| Letter from the Marquis Wellesley to Lord Ellenborough, 4th July, 1842.

and with reference to the future condition of the country, it becomes more important to give them confidence that no systematic attempt will be made to take advantage of the failures of heirs to confiscate their property, or to injure, in any respect, those sovereigns in the position they at present occupy."

Sir John Malcolm went further still, and declared, that "the tranquillity, not to say the security, of our vast Oriental dominions, was involved in the preservation of the native principalities, which are dependent upon us for protection. These are also so obviously at our mercy, so entirely within our grasp, that besides the other and great benefits which we derive from these alliances, their co-existence with our rule is, of itself, a source of political strength, the value of which will never be known till it is lost. * * * I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule."

Henry St. George Tucker likewise lifted up his voice in warning, declaring, that the annexation of a principality to our gigantic empire, might become the source of weakness, by impairing our moral influence over our native subjects.*

These opinions so far prevailed, that down to the viceroyalty of Lord Dalhousie, the Hindoo custom of adoption was not only sanctioned, but urged by the supreme government on native princes in the absence of natural heirs. The majority of Indian dynasties have been maintained in this manner. The famous Mahratta leaders, Dowlut Rao Sindia of Gwalior, and Mulhar Rao Holcar of Indore, both died childless: the latter adopted a son; the former left the choice of a successor to his favourite wife, who exercised the right, and herself filled the position of regent.†

On the death of the adopted prince, in 1843, his nearest relative, a boy of eight years of age, was proclaimed maharajah. The war which took place in the same year, and which terminated in the capture of the fortress of Gwalior by the British troops, on the 4th of January, 1844, did not lead

to the extinction of the principality, as it would unquestionably have done under the course of policy which subsequently prevailed. The young maharajah was confirmed in the position, for which, as he advanced in age, he showed himself well qualified; and his name, like that of his contemporary the rajah of Indore, now takes high rank amid the faithful allies of England.

Lord Ellenborough's opinions regarding the maintenance of native states, were not, however, shared by his zealous champion, Sir Charles Napier, who expressed himself on this point, as on most others, in very strong terms. "Were I emperor of India," he said, when his views were most matured, "no Indian prince should exist." He would dethrone the Nizam, he would seize Nepal: in fact, he considered, that without the abolition of the native sovereignties no great good could be effected, and the Company's revenues must be always in difficulty.‡

Sir Charles was probably singular in his desire to extend the British frontier indefinitely, and "make Moscowa and Peking shake;" but many persons, including Mr. Thoby Prinsep and other leading India House authorities, looked forward to the extinction of the subsidiary and protected states within our boundary as desirable, both in a political and financial point of view, especially in the latter.§

In India, the majority of the governing "caste," as Colonel Sykes called the civilians,|| were naturally disposed to favour extensions of territory which directly conduced to the benefit of their body, and for the indirect consequences of which they were in no manner held responsible. To them, the lapse of a native state was the opening of a new source of promotion, as it was to the directors in England of "patronage"—an advantage vague in sound, but very palpable and lucrative in operation. No wonder that the death of the "sick man" should have been often anticipated by his impatient heirs as a happy release, which it was excusable and decidedly expedient to hasten. It was but to place the sufferer or victim within reach of the devouring waves of the Ganges,


* Several of the above opinions, with others of similar tendency, will be found collected in a pamphlet entitled *The Native States of India*; published by Saunders and Stanford, 6, Charing-cross: 1853.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 427.

‡ See review in the *Times*, May 25th, 1857, of Sir W. Napier's *Life of Sir C. Napier*.

§ See Mr. Prinsep's pamphlet on the *Indian Question* in 1853.

|| Third Report of Colonization Committee, 1858; p. 88.



JOHN W. HARRIS

Author of "The History of the United States of America"

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and the result, according to Hindoo notions, is paradise to one party, and pecuniary advantage, or at least relief, to the other. The whirlpool of annexation has been hit upon as offering advantages of a similar kind; namely, complete regeneration to the native state subjected to its engulfing influence, and increased revenue to the paramount power. Bengal civilians began to study "annexation made easy," with the zeal of our American cousins, and it was soon deemed indispensable to hasten the process by refusing to sanction further adoptions. The opinions quoted in preceding pages were treated as out of date, and the policy founded on them was reversed. The experience of the past showed, that from the days of Clive, all calculations founded on increase of territorial revenue, had been vitiated by more than proportionate increase of expenditure. It might have also taught, that the decay of native states needed no stimulating, and that even if their eventual extinction should be deemed desirable, it would at least be well to take care that the inclined plane by which we were hastening their descent, should not be placed at so sharp an angle as to bring them down, like an avalanche, on our own heads. These considerations were lost sight of in the general desire felt "to extinguish the native states which consume so large a portion of the revenue of the country;"* and few paused to consider the peculiar rights of native administrators, as such, or remembered that, in many cases, the profit derived from the subsidy paid for military contingents, was greater than any we were likely to obtain from the entire revenue. In fact, the entire revenue had repeatedly proved insufficient to cover the cost of our enormous governmental establishments, civil and military.

The expenditure consequent on the war with, and annexation of, Sindé,† was the subject of much parliamentary discussion, the immense booty obtained by the army being contrasted with the burden imposed upon the public treasury and highly-taxed people of India. Still the lesson prominently set forth therein was unheeded, or treated as applicable only to projects of foreign ag-

grandisement, and having no relation to questions of domestic policy.

The Marquis of Dalhousie expressed the general sentiments of the Court of Directors, as well as his own, in the following full and clear exposition of the principles which prompted the series of annexations made under his administration:—"There may be a conflict of opinion as to the advantage, or to the propriety, of extending our already vast possessions beyond their present limits. No man can more sincerely deprecate than I do any extension of the frontiers of our territories, which can be avoided, or which may not become indispensably necessary from considerations of our own safety, and of the maintenance of the tranquillity of our provinces. But I cannot conceive it possible for any one to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of states which may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of these petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength; for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests, we believe, will be promoted thereby."

Lord Dalhousie differed from Lord Metcalfe and others above quoted, not less with regard to the nature of the end in view, than as to the means by which that end might be lawfully obtained; and he has recorded his "strong and deliberate opinion," that "the British government is bound not to put aside or to neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue, as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural, when the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of government being given to the ceremony of adoption, according to Hindoo law."

It is not surprising that the process

* *Modern India*; by Mr. Campbell, a civilian of the Bengal service.

† Mr. St. George Tucker asserted, that the proceedings connected with the annexation of Sindé were reprobated by every member of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, "as character-

ised by acts of the grossest injustice, highly injurious to the national reputation;" and that the acquisition of that country was "more iniquitous than any which has ever stained the annals of our Indian administration."—*Memorials of Indian Government*, pp. 351, 352.

of absorption should have been rapid, when the viceroy, who held the above opinions, was essentially a practical man, gifted with an "aptitude for business, unflagging powers of labour, and clearness of intellect;" which even the most decided opponents of his policy have applauded. In reviewing the result of his eight years' administration, Lord Dalhousie dwells, apparently without the slightest misgiving, on the large increase of the British territories in the East during that period; four kingdoms, and various chiefships and separate tracts, having been brought under the sway of the Queen of England. Of these, *the Punjab* was the fruit of conquest.* *Pegu and Martaban* were likewise won by the sword in 1852; and a population of 570,180 souls, spread over an area of 32,250 square miles, was thereby brought under the dominion of the British Crown.†

The *Raj or Principality of Sattara*, was the first state annexed by Lord Dalhousie, to the exclusion of the claims of an adopted son. There was only one precedent—and that a partial one—for this measure: it occurred under the administration of Lord Auckland, in 1840, in the case of the little *state of Colaba*, founded by the pirate Angria, whose chief fort, Gheria, was taken by Watson and Clive in 1756.‡ Colaba was dependent on the government of the Peishwa at Poona; and, on the extinction of his power, the British entered into a treaty with Ragojee Angria, the existing chief, guaranteeing the transmission of his territories in their integrity to his "successors." With the sanction of the Bombay government, Ragojee adopted a boy, who died soon after him. Permission was asked for a fresh adoption, but refused; and the territory was treated as having escheated for want of heirs male, although, it is alleged, there were many members of the Angria family still in existence, legally capable of succeeding to the government.

Sattara was altogether a more important case, both on account of the extent and excellent government of the kingdom, and because its extinction involved a distinct repudiation of the practice of adoption previously sanctioned by the British authorities, and held by the Hindoos as invariably conferring on the adopted child

every privilege of natural and legitimate issue.§ The fact was so generally recognised, that there seems no reason to doubt that the native princes, in signing subsidiary or other treaties, considered that children by adoption were included, as a matter of course, under the head of legitimate heirs and successors. The exception, if intended, was sufficiently important to demand mention. But the conduct of the government, in repeated instances (such as those of the Gwalior and Indore principalities, of Kotah in 1828, Dutteah in 1840, Oorcha, Banskwarra, and Oodipoor, in 1842, and, several years later, in Kerowlee),|| was calculated to remove all doubt by evidencing its liberal construction of the Hindoo law of succession.

Lord Auckland declared, in the case of Oorcha, that he could not for a moment admit the doctrine, that because the view of policy upon which we might have formed engagements with the native princes might have been by circumstances materially altered, we were therefore not to act scrupulously up to the terms and spirit of those engagements; and again, when discussing the question of the right of the widow of the rajah of Kishenghur to adopt a son without authority from her deceased husband, his lordship rejected any reference to the "supposed rights" which were suggested as devolving on the British government as the paramount power, declaring that such questions must be decided exclusively with reference to the terms and spirit of the treaties or engagements formed with the different states; and that no demand ought to be brought forward than such as, in regard to those engagements, should be scrupulously consistent with good faith.

By this declaration Lord Auckland publicly evinced his resolve to adhere to the principle laid down by high authority forty years before, under very critical circumstances. It was not an obedient dependency, but the fortified border-land of a warlike principality, that was at stake, when Arthur Wellesley urged the governor-general to abide by the strict rules of justice, however inconvenient and seemingly inexpedient. On other points of the question the brothers might take different views; on this they were sure to agree; for they

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, p. 65.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 456.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 458. Parl. Papers, 16th April, 1858.

§ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 271.

|| The social grounds on which the practice of adoption is based, are well set forth by General Briggs. See Ludlow's *Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 226; and *Native States*, pp. 21; 23.

were equally ready to "sacrifice Gwalior or every other frontier in India ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith."*

The recent mode of dealing with Sattara has not contributed to raise the British name either for generosity or unflinching integrity. The deposition of that most able ruler, Pertab Sing, on a charge of conspiracy against the supreme government,† was earnestly deprecated in England by many eminent men, and excited great indignation among his subjects. The secret and hurried manner in which his seizure and trial were conducted, increased the apparent hardship of his sentence; and an able writer asserts his conviction that, at the present time, not a native in India, nor five persons in the world, believe in his guilt.‡ He died in 1847, leaving an adopted son, around whom the affections of the people still cling.§ The remembrance of his misfortunes has not passed away; and one of the mutineers, hung at Sattara in 1857, addressed the surrounding natives while he was being pinioned, to the effect that, as the English had hurled the rajah from his throne, so they ought to be driven out of the country.|| The deposition of Pertab Sing was not, however, accompanied by any attempt at annexation of territory; the government, on the contrary, "having no views of advantage and aggrandisement," resolved, in the words of the new treaty (5th September, 1839), to invest the brother and next in succession to the rajah with the sovereignty. This brother (Appa Sahib) died in 1848. He, also, in default of natural issue, had adopted a son, whose recognition as rajah was strongly urged by Sir George Clerk, the governor of Bombay, on the ground that the terms of the treaty, "seemed to mean a sovereignty which should not lapse for want of heirs, so long as there was any one who could succeed, according to the usages of the people." "In a matter such as this question of resumption of territory, recovered by us, and restored to an ancient dynasty,"¶ he observes, "we are morally bound to give some consideration to the sense in which we induced or permitted the other party to understand the terms of a mutual agreement. Whatever we intend in favour of an ally in perpetuity,

when executing a treaty with him on that basis, by that we ought to abide in our relations with his successors, until he proves himself unworthy."

Sir G. Clerk further advocated the continuance of the independence of Sattara, on account of its happy and prosperous state. Mr. Frere, the British resident, said that no claimant would venture to put forward his own claim against the adopted sons of either of the late rajahs; but that there were many who might have asserted their claim but for the adoption, and who would "be able to establish a very good *prima facie* claim in any court of justice in India." These arguments did not deter Lord Dalhousie from making Sattara the first example of his consolidation policy. "The territories," he said, "lie in the very heart of our own possessions. They are interposed between the two military stations in the presidency of Bombay, and are at least calculated, in the hands of an independent sovereign, to form an obstacle to safe communication and combined military movement. The district is fertile, and the revenues productive. The population, accustomed for some time to regular and peaceful government, are tranquil themselves, and are prepared for the regular government our possession of the territory would give." With regard to the terms of the treaty, he held that the words "heirs and successors" must be read in their ordinary sense, and could not be construed to secure to the rajahs of Sattara any other than the succession of heirs natural: and the prosperity of the state, he did not consider a reason for its continued independence, unless this prosperity could be shown to arise from fixed institutions, by which the disposition of the sovereign would always be guarded, or compelled into an observance of the rules of good government. (This, of course, could not be shown, such security being peculiar to countries blessed with free institutions, and utterly incompatible with any form of despotism.) In conclusion, the governor-general argued, that "we ought to regard the territory of Sattara as lapse, and should incorporate it at once with the British dominions in India."**

The Court of Directors were divided in opinion on the subject: nine of them agreed

* *Wellington Despatches*, 17th March, 1804.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 432.

‡ *Ludlow's Lectures*, vol. ii., p. 171.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

|| *Bombay Telegraph*, 19th June, 1857.

¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 419.

** Minute by Lord Dalhousie, 30th August, 1848.

with, and five differed from, Lord Dalhousie.* The dissentients were Messrs. Tucker, Shepherd, Melville, Major Oliphant, and General Caulfield. Regarding the precedent established in the case of Colaba, Mr. Tucker said—

“I remonstrated against the annexation (I am disposed to call it the confiscation) of Colaba, the ancient seat of the Angria family, to which the allusion has been made in the Bombay minutes; and far from having seen reason to modify or recall the opinion recorded by me on that proceeding, I have availed myself of every suitable occasion to enforce my conviction, that a more mischievous policy could not be pursued than that which would engross the whole territory of India, and annihilate the small remnant of the native aristocracy. There are persons who fancy that landed possessions in India cannot be successfully administered by native agency. In disproof of this notion I would point to the Ram-poor jaghire in Rohilkund, which was a perfect garden when I saw it long ago, and which still remains, I believe, in a state of the highest agricultural prosperity. Nay, I would point to the principality of Sattara, which appears to have been most successfully administered both by the ex-rajah, Pertab Sing, and his brother and successor, Appa Sahib, who have done more for the improvement of the country than our government can pretend to have done in any part of its territory.”†

This, and other energetic protests, are said to have produced so strong an impression, that a vote seemed likely to pass in the Court of Proprietors, repudiating the annexation of Sattara. The majority of the directors perceiving this, called for a ballot, and so procured the confirmation of the measure by the votes of some hundreds of ladies and gentlemen, for the most part utterly ignorant of the merits of the case.‡

The provision made by the supreme government for the widows and adopted son,§ was censured by the directors; and Lord Dalhousie writes, that although the Hon. Court had declared “their desire to provide liberally for the family, and their wish that the ladies should retain jewels, fur-

niture, and other personal property suitable to their rank, they still objected that the grant of so much property, which was fairly at the disposal of the government, was greatly in excess of what was required.”||

The Kingdom of Nagpoor “became British territory by simple lapse, in the absence of all legal heirs;” for the government, says Lord Dalhousie, “refused to bestow the territory, in free gift, upon a stranger,¶ and wisely incorporated it with its own dominions.”**

Absorption was becoming a very familiar process to the British functionaries, and the addition of a population of about 4,650,000, and an area of 76,432 square miles,†† appeared to excite little attention or interest. Parliamentary returns prove, however, that the kingdom was not extinguished without palpable signs of dissatisfaction, and even some attempt at resistance on the part of the native government. The ranees, or queens, on the death of the rajah in December, 1853, requested leave to take advantage of the Hindoo law, which vested in them, or at least in the chief of them—the right of adopting a son, and of exercising the powers of the regency. They offered to adopt, according to the pleasure of the supreme government, any one of the rightful heirs, who, they alleged, existed, and were entitled to succeed to the sovereignty; “both according to the customs of the family and the Hindoo law, and also agreeably to the practice in such cases pursued under the treaties.” The reply was a formal intimation, that the orders issued by the government of India having been confirmed by the Hon. Court of Directors, the prayer of the ranees for the restitution of the raj to the family could not be granted. The maharanee, called the Banka Bye (a

* The question of the right of adoption, says Mr. Sullivan, was treated by all the authorities at home and abroad as if it had been an entirely new one, and was decided in the negative; whereas, it appeared, by records which were dragged forth after judgment was passed in the Sattara case, that the question had been formally raised, and as formally decided in favour of the right, twenty years before; and that this decision had been acted upon in no less than fifteen instances in the interval.—Pamphlet on the *Double Government*, published by India Reform Society; p. 24.

† Lieutenant-general Briggs, in his evidence before the Cotton Committee appointed in 1848, mentioned having superintended the construction of a road made entirely by natives for the rajah of Sattara, thirty-six miles long, and eighteen feet wide,

with drains and small bridges for the whole distance.

‡ Sullivan's *Double Government*, p. 26.

§ They were allowed to retain jewels, &c., to the value of sixteen lacs, and landed property worth 20,000 rupees a-year. Pensions were also granted (from the revenue) to the three ranees, of £45,000, £30,000, and £25,000 respectively.—Parl. Papers (Commons), 5th March, 1856; p. 10.

|| Parl. Papers, &c., p. 10.

¶ Lord Dalhousie, in a minute dated 10th June, 1854, admits that lineal members of the Bhonslay family existed; but adds, “they are all the progeny of daughters.”—Parl. Papers (Commons), 16th June, 1856.

** Minute, dated 28th February, 1856; p. 8.

†† Parl. Papers (Commons), 16th April, 1858.

very aged woman, of remarkable ability, who had exercised the authority of regent during the minority of her grandson, the late rajah), and the younger ranees, were not entirely unsupported in their endeavours for the continuance of the state, or at least for the obtainment of some concessions from the paramount power. The commissioner, and former resident, Mr. Mansel, represented the disastrous effect which the annexation of Nagpoor was calculated to produce upon certain influential classes. The dependent chiefs, the agriculturists, and the small shopkeepers would, he considered, "if not harshly agitated by new measures," be easily reconciled to British rule; but—

"The officers of the army, the courtiers, the priesthood, the chief merchants and bankers who had dealings with the rajah's treasury and household—all the aristocracy, in fact, of the country, see in the operation of the system that British rule involves, the gradual diminution of their exclusive consequence, and the final extinction of their order."*

The extinction of the aristocracy was calculated to affect the mass of the population more directly than would at first seem probable. Mr. Mansel truly says—

"The Indian native looks up to a monarchical and aristocratic form of life; all his ideas and feelings are pervaded with respect for it. Its ceremonies and state are an object of amusement and interest to all, old and young; and all that part of the happiness of the world which is produced by the gratification of the senses, is largely maintained by the existence of a court, its pageantry, its expenditure, and communication with the people. Without such a source of patronage of merit, literary and personal, the action of life in native society as it is and must long be, would be tame and depressing. * * * It is the bitter cry on all sides, that our rule exhibits no sympathy, especially for the native of rank, and not even for other classes of natives. It is a just, but an ungenerous, unloveable system that we administer, and this tone is peculiarly felt in a newly-acquired country. It may be that we cannot re-create, but we may pause ere we destroy a form of society already existing, and not necessarily barren of many advantages. * * * The main energies of the public service in India are directed to, or absorbed in, the collection of revenue and the repressing of rural crime; and the measures applied to the education of the native people are of little influence; while many of our own measures—as in the absorption of a native state (if we sweep clean the family of the native prince and the nobility gradually from the land)—are deeply depressing on the national character and social system."†

* Parl. Papers (Commons)—Annexation of Berar: No. 82; March 5th, 1856; p. 4.

† *Ibid.*, p. 6.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13.

§ The mode of appropriating the personal and here-

He therefore recommended, with a view of reconciling the past with the future, in a change of government from Oriental to European hands, that the Nagpoor royal family should be permitted to exercise the right of adoption; to enjoy the privileges of titular chieftainship; and to retain possession of the palace in the city of Nagpoor, with a fixed income and a landed estate.

The reply to these recommendations was, that the governor-general in council could not conceal his surprise and dissatisfaction at the advocacy of a policy diametrically opposed to the declared views of the supreme authority. The grounds on which the British commissioner advocated the creation of a titular principality, were pronounced to be weak and untenable; while all experience was alleged to be opposed to the measure which he had "most inopportunately forced" on the consideration of government. The king of Delhi, the nawab of Bengal, and the nawab-nizam of the Carnatic, were cited as so many examples of its impolicy: but "in all these cases, however, some purpose of great temporary expediency was served, or believed to be served, when the arrangement was originally made; some actual difficulty was got over by the arrangement; and, above all, the chiefs in question were existing things [?] before the arrangement." In the present instance, however, the official despatch declares there was no object of even temporary expediency to serve; no actual difficulty of any sort to be got over; no one purpose, political or other, to be promoted by the proposed measure.‡

The provision suggested by Mr. Mansel as suitable for the ranees in the event of his proposition being rejected, was condemned as extravagantly high; the hereditary treasure of the rajah, the governor-general considered, in accordance with the decision of the Hon. Court in an analogous case (Satara), was "fairly at the disposal of the government, and ought not to be given up to be appropriated and squandered by the ranees."§

The money hoarded, having been accumulated, it was alleged, out of the public funds, was available to defray the arrears of the palace establishments—a reasonable

ditary treasure of the late rajah, suggested by the commissioner as likely to be approved by the ranees, was the building a bridge over the Kumaon river; and thus, in accordance with Hindoo custom, linking the family name to a great and useful work.

plea, which could not be urged in defence of the same seizure of personal savings in the case of Sattara.

This unqualified censure of the commissioner was followed by his removal, a proceeding directly calculated to inculcate the suppression not only of opinions, but even of facts, of an unpalatable kind. The half-measure which he had suggested might possibly have worked badly, as most half-measures do; but it was avowedly proposed as a compromise, and as a means of meeting difficulties, which the Calcutta authorities saw fit to ignore. No notice whatever was taken of Mr. Mansel's statement, that in arguing with the people at Nagpoor on the practice of putting the members of the family of a deceased chief on individual life pensions, upon the absorption of a state, they immediately (though not before unsubservient to the execution of orders from Calcutta for the extinction of sovereign powers) fell back upon the law and rights of the case, and contended that the treaty gave what was now being arbitrarily taken away.*

Nothing, indeed, could be more arbitrary than the whole proceeding. A military officer, Captain Elliot, was made officiating commissioner, and a large body of troops was placed at his disposal to overawe opposition, in the event of the royal family or their late subjects evincing any disposition to resist the fulfilment of the orders of the governor-general for the seizure of the treasure, hereditary jewels, and even the personal property and household effects of the deceased rajah, which were advertised to be sold by public auction, to provide a fund for the support of his family.

The ranees sent a vakeel, or ambassador, to Calcutta, to intreat that a stop should be put to the sale of effects held as private property for a century and a-half; "and, further, for the cessation of the unjust, oppressive, and humiliating treatment shown by the commissioner, under the alleged orders of government, towards the maharanees and the other heirs and members of the family of the late rajah, whose lives are embittered and rendered burdensome by the cruel conduct and indignities to which they have been obliged to submit."

Repeated memorials were sent in by the ranees, concerning "the disrespect and contumely" with which they were treated by the acting commissioner, and also

* Parl. Papers on Berar, p. 7.

regarding the manner in which the sales by auction were conducted, and property sacrificed; particularly cattle and horses: a pair of bullocks, for instance, estimated to be worth 200 rupees, being sold for twenty.

The official return of the proceeds of the rajah's live stock, tends to corroborate the statement of the ranees. A hundred camels only realised 3,138 rupees, and 182 bullocks only 2,018; elephants, horses, and ponies in large numbers, sold at equally low prices. The remonstrances of the ranees were treated with contemptuous indifference. The government refused to recognise their envoys, and would receive no communications except through the official whose refusal to forward their appeals was the express reason of their having endeavoured to reach the ear of the governor-general by some other channel.

The removal of the property from the palace was attended by considerable excitement. The native officer employed by the English government, was "hustled and beaten" in the outer courtyard of the palace. The sepoy on duty inside the square, are described by Captain Elliot in his rather singular account of the matter, "as not affording that protection and assistance they were bound to do; for, setting aside Jumal-oo-deen's [the native officer's] rank, position, and employment, he was married, and somewhat lame." There was great excitement in the city, as well as in and about the palace, and great crowds had assembled and were assembling. It was doubtful to what extent opposition might have been organised, for the aged maharanees was asserted to have sent a message to the British officer in command, that if the removal of property were attempted, she would set the palace on fire. This threat, if made, was never executed: reinforcements of troops were introduced into the city, and the orders of the government were quietly carried through. The governor-general considered that the "scandalous conduct" of the sepoy and rifle guards on duty, ought to have been punished by dismissal from the service; but it had been already passed over in silence, and so no martyrs were made to the cause, and the affair passed over as an ebullition of that "floating feeling of national regret," which Mr. Mansel had previously described as ready to discharge itself in dangerous force upon any objects within its range.

The maharanee denied having incited or approved the resistance offered by her people; but the Calcutta authorities persisted in considering that a plan of resistance had been organised by her during the night preceding the disturbances which took place in the morning of the 11th of October, 1854, and threatened to hold the ranees generally responsible, in the event of any repetition of such scenes as those which had already brought down upon them the displeasure of government.

The ladies were, no doubt, extremely alarmed by this intimation, which the officiating commissioner conveyed to them, he writes, in "most unmistakable language." The sale of the chief part of the jewels and heirlooms (estimated at from £500,000 to £750,000 in value)* was carried on unopposed in the public bazaars; a proceeding which the then free press did not fail to communicate to the general public, and to comment on severely.† Of the money hidden within the sacred precincts of the zenana, 136 bags of silver rupees had been surrendered; but there was a further store of gold mohurs, with the existence of which the Banka Bye had herself acquainted the British functionaries immediately after the death of her grandson, as a proof of her desire to conceal nothing from them. When urged, she expressed her readiness to surrender the treasure; but pleaded as a reason for delay, the extreme, and as it speedily proved, mortal sickness of Unpoora Bye, the chief widow, in whose apartments the treasure was hidden, and her great unwillingness to permit its removal. The commissioner appears to have treated this plea as a continuation of "the old system of delay and passive resistance to all one's instructions and wishes." Nevertheless, he deemed it objectionable "to use force;" and "was unwilling that Captain Crichton [the officer in command] should go upstairs on this occasion, or take any active part in this matter," it being "better to avoid a scene;" and, as an alternative, he advised "writing off the amount known to be buried, to the debit of the ranees, deducting the same from their annual allowance, and telling them the same was at their disposal and in their own possession."‡

The princesses would have been badly off had this arrangement been carried out, for the amount of hoarded treasure had been exaggerated, as it almost invariably is in such cases; and although no doubt is expressed that the formal surrender of 10,000 gold mohurs (made immediately after the delivery of the governor-general's threatening message) included the entire hoard, yet double that sum was expected; the other half having, it is alleged, been previously expended.

The maharanee excited the angry suspicions of the Calcutta government by a despairing effort for the maintenance of the state, with which she felt the honour of her house indissolubly allied. It appeared, that Major Ramsay, then resident at Nepaul, had, when occupying the same position at the court of Nagpoor, been on very bad terms with the deceased rajah. The Banka Bye attributed the extinction of the raj to his representations, and sent a vakeel to him, in the hope of deprecating his opposition, and obtaining his favourable intervention. The errand of the vakeel was misunderstood, and attributed to a desire to communicate with the Nepaulese sovereign on the subject of the annexation of Nagpoor. Under this impression, the governor-general in council declared, that the ranees had no right whatever to communicate with native courts; that it was impossible to put any other than an unfavourable construction on their attempt to do so: and the acting commissioner was officially desired to acquaint them, that the repetition of such an act would "certainly lead to substantial proof of the displeasure of government being manifested to them."

On the mistake being discovered, the following minute was recorded by the governor-general, and concurred in by the four members of council whose names have become lately familiar to the British public. Its curt tone contrasts forcibly with that adopted by the Marquis Wellesley, and his great brother, in their arrangements for the royal family of Mysoor: yet the dynasty of Hyder Ali had been founded on recent usurpation, and overthrown in open fight; while that of Berar represented a native power of 150 years' duration, and long in peaceful alliance with the Company as a protected state. The age and reputation of the Banka Bye, her former position as regent, the remarkable influence exercised by her during the late reign, and her

* Parl. Papers (Annexation of Berar), p. 9.

† *Indian News*, 2nd April, 1855.

‡ Letter from officiating commissioner, Capt. Elliot, to government, 13th Dec., 1854.—Parl. Papers, p. 44.

uniform adhesion to the British government,—these, together with the dying state of Unpoora Bye, the eldest of the rajah's widows, and the bereaved condition of them all, might well have dictated a more respectful consideration of their complaints and misapprehensions, than is apparent in the brief but comprehensive account given by the supreme government, of the groundless charge which had been brought against the princesses :—

“It now appears that the vakeel sent by the ranees of Nagpoor to Nepaul, was intended, not for the durbar, but for Major Ramsay, the resident there. Major Ramsay, when officiating resident at Nagpoor, was compelled to bring the late rajah to order. The rajah complained of him to me, in 1848. The officiating resident was in the right, and, of course, was supported. It seems that these ladies now imagine that Major Ramsay's supposed hostility has influenced me, and that his intercession, if obtained, might personally move me. The folly of these notions need not to be noticed. The vakeel not having been sent to the durbar, nothing more need be said about the matter.”*

The means used by Major Ramsay “to bring the rajah to order,” had been previously called in question, owing to certain passages in the despatch which had occasioned the supersession of Mr. Mansel. These passages are given at length, in evidence of the entirely opposite manner in which successive British residents at Nagpoor exercised the extraordinary powers entrusted to them; interfering in everything, or being absolutely nonentities (except as a drain upon the finances of the state they were, barnacle-like, attached to), according to their temper of mind and habit of body.

“In my arguments,” says Mr. Mansel, “with natives upon the subject of the expediency and propriety of the British government dealing with the Nagpoor case as a question of pure policy, I have put to them the position, that we had all of us at Nagpoor, for the last two years, found it impracticable to carry on the government decently. I remarked that Major Wilkinson, after a long struggle, succeeded in getting the rajah within his own influence, and, by his fine sagacity and perfect experience, had controlled him whenever he chose. Colonel Speirs, from decaying health, was latterly unable to put much check upon the rajah, though his perfect knowledge of affairs of the day here, and of Oriental courts in general, would otherwise have been most valuable. Major Ramsay† pursued a course of uncompromising interference, and, in a state of almost chronic disease, attempted a perfect restoration to health. Mr. Davidson, as his health grew worse, left the rajah to do as he liked; and under the argument, that it was better to work by personal influence than by fear, he left the rajah to do as he pleased, with something like the pretence of an invalid physician—that his patient would die with too much care, and required gentle treatment. During my incumbency, I found the rajah so much spoiled by the absolute indulgence of my predecessor, that I was gradually driven to adopt the radical reform of Major Ramsay, or the extreme conservatism of Mr. Davidson; and in the struggle which latterly ensued between myself and the rajah, his end was undoubtedly hastened by vexation at my insisting on his carrying out the reform in spirit as well as to the letter. * * * The argument of the natives, with whom I have frequently conferred on this subject, is, that the British residents at Nagpoor should participate in the blame charged to the rajah by myself; for if the same system of advice and check which was contemplated by the last treaty, had been carried out from first to last, the rajah would never have been tempted into the habits of indolence and avarice that latterly made him make his own court and the halls of justice a broker's shop, for the disposal of official favours and the sale of justice. The answer to this is, that the British government does its best; that it sends its highest servants to a residency; and if the principles or abilities of the different incumbents vary, it is only natural and incidental to any colonial system in the world. The result, however, is, that the management of the country gets into all kinds of embarrassment, of death, judicial corruption, and irresponsibility of ministers, when the readiest course is to resume those sovereign powers that were delegated on trust.”†

* Minute, dated November, 1854. Parl. Papers (Annexation of Berar), p. 41. Signed—Dalhousie, J. Dorin, J. Low, J. P. Grant, B. Peacock.

† Major Ramsay denies this; and, while bearing testimony to the “high character” of Mr. Mansel, says, that the policy adopted by the latter was radically opposed to his own, for that he had pursued the most rigid system of non-interference with any of the details of the local government; whereas Mr. Mansel appointed, or caused the appointment of, several individuals to responsible offices in the

Nagpoor government, and set apart particular days in the week on which the heads of departments waited upon him at the residency, and submitted their reports and proceedings.—Letter of Major Ramsay to government, 5th February, 1855—Parl. Papers, pp. 46; 53.

‡ Letter of Commissioner Mansel, 29th April, 1854—Parl. Papers, p. 7. See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 420, for an account of the circumstances under which the so-called delegation of sovereign powers was made in the case alluded to.

§ Letter of Commissioner Mansel, 29th April, 1854—Parl. Papers, p. 7. See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 420, for an account of the circumstances under which the so-called delegation of sovereign powers was made in the case alluded to.

¶ Letter of Commissioner Mansel, 29th April, 1854—Parl. Papers, p. 7. See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 420, for an account of the circumstances under which the so-called delegation of sovereign powers was made in the case alluded to.

resident be an upright man, he can scarcely fail to be distracted by the conflicting interests of the paramount and dependent states—the two masters whom he is bound to serve; and if of a sensitive disposition, he cannot but feel the anomalous character of his situation at the elbow of a dependent sovereign, who must naturally regard him as something between a schoolmaster and a spy. No doubt there have been British residents whose influence has been markedly beneficial to native states; not only formerly, when their position was better defined, and, from circumstances, involved less temptation to, or necessity for, interference in the internal affairs of the state, but even of late years. The general effect, however, has been the deterioration and depression painted with half unconscious satire by Mr. Mansel, in the case of Nagpoor.

The circumstances attending the annexation of this state, have been dwelt on more on account of the incidental revelations which they involve of the practical working of a pernicious system, than from any special interest which attaches to the particular question so summarily decided by Lord Dalhousie. No connected statement of the case has been made public on behalf of the princesses, notwithstanding the spirited attempts made by the Banka Bye to obtain a fair hearing. When the governor-general refused to receive any communication through her envoys, she sent them to England, in the hope of obtaining a reversal of the decision pronounced at Calcutta. The vakeels complained of the treatment which the ranees had met with, especially of the strict surveillance under which they were placed: their statements were published in the newspapers, and the new commissioner for Nagpoor (Mr. Plowden) took up the matter in resentment. Meantime, Unpoora Bye died (14th Nov., 1855), her end being embittered, and probably accelerated, by the same mental distress which is acknowledged to have hastened that of her husband. The aged maharanees abandoned further opposition, and wrote to London to dismiss her vakeels (2nd Dec., 1855), on the ground that, instead of obeying her orders, and laying her case before the authorities in a suppliant way, so that her "honour and humble dignity might be upheld," they had displayed a great deal of imprudence, and used calumnious expressions against the British officers. She informed them,

with significant brevity, of the death of Unpoora Bye; adding—"Well, what has happened, has happened." This letter, which is alike indicative of the character of the writer and of the dictation (direct or indirect) under which it was written, closes the series of papers, published by order of parliament, regarding the annexation of Berar.

The territory resumed from Ali Morad, one of the Ameers of Sind, in 1852, comprised an area of 5,412 square miles. The reason of the resumption has been already stated.*

Odeipore is mentioned, in a Return (called for by the House of Commons in April, 1858) "of the Territories and Tributaries in India acquired since the 1st of May, 1851," as having been annexed in 1853. The area comprises 2,306 square miles, with a population of 133,748 persons. This place must not be confounded with the two Oodipoors (great and small) in Rajast'han, the absorption of which even Lord Dalhousie would scarcely have ventured on attempting.

The territory resumed from Toola Ram Senaputtee, in Cachar, in 1853, comprises 2,160 acres of land; but, unlike Odeipore, has only the disproportionate population of 5,015.†

Hyderabad.—In 1853, the Nizam concluded a new treaty with the Company, by which he transferred to them one-third of his country, to meet the expenses of the contingent maintained by him, but disciplined and commanded by British officers. The resident, Major-general Fraser, when the proposition for the cession of territory first came under consideration in 1851, recommended nothing less than the deposition of the Nizam, and the assumption of sovereign power by the Company for a definite number of years—a measure which he considered justified by the weak character of the Nizam, and the disorganised state of his administration. This proposition was at once rejected by Lord Dalhousie, who ably argued, that the transfer of the administration to the British government would never be consented to by the Nizam; that to impose it upon him without his consent, would be a violation of treaties; that the Nizam was neither cruel, nor ambitious, nor tyrannical; that his maladministration of his own kingdom did not materially affect the security of British territory, or the interests of British subjects; and that the

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 452.

† Parl. Paper (Commons), 16th April, 1858.

British authorities were neither called on, nor at liberty, to set aside an independent native government because, in their opinion, that government exercised its authority in a manner injurious to its subjects.* "The debt," Lord Dalhousie says, "which burdens the Nizam has been produced by the contingent. The monthly subsidy for which the resident at Hyderabad maintains a perpetual wrestle with the dewan [native chancellor of the exchequer], and which transforms the representative of the British government, by turns, into an importunate creditor and a bailiff in execution, is the pay of the contingent." The governor-general proceeds to expose the misinterpretation of the article of the treaty of 1800; which provided that the British army should, in time of war, be reinforced by a body of 15,000 of the Nizam's troops; but which had "been made to justify our requiring the Nizam to uphold a force of about 5,000 infantry, 2,000 horse, and four field batteries, officered by British officers, controlled by the British resident, trained on the British system, not in war only, but permanently, at a very costly rate, and so as to be available for the use of the Nizam only when the representative of the British government has given his consent."†

The scale of expenditure on which the contingent was maintained, was inordinate. Lord Dalhousie, in a minute of the 25th of September, 1848, declared—"I agree with Colonel Low in thinking that we cause the contingent to become a much heavier burden on the Nizam's finances than it ought to be. The staff, in my humble judgment, is preposterously large. The pay and allowances, and charges of various kinds, are far higher than they ought to be." Still, nothing was done to reduce this ruinous waste of public funds; for in March, 1853, another minute, by the same ready pen, described the contingent as having no less than five brigadiers, with brigade-majors, attached to it, and a military secretary, who drew the same salary as the adjutant-

general of the Bengal army. By the rules of the force, the officers were promoted to superior grades, and to higher pay, earlier than they would have been in their own service; and, altogether, the expenses were "unusually and unnecessarily heavy."‡

The plan devised for compelling the payment, by the Nizam, of expenditure thus recklessly incurred in the maintenance of a contingent which no treaty bound him to support, and which had existed on sufferance from the time of the Mahratta war, without any formal sanction on the part of either government, is vaunted as extremely liberal, apparently because it fell short of total annexation.

The sum claimed was about seventy-five lacs,§ or £750,000 (including interest at six per cent.); to provide for the payment of which, the supreme government demanded the transfer of "districts to the value of not less than thirty-five lacs per annum, so as to provide for the payment of the principal of the debt within three years, and further to afford a margin, which should in each year be applicable to meet any partial deficiencies which might still occur in the supply of monthly pay for the troops of the contingent."|| The resident pointed out, as the districts of which the British government might most fitly and advantageously demand possession, the Berar Payeen Ghaut, the border districts from thence down to Shorapoor,¶ and the territory of the dooab, between the Kistnah and the Toombuddra; which, together, comprised the whole frontier of the Nizam's kingdom along its northern and western boundaries, and along its southern boundary, as far as the junction of the above-named rivers.

"The Berar Payeen Ghaut (he adds) is, without exception, the richest and most fertile part of the Nizam's country, and the Raichore dooab is the next to it in this respect. These two districts hold out great prospect of improvement in regard to revenue and commerce, from an extended culture of the two articles of cotton and opium. * * * The quantity of opium now cultivated in Berar Payeen Ghaut,

* Parl. Papers, 26th July, 1854; p. 3.

† Minute by the governor-general, June, 1851.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 100.

‡ Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, pp. 4; 103.

§ Minute by governor-general, 27th May, 1851.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 32.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¶ The resident, Major-general Fraser, adds a remark on Shorapoor, which illustrates the systematic encroachment, manifested in so many ways, and excused by such various pretexts. The rajah of Shorapoor, he says, "is near his majority; but, I pre-

sume, that when that district is given over to his charge, measures will be taken by the supreme government for keeping it, for some years at least, subject to the control of a British officer. It is at present in a favourable and improving state; but if given up to the young rajah's exclusive and uncontrolled authority, it will quickly revert to the same state of barbarism in which it was before."—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 14. Shorapoor is inhabited by the Bedars, a warlike aboriginal tribe, whose chief claims a descent of more than thirty centuries.

as well as of cotton, might be greatly increased, and the duty upon them would form, in itself, a very productive source of revenue."

Captain Meadows Taylor likewise gave an extremely tempting account of the same districts; he referred to the reported existence of very valuable anicuts, and described the Raichore district as well supplied with tanks.

Temporary occupation, for the liquidation of the outstanding debt, was all that was to be immediately demanded; but Lord Dalhousie avowedly anticipated the probability of being compelled to retain these districts permanently, for the regular payment of the contingent. Major-general Fraser entered more fully into the subject; and his statements show, in the clearest manner, the irremediable disorder into which the proposed step was calculated to plunge the finances of Hyderabad. He writes (4th February, 1851):—

"We are about to assume, in pursuance of a just right to do so, which cannot be denied, the temporary management of a tract of country yielding from thirty to forty lacs of rupees; and the Nizam, therefore, will have so much income less to meet those demands, to which his whole and undivided revenue has long been proved to be quite unequal. He has been unable, for the last five years, to pay the contingent, except by partial instalments only, although he considers this the first and most important payment incumbent on his government to make; and it cannot, therefore, be expected that he should be able to meet this essential claim upon him with his financial means diminished to the extent above mentioned. It is all but certain that he will not be able to pay the contingent [*brigadiers, brigade-majors, military secretaries, and all*] for any further period than perhaps the next two months, and this, probably, but in small proportion only. The ultimate consequence, then, must be (and I see no reason why this argument should not be set before him in a plain and distinct light), that we should be under the necessity of retaining, permanently, in our possession the territory of which we are now about to assume the temporary charge."

The Nizam felt the iron pale which surrounded his kingdom closing in, and made an attempt at resistance which astonished the supreme authorities, and disconcerted, or at least delayed, the execution of their arrangements. Open resistance the governor-general was prepared to overwhelm by taking military possession of the specified districts. The Nizam was too prudent, or too powerless, to offer any. Suraj-ool-Moolk, the chief minister, appointed in compliance with Lord Dalhousie's suggestion, and pronounced by him to be the only man who seemed to possess the capacity to

grapple with the difficulties of the state, pointed out the certain ruin which the proposed cession would involve. The districts demanded, he said, afforded one-third of the entire revenue; another third would be required for the regular monthly payment of the contingent, &c.: and only one-third being left to carry on the entire administration, both the Nizam and his subjects would be reduced to distress for the means of existence.

Arguments of this nature had been anticipated, and would probably have made little impression, had they not been followed up by a distinct offer for the immediate liquidation of arrears. The resident had received no instructions how to act in so unexpected a case, and he therefore wrote word to Calcutta, that pending further orders, he had judged it his duty to consent to leave the question of the transfer of the districts in temporary abeyance, the Nizam having found means to take upon himself the entire and immediate payment of his debt, and to give "the best security that could be offered for the future regular payment of the contingent, short of the actual transfer, to us, of part of his country for this purpose."*

The first half of the debt was paid at once; the second proved more difficult to be raised in the precise manner required, although the Nizam contributed thirty lacs of rupees (£30,000) from his private funds. Suraj-ool-Moolk requested that a favourable rate of exchange might be allowed for the Nizam's bills, in consideration of the interest paid by him direct to the British government, of that exacted by usurers on sums borrowed on the same account, and especially because of the notorious embarrassments of the state. He asked that the existing average rate of exchange on the Company's bills should be applied to the Nizam's, and that these latter should be credited according to their dates. In support of his first request, he urged that it was the universal practice to pay a debt at the current rate of exchange, and not at the rate which prevailed when the loan was made; adding, that it ought to be borne in mind, that the present debt had accumulated, in the course of seven years, by comparatively small sums; and the whole of it was now required to be paid within four months. With regard to the

* Letter of Resident Fraser, 16th July, 1851.—Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 52.

second point, he said—"If instead of hoondees [bills], the Circar [state] paid the amount of the debt to you in cash, and you found it expedient to remit the money to the residencies, you would have to pay ready money to the soucars [bankers] for the hoondees you procured for this purpose; and as I send you hoondees so purchased, instead of the coin, I do not think I am unreasonable in requesting that credit may be given to this Circar [state] on the dates the hoondees are delivered to you."*

But the resident would hear of no allowance; no deductions in any way. The financial difficulties of the Nizam were a subject of regret; but it was not "equitable, that the loss of which Suraj-ool-Moolk complained, should be lessened at the expense of the British government."

The 31st of October—the time specified for the payment of the second and final instalment—arrived. The Nizam, though unable to raise the entire sum required, yet managed to furnish a considerable portion of it, and acted in such a manner as to convince the resident that he was really "exerting himself, in good faith, to liquidate the whole." The governor-general records this, in a minute dated 3rd January, 1852; yet, at the same time, he was occupied in framing a treaty which was to deprive the Nizam of the territory he had made so strenuous an effort to retain. Colonel Low was dispatched to Hyderabad to conduct the negotiations; "his judgment, firmness, and conciliatory demeanour" being relied on to bring about the issue desired by the supreme government. The task was neither an easy nor a pleasant one.

The proposals now made were, that the Nizam should cede the frontier districts in perpetuity, and receive, in return, a receipt in full for the portion of the instalment he had failed to pay in October, and likewise for the future subsistence of the contingent, which the Company proposed to reorganise in their own name, on a reduced scale, transforming it from the Nizam's force into one to be maintained for him by the government. There was, moreover, a subsidiary force, which the Company were bound to maintain in perpetuity by the treaty of 1800, within the state of

Hyderabad; the funds being provided by the cession of the Nizam's share of the territory acquired from Mysoor.† The government had need of these troops, and desired to obtain, by a new treaty, the right of employing the chief part of them elsewhere, on the plea of there being no necessity for them in Hyderabad; the danger of external foes which existed when the arrangement was first made, and when the Mahrattas were in the height of their power and turbulence, having long since passed away.

It was true that, by this particular part of the proposed arrangement, the Nizam would be no loser; because the contingent, and the large number of troops in his immediate service, alone exceeded the ordinary requirements of the state. Only, as Lord Dalhousie wanted the services of the subsidiary force elsewhere, and as the contingent force, to a great extent, performed its duties and supplied its place, it is evident that there could be no excuse for appropriating the services of the former body without contributing to the expenses of the latter, which amounted to £30,000 a month.‡

This was never even contemplated; and the state of Hyderabad having been made to furnish funds in perpetuity for a subsidiary force, was now to be compelled to cede territory for the support of another distinct but very similar body of troops, and to place the former at the service of the British government without receiving any compensation whatever.

It is true the Nizam was to be given the option of disbanding the contingent; but then the immediate ruin of the country was anticipated by the resident as so palpable and certain a consequence of such a measure, that the idea was viewed as one of the last the Nizam would entertain. Even in the event of his choosing this hazardous alternative, in a desperate endeavour to relieve his finances from the incubus with which they had been so long burdened, the transfer of territory was still to be insisted on, at least temporarily, for the payment of arrears, "and for covering the future expenses of the force during the time necessary for its absorption, in the gradual manner required by good faith to existing personal interests."§

* Letter from Sooraj-ool-Moolk, 14th August, 1851.—Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 70.

† For the origin and establishment of the subsidiary force, see *Indian Empire*, vol. i., pp. 373; 378.

‡ Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), 26th July, 1854; p. 94.

§ Despatch from directors, 2nd November, 1853.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 8.

"Beneficial as these proposals are, especially to the Nizam," writes Lord Dalhousie, "it is anticipated that his highness will be reluctant to assent to them:" and, in the event of his reluctance amounting to a positive refusal to sign the new treaty, military possession was ordered to be taken of the coveted districts.

The Nizam was, as had been anticipated, incapable of appreciating the advantages offered him: he saw no occasion for any new treaty at all; earnestly craved for time to pay off the debt; and promised to meet the expenses of the contingent with regularity for the future—a promise which, however, there is reason to fear he lacked the means of performing. At first, he seems to have been inclined to stand at bay; and in the opening conference with Colonel Low, he took up the strong point of his case, and put it very clearly.

"In the time of my father," said the Nizam, "the Peishwa of Poona became hostile both to the Company's government and to this government, and Sir Henry Russell (the resident) organised this contingent, and sent it in different directions, along with the Company's troops, to fight the Mahratta people; and this was all very proper, and according to the treaty; for those Mahrattas were enemies of both states; and the Company's army and my father's army conquered the ruler of Poona.* After that, there was no longer any war; so why was the contingent kept up any longer than the war?"

Colonel Low was not prepared to meet an argument which went at once to the gist of the question; and he made, as an honest man could not help doing, a very lame reply, excusing himself on the plea, that thirty-six years had elapsed since the occurrence of the events alluded to by the Nizam; that he (the colonel) was not in Hyderabad at the time; but that he supposed the reigning prince had considered the maintenance of the contingent a good arrangement, and therefore consented to it. He proceeded to represent the necessity of retaining this force to overawe the Arabs, Rohillas, Seiks, and other plunderers, and to enable the Nizam to collect his revenues: adding, that the governor-general was so much disposed to act liberally in the matter, that he would probably aid in re-

ducing the expenses of the contingent, if that were desired. The Nizam here abruptly terminated the conference.

A draft treaty was sent in, providing for the required cession; and the Nizam was reminded, that he would thereby gain relief, in future, from the heavy interest he had been compelled to pay on money borrowed for the maintenance of the contingent. His reiterated reply was—"A change in a treaty, be it what it may, can never be an advantage to a sovereign who prefers, as I do, that there should not be any change at all." He reluctantly consented to discuss the subject again with the resident, and received him at the second interview with a flushed face and excited manner, which, at first sight, resembled the effects of wine or opium. This was not the case; for the Nizam had never shown himself more acute in argument, nor more fluent in conversation; but he was very angry, and had been sitting up nearly all night examining the treaty with his chief nobles. "Two acts," he said, "on the part of a sovereign prince are always reckoned disgraceful: one is, to give away, unnecessarily, any portion of his hereditary territories; and the other is, to disband troops who have been brave and faithful in his service. * * * Did I ever make war against the English government, or intrigue against it? or do anything but co-operate with it, and be obedient to its wishes, that I should be so disgraced?"† Again and again he asked to be allowed to pay the forty-six lacs of rupees then owing, and provide security for future regularity; but the resident reminded him that similar pledges had been repeatedly violated, and urged him to accept the governor-general's proposition, and apply the sum he spoke of in lessening the heavy arrears of his own troops and servants. The Nizam, in reply, made what impartial readers may consider a natural and sensible speech; but which the resident reported as illustrative of "his highness's peculiar and strange character."

"Gentlemen like you," he said, "who are sometimes in Europe, and at other times in India; sometimes employed in government business, at other times soldiers; sometimes sailors, and at other times even engaged in commerce (at least I have heard that some great men of your tribe have been merchants), you cannot understand the nature of my feelings in this matter. I am a sovereign prince, born to live and

* See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 419.

† *Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory)*, p. 119.

die in this kingdom, which has belonged to my family for seven generations. You think that I could be happy if I were to give up a portion of my kingdom to your government in perpetuity: it is totally impossible that I could be happy; I should feel that I was disgraced. I have heard that one gentleman of your tribe considered that I ought to be quite contented and happy if I were put upon the same footing as Mohammed Ghouse Khan [the Nawab of Arcot]; to have a pension paid to me like an old servant, and have nothing to do but to eat and sleep and say my prayers. Wah!"*

Other remarks followed; the Nizam went over all the most disputed portions of former negotiations, and said that the Company ought to give him territory instead of taking any away. He complained bitterly of the discreditable transactions connected with the firm of Palmer & Co., by which his father had sustained both territorial and pecuniary loss;† and adverted sarcastically to the high value the British power placed on money. The second interview terminated as unsatisfactorily as the first. A third followed, at which the Nizam received the resident with "something of sadness in his expression of countenance," yet "with due courtesy and politeness." But he soon grew excited, and said angrily, "Suppose I were to declare that I don't want the contingent at all?" In that case, he was told, some years might elapse before the men could be otherwise provided for, and the specified districts would still be required to provide for them in the interim.

The conversation came to a standstill, and the resident broke silence by asking a decided answer to the question—whether the Nizam would consent to form a new treaty? "I could answer in a moment," was the retort; "but what is the use of answering? If you are determined to take districts, you can take them without my either making a new treaty, or giving any answer at all."

Once more the discussion was adjourned. The government had resolved, in case of necessity, "to take possession of the districts by physical force;"‡ but a difficulty arose as to the troops to be employed. There were, indeed, more than sufficient for the purpose already stationed within the

limits of Hyderabad; but the employment of troops ostensibly organised for the Nizam's service, in direct opposition to his will, would, one of the members of government observed, be a measure of doubtful propriety in the case of the subsidiary force, but, beyond all doubt, wrong in the case of the contingent. The same minute shows how completely native contingents were viewed as identified with British interests, and how little anticipation was then entertained that a time was coming when the majority would mutiny, murder their officers, and fight to the death against the united power of their own princes and the British government: it also illustrates the anomalous condition of contingent troops in general, on whom such divided allegiance as is here described, must necessarily have sat lightly; and who were counted upon by the supreme government, as being ready, at any moment, to march against the person and the capital of their ostensible master, to whom they had sworn allegiance, and whose salt they ate.

"I am quite satisfied," writes Sir Frederick Currie, "that the troops of the contingent would, at the command of the resident and their officers, march against the other troops of the state, against Hyderabad, and against the person of the Nizam himself, if so ordered, as readily as against any other parties, so entirely have they been taught to consider themselves our soldiers; but we must not, on that account, lose sight of the fact, that they are *bonâ fide* the Nizam's troops, enlisted (by British officers, it is true, but by British officers in the pay and service of the Nizam) in his name, sworn to allegiance to him, and obedience to his orders. It would be, to my mind, the very height of anarchy to order these troops to coerce their master in any way; but more especially so, to use them for the purpose of taking violent possession of a part of that master's territories in order to provide for their own pay."§

The government had therefore a special reason for desiring to procure the consent of the Nizam to their occupation of the frontier districts; beside which, the use of the subsidiary troops for their own purposes, could only be obtained by an article framed to supersede the rule by which they were "hampered"|| in the treaty of 1800; and further, it was desirable to secure a legal sanction for the continued maintenance of the contingent.

At length a modification of the draft treaty was agreed upon, chiefly through

* An Arabic exclamation, indicative of anger and surprise, and uttered with uncontrollable passion.—Parl. Papers (Nizam's Territory), p. 120.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 421.

‡ Resident's Letter.—Parl. Papers—*Ibid.*, p. 129.

§ Minute by Sir F. Currie, 2nd April, 1853.

|| Minute by Mr. Dorin, 1st June, 1853.—Parl. Papers, p. 154.

the mediation of Shums-ool-Omrah, the uncle-in-law of the Nizam; who was described by the resident as having been famed, throughout a long life, for truthfulness and general respectability of character, and who evinced, at a very advanced age, remarkable manliness and good sense. The Nizam positively refused to sign away any of his territory in perpetuity; but he reluctantly consented to the temporary transfer of the districts to British management, on condition of regular accounts being rendered to him, and the surplus revenue being paid into his treasury, after the liquidation of the old debt, and the regular payment of the contingent, with some other items, should have been provided for.

The governor-general had previously declared, that "much consideration" was due to the Nizam on account of the unnecessary expense at which the contingent had been maintained; and had dwelt forcibly on the heavy pecuniary sacrifice the government was willing to make by cancelling the old debt. Why this benevolent intention was not carried out, does not clearly appear. The Nizam would have joyfully accepted the boon, if assured that it involved no latent responsibility; but it never seems to have been placed within his reach. Lord Dalhousie, in his long minute on the subject of the advantages procured by the treaty, says, "that in providing, beyond risk, the means of regularly paying the contingent, and of terminating all pecuniary transactions and consequent causes of dispute with the Nizam, the government of India secured an all-important object; to obtain which, it was prepared not merely to accept an assignment of districts only, but further to cancel the fifty lacs of rupees due to it." His lordship adds—"The government may well be content with a treaty which gives it what it sought without requiring the sacrifice it was ready and willing to make in return."

No doubt the new arrangement was an

extremely favourable one for the British government, when viewed in the light of temporary financial expediency. The benefit to be derived by the prince, whom Lord Dalhousie truly called our "old and staunch ally," is by no means equally apparent.* Yet it would seem to have been so to the Calcutta council; for, in sending home to the Court of Directors the documents from which the preceding account has been exclusively framed, and the precise words of which have been, as far as possible, adhered to, entire confidence is expressed in the irrefragable proofs contained therein, "that the conduct of the government of India towards the Nizam, in respect of the contingent and of all his other affairs, has been characterised by unvarying good faith, liberality, and forbearance; and by a sincere desire to maintain the stability of the state of Hyderabad, and to uphold the personal independence of his highness the Nizam."

The directors evidently sympathised with Lord Dalhousie's views of the course prompted by such laudable motives, including "a due regard for our own interests."† They rejoiced to find the Indian government relieved "from the unbecoming position of an importunate creditor;" and presented their "cordial thanks to the governor-general, and the officers employed by him, in negotiating so satisfactory a treaty."

The transfer was effected in 1853. Since then, the annexation of Hyderabad has been openly canvassed, and, probably, would have been ere now completed, only the turn of Oude came first, and then—the mutiny. Fortunately for us, the Nizam died in the interim; otherwise, "the mingled exasperation and humiliation," which Lord Dalhousie himself declares the proceedings of the governor-general *must* have produced in his mind, would perhaps have taken a tangible form; and, to our other difficulties, might have been added that of struggling with "one of the most dangerous and fanatical Mussulman districts in India."‡

* Parl. Papers, p. 40.

† Minute and despatch by gov.-general, pp. 8, 9.

‡ See *Quarterly Review*, August, 1858; article on "British India," pp. 265, 266. The writer (believed to be Mr. Layard) refers to the "garbled" Blue Book from which the statement in the foregoing pages has been framed, as affording some insight into the manner in which Lord Dalhousie bullied the Nizam into a surrender of his three richest districts; and speaks of a letter full of unworthy invective and sarcasm, in which the latter is likened, by the former, "to the dust under his

feet." This sentence is not printed in the only letter from the governor-general to the Nizam in the Parl. Papers; which contains, however, the strange assertion, that the efficient maintenance of the contingent force was a duty imposed upon the government of Hyderabad, by the stipulations of existing treaties—a statement refuted by his lordship in repeated minutes. The Nizam is also threatened with the resentment of that great government "whose power can crush you at its will;" and an anticipation is expressed, of the pain and anxiety which must be caused to his highness by "the plain and peremptory

The present Nizam was suffered to ascend his hereditary throne in peace, and will, it is to be hoped, reap the reward of his allegiance in the restoration of the assigned districts, which a recent authority has declared, "were filched from his father by a series of manœuvres as unjust and discreditable as any that may be found in the history of our administration of British India."*

The Principality of Jhansi (a name with which we have been of late painfully familiar), annexed in 1854, added to our dominions 2,532 square miles of territory, peopled by 200,000 souls. The attendant circumstances were peculiar. In 1804, a treaty was concluded with Sheo Rao Bhao, subahdar or viceroy of Jhansi, by Lord Lake, under what the government truly described as the "nominal" sanction of the Peishwa. The adhesion of this chief was then deemed of much importance, and his influence had effect in inducing many others to follow his example, and thus facilitated our operations in Bundelcund. In 1817, the Peishwa having ceded to us all his rights, feudal, territorial, and pecuniary, in that province, a new treaty was entered into, by which the governor-general, "in consideration of the very respectable character" borne by the lately deceased ruler, Sheo Rao Bhao, "and his uniform and faithful attachment to the British government, and in deference to his wish expressed before his death," consented to confirm the principality of Jhansi, in perpetuity, to his grandson Ram Chandra Rao, his heirs and successors.†

The administration of Ram Chandra was carried on so satisfactorily, that, in 1832, the title of maharajah was publicly conferred on him, in lieu of that of subahdar, by Lord William Bentinck, who was returning by Jhansi to Calcutta, from a tour of inspection in the Upper Provinces. The little state was then well ordered. Its ruler was a sensible, high-spirited young man; his aristocracy and army were composed of two or three thousand persons, chiefly of his own family and tribe; and his villages and people had as good an appearance as language" addressed to him. Mr. Bright quoted the sentence already given from the *Quarterly Review*, in his place in parliament (June 24th, 1858); adding—"Passages like these are left out of despatches when laid on the table of the House of Commons. It would not do for the parliament, or the Crown, or the people of England, to know that their officer addressed language like this to a native prince." It is further alleged, that when forced to

any in India. After the ceremony had been performed in the presence of all orders of his subjects, the maharajah approached the governor-general in the attitude of supplication, and craved yet another boon. His subjects watched with deep interest the bearing of their ruler, which, in their view, implied unqualified devotion and allegiance; but they noticed (according to a native writer) the smile of surprise and derision with which the ladies and officials in the viceregal suite regarded the scene. Lord William himself had a juster appreciation of native character, but he naturally feared some embarrassing request, and heard with relief, that the boon desired was simply permission to adopt the English ensign as the flag of Jhansi. A union-jack was at once placed in his hands, and forthwith hoisted, by his order, from the highest tower of his castle under a salute of one hundred guns. The significance of the act thus gracefully carried through, was beyond misapprehension; for the adoption of the flag of the supreme power by a dependent chieftain, was the expressive and well-known symbol of loyalty and identity of interest.‡

Upon the death of Ram Chandra in 1835, without male heirs, the succession was continued in the line of Sheo Rao. Gungadhur Rao, the son of Sheo, while yet a young man, was suddenly carried off by dysentery, on the 21st of November, 1853. The day before his death, the maharajah sent for the political agent of Bundelcund (Mr. Ellis), and the officer in command (Captain Martin), and delivered to them the following *khareeta*, or testament, which he caused to be read to them in his presence, before all his court.

"[After compliments.] The manner in which my ancestors were faithful to the British government, previous to the establishment of its authority [in Bundelcund], has become known even in Europe; and it is well known to the several agents here, that I also have always acted in obedience to the same authority.

"I am now very ill; and it is a source of great grief to me, that notwithstanding all my fidelity, and the favour conferred by make the transfer in question, the Nizam had a counter pecuniary claim, exceeding in demand that urged against him; which claim, though of old standing and repeatedly advanced, Lord Dalhousie refused to discuss, until the coveted districts should have been surrendered.

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 266.

† *Parl. Papers* (Jhansi), 27th July, 1855; pp. 1; 17.

‡ *Indophilus' Letters to the Times*, p. 11.

such a powerful government, the name of my fathers will end with me; and I have therefore, with reference to the second article of the treaty concluded with the British government, adopted Damoodhur Gungadhur Rao, commonly called Anund Rao, a boy of five years old, my grandson through my grandfather.* I still hope that, by the mercy of God, and the favour of your government, I may recover my health; and, as my age is not great, I may still have children; and should this be the case, I will adopt such steps as may appear necessary. Should I not survive, I trust that, in consideration of the fidelity I have evinced towards government, favour may be shown to this child, and that my widow, during her lifetime, may be considered the regent of the state (Malika) and mother of this child, and that she may not be molested in any way."

Lakshmi Bye addressed the governor-general in favour of the adoption. She argued, that the second article of the treaty was so peculiarly worded, as expressly to state the right of succession in perpetuity, either through *warrisan* (heirs of the body, or collateral heirs) or *joh nasheenan* (successors in general); which the widow interpreted as meaning, "that any party whom the rajah adopted as his son, to perform the funeral rites over his body necessary to ensure beatitude in a future world, would be acknowledged by the British government as his lawful heir, through whom the name and interests of the family might be preserved." She likewise pleaded, that the fidelity evinced by the Jhansi chiefs in past years, ought to be taken into consideration in coming to a final decision on the fate of the principality.†

Major Malcolm, the political agent for Gwalior, Bundelcund, and Rewah, in forwarding the above appeal, speaks of the first point as an open question for the decision of government; but with regard to the latter plea, he says—"The Bye (princess or lady) does not, I believe, in the slightest degree overrate the fidelity and loyalty all along evinced by the state of Jhansi, under circumstances of considerable temptation, before our power had arrived at the commanding position which it has since attained."‡ In a previous communication,

* This term is used to denominate cousins in the third and fourth degrees, tracing their descent in the male line to a common ancestor.—Jhansi Papers, p. 8.

† Letters from the Ranee.—Parl. Papers, pp. 14; 24.

the British agent wrote—"The widow of the late Gungadhur Rao, in whose hands he has expressed a wish that the government should be placed during her lifetime, is a woman highly respected and esteemed, and, I believe, fully capable of doing justice to such a charge." Major Ellis, the political assistant for Bundelcund, considered the particular question of the right of adoption in Jhansi as settled by the precedent established in the case of Oorcha; treaties of alliance and friendship existing with both states, and no difference being discernible in the terms, which could justify the withholding the privilege of adoption from the one after having allowed it to the other. Moreover, he considered that the general right of native states to make adoptions, had been clearly acknowledged and recorded by the directors.§

The governor-general, after having "carefully considered" the above statements, decided that Jhansi, having "lapsed to the British government, should be retained by it, in accordance equally with right and with sound policy." Measures were immediately taken for the transfer of the principality to the jurisdiction of the lieutenant-governor of the North-Western Provinces. The native institutions were demolished at a blow, all the establishments of the rajah's government were superseded, and the regular troops in the service of the state were immediately paid up and discharged.||

The Gwalior contingent, and the 12th Bengal native infantry, were the troops chiefly employed by the British government in carrying through these unpopular measures; but reinforcements were held in readiness to overawe opposition. Employment such as this, on repeated occasions, was not calculated to increase the attachment of the sepoys to the foreign masters whom they served as mercenaries, in what many of them considered the confiscation of the rights and property of native royalty. If they had any latent patriotism, or any capacity for feeling it, nothing could have been more calculated to arouse or implant it than this ruthless system of absorption. Their sympathies would naturally be enlisted in favour of Lakshmi Bye, who fierce, relentless tigress as she has since appeared,

‡ Jhansi Papers, pp. 14; 24, 25.

§ Major Ellis referred especially to a despatch from the Court of Directors, dated 27th March, 1839 (No. 9), for an explicit statement of their views on the subject of adoption.—Jhansi Papers, p. 16.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 31.

was then venerated as a marvel of youth, ability, and discretion. "This lady," said Major Malcolm, "bears a very high character, and is much respected by every one in Jhansi;" and he urged especially (in the event of the annexation of the state), "that in compliance with her husband's last request, all the state jewels and private funds, and any balance remaining in the public treasury, after closing the accounts of the state, should also be considered as her private property."*

The governor-general replied, in general terms, that the property of the rajah would belong by law to his adopted son; because, the adoption, if legally made, was good for the conveyance of private rights, though not for the transfer of the principality. Thus the ranee was not only deprived of the regency, but was held to be cut off from other claims by the very means her dying husband had taken to ensure her future position. The first part of her history ends here. We have no account of the manner in which she bore her disappointment; but we know that she rose at the first signal of the mutiny, and that her name is now inseparably connected with thoughts of massacre and war. Her subsequent career does not, however, belong to this introductory chapter. The supreme council were by no means unanimous regarding the seizure of Jhansi. Messrs. Low and Halliday, while professing themselves convinced by Lord Dalhousie's reasoning on the legality of the annexation, stated, that they would have preferred the pursuance of a similar course towards Jhansi to that lately taken with regard to Kerowlee.

Now Kerowlee was a Rajpoot principality, the annexation of which was only prevented by the interference of the home government, on a threatened motion of the House of Commons.†

Indophilus (whose opinion on the subject is especially interesting, on account of his tendency towards the annexation policy in particular, and generally in favour of the Company) says, that Kerowlee had neither been so well governed, nor had entered into such an interesting relation with us, as Jhansi: but its rajah was descended from the Moon (Chandrabunsee); and some thou-

sands of half-civilised relations and retainers were dependent for their social position and subsistence upon the continuance of the little state. He also died without children; but the native institutions of the state were suffered to continue, and the ruling chief has remained faithful to us during the insurrection. The larger Rajpoot states of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, Bikaner, and others, have been also on our side. "The case of their Brother of the Moon was justly regarded by them as a test of our intentions towards them, and they were in some degree reassured by the result. There can be no doubt (adds Indophilus) that these small national states, which must be dependent upon the central government, and cannot, if treated with common fairness, combine against it, are an important element of the Indian system."

The Nawab of the Carnatic died in 1855, leaving no son. The claims of his paternal uncle, Azim Jah (who had been regent), were urged as entitling him, by Mohammedan law, to succeed to the musnud; but the decision was given against him, and the title of nawab placed "in abeyance," on the ground that the treaty by which the musnud of the Carnatic had been conferred on the nawab's predecessor, had been purely a personal one, and that both he and his family had disreputably abused the dignity of their position, and the large share of the public revenue which had been allotted to them.‡

Mr. Norton, an English barrister of the Madras bar, who had been present at the installation of the deceased nawab, and had resided at Madras throughout the whole of his occupation of the musnud, says, he was neither of bad parts nor of bad disposition; and had he been only moderately educated, his presence at Madras might have entailed great benefits upon the people, especially the Mussulman population. The nawab had been under the tutelage of the Company from his earliest infancy; and instead of superintending his moral and intellectual training, they gave him over "to the offices of panders and parasites, and left him to sink, from sheer neglect, into the life of sensuality and extravagance common to Eastern princes." He died suddenly, while still young; and Mr. Norton argues, that

* Letter of political agent (Malcolm), 16th March, 1854.—Parl. Papers on Jhansi, p. 28.

† *Quarterly Review*, July, 1858; article on "British India," p. 269.

‡ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 11. Minute of Governor-general Dalhousie, 28th February, 1856. Return to order of House of Lords; printed 16th June, 1856; pp. 12, 13.

foolish and improvident as his conduct had been, he had committed no offences sufficiently heinous to justify the penalty inflicted on the family; adding, "we might just as reasonably have refused to allow the heirs of George IV. to succeed him, on account of his irregular habits and extravagance."

The same writer states, that Azim Jah, the rejected claimant of the musnud, had been on several occasions officially recognised, in writing, as the lawful heir.*

The titular Raj of Tanjore was abolished by alleged right of lapse on the death of its last rajah, Sevajee, in 1855. The resident, Mr. Forbes, pleaded strongly in behalf of the daughter of the deceased. He urged that Tanjore was not a conquered country; that its acquisition had not cost the life of a single soldier, nor the value of a single rupee; and that during fifty years' possession, a revenue of no less than twenty crores, or as many millions sterling, had been derived from it by the British government. After entreating favourable consideration for the daughter of a line of princes who, when their aid was needed, had always proved our firm allies—he sets forth another and very pertinent view of the case, declaring, that "it is impossible to doubt that the now prosperous condition of the country would be very greatly affected by the sudden withdrawal of a circulation amounting to about eleven lacs a-year. So great a diminution of the expenditure within the province, must certainly lead to a difficulty in realising the revenue: it is a small tract of land from which to raise fifty lacs a-year; and it cannot be a matter of indifference to the producers, whether more than a fifth of the revenue be spent among them or not."

Mr. Norton gives his personal testimony with regard to the unnecessary and impolitic harshness with which the extinction of the titular principality was accomplished. A company of sepoys was marched suddenly into the palace; the whole of the property, real and personal, was seized, and the Company's seals put upon all the jewels and other valuables. The soldiery were disarmed, and in the most offensive way. The private estate of the rajah's mother, of the estimated value of three lacs a-year, was sequestered, and has remained so. The occupier of every piece of land in the district, which had at any time belonged to a former rajah, was

turned out of his possession, and ordered to come before the commissioner to establish a title to his satisfaction. The whole of the people dependent upon the expenditure of the raj revenue among them, were panic-struck at the prospect of being thrown out of employ; and, in a week, Tanjore, from the most contented place in our dominions, was converted into a hotbed of sullen disaffection. The people venerated the raj, and were indignant at its suppression: the very sepoys refused to receive their pensions.

According to Mr. Norton, the terms of the treaty promised the succession to "heirs" in general, and not exclusively to heirs male; but he considers the prior claim to be that of the senior widow, in preference to the daughter; and quotes a precedent in the history of the Tanjore dynasty, and many others in Hindoo history, including that of Malcolm's favourite heroine, Ahalya Bye, the exemplary queen of Indore.†

Kamachi Bye, the senior widow, intends contesting her claims to the raj, in England. She has filed a bill in the Supreme Court, for the recovery of the personal private estate of her late husband, and has obtained an injunction against the Company, to restrain them from parting with the property.‡

Passing over some minor absorptions, we arrive at the last and greatest of Lord Dalhousie's annexations—one which, both from its importance and special character, requires to be entered into at some length.

Oude, or *Ayodha*, was famous in ancient Hindoo lore as the kingdom of Dasaratha, the father of Rama, the hero of the famous epic the *Ramayana*. With the details of its fall as a Hindoo kingdom, and its history as a province of the Mogul empire, we are almost entirely unacquainted; but we know that it has retained its institutions to the present day, and that, in all respects, the Hindoo element largely predominates throughout Oude. The question of immediate interest is its connection by treaties with the East India Company, and the proceedings of its Mussulman rulers.

It has already been shown that their independence was founded on simple usurpation, having been obtained by taking advantage of the weakness of their rightful sovereigns, the Moguls of Delhi.§

Sadut Khan, nick-named the "Persian pedlar," the founder of the dynasty, was a

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, pp. 98—107.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 392.

‡ Norton's *Rebellion in India*, pp. 107—118.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 159.

merchant of Khorasan, who, by dint of ability and intrigue, eventually procured for himself the position of governor (or soubah, or nawab) of the province of Oude, together with that of vizier, which he held when Nadir Shah invaded India in 1738-'9.

The reigning emperor, Mohammed Shah, was powerless in the hands of his ambitious servants; their plots and peculations facilitated the progress of the invader; and their private quarrels incited the pillage and massacre which desolated Delhi. Sadut Khan was perpetually intriguing against his wily rival, the Nizam-ool-Moolk (or regulator of the state), "the old Deccani baboon," as the young courtiers called him; from whom the Nizams of the Deccan (Hyderabad) descended.

The death of Sadut Khan is said to have been indirectly caused by the Nizam.* It occurred before Nadir Shah quitted Delhi.† His son and successor, Sufdur Jung, was likewise able and unprincipled. The third of the dynasty was Shuja Dowlah,‡ who succeeded, in 1756, to the nawabship, which the weakness, not the will, of the Moguls of Delhi had suffered to become hereditary. The unfortunate emperor, Shah Alum, had indeed no worse enemy than his nominal servant, but really pitiless and grasping gaoler, the nawab-vizier of Oude.§ It was Shuja Dowlah who was conquered by the British troops in the battle of Buxar, in 1764; and with whom, in 1773, Warren Hastings concluded the infamous treaty of Benares, whereby the districts of Allahabad and Corah were, in defiance of the rights of Shah Alum, sold to the nawab-vizier; and British forces were hired out to the same rebellious subject, for the express purpose of enabling him to "annex" Rohileund, and "exterminate"|| the Rohilla chiefs, with whom we had no shadow of quarrel.

Immediately after the defeat and massacre of the Rohillas on the bloody field of Bareilly in 1774, Shuja Dowlah was seized with mortal sickness, and died after many

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 166. † *Ibid.*, p. 173.

‡ A memorandum on the Oude dynasty, drawn up by Fletcher Hayes, assistant-resident at Lucknow, is inserted in the Oude Blue Book of 1856. Shuja Dowlah is there described "as the infamous son of a still more infamous Persian pedlar," and as enjoying "the extensive province of Oude as a reward for a service of uncommon villainies." This and other statements are quoted on the authority of Ferishta, the famous Mohammedan annalist; but Mr. Hayes overlooks the fact, that Ferishta (or Mahomed Kasim) was born about the year 1570

months of agony. The cause was said to have been a wound inflicted by the daughter of Hafiz Rehmet, the principal Rohilla chief, who perished, sword in hand, at Bareilly. The unhappy girl had been captured; and when the nawab strove to add to the murder of the father the dishonour of his child, she stabbed him, and was immediately seized, and put to death. The wound inflicted by the unhappy girl was slight; but the dagger's point had been dipped in poison, which slowly and surely did its work.¶

The next nawab, Asuf-ad-Dowlah, was a weak and sensual youth, who had no strength of character to enable him to resist the evil counsels of unworthy favourites. The subsidiary troops at first obtained from the English for purposes of the most direct aggression, became a heavy drain on the resources of the misgoverned country. Warren Hastings saw, in his indolent neighbour, an instrument for increasing the dominions of the Company, and refilling their treasury; and then followed new treaties, new loans, new cementing of eternal friendships, and, lastly, the shameless plunder of the begums of Oude, which inflicted indelible disgrace alike on the nawab and the governor-general.**

The Marquis Cornwallis, in this as in other cases, took a very different view to that acted on by his predecessor. He saw the increasing disorganisation of Oude, and remonstrated forcibly with its ruler; who urged, in extenuation, the exactions of the Company, amounting, within a period of little more than nine years, to £2,300,000 sterling.†† The annual subsidy settled by treaty, had been raised, on one pretext or another, until it averaged eighty-four laes per annum; and Warren Hastings himself acknowledged the "intolerable burden" which was inflicted upon the revenue and authority of the nawab-vizier, by the number, influence, and enormous amount of the salaries, pensions, and emoluments of the Company's service, civil and military; which called forth the envy and resentment of the whole

during the reign of the emperor Akber, and was the cotemporary of the French traveller Bernier. It is therefore not the *Annals of Ferishta* which Mr. Hayes quotes from, but the continuation of them, known as Dow's *History of Hindoostan*, a work which, though honestly and ably written, occasionally records rumours of the day as historical facts.

§ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 299.

|| The word used in the treaty of Benares.—*Vide Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 329.

¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 330. ** *Ibid.*, p. 363.

†† Despatch of directors, 8th April, 1789.

country, by excluding the native servants and adherents of the vizier from the rewards of their services and attachment.*

Lord Cornwallis reduced the amount of tribute to fifty lacs; checked the interference, and curtailed the salaries and perquisites, of officials; and insisted on the disbandment of the temporary brigade, which had been subsidized by the vizier for so long a time only as he should require its services, but from the costly maintenance of which he had afterwards in vain sought relief.

The measures of the governor-general in favour of the Oude government were, unhappily, not attended by any corresponding internal reforms. Profligacy, incapacity, and corruption at court; tyranny, extortion, and strife among the semi-independent Hindoo chiefs; neglect and abject wretchedness among the mass, continued to prevail up to the death of Asuf-ad-Dowlah in 1797.

The succession was disputed between his brother Sadut Ali, and his son Vizier Ali, a youth of seventeen, of a disposition violent even to madness. The Calcutta government (of which Sir John Shore was then at the head) at first decided in favour of Vizier Ali; but clear proof of his illegitimacy, and consequent unfitness to succeed according to Mussulman law, being adduced, the decision was reversed in favour of Sadut Ali, who entered into a new treaty with the Company; by which he consented to surrender the fortress of Allahabad, to increase the annual subsidy, and to receive into his service the additional troops deemed necessary for the protection of Oude.

The Marquis Wellesley (then Lord Mornington) became governor-general in 1798; and his attention was at once drawn to the notorious misgovernment of Oude. The three brothers—the Marquis, Colonel Wellesley (the future duke), and Henry Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley)—discussed the subject publicly and privately; and the colonel drew up a memorandum on the subject, which, in fact, anticipates all that has since been said on the evils of subsidiary troops.

"By the first treaty with the nabobs of Oude, the Company were bound to assist the nabob with their troops, on the condition of receiving payment for their expenses. The adoption of this system of

alliance is always to be attributed to the weakness of the state which receives the assistance, and the remedy generally aggravates the evil. It was usually attended by a stipulation that the subsidy should be paid in equal monthly instalments; and as this subsidy was generally the whole, or nearly the whole, disposable resource of the state, it was not easy to produce it at the moments at which it was stipulated. The tributary government was then reduced to borrow at usurious interest, to grant tuncaws upon the land for repayment, to take advances from aumildars, to sell the office of aumildar, and to adopt all the measures which it might be supposed distress on the one hand, and avarice and extortion on the other, could invent to procure the money necessary to provide for the payment of the stipulated subsidies.

"As soon as this alliance has been formed, it has invariably been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary government consisted in the aid afforded by its more powerful ally, or rather protector; and from that moment the respect, duty, and loyalty of its subjects have been weakened, and it has become more difficult to realise the resources of the state. To this evil must be added those of the same kind arising from oppression by aumildars, who have paid largely for their situations, and must remunerate themselves in the course of one year for what they have advanced from those holding tuncaws, and other claimants upon the soil on account of loans to government; and the result is, an increasing deficiency in the regular resources of the state.

"But these financial difficulties, created by weakness and increased by oppression, and which are attended by a long train of disorders throughout the country, must attract the attention of the protecting government, and then these last are obliged to interfere in the internal administration, in order to save the resources of the state, and to preclude the necessity of employing the troops in quelling internal rebellion and disorder, which were intended to resist the foreign enemy."†

Lord Wellesley was ambitious, and certainly desirous of augmenting, by all honourable means, the resources and extent of the dominion committed to his charge. He had, however, no shade of avarice in his composition, for himself or for the Company he served: all his plans were on a large scale—all his tendencies were magnificent and munificent. He saw that the Company, by their ostensible system of non-interference in the internal affairs of the nawab's government, and by the actual and almost inevitable exercise of authority therein for the restraint of intolerable acts of oppression and disorder, had created a double government, which was giving rise to the greatest extortion and confusion.

Successive governors-general had borne testimony to the absence of law, order, and justice throughout Oude, and had endeavoured to introduce remedial measures; which, however, had all produced a directly contrary effect to that for which they were

* Quoted in *Dacoites in Excelsis*; or, *the Spoliation of Oude*, p. 28. London: Taylor.

† Memorandum on Oude.—*Wellington Supplementary Despatches*; edited by the present Duke. London: Murray, 1858.

designed, by complicating the involvements of the state, and increasing the extortions practised on the people by the aumildars and licentious native soldiery. These latter had become so perfectly mutinous and ungovernable, that Sadut Ali required the presence of British troops to secure him against the anticipated treachery of his own; and declared that, in the day of battle, he could not tell whether they would fight for or against him.

The consideration of these circumstances induced Lord Wellesley to frame a treaty, concluded in 1801, by which the nawab ceded one-half of his territories to the Company (including the districts now forming part of the North-Western Provinces, under the names of Rohilcund, Allahabad, Furruckabad, Mynpoorie, Etawa, Goruckpoor, Azimghur, Cawnpoor, and Futtehpoor), in return for a release from all arrears of subsidy, and for all expenses to be hereafter incurred in the protection of his country, which the Company bound themselves to defend in future, alike against foreign and domestic foes. They distinctly promised that no demand whatever should be made upon his territory, whether on account of military establishments; in the assembling of forces to repel the attack of a foreign enemy; on account of the detachment attached to the nawab's person; on account of troops which might be occasionally furnished for suppressing rebellions or disorders in his territories; nor on account of failures in the resources of the Ceded Districts, arising from unfavourable seasons, the calamities of war, or any other cause whatever.

The Company guaranteed to Sadut Ali, his heirs and successors, the possession of the reserved territories, together with the exercise of authority therein; and the nawab engaged to establish therein such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers) as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and calculated to secure their lives and property. He likewise bound himself to disband the chief part of the native troops; which he immediately did by reducing them from 80,000 to 30,000. The treaty of 1801 gave the nawab a certainty for an uncertainty; and restored to the remaining portion of Oude something of the vigour of an independent state. It would probably have done much more than this, had the Company confirmed the appointment of Henry

Wellesley, by the governor-general, to superintend the working of the new arrangements, and assist in initiating and carrying out useful reforms. The ability, tact, and courtesy which he had manifested in the previous negotiations, had won the confidence of Sadut Ali; and, as the brother of the governor-general, Henry Wellesley might have exercised an influence beneficial to both parties, similar to that which contributed so largely to the tranquil settlement of Mysoor, under the auspices of Colonel Wellesley. But the directors would not sanction such a breach of the privileges of the covenanted service, and the appointment was cancelled. The papers of the late Lord Cowley, and the Wellesley MSS. in the British Museum, abound with evidence of judicious reformatory measures projected for Oude, but neutralised or set aside by the home government. While Sadut Ali lived the treaty worked well, although the manner in which he availed himself of the stipulated services of British troops, repeatedly made the Calcutta government sensible of the responsibility they had assumed, and the difficulty of reconciling the fulfilment of their engagements to the ruler, with a due regard to the rights and interests of his subjects.

The nawab conducted his affairs with much discretion and economy; and, on his death in 1814, he left fourteen millions sterling in a treasury which was empty when he entered on the government.

The partition of Oude was not, however, accomplished without bloodshed. The Hindoo landowners in the ceded country—who were, for the most part, feudal chieftains of far older standing than any Mussulman in India—resisted the proposed change, and were with difficulty subdued.* The fact was significant; and it would have been well had the subsequent annexators of Oude remembered, that the danger to be apprehended lay with the feudal and semi-independent chiefs, rather than with their sensual and effete suzerain.

Sadut Ali was succeeded by Ghazi-oo-deen, who is described by one authority as "indolent and debauched;"† and, by another, as bearing some resemblance to our James I.‡ He lent the Company two millions of the treasure accumulated by his predecessor, to assist them in carrying on their wars with

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 386.

† *Sleeman's Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 192.

‡ *Heber's Journal*.

Burmah and Nepaul; and they gave him, in return, a share of their conquests; namely, the Turnee*—a fertile, richly-wooded, but unhealthy tract, which extends along the foot of the Himalayas; and sanctioned his assumption of regal dignity.

The acceptance of a loan, under the circumstances, was unworthy of a great government; and the confirmation of Ghazi-oo-deen's sovereignty was of doubtful policy. Complaints of misgovernment were rife, and appear to have been supported by forcible evidence. Bishop Heber, who travelled through Oude in 1824-'5, gave a more favourable account than other witnesses of the condition of the country; but his observations were necessarily cursory. He reasoned with Ghazi-oo-deen on the duty of attending to the condition of the people; and "the reply was, that he was powerless, having lent to the British government all the money which would have enabled him to ease his subjects of their burdens." Had the money remained in the Oude treasury, it is highly improbable that it would have benefited the people, except, indeed, indirectly, through the reckless expenditure of an unscrupulous minister, and a most unworthy set of favourites. Still, it is painful to learn that English governors should have exposed themselves to such a reproach, or should have acknowledged a loan from a dependent prince, in such a strain of fulsome and profane flattery as that in which Lord Amherst invokes the blessing of the Almighty on "the Mine of Munificence;" and declares, that "the benefits and fruits of our amity, which have existed from days of yore, are impressed upon the heart of every Englishman, both here and in Europe, as indelibly as if they had been engraven on adamant; nor will lapse of time, or change of circumstance, efface from the British nation so irrefragable a proof, so irresistible an argument, of the fraternal sentiments of your majesty."†

Nevertheless, the internal management of the "Mine of Munificence" was far from satisfactory, and the resident was officially reminded (July 22nd, 1825), that "by the treaty of 1801, the British government is clearly entitled, as well as morally obliged, to satisfy itself by whatever means it may

deem necessary; that the aid of its troops is required in support of right and justice, and not to effectuate injustice and oppression." In conformity with these instructions, the resident, and the officers commanding troops employed in the king's service, exercised a scrutiny which became extremely distasteful; and the treaty was violated by the increase of the native force (which was available, unchallenged, for any purpose, and afforded emolument and patronage to the native ministers and favourites), until, within the last few years of the reign of Ghazi-oo-deen, it comprised about sixty thousand men.

Nuseer-oo-deen, the son of Ghazi, succeeded him on the musnud in 1827. This is the "Eastern king" whose private life has been gibbeted to deserved infamy, in a sort of biographical romance‡ written by a European adventurer, for some time member of the royal household (as librarian or portrait-painter.) Recollecting the scandalous scenes revealed by contemporary diaries and memoirs regarding our nominally Christian kings—the Merry Monarch, and Nuseer's contemporary, the Fourth George—we need not be too much surprised by the mad vagaries and drunken cruelties of the Moslem despot, who prided himself on his adoption of certain English habits and customs§—such as wearing broad-cloth and a beaver hat under the burning sun of Oude; and usually terminated his daily drinking bouts with his boon companions, under the table, after the most approved English fashion. The favourite, shortly before the death of Nuseer, was a barber from Calcutta, who had come out to India in the capacity of a cabin-boy, and from that became a river trader. Hair-dressing, however, continued to be a lucrative resource to him: the natural curls of the governor-general were widely imitated; and when the barber went on his other affairs to Lucknow, he was employed in his old vocation by the resident. The king, delighted with the change produced in the appearance of this powerful English functionary, tried a similar experiment on his own lank locks, and was so gratified by the result, that he appointed the lucky *coiffeur* to a permanent post in his house-

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 413.

† Letters of Lord Amherst to the King of Oude, October 14th, 1825; and June 23rd, 1826. Quoted in *Dacoitee in Excelsis; or, the Spoliation of Oude*: pp. 68—70.

‡ *Private Life of an Eastern King*; by a member of the household of his late majesty, Nuseer-oo-deen, King of Oude. London, 1855.

§ Nuseer substituted a chair of gold and ivory for the musnud, or cushion, of his ancestors.

hold, with the style of Sofraz Khan (the illustrious chief), and gave him a seat at his table. The barber had a fund of low humour: he amused the king by pandering to his vitiated taste; and soon made himself indispensable. The existence of Nuseer-oo-deen was embittered by a well-grounded suspicion of treachery among his own family and household: the fear of poison was continually present with him; and he would touch no wine but that placed before him by his new favourite, who consequently added the office of wine-merchant to his other lucrative monopolies.

The European papers learned something of what was passing at the palace of Lucknow, despite the care which the European adventurers installed there, naturally took to keep things quiet. The *Calcutta Review*, and *Agra Ukbar*, published squibs and pasquinades upon the "low menial" who had ingratiated himself with the King of Oude; but the object of their jeers set them at nought, and continued to accumulate wealth, and to retain his influence at court by ever-new inventions of buffoonery and indecency, until the European members of the household threw up their appointments in uncontrollable disgust; and such scenes of open debauchery disgraced the streets of Lucknow at mid-day, that the resident, Colonel Low, was compelled to interfere, and at length succeeded in procuring the dismissal of the barber.*

These and other statements of the anonymous memoir-writer, are quite compatible, and, indeed, frequently correspond with the entries in the journal of Sir William Sleeman, of accounts furnished by natives of the character and habits of Nuseer-oo-deen.

Both writers dwell much on the repeated declaration of the king that he should be poisoned; and Sir William states, that for some time before his death, Nuseer wore constantly round his neck a chain, to which was attached the key of a small covered well in the palace, whence he drew water. His death was very sudden. It occurred shortly after a glass of sherbet had been administered to him by one of the women of his harem, in the night of the 7th of July, 1837.

The question of succession was stormily contested. The king had had several wives,

whose history forms a not very edifying episode in Sir William Sleeman's journal. The most reputable one was a grand-daughter of the King of Delhi—a very beautiful young woman, of exemplary character; who, unable to endure the profligacy of the court, quitted it soon after her marriage, and retired into private life, on a small stipend granted by her profligate husband. Then there was Mokuddera Ouleea, originally a Miss Walters, the illegitimate daughter of a half-pay officer of one of the regiments of British dragoons, by a Mrs. Whearty, a woman of notoriously bad character, although the daughter of one English merchant, and the widow of another. She was married to the king in 1827, and was seen by Mrs. Park, in her visit to the zenana in 1828, sitting silently on the same couch with her successful rival, the beautiful Taj Mahal.†

Mulika Zamanee (Queen of the Age) entered the palace of Lucknow while Nuseer-oo-deen was only heir-apparent, in the capacity of wet-nurse to his infant son, Moonna Jan (by another wife called Afzul-Mahal); and so fascinated the father, that, to the astonishment of the whole court (in whose eyes the new-comer appeared very plain and very vulgar), he never rested until she became his acknowledged wife. Her former husband (a groom in the service of one of the king's troopers, to whom she had previously been faithless) presumed to approach the palace, and was immediately thrown into prison; but was eventually released, and died soon after the accession of Nuseer. Her two children, a boy and girl, were adopted by Nuseer; who, when he became king, declared the boy, Kywan Jah, to be his own son, and publicly treated him as such.

When Viscount Combermere visited Lucknow in 1827, in the course of his tour of inspection as commander-in-chief, Kywan Jah was sent, as heir-apparent, with a large retinue and a military escort, to meet his lordship and attend him from Cawnpoor. The king was, no doubt, desirous to propitiate his guest. He came outside the city to welcome him, invited him to share the royal howdah on the state elephant, and escorted him to the palace in full procession, flinging, meantime, handfuls of coin among the multitude who accompanied the cavalcade.

The Orientals dearly love pageantry; it would seem as if it reconciled them to des-

* The barber carried off £240,000.—*Private Life of an Eastern King*, p. 340.

† Mrs. Park's *Wanderings*, vol. i., p. 87.

potism: and the present occasion must have been an interesting one; for the externals of royalty sat gracefully on the handsome person of the sensual and extravagant Nuseer-oo-deen; and the British general, besides being in the zenith of his fame as the conqueror of Bhurtpoor (which had successfully resisted the British troops under Lord Lake), had a manly bearing, and a rare gift of skilful horsemanship—befitting the soldier pronounced by the great Duke the best cavalry officer in the service—united to an easy, genial courtesy of manner, calculated to gain popularity everywhere, but especially in India.

Lord Combermere occupied the residency for a week, during which time, a succession of hunts, sports, and *fêtes* took place, which formed an era in the annals of Lucknow. Nuseer-oo-deen was, in turn, sumptuously entertained by the commander-in-chief; to whom, on parting, he gave his own portrait, set in magnificent diamonds. The Company appropriated the diamonds; but the picture remains in the possession of Lord Combermere, and is an interesting relic of the fallen dynasty of Oude.

Nuseer-oo-deen subsequently demanded from the resident the formal recognition of Kywan Jah, as his heir-apparent, by the British government. The resident demurred, on the plea that the universal belief at Lucknow was, that Kywan Jah was three years of age when his mother was first introduced to his majesty. But this had no effect: Nuseer-oo-deen persisted in his demand; and, to remove the anticipated obstacle, he repudiated Moonna Jan publicly and repeatedly.* The consequence of his duplicity was, that he was held to have left no legitimate son. According to Sir William Sleeman (who, during his situation as resident, had abundant means of authentic information), the general impression at Lucknow and all over Oude was, that the British government would take upon itself the management of the country on the death of the king, who himself "seemed rather pleased than otherwise" at the thought of being the last of his dynasty. He had repudiated his own son, and was unwilling that any other member of the family should fill his place. The ministers, and the other public officers and court favourites, who had made large fortunes, were favourable to the anticipated measure; as it was understood by some, that thereby they would be secured from

all scrutiny into their accounts, and enabled to retain all their accumulations.†

The reader—recollecting the custom in Mussulman kingdoms, of a complete change of officials at every accession, generally accompanied by the spoliation of the old ones—will understand this was likely to prove no inconsiderable advantage. Lord Auckland, the governor-general, had, however, no desire for the absorption of Oude, but only that measures should be taken for its better government. He decided that the eldest uncle of the late king should ascend the musnud, and that a new treaty should be formed with him.

On the death of Nuseer-oo-deen, a British detachment was sent to escort the chosen successor from his private dwelling to the palace. He was an old man, had led a secluded life, and was weakened by recent illness. On arriving at his destination, he was left to repose for a few hours in a small secluded room, previous to the tedious formalities of enthronement. But the succession was not destined to be carried without opposition. The Padshah Begum (the chief queen of Ghazi-oo-deen, and the adoptive mother of Nuseer, with whom she had been long at variance) asserted the claims of her grandson, the disowned child but rightful heir of the late ruler. She made her way to the palace in the middle of the night, on the plea of desiring to see the dead body of the king—forced the gates with her elephants, and carried in with her the youth Moonna Jan, whom she succeeded in literally seating on the musnud; while she herself took up her position in a covered palanquin at the foot of the throne. Amid the confusion, the sovereign selected by the Company remained unnoticed, and apparently unknown. His sons, grandsons, and attendants were, however, discovered, and very roughly treated; nor did the resident (Colonel Low) escape severe handling. On learning what had occurred, he proceeded to the palace with his assistants, and remonstrated with the begum on the folly of her procedure; but his arguments were stopped by the turbulence of her adherents, who seized him by the neckcloth, dragged him to the throne on which the boy sat, and commanded him to present a complimentary offering on pain of death. This he positively refused; and the begum's vakeel, Mirza Ali, seeing the dangerous excitement of her rabble followers, and dreading the

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 40.

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 152.

sure vengeance of the Company if the lives of their servants were thus sacrificed, laid hold of the resident and his companions, and shouted out, that by the command of the begum they were to be conducted from her presence. The resident and his party, with difficulty and danger, made their way to the south garden, where Colonel Monteath had just brought in, and drawn up, five companies in line. The temper of the troops, generally, seemed doubtful. At this crisis Colonel Roberts, who commanded a brigade in the Oude service, went in, and presented to Moonna Jan his offering of gold mohurs; and then absconded, being seen no more until the contest was decided. Captain Magness drew up his men and guns on the left of Colonel Monteath's, and was ordered to prepare for action. He told the resident that he did not feel quite sure of his men; and a line of British sepoy was made to cover his rear.*

Meanwhile the begum began to think the game in her own hands. The palace and *baraduree*, or summer-house, were filled with a motley crowd; nautch-girls danced and sang at one end of the long hall, in front of the throne; and the populace within and without enjoyed the tumult, and shouted acclamation: every man who had a sword or spear, a musket or matchlock, flourished it in the air, amid a thousand torches. Everything portended a popular insurrection. The begum saw this, and desired to gain time, in the hope that the British troops in the garden would be surrounded and overwhelmed by the armed masses which had begun to pour forth from the city. Had this catastrophe occurred, the British authorities would have borne the blame for the deficiency of the subsidized British troops, and for having indiscreetly omitted to watch the proceedings of the Padshah Begum, whose character was well known. The fault, in the latter case, is attributed to the negligence of the native minister.

The resident was anxious to avoid a collision; yet convinced of the necessity for prompt action: therefore, on receiving a message from the begum, desiring him to return to her presence, he refused, and bade her and the boy surrender themselves immediately; promising, in the event of compliance, and of the evacuation of the palace and city by her followers, that the past

should be forgiven, and that the pension of 15,000 rupees a-month, accorded by the late king, should be secured to her for life. But in vain: the begum had no thought of surrendering herself; the tumult rapidly increased; the rabble began to plunder the palace; several houses in the city had already been pillaged; and the British officer in command urged the resident to action, lest his men should no longer have room to use their arms.

The native commanders of the state troops manifestly leant towards the begum. One of them declared that "he was the servant of the throne; that the young king was actually seated on it; and that he would support him there:" whereupon he also presented his offering of gold mohurs. The armed crowds grew momentarily more menacing: a ringleader attempted to seize a British sepoy by the whiskers; and an affray was with difficulty prevented. The resident, taking out his watch, declared, that unless the begum consented to his offer within one quarter of an hour, the guns should open on the throne-room. She persisted in her purpose, encouraged by the increasing numbers of her followers. The stated time elapsed; the threat of the resident was fulfilled; and, after a few rounds of grape, a party of the 35th regiment, under Major Marshall, stormed the halls.

As soon as the guns opened, the begum was carried by her attendants into an adjoining room; and Moonna Jan concealed himself in a recess under the throne. They were, however, both captured, and carried off to the residency. None of the British troops were killed; but one officer and two or three sepoy were wounded. Many of the insurgents perished; from forty to fifty men being left killed and wounded, when their companions fled from the palace. The loss would probably have been much greater, had not the soldiers of the 35th, on rushing through the narrow covered passage, and up the steep flight of steps by which they entered the throne-room, seen, on emerging from the dim light, a body of sepoy with fixed bayonets and muskets, drawn up (as they imagined) behind the throne. At these they fired; a smash of glass followed, and proved their first volley to have been spent, on their own reflection, in an immense mirror. This happy mistake saved a needless waste of blood. No further resistance was attempted; order was gradually restored; and the sovereign selected

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 162.

by the Company was publicly crowned in the course of the morning.

Strangely enough, the innocent and ill-used Delhi princess, after years of seclusion, was involved in the tumult, but escaped injury by the zeal and presence of mind of her female attendants. The begum, on her way from her own residence to the palace, had passed that of the princess, whom she summoned to accompany her. Perhaps awed by her imperious mother-in-law—perhaps desirous of looking once again on the face of the man whose conduct had doomed her to long years of widowhood, the princess obeyed, and appears to have been a silent witness of the whole affair. When the firing began, her two female bearers carried her in her litter to a small side-room. One attendant had her arm shattered by grapeshot; but the other tied some clothes together, and let her mistress and her wounded companion safely down, from a height of about twenty-four feet, into a courtyard, where some of the retinue of the princess found and conveyed them all three safely home.

The claim of Moonna Jan appears to have been a rightful one, despite the formal declaration of the late king, that he had ceased to cohabit with the boy's mother for two years before his birth. The decision arrived at by the British government cannot, however, be regretted; for Moonna Jan was said, even by the members of his own family who asserted his legitimacy, to be of ungovernable temper, and the worst possible dispositions.* Both he and the begum† were sent to the fort of Chunar, where they ended their days as state prisoners.

The new king, Mohammed Ali Shah, succeeded to an empty treasury and a disorganised government: he had the infirmities of age to contend with; nevertheless, he displayed an amount of energy and shrewdness very rare in his family.

A new treaty with Oude was alleged to be necessary, because no penalty had been attached, in that of 1801, to the infraction of the stipulation for reforms to be made in the government. Another article had

been violated by the increase of the native army greatly beyond the stated limit. Of this latter infraction the British government were well disposed to take advantage, having, in fact, themselves violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty, by keeping Oude very ill supplied with troops. Thus, at the time of the death of Nuseer-oo-deen (previous to the arrival of the five companies under Colonel Monteath), the whole of the British force in charge of Lucknow and its million inhabitants, consisted of two companies and a-half of sepoy under native officers. One of the companies was stationed at the treasury of the resident; another constituted his honorary guard; and the remaining half company were in charge of the gaol. All the sepoy stood nobly to their posts during the long and trying scene; but no attempt was made to concentrate them for the purpose of arresting the tumultuous advance of the begum's forces: collectively, they would have been too few for the purpose; and it was, moreover, deemed unsafe to remove them from their respective posts at such a time.‡

Something more than tacit consent had probably been given to the increase of the native force of Oude; which, in 1837, numbered about 68,000 men. By the new treaty, Mohammed Ali was authorised to increase his military establishment indefinitely; but bound to organise, as a part of it, an auxiliary British force, and to provide a yearly sum of sixteen lacs (£160,000) for the maintenance of the same. The concluding articles stipulated, that the king, in concert with the resident, should take into immediate and earnest consideration the best means of remedying the existing defects in the police, and in the judicial and revenue administration of his dominions; and set forth, that "if gross and systematic oppression, anarchy, and misrule should hereafter at any time prevail within the Oude dominions, such as seriously to endanger the public tranquillity, the British government reserves to itself the right of appointing its own officers to the management of whatsoever portions of the Oude

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 170.

† The previous history of the begum appears to have been very remarkable. Ghazi-oo-deen had conceived a strong dislike to his son Nuseer, and considered him utterly unfit to mount the throne. The begum stanchly and successfully asserted his rights, as her husband's lawful heir. When he, in turn, conceived a violent aversion to his own child Moonna Jan, she took her grandson under her pro-

tection, armed her retainers, and, after a contest in which many lives were lost, succeeded in maintaining her ground until the resident interfered, and satisfied her by guaranteeing the personal safety of the boy, for whose sake she eventually sacrificed the independence of her latter years, and died a prisoner of state.—*Private Life of an Eastern King*, p. 205.

‡ Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 168.

territory—either to a small or to a great extent—in which such misrule as that above alluded to may have occurred, for so long a period as it may deem necessary; the surplus receipts in such case, after defraying all charges, to be paid into the king's treasury, and a true and faithful account rendered to his majesty of the receipts and expenditure of the territory so assumed." In the event of the above measure becoming necessary, a pledge was given for the maintenance, as far as possible, of the native institutions and forms of administration within the assumed territories, so as to facilitate the restoration of those territories to the sovereign of Oude when the proper period for such restoration should arrive.*

The above treaty was executed at Lucknow on the 11th of September, 1837, and was ratified on the 18th of the same month by the governor-general. It is necessary that the manner in which the compliance of Mohammed Shah was ensured, should be clearly understood. The death of Nuseer occurred at midnight, and the resident, as has been stated, instantly sent off one of his assistants to the house of Mohammed Shah, with orders to conduct him to the palace, after having secured his signature to a paper promising consent "to any new treaty that the governor-general might dictate." This was obtained.

Lord Auckland was rather shocked by such undisguised dictation; and declared, "he should have been better pleased if the resident had not, in this moment of exigency, *accepted* the unconditional engagement of submissiveness which the new king had signed. This document may be liable to misconstruction; and it was not warranted by anything contained in the instructions issued to Colonel Low."†

If Lord Auckland was startled by the means taken to ensure the consent of the king to any terms which might be required from him, the resident was not less painfully surprised by the draft treaty framed by the governor-general in council. Colonel Low wrote, that the concessions so unexpectedly demanded, were "of a nature that would be very grating to any native sovereign of respectable character;" especially to the present king, "who, to the best of my belief at least, knows by experience how to manage a country properly, and really wishes to govern

with moderation and justice." The resident especially deprecated the requisition for the payment of a very large annual sum for the maintenance of an army, which was not to be under the command of the king, or even at his own disposal—"a heavy payment, in fact, which he must clearly perceive is more for our own purposes and interests than for his, or for the direct advantage of his subjects." Colonel Low requested a reconsideration of the unfavourable opinion which had been expressed regarding the preliminary pledge he had exacted from Mohammed Ali, declaring, that so far from its being superfluous, it was indispensable; otherwise, the "desired objects of the Indian government could never have been gained without some forcible and most unpleasant exercise of our power." In a significant postscript, he asked whether, in the event of the present king's death before the ratification of the treaty, he ought to take any, and, if so, what, agreement from the next heir? adding, that the residency surgeon lately in attendance on Mohammed Shah, was decidedly of opinion, that "any unusual excitement, or vexation of mind, would be likely to bring on apoplexy."‡ All this the resident stated in a public letter; but he wrote another in the secret department, in which he earnestly advised a revision of the treaty; urging, that the formation of the proposed auxiliary force would create great discontent in Oude, and inflict a burden which would necessarily be felt by all classes; and that it would be considered "as distinctly breaking our national faith and recorded stipulations in the former treaty."§

Lord Auckland persisted in his policy: the resident was told that he had "misapprehended" the spirit of the treaty, which the king was compelled to sign, literally at the hazard of his life; for, on being made acquainted with its terms, "the idea of such new rights being ordered in his time, so hurt the old man's feelings, that it had an immediate effect on his disease;" producing an attack of spasms, from which he did not entirely recover for twenty-four hours.||

The authorities in England, to their honour be it spoken, refused to sanction such a shameless breach of faith as this repudiation of the terms on which half Oude had been annexed in 1801. They unanimously de-

* Treaty between E. I. Company and King of Oude: printed in Parl. Papers relating to Oude (Commons), 20th July, 1857; pp. 31—33.

† Parl. Papers, p. 13.

‡ *Ibid.*,—pp. 14, 15.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

|| Letter of Resident, July 30, 1837.—Parl. Papers.

creed the abrogation of the recent treaty, and desired that the king should be exonerated from the obligations to which his assent had been so reluctantly given. Nothing could be more thoroughly straightforward than the view taken by the directors. They declared, that it would have been better to have given the king a fair trial, without any new treaty; and condemned the preliminary engagement as having been "extorted from a prince from whom we had no right to demand any condition on coming to his lawful throne." The proposed auxiliary force was pronounced inadmissible, on the ground that the payment "would constitute a demand upon the resources of Oude that we are not entitled to make; for we are already bound, by the treaty of 1801, to defend at our own expense, that country against internal and external enemies; and a large cession of territory was made to us for that express purpose."

The sentiments expressed on this occasion are directly opposed to those which animated the annexation policy, subsequently adopted. The directors conclude their despatch with the following explicit opinion:—"The preservation of the existing states in India is a duty imposed upon us by the obligations of public faith, as well as the dictates of interest; for we agree in the opinion expressed by Lieutenant-colonel Low, in his letter of the 26th of September, 1836, that the continued existence of such states will afford the means of employment to respectable natives, which they cannot at present obtain in our service; and, until such means could be provided in our own provinces, the downfall of any of the native states under our protection might, by depriving numerous influential natives of their accustomed employment, be attended with consequences most injurious to our interests. Our policy should be to preserve, as long as may be practicable, the existing native dynasties; and should the fall of them, or of any one of them, from circumstances beyond our control, become inevitable, then to introduce such a system of government as may interfere in the least possible way with the institutions of the people, and with the employment of natives of rank under proper superintendence, in the administration of the country."*

* Despatch, 10th April, 1838, from Secret Committee; p. 38. Signed by J. R. Carnac and J. L. Lushington.

† Minute by Governor-general Auckland, dated

The directors left the governor-general in council to choose the manner in which to convey to the King of Oude the welcome tidings of the annulment of a compact which, they truly observed, he regarded as inflicting not only a pecuniary penalty upon his subjects, but a disgrace upon his crown and personal dignity. They advised, however, that it should rather proceed as an act of grace from his lordship in council, "than as the consequence of the receipt of a public and unconditional instruction from England."

Lord Auckland thereupon declared, that the directors, like the resident, had much misunderstood his measure;† and his council agreed with him in the hope that, by a relaxation of the terms of the treaty, the authorities in England might be reconciled to a measure which could not be cancelled without the most serious inconvenience, and even danger:‡ and when they found that the Company were pledged to the British parliament for the annulment of the treaty, they persisted in urging the inexpediency of making any communication to the King of Oude on the subject. On the 15th of April, 1839, the directors reiterated their previous orders, and desired that no delay should take place in announcing, in such manner as the governor-general might think fit, to the King of Oude, the disallowance of the treaty of 11th of September, 1837, and the restoration of our relations with the state of Oude to the footing on which they previously stood.

On the 11th of July, 1839, they simply reverted to their previous instructions, and required their complete fulfilment.§ Yet, on the 8th of the same month, the governor-general acquainted the King of Oude that, after some months' correspondence with the Court of Directors upon the subject of the treaty, he was empowered to relieve his majesty from the payment of the annual sixteen lacs. His lordship expressed his cordial sympathy with the liberal feelings which dictated this renunciation of a sum, the raising of which he had "sometimes feared" might lead to "heavier exactions on the people of Oude than they were well able, in the present state of the country, to bear."

Then followed an exordium on the lightening of taxation, and the extension of

"Umritsir, 13th December, 1838."—Parl. Papers, pp. 43—52.

† Minutes by Messrs. Morison and Bird, 28th January, 1839; pp. 52; 57. § Parl. Papers, pp. 57—60.

useful public works, which might be effected with the aforesaid sixteen lacs; and a complacent reference to the fresh proof thus afforded, "of the friendship with which your majesty is regarded by me and by the British nation." Not one word, not the most distant hint of the abrogation of the treaty; nay, more—the newly-appointed resident, Colonel Caulfield, was specially desired "to abstain from encouraging discussion as to the treaty of 1837," except as regarded the reasons above quoted from the letter of the governor-general, for releasing the king from the pecuniary obligation of maintaining an auxiliary force.*

The above statements are taken from the returns laid before parliament on the motion of Sir Fitzroy Kelly; but it is confidently alleged that the papers therein published are, as in the case of the Nizam, fragmentary and garbled; especially that the important letter written by Lord Auckland to the King of Oude is not a correct translation of the original, but a version adapted to meet the ideas of the British public.†

No such aggravation is needed to enhance the effect of the duplicity exhibited by the Indian government, in their sifted and carefully prepared records laid before parliament, of the mode in which the king was led to believe that the treaty which the Court of Directors had disavowed, because it was essentially unjust and had been obtained by unfair means, was really in force, the pressure being temporarily mitigated by the generous intervention and paternal solicitude of the governor-general.

This is a painful specimen of Anglo-Indian diplomacy. Still more painful is it to find such a man as Lord Dalhousie characterising the deliberate concealment practised by his predecessor, as "an inadvertence." The treaty was never disallowed in India—never even suppressed. The discussion regarding its public disallowance

seems to have fallen to the ground; the directors, engrossed by the cares and excitements of that monstrous compound of injustice, folly, and disaster—the Afghan war—probably taking it for granted that their reiterated injunctions regarding Oude had been obeyed by Lord Auckland and his council.

Mohammed Ali Shah died in 1842, in the full belief that the treaty which so galled and grieved him was in operative existence. His son and successor, Amjud Ali, had no reason for doubt on the subject: the British functionaries around him spoke and wrote of it as an accepted fact; and, in 1845, it was included in a volume of treaties, published in India by the authority of government. No important change, for good or for evil, appears to have taken place during the five years' sway of Amjud Ali, who died in February, 1847, and was succeeded by Wajid Ali, the last of his dynasty. The new king was not deficient in natural ability. He had considerable poetical and musical gifts; but these, precociously developed under the enervating influences of the zenana, had been fostered to the exclusion of the sterner qualities indispensable to the wielder of a despotic sceptre.

Notwithstanding the acknowledged and often sharply-exercised supremacy of the British government, the dynasty of Oude still preserved, by virtue of Lord Wellesley's treaty of 1801 (that is to say, by the portions of it not cancelled by that of 1837), a degree of independence, and of exemption from internal interference; which, rightly used by an upright, humane, and judicious sovereign, might yet have raised fertile, beautiful Oude to a state of prosperity which, by affording incontestable proofs of its efficient government, should leave no plea for its annexation. Public works, efficient courts of justice, reduced rates of assessment—these things can never be wholly misrepresented

* Deputy Secretary of Government to the Resident, 8th July, 1839.—Parl. Papers, p. 61.

† The letter published in the Parl. Papers, and the Persian and English versions sent to the king: all three differed on important points. In *Dacoitee in Excelsis* (written, according to the editor of Sleeman's *Oude*, by Major Bird), a literal translation of the Persian letter actually sent to the King of Oude is given, which differs widely and essentially from that above quoted from the Parl. Papers. In the latter there is no sentence which could fairly be rendered thus:—"From the period you ascended the throne, your majesty has, in comparison with times past, greatly improved the kingdom; and I have, in consequence, been authorised by the

Court of Directors to inform you, that, if I think it advisable, for the present, I may relieve your majesty from part of the clause of the treaty alluded to, by which clause expense is laid upon your majesty." The writer of *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, says that the italicised words bear a different sense in the autograph English letter, in which they run thus:—*I am directed to relieve you.* The king pointed out the non-agreement of the two documents, and the governor-general forthwith issued an order, directing that the old custom of sending the original English letter as well as the Persian version, should be discontinued.—(p. 92.) See also *Oude, its Princes and its Government Vindicated*: by Moulvee Mussehood-deen Khan Bahadoor; p. 75.

or overlooked; but such reforms were little likely to be effected while Wajid Ali sat at the helm.

In November, 1847, the governor-general, Lord Hardinge, visited Lucknow, held a conference with the king, and caused a memorandum, previously drawn up, to be specially read and explained to him. In this memorandum, Wajid Ali was enjoined "to take timely measures for the reformation of abuses," and for "the rescue of his people from their present miserable condition." Failing this, the governor-general stated, he would have no option but to act in the manner specified by the treaty of 1837; which not only gave the British government a right to interfere, but rendered it obligatory on them to do so whenever such interference should be needful to secure the lives and property of the people of Oude from oppression and flagrant neglect. If the king, within the following two years, should fail in "checking and eradicating the worst abuses," then the governor-general would avail himself of the powers vested in him by the aforesaid treaty.*

Two years and more passed, but the king evinced undiminished aversion for the duties of his position. His time and attention were devoted entirely to the pursuit of personal gratifications, and he associated with none but such as contributed to his pleasures—women, singers, fiddlers, and eunuchs; and could, in fact, submit to the restraints of no other society. He ceased to receive the members of the royal family, or the aristocracy; would read no reports from his local officers, civil or military—from presidents of his fiscal and judicial courts, or functionaries of any kind; and appeared to take no interest whatever in public affairs.

A change was made about this time in the mode of collecting the land revenue (from the *ijara*, or contract system, to the *amanee*, or trust-management system) in many districts; but no favourable result was produced—the same rack-rent being exacted under one as under the other; the same

uncertainty continuing to exist in the rate of the government demand; and the same exactions and peculations on the part of the native officials.

Colonel (afterwards Sir William) Sleeman received the appointment of resident in 1849, and was authorised by Lord Dalhousie to make a tour throughout Oude, and report upon the general condition of the people. The letter which communicates the information of the appointment, shows that the governor-general was bent on the assumption of sovereign power over Oude, and the reconstruction of the internal administration of that "great, rich, and oppressed country."† The mission of Colonel Sleeman was evidently designed to collect a mass of evidence which should convince the home authorities of the necessity for the "great changes" which their representative had resolved upon initiating; and in this sense the new resident has been truly called "the emissary of a foregone conclusion."‡ Still, though not unprejudiced, Colonel Sleeman was an honest and earnest man, well calculated by character and long training to extract truth, and experienced in framing a plain, unvarnished statement of facts. Forty years of active Indian service had afforded him opportunities of intercourse with the natives, of which he had taken abundant advantage. Active, methodical, and rigidly abstemious, he had been invaluable in the very departments where his countrymen have usually proved least able to grapple with the enervating influences of climate, routine, and red tape.§ His successful efforts in bringing to justice, and almost eradicating the murderous fraternity of the Thugs, || by dispersing the horrible obscurity in which their midnight deeds of assassination and theft had been so long shrouded, breaking up their gangs, and tracking them out in detail, was altogether most masterly, and conferred an incalculable amount of benefit on the peaceable and industrious, but helpless portion of the population. Colonel Sleeman's character and career, however,

he was at Lucknow; General Pollock did all he could, but it was not much; and Colonel Richmond does nothing. There the Buduk dacoits, Thugs and poisoners, remain without sentences, and will do so till Richmond goes, unless you give him a filip. * * * Davidson was prevented from doing any thing by technical difficulties; so that out of four residents we have not got four days' work.—*Journey through the Kingdom of Oude* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xxviii.

|| See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 429; for an account of the Thugs, or Phansi-gars.

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., pp. 201—215.

† Letter from Lord Dalhousie to Colonel Sleeman.—*Journey through the Kingdom of Oude* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xviii.

‡ *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 109.

§ Writing to Mr. Elliot, secretary to government in 1848, regarding the difficulty of getting dacoit prisoners tried, Colonel Sleeman said that political officers had little encouragement to undertake such duties; adding—"It is only a few choice spirits that have entered upon the duty *con amore*. General Nott prided himself upon doing nothing while

naturally tended to render him a severe censor of incapacity, sensuality, and indolence—the besetting sins of the King of Oude. Consequently, his correspondence manifests a contemptuous aversion for the habits and associates of Wajid Ali, scarcely compatible with the diplomatic courtesy expected in the intercourse of a British functionary with a national ally. Personal acquaintance might have mitigated this feeling; but Colonel Sleeman does not seem to have attempted to employ the influence which his age, position, and knowledge of the world might have given him with the king, who was then a young man of about five-and-twenty. “I have not,” he says, “urged his majesty to see and converse with me, because I am persuaded that nothing that I could say would induce him to alter his mode of life, or to associate and commune with any others than those who now exclusively form his society.”*

The tour of inspection was made during three months of the cold season of 1850, in defiance of the tacit opposition of the native government, on whom the expenses, amounting to £30,000, were charged.† The mode of proceeding adopted to procure evidence against the King of Oude, and the complete setting aside of the authority of the native government therein involved, may be excused by circumstances, but cannot be justified. A similar proceeding in any Anglo-Indian province would unquestionably have revealed a mass of crime and suffering, of neglect and unredressed wrongs, of which no conception could have been previously formed. Under our system, however, the evils from which the people labour, lie deep, and resemble the complicated sufferings which affect the physical frame in a high state of civilisation. Under native despotism, the diseases of the body politic are comparatively few in number, and easily discernible, analogous to those common to man in a more natural state. The employment of torture, for instance, as a means of extorting revenue, is a barbarism which seems general among Asiatic governments;

* Parl. Papers relative to Oude.—Blue Book, 1856; p. 168.

† In the *Reply to the Charges against the King of Oude*, published in the name of Wajid Ali Shah himself, the following passage occurs:—“When Colonel Sleeman had, under pretence of change of air for the benefit of his health, expressed a wish to make a tour through the Oude dominion, although such a tour was quite unusual, I provided him with tents and bullock-trains, and ordered my officers to furnish him with men for clearing the road, provi-

and it has been, if indeed it be not still, practised by our own native underlings, in consequence of imperfect supervision and excessive taxation. In Oude, this favourite engine of despotism and oppression was, as might have been expected, in full operation. It ought, long years before, to have been not simply inveighed against by residents in communications to their own government, but enacted against in treaties; for, clearly, when the British government guaranteed to a despotic ruler the means of crushing domestic rebellion, they became responsible that their troops should not be instrumental in perpetuating the infliction, on the innocent, of cruelties which the laws of England would not suffer to be perpetrated on the person of the vilest criminal.

The supreme government are accused of having contented themselves with inculcating rules of justice and mercy by vague generalities, without any attempt to take advantage of opportunities for initiating reforms. Major Bird, formerly assistant-resident at Lucknow, affirms that he has now in his custody proposals framed by the native government, with the assistance of the resident, Colonel Richmond, in 1848, for the introduction of the British system of administration in the king's dominions, to be tried in the first instance in such portions of them as adjoined the British territories. The scheme was submitted to Mr. Thomason, the lieutenant-governor of the North-Western Provinces, for correction, and was then forwarded to the governor-general, by whom it was rejected; the secretary to government stating, that “if his majesty the King of Oude would give up the whole of his dominions, the East India government would think of it; but that it was not worth while to take so much trouble about a portion.”‡

Such a rebuff as this is quite indefensible. Although the worthless ministers and favourites by whom the king was surrounded, might have eventually neutralised any good results from the proposed experiment, yet, had the Calcutta authorities really felt the sions and all other necessities; and although this cost me lacs of rupees, still I never murmured nor raised any objections.” In Colonel Sleeman's very first halt, he is described as having received petitions, and wrote letters thereon to the native government, in defiance alike of treaties, of the express orders of the Court of Directors, and of the rule of neutrality previously observed by successive residents.—(Pp. 8; 13.)

‡ *Dacoitee in Excelsis; or, the Spoliation of Oude*, p. 102. Taylor: London.

earnest solicitude expressed by them for the people of Oude, they would have encouraged any scheme calculated to lessen the disorganisation of which they so loudly complained, instead of waiting, as they appear to have done, to take advantage of their own neglect.

It is not easy to decide how far the British government deserves to share the disgrace which rests on the profligate and indolent dynasty, of which Wajid Ali was the last representative, for the wretched condition of Oude. Of the fact of its misgovernment there seems no doubt; for Colonel Sleeman was a truthful and able man; and the entries in his Diary depict a state of the most barbarous anarchy. The people are described as equally oppressed by the exactions of the king's troops and collectors, and by the gangs of robbers and lawless chieftains who infested the whole territory, rendering tenure so doubtful that no good dwellings could be erected, and preventing more than a very partial cultivation of the land, besides perpetrating individual cruelties, torturings, and murders almost beyond belief.

No immediate result followed the report of the resident; for the Burmese war of 1851-'2 occupied the attention of government, and gave Wajid Ali Shah a respite, of which he was too reckless or too ill-advised to take advantage. Colonel Sleeman, writing to Lord Dalhousie in September, 1852, declared—

"The longer the king reigns the more unfit he becomes to reign, and the more the administration and the country deteriorates. The state must have become bankrupt long ere this; but the king, and the knaves by whom he is governed, have discontinued paying the stipends of all the members of the royal family, save those of his own father's family, for the last three years; and many of them are reduced to extreme distress, without the hope of ever getting their stipends again, unless our government interferes. The females of the palaces of former sovereigns ventured to clamour for their subsistence, and they were, without shame or mercy, driven into the streets to starve, beg, or earn their bread by their labour. * * * The king is surrounded by eunuchs, fiddlers, and poetasters worse than either; and the minister and his creatures, who are worse than all. They appropriate at least one-half the revenues of the country to themselves, and employ nothing [sic] but knaves of the very worst kind in all the branches of the administration. * * * The fiddlers have control over the administration of civil justice; the eunuchs over that of criminal justice, public buildings, &c; the minister has the land revenue: and all are making large fortunes."*

In the beginning of 1853, the resident

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 369.

† *Ibid.* (Introduction), vol. i., p. xxii.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii., p. 388.

writes to Sir James Weir Hogg, that the King of Oude was becoming more and more imbecile and crazy; and had, on several occasions during some recent religious ceremonies, gone along the streets beating a drum tied round his neck, to the great scandal of his family, and the amusement of his people. The minister, Ali Nukkee Khan, is described as one of the cleverest, most intriguing, and most unscrupulous villains in India;† who had obtained influence over his master by entire subservience to his vices and follies, and by praising all he did, however degrading to him as a man and a sovereign.

Notwithstanding the king's utter inattention to public affairs, and devotion to drumming, dancing, and versifying, he believed himself quite fit to reign; and Colonel Sleeman considered that nothing would ever induce Wajid Ali to abdicate, even in favour of his own son, much less consent to make over the conduct of the administration, in perpetuity, to our government. The conclusion at which the resident arrives is important:—

"If, therefore, our government does interfere, it must be in the exercise of a right arising out of the existing relations between the two states, or out of our position as the paramount power in India. These relations, under the treaty of 1837, give our government the right to take upon itself the administration under present circumstances; and, indeed, imposes upon our government the duty of taking it: but, as I have already stated, neither these relations, nor our position as the paramount power, give us any right to annex or to confiscate the territory of Oude. We may have a right to take territory from the Nizam of Hyderabad, in payment for the money he owes us; but Oude owes us no money, and we have no right to take territory from her. We have only the right to secure for the suffering people that better government which their sovereign pledged himself to secure for them, but has failed to secure.‡"

The entire reliance manifested in the above extracts, on the validity of the treaty of 1837, is equally conspicuous in other letters. It is repeatedly mentioned as giving the government ample authority to assume the whole administration; but it is added—"If we do this, we must, in order to stand well with the rest of India, honestly and distinctly disclaim all interested motives, and appropriate the whole of the revenues for the benefit of the people and royal family of Oude;" for, "were we to take advantage of the occasion to annex or confiscate Oude, or any part of it, our good name in India would inevitably suffer; and

that good name is more valuable to us than a dozen Oudes."

On the annexation policy in general, the resident commented in terms of severe censure. "There is a school in India," he says, "characterised by impatience at the existence of any native states, and by strong and often insane advocacy of their absorption—by honest means if possible; but still their absorption. There is no pretext, however weak, that is not sufficient, in their estimation, for the purpose; and no war, however cruel, that is not justifiable, if it has only this object in view." Such views he denounced as dangerous to our rule; for the people of India, seeing that annexations and confiscations went on, and that rewards and honorary distinctions were given for them, and for the victories which led to them, and for little else, were too apt to infer that they were systematic, and encouraged and prescribed from home. The native states he compared to breakwaters, which, when swept away, would leave us to the mercy of our native army, which might not always be under our control.*

With such opinions, he watched with deep anxiety the progress of the aggressive and absorbing policy favoured by Lord Dalhousie and his council, which, he considered, was tending to crush all the higher and middle classes connected with the land, and to excite general alarm in the native mind. He began to fear the adoption of some course towards Oude which would involve a breach of faith; but he does not seem to have suspected the possibility of any right of annexation being grounded on the repudiation by the Calcutta government, at the eleventh hour, of the treaty of 1837.

In a private letter (the latest of his correspondence), he writes—"Lord Dalhousie and I, have different views, I fear. If he wishes anything done that I do not think right and honest, I resign, and leave it to be done by others. I desire a strict adherence to solemn engagements with white faces or black. We have no right to annex or confiscate Oude; but we have a right, under the treaty of 1837, to take the management of it, but not to appropriate its revenues to ourselves. To confiscate would be dis-

honest and dishonourable. To annex would be to give the people a government almost as bad as their own, if we put our screw upon them."†

The last admission is a strange one from the narrator of the *Tour through Oude*. He was not spared to remonstrate, as he certainly would have done, against the adoption of measures he had denounced by anticipation; but he was spared the too probable pain of remonstrating in vain. In the summer of 1854 his health began to fail. He went to the hills in the hope of recruiting his strength and resuming his labours. At last, warned by indications of approaching paralysis, he resigned his office, and embarked for England, but died on his passage, on the 10th of February, 1856, at the age of sixty-seven. Four days before, his services had been recognised by his nomination as a K.C.B., at the express request of Lord Dalhousie, who, despite their difference in opinion, fully appreciated the qualities of his able subordinate. The mark of royal favour came in all respects too late: it would have been better bestowed at the time when it had been richly earned by the measures for the suppression of Thuggee and Dacoitee, instead of being connected with the ill-omened *Tour* which preceded the annexation of Oude.

General Outram (Napier's old opponent) was sent as officiating resident to Lucknow, in December, 1854, and desired to furnish a report with a view to determine whether public affairs continued in the state described from time to time by his predecessor. This he did, at considerable length, in February, 1855;‡ and his conclusion was, that matters were as bad, if not worse, than Colonel Sleeman had described them; and that "the very culpable apathy and gross misrule of the sovereign and his durbar," rendered it incumbent on the supreme government to have recourse to the "extreme measures" necessary for the welfare of the five millions of people who were now oppressed by an effete and incapable dynasty.

Major-general Outram added, that in the absence of any personal experience in the country, he was dependent for information on the residency records, and on the channels which supplied his predecessor. It would seem that he (like Colonel Caulfield) had been instructed to refrain from any mention of the treaty of 1837; for his report refers exclusively to that concluded in 1801: but in a paper drawn up by Captain

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 392.

† Written in 1854-5. Published in the *Times*, November, 1857.

‡ See *Oude Blue Book* for 1856; pp. 12-46.

Fletcher Hayes (assistant-resident), on the "history of our connection with the Oude government," the Calcutta authorities are reminded, that in the absence of any intimation of the annulment of the treaty of 1837, all its articles (except that of maintaining an auxiliary force, from which the king had been relieved as an act of grace) were considered by the court of Lucknow as binding on the contracting powers.*

The supreme authorities had placed themselves in a difficult position: they had pertinaciously stood between the Court of Directors and the government of Oude, and had taken upon themselves the responsibility of maintaining the treaty repudiated by the directors as unjust and extortionate. But in 1855, the rapid march of the annexation policy had left the landmarks of 1837 so far behind, that it had become desirable to set the contract of that date aside, because its exactions and its penalties, once denounced as unfair to the king, would now, if enforced, limit and cripple the plans of the governor-general. The very instrument, obtained and retained for aggressive purposes, in defiance of the orders of the home authorities, was likely to prove a weapon of defence in the hands of the King of Oude, and to be rested upon as the charter of the rights of the dynasty and state. But the Red treaty palmed off on Omichund, with the forged signature of Admiral Watson, was not more easily set aside by Clive† than the treaty with Oude by the governor-general in council. In each case, the right of the stronger prevailed without a struggle, and left the weaker party no power of appeal. Still the authorities, in discussing the affairs of Oude, abstained, as far as possible, from any mention of the treaty of 1837, and evidently thought the less said on the subject the better. Thus, the governor-general, in his minute on the measures to be adopted for the future administration of Oude (extending over forty-three folio pages), adverts to the treaty of 1837, only in one short paragraph, in which he states that the instrument by which the mutual relations of the British and Oude governments were defined, was the treaty of 1801. "A very general im-

pression prevails that a subsequent re-adjustment of those relations was made by the treaty concluded by Lord Auckland in 1837. But that treaty is null and void. It was wholly disallowed by the Hon. Court of Directors as soon as they received it."

In other paragraphs, repeated reference is made to the warnings given by Lord Hardinge to Wajid Ali, in 1847, of the determination of the supreme government, in the event of continued neglect, to interfere for the protection of the people of Oude; but the important fact is suppressed, that the right of interference was explicitly stated to rest, wholly and solely, "on the treaty ratified in the year 1837."‡

"It is to the treaty of 1801," said Lord Dalhousie, "that we must exclusively look:"§ and, accordingly, it was looked to, for the express purpose of proving that it had been violated by the King of Oude, and might, therefore, be likewise declared null and void. Yet Lord Dalhousie hesitated at "resorting to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the territory, and the abolition of the throne." The rulers of Oude, he admitted, had been unwavering in their adherence to the British power, and had "aided us as best they could in our hour of utmost need:" he therefore recommended that the king should be suffered to retain his title and rank, but should be required to transfer the whole civil and military administration into the hands of the E. I. Company, in perpetuity, by whom the surplus revenues were to be appropriated, a liberal stipend being allowed for the maintenance of the royal family. "The king's consent," he added, "is indispensable to the transfer of the whole, or of any part, of his sovereign power to the government of the East India Company. It would not be expedient or right to extract this consent by means of menace or compulsion." Lord Dalhousie, therefore, advised that the king should be requested to sign a treaty based on the foregoing terms, and warned that, in the event of refusal, the treaty of 1801 would be declared at an end, and the British subsidiary force entirely withdrawn. The proposal appears to have been made under the idea that the very existence of the throne of Oude depended so entirely on the presence

* *Oude Blue Book*, p. 81.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., pp. 276—278.

‡ Minute by Lord Dalhousie, June 18th, 1855.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 149.

§ Any reader who doubts the illegality of Lord

Dalhousie's conclusion, would do well to peruse the able opinion of Dr. Travers Twiss, dated 24th February, 1857, on the infraction of the law of nations, committed by setting aside the treaty of 1837: quoted in *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, pp. 192—199.

of a British force, that the king would accede to any conditions required from him. But the other members of council unani- mously deprecated the offering of the pro- posed alternative, on the ground of the ter- rible crisis of anarchy which would be the probable consequence; and it was suggested that, "if there should be in the king's council but one person of courage and genius, though it should be but a dancing-girl (such as Indian annals show many), the king might be led to elect disconnection rather than abdication."*

Mr. Dorin minuted in favour of the entire incorporation of Oude, and objected to con- tinuing "to the most unkingly monarch of Oude any portion of the royal position and dignity which, by nature and inclination, he is incapable of sustaining;" yet he foresaw that the king would never surrender his kingdom except on compulsion. All Mr. Dorin's sympathies were, he declared, with the people of Oude, the "fine, manly race," from whom we drew "almost the flower of the Bengal army."

Mr. Grant agreed generally with Mr. Dorin, but thought that the king might be suffered to retain his title for his life- time. Mr. Grant took strong views of the rights and responsibilities of the British government, both in its own right, and as having "succeeded to the empire of the Mogul;" and he denied that the Oude rulers had ever stood in the position of sovereign princes. Major-general Low (who had held the position of resident at Lucknow for eleven years) minuted in favour of annexa- tion, but desired to see more liberal provi- sion made for the present king and his suc- cessors than the other members of council deemed necessary. He urged that the well- known habits of Mohammedans of rank afforded a guarantee for their income being expended among the people from whom it was levied, and not hoarded up, and sent off to a distant country, according to the prac- tice of most European gentlemen on reaching the highest offices in the Indian service. The character of the last five princes of Oude, all of whom he had known personally, had, he said, been much misrepresented: they had sadly mismanaged their own affairs, but they had constantly proved active and

useful allies, having again and again for- warded large supplies of grain and cattle to our armies with an alacrity that could not be exceeded by our own British chiefs of provinces, and having lent us large sums of money when we were extremely in want of it, and could not procure it elsewhere. As individual princes, their intercourse with our public functionaries had been regular, attentive, courteous, and friendly.†

Mr. Peacock minuted in favour of the assumption of sovereign power over Oude, but desired that the surplus revenue might be disposed of entirely for the benefit of the people, and no pecuniary benefit be derived by the East India Company. The sugges- tion deserved more notice than it appears to have received, seeing that "the benefit of the people" is declared by the directors to have been "the sole motive, as well as the sole justification," of the annexation.‡

Not one of the four members of coun- cil (not even Mr. Peacock, though an emi- nent lawyer) took the slightest notice of the treaty of 1837, or alluded to the fre- quent references concerning it made by their delegates at the court of Lucknow. They spoke freely enough of treaties in general, discussed the law of nations, and quoted Vattel; but the latest contract was tabooed as dangerous ground. The governor- general, in forwarding to the Court of Directors the minutes and other papers above quoted, alluded to his own approach- ing departure, but offered to remain and carry out the proposed measures regarding Oude, if the directors considered that the experience of eight years would enable him to do so with greater authority than a newly-appointed governor might probably command. The task, he added, would impose upon him very heavy additional labour and anxiety; the ripened fruit would be gathered only by those who might come after him.§ The simile is an unfortunate one, if the fruit we are now gathering in Oude is to be viewed as evidencing the cha- racter of the tree which produced it.

The Court of Directors, in announcing their decision on the subject, imitated the reserve of their representatives; and having the fear of Blue Book revelations, and India Reform Society philippics before

* Minute by Mr. Grant.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 218.

† This last portion of Major-general Low's minute certainly does not accord with the account given by Colonel Sleeman of his intercourse with Wajid Ali; but the colonel, though just and honourable

in deed, was not conciliatory in manner; and his official communication with the king would be naturally affected by this circumstance.

‡ *Oude Blue Book*, p. 234.

§ Despatch dated July 3rd, 1855.—*Ibid.*, p. 1.

their eyes (but not of mutiny and insurrection), they ignored the chief difficulty, and accepted Lord Dalhousie's offer in the most complimentary terms, leaving him unfettered by any special instructions. They suggested, however, that the officiating resident (Outram) should be instructed to ascertain whether the prospect of declaring our connection with the Oude government at an end, would be so alarming to the king as to render his acceptance of the proposed treaty a matter of virtual necessity. If this could be relied on, the alternative was to be offered; if not, the directors authorised and enjoined the attainment of the "indispensable result," in such manner as the governor-general in council should see fit. Concerning the appropriation of the surplus revenue, they made no remark whatever.*

The idea of offering the king the withdrawal of the subsidiary force as the alternative of abdication, was abandoned, and measures were taken for the assumption of the government of Oude, by issuing orders for the assembling of such a military force at Cawnpore as, added to the troops cantoned at that station, and to those already in Oude, was considered sufficient to meet every immediate contingency. The additional troops numbered about 13,000 men, and were placed under the divisional command of (the late) Major-general Penny; but constituted a distinct field force under (the late) Colonel Wheeler, as brigadier. In the meantime, the disorganisation of Oude was clearly on the increase, and one of its marked features was a rising spirit of Moslem fanaticism. It happened that a Mohammedan fast fell on the same day as a Hindoo feast; and Ameer Ali, a moolvee, or priest, of high repute, took advantage of the circumstance to incite his co-religionists to a fierce onslaught on the Hindoos. Troops were ordered out to quell the disturbances; but Ameer Ali seized and confined two of the officers, assembled 3,000 men, and declared his intention of destroying a certain Hindoo temple, and erecting a mosque in its stead. At length the British subsidiary force was employed by the king against the moolvee. An affray ensued, in

which a body of Patans fought with the recklessness of fanaticism, and were cut down, standing shoulder to shoulder round their guns, by a party of Hindoo zemindars and their retainers. In all, 200 Hindoos and 300 Patans perished. This occurred in November, 1855. About the same time the Oude government became aware that some great change was in agitation. They asked the reason for the assembling of so large a force at Cawnpore; and were, it is alleged, solemnly assured that it was intended to keep in check the Nepaulese, who were supposed to be meditating a descent towards the district of Nanparah.†

The veil, however, was soon withdrawn. On the 30th of January, 1856, General Outram requested the attendance of Ali Nukki Khan at the residency, and after informing him of the contemplated changes, "mentioned that, in order to prevent the chance of a disturbance on the part of evil-disposed persons, a strong brigade of troops was directed to cross the Ganges, and march on the capital."‡

Having impressed the minister with the futility of resistance, the resident proceeded to seek, or rather to insist upon, an interview with the king. Remembering the discussions which had taken place between the Nizam of Hyderabad and Colonel Low, the governor-general was anxious that General Outram should not be surprised into indiscreet admissions; and warned him, that it was "very probable" that the king would refer to the treaty negotiated with his predecessor in the year 1837, of the entire abrogation of which the court of Lucknow had never been informed. "The effect of this reserve, and want of full communication, is felt to be embarrassing to-day. It is the more embarrassing that the cancelled instrument was still included in a volume of treaties which was published in 1845, by the authority of government. There is no better way of encountering this difficulty than by meeting it full in the face." This was to be done by informing the king that the communication had been inadvertently neglected; and the resident was authorised to state the regret felt by the governor-general in council, that "any such neglect should have taken place even inadvertently." Should the king observe, that although the treaty of 1837 was annulled, a similar measure, less stringent than that now proposed, might be adopted, he was to be told, that all subsequent experience had

* Despatch from the Court of Directors, dated November 21st, 1855. Signed—E. Macnaghten, W. H. Sykes, &c., &c., &c.—*Oude Blue Book*, pp. 233—236.

† *Dacottee in Exile*, p. 140.

‡ *Oude Blue Book*, p. 280.

shown that the remedy then provided would be wholly inadequate to remove the evils and abuses which had long marked the condition of Oude.*

Such were the arguments put by the supreme government of India, into the mouth of General Outram. They must have been extremely unpalatable to a man whose friendly feeling towards Indian princes had been strengthened by personal and friendly intercourse, and not frozen by viceregal state, or neutralised by exclusive attention to the immediate interests and absorbing pecuniary anxieties of the East India Company. But the resident had swallowed a more bitter pill than this when negotiating with the unfortunate Ameers of Sind, whom, in his own words, he had had to warn against resistance to our requisitions, as a measure that would bring down upon them utter and merited destruction; while he firmly believed, that every life lost in consequence of our aggressions, would be chargeable upon us as a murder.†

In the present instance he was spared the task of adding insult to injury. Neither the king nor his minister attempted to stand upon any abstract theory of justice, or fought the ground, inch by inch, as Mahratta diplomatists would have done—throwing away no chance, but, amid defeat and humiliation, making the best possible terms for themselves. Wajid Ali Shah, on the contrary, “unkingly” as he had been described to be, and unfit to reign as he certainly was, did not stoop to discussions which he knew would avail him nothing, but acted on the imperial axiom, “*aut Cæsar aut nullus.*”

When the resident proceeded, as pre-arranged, to present to the king the draft treaty now proposed, accompanied by a letter from the governor-general urging its acceptance, he found the palace courts nearly deserted, and the guns which protected the inner gates dismounted from their carriages. The guard of honour were drawn up unarmed, and saluted him with their hands only. The mere official report of the interview is very interesting. The king received the treaty with the deepest emotion, and gave it to a confidential servant, Sahib-oo-Dowlah, to read aloud; but the latter, overcome by his feelings, was unable to

proceed beyond the first few lines; on which the king took the treaty into his own hands, and silently read the document, in which he was called upon to admit that he and his predecessors had, by continual maladministration, violated the treaty of 1801; and to make over the entire government of Oude to the East India Company in perpetuity, together with the free and exclusive right to “the revenues thereof.” In return for signing this humiliating abdication, Wajid Ali was to retain and bequeath “to the heirs male of his body born in lawful wedlock” (not his heirs generally, according to Mohammedan law), the style of a sovereign prince, and a stipend of twelve lacs per annum.

After carefully perusing every article, the king exclaimed, in a passionate burst of grief—“Treaties are necessary between equals only; who am I now, that the British government should enter into treaties with me?” Uncovering himself (the deepest token of humiliation which a Mohammedan can give),‡ he placed his turban in the hands of the resident, declaring that, now his titles, rank, and position were all gone, he would not trouble government for any maintenance, but would seek, in Europe, for that redress which it was vain to look for in India.

General Outram begged the king to reflect, that if he persisted in withholding his signature, “he would have no security whatever for his future maintenance, or for that of his family; that the very liberal provision devised by the British government would inevitably be reconsidered and reduced; that his majesty would have no guarantee for his future provision, and would have no claim whatever on the generosity of the government.” The prime minister warmly supported the resident; but the king’s brother exclaimed, that there was no occasion for a treaty, as his majesty was no longer in a position to be one of the contracting powers. The king reiterated his unalterable resolve not to sign the treaty: the resident intimated that no further delay than three days could be permitted; and then, with the usual ceremonies and honours, took his leave.

The government, in their anxiety to obtain the king’s signature, had empowered

* Letter from secretary of government to Major-general Outram, January 23rd, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 243.

† Outram’s *Commentary on Napier’s Conquest of*

Sind, p. 439. See also *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 451.

‡ May your father’s head be uncovered! is one of the most bitter curses of the Mohammedans.

the resident to increase the proffered stipend of twelve lacs (£120,000) to fifteen, if their object could be thus attained. But the demeanour of Wajid Ali convinced General Outram that the promise of double that sum, or of any amount of money, would have no effect; and he therefore considered it unworthy of the government he represented, to make any offer to raise the proposed allowance by a lac or two per annum.

An attempt was made to gain the king's consent through his mother, a lady remarkable for good sense and intelligence,* who exercised great influence over her son; and a yearly stipend of a lac of rupees was offered her as the reward of success. The reply of the queen-mother is not stated in General Outram's account of the conference, and the circumstance itself is only incidentally mentioned; but it is evident that she rejected it, and ceased not to protest against the proposed treaty, and to beg that a further period might be allowed, during which the king might be enabled to show to the world, by the adoption of vigorous reforms, how anxious and eager he was to follow out the plans of the British government.

The three days allowed for consideration elapsed: the king persisted in his resolve; and the resident carried out his instructions by issuing a proclamation, previously prepared at Calcutta, notifying the assumption of the exclusive and permanent administration of the territories of Oude by the Hon. East India Company.

The king offered no opposition whatever to the measures adopted by the British government; but, in what the resident called "a fit of petulance," he ordered all his troops at the capital to be immediately paid-up and dismissed. General Outram thereupon informed the king, that it was incumbent on him to retain the soldiery until the arrangements of the new administration should be completed; adding, that should any disturbance take place, his majesty would be held responsible, and made answerable for the same. Upon the receipt of this threat, Wajid Ali Shah, having resolved to give no pretext for a quarrel, issued proclamations, desiring all his people, civil and military, to obey the orders issued by the British government; to become its faithful subjects; and on no account to resort to resistance or rebellion.

* "Note of a Conference with the queen-mother, by General Outram."—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 286.

He expressed his determination of proceeding at once to Calcutta, to bring his case to the notice of the governor-general, and thence to England, to intercede with the Queen; but he specially commanded that his subjects should not attempt to follow him. General Outram desired that this last paragraph should be omitted. It originated, he said, in the absurd idea impressed upon the king by his flatterers, that a general exodus of his people would follow his departure; or else was introduced with the intention of exciting sympathy in Europe. "Another manoeuvre," he added, "has been had recourse to, with the same object doubtless. For two days past, a written declaration of satisfaction with his majesty's rule has been circulated for signature in the city, where it may probably meet with considerable success. Of course, most classes at Lucknow will suffer, more or less, from the deprivation of the national plunder which is squandered at the capital."†

There is reason to believe that very general dismay was caused at Lucknow by the annexation of the kingdom. The breaking up of a native government is always a terrible crisis to the metropolis. In the present instance, the amount of immediate and individual suffering was unusually large. The suddenness of the king's deposition, and his refusal to sign the treaty, aggravated the distress which the change from native to European hands must have occasioned, even had it happened as a so-called lapse to the paramount power, in the event of the sovereign's death without heirs. As it was, the personal rights of the deposed monarch were dealt with as summarily as the inherited ones of the royal family of Nagpoor had been. No official account has been published of these proceedings; but in the statement of the case of the King of Oude, attributed to Major Bird, the following assertions are made:—

"Since the confiscation of the Oude territory, the royal palaces, parks, gardens, menageries, plate, jewellery, household furniture, stores, wardrobes, carriages, rarities, and articles of *virtu*, together with the royal museum and library, containing 200,000 volumes of rare books, and manuscripts of immense value, have been sequestered. The king's most valuable stud of Arabian, Persian, and English horses, his fighting, riding, and baggage elephants, his camels, dogs and cattle, have all been sold by public auction at nominal prices. His majesty's armoury, including the most rare and beautifully worked arms of every description, has also

† Major-general Outram to secretary of government, February 7th, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book*, p. 292.

been seized, and its contents disposed of by sale or otherwise. * * * The ladies of the royal household were, on the 23rd of August, 1856, forcibly ejected from the royal palace of the Chuttar Munzul, by officers who neither respected their persons nor their property, and who threw their effects into the street."

It is to be hoped that the above statement is exaggerated; and if so, it is especially to be regretted that the British public, or their representatives, are not furnished with authentic information on so interesting and important a point as the manner in which the deposition of Wajid Ali Shah was accomplished, and in what respects it was calculated to raise or allay the ferment of the mass of the aristocratic and manufacturing classes, the interests of the latter being closely associated with the former. In the *Reply to the Charges against the King of Oude* (already quoted), Wajid Ali Shah asserts, that the usurpation of his dominion would tend to destroy the trade in embroidered silk and cotton cloths. "It is notorious, that three-fourths of the rich embroidered cloths of Benares are imported to Oude; the remainder, one-fourth, being sent to other countries. In Bengal and other provinces, people very seldom use these costly dresses." The reason implied, rather than declared, by the king is probably the true one; namely, that his subjects could afford to clothe themselves in luxurious apparel, whereas those of the East India Company could not; and he adds—"My territories have not been strictly measured with chains so as to render it impossible for the agriculturist to derive a profit, nor have I resumed the allowances of any class of people."†

The testimony of the king regarding the probable results of his deposition, is, in part, corroborated by that of an eye-witness, who will hardly be accused of exaggerating the case; and who, in speaking of the many innocent sufferers from the change of government, includes in his list, "thousands of citizens who had previously found employ in providing for the ordinary wants of the court and nobility. There were several hundreds of manufacturers of hookah snakes. The embroiderers in gold and silver thread were also reckoned by hundreds. The makers of rich dresses, fine turbans, highly ornamental shoes, and many other subordinate trades, suffered severely from the cessa-

tion of the demand for the articles which they manufactured."‡

Oude was taken possession of, very much more as if it had been obtained by force of arms than by diplomacy. Annexation on a large scale, is in either case a hazardous operation, requiring the greatest circumspection. Let any one turn to the Wellesley and Wellington despatches, or to the Indian annals of that eventful period, and see the extreme care which was taken in the settlement of Mysoor—the forethought in preparing conciliatory measures, and meeting national prejudices; the liberal consideration for individual interests—and then peruse, in the parliamentary papers, the summary manner in which the native institutions in Oude, without the least consideration or examination, were to be rooted up and superseded by a cut-and-dried system, to be administered in the higher departments exclusively by Europeans. After such a comparison of preliminary measures, the different results, in the case of Oude and Mysoor, will be deemed amply accounted for. It has been truly said of Lord Wellesley, in a leading Indian journal, that "whatever he was suffered to carry out to his premeditated conclusion, fell into its place with as few disadvantages to the political and social state of Indian society, as a radical operation could well be attended with." In the settlement of Mysoor, it is asserted, "every difficulty was foreseen, and every exigency met; and the dynasty of Tippoo was plucked up, flung aside, and replaced by a new arrangement, which fitted into its place as if it had been there, untouched, from the days of Vishnu." Regarding the occupation of Oude, a very different picture is drawn by the writer, who asserts, that its annexation was carried out in the most reckless manner, and that most important circumstances connected with it were entirely overlooked. "In Lord Dalhousie's opinion, all that was necessary was simply to march a small body of troops to Lucknow, and issue the fiat of annexation. This done, everything, it was supposed, would go on in an easy, plain-sailing manner. The inhabitants might not be satisfied; the zemindars might grumble a little in their forts; the budmashes might frown and swagger in the bazaar; but what of that? The power of the British was invincible."§

* *Dacoitee in Excelsis*, p. 145.

† *Reply to Charges*, &c., p. 43.

‡ *Mutinies in Oudh*; by Martin Richard Gub-

bins, of the Bengal civil service, financial commissioner for Oudh. London: Bentley, 1858; p. 70.

§ *Bombay Athenæum*.

The minutes of the supreme council certainly tend to corroborate the foregoing opinion, by showing that the difficulties and dangers attendant on the annexation of Oude were very imperfectly appreciated. The refusal of the king to sign the proffered treaty (though previously deprecated by the governor-general as an insurmountable obstacle to direct absorption), seems to have been welcomed when it actually occurred, as an escape from an onerous engagement; and the submission of all classes—hereditary chiefs, discarded officials, unemployed tradespeople, and disbanded soldiery—was looked for as a matter of course; any concessions made by the annexators being vouchsafed as a matter of free grace, to be received with gratitude, whether it regarded the confirmation of an hereditary chieftdom, or a year's salary on dismissal from office.

The king, Lord Dalhousie considered, by refusing to enter into any new engagement with the British government, had placed himself in entire dependence upon its pleasure; and although it was desirable that "all deference and respect, and every royal honour, should be paid to his majesty Wajid Ali Shah," during his lifetime, together with a stipend of twelve lacs per annum, yet no promise ought now to be given of the continuance of the title, or of the payment of the same amount of money to his heirs. Messrs. Dorin, Grant, and Peacock concurred in this opinion; but Major-general Low minuted against "the salary of the heirs" of Wajid Ali being left to the decision of a future government, the members of which would very probably not sufficiently bear in mind the claims of the Oude family on the British government for comfortable income at least. The minute proceeded to state, that though, for many reasons, it was to be regretted that the king had not signed the treaty, yet, in a pecuniary point of view, his refusal was advantageous. To himself the loss had been great; and, as he had issued all the orders and proclamations that could be desired, and had done his utmost to prevent all risk of strife at the capital, by dismounting his artillery, guns, &c., it would be harsh, and not creditable to a great paramount state, which would "gain immense profit from the possession of the Oude territories," if, in addition to the punishment inflicted on the king, the income intended for his direct male heirs should also be curtailed.

Major-general Low was in a minority of

one, as Mr. Peacock had been regarding the appropriation of the surplus revenue; and their opinions, in neither case, appear to have met with any consideration. The claims of the various classes of the population were treated in as summary and arbitrary a manner as those of their sovereign; and, owing to the peculiar constitution of Oude, the experiment was a much more dangerous one in their case than in his. The administration was to be conducted, as nearly as possible, in accordance with the system which the experience of nearly seven years had proved to be eminently successful in the provinces beyond the Sutlej; that is to say, the measures which had been matured, and gradually carried through, in the conquered Punjab, by the co-operation of some of the most earnest and philanthropic men whom India has ever seen, was now to be thrust upon Oude, without any preliminary inquiry into its adaptation. In the Punjab, the Lawrences and their staff acted as a band of pacificators on an errand of love and mercy, rather than in the usual form of a locust-cloud of collectors. Such men, invested with considerable discretionary power, could scarcely fail of success; yet one at least of them shrunk from enforcing the orders of government, and left the Punjab, because he could not bear to see the fallen state of the old officials and nobility.*

In Oude, the newly-created offices, rather than the men who were to fill them, occupy the foreground of the picture. General Outram was appointed chief commissioner, with two special military assistants, a judicial and financial commissioner, four commissioners of divisions, twelve deputy-commissioners of districts, eighteen assistant-commissioners, and eighteen extra assistants, to begin with. An inspector of gaols was to be appointed as soon as the new administration should be fairly established; and a promise was held out for the organisation of a department of public works, to aid in developing the resources of the country.

The pay of the new functionaries was to range from 3,500 rupees to 250 rupees a month (say from £4,200 to £300 a-year.) The number of native officials to be retained was, as usual, miserably small, and their remuneration proportionately low. As a body, they were of course great losers by the revolution.

* Arthur Cocks, chief assistant to the resident.—*Raikes' Revolt in the North-West Provinces*, p. 25.

The king urged, as a special ground of complaint, the manner in which "writers, clerks, and other *attachés*" of departments had been supplanted by strangers. "Is it," he asks, "consistent with justice to deprive people of the soil of situations of this nature, and bestow them on foreigners? Foreigners have no claim to support from the government of Oude, while natives of the soil are left without means of procuring their livelihood."*

Mr. Gubbins, the financial commissioner for Oude, who was sent there at the period of the annexation, speaks of the sufferings of the nobility as having been aggravated by the neglect of the British functionaries. "The nobles had received large pensions from the native government, the payment of which, never regular, ceased with the introduction of our rule. Government had made liberal provision for their support; but before this could be obtained, it was necessary to prepare careful lists of the grantees, and to investigate their claims. It must be admitted, that in effecting this there was undue delay; and that, for want of common means of support, the gentry and nobility of the city were brought to great straits and suffering. We were informed that families which had never before been outside the *zunana*, used to go out at night and beg their bread."†

When Sir Henry Lawrence came to Lucknow, towards the close of March, 1857, we are told that he applied himself to cause the dispatch of the necessary documents, and gave the sufferers assurance of early payment and kind consideration. But nearly fourteen months had dragged slowly away before his arrival; and a smouldering mass of disaffection had meanwhile accumulated, which no single functionary, however good and gifted, could keep from bursting into a flame.

The discharged soldiery of the native government, amounting to about 60,000 men, naturally regarded the new administration with aversion and hostility. Service was given to about 15,000 of them in newly-formed local regiments, and some found employment in the civil departments. The large proportion, for whom no permanent provision could be made, received small pensions or gratuities: for instance, those who had served from twenty-five to thirty years, received one-fourth of their emoluments as pension; and those who had served

from seven to fifteen years, received three months' pay as a gratuity. Under seven years' service, no gratuity whatever appears to have been given to the unfortunates suddenly turned adrift for no fault of their own. It was further decreed, that no person whatever should be recommended for pension or gratuity, who should decline employment offered to him under the British government.‡ Of the late king's servants, civil and military, many remained without any permanent provision; and not a few refused employ—some because they hoped that the native kingdom would be restored; but the majority of the soldiery, on account of the severity of the British discipline.§

By far the greatest difficulties in which the new government became involved, regarded the settlement of titles to land. Considering the long series of years during which at least the temporary assumption of the powers of administration had been contemplated by the British government, it is not a little surprising to find the governor-general in council avowedly unprovided with "any information as to the extent and value of rent-free holdings in Oude, or as to the practice which may have prevailed under the native government in respect of these grants." Without waiting for any enlightenment on the subject, rules are laid down "for the adjudication of claims of the class under consideration;" and, as might have been reasonably expected, these rules worked badly for all parties.

The despatch above quoted is very able, but decidedly bureaucratic throughout: its arbitrary provisions and minute details remind one of the constitutions which the Abbé Sièyes kept in the pigeon-holes of his writing-table, ready for any emergency. No consideration was evinced therein for the peculiar state of society in Oude, or even for the prominent features portrayed by Colonel Sleeman in his honest but cursory investigation. The fact was, that Oude, instead of the exclusively Mohammedan kingdom, or the British dependency, which it was represented to be, was really a Hindoo confederacy, presided over by a foreign dynasty. The most powerful class were Rajpoot chiefs, claiming descent from the sun and the moon; who laughed to scorn the mushroom dynasty of Wajid Ali, and regarded, with especial contempt, his assumption of the kingly title. These men,

* Reply to Charges, p. 43.

† Gubbins' *Mutines in Oudh*, p. 70.

‡ Oude Blue Book for 1856, p. 278.

§ Gubbins' *Mutines in Oudh*, p. 69.

united, might at any moment have compelled the Mohammedan ruler to abdicate or govern on just principles, had not co-operation for such an object been rendered impracticable by their own intestine strife. The state of things among them resembled that which brought and kept the Rajpoot princes under partial subjection: the faggots bound up together could not have been broken; but it was easy to deal with them one by one. Thus the suzerainty of the Mogul emperor was established over Rajast'han; and thus, though somewhat more firmly, because on a smaller scale, the power of the usurping governors was fixed in Oude. But the great jungle barons were overawed rather than subjugated; and, in the time of Colonel Sleeman, the officers of the native government could not examine into their rent-rolls, or measure their lands, or make any inquiry into the value of the estates, except at the risk of open rebellion. They had always a number of armed and brave retainers, ready to support them in any enterprise; and the amount was easily increased; for in India there is seldom any lack of loose characters, ready to fight for the sake of plunder alone.*

The talookdars were mostly the hereditary representatives of Rajpoot clans; but some were the heads of new families (Hindoo or Mohammedan), sprung from government officials, whose local authority had enabled them to acquire a holding of this description. The term "talookdar" means holder of a talook, or collection of villages, and, like that of zemindar (as used in Bengal), implied no right of property in the villages on behalf of which the talookdar engaged to pay the state a certain sum, and from which he realised a somewhat larger one, which constituted his remuneration. In fact, the property in the soil was actually vested in the village communities; who "are," says Mr. Gubbins, "the only proprietors of the soil; and they value this right of property in the land above all earthly treasure."†

Over these talookdars there were government officers (with whom they have often been confounded), and who, under the title of Nazims or Chukladars, annually farmed from government the revenues of large tracts of country for a certain fixed payment; all that they could squeeze out in

excess being their own profit. "These men, from the necessities of their position, were," says Carre Tucker, "the greatest tyrants and oppressors imaginable. Backed by artillery, and the armed force of government, it was their business to rack-rent the country, extracting, within the year of their lease, all that they possibly could; whilst landholders resisted their exactions by force of arms. A constant war was thus carried on, and the revenue payments varied according to the relative strength of the nazim and the landowners. To avoid such contests, and obtain the privilege of paying a fixed sum direct into the government treasury, many of the talookdars would bid for the farm of their own part of the country. Such men, while acting as lord-lieutenants, would of course use their delegated authority to consolidate their influence over their own clan and tenantry, and also to usurp rights over independent village communities." This system led to the most cruel oppression; but it was supported by the ministers and courtiers of the king at Lucknow, as leading to an annual repetition of presents and bribes, without which no candidate could hope to obtain investiture as nazim or chukladar.‡

The government, not content with abolishing this manifest evil, attempted to revolutionise, at a stroke, the whole state of society, by sweeping aside the entire class of chiefs and barons, with the incidents of their feudal tenure, and making the revenue settlement with the village communities and smaller holders. Hereditary rights, unquestioned during successive generations, were confounded with those exercised by the revenue-farmers *ex officio*, and the settlement officers were desired to deal with the proprietary coparcenaries which were believed to exist in Oude, and not to suffer the interposition of middlemen, such as talookdars, farmers of the revenue, and such like. The claims of these, if they had any tenable ones, might be, it was added, more conveniently considered at a future period.

Nothing could be more disheartening to the great landowners than this indefinite adjournment of any consideration of their claims; which, in effect, acted like a decree of confiscation, with a distant and very slight chance of ultimate restitution. It was quite evident that the motive of the measure was expediency, and that the government had, as stated by the *Times*,

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., pp. 1, 2.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 61.

‡ *Letter on Oudh and its Talookdars*, p. 2.

"a natural leaning in favour of the peasant cultivators, to the detriment of the war-like and turbulent chiefs," whom it was thought politic to put down; and the plan of ignoring their ancient possessions had the additional advantage of bringing their manorial dues, averaging from ten to twenty per cent. on the village assessment, into the public exchequer.

The summary settlement in Oude too far resembled that which had been previously carried through, with a high hand, in the North-West Provinces, concerning which much evidence has recently been made public. Mr. H. S. Boulderson, a Bengal civilian, engaged in establishing the revenue settlement of 1844, declares, that whether the talookdars in Oude experienced, or only anticipated, the same dealings from our government which the talookdars in the North-West Provinces received, they must have had a strong motive to dread our rule. "The 'confiscation' which has been proclaimed against them—whether it really means confiscation, or something else—could not be more effectually destructive to whatever rights they possessed, than the disgraceful injustice by which the talookdars of the North-West Provinces were extinguished." He asserts, that the settlement involved an utter inversion of the rights of property; and that the commissioners, in dealing with what they termed "the patent right of talookdaree," and which even they acknowledged to be an hereditary right which had descended for centuries, treated it as a privilege dependent on the pleasure of government, and assumed the authority of distributing at pleasure the profits arising out of the limitation of their own demand.*

The opinion of Sir William Sleeman has been already quoted concerning the treatment which the landed proprietors had received in the half of Oude annexed by the British government in 1801, and now included in the North-West Provinces. By his testimony, the measures, and the men who enforced them, were equally obnoxious to the native chiefs and talookdars; being resolved on favouring the village communities, to the exclusion of every kind of vested interest between them and the state treasury. Sir William states—

"In the matter of discourtesy to the native

* Minute on the Talookdaree cases, recorded on 2nd of April, 1844. Printed for private circulation in June, 1858; p. 19.

gentry, I can only say that Robert Martin Bird insulted them whenever he had the opportunity of doing so; and that Mr. Thomason was too apt to imitate him in this, as in other things. Of course their example was followed by too many of their followers and admirers. * * * It has always struck me that Mr. Thomason, in his system, did all he could to discourage the growth of a middle and upper class on the land—the only kind of property on which a good upper and middle class could be sustained in the present state of society in India. His village republics, and the ryotwar system of Sir Thomas Munro at Madras, had precisely the same tendency to subdivide minutely property in land, and reduce all landholders to the common level of impoverishment. * * * Mr. Thomason would have forced his village republics upon any new country or jungle that came under his charge, and thereby rendered improvement impossible. * * * He would have put the whole under our judicial courts, and have thereby created a class of pettifogging attorneys, to swallow up all the surplus produce of the land. * * * Mr. Thomason, I am told, systematically set aside all the landed aristocracy of the country as a set of *middlemen*, superfluous and mischievous. The only part of India in which I have seen a middle and higher class maintained upon the land, is the moderately settled districts of the Saugor and Nerbudda territories; and there is no part of India where our government and character are so much beloved and respected."†

Mr. Gubbins makes some very important admissions regarding the revenue system pursued in the North-West Provinces, and that subsequently attempted in Oude. "The pressure of the government demand is, in many districts, greatly too high. It is too high in Alighur, in Mynpoorie, in Boolundshuhur, and throughout the greater part of Rohilcund. The principle on which that settlement was made, was to claim, as the share of government, two-thirds of the nett rental. But the fraud and chicanery opposed to our revenue officers, caused them unwittingly to fix the demand at more than this share. In Oude, after repeated and most careful examination, I came unhesitatingly to the conclusion, that the government collector appropriated, if possible, the entire rent, and never professed to relinquish any part of it."‡ Of course, under a system which grasped at the *entire rent* of the soil, there could be no landlord class: a very short period of time would suffice for their extinction; and any so-called proprietary rights must, in due course, have also been annihilated.

No arguments in favour of the village system (excellent as this was in its place and degree), could justify the suppression of

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. ii., p. 413. Letter to Mr. Colvin, dated "Lucknow, 28th December, 1853."

‡ Gubbins's *Mutinies in Oudh*. p. 73.

every other co-existing institution. But the projected change, even had it been unexceptionable in its tendency, was altogether too sudden: the village communities were not strong enough to feel safe in occupying the vantage-ground on which they were so unexpectedly placed; and many of them considered the rough-and-ready patriarchal sway of their chiefs but ill-exchanged for our harsh and unbending revenue system, and tedious and expensive law processes. Government erred grievously "in following supposed political and financial expediency, instead of ascertaining and maintaining existing rights in possession; and in supposing, that in the course of a very hurried assessment of revenue by officers, many of whom were inexperienced, it was possible to adjudicate properly difficult claims to former rights.* Lord Dalhousie's successor admits it to be too true, "that unjust decisions were come to by some of our local officers, in investigating and judging the titles of the landholders."† The natural consequence was, as stated by General Outram, that the landholders, having been "most unjustly treated under our settlement operations," and "smarting, as they were, under the loss of their lands," with hardly a dozen exceptions, sided against us, when they saw that "our rule was virtually at an end, the whole country overrun, and the capital in the hands of the rebel soldiery."‡ The yeomanry, whom we had prematurely attempted to raise to independence, followed the lead of their natural chiefs. All this might, it is alleged, have been prevented, had a fair and moderate assessment been made with the talookdar, wherever he had had clear possession for the legal limit of twelve years, together with a sub-settlement for the protection of the village communities and cultivators.§

Very contradictory opinions are entertained regarding the manner in which the British sepoy were affected by the annexation of Oude.

Mr. Gubbins admits, that when the mutinies commenced in the Bengal army, the talookdars in Oude were discontented and aggrieved; numbers of discharged soldiers were brooding over the recollection of their former license; and the inhabitants of the cities

generally were impoverished and distressed; but the sepoy, he says, had benefited by the change of government, and were rejoicing in the encouragement given to the village communities at the expense of the talookdars. Thousands of sepoy families laid complaints of usurpation before the revenue officers, and "many hundreds of villages at once passed into their hands from those of the talooqdars! Whatever the talooqdar lost, the sepoy gained. No one had so great cause for gratulation as he."

The sepoy, although an exceptional class, had their own grievance, besides sharing in the general distrust and aversion entertained by the whole people at the idea of being brought under the jurisdiction of our civil courts; as well as at the introduction of the Company's opium monopoly, and the abkaree, or excise, on the retail sale of all spirituous liquors and intoxicating drugs, the consumption of which was very large throughout Oude, and especially among the soldiery.

Under the native government, the British sepoy enjoyed special and preferential advantages, their complaints being brought to its notice by the intervention of the resident. Each family made a point of having some connection in the British army, and, through him, laid their case before his commanding officer. The sepoy's petition was countersigned by the English colonel, and forwarded to the resident, by whom it was submitted to the king.|| This privilege was not recognised or named in any treaty or other engagement with the sovereign of Oude, nor could its origin be traced in any document recorded in the resident's office;¶ but it was in full operation at the time of our occupation of Oude; and had been, for a long term of years, the subject of continued discussion between successive residents and the native durbar.

Mr. Gubbins considers that the termination of this custom could not have produced disaffection among the sepoy, because but little redress was thereby procured by them. "Some trifling alleviation of the injury complained of, might be obtained; but that was all. That a sepoy plaintiff ever succeeded in wresting his village from the grasp of the oppressor, by aid of the British

* *Letter on Oudh and its Talookdars*; by H. Carre Tucker: p. 5.

† Despatch dated 31st March, 1858.—Parl. Papers on Oude (Commons), 20th May, 1858; p. 4.

‡ Despatch dated 8th March, 1858.—Parl. Papers, p. 1.

§ Carre Tucker's *Letter*, p. 7.

|| Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 64.

¶ Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., p. 289.

resident, I never heard; if it ever occurred, the cases must have been isolated and extraordinary."*

The evidence of Sir W. Sleeman (whose authority is very high on this subject, in his double character of officer and resident) is directly opposed to that above cited. He thought the privilege very important; but desired its abolition because it had been greatly abused, and caused intolerable annoyance to the native government. The military authorities, he said, desired its continuance; for though the honest and hard-working sepoys usually cared nothing about it, a large class of the idle and unscrupulous considered it as a lottery, in which they might sometimes draw a prize, or obtain leave of absence, as the same sepoy has been known to do repeatedly for ten months at a time, on the pretext of having a case pending in Oude. Consequently, they endeavoured to impress their superiors with the idea, "that the fidelity of the whole native army" depended upon the maintenance and extension of this right of appeal. And the privilege was gradually extended, until it included all the regular, irregular, and local corps paid by the British government, with the native officers and sepoys of contingents employed in, and paid by, native states, who were drafted into them from the regular corps of our army up to a certain time—the total number amounting to between 50,000 and 60,000. At one period, the special right of the sepoys to the resident's intervention extended to their most distant relatives; but at the earnest entreaty of the native administration, it was restricted to their wives, fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters. "In consequence, it became a common custom with them to lend or sell their names to more remote relations, or to persons not related to them at all. A great many bad characters have, in this way, deprived men of lands which their ancestors had held in undisputed right of property for many generations or centuries; for the court, to save themselves from the importunity of the residency, has often given orders for the claimant being put in possession of the lands without due inquiry, or any inquiry at all."†

The use or abuse of the privilege depended chiefly on the character of the resi-

dent; and that it was occasionally shamefully abused, is a fact established, we are told, by the residency records.

"If the resident happens to be an impatient, overbearing man, he will often frighten the durbar and its courts, or local officers, into a hasty decision, by which the rights of others are sacrificed for the native officers and sepoys; and if he be at the same time an unscrupulous man, he will sometimes direct that the sepoy shall be put in possession of what he claims, in order to relieve himself from his importunity, or from that of his commanding officer, without taking the trouble to inform himself of the grounds on which the claim is founded. Of all such errors there are, unhappily, too many instances recorded in the resident's office."‡

Sir W. Sleeman adduces repeated instances of sepoys being put in possession of landed estates, to which they had no rightful claim, by the British government, at the cost of many lives; and quotes, as an illustration of the notorious partiality with which sepoy claims were treated, the case of a shopkeeper at Lucknow, who purchased a cavalry uniform, and by pretending to be an invalid British trooper, procured the signature of the brigadier commanding the troops in Oude, to numerous petitions, which were sent for adjustment to the durbar through the resident. This procedure he continued for fifteen years; and, to crown all, succeeded in obtaining, by the aid of government, forcible possession of a landed estate, to which he had no manner of right. Soon after, he sent in a petition stating that he had been in turn ejected, and four of his relations killed by the dispossessed proprietor. Thereupon an inquiry took place, and the whole truth came out. The King of Oude truly observed, with regard to this affair:—"If a person known to thousands in the city of Lucknow is able, for fifteen years, to carry on such a trade successfully, how much more easy must it be for people in the country, not known to any in the city, to carry it out!"§

On one occasion, no less than thirty lives were lost in attempting to enforce an award in favour of a British sepoy. On another, a sepoy came to the assistant-resident (Captain Shakespear), clamouring for justice, and complaining that no notice of his petition had been taken by the native government. On being questioned, he admitted that no less than forty persons had been seized, and were in prison, on his requisition.

§ Letter of the King of Oude to the resident; 16th June, 1836.—Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 286.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudeh*, p. 65.

† Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., pp. 288—292.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

As to punishing the sepoys for preferring fraudulent claims, that was next to impossible, both on account of the endless trouble which it involved, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of procuring a conviction from a court-martial composed of native officers; the only alternative being, to lay the case before the governor-general. The natural consequence was, that the sepoys became most importunate, untruthful, and unscrupulous in stating the circumstances of their claims, or the grounds of their complaints.*

It is impossible to read the revelations of Colonel Sleeman on this subject, without feeling that the British authorities themselves aggravated the disorganisation in the native administration, which was the sole plea for annexation. At the same time, it is no less clear, that the injustice perpetrated on behalf of the sepoys, was calculated to exercise a most injurious effect on their morals and discipline. The unmerited success often obtained by fraud and collusion, was both a bad example and a cause of disgust to the honest and scrupulous, on whom the burthen of duties fell, while their comrades were enjoying themselves in their homes, on leave of absence, obtained for the purpose of prosecuting unreasonable or false claims. Of the honest petitioners, few obtained what they believed to be full justice; and where one was satisfied, four became discontented. Another cause of disaffection arose when it was found necessary to check the growing evil, by decreeing that the privilege of urging claims through the resident should cease when native officers and sepoys were transferred from active service to the invalid establishment.

Altogether, the result of making the sepoys a privileged class (in this, as in so many other ways), was equally disastrous to their native and European superiors. Colonel Sleeman says, that the British recruits were procured chiefly from the Byswara and Banoda divisions of Oude, whose inhabitants vaunt the quality of the water for *tempering* soldiers, as we talk of the water of Damascus for tempering sword-blades. "The air and water of Malwa," it is popularly said, "may produce as good trees and crops as those of Oude, but cannot produce as good soldiers." They are de-

scribed as never appearing so happy as when fighting in earnest with swords, spears, and matchlocks, and consequently are not much calculated for peaceful citizens; but the British sepoys who came home on furlough to their families (as they were freely permitted to do in time of peace, not only to petition the native government, but also ostensibly to visit their families, on reduced pay and allowances), were the terror, even in the midst of this warlike population, of their non-privileged neighbours and co-sharers in the land.

The partiality shown them did not prevent "the diminished attachment felt by the sepoys for their European officers" from becoming an established fact; and officers, when passing through Oude in their travels or sporting excursions, have of late years generally complained, that they received less civility from villages in which British invalids or furlough sepoys were located, than from any others; and that if anywhere treated with actual disrespect, such sepoys were generally found to be either the perpetrators or instigators.†

The evidence collected in preceding pages, seems to place beyond dispute, that the annexation of Oude, if it did not help to light the flames of mutiny, has fanned and fed them by furnishing the mutineers with refuge and co-operation in the territories which were ever in close alliance with us when they formed an independent kingdom; but which we, by assuming dominion over them on the sole plea of rescuing the inhabitants from gross misgovernment, have changed into a turbulent and insurrectionary province.

The metamorphosis was not accomplished by the deposition of the dynasty of Wajid Ali Shah. Indian princes generally, might, and naturally would, view with alarm so flagrant a violation of treaties, and of the first principles of the law of nations; but the Hindoos of Oude could have felt little regret for the downfall of a government essentially sectarian and unjust. The kings of Oude, unlike the majority of Mohammedans in India, were Sheiahs;‡ and so bigoted and exclusive, that no Sheiah could be sentenced to death at Lucknow for the murder even of a Sonnite, much less for that of a Hindoo. According to Colonel Sleeman, it was not only the law, but the everyday practice, that if a Hindoo murdered a Hindoo, and consented to become a Mussulman, he could not be executed for

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 292.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 289.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 62.

the crime, even though convicted and sentenced.*

Under such a condition of things, it is at least highly probable, that a rigidly impartial and tolerant administration would have been a welcome change to the Hindoo population. That it has proved the very reverse, is accounted for by the aggressive measures initiated by the new government, and the inefficient means by which their enforcement was attempted.

The latter evil was, to a certain extent, unavoidable. The Russian war deprived India of the European troops, which Lord Dalhousie deemed needful for the annexation of Oude: but this does not account for the grave mistake made in raising a contingent of 12,000 men, for the maintenance of the newly-annexed country, almost entirely from the disbanded native army. These levies, with half-a-dozen regular corps, formed the whole army of occupation.

Sir Henry Lawrence foresaw the danger; and in September, 1856, seven months before the commencement of the mutiny, he urged, that some portion of the Oude levies should change places with certain of the Punjab regiments then stationed on the Indus. Oude, he said, had long been the Alsatia of India—the resort of the dissipated and disaffected of every other state, and especially of deserters from the British ranks. It had been pronounced hazardous to employ the Seiks in the Punjab in 1849; and the reason assigned for the different policy now pursued in Oude was, that the former kingdom had been conquered, and the latter “fell in peace.” Sir Henry pointed out the fallacy of this argument, and the materials for mischief which still remained in Oude, which he described as containing “246 forts, besides innumerable smaller strongholds, many of them sheltered within thick jungles. In these forts are 476 guns. Forts and guns should all be in the hands of government, or the forts should be razed. Many a foolish fellow has been urged on to his own ruin by the possession of a paltry fort, and many a paltry mud fort has repulsed British troops.”†

The warning was unheeded. The government, though right in their desire to

protect and elevate the village communities, were unjust in the sweeping and indiscriminating measures which they adopted in favour of the villagers, and for the increase in the public revenue, anticipated from the setting aside of the feudal claims of the so-called middlemen. Before attempting to revolutionise the face of society, it would have been only politic to provide unquestionable means of overawing the opposition which might naturally be expected from so warlike, not to say turbulent, a class as the Rajpoot chiefs.

Had men of the Lawrence school been sent to superintend the “absorption” of Oude, it is probable they might have seen the danger, and suggested measures of conciliation; but, on the contrary, it is asserted, that the European officials employed were almost all young and inexperienced men, and that their extreme opinions, and the corruption of their native subordinates, aggravated the unpopularity of the system they came to administer. Personal quarrels arose between the leading officers; and the result was a want of vigour and co-operation in their public proceedings.‡

Meantime, the obtainment of Oude was a matter of high-flown congratulation between the home and Indian authorities. The Company have changed their opinion since;§ but, at the time, they accepted the measure as lawful, expedient, and very cleverly carried out. Far from being disappointed at the want of enthusiasm evinced by the people in not welcoming their new rulers as deliverers, their passive submission (in accordance with the proclamations of Wajid Ali Shah) called forth, from the Court of Directors, an expression of “lively emotions of thankfulness and pleasure,” at the peaceable manner in which “an expanse of territory embracing an area of nearly 25,000 square miles, and containing 5,000,000 inhabitants, has passed from its native prince to the Queen of England, without the expenditure of a drop of blood, and almost without a murmur.”||

Upon the assumption of the government of Oude, a branch electric telegraph was commenced to connect Cawnpoor and Lucknow. In eighteen working days it was completed, including the laying of a cable,

* Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., p. 135.

† Article on “Army Reform,” by Sir H. Lawrence.—*Calcutta Review* for September, 1856.

‡ See Letter signed “Index,” dated “Calcutta, December 9th, 1857.”—*Times*, January 15th, 1858.

§ See Despatch of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 19th April, 1858.—*Parl. Papers*, 7th May, 1858; p. 4.

|| Despatch dated December, 1856.—*Oude Blue Book* for 1856; p. 288.

6,000 feet in length, across the Ganges. On the morning of the 1st of March, Lord Dalhousie (who on that day resigned his office) put to General Outram the significant question—"Is all quiet in Oude?" The reply, "All is quiet in Oude," greeted Lord Canning on his arrival in Calcutta.

On the previous day, a farewell letter had been written to the King of Oude by the retiring governor-general, expressing his satisfaction that the friendship which had so long existed between the Hon. East India Company and the dynasty of Wajid Ali Shah, should have daily become more firmly established. "There is no doubt," he adds, "that Lord Canning will, in the same manner as I have done, strengthening and confirming this friendship, bear in mind and give due consideration to the treaties and engagements which are to exist for ever."*

It is difficult to understand what diplomatic purpose was to be served by this reference to the eternal duration of treaties which had been declared null and void, and engagements proffered by one party, which the other had at all hazards persisted in rejecting; or why Lord Dalhousie, so clear, practical, and upright in his general character, should seem to have acted so unlike himself in all matters connected with what may be termed his foreign policy.

It must not, however, be forgotten, that that policy, in all its circumstances, was sanctioned and approved, accepted and rewarded, by the East India Company. Lord Dalhousie's measures were consistent throughout; and he enjoyed the confidence and support of the directors during the whole eight years of his administration, in a degree to which few, if any, of his predecessors ever attained. It was the unqualified approval of the home authorities that rendered the annexation policy the prominent feature of a system which the people of India, of every creed, clime, and tongue, looked upon as framed for the express purpose of extinguishing all native sovereignty and rank. And, in fact, the measures lately pursued are scarcely explicable on any other ground. The democratic element is, no doubt, greatly on the increase in England; yet our institutions and our prejudices are monarchical and aristocratic:

and nothing surprises our Eastern fellow-subjects more, than the deference and courtesy paid by all ranks in the United Kingdom, to rajahs and nawabs, who, in their hereditary principalities, had met—as many of them aver—with little civility, and less justice, at the hands of the representatives of the East India Company.

Yet, it was not so much a system as a want of system, which mainly conduced to bring about the existing state of things. The constant preponderance of expenditure above income, and an ever-present sense of precariousness, have been probably the chief reasons why the energies of the Anglo-Indian government have been, of late years, most mischievously directed to degrading kings, chiefs, nobles, gentry, priests, and landowners of various degrees, to one dead level of poverty—little above pauperism. We have rolled, by sheer brute force, an iron grinder over the face of Hindoo society—crushed every lineament into a disfigured mass—squeezed from it every rupee that even torture could extract; and lavished the money, thus obtained, on a small white oligarchy and an immense army of mercenary troops, who were believed to be ready, at any moment, to spread fire and the sword wherever any opposition should be offered to the will of the paramount power, whose salt they ate.

We thought the sepoys would always keep down the native chiefs, and, when they were destroyed, the people; and we did not anticipate the swift approach of a time when we should cry to the chiefs and people to help us to extinguish the incendiary flames of our own camp, and to wrench the sword from the hands in which we had so vauntingly placed it.

In our moment of peril, the defection of the upper classes of Hindoostan was "almost universal." But surely it is no wonder that they should have shown so little attachment to our rule, when it is admitted, even by the covenanted civil service, that they "have not much to thank us for."

Throughout British India, several native departments are declared to have been "grossly underpaid," particularly the police service, into which it has been found difficult to get natives of good family to enter at all. In revenue offices, they were formerly better paid than at present. The general result of our proceedings has been, that at the time of the mutiny, "the native

* Letter, vouched for as a true translation by Robert Wilberforce Bird, and printed in a pamphlet entitled *Case of the King of Oude*; by Mr. John Davenport: August 27th, 1856.

gentry were daily becoming more reduced, were pinched by want of means, and were therefore discontented.”*

It is difficult to realise the full hardship of their position. Here were men who would have occupied, or at least have had the chance of occupying, the highest positions of the state under a native government, and who were accustomed to look to the service of the sovereign as the chief source of honourable and lucrative employment, left, frequently with no alternative but starvation or the acceptance of a position and a salary under foreign masters, that their fathers would have thought suitable only for their poorest retainers. Not one of them, however ancient his lineage, however high his attainments, could hope to be admitted within the charmed circle of the covenanted civil service, as the equal of the youngest writer, or even in the army, to take rank with a new-fledged ensign.

The expenses of an Asiatic noble are enormous. Polygamy is costly in its incidentals; and the head of a great family is looked to, not only for the maintenance of his own wives and children, in a style proportionate to their birth, but also of those of his predecessors. The misery which the levelling policy produced, was severely felt by the pensioners and dependents of the fallen aristocracy, by the aged and the sick, by women and children. And this latter fact explains a marked feature in the present rebellion; namely, the number of women who have played a leading part in the insurrection. The Ranee of Jhansi, and her sister, with other Hindoo princesses of less note, have evinced an amount of ability and resolve far beyond that of their countrymen; and the cause of disaffection with almost all of these, has been the setting aside of their hereditary rights of succession and of adoption. They have viewed the sudden refusal of the British government to sanction what they had previously encouraged, as a most faithless and arbitrary procedure; and many chiefs, whose hostility is otherwise unaccountable, will probably, like the chief of Nargoond, prove to have been incited to join the mutineers chiefly, if not exclusively, by this particular grievance.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, pp. 56, 57.

† Regulation xxxi., of 1803.

‡ For instance, in the alienation of a part of the revenues of the post-office, and other public departments; enacted in the case of certain noble families.

A branch of the annexation question, in which the violation of rights of succession is also a prominent feature, yet remains to be noticed—namely, the

Resumption of Rent-free Lands; whereby serious disaffection has been produced in the minds of a large class of dispossessed proprietors. All rightful tenure of this kind is described, in the regulations of the East India Company, as based upon a well-known provision “of the ancient law of India, by which the ruling power is entitled to a certain proportion of the annual produce of every beegah (acre) of land, excepting in cases in which that power shall have made a temporary or permanent alienation of its right to such proportion of the produce, or shall have agreed to receive, instead of that proportion, a specific sum annually, or for a term of years, or in perpetuity.”†

Both Hindoo and Mohammedan sovereigns frequently made over part, or the whole, of the public revenue of a village, or even of a district, to one of their officers; they often assigned it in jaghire for the maintenance of a certain number of troops, or gratuitously for life, as a reward for service done; and sometimes in perpetuity. In the latter case, the alienation was more complete than that practised in the United Kingdom;‡ for here titles and estate escheat to the state on the death of the last legal representative of a family; but, among the Hindoos, such lapse never, or most rarely occurs, since all the males marry, in childhood generally, several wives; and their law vests rights of succession and adoption in the widows of the deceased. These rights were acknowledged equally by Hindoo and Moslem rulers—by the Peishwa of Poona, and the Nawab-vizier of Oude; the only difference being, that in the event of adoption, a larger nuzzurana, or tributary offering, was expected on accession, than if the heir had been a son by birth: in other words, the legacy duty was higher in the one case than the other.

“Enam,” or “gift,” is the term commonly given to all gratuitous grants, whether temporary or in perpetuity—whether to individuals, or for religious, charitable, or educational purposes: but it is more strictly applicable to endowments of the latter description; in which case, the amount of state-tribute transferred was frequently very considerable, and always in perpetuity. “A large proportion of the grants to individuals,” Mountstuart Elphinstone writes,

"are also in perpetuity, and are regarded as among the most secure forms of private property; but the gradual increase of such instances of liberality, combined with the frequency of forged deeds of gift, sometimes induces the ruler to resume the grants of his predecessors, and to burden them with heavy taxes. When these are laid on transfers by sales, or even by succession, they are not thought unjust; but total resumption, or the permanent levy of a fixed rate, is regarded as oppressive."*

During the early years of the Company's rule, the perpetual enam tenures were sedulously respected; but as the supreme government grew richer in sovereignty, and poorer in purse (for the increase of expenditure always distanced that of revenue), the collectors began to look with a covetous eye on the freeholders. They argued, truly enough, that a great many of the titles to land were fraudulent, or had been fraudulently obtained; and in such cases, where grounds of suspicion existed, any government would have been in duty bound to make inquiry into the circumstances of the original acquisition.

But instead of investigating certain cases, a general inquiry was instituted into the whole of them; the principle of which was, to cast on every enamdar the burthen of proving his right—a demand which, of course, many of the ancient holders must have found it impossible to fulfil. The lapse of centuries, war, fire, or negligence might, doubtless, have occasioned the destruction of the deeds. Some of the oldest were, we know, engraven on stone and copper, in long-forgotten characters; and few of the commissioners could question the witnesses in the modern Bengalee or Hindoostani, much less decipher Pali or Sanscrit.

A commission of inquiry was instituted in Bengal in 1836, "to ascertain the grounds on which claims to exemption from the payment of revenue were founded, to confirm those for which valid titles were produced, and to bring under assessment those which were held without authority."† In theory, this sounds moderate, if not just; in practice, it is said to have proved the very reverse, and to have cast a blight over the whole of Lower Bengal. The expense of

the commission was, of course, enormous; and even in a pecuniary sense, the profit reaped by government could not compensate for the ruin and distress caused by proceedings which are asserted to have been so notoriously unjust, that "some distinguished civil servants" refused to take any part in them.‡

Mr. Edmonstone, Mr. Tucker, and a few of the ablest directors at the East India House, protested, but in vain, against the resumption laws, which were acted upon for many years. The venerable Marquess Wellesley, a few weeks before his decease (July 30th, 1842), wrote earnestly to the Earl of Ellenborough (then governor-general), as follows:—

"I am concerned to hear that some inquiry has been commenced respecting the validity of some of the tenures under the permanent settlement of the land revenue. This is a most vexatious, and, surely, not a prudent measure. Here the maxim of sound ancient wisdom applies most forcibly—'*Quieta non movere.*' We ancient English settlers in Ireland have felt too severely the hand of Strafford, in a similar act of oppression, not to dread any similar proceeding."

Strafford, however, never attempted anything in Ireland that could be compared with the sweeping confiscation which is described as having been carried on in Bengal, where "little respect was paid to the principles of law, either as recognised in England or in India;" and where, "it is said, one commissioner dispossessed, in a single morning, no less than two hundred proprietors."§

In the Chittagong district, an insurrection was nearly caused by "the wholesale sweeping away of the rights of the whole population;" and in the Dacca district, the commission likewise operated very injuriously.||

The general alarm and disaffection excited by these proceedings, so materially affected the public tranquillity, that the Court of Directors was at length compelled to interfere, and the labours of the Bengal commission were fortunately brought to a close some years before the mutiny.¶

The enam commission appointed for the Deccan, was no less harsh and summary in

* Quoted in evidence before Colonization Committee of House of Commons, of 1858.—Fourth Report, published 28th July, 1858; p. 36.

† Statement of the East India Company.

‡ Fourth Report of Colonization Committee, p. 47.

§ *Quarterly Review*, 1858.—Article on "British India," attributed to Mr. Layard: p. 257.

|| See Second Report of Colonization Committee of 1858; p. 60.

¶ *Quarterly Review*, 1858; p. 257.

its proceedings, the results of which are now stated to afford the people their "first and gravest cause of complaint against the government."*

Due investigation ought to have been made in 1818, when the dominions of the Peishwa first became British territory, into the nature of the grants, whether hereditary or for life; and also to discover whether, as was highly probable, many fraudulent claims might not have been established under the weak and corrupt administration of the last native ruler, Bajee Rao. All this might have been done in perfect conformity with the assurance given by the tranquilliser of the Deccan (Mountstuart Elphinstone), that "all wuttuns and enams (birthrights and rent-free lands), annual stipends, religious and charitable establishments, would be protected. The proprietors were, however, warned that they would be called upon to show their sunnuds (deeds of grant), or otherwise prove their title."†

Instead of doing this, the government suffered thirty years to elapse—thus giving the proprietors something of a prescriptive right to their holdings, however acquired; and the Court of Directors, as late as September, 1846, expressly declared, that the principle on which they acted, was to allow enams (or perpetual alienations of public revenue, as contradistinguished from surinjams, or temporary ones) to pass to heirs, as of right, without need of the assent of the paramount power, provided the adoption were regular according to Hindoo law.‡

The rights of widows were likewise distinctly recognised, until the "absorption" policy came into operation; and then investigations into certain tenures were instituted, which paved the way for a general enam commission for the whole Bombay presidency; by which all enamdars were compelled to prove possession for a hundred years, as an indispensable preliminary to being confirmed in the right to transmit their estates to lineal descendants—the future claims of widows and adopted sons being quietly ignored.

The commission was composed, not of judicial officers, but of youths of the civil service, and of captains and subalterns taken from their regiments, and selected princi-

pally on account of their knowledge of the Mahratta languages; while, at the head of the commission, was placed a captain of native infantry, thirty-five years of age.§

These inexperienced youths were, besides, naturally prejudiced in deciding upon cases in which they represented at once the plaintiff and the judge. The greater the ingenuity they displayed in upsetting claims, the greater their chance of future advancement. Every title disallowed, was so much revenue gained. Powers of search, such as were exercised by the French revolutionary committees, and by few others, were entrusted to them; and their agents, accompanied by the police, might at any time of the night or day, enter the houses of persons in the receipt of alienated revenue, or examine and seize documents, without giving either a receipt or list of those taken. The decisions of previous authorities were freely reversed; and titles admitted by Mr. Brown in 1847, were re-inquired into, and disallowed by Captain Cowper in 1855.||

An appeal against a resumptive decree might be laid before the privy council in London; and the rajah of Burdwan succeeded in obtaining the restoration of his lands by this means.¶ But to the poorer class of ousted proprietors, a revised verdict was unattainable. Few could afford to risk from five to ten thousand pounds in litigation against the East India Company. But, whatever their resources, it was making the evils of absentee sovereignty most severely and unwisely felt, to require persons, whose families had occupied Indian estates fifty to a hundred years and upwards, to produce their title-deeds in England; and to make little or no allowance for the various kinds of proof, which, duly weighed, were really more trustworthy, because less easily counterfeited, than any written documents.

The commissioners on whom so onerous a duty as the inquiry into rent-free tenures was imposed, ought at least to have been tried and approved men of high public character, who would neither hurry over cases by the score, nor suffer them to linger on in needless and most harassing delays; as the actual functionaries are accused of

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 259.

† Proclamation of Mr. Elphinstone; and instructions issued to collectors in 1818.

‡ Fourth Report of Colonization Committee, p. 35.

§ *Ibid.*

|| *Quarterly Review*, p. 258. Stated on the authority of "Correspondence relating to the Scrutiny of the revised Surinjam and Pension Lists." Printed for government. Bombay, 1856.

¶ Second Report of Colonization Committee, p. 9.

having done, according to their peculiar propensities. Perhaps it would have been better to have acted on altogether a different system, and acknowledged the claim established by many years of that undisturbed possession which is everywhere popularly looked upon as nine-tenths of the law; and, while recognising all in the positions in which we found them on the assumption of sovereignty, to have claimed from all, either a yearly subsidy or (in pursuance of the practice of native sovereigns) a succession duty. At least, we should thereby have avoided the expense and odium incurred by the institution of a tribunal, to which Lieutenant-governor Halliday's description of our criminal jurisdiction would seem to apply—viz., that it was "a lottery, in which, however, the best chances were with the criminal." On the outbreak of the rebellion, the resumption commission was brought suddenly to a close; its introduction into Guzerat (which had been previously contemplated) was entirely abandoned, and some of the confiscated estates were restored. But the distrust inspired by past proceedings will not easily be removed, especially as the feeling of ill-usage is aggravated by the fact, that in border villages belonging jointly to the Company and to Indian princes, the rent-free lands, on the side belonging to the former, have been resumed, while those on the latter remain intact.*

In the North-West Provinces, the government avoided incurring the stigma of allowing a prescriptive right of possession and transmission to take root through their neglect, by immediately making a very summary settlement. The writings of Sleeman, Raikes, Gubbins and others, together with the evidence brought before the colonization committee, tend to prove the now scarcely disputed fact, that the attempted revenue settlement of the North-West Provinces, and the sweeping away of the proprietary class as middlemen, has proved a failure. With few exceptions, the ancient proprietors, dispossessed of their estates by the revenue collectors, or by sales under decrees of civil courts, have taken advantage of the recent troubles to return, and have been suffered, and even encouraged, to do so by the ryots and small tenants, to whom their dispossession would have appeared most advantageous.†

* *Quarterly Review*, p. 259.

† *Ibid.*, p. 251.

‡ Minute on Talookdaree cases; by Mr. Boulderson.

§ *Quarterly Review* (July, 1858), p. 260.

A number of cases of alleged individual injustice towards the rajahs and talookdars, were collected, and stated, in circumstantial detail, in a minute laid before Mr. Thomason (the lieutenant-governor of Agra in 1844), by Mr. Boulderson, a member of the Board of Revenue; who eventually resigned his position, sooner than be associated in proceedings which he believed to be essentially unjust. His chief ground of complaint was, that the board, instead of instituting a preliminary inquiry into what the rights of talookdars and other proprietors really were, acted upon *à priori* arguments of what they must be; and never, in any one of the many hundred resumptions made at their recommendation, deemed the proofs on which the proceedings rested, worthy of a moment's inquiry.

After reciting numerous instances of dispossession of proprietors who had held estates for many years, and laid out a large amount of capital in their improvement, the writer adds:—

"I have in vain endeavoured, hitherto, to rouse the attention of my colleague and government to this virtual abolition of all law. * * * The respect of the native public I know to have been shaken to an inexpressible degree; they can see facts; and are not blinded by the fallacious reasonings and misrepresentations with which the board have clothed these subjects; and they wonder with amazement at the motives which can prompt the British government to allow their own laws—all laws which give security to property—to be thus belied and set aside. All confidence in property or its rights is shaken; and the villany which has been taught the people they will execute, and reward the government tenfold into their own bosom."‡

In a Preface, dated "London, 8th June, 1858," Mr. Boulderson states, that his minute "produced no effect in modifying or staying the proceedings" of the revenue board; and if "forwarded to England, as in due official course it should have been, it must have had as little effect upon the Hon. Court of Directors."

Even in the Punjab, the system pursued was a levelling one. Notwithstanding all that the Lawrences and their disciples did to mitigate its severity, and especially to conciliate the more powerful and aggrieved chiefs, the result is asserted to have been, to a great extent, the same there as in the Deccan: "the aristocracy and landed gentry who have escaped destruction by the settlement, have been ruined by the resumption of alienated land."§

Thus annexation and resumption, confiscation and absorption, have gone hand-in-

hand, with a rapidity which would have been dangerous even had the end in view and the means of attainment been both unexceptionable. However justly acquired, the entire reorganisation of extensive, widely scattered, and, above all, densely populated territories, must always present difficulties which abstract rules arbitrarily enforced can never satisfactorily overcome.

The fifteen million inhabitants brought by Lord Dalhousie under the immediate government of the British Crown, were to be, from the moment of annexation, ruled on a totally different system: native institutions and native administrators were expected to give place, without a murmur, to the British commissioner and his subordinates; and the newly absorbed territory, whatever its history, the character of its population, its languages and customs, was to be "settled," without any references to these important antecedents, on the theory which found favour with the Calcutta council for the time being.

Many able officials, with much ready money, and a thoroughly efficient army to support them, were indispensable to carry through such a system. In the Punjab, these requisites were obtained at the expense of other provinces; and the picked men sent there, were even then so few in number and so overworked, that they scarcely had time for sleep or food. Their private purse often supplied a public want. Thus, James Abbott was sent by Sir Henry Lawrence to settle the Huzara district, which he did most effectually; going from valley to valley, gaining the confidence of all the tribes, and administering justice in the open air under the trees—looking, with his long grey beard on his breast, and his grey locks far down his shoulders, much more like an ancient patriarch than a deputy-commissioner. "Kākā," or "Uncle" Abbott, as the children called him (in return for the sweetmeats which he carried in readiness for them), took leave of the people in a very characteristic fashion, by inviting the entire population to a feast on the Nara hill, which lasted three nights and days; and he left Huzara with only a month's pay in his pocket, "having literally spent all his substance on the people." His successor, John Becher, ably fills his place, "living in a house with twelve doors, and

all open to the people. * * * The result is, that the Huzara district, once famous for turbulence, is now about the quietest, happiest, and most loyal in the Punjab."* Of course, Kākā Abbott and his successor, much less their lamented head (Sir Henry Lawrence), cannot be taken as average specimens of their class. Such self-devotion is the exception, not the rule: it would be asking too much of human nature, to expect the entire civil service to adopt what Colonel Herbert Edwardes calls the Bahaduree (summer-house) system of administration, and keep their cutcherries open, not "from ten till four" by the regulation clock, but all day, and at any hour of the night that anybody chooses.† Neither can chief commissioners be expected, or even wished, to sacrifice their health as Sir Henry Lawrence did in the Punjab, where, amid all his anxieties for the welfare of the mass, he preserved his peculiar character of being pre-eminently the friend of the man that was down; battling with government for better terms for the deposed officials and depressed aristocracy, and caring even for thieves and convicts. He originated gaol reform; abolished the "night-chain," and other abominations; introduced in-door labour; and himself superintended the new measures—going from gaol to gaol, and rising even at midnight to visit the prisoners' barracks.‡

The manner in which the Punjab was settled is altogether exceptional: the men employed certainly were; so also was the large discretionary power entrusted to them. Elsewhere matters went on very differently. The civil service could not furnish an efficient magistracy for the old provinces, much less for the new; the public treasury could not satisfy the urgent and long reiterated demand for public works, canals to irrigate the land, roads to convey produce, and avert the scourge of famine, even from Bengal: how, then, could it spare ready money to build court-houses and gaols in its new possessions?

Like Aurungzebe, in the Deccan, we swept away existing institutions without being prepared to replace them, and thereby became the occasion of sufferings which we had assumed the responsibility of preventing. Thus, in territories under British government, the want of proper places of

* See the graphic description given by Colonel Herbert Edwardes, of Sir Henry Lawrence's old staff in the Punjab, previous to annexation.—

Quoted in Raikes' *Revolt in the North-West Provinces*, p. 25.

† *Ibid.*, p. 29.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

confinement is alleged to be so great, that "prisoners of all classes are crammed together into a dungeon so small, that, when the sun goes down, they fight for the little space upon which only a few can lie during the weary night. Within one month, forty die of disease, produced by neglect, want of air, and filth. The rest, driven to despair, attempt an escape; twenty are shot down dead. Such is a picture—and not an imaginary picture—of the results of one of the most recent cases of annexation!"*

Even supposing the above to be an extreme, and, in its degree, an isolated case, yet one such narrative, circulated among the rebel ranks, would serve as a reason for a general breaking open of gaols, and as an incitement and excuse for any excesses on the part of the convicts, to whom, it will be remembered, some of the worst atrocities committed during the rebellion are now generally attributed.

In fact, the increase of territory, of late years, has been (as the Duke of Wellington predicted it would be) greatly in excess of our resources. Annex we might, govern we could not; for, in the words of Prince Metternich, we had not "the material."† That is, we had not the material on which alone we choose to rely. Native agency we cannot indeed dispense with: we could not hold India, or even Calcutta, a week without it; but we keep it down on the lowest steps of the ladder so effectually, that men of birth, talent, or susceptibility, will serve us only when constrained by absolute poverty. They shun the hopeless dead-level which the service of their country is now made to offer them.

Our predecessors in power acted upon a totally different principle. Their title was avowedly that of the sword; yet they delegated authority to the conquered race, with a generosity which puts to shame our exclusiveness and distrust; the more so because it does not appear that their confidence was ever betrayed.

Many of the ablest and most faithful servants of the Great Moguls were Hindoos. The Moslem knew the *prestige* of ancient lineage, and the value of native ability and acquaintance with the resources of the country too well, to let even bigotry stand in the way of their employment.

* *Quarterly Review* (July, 1858), p. 273.

† Quoted by Mr. Layard, in a Lecture delivered at St. James's Hall, Piccadilly, on his return from India, May 11th, 1858.

The command of the imperial armies was repeatedly intrusted to Rajpoot generals; and the dewans (chancellors of the exchequer) were usually Brahmins: the famous territorial arrangements of Akber are inseparably associated with the name of Rajah Todar Mul; and probably, if we had availed ourselves of the aid of native financiers, and made it worth their while to serve us well, our revenue settlements might have been ere now satisfactorily arranged. If Hindoos were found faithful to a Moslem government, why should they not be so to a Christian one, which has the peculiar advantage of being able to balance the two great antagonistic races, by employing each, so as to keep the other in check? Of late, we seem to have been trying to unite them, by giving them a common cause of complaint, and by marking the subordinate position of native officials more offensively than ever. They are accused of corruption—so were the Europeans: let the remedy employed in the latter case be tried in the former, and the result will be probably the same. The need of increased salary is much greater in the case of the native official. Let the government give him the means of supporting himself and his family, and add a prospect of promotion: it will then be well served.

By the present system we proscribe the higher class, and miserably underpay the lower. The result is unsatisfactory to all parties, even to the government; which, though it has become aware of the necessity of paying Europeans with liberality, still withholds from the native "the fair day's wage for the fair day's work." Latterly, the Europeans may have been in some cases overpaid; but the general error seems to have lain, in expecting too much from them; the amount of writing required by the Company's system, being a heavy addition to their labours, especially in the newly annexed territories. The natural consequence has been, that while a certain portion of the civilians, with the late governor-general at their head, lived most laboriously, and devoted themselves wholly to the duties before them; others, less zealous, or less capable, shrunk back in alarm at the prospect before them, and, yielding to the influences of climate and of luxury, fell into the hands of interested subordinates—signed the papers presented by their clerks, and, in the words of their severest censor, "amused

themselves, and kept a servant to wash each separate toe.”*

Under cover of their names, corruption and extortion has been practised to an almost incredible extent. Witness the exposure of the proceedings of provincial courts, published in 1849, by a Bengal civilian, of twenty-one years' standing, under the title of *Revelations of an Orderly*.

An attempt has been made to remedy the insufficient number of civilians, by taking military men from their regiments, and employing them in diplomatic and administrative positions; that is to say, the Indian authorities have tried the Irishman's plan of lengthening the blanket, by cutting off one end and adding it to the other.

The injurious effect which this practice is said to have exercised on the army, is noticed in the succeeding section.

The State of the Indian Army, and the alleged Causes of the Disorganisation and Disaffection of the Bengal Sepoys, remain to be considered. The origin of the native army, and the various phases of its progress, have been described in the earlier chapters of this work. We have seen how the restless Frenchman, Dupleix, raised native levies, and disciplined them in the European fashion at Pondicherry;† and how these were called sepoy (from *sipahi*, Portuguese for soldier), in contradistinction to the *topasses* (or hat-wearers); that is to say, to the natives of Portuguese descent, and the Eurasians, or half-castes, of whom small numbers, disciplined and dressed in the European style, were entertained by the East India Company, to guard their factories. Up to this period, the policy of the Merchant Adventurers had been essentially commercial and defensive; but the French early manifested a political and aggressive spirit. Dupleix read with remarkable accuracy the signs of the times, and understood the opportunity for the aggrandisement of his nation, offered by the rapidly increasing disorganisation of the Mogul empire, and the intestine strife which attended the assertion of independence by usurping governors and tributary princes. He began to take part in the quarrels of neighbouring potentates; and the English levied a native soldiery, and followed his example.

The first engagement of note in which the

British sepoy took part, was at the capture of Devicotta, in 1748, when they made an orderly advance with a platoon of Europeans, as a storming party, under Robert Clive. Three years later, under the same leader, a force of 200 Europeans and 300 sepoy, marched on, regardless of the superstitions of their countrymen, amid thunder and lightning, to besiege Arcot; and having succeeded in taking the place, they gallantly and successfully defended it against an almost overwhelming native force, supported by French auxiliaries.

The augmentation in the number of the sepoy became very rapid in proportion to that of the European troops. The expedition with which Clive and Watson sailed from Madras in 1756, to recapture Calcutta from Surajah Dowlah, consisted of 900 Europeans and 1,500 natives.

The total military force maintained by the English and French on the Madras coast was at this time nearly equal, each comprising about 2,000 Europeans and 10,000 natives. The British European force was composed of H. M.'s 39th foot, with a small detail of Royal Artillery attached to serve the regimental field-pieces; the Madras European regiment, and a strong company of artillery. The sepoy were supplied with arms and ammunition from the public stores, but were clothed in the native fashion, commanded by native officers, and very rudely disciplined.

At the commencement of the year 1757, Clive organised a battalion of sepoy, consisting of some three or four hundred men, carefully selected; and he not only furnished them with arms and ammunition, but clothed, drilled, and disciplined them like the Europeans, appointing a European officer to command, and non-commissioned officers to instruct them. Such was the origin of the first regiment of Bengal native infantry, called, from its equipment, the “Lall Pultun,” or “Red regiment” (pultun being a corruption of the English term “platoon,” which latter is derived from the French word “peloton.”) It was placed under the direction of Lieutenant Knox, who proved a most admirable sepoy leader. There was no difficulty in raising men for this and other corps; for during the perpetually-recurring warfare which marked the Mussulman occupation of Bengal, adventurers had been accustomed to flock thither from Bahar, Oude, the Doab, Rohilcund, and even from beyond the Indus;

* Sir Charles Napier.—*Life and Opinions*.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., pp. 114; 258; 304; 533.

engaging themselves for particular services, and being dismissed when these were performed. It was from such men and their immediate descendants that the British ranks were filled. The majority were Mussulmans; but Patans, Rohillas, a few Jats, some Rajpoots, and even Brahmins were to be found in the early corps raised in and about Calcutta.*

The Madras sepoy, and the newly-raised Bengal battalion, amounting together to 2,100, formed two-thirds of the force with which Clive took the field against Surajah Dowlah at Plassy, in June, 1757. Of these, six Europeans and sixteen Natives perished in the so-called battle, against an army estimated by the lowest calculation at 58,000 men.† Of course, not even Clive, "the daring in war," would have been so mad as to risk an engagement which he might have safely avoided, with such an overwhelming force; but he acted in reliance on the contract previously made with the nawab's ambitious relative and commander-in-chief, Meer Jaffier, who had promised to desert to the British with all the troops under his orders at the commencement of the action, on condition of being recognised as Nawab of Bengal. The compact was fulfilled; and Meer Jaffier's treachery was rewarded by his elevation to the musnud, which the East India Company allowed him to occupy for some years. Meanwhile, the cessions obtained through him having greatly increased their territorial and pecuniary resources, they began to form a standing army for each of the three presidencies, organising the natives into a regular force, on the plan introduced by Clive.

The first instance on record of a Native court-martial occurred in July, 1757. A sepoy was accused of having connived at the attempted escape of a Swiss who had deserted the British ranks, and acted as a spy in the service of the French. The Swiss was hanged. The sepoy was tried by a court composed of the subahdars and jemadars (Native captains and lieutenants) of his detachment, found guilty, and sentenced to receive 500 lashes, and be dismissed from the service—which was accordingly done.

The hostilities carried on against the French, subjected the East India Company's troops to great hardships. The Europeans had

been much injured in health and discipline by repeated accessions of prize-money, and by the habits of drinking and debauchery into which they had fallen. Numbers died; and the remainder had neither ability nor inclination to endure long marches and exposure to the climate. During an expedition in pursuit of a detachment under M. Law, they positively refused to proceed beyond Patna: Major Eyre Coote declared that he would advance with the sepoy alone; which, they rejoined, was "the most desirable event that could happen to them." Major Coote marched on with the sepoy only; but the French succeeded in effecting their escape. The recreants got drunk, and behaved in a very disorderly manner; whereupon thirty of the worst of them were brought before a court-martial, and, by its decree, publicly flogged for mutiny and insubordination.

The sentence was pronounced and executed on the 28th of July, 1757. On the following day, the sepoy, undeterred by the penalty exacted from their European comrades, laid down their arms in a body, and refused to proceed farther. The Madrassese especially complained, that although they had embarked only for service in Calcutta, they had been taken on to Chandernagore, Moorshedabad, and Patna; and that now they were again required to advance, to remove still farther from their families, and endure additional fatigues and privations. They alleged that their pay was in arrears, and that they had not received the amount to which they were entitled. Major Coote warned them of the danger which would accrue from the want of unanimity and discipline among a small force surrounded with enemies, and the hazard to which, by laying down their arms, they exposed the savings they had already accumulated, and the large amount of prize-money then due to them. These considerations prevailed; the men resumed their arms, and marched at once with the artillery to Bankipoor, the European infantry proceeding thither by water.

When Clive first left India, in 1760, the Bengal force consisted of one European battalion of infantry and two companies of artillery (1,000 men in all), and five Native battalions (1,000 men in each.) The number of European officers was at the same time increased: one captain as commandant, one lieutenant and one ensign as staff, with four sergeants, being allowed to each Native

* *Rise and Progress of the Bengal Army*; by Captain Arthur Broome, Bengal Artillery; 1850: vol. i., p. 93.

† See *Indian Empire*, "Table of Battles," vol. i., pp. 460, 461.

battalion. There was likewise a Native commandant, who took post in front with the captain, and a Native adjutant, who remained in the rear with the subalterns.

In 1764, very general disaffection was manifested throughout the army, in consequence of the non-payment of a gratuity promised by the nawab, Meer Jaffier. The European battalion, which was, unfortunately, chiefly composed of foreigners (Dutch, Germans, Hessians, and French), when assembled under arms for a parade on the 30th of January, refused to obey the word of command, declaring, that until the promised donation should be given, they would not perform any further service. The battalion marched off under the leadership of an Englishman named Straw, declaring their intention of joining their comrades then stationed on the Caramnassa, and with them proceeding to Calcutta, and compelling the governor and council to do them justice. This appears to have been really the design of the English mutineers; but the foreigners, who were double their number, secretly intended to join Shuja Dowlah, the nawab-vizier of Oude; and went off with that intention.

The sepoy were at first inclined to follow the example of the Europeans, whose cause of complaint they shared; but the officers succeeded in keeping them quiet in their lines, until the Mogul horse (two troops of which had been recently raised) spread themselves among the Native battalions, and induced about 600 sepoy to accompany the treacherous foreigners.

The European officers rode after the mutineers, and induced their leader Straw, and the greater part of them, to return. Probably they would have done so in a body but for the influence exercised over them by a sergeant named Delamarr, who had been distinguished by intelligence and good conduct in the previous campaign, but who had a private grievance to avenge, having, as he alleged, been promised a commission on leaving the King's and entering the Company's service; which promise had been broken to him, though kept to others similarly circumstanced. This man was born in England of French parents, and spoke both languages with equal facility; on which account he was employed by the officers as a medium of communication with the foreign troops. As long as any of the officers remained with the mutineers, he affected fidelity; but when the last officer, Lieutenant

Eyre, was compelled to relinquish the hope of reclaiming his men, by their threatening to carry him off by force, Delamarr put himself at the head of the party, and gave out an order that any one who should attempt to turn back, should be hanged on the first tree. The order appears to have had a contrary effect to that which it was intended to produce; for the Germans thought the French were carrying the matter too far; and they, with all but three of the few remaining English, returned on the following day, to the number of seventy, accompanied by several sepoy.

Thus the original deserters were diminished to little more than 250, of whom 157 were of the European battalion (almost all Frenchmen), sixteen were of the European cavalry, and about 100 were Natives, including some of the Mogul horse. They proceeded to join the army of Shuja Dowlah of Oude; and some of them entered his service, and that of other Indian potentates; but the majority enlisted in Sumroo's brigade.*

On the 12th of February (the day following the mutiny), a dividend of the nawab's donation was declared as about to be paid to the army, in the proportion of forty rupees to each European soldier, and six to each sepoy. The sepoy were extremely indignant at the rate of allotment: they unanimously refused to receive the proffered sum, and assembled under arms on the 13th of February, at nine in the forenoon. The Europeans were very much excited; and it became difficult "to restrain their violence, and prevent their falling upon the sepoy, for presuming to follow the example they themselves had afforded."†

Suddenly the sepoy set up a shout, and rushed down, in an irregular body, towards the Europeans, who had been drawn up in separate companies across the parade, with the park of artillery on their left, and two 6-pounders on their right.

Captain Jennings, the officer in command, perceiving that the sepoy were moving with shouldered arms, directed that they should be suffered to pass through the intervals of the battalion, if they would do so quietly. Several officers urged resistance; but Captain Jennings felt that the discharge of a single musket would be the signal for a fearful struggle, which must end either in the extermination of the Europeans, or in the total dissolution of the

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 297.

† *Broome's Bengal Army*, vol. i., p. 420.

Native force, on which the government were deeply dependent. He rode along the ranks, urging the men to be quiet; and arrived at the right of the line just in time to snatch the match out of the hand of a subaltern of artillery, as he was putting it to a 6-pounder, loaded with grape.

The result justified his decision. Two corps (the late 2nd grenadiers and 8th Native infantry) went off towards the Caramnassa river. The other two Native battalions present (the late 1st and 3rd Native infantry), remained behind—the one perfectly steady, the other clamorous and excited. The remaining three detached battalions all exhibited signs of disaffection. Captain Jennings, with the officers of the mutinous corps, followed them, and induced every man of them to return, by consenting to their own stipulation, that their share of the donation should be raised to half that of the corresponding ranks of the European battalion. This concession being made generally known, tranquillity was at once re-established.

The question of the better adaptation of the natives of India to serve as regular or irregular cavalry, was discussed. The council considered that a body of regular Native cavalry might be raised on the European system, under English officers. Major Carnac objected on the following grounds:—"The Moguls," he said, "who are the only good horsemen in the country, can never be brought to submit to the ill-treatment they receive from gentlemen wholly unacquainted with their language and customs. We clearly see the ill effects of this among our sepoy, and it will be much more so among horsemen, who deem themselves of a far superior class; nor have we a sufficiency of officers for the purpose: I am sorry to say, not a single one qualified to afford a prospect of success to such a project." These arguments prevailed. The Mogul horse was increased, during the year (1764), to 1,200 men each risallah (or troop) under Native officers, with a few Europeans to the whole.

The number of the Native infantry was also rapidly on the increase; but their position and rights remained on a very indefinite footing, when Major Hector Munro succeeded to the command of the Bengal army in August, 1764. In the following month a serious outbreak occurred. The oldest corps in the service, then known as the 9th, or Captain Galliez' battalion, but afterwards the 1st Native infantry, while stationed at

Manjee (near Chupra), instigated by some of their Native officers, assembled on parade, and declared themselves resolved to serve no longer, as certain promises made to them (apparently regarding the remainder of the donation money) had been broken. They retained their arms, and imprisoned their European officers for a night; but released them on the following morning.

There did not then exist, nor has there since been framed, any law decreeing gradations of punishment in a case which clearly admits of many gradations of crime. It has been left to the discretion of the military authorities for the time being, to punish what Sir Charles Napier calls "passive, respectful mutinies," with sweeping severity, or to let attempted desertion to the enemy, and sanguinary treachery, escape almost unpunished.

The present proceeding resembled the outbreak of spoilt children, rather than of concerted mutiny.* No intention to desert was shown, much less to join the enemy. Such conduct had been before met with perhaps undue concessions. Major Munro now resolved to attempt stopping it by measures of extreme severity. Accordingly he held a general court-martial; and on receiving its verdict for the execution of twenty-four of the sepoy, he ordered it to be carried out immediately. The sentence was, "to be blown away from the guns"—the horrible mode of inflicting capital punishment so extensively practised of late.

Four grenadiers claimed the privilege of being fastened to the right-hand guns. They had always occupied the post of honour in the field, they said; and Major Munro admitted the force of the argument by granting their request. The whole army were much affected by the bearing of the doomed men. "I am sure," says Captain Williams, who then belonged to the Royal Marines employed in Bengal, and who was an eye-witness of this touching episode, "there was not a dry eye among the Marines, although they had been long accustomed to hard service, and two of them had actually been on the execution party which shot Admiral Byng, in the year 1757."† Yet Major Munro gave the signal, and the explosion followed. When the loathsome results became apparent—the mangled limbs scattered far and wide, the strange burning

* Broome's *Bengal Army*, vol. i., p. 459.

† Captain Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 170.

smell, the fragments of human flesh, the trickling streams of blood, constituted a scene almost intolerable to those who witnessed it for the first time. The officers commanding the sepoy battalions came forward, and represented that their men would not suffer any further executions; but Major Munro persevered. The other convicted mutineers attempted no appeal to their comrades, but met their deaths with the utmost composure.

This was the first example, on a large scale, of the infliction of the penalty of death for mutiny. Heretofore there had been no plan, and no bloodshed in the numerous outbreaks. Subsequently they assumed an increasingly systematic and sanguinary character.

On the return of Clive to India in 1765 (as Lord Clive, Baron of Plassy), the Bengal army was reorganised, and divided into three brigades—respectively stationed at Monghyr, Allahabad, and Bankipoor. Each brigade consisted of one company of artillery, one regiment of European infantry, one risallah, or troop, of Native cavalry, and seven battalions of sepoys.

Each regiment of European infantry was constituted of the following strength:—

1 Colonel commanding the whole Brigade.	
1 Lieutenant-colonel commanding the Regiment.	
1 Major.	36 Sergeants.
6 Captains.	36 Corporals.
1 Captain Lieutenant.	27 Drummers.
9 Lieutenants.	630 Privates.
18 Ensigns.	

The artillery comprised four companies, each of which contained—

1 Captain.	4 Corporals.
1 Captain Lieutenant.	2 Drummers.
1 First Lieutenant.	2 Fifers.
1 Second Lieutenant.	10 Bombardiers.
3 Lieut. Fireworkers.	20 Gunners.
4 Sergeants.	60 Matrosses.

Each risallah of Native cavalry consisted of—

1 European Subaltern in command.	
1 Sergeant-major.	3 Jemadars.
4 Sergeants.	2 Naggers.
1 Risaldar.	6 Duffadars.
	100 Privates.

A Native battalion consisted of—

1 Captain.	30 Jemadars.
2 Lieutenants.	1 Native Adjutant.
2 Ensigns.	10 Trumpeters.
3 Sergeants.	30 Tom-toms.*
3 Drummers.	80 Havildars.
1 Native Commandant.	50 Naiks.
10 Native Subahdars.	690 Sepoys.

* That is, Tom-tom (native drum) players.

† Broome's *Bengal Army*, vol. i., p. 540.

Captain Broome, from whom the above details are derived, remarks, "that the proportion of officers, except to the sepoy battalions, was very much more liberal than in the present day; and it is most important to remember, that every officer on the list was effective—all officers on other than regimental employ, being immediately struck off the roll of the corps; although, as there was but one roster for promotion in the whole infantry, no loss in that respect was sustained thereby. The artillery and engineers rose in a separate body, and were frequently transferred from one to the other."†

The pay of the sepoy was early fixed at seven rupees per month in all stationary situations, and eight rupees and a-half when marching, or in the field; exclusive of half a rupee per month, allotted to the off-reckoning fund, for which they received one coat, and nothing more, annually. From that allowance they not only fed and clothed themselves, but also erected cantonments in all stationary situations, at their own expense, and remitted to their wives and families, often to aged parents and more distant relatives, a considerable proportion of their pay; in fact, so considerable, that the authorities have been obliged to interfere to check their extreme self-denial.‡

In 1766, the mass of the British officers of the Bengal army entered into a very formidable confederacy against the government, on account of the withdrawal of certain extra allowances, known as "double batta." The manner in which Lord Clive then used the sepoys to coerce the Europeans, has been already narrated.§

The first epoch in the history of the Bengal army may be said to end with the final departure of Clive (its founder) from India, in 1767. Up to this time, no question of caste appears to have been mooted, as interfering with the requirements of military duty, whether ordinary or incidental; but as the numbers of the sepoys increased, and the proportion of Hindoos began to exceed that of Mussulmans, a gradual change took place. A sea voyage is a forbidden thing to a Brahminist; it is a violation of his religious code, under any circumstances: he must neglect the frequent ablutions which his creed enjoins, and to which he has been accustomed from childhood; and if he do not irrecoverably forfeit his caste, it must be by enduring severe privations in regard to food

† Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 263.

§ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 305.

while on board ship. The influence of the officers, however, generally sufficed to overcome the scruples of the men; and, in 1769, three Bengal battalions prepared to return by sea from the Madras presidency to Bengal. Two grenadier companies embarked for the purpose, and are supposed to have perished; for the ship which they entered was never heard of afterwards. This event made a deep impression on the minds of the Hindoos, confirmed their superstitious dread of the sea, and aggravated the mingled fear and loathing, which few Englishmen, except when actually rounding the "Cape of Storms," or becalmed in a crowded vessel in the Red Sea, can understand sufficiently to make allowance for.

In 1782, a mutiny occurred at Barrackpoor, in consequence of the troops stationed there being ordered to prepare for foreign service, which it was rumoured would entail a sea voyage. No violence was attempted; no turbulence was evinced; the men quietly combined, under their Native officers, in refusing to obey the orders, which the government had no means of enforcing. After the lapse of several weeks, a general court-martial was held. Two Native officers, and one or two sepoys, were blown from the guns. The whole of the four corps concerned (then known as the 4th, 15th, 17th, and 31st) were broken up, and the men drafted into other battalions.

In 1787, Lord Cornwallis arrived in India, as governor-general and commander-in-chief. He earnestly desired to dissipate, by gentle means, the prejudices which marred the efficiency of the Native army; and he offered a bounty of ten rupees per man, with other advantages, to such as would volunteer for service on an expedition to Sumatra. The required four companies were obtained; the promised bounty was paid previous to embarkation; every care was taken to ensure abundant supplies of food and water for sustenance and ablution; the detachment was conveyed on board a regular Indiaman at the end of February; and was recalled in the following October. Unfortunately, the return voyage was tedious and boisterous: the resolute abstinence of the Hindoos from all nutriment save dry peas and rice, and the exposure consequent on the refusal of the majority to quit the deck night or day, on account of the number of sick below, occasioned many to be afflicted with *nyctalopia*, or night-blindness; and deaths were numerous. Notwithstanding

this, the care and tact of the officers, and the praise and gratuities which awaited the volunteers on relanding, appear to have done much to reconcile them to the past trial, and even to its repetition if need were.

The government thought the difficulty overcome, and were confirmed in their opinion by the offers of proceeding by sea made during the Mysoor war. In 1795, it became desirable to send an expedition to Malacca, whereupon a proposition was made to the 15th battalion (a corps of very high character), through its commanding officer, Captain Ludovick Grant, to volunteer for the purpose. The influence of the officers apparently prevailed; the men were reported as willing to embark; but, at the last moment, a determined mutiny broke out, and the 29th battalion was called out, with its field-pieces, to disperse the mutineers. The colours of the 15th were burnt; and the number ordered to be left a blank in the list of Native corps.* Warned by this occurrence, the government proceeded to raise a "Marine battalion,"† consisting of twelve companies of a hundred privates each; and it became generally understood, if not indeed officially stated, that the ordinary Bengal troops were not to be sent on sea voyages.

A corps of Native militia was raised for Calcutta and the adjacent districts, and placed, in the first instance, under the town major. It consisted of eighty companies of ninety privates; but was subsequently augmented to sixteen or more companies of one hundred privates each. Captain Williams, writing in 1816, says—"It is now commanded by an officer of any rank, who may be favoured with the patronage of the governor-general, with one other European officer, who performs the duty of adjutant to the corps."‡ Several local corps were formed about the same time.

Some important changes were made in the constitution of the Bengal army in 1796; one effect of which was to diminish the authority and influence of the Native officers. The staff appointment of Native adjutants was abolished, and a European adjutant was appointed to each battalion. The principle of regimental rank and promotion (to the rank of major, inclusive), was

* A regiment was raised in Bahar, in 1798, and numbered the 15th.

† Formed into the 20th, or Marine regiment, in 1801.

‡ *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 243.

adopted throughout the E. I. Company's forces; and, contrary to the former arrangement, the whole of the staff of the government and of the army, inclusive of a heavy commissariat, with the numerous officers on furlough in Europe, and those employed with local corps, and even in diplomatic situations, were thenceforth borne on the strength as component parts of companies and corps. Thus, even at this early period, the complaint (so frequently reiterated since) is made by Captain Williams, that the charge of companies often devolved on subalterns utterly unqualified, by professional or local acquirements, for a situation of such authority over men to whose character, language, and habits they are strangers.*

The rise, and gradual increase, of the armies of the Madras and Bombay presidencies, did not essentially differ from that of the Bengal troops, excepting that the total number of the former was much smaller, and the proportion of Mohammedans and high-caste Brahmins considerably lower than in the latter. The three armies were kept separate, each under its own commander-in-chief. Many inconveniences attend this division of the forces of one ruling power. It has been a barrier to the centralisation which the bureaucratic spirit of the Supreme government of Calcutta has habitually fostered; and attempts have been made, more or less directly, for an amalgamation of the three armies. The Duke of Wellington thoroughly understood the bearing of the question, and his decided opinion probably contributed largely to the maintenance of the chief of the barriers which have prevented the contagion of Bengal mutiny from extending to Bombay and Madras, and hindered the fraternisation which we may reasonably suspect would otherwise have been general, at least among the Hindoos. The more united the British are, the better, no doubt; but the more distinct nationalities are kept up in India, the safer for us: every ancient landmark we remove, renders the danger of combination against us more imminent.

The Madras and Bombay sepoys, throughout their career, have had, like those of Bengal, occasional outbreaks of mutiny, the usual cause being an attempt to send them on expeditions which necessitated a sea voyage.

* Williams' *Bengal Native Infantry*, p. 253.

† Parliamentary evidence of Sir J. Malcolm in 1832.

‡ *Ibid.*

Thus, in 1779, or 1780, a mutiny occurred in the 9th Madras battalion when ordered to embark for Bombay; which, however, was quelled by the presence of mind and decision of the commandant, Captain Kelly. A fatal result followed the issue of a similar order for the embarkation of some companies of a corps in the Northern Circars. The men, on arriving at Vizagapatam (the port where they were to take shipping), rose upon their European officers, and shot all save one or two, who escaped to the ship.†

One motive was strong enough to overcome this rooted dislike to the sea; and that was, affection for the person, and confidence in the skill and fortune, of their commanding officer. Throughout the Native forces, the fact was ever manifest, that their discipline or insubordination, their fidelity or faithlessness, depended materially on the influence exercised by their European leaders. Sir John Malcolm, in his various writings, affords much evidence to this effect. Among many other instances, he cites that of a battalion of the 22nd Madras regiment, then distinguished for the high state of discipline to which they had been brought by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-colonel James Oram. In 1797, he proposed to his corps, on parade, to volunteer for an expedition then preparing against Manilla. "Will he go with us?" was the question which went through the ranks. "Yes!" "Will he stay with us?" Again, "yes!" and the whole corps exclaimed, "To Europe, to Europe!" They were ready to follow Colonel Oram anywhere—to the shores of the Atlantic as cheerfully as to an island of the Eastern Ocean. Such was the contagion of their enthusiasm, that several sepoys, who were missing from one of the battalions in garrison at Madras, were found to have deserted to join the expedition.‡

The personal character of Lord Lake contributed greatly to the good service rendered by the Bengal sepoys (both Hindoo and Mohammedan) in the arduous Mahratta war of 1803-'4. He humoured their prejudices, flattered their pride, and praised their valour; and they repaid him by unbounded attachment to his person, and the zealous fulfilment of their public duty. Victorious or defeated, the sepoys knew their efforts were equally sure of appreciation by the commander-in-chief. His conduct to the shattered corps of Colonel Monson's detachment, after their

gallant but disastrous retreat before Holcar,* was very remarkable. He formed them into a reserve, and promised them every opportunity of signalising themselves. No confidence was ever more merited. Throughout the service that ensued, these corps were uniformly distinguished.

The pay of the forces in the last century was frequently heavily in arrears, and both Europeans and Natives were driven, by actual want, to the verge of mutiny. The Bombay troops, in the early wars with Mysoor, suffered greatly from this cause; and yet none ever showed warmer devotion to the English. When, on the capture of Bednore, General Matthews and his whole force surrendered to Tippoo, every inducement was offered to tempt the sepoy to enter the sultan's service; but in vain. During the march, they were carefully separated from the European prisoners at each place of encampment, by a tank or other obstacle, supposed to be insurmountable. It did not prove so, however; for one of the captive officers subsequently declared, that not a night elapsed but some of the sepoy contrived to elude the vigilance of the guards by swimming the tanks (frequently some miles in circumference), or eluding the sentries; bringing with them such small sums as they could save from the pittance allowed by the sultan, for their own support, in return for hard daily labour, to eke out the scanty food of the Europeans. "We can live upon anything," they said; "but you require mutton and beef." At the peace of 1783, 1,500 of the released captives marched 500 miles to Madras, and there embarked on a voyage of six or eight weeks, to rejoin the army to which they belonged at Bombay.†

Similar manifestations of attachment were given by the various Native troops of the three presidencies; their number, and proportion to the Europeans, increasing with the extension of the Anglo-Indian empire. In 1800, the total force comprised 22,832 Europeans, and 115,300 Natives of all denominations; the Europeans being chiefly Royal troops belonging to the regular cavalry and infantry regiments, which were sent to India for periods varying from twelve to twenty years. As the requirements of government augmented with every addition of territory, the restrictions of caste became daily more

obnoxious; and attempts, for the most part very ill-judged, were made to break through them. Certain regulations, trivial in themselves, excited the angry suspicions of the sepoy, as to the latent intentions of government; and the sons of Tippoo Sultan (then state-prisoners at Vellore), through their partisans, fomented the disaffection, which issued in the mutiny of 1806, in which thirteen European officers and eighty-two privates were killed, and ninety-two wounded.‡

In 1809, another serious outbreak occurred in the Madras presidency, in which the Native troops played only a secondary part, standing by their officers against the government. The injudicious manner in which Sir George Barlow had suppressed an allowance known as "tent-contract," previously made to Europeans in command of Native regiments, spread disaffection throughout the Madras force. Auber, the annalist of the East India Company, gives very few particulars of this unsatisfactory and discreditable affair; but he mentions the remarkable fidelity displayed by Purneah, the Dewan of Mysoor (chosen, and earnestly supported, by Colonel Wellesley, after the conquest of that country.) The field-officer in charge of the fortress of Seringapatam, tried to corrupt Purneah, and even held out a threat regarding his property, and that belonging to the boy-rajah in the fort. The dignified rejoinder was, that the British government was the protector of the rajah and his minister; and that, let what would happen, he (Purneah) would always remain faithful to his engagements.§

A skirmish actually took place between the mutineers and the king's troops. Lord Minto (the governor-general) hastened to Madras, and, by a mixture of firmness and conciliation, restored order, having first obtained the unconditional submission of all concerned in the late proceedings; that is to say, the great majority of the Madras officers in the Company's service.

The refusal of the 47th Bengal regiment to march from Barrackpore in 1825, on the expedition to Burmah, is fully accounted for by the repugnance of the sepoy to embarkation having been aggravated by the insufficient arrangements made for them by the commissariat department. The authorities punished, in a most sanguinary man-

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 400.

† Sir John Malcolm's *Government of India*. London: John Murray, 1833; p. 210.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 407.

§ Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii., pp. 476, 477.

ner, conduct which their own negligence had provoked.*

An important change was introduced into the Native army, under the administration of Lord William Bentinck (who was appointed commander-in-chief as well as governor-general in 1833), by the abolition of flogging, which had previously been inflicted with extreme frequency and severity. Sir Charles Napier subsequently complained of this measure, on the ground of its leaving no punishment available when the army was before the enemy. The limited authority vested in the officers, increased the difficulty of maintaining discipline, by making expulsion from the service the sole punishment of offenders who deserved perhaps a day's hard labour. Sir Charles adds—"But I have been in situations where I could not turn them out, for they would either starve or have their throats cut; so I did all my work by the provost-martial." His favourite pupil, "the war-bred Sir Colin Campbell," appears to have been driven to the same alternative to check looting.

The change which has come over the habits of both military men and civilians during the present century, has been already shown. Europeans have gradually ceased to take either wives or concubines from among the natives: they have become, in all points, more exclusive; and as their own number has increased, so also has their regard for conventionalities, which, while yet strangers in the land—few and feeble—they had been content to leave in abeyance. The effect on Indian society, and especially on the army, is evident. The intercourse between the European and Native officers has become yearly less frequent and less cordial. The acquisition of Native languages is neglected; or striven for, not as a means of obtaining the confidence of the sepoys, but simply as a stepping-stone to distinction in the numerous civil positions which the rapid extension of territory, the paucity of the civil service, and the rejection of Native agency, has thrown open to their ambition. There is, inevitably, a great deal of sheer drudgery in the ordinary routine of regimental duty; but it surely was not wise to aggravate the distaste which its

performance is calculated to produce, by adopting a system which makes long continuance in a regiment a mark of incapacity.

The military and civil line of promotion is, to a great extent, the same. An Indian military man is always supposed to be fit for anything that offers. He can be "an inspector of schools, an examiner in political economy, an engineer, a surveyor, an architect, an auditor, a commissary, a resident, or a governor."† Political, judicial, and scientific appointments are all open to him; and the result, no doubt, is, that Indian officers, in many instances, show a versatility of talent unknown elsewhere.

But through teaching officers to look to staff appointments and civil employ for advancement, the military profession is described as having fallen into a state of disparagement. Officers who have not acquitted themselves well in the civil service are "remanded to their regiments," as if they were penal corps; and those who remain with their regiments, suffer under a sense of disappointment and wounded self-esteem, which makes it impossible for them to have their heart in the work.‡

The employment of the army to do the civil work, was declared by Napier to be "the great military evil of India;" the officers occupying various diplomatic situations, the sepoys acting as policemen, gaolers, and being incessantly employed in detachments for the escort of treasure from the local treasuries, to the manifest injury of their discipline. "Sir Thomas Munro," he adds, "thought three officers were sufficient for regiments. This is high authority; yet I confess to thinking him wrong; or else, which is very possible, the state of the army and the style of the officer have changed, not altogether better nor altogether worse, but become different."

There is, probably, much truth in this suggestion. The character of the Native officers and sepoys, as well as that of the Europeans, had changed since the days of Munro. The Bengal army had grown, with the Bengal presidency, into an exclusively high-caste institution. The men were chiefly Brahmins and Rajpoots, or Mussulmans—handsome, stately men, higher by the head and shoulders than the Madrassesees or Mahrattas; immeasurably higher in caste. Great care was taken to avoid low-caste recruits; still more, outcasts and Christians. In this respect, most exaggerated deference was paid to religious prejudices which, in

* *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 424. Thornton's *India*, vol. iv., p. 113.

† *Times*, 15th July, 1857. Letter from Bombay correspondent.

‡ *Indophilus' Letters to the Times*, p. 15.

other points, were recklessly infringed. In Bombay and Madras, no such distinctions were made. Recruits were enlisted without regard to caste; and the result was, a mixture much less adapted to combine for the removal of common grievances. A Native army, under foreign rule, can hardly have been without these: but so flattering a description was given of the Indian troops, that, until their rejection of our service, and subsequent deadly hostility, raised suspicions of "a long-continued course of mismanagement,"* little attention was paid to those who suggested the necessity of radical reforms.

Yet Sir John Malcolm pointed out, as early as 1799, the injustice of a system which allowed no Native soldier the most distant prospect of rising to rank, distinction, or affluence; and this "extraordinary fact" he believed to be "a subject of daily comment among the Native troops."†

The evil felt while the Indian army was comparatively small, could not but increase in severity in proportion to the augmentation of the sepoys, who, in 1851, amounted to 240,121, out of 289,529 men; the remainder being Europeans. Meanwhile, the extinction of Indian states and of national armies had been rapidly progressing. The disbanded privates (at least such of them as entered the British ranks) may have benefited by the change; regular pay and a retiring pension compensating them for the possibility of promotion and the certainty of laxer discipline, with license in the way of loot (plunder.) But the officers were heavy losers by the change. In treating of the causes of the mutiny, Mr. Martin Gubbins says, that in the Punjab, "the father may have received 1,000 rupees per mensem, as commandant of cavalry, under Runjeet Sing; the son draws a pay of eighty rupees as sub-commander, in the service of the British government. The difference is probably thought by themselves to be too great." In support of this guarded admission, he proceeds to adduce evidence of the existence of the feeling suggested by him as probable, by citing the reproachful exclamation of a Seik risaldar, conspicuous for good conduct during the insurrection—"My father used to receive 500 rupees a-month in command of a party of Runjeet Sing's horse; I receive but fifty."‡

* Speech of Lord Ellenborough: Indian debate, July 13th, 1857. The Duke of Argyll, and others, said, that "there could be no doubt there had been some mismanagement."—*Ibid.*, July 27th, 1858.

Sir Charles Napier returned to India, as commander-in-chief of the Anglo-Indian armies, on the 6th of May, 1849. He was sent out for the express purpose of carrying on the war in the Punjab; but it had been successfully terminated before his arrival. He made a tour of inspection, and furnished reports to government on the condition of the troops; which contained statements calculated to excite grave anxiety, and prophecies of evil which have been since fulfilled.

He pointed out excessive luxury among the officers, and alienation from the Native soldiery, as fostering the disaffection occasioned among the latter by sudden reductions of pay, accompanied by the increased burthen of civil duties, consequent on the rapid extension of territory.

It was, however, not until after positive mutiny had been developed, that he recognised the full extent of the evils, which he then searched out, and found to be sapping the very foundation of the Indian army.

Writing to General Caulfield (one of his few friends in the East India direction) in November, 1849, he calls the sepoy "a glorious soldier, not to be corrupted by gold, or appalled by danger;" and he adds—"I would not be afraid to go into action with Native troops, and without Europeans, provided I had the training of them first."§

In a report addressed to the governor-general in the same month, the following passage occurs:—

"I have heard that Lord Hardinge objected to the assembling of the Indian troops, for fear they should conspire. I confess I cannot see the weight of such an opinion. I have never met with an Indian officer who held it, and I certainly do not hold it myself; and few men have had more opportunities of judging of the armies of all three presidencies than I have. Lord Hardinge saw but the Bengal army, and that only as governor-general, and for a short time; I have studied them for nearly eight years, constantly at the head of Bengal and Bombay sepoys, and I can see nothing to fear from them, *except when ill-used*; and even then they are less dangerous than British troops would be in similar circumstances. I see no danger in their being massed, and very great danger in their being spread over a country as they now are: on the contrary, I believe that, by concentrating the Indian army as I propose, its spirit, its devotion, and its powers will all be increased."||

The above extract tends to confirm the general belief, that the private opinion of Lord Hardinge, regarding the condition of

† Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, vol i., p. 96.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 98.

§ Sir Charles Napier's *Life*, vol. iv., pp. 212, 213.

|| Parl. Paper (Commons), 30th July, 1857.

the army, was less satisfactory than he chose to avow in public. Lord Melville has given conclusive evidence on the subject by stating, from his personal acquaintance with the ex-commander-in-chief, that—"Entertaining the worst opinion privately, Lord Hardinge never would express it publicly, trying thereby to bolster up a bad system, on the ground of the impolicy of making public the slight thread by which we held our tenure of that empire."* Napier, who never kept back or qualified his views, soon saw reason to declare, that "we were sitting on a mine, and nobody could tell when it might explode."† The circumstances which led him to this unsatisfactory conclusion were these. After the annexation of the Punjab, the extra allowance formerly given to the troops on service there, was summarily withdrawn, on the ground that the country was no longer a foreign one. The 22nd Native infantry stationed at Rawul Pindee refused the reduced pay. The 13th regiment followed the example; and an active correspondence took place between these corps, and doubtless extended through the Bengal army; for there are news-writers in every regiment, who communicate all intelligence to their comrades at headquarters.‡

Colonel Benson, of the military board, proposed to Lord Dalhousie to disband the two regiments; but the commander-in-chief opposed the measure, as harsh and impolitic. Many other regiments were, he said, certainly involved: the government could not disband an army; it was, therefore, best to treat the cases as isolated ones, while that was possible; for, he added, "if we attempt to bully large bodies, they will do the same by us, and a fight must ensue."§ The governor-general concurred in this opinion. The insubordination at Rawul Pindee was repressed without bloodshed, by the officer in command, Sir Colin Campbell; and the matter was treated as one of accidental restricted criminality, not affecting the mass.

Sir Charles Napier visited Delhi, which he considered the proper place for our great magazines, and well fitted, from its central position, to be the head-quarters of the

artillery—the best point from whence to send forth troops and reinforcements. Here, too, the spirit of mutiny manifested itself; the 41st Native infantry refusing to enter the Punjab without additional allowances as heretofore; and twenty-four other regiments, then under orders for the same province, were rumoured to be in league with the 41st. The latter regiment was, however, tranquillised, and induced to march, by what Sir William Napier terms "dexterous management, and the obtaining of furloughs, which had been unfairly and recklessly withheld."

At Vizierabad the sepoys were very sullen, and were heard to say they only waited the arrival of the relieving regiments, and would then act together. Soon after this, the 66th, a relief regiment on the march from Lucknow (800 miles from Vizierabad), broke into open mutiny near Amritsir, insulted their officers, and attempted to seize the strong fortress of Govindghur, which then contained about £100,000 in specie. The 1st Native cavalry were fortunately on the spot; and being on their return to India, were not interested in the extra-allowance question. They took part with the Europeans; and, dismounting, seized the gates, which the strength and daring of a single officer (Captain M'Donald) had alone prevented from being closed, and which the mutineers, with fixed bayonets, vainly sought to hold. This occurred in February, 1850. Lord Dalhousie was not taken by surprise. Writing to Sir Charles Napier, he had declared himself "prepared for discontent among the Native troops, on coming into the Punjab under diminished allowances; and well satisfied to have got so far through without violence." "The sepoy," he added, "has been over-petted and overpaid of late, and has been led on, by the government itself, into the entertainment of an expectation, and the manifestation of a feeling, which he never held in former times."||

This was written before the affair at Govindghur; and in the meantime, Sir Charles had seen "strong ground to suppose the mutinous spirit general in the Bengal army."¶ He believed that the Brahmins

* Letter to General Sir William Gomm, July 15th, 1857.—*Times*, July 21st, 1857. † *Ibid.*

‡ Evidence of Colonel Greenhill.—Parl. Committee, 1832-'3.

§ Sir Charles Napier's *Life*, vol. iv., p. 227.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 216; 269; 427.

¶ Two great explosions of ammunition have been mentioned in connexion with the mutinous feeling of the period; one at Benares, of 3,000 barrels of powder, in no less than thirty boats, which killed upwards of 1,200 people: by the other, of 1,800 barrels, no life was lost.

were exerting their influence over the Hindoos most injuriously; and learned, with alarm, a significant circumstance which had occurred during the Seik war. Major Neville Chamberlaine, hearing some sepoy grumbling about a temporary hardship, exclaimed, "Were I the general, I would disband you all." A Brahmin havildar replied, "If you did, we would all go to our villages, and you should not get any more to replace us." Napier viewed this remark as the distinct promulgation of a principle upon which the sepoys were even then prepared to act. The Brahmins he believed to be secretly nourishing the spirit of insubordination; and unless a counterpoise could be found to their influence, it would be hazardous in the extreme to disband the 66th regiment, at the risk of inciting other corps to declare, "They are martyrs for us; we, too, will refuse;" and of producing a bayonet struggle with caste for mastery. "Nor was the stake for which the sepoy contended a small one—exclusive of the principle of an army dictating to the government: they struck for twelve rupees instead of seven—nearly double! When those in the Punjab got twelve by meeting, those in India Proper would not long have served on seven."*

The remedy adopted by Napier, was to replace the mutinous 66th with one of the irregular Goorka battalions;† and he expressed his intention of extensively following up this plan, in the event of the disbandment of further regiments becoming necessary. "I would if I could," he says, "have 25,000 of them; which, added to our own Europeans, would form an army of 50,000 men, and, well handled, would neutralise any combination amongst the sepoys."

The Goorkas themselves he describes as of small stature, with huge limbs, resembling Attila's Huns; "brave as men can be, but horrid little savages, accustomed to use a weapon called a *kookery*, like a straightened reaping-hook, with which they made three cuts—one across the shoulders, the next across the forehead, the third a ripping-up one."

The Nusseere battalion, chosen to replace the 66th, welcomed, with frantic shouts of joy, the proposal of entering the regular army, and receiving seven rupees a

month, instead of four rupees eight annas; which sum, according to their commanding officer, had been actually insufficient for their support. What the European officers of the 66th thought of the substitution does not appear; but Lord Dalhousie, while approving the disbandment of the mutineers, disapproved of the introduction of the Goorkas. The commander-in-chief was at the same time reprimanded for having, in January, 1850 (pending a reference to the Supreme government), suspended the operation of a regulation regarding compensation for rations; which he considered, in the critical state of affairs, likely to produce mutiny. This regulation, says Sir W. Napier, "affected the usual allowance to the sepoys for purchasing their food, according to the market prices of the countries in which they served: it was recent; was but partially known; was in itself unjust; and became suddenly applicable at Vizierabad, where it was entirely unknown." General Hearsey, commander at Vizierabad, and Generals Gilbert and Colin Campbell, deprecated its enforcement as most impolitic, and calculated, in the sullen temper of the sepoys, to produce a mutiny; and, in fact, only twelve days elapsed before the Govindghur outbreak occurred. The amount of money involved in the temporary suspension was only £10; but even had it been much greater, if a commander-in-chief could not, in what he believed to be a crisis, and what there is little doubt really was one, be allowed to use his discretion on a subject so immediately within his cognizance, he had, indeed, a heavy weight of responsibility to bear, without any commensurate authority. A less impetuous spirit than that of the "fiery Napier," would have felt no better than a "huge adjutant-general," when informed that he "would not again be permitted, *under any circumstances*, to issue orders which should change the pay and allowances of the troops in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which had been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the Supreme government alone."‡

The general at once sent in his resignation (May 22nd, 1850) through Lord Fitzroy Somerset; stating the rebuke he had received, and probably hoping that the

* Sir C. Napier's *Life and Correspondence*, vol. iv., pp. 261, 262.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 445.

‡ After Sir Charles left India, a minute was drawn up by the Supreme Council, which stated,

"that the ration and mutiny question, which led to Sir Charles Napier's resignation, was not the real cause for the reprimand; but the style of the commander-in-chief's correspondence had become offensive."—*Life*, vol. iv., p. 411.

British commander-in-chief, the Duke of Wellington, would urge its withdrawal. The Duke, on the contrary, decided, after examining the statements sent home by the Calcutta authorities (which, judging by subsequent events, were founded on a mistaken view of the temper of the troops), that no sufficient reason had existed for the suspension of the regulation, and that the governor-general in council was right in expressing his disapprobation of the act. The resignation was consequently accepted; and Sir Charles's statements regarding the condition of the army, were treated as the prejudiced views of a disappointed man.

Yet the report addressed by him to the Duke in June, while ignorant, and probably not expectant, of the acceptance of his resignation, contains assertions which ought then to have been investigated, and which are now of primary importance as regards the causes of our sudden calamity, and the system to be adopted for the prevention of its recurrence.

"The Bengal Native army," Sir Charles writes, "is said to have much fallen off from what it was in former days. Of this I am not a judge; but I must say that it is a very noble army, and with very few defects. The greatest, as far as I am capable of judging, is a deficiency of discipline among the European officers, especially those of the higher ranks. I will give your grace an instance.

"The important order issued by the governor-general and the commander-in-chief, to prepare the sepoys for a reduction in their pay, I ordered to be read, and explained with care to every regiment. With the exception of three or four commanders of regiments, none obeyed the order; some gave it to pay-sergeants to read, and others altogether neglected to do so—such is the slackness of discipline among officers of high rank, and on an occasion of such vast importance. This want of discipline arises from more than one cause: a little sharpness with officers who disobey orders will soon correct much of this; but much of it originates in the great demand made upon the troops for civil duties, which so breaks up whole regiments, that their commanding officers lose that zeal for the service which they ought to feel, and so do the younger officers. The demand also made for guards is immense. * * * I cannot believe that the discipline of the Bengal army will be restored till it is relieved from civil duties, and those duties performed by police battalions, as was intended by Lord Ellenborough.

"The next evil which I see in the Native army is, that so many of the senior officers of regiments are placed on the staff or in civil situations; and very old, worn-out officers command regiments: these carry on their duties with the adjutant and some favoured Native officer. Not above one or two captains are with the regiment; and the subalterns being all young, form a society among themselves, and neglect the Native officers altogether. Nothing is therefore known as to what is passing in a Native regiment. * * * The last, and most

important thing which I reckon injurious to the Indian army, is the immense influence given to "caste;" instead of being discouraged, it has been encouraged in the Bengal army. In the Bombay army it is discouraged, and that army is in better order than the Bengal army. In this latter the Brahmins have been leaders in every mutiny." *

The manner in which courts-martial were conducted, excited his indignation throughout his Indian career. Drunkenness and gambling were, in his eyes, unsoldierly and ungentlemanly vices, and he drew no distinction between the officer and the private. "Indian courts-martial are my plagues," he writes; "they are farces. If a private is to be tried, the courts are sharp enough; but an officer is quite another thing." He mentions a case of notorious drunkenness, in which the accused was "honourably acquitted;" and he adds—"Discipline is so rapidly decaying, that in a few years my belief is, no commander-in-chief will dare to bring an officer to trial: the press will put an end to all trials, except in law courts. In courts-martial now, all is quibbling and disputes about what is legal; the members being all profoundly ignorant on the subject: those who judge fairly, in a military spirit, are afraid of being brought up afterwards, and the trials end by an acquittal in the face of all evidence!" This state of things was not one in which he was likely to acquiesce; and in six months he had to decide forty-six cases of courts-martial on officers (some for gambling, some for drunkenness), in which only two were honourably acquitted, and not less than fourteen cashiered. In the celebrated address in which he took leave of the officers of the Indian army (9th December, 1850), he blamed them severely for getting into debt, and having to be brought before the Court of Requests. "A vulgar man," he wrote, "who enjoys a champagne tiffin [luncheon], and swindles his servants, may be a pleasant companion to those who do not hold him in contempt as a vulgar knave; but he is not a gentleman: his commission makes him an officer, but he is not a gentleman."

The luxury of the Indian system was, as might be expected, severely criticised by a warrior who is popularly said to have entered on a campaign with a piece of soap and a couple of towels, and dined off a hunch of bread and a cup of water. Previous commanders-in-chief, when moving on

* Sir C. Napier to the Duke of Wellington, 15th June, 1850.—Parl. Paper, August 6th, 1857.

a military inspection, used, at the public expense, eighty or ninety elephants, three or four hundred camels, and nearly as many bullocks, with all their attendants: they had also 332 tent-pitchers, including fifty men solely employed to carry glass doors for a pavilion. This enormous establishment was reduced by Napier to thirty elephants, 334 camels, 222 tent-pitchers; by which a saving was effected for the treasury of £750 a-month. "Canvas palaces," he said, "were not necessary for a general on military inspection, even admitting the favourite idea of some 'old Indians'—that pomp and show produce respect with Indian people. But there is no truth in that notion: the respect is paid to military strength; and the astute natives secretly deride the ostentation of temporary authority."*

"Among the modern military changes," he says, "there is one which has been gradually introduced in a number of regiments by gentlemen who are usually called 'martinets'—not soldiers, only martinets. No soldier can now go up to his officer without a non-commissioned officer gives him leave, and accompanies him! * * * This is a very dangerous innovation; it is digging a ditch between the officers and their men! How are Company's officers to study men's characters, when no man dare address them but in full dress, and in presence of a non-commissioned officer?"†

Sir Charles deplored "the caste and luxury which pervaded the army," as calculated to diminish their influence equally over European soldiers and Indian sepoy.

"His [the soldier's] captain is no longer his friend and chief: he receives him with upstart condescension; is very dignified, and very insolent, nine [times?] out of ten; and as often the private goes away with disgust or contempt, instead of good, respectful, comrade feelings. Then the soldier goes daily to school, or to his library, now always at hand; while his dignified officer goes to the billiard-room or the smoking-room; or, strutting about with

a forage-cap on the side of an empty pate, and clothed in a shooting-jacket, or other deformity of dress, fancies himself a great character, because he is fast, and belongs to a fast regiment—i.e., a regiment unfit for service, commanded by the adjutant, and having a mess in debt!"‡

It is, of course, exclusively to the sepoy that Sir Charles refers in the following passages, in which he upholds the necessity for discipline and kindly intercourse being maintained by the European officers:—

"They are admirable soldiers, and only give way when badly led by brave but idle officers, who let discipline and drill grow slack, and do not mix with them: being ignorant themselves, they cannot teach the sepoy. * * * I could do anything I like with these natives. Our officers generally do not know how to deal with them. They have not, with some exceptions, the natural turn and soldierlike feelings necessary to deal with them. Well, it matters little to me; India and I will soon be separate: I see the system will not last fifty years. The moment these brave and able natives learn how to combine, they will rush on us simultaneously, and the game will be up. A bad commander-in-chief and a bad governor-general will clench the business. § * * * I am disposed to believe, that we might, with advantage, appoint natives to cadetships, discharge all our Native officers on the pensions of their present rank, and so give the natives common chance of command with ourselves—before they take it!

"Every European boy, aye, even sergeants, now command all Native officers! When the native saw the English ensign live with him and cherish him, and by daily communication was made aware of his superior energy, strength, daring, and mental acquirements, all went smooth. Now things have changed. The young cadet learns nothing: he drinks, he lives exclusively with his own countrymen; the older officers are on the staff, or on civil employ, which they ought not to be; and high-caste—that is to say, mutiny—is encouraged. I have just gotten this army through a very dangerous one; and the Company had better take care what they are at, or some great mischief will yet happen!

"I think that Native ensigns, lieutenants, and captains, aye, and commanders of corps too, will assimilate with our officers, and, in course of time,

* *Life*, vol. iv., p. 206. The ostentatious parade with which the progresses of Indian functionaries, both civil and military, was usually attended, not only aggravated, by contrast, the hardships endured by their inferiors, but inflicted most cruel sufferings on the natives of the countries through which they passed, thousands being pressed for palanquin or dooly (litter) bearers, and for porters of luggage, and paid very poorly, and often very irregularly. "The coolies," says Sir C. Napier, "who are summoned to carry the governor-general's baggage when he moves, are assembled at, or rather driven by force to, Simla from immense distances, and are paid about twopence a-day, under circumstances of great cruelty. Now, I happen to know, that from the delays of offices, and without, perhaps, any tangible act of knavery in any especial officer or individual, some 8,000 or 10,000 coolies employed to take Lord — down into the plains when he left India, were not paid this miserable pittance for three

years!" It is scarcely possible to believe that Englishmen could be either so ungenerous or so short-sighted as wantonly to outrage the feelings of the natives; but, on this point, the testimony of various authorities is corroborated by the special correspondent of the *Times*, whose sympathies naturally lay with his countrymen, and who would not, without strong evidence, venture to bring such a heavy charge against them. Seeing a native badly wounded on a charpoy (movable bed), with a woman sitting beside him in deep affliction, he asked for an explanation, and was told that an officer "had been licking two of his bearers, and had nearly murdered them." Mr. Russell probably did not disguise his disgust on this or other occasions; for he was often told, "Oh, wait till you are another month in India, and you'll think nothing of licking a nigger."—*The Times*, June 17th, 1858.

† *Life and Correspondence*, vol. iv., p. 325.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. iv., pp. 306; 326. § *Ibid.*, pp. 185; 212.

gradually throw caste to the dogs, and be like ourselves in all but colour. I have no belief in the power of caste resisting the Christian faith for any great length of time, because reason is too strong for nonsense in the long run; and I believe if the Indians were made officers, on the same footing as ourselves, they would be perfectly faithful, and in time become Christians: not that I want to convert them; but so it will be.*

So far from any idea being entertained of elevating the Native officers according to the plan propounded by the commander-in-chief, their absolute extinction was discussed in public journals and periodicals; a fact which supplies a very clear reason for general disaffection.

Sir Charles Napier, in the year in which he died (1853), writes to his brother, Sir William:—

"The Edinburgh article you mentioned says, that if the Native officers were gradually gotten rid of, the operation would be safe, though not economical or generous. But however gradually it might be done, 300,000 armed men would at once see that all their hopes of rising to be lieutenants, captains, and majors, and when no longer able to serve, the getting pensions, would, for those ranks, be blasted for ever. The writer would soon find his plan unsafe; it would end all Indian questions at once. There is no sepoy in that great army but expects to retire, in age, with a major's pension, as certainly as every ensign expects to become a major or a colonel in our army. There is but one thing to be done: give the Native officers rank with our own, reducing the number of ours. This may endanger; but it will not do so more than the present system does; and my own opinion is pretty well made up, that our power there is crumbling very fast."†

The above statements have been given at length, not simply because they were formed by the commander-in-chief of the Indian army, but because they are the grounds on which he based his assertion, that the mutiny of the sepoys was "the most formidable danger menacing our Indian empire." Certainly Sir William Napier has done good service in his unreserved exposition of his brother's opinions; and though many individuals of high position and character, may, with justice, complain of the language applied to them, yet the sarcasms

of the testy old general lose half their bitterness when viewed as the ebullitions of an irascible temper, aggravated by extreme and almost constant bodily pain. When he descends to personalities, his own comparison describes him best—"a hedgehog fighting about nothing:" but his criticisms on the discipline of the Indian army, its commissariat, ordnance, and transport departments, bear witness of an extraordinary amount of judgment and shrewdness. If, as "Indophilus" asserts, "Sir Charles Napier had not the gift of foresight beyond other men," it is the more to be regretted that other men, and especially Indian statesmen, should have allowed his assertions to remain on record, neither confirmed nor refuted, until the mutinies of 1857 brought them into general notice.

Sir Charles Napier was not quite alone in his condemnation of the lax discipline of the Bengal army. Viscount Melville, who commanded the Punjab division of the Bombay forces at the time of the mutiny of the two Bengal regiments under Sir Colin Campbell, in 1849, was astonished at the irregularity which he witnessed in the Bengal army. When questioned concerning its condition, on his return to England in 1850, he did not disguise his strong disapprobation; upon which he was told that, however true his opinion might be, it would be imprudent to express it.‡

Sir Colin Campbell kept silence on the same principle; but now says, that if he had uttered his feelings regarding the sepoys ten years ago, he would have been shot.§

Major John Jacob wrote a pamphlet|| in 1854, in which he pointed out various defects in the system; but the home authorities were evidently unwilling to listen to any unpleasant information. The reports of the commander-in-chief who succeeded Sir Charles Napier, and of the governor-general, were both exceedingly favourable; but then the efforts of both Sir William Gomm¶ and of Lord Dalhousie, seem to have been directed exclusively to the furtherance of very necessary measures for the welfare of the European troops. Indeed, in his lordship's own summary of his administration, the condition of the immense mass of the Indian army, amounting to nearly 300,000 men, is

* Letter written May 31st, 1850; published by Lieutenant-general Sir William Napier, in the *Times* of August 17th, 1857.

† *Life and Opinions*, vol. iv., p. 383.

‡ Speech in the House of Lords, July 15th, 1857.
§ *Times*, 15th January, 1858.

|| *Native Troops of the Indian Army*.

¶ *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 537.

dismissed in the following brief, and, if accurate, very satisfactory sentence:—

"The position of the Native soldier in India has long been such as to leave hardly any circumstance of his position in need of improvement."*

This statement is hardly consistent with that made by the chairman of the East India Company (Mr. R. D. Mangles) to the cadets at Addiscombe, in June, 1857. He adverted to the "marked alteration in the tone and bearing of the younger officers of the Indian army, towards the natives of all ranks," as a fact which "all joined in lamenting;" and he added, that if the "estrangement of officers from men, and especially of English from Native officers, was allowed to continue and grow, it was impossible to calculate the fatal consequences that might ensue."†

Here, at least, was one point in which the treatment of the Native soldiery was susceptible of improvement. But there were others in which the peculiar advantages they had once enjoyed had sensibly diminished: their work had increased; their pay, at least in the matter of extra allowances, had decreased. Since, for instance, was just as unhealthy—just as far from the homes of the sepoys; under British as under Native government; yet the premium previously given for foreign service was withdrawn on annexation. So also in the Punjab, and elsewhere.

The orders for distant service came round more rapidly as territory increased. The sepoys became involved in debt by change of station, and the Madras troops could ill afford the travelling expenses of their families, from whom they never willingly separate, and whose presence has probably been a chief cause of their fidelity during the crisis. One regiment, for instance, has had, within the last few years, to build houses and huts at three different stations; and on their late return from Burmah, the men had to pay sixty rupees per cart, to bring their wives and children from Burhampoor to Vellore, a distance of 700 miles. This is said to be a fair average specimen of what is going on everywhere. "The result is, that the men are deeply embarrassed. A sepoy on seven

rupees a-month, who has to pay fifty or sixty rupees for his wife's cart once in every two or three years, is unavoidably plunged in debt. He must borrow at exorbitant interest from the money-lender; and before he can reclaim the past, the 'route' comes for a fresh march to far-distant cantonments, and hurries him into fresh difficulties."‡

The Bengal sepoys do not carry their families with them on a campaign, but leave them in their native villages, visiting them every year. The furloughs granted for this purpose, have been diminished in consequence of the growing necessities of the service; and another infringement of a prerogative, which their separation from their wives and children rendered very valuable, was committed by the withdrawal of their privilege of franking letters to their homes. Several late regulations regarding the payment of pensions, and increasing strictness on the part of the general invaliding committee, are asserted to have been viewed by the sepoys as involving breach of faith on the part of the government. They are said to have felt with the old Scotchwoman, "I ken ye're cheating me, but I dinna ken exactly hoo."§ Any alteration in the rules of the retiring pension-list, was watched by the sepoy with jealous care. The terms which secured to him a fixed monthly stipend in the event of becoming incapacitated for further duty after a service of fifteen years, and which, if he died in battle, or from sickness while on foreign service, made some provision for his family, could not of course be altered, even slightly, without exciting alarm as to what further changes might follow. The Bengal sepoys were largely drawn from Oude; and not from Oude generally, but from certain limited districts. Naturally there existed among them the feeling observable in British soldiers born in the same county, when associated in a regiment on foreign service; and possibly it was clanship, quite as much as caste, which bound them together; but whatever it was, a strong tie of union, and consequent power of combination, existed among them, which rendered them efficient for good or evil. Sir John Malcolm had given a memorable warning regarding them. Neither the Hindoo nor the Mohammedan soldier were, he said, revengeful, but both were prone to acts of extreme violence in points where they deemed their honour slighted. The absence of any fear of death was common to them all. Such an instru-

* Minute, dated 28th February, 1856; p. 41.

† See *Daily News*, July 13th, 1857, p.p. 26, 27.

‡ Norton's *Rebellion in India*.

§ Letter signed "Caubules."—*Daily News*, July 17th, 1857.

ment as an army constituted of men like these afforded, had need be managed with care and wisdom, or our strength would become our danger. The minds of the sepoys were alive to every impulse, and would all vibrate to the same touch. Kindness, liberality, and justice would preserve their attachment: besides this, Malcolm adds, "we must attend to the most trifling of their prejudices, and avoid rash innovations; but, above all, those that are calculated to convey to their minds the most distant alarm in points connected with their usages or religion."* This policy found little favour among the Europeans in 1856.

The exclusive payment of the troops in such an inconveniently heavy coin as the silver rupee (two-shilling) piece, obliges them to resort frequently to money-changers; and thus to lose a per-centage on their small stipend. Unfortunately, the governor-general, whose practical ability might have been so beneficially exercised in this and other matters, appears to have listened to only one set of statements regarding the Native army, and to have acted upon the principle that the sepoy had been "overpetted," and required sterner discipline.

General Anson, who succeeded Sir William Gomm in command of the army, took the same view of the case, only a more exaggerated one. When the cartridge agitation first commenced, he set at nought the feelings of the sepoys, by declaring that "he would never give in to their beastly prejudices." This speech sufficiently reveals the character of the commander-in-chief to whom it could be even attributed with any show of probability; and it certainly deserves a place among the immediate causes of the mutiny.† The European officers appear to have too generally adopted the same tone, especially as regarded the Bengalees; and it was commonly said, that whereas the leading feeling with the Bombay and Madras sepoys was the honour of their regiment, that of the Bengal sepoy was the pride of caste. But, in fact, all the Hindoos, except the outcastes, maintain more or less strongly, certain religious prejudices which interfere with their efficiency as soldiers; especially their invariable dislike to sea voyages, and to passing certain recognised boundaries.

* Malcolm on the Government of India, p. 219.

† Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 37.

‡ Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. ii., p. 95.

The Afghan war was very unpopular for this reason; and the calamities and sore discomfiture endured there, deepened the unfavourable impression which it made upon the whole Native army, and generally upon the people of India. An insurrection in the Saugor and Nerbudda districts broke out in 1842. The wild barons of the hills and jungles swept down over the valleys and cultivated plains; yet the pillaged inhabitants yielded little support to the officers of the government, and would furnish no information with regard to the movements of the insurrectionists. Colonel Sleeman was sent by Lord Ellenborough to inquire into the cause of this inconsistency. He assembled a party of about fifty of the lowlanders in his tent; and there, seated on the carpet, each man freely spoke his mind. Umrao Sing, a sturdy, honest farmer, spoke of the conduct of the chiefs as quite natural. The sudden withdrawal of the troops for objects of distant conquest, and the tidings of disaster and defeat, awakened their hopes of regaining their former position, for they thought the British raj at an end. Colonel Sleeman said, that the farmers and cultivators of the disturbed districts, having been more favoured, in regard to life and property, than in any other part of India, ought to have been staunch to their protectors: "but," he added, "there are some men who never can be satisfied; give them what you will, they will always be craving after more." "True, sir," replied Umrao Sing, with the utmost gravity, "there are some people who can never be satisfied, give them what you will; give them the whole of Hindoostan, and they will go off to Cabool to take more."‡

Hedayut Ali, a subahdar of the Bengal Seik battalion, a man of excellent character, whose father and grandfather had occupied the highest positions attainable to natives in the British service, has furnished some important evidence on the causes of disaffection among the sepoys. He lays much stress on the sufferings endured by the sepoys in Afghanistan in 1838-'9, and the violations of caste which they were compelled to commit by the extreme cold, especially in the matter of eating without first bathing, and of wearing sheepskin jackets; whereas no Hindoo, except of the lowest caste, likes to touch the skin of a dead animal.

The annexation of Oude is cited by this witness as having, in addition to other real

or imaginary grievances, caused universal disaffection throughout the army, which from that time determined upon mutinying. The grounds upon which this opinion is based, are very clearly stated. On the 14th of March, 1856, the King of Oude reached Cawnpoor, on his way to Calcutta. Hedayut Ali reached that city on the same day. He remained there six days, and had frequent interviews with the king's vakeels, courtiers, and servants; as did also the principal people of Cawnpoor, and many of the Native officers and sepoy of the regiments stationed there; all of whom were indignant at the king's dispossession. The vakeel of Nana Sahib was among the visitors, and took pains to increase the excitement, by saying how displeased and grieved his master was by the conduct of the English. Shortly after, Hedayut Ali proceeded to join his corps at Lahore, and marched thence to Bengal. On the way, he learnt that the Native infantry at Barrackpoor were showing symptoms of mutiny; and this, with other intelligence, he, from time to time, communicated to his commanding officer.

The King of Oude again visited Cawnpoor in December, 1856, and stayed about a fortnight; during which time much mischief is said to have been concocted. Meanwhile the commander-in-chief and the governor-general were initiating measures very displeasing to various classes of natives. The Madras sepoy had shown, at Vellore, how dangerous it was to interfere with the marks on their foreheads, or the fashion of their turbans. The Sikhs and Mohammedans are scarcely less susceptible on the subject of their beards and moustachios. Consequently, in the extensive enlistments of these races, carried on after the annexation of the Punjab, a pledge was given that no interference should be attempted in the matter of hair-dressing. General Anson, however, issued an order, directing the Mohammedans to cut their beards after a prescribed fashion. They refused, pleading the condition of their enlistment. The general insisted on their obeying the order, or quitting the service; and many of them, sooner than suffer what, in their view, was a disgrace, took their discharge, and went to their homes. Sir Charles Napier understood the native character far too well to have so needlessly played the martinet, independently of the sympathy which he would naturally have felt for the recusants, by reason of having himself "a beard like a

Cashmere goat." The discharged sepoy "bitterly complained of the commanding officers having broken faith with them; and several of them, who afterwards re-enlisted in the same regiment as Hedayut Ali, frequently spoke of the manner in which they had been deprived of the benefit of several years' service. But the crowning act of innovation enacted by Lord Canning and General Anson, was the general service order of 1856, by which all recruits were to be compelled to swear that they would go, by sea or land, wherever their services were required. The refusal of the 38th Bengal infantry to march to Burmah, was severely punished by Lord Dalhousie's sending the regiment by land to Dacca, where the cantonments were very bad, and the loss of life among the troops extremely heavy."* He did not, however, attempt to strike such a blow as that now aimed at caste; for the unqualified aversion to the sea entertained by the Bengal sepoy, would, it was well known, prevent many from bringing up their children to a profession which they had learned to look upon as an hereditary means of obtaining an honourable maintenance. They feared also for themselves. Hedayut Ali says—"When the old sepoy heard of this order, they were much frightened and displeased. 'Up to this day, those men who went to Afghanistan have not been readmitted to their caste; how are we to know where the English may force us to go? They will be ordering us next to go to London.' Any new order is looked upon with much suspicion by the Native army, and is much canvassed in every regiment."

This latter remark is unquestionably a just one; the intercourse maintained throughout the Bengal army, and the rapid and correct transmission of intelligence, having been one of the most marked features of the mutinies. The following observations are also painfully correct:—

"Of late years the sepoy have not confided in their officers. * * * A native of Hindoostan seldom opens his mind to his officer; he only says what he thinks would please his officer. The sepoy reserve their real opinion until they return to their lines and to their comrades. * * * The government must be aware, that when a soldier has once or twice shown a disposition to mutiny, he is useless as a soldier: one mutinous sepoy infects a whole company; and gradually, one man after another, from fear or sympathy, joins the mutineers.

"Many commanding officers, to my knowledge, reported that regiments were all right, when they

* Norton's *Rebellion in India*, p. 21.

knew that there were discontent and bad feeling in the ranks; and, to my belief, for the sake of the name of their respective regiments, concealed the real state of their regiments, until at length the sepoys took to murdering their officers. * * *

Another reason (and, in my opinion, a very serious one) why the army became mutinous and disaffected is this. Promotion all went by seniority, and not, as it ought, according to merit and proficiency. All the old men, from length of service worth nothing as commissioned or non-commissioned officers, received promotion; while younger men, in every way fit, languished in their lines: saying, 'What use is there in us exerting ourselves; we cannot get promotion until our turn comes, and that time can't come until our heads are gray and our mouths toothless.' For this reason, the sepoys for the most part drew their pay, and were careless with regard to their duty. The higher ranks of the Native army, from old age alone, were quite incapacitated from doing their duty, even had they the will to do it. I state confidently, that the generality of Native officers were an encumbrance to the state: instead of commanding sepoys, the sepoys commanded them; and instead of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks preventing the men from mutinying, they rather persuaded them to do so.*

The above opinion of a Native officer on the effect of the Bengal military system upon his countrymen, reads like the echo of that of Indophilus, regarding its operation on the Europeans. The arguments urged in the two cases are so nearly identical, that it may well be asked whether justice and common sense do not prompt to the same course of general legislation.

"Under a pure seniority system, an officer's promotion goes on precisely in the same manner whether he exerts himself or takes his ease; and as few love exertion for its own sake, the majority take their ease. Under a system of selection according to qualification and service, promotion is dependent upon exertion, and the majority consequently exert themselves. Those only who know the Bengal army can form some estimate of the amount of idleness and bad habit engendered by the seniority system co-operating with the enervating influences of the climate, which would be converted into active interest in professional duty, by the substitution of a well-considered system of promotion according to qualification and good service."†

Lord Melville‡ had also urged, so far as he was allowed to do, the evils of the seniority system. Other authorities, more or less directly, assert, that it was the defective character, rather than the insufficient number, of the officers left to do regimental duty as "the refuse of the army," which weakened their

* Translated by Captain T. Rattray, from the original Oodoo; and published in the *Times*, April 1st, 1858.

† *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 18.

‡ The directors are said to defend themselves for neglecting Lord Melville's representations, on the ground that his "evidence was contradicted most

hold on their men. Brigadier-general Jacob remarks, that "qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of the native Indian soldiers;" and his opinion is corroborated by the fact, that the irregular and local force, which was officered entirely by a few but picked men, was—allowing for discrepancies of pay and dates of enlistment—generally held to be in an equally, if not more, efficient condition than the regular regiments.

A well-informed, but not unprejudiced witness says, that the conduct of irregular regiments, which possess only three European officers, has always contrasted so favourably with that of line regiments, with their fourteen or fifteen, that the natural conclusion one would arrive at is, that the latter are over-officered. He also deprecates the seniority system, by which a sepoy who may enter the service at the age of sixteen, cannot count on finding himself a naik (corporal) before he attains the age of thirty-six; a havildar (sergeant) before forty-five; a jemadar (lieutenant) before fifty-four; or a subahdar (captain) before sixty; while, "after fifty, most natives are utterly useless."§

The full complement of European officers to each regular regiment is twenty-six; but of these half are generally absent, either on service or on furlough. The commander is usually a lieutenant-colonel; then there is an adjutant, to superintend the drill; a quartermaster, whose duty it is to look after the clothing of the men; and, lastly, an interpreter. The necessity for this last functionary lies at the root of our late sudden calamity; for the officers, if they had been able and willing to hold close intercourse with their men, and explain to them the reasons for the various unpopular orders recently issued, would, if they could not remove disaffection, at least have become acquainted with its existence. An infantry regiment on the Bengal establishment comprises ten companies, each containing a hundred privates, two native commissioned, and twelve non-commissioned officers.

The great increase of the irregular regiments has been in itself a source of jealousy and heartburning to the regular troops, who strongly, in every particular, by that of Sir Patrick Grant, who assured us, that the Bengal army (of which he had been long adjutant-general) was all that it should be.—Letter, signed "H. C."—*Daily News*, July 25th, 1857.

§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army* by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; pp. 1; 7.

expected that their numbers would be largely augmented on the recent annexations, and that extensive promotions would take place. This expectation was wholly disappointed. The enormous expenses of the army rendered the comparative cheapness of irregular troops an irresistible advantage. According to the Army List for 1857, the irregular and local force of Bengal numbered forty-two infantry, and twenty-seven cavalry regiments; and the so-called contingents of Native States, comprised sixteen of cavalry and nineteen of infantry: in all, ninety-four regiments; the whole officered by picked men from the twenty-four regiments of the regular army. The relative numbers of the three armies need not be given here, as their proportions and distribution are immediately connected with the history about to be entered on. The question of the greased cartridges has been already noticed under the head of "Caste;" and will frequently recur in the ensuing narrative.

A Mohammedan Conspiracy, widely ramified and deeply rooted, is urged by some authorities as in itself the great motive power of the late political convulsion; others, on the contrary, deny its existence, on the ground of no sufficient evidence having been adduced thereof.

Dr. Alexander Duff, the eloquent Presbyterian preacher of Calcutta, writing in August, 1857, says—"It is a long-concocted Mohammedan conspiracy now come to a head. The main object is the destruction of British power, and the reascendancy of Mohammedan. Even the cartridge affair was only a casual incident, of which the conspirators adroitly took advantage."*

In his published *Letters on the Indian Rebellion*, the Doctor throughout insists on Mussulman intrigues as being continually developed and exposed; but he wrote in a season of excitement, when rumours abounded of dangers and atrocities, many of which have happily proved unfounded, but which naturally served to confirm his preconceived opinion. The truth is terrible enough; and for the sake of our national honour, for the sake of human nature, and, above all, for the sake of truth itself, we

should strive to strip this fearful episode of the obscurity in which conflicting exaggerations have wrapped its origin and progress. Beyond question, the Mohammedan princes of India have strong reason for combining to restore the green flag of Islam to its former supremacy in Hindoostan. If an opportunity offered, it is at least highly probable that the orthodox Sonnites of Delhi, and the heterodox Sheiahs of Oude, would be content to forget for a time the rival claims of Caliphs and Imaums to apostolic succession, and make common cause against the power which treats both with indifference.

The whole Mussulman body would of necessity be drawn closer together by the danger which threatened all alike. They had still something to lose; that is, something to fight for. Submission had not succeeded in preserving the independence of Oude; and even Hyderabad, much more the titular principality of Delhi, seemed tottering to a close. Still the Mohammedans were as a handful amid a heap; and the chief point to solve was, whether the recent innovations had sufficiently disgusted the leading Hindoos to render them willing to forget past usurpations, and join with their former subjugators in attempting the overthrow of the British raj.

Tippoo Sultan had made an effort of the kind, but without success; and it now appears, by his own proclamation, that Prince Mirza Feroze Shah, on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca, "persuaded many at Delhi to raise a religious war;" being incited thereto by observing that "the English were in a bad and precarious state."†

Great anxiety had been felt at Delhi, throughout the period of Lord Dalhousie's administration, regarding the manner in which his annexation policy would be brought to bear upon the family who, fallen as they were, still represented, in the minds of the Indian people, the mighty Mogul emperors of old, and whose restoration to power had been prayed for daily in the mosques throughout India for nearly a hundred years.‡

In 1849, the heir-apparent died, and the Indian government recommended the Court of Directors to "terminate the dynasty of Timour whenever the reigning king should die." The court consented; but so reluctantly, that the governor-general did not care to avail himself of their permission, and therefore recognised the grandson of

* Speech of the Hon. A. Kinnaid, 11th June, 1857: second edition; p. 35.

† Proclamation issued by Prince Mirza Mohammed Feroze Shah, 17th February, 1858.

‡ See *Times*, September 1st, 1857.

the king as heir-apparent; "but only on condition that he should quit the palace in Delhi, in order to reside in the palace at the Kootub; and that he should, as king, receive the governor-general of India, at all times, on terms of perfect equality."

These conditions show that something of external pomp and circumstance still lingered around Delhi, of which the representatives of the East India Company were anxious to be rid, and the royal family as anxious to retain. True, the power had long vanished; but even the tarnished pageantry was clung to, naturally enough, by those who had no other birthright, and no prospect of being able to win their way to wealth and honour as warriors; the profession of arms being the only one in which a Mohammedan prince of the blood could engage without forfeiting caste. The sultaneen (plural for sultan)—as the various branches of the family are termed—are probably a very idle and dissolute race. It is in the nature of things that they should have become so. Certainly we never did anything to hinder their debasement; and have, while acting as their political and pecuniary trustees, been lamentably indifferent to their moral and physical welfare. We never evinced the slightest interest in them; and have no right to wonder at their degradation.

With the downfall of the dynasty we had no concern. In dealing generously with Shah Alum, we acted with sound policy. All India respected us for it. Even in Leadenhall-street, sufficient memory of the bygone feelings and events lingered in 1849, to make the application of the new absorption laws seem peculiarly harsh in the case of Delhi. The scruples of the Court of Directors induced Lord Dalhousie to draw back his hand, at least as far as the titular sovereignty was concerned; but his proposal for its extinction having been once mooted, and even sanctioned, it may be considered that the sentence was rather deferred than reversed. This, at least, was the public opinion. It is a singular fact, that the same accounts from India, which have been already quoted as describing the unbroken tranquillity of the entire peninsula at the close of 1856, state that the palace of Delhi was "in a ferment," owing to the recent death of the heir-apparent from cholera, and the renewed discussion regarding the succession. "We have (it is added) no treaty, agreement, or

stipulation with Delhi. The king's privileges and pension were all granted as of free grace; and the former will probably be withdrawn. The palace is a sink of iniquity; and the family, on the death of its present head, will probably be compelled to move."*

The same paper contains the announcement that the anticipated declaration of war against Persia had appeared in a proclamation published at Calcutta on the 1st of November, 1856. The *casus belli* was the breach of the treaty of 1853, by which the Persian government promised to abstain from all interference with Herat; the independence of that city, under its brave chief, Esa Khan, being deemed essential to the security of the British frontier. On the pretence that Dost Mohammed had been instigated to seize Candahar and advance upon Herat, a Persian army crossed into the Herat territory (which was declared to be Persian soil), and laid siege to the city. Under instructions from the home government, a force was assembled at Bombay for service in the Persian Gulf. The *Times*' correspondent describes the departure of the force, in three divisions, as taking place in the middle of November. The first, consisting of H.M.'s 64th regiment and the 20th Native infantry, embarked from Vingorla in two steamers, each with its transport in tow. The second, comprising a European regiment, the 2nd Belooch cavalry, and two squadrons of the 3rd cavalry, sailed from Poorbunder and Kurrachee. The third embarked from Kurrachee a few days later, and consisted of the 4th Rifles (a very strong and well-appointed regiment), two troops of the Poona horse, a field battery, a troop of horse artillery, a third-class siege-train, and two companies of sappers and miners. The rendezvous was fixed at Bunder Abbas, a place near the entrance of the gulf, in the occupation of our Arab ally, the Imaum of Muscat.†


At the time the above facts were recorded, no idea appears to have been entertained of any connection existing between the Persian war and the ferment in the palace of Delhi. The declaration of war had been long expected; and, according to the *Times*' correspondent, created little excitement at Bombay. The Persians, who are numerous there, as also in other large Indian cities, relied on the promise of protection given them, and remained quiescent. "Even

* Calcutta correspondent, November 8th, 1856.—*Times*, December 9th, 1856.

† Bombay correspondent, November 17th, 1856.—*Times*, December 9th, 1856.

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the Mussulman population, who sympathise with Persia," he adds, "sympathise still more with Afghanistan;* and the fact that we are fighting with, and not against, Dost Mohammed, is thoroughly understood. The European public accepts the war with a feeling of quiet resignation. The idea that it is our destiny to advance—that we cannot help ourselves, has obtained a control over the public mind; and every war breaks the monotony of Indian life, which is the curse of India, as of all aristocratic life."

It seems probable that the Persian war materially, though indirectly, contributed to break up the aristocratic monotony of high-caste European life, by denuding India of her most reliable troops. The number sent, of men of all arms, to the Persian Gulf, in November, 1856, amounted to 5,820, of whom 2,270 were Europeans. In the following February a still larger force was dispatched, under Brigadier-general Havelock, consisting of 5,340 men, of whom about 1,770 were Europeans; and 800 cavalry were subsequently dispatched at an enormous cost. Thus the "army of Persia" deprived India of about 12,000 men, of whom one-third were Europeans. Lord Canning considered this force quite sufficient for any operations which Major-general Outram could undertake before the hot season; but, he adds, "it is certain that very large reinforcements will be needed before a second campaign, commencing with the autumn of 1857, can be entered upon."

Man proposes—God disposes. Long before the autumn set in, an Indian campaign had commenced, which, whether the Persians had or had not withdrawn their claims on Herat, must have equally relieved the governor-general from the task of providing a third armament for the Persian Gulf, "to include not less than six European regiments of infantry and one of cavalry." The Persians were overcome, and the independence of Herat was secured, at a cost to Britain of about £500,000 in money.† Meanwhile, intimations of Persian intrigues were given to the authorities by various persons, but set at nought as idle

* This assertion may be reasonably questioned, since the Sheiahs of Oude looked up to the Shah of Persia as the head of their sect. Mr. Ludlow says that the Persian war caused great excitement in Northern India, where many of the Moslems were of the Sheiah sect; and he adds, that one of his relatives had himself, within the last two or three years, read placards on the walls of Delhi, calling true

rumours. The trial of the King of Delhi furnishes evidence that inducements to revolt were held forth by the Shah of Persia, who promised money and troops. His proclamation to that effect was posted over the mosque gate, and was taken down by order of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who, moreover, was informed by John Everett, a Christian risaldar very popular with the natives, that he had been warned to fly, as the Persians were coming, and the Mussulmans were greatly excited. Sir T. Metcalfe thought the information of no importance.‡ A statement of a Mohammedan plot was laid before Mr. Colvin; but he also suffered the warning to pass unheeded, and did not even report it to government.

At this very time Delhi was absolutely devoid of European troops, yet strongly fortified, and stored with the munitions of war. Its palace-fort was still tenanted by the representative of the *rois faibles* of the East, whose persons had formerly been fought for by opposing factions as a tower of strength; their compulsory signature being used notoriously to legitimatise usurpation, and influence the populace.

Extreme insalubrity is given by Lord Ellenborough as the reason why no European regiment had ever yet been stationed there, sickness prevailing to such an extent, that, after the rains, two-thirds of the strength even of the Native troops were in hospital.§ Sanitary measures would probably have prevented, or greatly mitigated this evil (as at Seringapatam); nor does it appear that any cause but neglect existed to render Delhi less habitable than of old.

Sir Charles Napier's prediction was one which any chance traveller might have reasonably made; and there is, therefore, the less excuse for the absence of obviously necessary precautions. "Men," he said, "of all parts of Asia meet in Delhi; and, some day or other, much mischief will be hatched within those city walls, and no European troops at hand."|| He knew also, and officially urged upon the governor-general, "that the powder-magazine was defended only by a guard of fifty natives, and the gates so weak that a mob could push them

believers to the holy war in the name of the Shah of Persia.—*Lectures on British India*, vol. ii., p. 219.

† Speech of Lord Claude Hamilton: Indian debate, July 20th, 1857.

‡ Calcutta correspondent.—*Times*, March 29, 1858.

§ Indian debate, July 13th, 1857.

|| Letter to a lieutenant-colonel in the Bengal artillery: published in the *Times*, 20th August, 1857.

in; whereas the place ought to be garrisoned by 12,000 picked men.”*

The absence of a European garrison in Delhi is the most unpardonable of our blunders; and—what does not always follow—it is the one for which we have most dearly paid, not in money only, but in the life-blood of our best and bravest soldiers. One cannot think of Nicholson and his gallant companions without bitterly denouncing the neglect which suffered Delhi to fall defenceless at the feet of a few rebels, put at once a sword and shield into their hands, and gave them the ancient Mussulman metropolis of India as a nucleus for every aggrieved chief, every disaffected soldier, every reckless adventurer, escaped convict, pindarree, thug, dacoit, to rally round, for the destruction of the British raj—at least for a long carnival of war and loot. The very heroism of the troops who regained Delhi embitters the recollection of the neglect by which it was lost. *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori!* as one of them (Captain Battye) said when mortally wounded; but, to their country, their very devotion only renders it more painful that the necessity for such sacrifices should have been so culpably occasioned. This is, however, anticipating events, the progress of which will best evidence how far Persian intrigues may have been connected with the mutiny. At present, many assertions are made, the truth of which yet remains in dispute. It would seem, however, that the efforts of the King of Persia had been chiefly directed to Delhi; and that if communications were entered into with leading Mohammedans in other parts of India, these had not had time to ripen; and, consequently, when the mutinies broke forth, heralded by incendiary fires in every British camp, the conspirators must have been

taken by surprise almost as much as the Europeans themselves.†

Shett Nowmull, “a native merchant of Kurrachee, for many years favourably known to government on account of his great intelligence, his extensive influence and connexions throughout the countries on our western frontier, and his true attachment to the British government,” communicated, to Mr. Freere, commissioner of Sind, in June, 1857, his reasons for believing that “Persian influence was at the bottom of the mutiny.” He declared that cossids (messengers), under different disguises, with letters secreted in the soles of their shoes or otherwise, had, for the last two years, been regularly passing between Delhi and the Persian court, *via* Candahar; that a great spread of the Sheiah tenets of Islamism had been observable during the same period; and also that a very perceptible decrease had taken place in the rancour usually existing between the Sheiahs and Sonnites. The new cartridges had been used “through the same influence,” to excite the feelings of the Hindoo portion of the army, and lead them to mutiny. Dost Mohammed, he said, thought more of Persia than of England, for a very pertinent reason—“Persia is on the Dost’s head; Peshawur is under his feet:”‡ in other words, a man placed between two fires, would especially dread the more immediate one.

Prophecies of various kinds were current—always are current, in India; but when the mutiny broke out, more heed was given to them by the natives; and the Europeans also lent an ear, knowing that a pretended prophecy might disguise an actual plot, and, in more ways than one, work out its own fulfilment. The alleged prediction which limited the duration of the British raj to a hundred years, was repeated far and wide;§

* *Memoir on the Defence of India*; addressed by Sir C. Napier to Lord Dalhousie. See Indian debate of 23rd July, 1857.

† In the captured tent of the Shahzada commander, after the rout of the Persians at Mohumrah, there was found a royal proclamation addressed “to all the people of Heran;” but which also called on “the Afghan tribes, and the inhabitants of that country who are co-religionists of the Persians, and who possess the same Koran and Kebla, and laws of the prophet, to take part in the *Jahād*.” It expressly invited the followers of Islam in India and Sind to unite and wreak vengeance on the British for all the injuries which the holy faith had suffered from them, and not to withhold any sacrifice in the holy cause. “The old and the young, the small and the great, the wise and the ignorant, the ryot and the sepoy,

all without exception,” are summoned by the Shah-in-Shah to arise in defence of the orthodox faith of the prophet; and having girt up the waist of valour, adorn their persons with arms and weapons; and let the Ulema and preachers call on the people in the mosques and public assemblies, and in the pulpits, to join in a *Jahād*, in the cause of God; and thus shall the Ghazis in the cause of faith have a just title to the promises contained in the words of the prophet, “Verily we are of those who fought in the cause of God.”—Blackwood’s *Edinburgh Magazine* for 1857: article entitled “The Poorbeah Mutiny.”

‡ Letter from H. B. Freere, commissioner of Sind, to Lord Elphinstone, governor of Bombay, 11th June, 1857.—Parl. Papers (253), 4th May, 1858; p. 48.

§ Dr. A. Duff’s *Letters*: London, 1858; p. 26.

and the Europeans in Calcutta and many of the leading cities, watched the approach of the centenary of Plassy with a feverish anxiety bordering on panic.

But prophecies such as these, are usually the consequence or the sign, rather than the cause, of popular tumults. In health we can smile at language which, in sickness, excites a fevered imagination to frenzy. For years the natives had been allowed to speculate on the future destiny, and comment on the present policy, of their rulers, without any restraint whatever; now, every third word seemed treason. Such of the English functionaries as understood Indian languages, began to examine the literature of the day; and were exceedingly puzzled to decide what was, and what was not, written with a sinister intent.

A Persian paper, for instance, was brought to Mr. Freere about the commencement of hostilities, which described the signs preceding the day of judgment, in language strikingly applicable to existing circumstances, and calculated to unsettle and excite men's minds, and prepare them for some sudden disturbance; but it read so like a free translation of a sermon by a popular English preacher on the same subject, as to render it difficult to decide how to act with regard to it.*

The struggle which has taken place between the Christians and the Mussulmans, in various distinct parts of Europe as well as Asia, and which has been contemporaneous with the Indian mutiny, is viewed as indicating a desire on the part of the present representatives of Islam to regain something of their former dominancy. The Indo-Mohammedans are, however, very unlike their co-religionists in other countries, and the anti-idolatrous doctrines of their founder have been so corrupted by intermixture of the superstitious practices of modern Brahminism, that it is not possible to judge their feelings by any test applicable to Mohammedans in general.

The English naturally viewed, with great alarm, the fanatical outbreaks at Jaffa, Marash, and Belgrade, and still more so the alarming one at Jeddah; but the government have wisely striven to repress the suspicious distrust and aversion manifested by the Europeans to the Mohammedans as a class, fearing to see them driven to revolt by conduct equally unjust and impolitic.†

This possible source of mutiny has been as yet but very partially explored, and the present heat of prejudice and excitement must be allowed to subside before any satisfactory conclusion can be formed on the subject.

Foreign intrigues are alleged to have been practised against us, and attempts made to undermine our position in India, in various ways, by a Christian as well as by a Mohammedan power; by Russia as well as Persia. It is difficult to say how far the vague expectation of Russian invasion (which certainly exists in India) has been occasioned by exaggerated rumours, and perverted reports gleaned from European journals, and circulated by the native press during the period of the Crimean war, or how much of it may be attributed to the deliberate machinations of Russia.

In England, both sources of danger were equally disregarded; and, amid the miserable inconsistencies which marked the war from beginning to end, not the least was the fact, that one of the arguments used to reconcile the people to heavy additional taxation, was the necessity of maintaining and restoring effete and incapable Mohammedan Turkey, as a means of checking the inordinate increase of the power of Russia, and making the battle-field in the Crimea, rather than on the frontier of our Indian empire. The Russian government intimated, that to roll back their European boundary would but lead them to advance their Asiatic one; and some years before the campaign of 1853, their organ at St. Petersburg declared that, in the event of war, the czar would dictate the terms of peace at Calcutta. In the teeth of this defiant warning, the British ministry, accustomed to treat India as a sort of peculiarly circumstanced colony, and to neglect colonies as a matter of course, paid no heed whatever to the strange excitement manifested throughout India at the first tidings of the Crimean conflict. No pains were taken to ascertain the tone adopted by the natives, or to guard against rumours circulated and schemes set afoot by foreign emissaries, in a country where a passport system would have been a common measure of prudence. Ministers concentrated all their energies on the conduct of the European struggle (though not with any very satisfactory result), and acted as if on the understanding that, "during the Russian war, the

* Letter from H. B. B. Freere.—Parl. Papers (253), 4th May, 1858; p. 48.

† See letter of Lord Hobart.—*Times*, December 3rd, 1857.

government had too much to do, to be expected to attend to India.”*

The ill effects which the tidings of the Russian and Persian wars were calculated to produce in India, were aggravated by the drain of European troops thereby occasioned. The government demand for two regiments of infantry for the Crimean war, was earnestly deprecated by Lord Dalhousie.

“Although the war with Russia,” observes his lordship, “does not directly affect our Indian dominions, yet it is unquestionably exercising at this moment a most material influence upon the minds of the people over whom we rule, and upon the feelings of the nations by which we are surrounded; and thus it is tending indirectly to affect the strength and the stability of our power.

“The authorities in England cannot, I think, be aware of the exaggerated estimate of the power of Russia which has been formed by the people of India. I was myself unaware of it until the events of the past year have forced it upon my convictions. Letters from various parts of India have shown me, that the present contest is regarded by them with the deepest interest, and that its issue is by no means considered so certain as we might desire. However mortifying to our pride it may be to know it, and however unaccountable such a belief may appear in people living amidst the visible evidences of our might, it is an unquestionable fact, that it is widely believed in India, that Russia is pressing us hard, and that she will be more than a match for us at last.

“We know by our correspondence in the East, that the King of Ava has declaredly been acting on this feeling; and that, influenced by it, he has been delaying the dispatch of the mission which many months ago he spoke of sending to Calcutta. * * *

“India is now in perfect tranquillity from end to end. I entertain no apprehension whatever of danger or disturbance. We are perfectly secure so long as we are strong, and are believed to be so: but if European troops shall be now withdrawn from India to Europe; if countenance shall thus be given to the belief already prevalent, that we have grappled with an antagonist whose strength will prove equal to overpower us; if, by consenting to withdrawal, we shall weaken that essential element of our military strength, which has already been declared to be no more than adequate for ordinary times; and if, further, we should be called upon to dispatch an army to the Persian Gulf—an event which, unlooked-for now, may any day be brought about by the thralldom in which Persia is held, and by the feeble and fickle character of the Shah; then, indeed, I shall no longer feel, and can no longer express the same confidence as before, that the security and stability of our position in the East will remain unassailed. * * * In a country where the entire English community is but a handful of scattered strangers, I feel it to be a public duty to record, that in my deliberate judgment, the European infantry force in India, ought in no case to be weakened by a single man, so long as Eng-

land shall be engaged in her present struggle with Russia.”†

The regiments were nevertheless withdrawn, and were not even returned at the close of the Russian war. Then came the Persian war, and the requisition upon Lord Canning, who complied less reluctantly than Lord Dalhousie had done; but still under protest. Lord Canning reminded the home authorities, that, for all Indian purposes, the strength of the army would be equally reduced, whether the regiments were sent to Persia or to the Crimea. He spoke of the excitement which even a distant war raised in the minds of the natives, and insisted on the necessity of an increase of European troops, as necessary to the safety of India during the continuance of hostile operations against Persia.‡

It is at least possible that the Russian government should have retaliated on us our invasion of its territory, by striving to sow discord in India. The course of the rebellion has afforded many incidents calculated to produce a conviction of their having done so: for instance, the assertion of one of the Delhi princes, that when the mutineers marched on that city, the royal family believed them to be the advanced guard of the Russian army. Another far more significant fact, which was communicated to me on the authority of a naval officer in a high position on the Indus, was the extraordinary amount of silver roubles seen in the bazaars in the North-West Provinces, immediately before the mutiny, and supposed to have passed to the tables of the money-changers from the notoriously well-filled pockets of Russian spies. The extent and mode in which this agency may have been employed, will probably never be revealed; but it can hardly be doubted that it is an active and recognised mode of obtaining the accurate and comprehensive information possessed by the government of St. Petersburg, regarding the condition of the domestic and foreign affairs of every other nation. Spies, in time of peace, may easily become political incendiaries in time of war, in countries hostile to the authority which they serve. As to detecting them, that is next to impossible: a charge of this nature is always difficult to prove; but, to an Englishman, the difficulty is insur-

* Speeches of Mr. Disraeli and Mr. Vernon Smith, president of the India Board.—Indian debate, July 26th, 1857.

† Minute by the governor-general: 13th Septem-

ber, 1854.—Parl Papers, 12th February, 1858; pp. 7; 9.

‡ Minutes dated 7th and 8th February, 1857.—Parl. Papers, 20th July, 1857; pp. 8, 9.

mountable. Clever thieves, clever forgers, England has produced in abundance: unscrupulous politicians are not quite unknown among us; but our secret service department has, on the whole, been singularly free from subterranean and systematised "dirty work." The secret opening of a letter is scouted at, in a political functionary, as listening at a keyhole would be in a private individual; and, even while quite uncertain as to the extent of the mutiny in 1849, Sir Charles Napier would not entertain the idea of examining the correspondence of the sepoys, then passing to an unusual extent through the government post-offices. The Russian language has probably many words which, like the French one *fin, finesse*, and others, have no equivalent in English; nor has America—sharp, shrewd, and slick as some of her children are—annexed to the mother-tongue any words which serve as fit exponents for that peculiar branch of continental diplomacy which renders trained spies a regular governmental department. We have no political detectives among us. Our aristocracy, whether of rank or letters, may indeed be occasionally annoyed by the indiscretion of caterers for the public press, in the shape of newspaper reporters and gossiping memoir writers; but, at our tables, the host speaks his mind in the plainest terms regarding the most powerful personages of the moment, without fearing that one of his servants may be taking notes behind his chair, which may procure his exile or imprisonment; and the hostess is equally certain that none of her guests will drive from her roof to lodge information of some enthusiastic ebullition which has escaped her lips, and for which neither youth nor beauty, character nor station, would save her from personal chastisement under the orders of a Russian Usher of the Black Rod. What we call grumbling in Great Britain, folks abroad call treason; and that is an offence for which Britons have so little temptation, that they are slow to note its existence, or provide against it even when themselves exercising those despotic powers which, if men dare not openly oppose, they secretly strive against. To what extent Russian emissaries have fomented Indian disaffection, will probably never be proved: the natives can, perhaps, give information on the subject, if they will; and if that evidence be obtained, and thoroughly sifted, by men possessing intimate acquaintance with the

Indian languages and character, united to sound judgment, some light may yet be thrown on a subject every branch of which is most interesting as regards the past, most important as regards the future.

No Englishman, except under very peculiar circumstances, would ever detect spies amid a multitude of foreigners. I speak strongly on this point, because, in China, several Russians were pointed out to me by the experienced Dr. Gutzlaff; dressed in the costume of the country, speaking the language, adopting the habits of the people, and appearing, to the casual observer, to all intents native born.

It is notorious that a Captain Vikovitch played a conspicuous part in inciting the unjust and disastrous expedition to Afghanistan against Dost Mohammed. This and many other instances, leave little doubt that Russia maintains, in Central Asia, agents to watch and, if possible, influence the proceedings of England, and probably receives from some of the Greek or Armenian merchants settled at Calcutta or Bombay, accounts about the state finances, the army, and affairs in general; but, besides this, disclosures are said to have been made which prove that Russian emissaries, under various guises, have been successfully at work in inflaming the bigotry of the Mussulman, and the prejudices of the high-caste Hindoo.* It is possible, however, that information on this subject obtained by the government, may, for obvious reasons, be withheld from the public.

This introductory chapter has extended to a greater length than the writer anticipated at its commencement. His design was simply to state the alleged causes of the mutiny, as far as practicable, in the words of those who were their chief exponents, and to refrain from mingling therewith his own views. But the future welfare of India and of England is so manifestly connected with the policy now evolving from the crucible of heated and conflicting public and party feeling, that it is barely possible for any one really interested in the result, to look on, and describe the struggle, without revealing his own convictions on points where right and wrong, truth and fallacy, justice and oppression, are clearly at issue.

In the foregoing summary, some alleged causes are noted which appear to be scarcely compatible with one another. The incom-

* Dr. Duff's *Indian Rebellion*, p. 93.

patibility is perhaps less real than apparent. What we call BRITISH INDIA, is, in fact, a congeries of nations, differing in language, creed, and customs, as do European states, and with even less points of union, excepting only their involuntary association under a foreign government.

It follows, that in striving to trace the origin of wide-spread disaffection, and the connection between seemingly distinct insurrectionary movements, we must be prepared to find great variety of motive—general, local, and temporary—affecting scattered masses, and manifesting itself sometimes in active hostility, sometimes in sullen discontent.

Under a despotic government, with an enormous army of native mercenaries, the outbreak of rebellion would naturally occur among the soldiery. While they were contented, the people would almost necessarily remain in complete subjection; but if the soldiery had grievances, however slight compared with those of the people, the two classes would coalesce; the separate discontent of each party reacting upon the other, the army would initiate rebellion, the people would maintain it. According to Mr. Disraeli, this has actually been the case; the conduct of the Bengal troops, in revolting, having been that of men "who were not so much the avengers of professional grievances, as the exponents of general discontent."*

It is difficult to understand what the reason can have been for keeping up such an enormous Native army as a peace establishment. Soldiers were used to perform police duties in the older provinces, where war had been unknown for years, simply because there were not policemen to do them; and this confounding of civil and military duties lies at the bottom of much misgovernment, extortion, and unnecessary expense: The troops so variously engaged were trained only for arms, yet employed mainly in duties which officers and men looked upon as derogatory to them as soldiers, and which, in fact, they had no business with at all. It was at once deteriorating

their efficiency, and putting power unnecessarily in their hands, to employ them in functions which should have been, as a mere matter of policy, kept perfectly distinct.

There is much justice in Lord John Russell's remark, that we have had altogether too large an army, and that 50,000 Europeans, with 100,000 Natives, would be a much better security, as far as force is concerned, than a Native army of 300,000.†

At this moment, the total amount of troops in our service is scarcely less than before the mutiny, so rapidly have new corps replaced the old ones, and new sources of supply become available to meet an urgent demand.‡

There is need of care, lest our new auxiliaries prove equally, if not more dangerous than the old ones. There is more need than ever of moderation, or rather of justice and charity, being urged by the British public on their countrymen in India, lest we lose for ever our hold on the confidence of its vast population.

It is most true that "the time is really come for the people of England and for the government of the country to meet the manifestations of a spirit which would render our rule in India not only a crime but an impossibility, by an active and resolute policy. Outrages on natives must be punished, unless we would willingly and knowingly accept the hostility of India, and, with our eyes open, justify the assertions of the intriguers, who tell the people that nothing will content us but their utter extermination."

The growing alienation of the Europeans from the natives has been already noticed as a cause of disaffection; but since that section was written, the free, fearless, graphic representations of Mr. Russell have thrown new light on the subject, and shown but too plainly a sufficient reason for "the rift, bottomless and apparently causeless, which, even before the mutiny, was observed as separating the European from the native, and increasing in breadth every day."§

Unhappily, it is no new thing to be told

* Debate (Commons), July 28th, 1857. † *Ibid.*

‡ The new recruits are, however, very different men from the tall, well-formed Brahmin or Rajpoot peopls of the old Bengal army. These were six feet in height, and forty inches round the chest; docile, polite, doing credit to their officers on parade, smart at drill, neat and clean on duty. Already the reaction has commenced; and Indian officers in general appear disposed to recollect (what the best and

wisest of them have never forgotten), that "Pandy, until he went mad in 1857, was a good orderly soldier." "For myself," an officer writes in a recent Indian journal, "I would rather serve with them than with the dirty, unworthy, ungentlemanly (Pandy was a gentleman) set of strange bedfellows with whom misfortune has made us acquainted."—Mr. Russell—*Times*, Nov. 8th, 1858.

§ *Ibid.*, October 20th, 1858.

that Englishmen in India are arrogant and exclusive. In the last century, West Indian proprietors and East Indian nabobs were chosen by essayists, novelists, and playwrights, as representing a peculiar class of domestic tyrants, wealthy and assumptious; whose presence, Lord Macaulay said, raised the price of everything in their neighbourhood, from a rotten borough to a rotten egg. The habits they had acquired indicated the life they had led; and all who knew India, and had the intelligence to form, and the moral courage to express, an opinion on the subject, sorrowfully agreed with Bishop Heber in deprecating the "foolish, surly, national pride," of which he daily saw but too many instances, and which he was convinced did us much harm in India. "We are not guilty," he said, "of wilful injustice or oppression; but we shut out the natives from our society, and a bullying, insolent manner is continually assumed in speaking to them."

Some went still further than this, and echoed Lord Byron's emphatic warning,* of the sure retribution that would attend us, if, instead of striving to elevate India, by safe and sure degrees, to our own height of freedom, we tried, with selfish blindness, to get and keep her down beneath the iron heel of despotism, using the energy our own dear-bought freedom sustains in us, not to loosen, but to rivet the chains of a feebler race, for whose welfare we have made ourselves responsible before God and man.

Nothing can be more incompatible with the dignity of our position, than the "vulgar bahaudering" which disgusted Sir Charles Napier in 1850. It appeared then as if Mr. Thackeray's lash were needed to keep within bounds the vagaries of the Anglo-Indian variety of the *genus* "Snob." Now the evil seems to have passed dealing with by such means; it is the provost-marshal or the police-magistrate, not the accomplished satirist, who can alone cope with men whose insolent cruelty needs corporeal rather than mental discipline.

The Duke of Wellington always listened with impatience to commendations of the mere courage of officers. "Brave!" he would say, "of course they are; all Englishmen are brave; but it is the spirit of the

gentleman that makes a British officer." Yet, at this very time, when Englishmen and Englishwomen have passed all former traditions of valour and steadfastness in extremest peril, when once again India has proved, in Canning's words, "fertile in heroes"—a class, it would appear not inconsiderable in number, are acting in such a manner as to disgrace the British army, and even the British nation, in the eyes of Europe, and to render the restoration of peace in India as difficult as they possibly can.

The excessive timidity of the Hindoos (of which their reckless daring, or passive submission when hopeless, is the natural counterpart) encourages, in coarse natures, the very arrogance it disarms in higher ones. The wretched manner in which our law-courts are conducted, and the shilling necessary to procure the stamped paper on which to draw up a petition to the court,† operate, in the extreme poverty and depression of the sufferers, in deterring them from bringing any formal complaint, even to obtain justice for a ferocious assault; and so the "sahibs" (European *gentlemen*) ride through the bazaars (markets), and lay open the heads of natives with the butt of their whips, just to clear the way; or, when summoned to court for debt, lay the lash across the shoulders of the presumptuous summonser in the open street, as an expression of opinion. A young gentleman in his cups shoots one of his servants with his revolver; an officer kicks a servant downstairs because he has entered without leaving his shoes outside the door; and now, daily at the mess-tables, "every man of the mute white-turbaned file, who with crossed hands, glistening eyes, and quick ears, stand motionless in attendance," hears the word "nigger" used every time a native is named, and knows well that it is an expression of contempt. In India, the ears of Europeans become familiarised with the term, which soon ceases to excite surprise or disgust. In England, it is felt to be painfully significant of the state of opinion among those who use it, and cannot be disassociated with the idea of slaves and slave-drivers. It seems the very last word whereby British officers (even in the "griffin" stage) would

* "Look to the East, where Ganges' swarthy race
Shall shake your tyrant empire to the base;
Lo! there rebellion rears her ghastly head,
And glares the Nemesis of native dead;
Till Indus rolls a deep purpureal flood,
And claims his long arrear of Northern blood;

So may ye perish! Pallas, when she gave
Your free-born rights, forbade ye to enslave."

The Curse of Minerva.

† The number of petitions rejected because not written on stamped paper, is said to be enormous. The fact has been repeatedly alluded to in parliament.

choose to denote the men they commanded, or even the people among whom they lived, and who, whatever their colour, are not the less British subjects. But what is to be said for the example given to the European soldiery* by British officers, of Christian parentage and education, one of whom "takes his syce (native groom), because he has put a wrong saddle on his horse, and fastens him on a pole placed out in the full sun of May?"—or by another, who "fastens down his syce in the sun by heel-ropes and foot-ropes, as if he were a horse, and spreads grain before him in mockery?" These instances Mr. Russell gives publicly. Privately, he offers to send the editor of the *Times* evidence of still greater significance.

It is a mockery to talk of equal laws, and yet suffer such outrages as these to pass unpunished. It is difficult to understand why the senior regimental officers do not bring the offenders to justice, unless, indeed, the courts-martial are becoming, as Sir Charles Napier prophesied, mere forms; and the most undoubted offenders certain of "honourable acquittal." Some of the old officers are said to watch the state of affairs with great dissatisfaction; and Sir Frederick Currie (the late chairman of the Court of Directors); with Colonel Sykes and some other leading men, have expressed their opinions with a plainness which has exposed them to the invectives of a certain portion of the Anglo-Indian press.†

The plain speaking of Mr. Russell himself, is of the first importance to the best interests of England and of India. Nothing but the strongest and most genuine love of justice and hatred of oppression, could give him courage to write as he does, circumstanced as he is. Among the deeds of heroism he so eloquently chronicles, none can surpass that which he is himself enacting, in pleading even now for the rights of the wretched and despised native population, while living in the midst of the class to whom that very wretchedness furnishes food for cruel tyranny, or idle, heartless, senseless jests. On this point, as indeed some other leading features of the rebellion, the public journals, with the *Times*


at their head, and the fragmentary but deeply interesting accounts of individual sufferers, are almost the exclusive sources of information. The government have, it is true, furnished the House of Commons with reams of Blue Books and other parliamentary papers; but not one of these contains anything approaching a connected statement of the view taken by the home or Indian authorities of the cause, origin, or progress of the mutiny, which has now lasted fully eighteen months. Each department appears to have sent in its own papers, duly sifted, weeded, and garbled; but no person appears to have revised them as a whole. The omissions of one set are partially supplied by the admissions of another; decided assertions made in ignorance by one functionary, are qualified in the next page by the statement of a colleague. This is the case throughout the whole series yet published, beginning with the various and contradictory allegations made regarding the greased cartridges. To enter into discussion on each point would be endless; and therefore, in subsequent pages, facts, so far as they can be ascertained, will be simply stated, with the authority on which they rest; the counter-statements being left unnoticed, unless they happen to be of peculiar importance or interest.

"That most vindictive, unchristian, and cruel spirit which the dreadful contest and the crimes of the mutineers have evoked," is not, however, confined to the army and the press; it extends to the counting-house, and even to the pulpit. "One reverend divine has written a book, in which, forgetting that the heart of man is deceitful and desperately wicked, he takes the cheerful view that the Oriental nature is utterly diabolical and hopelessly depraved, as contradistinguished from his own nature and that of his fellows. * * * An excellent clergyman at Simla, recently took occasion, in his sermon, to rebuke the disposition on the part of certain of his hearers to ill-use the natives; but generally, the voice from the pulpit has been mute on this matter, or it has called aloud, 'Go forth and spare not.'"[‡]

* The European soldiery are unhappily not slow to follow the example. It is alleged, that very recently a convoy, under a party of the 97th and 20th regiments, were on their way to Lucknow. Darkness fell upon them; there were confusion and delay on the road; probably there were apathy, neglect, and laziness on the part of the garrewans, or native drivers, who are usually a most harmless, inoffen-


sive, and honest race. Some ruffians among the soldiery took advantage of the obscurity to wreak their brutal ferocity on the drivers, and pricked them with their bayonets so severely that one man died of his wound almost immediately, and the others were removed to the hospital in litters.—*Times*, Nov. 8th, 1858.

† *Ibid.*, Oct. 20th, 1858.
‡ *Ibid.*, November 8th, 1858.





SEAL OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY



REFERENCE
British Possessions
States under British Protection
Independent States

TIGER HUNT

Longitude East from Greenwich



CHAPTER II.

JANUARY TO MAY, 1857.

At the commencement of 1857, the Indian army, exclusive of the contingents of Native states, stood thus:—

Presidency.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bengal	24,366	135,767	160,133
Madras	10,726	51,244	61,970
Bombay	10,430	45,213	55,689
Grand Total	45,522	232,224	277,172

The royal European troops included four cavalry and twenty-two infantry regiments, containing, in all, 24,263 men. The Europeans in the service of the Company, consisted of five horse brigades of artillery, twelve battalions of foot, and nine cavalry regiments. The Native cavalry was composed of twenty-one regular, and thirty-three irregular regiments; the Native infantry, of 155 regular, and forty-five irregular regiments.*

The whole expense of the Indian army, which, including the Native contingents officered by us, mustered 315,520 men, was returned at £9,802,235, of which £5,668,100 was calculated to be the cost of the 51,316 European soldiers, leaving £4,134,135 as the sum total required for 263,204 natives.

The number of European troops was actually less in 1857 than in 1835, whereas the Native army had increased by 100,000 men. The disproportion was greatest in the Bengal presidency. In Bombay, the relative strength of European to Native infantry was as 1 to 9½; in Madras, as 1 to 16½; and in Bengal, as 1 to 24½.†

The preponderance of Brahmins in the Bengal army was very great, and the government had directed the enlistment of 200 Seiks in each regiment. But this order had been only very partially obeyed. A large proportion of the Madras troops are low-caste Hindoos. In the Bombay regiments a third are Brahmins, from one to two hundred men are Mussulmans, and the remainder low-caste Hindoos, with a few Jews.

The number and strength of the Bengal

army (European and Native) in January, 1857, are thus shown:—

Description of Troops.	European Officers.	European Non-Com. and Rank and File.	Native Commissd., Non-Com., and Rank and File.
Queen's Troops:—			
2 Regts. of Dragoons . .	56	1,310	—
16 ditto of Infantry . .	473	13,956	—
	529	15,266	—
Company's Troops:—			
Engineers and Sappers . .	120	88	1,289
Artillery—Horse	63	999	798
" Foot (Euro.)	102	1,899	1,531
" (Nat.)	76	27	2,302
Cavalry—Regular	106	28	5,002
" Irregular	91	—	14,061
Infantry—Europeans . . .	114	2,460	—
" Native Regt.	1,276	136	83,103
" Irreg.	126	56	27,355
Veterans	85	186	—
Medical Establish- ment and Warrant Officers	370	163	326
Total	3,058	21,308	135,767
Grand Total		160,133	

The distribution of the above force was as follows:—

Distribution of Bengal Army.	Euro-peans.	Natives.	Total.
Presidency Division, includ- ing the garrison of Fort William	1,221	14,639	15,860
Sonthal District	41	3,366	3,407
Dinapore Division	1,174	12,251	13,425
Cawnpore ditto	314	16,048	16,362
Oude Field Force	1,034	3,661	4,695
Saugor District	257	5,864	6,121
Meerut Division	3,098	17,248	20,346
Station of Sirdarpoor . . .	1	656	657
" of Rewah	6	762	768
" of Kherwarrah	6	1,034	1,040
Sirhind Division	4,930	12,849	17,779
Lahore ditto	4,198	15,964	20,162
Peshawur ditto, including Sind Sagur District . . .	4,794	20,129	24,923
Punjab Irregular Force . . .	58	9,049	9,107
Troops in Pegu	1,817	2,121	3,938‡

The Native regiments in India are never quartered in barracks, but in thatched huts; each of the ten companies which form a regiment having its own line, in front of which is a small circular building called

* Parl. Papers, April 16th, 1858; pp. 4, 5.

† Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, 1857 (No. 1), p. 9.

‡ The above statements were kindly furnished by Captain Eastwick, deputy-chairman of the East India Company.

"the Bells," in which the arms and accoutrements are placed after having been cleaned—the key being usually held by the havildar (sergeant) on duty. The officers reside in bungalows (also thatched, and very inflammable), each situated in its own compound; and the powder-magazines and depôts of stores are, or rather were, exposed without protection in the open plain. Each cantonment resembled an extensive camp; and the principal stations (such as Meerut and Cawnpoor) covered so large an area, that they required almost as strong a force to defend them as to occupy them; and a long time might elapse before what was done in one part of them was known in other parts.* The idea of combination to mutiny, on any ground whatever, was evidently the last thing the European officers suspected; and the construction of the cantonments was on a par with the blind security which marked the general arrangements of the period.

In 1856, the authorities desired to place an improved description of musket in the hands of the sepoys; that is to say, to substitute the Minié rifle for the old "Brown Bess." Considering the nature of our position in India, and the peaceful character of the duties which the Native army was then fulfilling, and which alone it seemed likely to be required for, the policy of this measure may be doubted; but of the suicidal folly with which it was carried out, there can scarcely be a second opinion.

In 1853, some rifle ammunition was sent from England to India, and experiments were directed to be tried, which induced Major-general Tucker (then adjutant-general) to recommend earnestly to government, that "in the greasing composition nothing should be used which could possibly offend the caste or religious prejudices of the natives."†

This warning did not prevent the authorities, three years later, from committing the double error of greasing cartridges in the Dum Dum arsenal, eight miles from Calcutta, after the English receipt, with a compound chiefly made from tallow; and of issuing to the Native troops similarly prepared cartridges, sent out direct from England, but which ought, of course, only to have been given to the European troops. Not a single person connected with the

store department cared to remember, that to order the sepoys to tear with their teeth paper smeared with tallow made of mixed animal fat (a filthy composition, whether the animal were clean or unclean, and especially to men who never touch animal food), would naturally excite the distrustful suspicions of the Native soldiery—Mohammedan, Hindoo, and even Seik; for the Seik also considers the cow a sacred animal.

Such suspicions were unquestionably excited; and though much latent disaffection might have existed, it is clear that the cartridge affair was a grievance which gave the more daring a pretext for rebellion, and a rallying-cry, to which they well knew the multitude would respond.‡

The first persons who noticed the obnoxious means used in preparing the ball cartridges, were the Native workmen employed in the arsenal. A Clashie, or Classie, attached to the rifle depôt, asked a sepoy of the 2nd grenadiers for water from his lotah (or brass drinking-vessel.) The sepoy refused, observing, he was not aware of what caste the man was; whereupon the Clashie rejoined, "You will soon lose your caste, as, ere long, you will have to bite cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows." Lieutenant Wright, the officer to whom this circumstance was reported, understood the feelings of the Hindoos too well to neglect the warning. He entered into conversation with the men; and they told him that the rumour of their intended degradation had spread throughout India, and that when they went home on furlough, their friends would not eat with them. Lieutenant Wright, "believing it to be the case," assured them that the grease used was composed of mutton fat and wax: to which they replied, "It may be so, but our friends will not believe it; let us obtain the ingredients from the bazaar, and make it up ourselves; we shall then know what is used, and be able to assure our fellow-soldiers and others that there is nothing in it prohibited by our caste." Lieutenant Wright urged the adoption of the measure suggested by the men.

Major Bontein, the officer in command at Dum Dum, on receiving the above statement, assembled all the Native portion of the depôt, and asked if they had any complaint to make. At least two-thirds of the

* Indophilus' *Letters to the Times*, p. 12.

† Letter of Major-general Tucker to the *Times*, 1857.

‡ A good summary of the official proceeding regarding the cartridges, is given in a pamphlet by George Crawshay, Esq., mayor of Gateshead.

detachment, including all the Native commissioned officers, immediately stepped to the front, and very respectfully, but distinctly, repeated their previous complaint and request. Major Bontein thought the matter so serious, that he took immediate steps to bring it before the commander-in-chief.

Major-general Hearsey, the head of the presidency division, in a letter dated "Barrackpoor,* January 23rd, 1857," represented to government the extreme difficulty of eradicating the notion which had taken hold on the mind of the Native soldiery; and urged, as the only remedy, that, despite the trouble and inconvenience with which the arrangement would be attended, the sepoys should be allowed to obtain from the bazaars the ingredients necessary to prepare the bullet-patches.

On the 29th, Colonel Abbott, the inspector-general of ordnance, being desired to inquire into the nature of the composition used at the arsenal, found that it was supplied by a contractor, and that "no extraordinary precautions had been taken to insure the absence of any objectionable fat." He adds—"It is certainly to be regretted that ammunition was not prepared expressly for the practice dépôt without any grease at all; but the subject did not occur to me, and I merely gave orders for the requisite number of rounds."†

Of course, after this admission, no officer, with any regard for truth, could state to his men, that contaminating substances had not been used in the preparation of the cartridges. Instead of withdrawing the cause of contention at once and entirely, the government resolved that the sepoys at the dépôts should be allowed to use any mixture they might think fit; but that the question of the state in which cartridges should be issued under other circumstances, and especially for service in the field, must remain open for further consideration. The concession was both tardy and insufficient. It was not communicated to the sepoys at Dum Dum and Barrackpoor until the 28th. In the meantime, several fires occurred simultaneously at Barrackpoor and Raneegunge, where a detachment from Barrackpoor were stationed. The electric tele-

* *Barrackpoor* (or *barrack-town*) is situated on the Hooghly, sixteen miles from Calcutta. The governor-general has a residence here, commenced on a magnificent scale by Lord Wellesley, and only partially finished, but standing in a park of about 250 acres in extent, laid out with great taste and

graph bungalow at the latter place was burned; and Ensign Chamier, of the 34th regiment, snatched an arrow, with a lighted match attached thereto, from the thatch of his own bungalow, and thus saved, or at least postponed, its destruction. The arrow was one such as the Sonthals use, and suspicion fell on the men of the 2nd grenadiers, who had recently been serving in the Sonthal districts. A thousand rupees were offered for the conviction of the offenders, but without result. On the 27th, the men had been assembled on parade, and asked if they had any grievance to complain of; upon which a Native officer of the 34th stepped forward, and asked Colonel Wheeler whether any orders had yet been received regarding the new cartridges. The answer was, of course, in the negative. To add to the difficulties of the military authorities at the dépôts, the officer in command of a wing of her majesty's 53rd, stationed at Dum Dum, received directions from Fort William (Calcutta), to be ready to turn out at any moment, and to distribute to his men ten rounds of balled ammunition, as a mutiny had broken out at Barrackpoor among the sepoys. General Hearsey represented the ill-feeling which such rash precipitancy was calculated to produce. He also pointed out the influence which was probably exercised by a Brahminical association, called the *Dhurma Sobha*, formed at Calcutta for the advocacy of ancient Hindoo customs, against European innovations (especially the recent abolition of the laws enforcing perpetual widowhood.) This association he thought had been instrumental in tampering with the sepoys; and had circulated, if not initiated, the idea, that the new ammunition was in some way or other connected with a general design of government for the destruction of the caste of the whole Bengal army. Everything connected with the cartridges was viewed with suspicion; and it was soon noticed that, although served out ungreased, they had a greasy look; consequently, by obeying the military regulation, "to bring the cartridge to the mouth, holding it between the forefinger and thumb, with the ball in the hand, and bite off the top elbow close to the body,"‡ they might still incur the forfeiture of caste, in consequence of some polluting care. Job Charnock is said to have built a bungalow here in 1689, before the site of Calcutta was decided upon. Barrackpoor has been called the *Montpelier of Bengal*.

† Appendix to *Parl. Papers on Mutinies, 1857*; p. 7.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

ingredient in the paper itself. The new cartridges were, in fact, made from paper sent from England—much more highly glazed than that previously used, and altogether thinner and tougher; for the bore of the new rifle being far smaller than that of the former musket, the old thick paper would not contain the amount of powder necessary to throw the bullet to its utmost range, without being inconveniently long.

The officers vainly reasoned with the men: the paper, they said, tore like waxed cloth; and, when thrown in the fire, fizzed, so that there must be grease in it; in short, General Hearsey declared (February 8th), that "their suspicions having been fairly roused on the subject of cow and pig fat, it would be quite impossible to allay them."*

The excitement continued to increase, and information was privately given to the officers, of meetings held at night in the sepoy lines, where plans of resistance to the new cartridges, amounting to open and violent mutiny, were discussed. The four regiments then at Barrackpore were the 2nd grenadiers, the 34th Native infantry, the 43rd light infantry, and the 70th Native infantry. By information which has subsequently transpired, the incipient mutiny appears to have been at this time confined to the two former regiments. They thought to induce their comrades to make common cause with them, and then to rise against the officers, burn or plunder the bungalows, and proceed to Calcutta and seize Fort William; or, failing that, take possession of the treasury. The man who communicated this intelligence could not be induced to divulge the names of the ringleaders, nor could any proof of the truth of his assertions be obtained.

General Hearsey understood the native character well, and spoke the language with rare facility. He caused the entire brigade to be paraded on the 9th of February, and reasoned with them on the folly of supposing the British government inclined to attempt their forcible conversion. "Christians of the Book (Protestants)," he said, "admitted no proselytes, and baptized none, who did not fully understand and believe in the tenets therein inculcated." His arguments proved successful in tranquillising the troops for the moment; but the brigadier knew

well that the lull was likely to be of brief duration, and he wrote to government on the 11th, urging that his previous proposal of changing the cartridge paper, might at once either be confirmed or rejected; that no further time should be lost in coming to some decision; for, he adds, "we are dwelling on a mine ready for explosion."

On the 21st of February, Lieutenant-colonel Hogge wrote from Meerut, to propose that the biting of the cartridge should be altogether abolished, and that the men should be instructed to twist off the end with the right hand—a plan which would "remove all objections from that class of Hindoos who never touch animal food." On the 2nd of March, Major Bontein wrote from Dum Dum to the same effect; but he adds, that by his suggestion he did not "in the least intend to consult the caprice of the Native soldiers," and had no other motive than increased efficiency.

Apparently this was the right way of putting the case in the sight of the authorities; for the governor-general in council, with all due form, and without any undignified haste, informed the commander-in-chief, at Simla, of the proposed alteration; suggesting, that if his excellency approved, new instructions should be given for the rifle practice, in which no allusion should be made to the biting of the cartridge, laid down in previous regulations. Pending the answer of General Anson, private instructions were sent to Dum Dum, to let the musketry practice there stop short of actually loading the rifle.

While the European authorities discussed matters among themselves, the sepoys did the same, but arrived more rapidly at more important conclusions. It is not probable that they viewed the cartridge as a solitary indication of the feeling of government towards them: the general service order of 1856; the affront put on the Mohammedans in the Punjab by General Anson in the same year, by expelling them the service for refusing to allow their beards to be cut; the total withdrawal, when the penny postage came into operation, of the privilege of having their letters franked† by their commanding officers; the alterations in the invaliding regulations;—these and other recent innovations were probably ranking in their minds. The regiments understood one another; a certain power of combination existed, ready to be called into action; and by reason of constant correspon-

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, 1857; p. 20.

† The franking by the European officers, was in itself calculated to impose some check on the transmission of treasonable correspondence.

dence, the whole of the Bengal troops were engaged in an incipient conspiracy before they well knew what they were conspiring about. We left the poison full time to work. The filthy cartridges prepared for them did, we cannot now doubt, actually contain the forbidden substance, which prisoners starving in a dungeon, and sepoy on board ship, will perish sooner than touch; and yet, instead of manfully owning the error, and atoning for it by changing the paper, and, once for all, removing every shadow of suspicion, we persisted in holding it over their heads like a drawn sword, to be let fall at any moment. So late as the 5th of March (the government respite not having then arrived), the sepoys at Dum Dum were, notwithstanding their remonstrances, employed in making cartridges of the new, and as they believed greased, paper; and Major Bontein was preparing to enforce the regulations, and considering how to deal with the prisoners he expected to be obliged to make for disobedience of orders.*

The first mutiny was not, however, destined to occur at Dum Dum: it broke out at Burhampoor on the Ganges, about 120 miles from Calcutta. The only troops then at the station were the 19th Native infantry, a detachment of Native cavalry, and a battery of Native artillery. The 19th and 34th had been stationed together at Lucknow for two years; and the men were of course personally acquainted. During the latter part of the month of February, two sepoy parties of the 34th regiment were sent from Calcutta to Burhampoor. The second came as the escort of some sick Europeans on the 25th, and their communications regarding the proceedings at Barrackpoor, so alarmed the 19th, that the whole corps, Hindoos, Seiks, and Mohammedans, resolved upon a general fast; and for three days, beginning with the 26th, took only bhang, and other exciting drugs. Of this excitement, their commanding officer, Colonel Mitchell, was entirely ignorant. The new muskets had arrived shortly before, and he had explained to the sepoys that the necessary grease would be prepared before them by the pay havildars. On the 26th of February, orders were given for the

firing of fifteen rounds of blank cartridge per man. The cartridges were then sent to the bells of arms, and examined by the men. They had previously been in the habit of making all they used. Those now served out were of two kinds; one like the paper they had been accustomed to, the other whiter and thinner. The sepoys compared them in all ways; they burnt the paper, and laid other portions in water. Still they saw, or fancied they saw, a marked difference. They felt convinced that they were greased, and refused to take the percussion-caps served out for the intended practice; saying, "Why should we take the caps, as we won't take the cartridges until the doubt about them is cleared up?"† This occurred at about four o'clock in the afternoon. The incidents which followed are best told in the words of the petition subsequently laid before government by the 19th regiment, and which the governor-general in council has pronounced to be, "upon the whole, a fair account of what took place on the occasion of the outbreak; the main points being borne out by the evidence at the court of inquiry."‡

"At half-past seven o'clock," the petitioners state, "the colonel, accompanied by the adjutant, came on parade, and very angrily gave orders to us, saying, 'If you will not take the cartridges I will take you to Burmah, or to China,§ where, through hardship, you will all die. These cartridges were left behind by the 7th Native infantry, and I will serve them out to-morrow morning by the hands of the officers commanding companies.' He gave this order so angrily, that we were convinced that the cartridges were greased, otherwise he would not have spoken so."||

Colonel Mitchell sent an order to the cavalry and artillery (whose lines were about three miles from those of the infantry), to assemble on parade, for the purpose of compelling the sepoys to use the cartridges. It would appear that the sepoys were right in believing that the cartridges were to be bitten, not torn. The news soon got wind; and the same night, about a quarter to eleven, shouts were heard in the lines; some persons cried fire, others that they were surrounded by Europeans—that the guns

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 38.

† *Ibid.*, p. 273.

‡ Minute of March 27th, 1857.—Appendix, p. 50.

§ This threat was denied by Colonel Mitchell, but established on European as well as Native testi-

mony. It might easily have been uttered in the excitement of so critical a moment, and forgotten by the utterer, but not by those whose interests were immediately affected by it.—Appendix, &c., p. 290.

|| Appendix to Parl. Papers, pp. 278, 279.

and cavalry had arrived. In the midst of the din the alarm was sounded; and the sepoys, mad with fear, rushed to the bells and seized their arms.

It is manifest they had no plan, and no intention of attempting violence, or they would not have refused to receive the percussion-caps offered them that afternoon, nor have remained passive while the 11th irregular cavalry and guns were fetched to the parade, which they reached by torchlight between twelve and one. The armed sepoys then ran out of their lines to the parade in the greatest alarm. The colonel was much excited, and said, that he and the officers were prepared to do their duty, should the men not yield obedience; they (the officers) were ready to die, and would die there. The Native officers represented that the sepoys really believed that the matter affected their religion, and begged the colonel to send away the cavalry and guns; which was accordingly done.* The sepoys lodged their arms quietly, and returned to their lines. The whole regiment appeared on parade the next morning; and, on the 28th, there was another parade. The cartridges which the men had refused to fire, were publicly inspected; and the two kinds were put up by Colonel Mitchell, and forwarded for the inspection of government, with an account of what had taken place. Daily parades took place, and the 19th again became as steady and orderly as any men could be.†

Tranquillity was restored, and might have been maintained, had the government been sufficiently generous or discreet to deal gently with an offence which their own indiscretion had provoked. The disbandment of the regiment was summarily decided on, without any correspondence with the commander-in-chief, whose concurrence it appeared was necessary to the simple alteration of a clumsy mode of loading, which was goading the troops to mutiny, but was not necessary to the enactment of a decree which suddenly reduced a thousand men, whose fault must have varied very considerably in its circumstances, to the same utter poverty. Their appeal made to government, through Colonel Mitchell, was very touching. They said it was hard, after so many years' service, to lose their bread. Since the unfortunate

night of the 26th of February, all their duties had been carefully carried on, and (they add) "so shall be; as long as we live we will faithfully obey all orders; wherever, in the field of battle, we are ordered to go, there shall we be found; therefore, with every respect, we now petition, that since this is a religious question from which arose our dread, and as religion is, by the order of God, the first thing, we petition that, as we have done formerly, we may be also allowed to make up our own cartridges, and we will obey whatever orders may be given to us, and we will ever pray for you."

There is no mistaking the earnestness with which the 19th, even in the moment of reaction and reflection, dwell on the immediate cause of their outbreak. The government, in acquainting the Court of Directors with the whole transaction, give the same version, by saying that the regiment had refused to take the cartridges, "in consequence of the reports in circulation, that the paper of which they were made was greased with the fat of cows and pigs."

This despatch is dated 8th April, 1857. On the same day, the directors were inditing one expressive of their gratification at learning that the matter had been fully explained to the men at Barrackpore and Dum Dum, and that they appeared perfectly satisfied that no intention existed of interfering with their caste. Of course by this time it was pretty evident that the sepoys generally were convinced of the direct opposite, and viewed the 19th as a body of victims and martyrs.

The penalty of disbandment found little favour with any party. The ultra-disciplinarians pronounced the punishment insufficient, for what the governor-general thought fit to term "open and defiant mutiny;" and moderate men considered it would have been wiser to have accepted the offer of the corps, and make it a general service regiment, rather than send a thousand men to their homes, to beg or plunder food for the support of themselves and their families, and to sow the seed of distrust and disaffection wherever they went. Besides, evidence was adduced which proved beyond a doubt that the 19th had been instigated to mutiny by the representations of the 34th, who had

* It is highly improbable that, in the absence of European soldiers, the Native corps would have fired on their countrymen in such a case as this; yet the mode in which "the coercing force was withdrawn," was pronounced by the governor in

council as a special reason for declaring Colonel Mitchell unfit for the command of a regiment.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 297.

† Letter of Lieutenant-colonel Mitchell, March 3rd, 1857.—Appendix, p. 267.

been long on the verge of an outbreak, and were only kept back by the influence of their officers. The government, knowing this, resolved on making the 19th the scape-goat for the 34th and other regiments, whose disaffection had been proved by incendiarism and sullen murmurings, and ordered the disbandment to take place at Barrackpoor.

The Calcutta authorities were not quite insensible to the danger pointed out by Napier, of "attempting to bully large masses of men." The sentence resolved on against the 19th was not made public until H.M.'s 84th regiment had been brought from Rangoon. The 84th arrived at Calcutta on the 20th of March, and were immediately conveyed to Chinsurah—a station about eight miles from Barrackpoor, whither the 19th were ordered to proceed. The arrival of the Europeans increased the excitement among the Native troops at Barrackpoor, which was evidently the centre of disaffection. Two of the 2nd Native grenadiers were taken up on a charge of endeavouring to excite mutiny on the 11th of March, found guilty, and sentenced to fourteen years' hard labour. The sentence is memorable, since General Anson thought fit to write a minute on it from his far-distant residence in the Himalayas—a mark of interest which the disbanding of entire regiments had not elicited. Death would, he considered, have been the proper penalty; but fourteen years of disgraceful labour might be to some worse than death; therefore he would not call for a revision of the sentence. "The miserable fate which the prisoners had brought upon themselves, would," he added, "excite no pity in the breast of any true soldier."*

Avowedly, in consequence of communications sent them by the 34th regiment, three companies of the 63rd regiment at Sooree refused to accept their furloughs, saying, "If our brethren at Barrackpoor go, we will go; but we hear they are not going." Afterwards they expressed contrition for their conduct, and were allowed to enjoy their furloughs. The refusal occurred on the 28th of March. On the afternoon of Sunday, the 29th, the Native officers of the 34th regiment at Barrackpoor reported that the men were in a very excited state. Sergeant-major Hewson proceeded to the lines, and found a sepoy walking up and down in front of the quarter-guard, and calling out to the men of the brigade to join him in defending and

dying for their religion and their caste. This was Mungul Pandey, a man of previously excellent character, who had been above seven years in the service, but had lately taken to the use of intoxicating preparations of opium and bhang. Whether he had resorted to these stimulants, as the Indian soldiery are in the habit of doing, to nerve himself for this special purpose, or whether the habit itself had rendered him reckless of consequences, does not appear; but General Hearsey speaks of the actuating motive as "religious frenzy." "The Europeans," Mungul Pandey said, alluding to a wing of her majesty's 53rd, detached from Dum Dum, "had come to slaughter the sepoy, or else force them to bite the cartridges, and become apostates;" and when the English sergeant attempted to seize him, he called out to the men who were thronging the lines, in their undress and unarmed, to come and support him: "You incited me to this," he cried; "and now, poltroons, you will not join me." Taking aim at Sergeant Hewson, he fired, but missed; upon which the sergeant retreated, and called to the guard to fall-in and load. Adjutant Baugh, of the 34th, next rode up, calling out, "Where is he? where is he?" Mungul Pandey fired at the adjutant, and his horse fell wounded. The adjutant drew a pistol from his holster and took aim, but failed; upon which he and the sergeant rushed on Mungul Pandey, who wounded both with his tulwar, or native sword. The other sepoy began to hustle and surround the two Europeans, but their lives were saved by the courage and devotion of a Mohammedan sepoy, named Sheikh Phultoo, who rushed forward unarmed, and intercepted a blow directed at the adjutant; and, flinging his right arm round Mungul Pandey (the left being severely wounded), enabled the Europeans to escape. A shot from the direction of the quarter-guard was fired at them, but without effect. There were about 400 men in the lines, looking on; and Adjutant Baugh, as he passed them maimed and bleeding, said, "You cowardly set of rascals! You see an officer cut down before your eyes, and not a man of you advances to assist him." They made no reply; but all turned their backs on the speaker, and moved slowly and sullenly away. The unpopularity of the adjutant† is alleged to have influenced the sepoy; and, after he had left, they compelled Sheikh Phultoo to let Mungul Pandey go.

* Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 86. † *Ibid.*, p. 147.

Lieutenant-colonel Wheeler, the officer in command of the regiment, came on parade soon after, and ordered the quarter-guard to secure the mutineer. The jemadar who ought to have led them, sided with Mungul Pandey; and, coming up to the colonel, told him that the men refused to obey the order. A native standing by said, that the offender being a Brahmin, nobody would hurt him. Colonel Wheeler "considered it quite useless, and a useless sacrifice of life, to order a European officer with the guard to seize him, as he would no doubt have picked off the European officer, without receiving any assistance from the guard itself." The colonel therefore left the spot, and reported the matter to the brigadier. On learning what had occurred, General Hearsey, with his two sons and Major Ross, rode to the quarter-guard house, where about ten or twelve men had turned out. Mungul Pandey watched their approach, and Captain Hearsey called out to his father to be on his guard, for the mutineer was taking aim at him. The general replied, "If I fall, John, rush upon him, and put him to death." In a moment Mungul Pandey dropped on his knee, turned the muzzle of his musket to his own breast, and pulled the trigger with his foot. The bullet made a deep graze, ripping up the muscles of the chest, shoulder, and neck. He fell prostrate, with his clothes on fire, was picked up shivering, convulsed, and apparently dying, and was handcuffed and conveyed to the hospital; none of the sepoy's attempting further interference.

General Hearsey rode amongst the 43rd and 34th Native regiments, and, while blaming the latter for their conduct (which appears to have been most outrageous), he assured them that no person should be permitted to interfere with their religious and caste prejudices while he commanded them. No attempt was made to arrest the jemadar or the sepoy's of the quarter-guard, probably because General Hearsey feared to precipitate a struggle for which he was not yet prepared. The culprits must have known the rules of British discipline too well to expect to escape with impunity the consequences of their mutinous and dastardly conduct. That night, in the lines, a plan of action was concocted; and the 19th regiment, on their arrival at Baraset (eight miles from Barrackpore) on the following morning, found messengers waiting for them from the 34th, who proposed to them to

rise that evening, kill their officers, and march to Barrackpore, where they would find the 2nd and 34th in readiness to co-operate with them in overpowering the European force, and proceeding to surprise and sack Calcutta.

The unfortunate 19th had already suffered deeply for listening to suggestions from Barrackpore. They rejected the proposals decidedly and at once; but they did not betray their tempters, who returned safely, their errand unsuspected.

The disbandment took place on the following morning at Barrackpore, in presence of the available troops of all arms within two days' march of that station. The government order having been read, the arms were piled, and the colours deposited by the sepoy's, who evinced much sadness, but no sullenness. The number of the regiment was not to be effaced from the army list; and there were other slight concessions, of which General Hearsey made the most in addressing the men. They knew he pitied them; and as they left the ground, disgraced and impoverished, they cheered him cordially, and wished him long life—a wish which he as cordially returned. Perhaps no regiment in the Bengal army was more sound at the core than the 19th. Lieutenant-colonel Macgregor, who had been stationed with them at Burhampore for some months, declared that he had never met with a quieter or better-behaved regiment, and described them as appearing very sorry for the outbreak of the 26th of February. They felt that they had been misled by the 34th; and when their request to be suffered to re-enlist was refused, they are said to have begged, before leaving the ground, to be allowed to resume their arms for one half-hour, and brought face to face with the 34th, on whom they promised to avenge the quarrel of the government and their own.

Some alarm, says Mr. Mead, was entertained lest they should plunder the villages on their way up country, but they seem to have conducted themselves peaceably. Many got employment as durwans (orgate-keepers), and a few were entertained by magistrates, for whom they have since done efficient service in the capture of fugitive mutineers. Hundreds died of cholera by the way-side, and a large proportion went into the service of the Nawab of Moorsheadabad. It has not been proved that any of them entered the ranks of the rebel army.*

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 62.

The order for the disbandment of the 19th was read on parade to every regiment throughout India. If the change from biting to tearing the cartridges had been simultaneously announced, the army might have been tranquillised, and accepted the fate of the 19th as a vicarious sacrifice for the general benefit. Instead of this the order of disbandment was read alone; and no mention whatever being made of the cartridges, the natural conclusion was, that the sepoy would be compelled to bite them or be turned on the world after long years of faithful service. The General Orders certainly contained an assertion, that "it had been the unvarying rule of the government of India to treat the religious feelings of all its servants, of every creed, with careful respect;" but, as it was notorious that a flagrant breach of this rule had been recently committed, and was, so far as the sepoy could tell, to be determinedly persevered in, it followed that the assurance, intended to tranquillise them, utterly failed in its effect; and the only part of the address which really impressed them, was the declared intention of government never to cease exacting the unhesitating obedience the men had sworn to give.

The 19th being disposed of, the next question was, how to deal with the 34th. Never was prompt action more evidently needed; yet five weeks were allowed to elapse, during which tokens of mutiny were multiplying throughout India, without any decision being arrived at regarding the dastardly quarter-guard. Mungul Pandey was tried, condemned, and hung, on the 7th of April, in the presence of all the troops then at Barrackpore. He was much debilitated by his wound (which would probably have proved mortal); but he met his death with perfect composure, and refused to make any statement which could implicate his comrades. The jemadar, who commanded the guard of the 34th, was also tried and condemned to death, but the execution of the sentence was delayed until the 21st of April, owing to the time lost in corresponding with the commander-in-chief at Simla; who

first declined, and then consented, to empower General Hearsey to confirm the sentences of court-martials on Native commissioned officers.*

It seemed as if government had resolved to drop proceedings here. The remarks appended to General Anson's confirmation of the jemadar's sentence, were very like an act of amnesty to the Barrackpore troops in general, and the 34th in particular. He stated his trust that the crime of which Mungul Pandey and the jemadar had been guilty, would be viewed with horror by every man in the army; and he added, in evident allusion to the guard, that if there were any "who had looked on with apathy or passive encouragement," he hoped the fate of their guilty comrades would "have a beneficial effect upon their future conduct."†

The Mohammedan orderly who had saved the life of the adjutant and sergeant, was promoted to the rank of havildar by General Hearsey, and given an Order of Merit for his conduct. The divisional order to this effect was issued on the 5th of April. The general was reproved by the governor-general in council, for having exceeded his authority by this act, and also for having described Mungul Pandey as stimulated by "religious frenzy."‡ Lord Canning, in his own minute, speaks of Mungul Pandey as "that fanatic;" but considered, that "however probable it may be that religious feelings influenced him," it would have been better to have left this feature of the case unnoticed.§

Early in April, a Native court-martial sentenced a jemadar, of the 70th Native infantry, to dismissal from the army (in which he had served thirty-three years), in consequence of his having incited other Native officers to mutiny, as the only means of avoiding the pollution of biting the new cartridges. The commander-in-chief desired that the sentence should be revised, as too lenient; but the Native officers persisted in their decision, which was eventually confirmed.

An event took place at the same time, which showed that the temper of the distant troops was mutinous and disaffected. The 48th infantry, a corps reputed to be one of the

* A telegram was transmitted to Simla, on the 14th of April, strongly urging General Anson to issue a special warrant to General Hearsey, for the purpose of at once carrying out the sentence in which the trial then pending was expected to issue. On the 17th, the following telegram was sent to General Hearsey, from Calcutta:—"The commander-in-chief refuses to empower you to confirm sentences of courts-martial on commissioned officers." On the

20th, General Anson changed his mind, and sent the desired warrant.—(See Appendix to Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, 1857; pp. 104—107.)

† *Ibid.*, p. 124. A sepoy was identified as having struck the sergeant-major (when cut down by Mungul Pandey) with the butt of his musket; but he escaped punishment by desertion.—(p. 158.)

‡ Divisional order, April 5th, 1857; p. 63.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 63.

finest in the service, long commanded by Sir H. M. Wheeler, the general in charge of Cawnpoor, was at this time stationed at Lucknow, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Palmer. Dr. Wells, the surgeon of the regiment, having occasion to visit the medicine store at the hospital, and being at the time indisposed, drank a portion of a carminative from a bottle containing a quantity, after which no high-caste Hindoo could partake of the remainder without pollution. The Native apothecary in attendance, saw and reported the act to the sick sepoy, upon which they all refused to touch any of the medicines prescribed for them. Colonel Palmer assembled the Native officers, and, in their presence, rebuked the surgeon for his heedlessness, and destroyed the bottle which he had put to his mouth. The men took their medicines as before; but a few nights after, the bungalow (thatched house) in which Dr. Wells resided was fired, and most of his property destroyed. It was notorious that the incendiaries belonged to the 48th Native infantry; but their comrades shielded them, and no proof could be obtained against the individuals.

Not long after, the Native officers of the regiment were reported to be intriguing with Rookan-oo-Dowlah and Mustapha Ali, relatives of the King of Oude, residing in Lucknow. The most absurd rumours were circulated and believed in the city. While the cartridges were to be used as the means of compelling the sepoy to lose caste, other measures were, it was reported, being taken to rob the non-military class of theirs. Government was said to have sent up cart-loads and boat-loads of bone-dust, to mix with the *otta* (prepared flour) and sweetmeats sold in the bazaars; and the authorities vainly strove to disabuse the public mind, which was kept in a perpetually-recurring panic. Money was repeatedly given, with directions to purchase some of the adulterated *otta*; but though the parties always returned with the money in their hands, stating their inability to find the shops where it was sold, it was evident that

they were silenced, but not convinced of its non-existence. Sir Henry Lawrence listened with patient attention to all these rumours, and did what probably few other men could have done to extract their venom. But the yet unwithdrawn order for biting the cartridges, afforded to the earnest a reason, and to the intriguing a pretext, for distrusting the government; and the four first months of 1857 had given time for the growth of seed, which could not afterwards be prevented from producing baneful fruit. There was a Hindoo subahdar of one of the Oude local artillery batteries, named Dabee Sing, an old and tried soldier. Mr. Gubbins speaks of Sir Henry Lawrence as having been closeted for hours at a time with this man, who told him all the wild projects attributed to the British government for the purpose of procuring the annihilation of the religious and territorial rights of the people of India. Among other things which Dabee Sing gravely related, without expressing his own opinion one way or the other, was a plan for transporting to India the numerous widows of the Europeans who had perished in the Crimean campaign. The principal zemindars of the country were to be compelled to marry them; and their children, who would of course not be Hindoos, were to be declared the heirs to the estates. Thus the Hindoo proprietors of land were to be supplanted!*

How far such reports as these might really gain credence, or how far they might be adopted as a means of expressing the discontent excited by the recent annexation and resumption measures, does not appear; but throughout the Bengal army, the cartridges continued to be the rallying-cry for discontent up to and beyond the end of April. At Agra incendiary fires had been frequent, and the sepoy had refused their aid to subdue the flames: at Sealkote, letters had been discovered from the Barrackpoor sepoy, inciting their brethren at that distant station to revolt: at Umballah, the discontent and distrust excited by the new fire-arms, had been most marked.† The

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, pp. 86; 88. A singular instance of the extent of the gulf which separates us from the aboriginal tribes, and the small respect they feel for European civilisation, was witnessed by Mr. Gubbins several years ago. A report got abroad among the hill-men of the sanitarium at Simla, that orders had arrived from the governor-general for the preparation of a certain quantity of human fat, to be sent down to Calcutta; and that, for this purpose, the local authorities were

engaged in entrapping the hill-men, killing and boiling them down. Numbers of these men were at this time employed in carrying the ladies' litters, and in a variety of domestic duties which brought them in daily contact with the Europeans. Yet the panic spread, until numbers fled from the station; nor were they, Mr. Gubbins believes, ever thoroughly convinced of the falsehood of the report.—(p. 87.)

† *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 28.

Calcutta authorities were, nevertheless, so blind to the imminence of the peril, that the *Oriental*, which was supposed to be lying at Madras, was twice telegraphed for to convey the 84th back to Burmah; and but for the accident that sent her across to Rangoon, the month of May would have found Calcutta left as before, with only the wing of a European regiment. Nothing was decided upon with regard to the 34th, or the Barrackpore division in general, despite Brigadier Hearsey's warning (given two months before, and confirmed by the very unsatisfactory evidence adduced before the court-martial) regarding the condition of the troops stationed there. It has since transpired, that an order, and a most needful one, for the disbandment of the 34th, was actually drafted immediately after the attack on Lieutenant Baugh; but it was withheld until new outbreaks in various directions heralded the shock for which the government were forewarned, but not forearmed.

The home authorities shield themselves from the charge of negligence, on the ground that up to May, 1857, not "the slightest indication of any disaffection among the troops had been sent home."* "*Indophilus*," who has means of information peculiar to a man whose position enables him to search the government records, and examine the original papers unpublished and ungarbled, says, that it cannot be ascertained, by the most careful inquiry, that General Anson ever made a single representation to the directors,† or to any member of her majesty's government, on the subject; but that, on the contrary, assurances were given of the satisfactory state of the Bengal army, and especially of its continued fidelity, which might well lull suspicion to sleep. "It is hard," he adds, "to expect a government to see better than with its own eyes."‡ The government might, perhaps, save the nation many disasters, and themselves much discredit, by condescending to look through the eyes of those bystanders who proverbially see more of the game than the players. But in this instance they did not heed the warnings of even their own servants.

* Speech of Mr. Vernon Smith.—India debate, July 27th, 1857.

† The chairman of the East India Company likewise declared in parliament, that not a single word of notice had been received from General Anson on the subject.—(India debate, July 15th, 1857.)

‡ *Letters of Indophilus*, p. 25.

§ See *ante*, p. 120.

|| Napier's *Life*, vol. iv., p. 414.

Sir Charles Napier, Lord Melville, Sir John Lawrence, and Colonel Jacob, all lifted up their voices in vain; nay, Lord Dalhousie himself remonstrated against the removal of Europeans, in a manner which proved his mistrust of the tone and temper of the Native army.§ The Duke of Wellington always watched Indian proceedings with an anxious eye. His decision against Napier was possibly prompted even less by the partial statements laid before him, than by the feeling that if the spirit of mutiny had been roused in the Bengal army, it would need all the influence of united authority for its extinction. No commander-in-chief could effect it except with the full support and cordial co-operation of the governor-general. Such a state of things was impossible between Lord Dalhousie and General Napier. "The suppression of mutiny," the Duke wrote, in his memorandum on the proffered resignation of Sir Charles Napier, "particularly if at all general or extended to numbers, and the restoration of order and subordination to authority and discipline among troops who have mutinied, is the most arduous and delicate duty upon which an officer can be employed, and which requires, in the person who undertakes it, all the highest qualifications of an officer, and moral qualities; and he who should undertake to perform the duty, should enjoy, in a high degree, the respect and confidence of the troops and of the government."|| Sir William Gomm, the successor to Napier appointed by the Duke (an active, kind-hearted, and thoroughly gentlemanly man), appears to have been popular both with the government and the army, European and Native, and mutiny certainly made no head under him. It does not appear that General Anson enjoyed this advantage, either with regard to the government¶ or the Native troops; but, with the latter, decidedly the reverse. His appointment was a notorious instance of the principle of "taking care of Dowb," at the expense of the best interests of the country. It is true, that in the civil position of "Clerk of the Ordnance," he had been both active and efficient; and to

¶ Great difference of opinion is alleged to have existed between Lord Canning and General Anson; and the conduct of the latter, together with the tone of the very few and brief communications published, as having passed between Simla and Calcutta even in the height of the crisis, tends to confirm this allegation. Mr. Smith blamed Mr. Disraeli for alluding to it; but acknowledged the prevalence of the assertion "in private circles."—*Times*, June 30th, 1857.

a reputation for practical business habits, he united that of a popular "man about town;" was a high authority on racing matters, and a first-rate card-player; but he had never commanded a regiment, and would certainly not have been selected, at sixty years of age, to take charge of the Indian army, had he not been a member, not only of an honoured and really honourable, but also of a very influential family. In fact, he was a person to be handsomely provided for. By acts of commission and omission, he largely contributed to bring the mutiny to a head; yet, strangely enough, those who have been most lavish of censure regarding Lord Canning and his colleagues, have for the most part passed over, in complete silence, the notorious fact that General Anson remained quietly in the Himalayas, in the healthiest season of the year for Calcutta, without taking the slightest share in the anxious deliberations of the Supreme Council; yet, nevertheless, drew £6,000 a-year for being a member thereof, in addition to his salary of £10,000 as commander-in-chief. For instance, "One who has served under Sir Charles Napier," says—"The men who ruled India in 1857, knew little of Asiatic character. The two civilians [Messrs. Dorin and Grant] had seen only that specimen of it of which the educated Bengalee is a type: the legal member [Mr. Peacock] and Lord Canning had seen no more; and General Low was a Madras officer:" but the very name of General Anson is significantly omitted. The manner in which the council treated the crisis through which they were passing, proved, he adds, that they did not comprehend it.* This was conspicuous in the reproaches directed against Colonel Wheeler for conversing with the sepoys, as well as the natives generally, on the subject of Christianity, and disseminating tracts among them. No single complaint was ever uttered by the sepoys on this head. They were quite capable of distinguishing the zeal of an individual from the supposed forcible and fraudulent measure of the greased cartridges, by which they believed the government desired to compel them to become apostates *en masse*. It was not change of creed, but loss of caste they dreaded; not tracts and arguments, but greased cartridges, backed by the penalty of disbandment courts-martial, and a park of

artillery. "Already, in their eyes, we were on a par with their lowest caste: a Christian was one who drank brandy and ate pork and beef. Was not the idea that we wished to reduce them, by trick, to the same degrading position, sufficient to excite every deep-seated prejudice against us?"† The military writer of the above sentence, does not add that Lord Canning and his council really sought to conciliate the sepoys by every measure short of the compromise of dignity, which they unhappily considered to be involved in withdrawing the cartridges (as they ought to have done in January), and publicly denouncing and punishing what the Supreme Council did not hesitate to call, among themselves, "the very culpable conduct of the Ordnance department, which had caused all this excitement."‡ It is, however, highly improbable that, had the council proposed such a measure, General Anson would, at any time during the first four months of 1857, have sanctioned such a concession to what he termed the "bestly prejudices," which, ever since he came to India, he had been labouring to destroy; forgetting that the Bengal army, whether wisely or foolishly, had been established and maintained on the basis of toleration of caste observances, and that that basis could not be touched with impunity. He had been for a short time in command at Madras, previous to his appointment as commander-in-chief of the three Indian armies; and it was probably what he learned there, that gave rise to his strong anti-caste opinions. The sepoys had enjoyed perfect toleration for nearly a hundred years; but General Anson's policy, from the first, indicated a resolve, which the Anglo-Indian press earnestly supported, to abandon the old policy. The Bengal force had been, from its commencement, an enormous local militia, enlisted for service in India, and in India only; special regiments (of which there were six), or volunteer corps, being employed on foreign service, and rewarded by extra allowances. In 1856, government declared its intention of radically altering the constitution of the army, and issued an order that every recruit should be enlisted for general service wherever the state might require. There can be no doubt, says Mr. Gubbins, speaking of the General Service Order, "that the vast change which it must of necessity make in the position of the Bengal soldier, was not duly weighed; or, if weighed, provision was certainly not made to meet the consequences

* *Mutiny of Bengal Army*, p. 59.

† *Ibid.*, p. 58.

‡ Appendix to Papers on Mutinies, p. 212.

of the dissatisfaction which it would produce."*

Nearly at the same time another order was published, which affected not merely the prospects of recruits, but also the dearest privilege of the existing Native troops. Under the old regulations the sepoy might become invalided after fifteen years' service, and retire to his home on a monthly pension of four rupees. The Bengallee, it must be remembered, was never accompanied by his family when on service, like the Madrassee; and so earnestly was the power of returning home coveted, that men starved themselves for months, and became weak and emaciated for the sake of retiring on this scanty pittance. In former times, the evil had been met by holding out inducements to longer service; an extra rupee per month being granted after fifteen, and two rupees after twenty, years' service. A further allowance, called hutting-money, was granted to them by Lord Hardinge; and an honourable distinction, accompanied by a valuable increase of pay, was opened to the Native officers, by the establishment of the "Order of British India." Still the love of home proved too strong; and in pursuance of the new policy, it was decided that a sepoy who was declared unfit for foreign service, should no longer be permitted to retire to his home on an invalid pension, but should be retained with the colours, and employed in ordinary cantonment duty. This order was, as usual, read out to each regiment on parade, and it excited a murmur of general dissatisfaction throughout the ranks. By these two measures the retired sepoy was transformed into a local militiaman, and the former militia became general service soldiers.† The first measure was a direct blow at caste; the second was a manifest breach of the terms of enlistment. There were also other circumstances, indicative of a policy very different to the genial kindly consideration of old times. "General Anson," says the late adjutant-general of the Bombay army

(Major-general Tucker), "anxiously desired to innovate; his predecessor had been harshly charged with supineness and apathy; his own he designed should be a reign of a very different description, and he attempted to commence it with a curtailment of the leave or furlough annually granted to the sepoys—a very hasty and injudicious beginning—and apparently so considered by more than myself; for it was then negatived, though I have since heard, that at a later period, it was successfully advocated."‡

The above circumstances tend to account for the disbelief evidenced by the sepoys in the protestations of government, and the excitement created by the unprecedented order to bite cartridges made in the arsenal, instead of by themselves, as heretofore. Brigadier Hearsey must have been well acquainted with the general feeling, when he urged in January, the immediate and total withdrawal of the new cartridges; the idea of forcible conversion in connection with them, being so rooted in the minds of the sepoys, that it would be both "idle and unwise to attempt its removal."

This idle and unwise attempt was, as we have seen, continued through the months of February, March, and April; and in spite of the mutiny of the 34th, and the disbandment of the 19th, the experiment of explanatory words, and deeds of severe and increasing coercion, was continued, until the vigorous measures taken in May, issued not in the disbandment, but in the revolt of the entire Bengal army.

One feature connected with the preliminary stage of the mutinies remains to be noticed; namely, the circulation in February of chupatties (small unleavened cakes) through certain districts of the North-West Provinces, and especially of the Saugor territory. Major Erskine, the commissioner for Saugor, made some enquiry regarding the purport of this strange proceeding; but could discover nothing, "beyond the fact of the spread of the cakes, and the general

younger men were passed over their heads, instead of being pensioned and suffered to retire and enjoy their latter years in the bosom of their families. "In my own regiment," a British officer writes to the *Times*, "we have havildars (sergeants), of forty years' service; and the last muster roll I signed, the strength of my company bore upon it, I think, five full privates of twenty years' service."—*Times*, July 2nd, 1857. Letter signed Sookhn Sunj.

‡ Major-general Tucker's Letter to the *Times*, dated July 19th, 1857.

* *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 94.

† The authority here relied on is Mr. Gubbins. But it appears, that before the alterations in the invaliding regulations referred to by him, as nearly simultaneous with the general service order, stringent rules had been given to the medical committees, which as early as 1854 had proved "a fruitful source of discontent and disgust;" native officers of excellent character being refused promotion, because "lame, worn-out, and unfit for further service;" yet kept for cantonment duty, while

belief that such distribution, passed on from village to village, will prevent hail falling, and keep away sickness. I also understand," the major adds, "that this practice is adopted by dyers, when their dye will not clear properly; and the impression is, that these cakes originally came from Scindia's, or the Bhopal states."*

Certainly, there was no attempt at secrecy; the Native officials themselves brought the chupatties to the European magistrates for inspection; but either could not, or would not, give any satisfactory account of the meaning of the transaction. It appears, that each recipient of two cakes was to make ten others, and transmit them in couples to the chokeydars (constables) of the nearest villages. It is asserted, that the cakes were circulated among the heads of villages not concerned in the mutiny, and did not pass at all among the sepoys.†

Still, the circumstance was a suspicious one, especially if there be any truth in the allegation, that sugar was used as a signal at the time of the Vellore mutiny.‡ The notion of thus conveying a warning to be in readiness for a preconcerted rising, is one which would naturally present itself to any people; and we are told that, in China, the "Feast of the Moon Loaves" is still held, in commemoration of a similar device in the conspiracy by which the Mongol dynasty was overthrown 500 years ago.§ At all events, it would have been only prudent in the government to endeavour to trace out the source of the movement, and the intent of its originators.

It is difficult to frame a succinct narrative of the events which occurred during the first few days of May. The various accounts laid before parliament are not only fragmentary, but consist in great part of telegrams founded on current rumours; and those narratives of individuals, published in the public journals, are, for the most part, from the nature of the subject, trustworthy only as regards transactions which occurred in the immediate locality of the writers. The official documents, however, disconnected and unsatisfactory as they are, furnish a clue to the inconsistency, indecision, and delay, which characterised the proceedings of the authorities; namely, that the objects and instructions of the commander-in-chief, were

diametrically opposed to those of the governor-general in council. They appear to have acted, the one on an avowedly innovating and coercive, the other on a professedly conservative plan; each issuing orders which puzzled the Europeans, and aggravated the distrust of the natives. The officers were placed in a most painful position; they could not tell which was to prevail, the Calcutta or the Simla policy; and, meanwhile, they did not know what tone to adopt towards their men. In a circular issued in May, by the governor-general in council, their incertitude is specially noticed in a paragraph, which states that, "from communications lately received by the government, it seems that misapprehension regarding the cartridges is not confined to the Native troops," but shared in by "some officers." The communications referred to would probably throw light on this critical period; and a handful of papers, uninteresting or needlessly given in duplicate, might have been left out of the Blue Books to make room for them. But they might involve unpleasant revelations, and are probably purposely withheld. As it is, the series of papers published on the subject, when carefully analysed, produce a painful conviction, not only that the attitude assumed by both civil and military authorities, was calculated to alarm the natives generally, and the Bengal army in particular; but also that the authorities themselves being aware of this, have concurred in withholding from the directors of the East India Company and from parliament, the evidences of their own disunion, vacillation, and inconsistency. Otherwise, surely they would have felt it necessary, and found it easy, to furnish the British nation with a connected statement of their measures and policy attested by the needful documents, instead of sending home a heterogeneous mass of papers, which, except in the case of those specially moved for by resolute members of parliament, resemble a heap of chaff in which some grains of wheat have been left by mistake.

One of these grains is an official communication, dated Simla, 4th of May, in which General Anson, with an infatuation which would be incredible except on his own showing, takes the success of his system for granted, and informs the Supreme government, as a matter for congratulation, that the practice of the Enfield rifle has been commenced at the several mus-

* Letter, March 5th, 1857.—Parl. Papers.

† *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1857. ‡ *Ibid.*

§ Gabet and Huc's *Travels in Tartary* in 1844, chap. iii.

ketry depôts, and that "the men of all grades have unhesitatingly and cheerfully used the new cartridges."* In the commander-in-chief's private circle "teaching the sepoys to fire with the Enfield rifle" was, however, spoken of as an "expensive amusement"† to government, on account of the incendiary fires by which the sepoys gave vent to their feelings. In a circular issued in the middle of May, the governor-general in council affirms, that "no cartridges for the new musket, and no cartridges made of a new kind of paper, have at any time been issued to any regiment of the army."‡ The substitution of tearing for biting, is referred to in the same paper as having been generally carried out; but this was not the case; for unquestionably, the first mutiny which occurred in Oude was directly caused by an attempt to compel a body of men, for the first time in their lives, to bite suspected cartridges.

Oude. 7th N. Infantry disarmed.—On the 1st of May, there were about 2,200 Native troops in Oude, and some 900 Europeans. The entire force consisted of—H. M.'s 32nd regiment; a troop of horse artillery; 7th light cavalry; seven regiments of Native infantry; three field batteries of the Oude irregular force; three regiments of Oude irregular infantry: and three regiments of Oude police.

Sir Henry Lawrence was, as has been shown (page 88), fully aware of the dangerous character of the force provided by government for the maintenance of British power in Oude. His endeavours to conciliate the talookdars by redressing some of the most notorious cases of oppression, had not been ineffectual; and the reductions made from the original rates of assessment in certain districts, had afforded some measure of relief from our revenue screw. In short, things seemed settling down quietly, or at least the authorities thought so; and they welcomed the rapidity with which the

district treasuries were filled on the commencement of the month, as a very favourable indication of the temper of the people. The troops were far from being in a satisfactory condition; but the care with which Sir Henry watched, met, and explained away rumours calculated to incite them to mutiny, preserved, and might have continued to preserve, at least their outward allegiance, but for the suicidal folly committed in issuing an order to the 7th infantry, which the men could not obey without being, in the words of General Low, "guilty of a heinous sin." They therefore refused, "not from any feeling of disloyalty or disaffection towards the government or their officers, but from an unfeigned and sincere dread, owing to their belief in the late rumours about the construction of these cartridges, that the act of biting them would involve a serious injury to their caste and to their future respectability of character."§

The commanding officer, Captain Graydon, was absent in the hills, on sick leave; and Lieutenant Watson was in charge, when, on the 2nd of May, according to the brief official account,|| the 7th N. infantry, stationed seven miles from the Lucknow cantonments, "refused to bite the cartridge when ordered by its own officers; and, subsequently, by the brigadier,"¶ on the ground of a current rumour that the cartridges had been tampered with.** In the afternoon of the following day, Brigadier Gray reported to Sir Henry Lawrence, at Lucknow, that the regiment was in a very mutinous and excited state. About the same time a letter was placed in the hands of Sir Henry, in which the men of the 7th infantry sought the advice and co-operation of their "superiors" or "elders" of the 48th, in the matter of the cartridges, and promised to follow their instructions for either active or passive resistance. This letter was originally delivered to a Brahmin sepoy of the 48th, who com-

the musketry depôt obnoxious to the incendiaries."

—May 7th, 1857. Further Papers (Parl.), p. 24.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies; p. 340.

§ Minute by Major-general Low.—*Ibid.*, p. 211.

|| The dates given above are taken from the official letter written by the secretary of the chief commissioner (Sir H. Lawrence,) to the secretary to government at Calcutta, on the 4th of May, 1857. Mr. Gubbins, in his interesting account of the affair, places it a week later; that is, dates the émeute on Sunday, the 10th, instead of the 3rd of May, and other consecutive events accordingly.

¶ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 209.

** Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 10.

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 370.

† An officer of rank, writing a semi-official letter from Simla on the 28th of April, 1857, by command of General Anson, says, "It is an expensive amusement teaching the sepoys to fire with the Enfield rifle, at least as far as it has turned out at Umballa. It has cost, I believe, the government by two fires alone some 32,700 rupees, and I take the liberty of doubting whether the old musket in the hands of the sepoy was not quite as efficient an arm as the new one is ever likely to prove." From March 26th to May 1st, fires occurred on fifteen different evenings. "The 'new cartridges' were pointed out by Commissioner Barnes as the sole cause which rendered

municated its contents to two Native officers, and the three laid it before the chief commissioner.*

Sir Henry Lawrence ordered the brigadier to parade the regiment, make every possible explanation, and induce the sepoys to bite the cartridge. One Native officer was nearly prevailed on to obey the obnoxious orders; but several of the men called out to him that, even if he did so, they would not. A wing of H.M.'s 32nd regiment, and a strong body of Native infantry and cavalry, selected from various corps, were ordered out by Sir Henry, and arrived at the lines of the mutineers about nine o'clock in the evening of the 3rd of May, the second Sunday—memorable for panic and strife. But the climax was not yet reached. The cup was not yet full to overflowing.

Two officers (Captain Boileau and Lieutenant Hardinge) unconnected with the regiment,† and whose extraordinary and most creditable influence is not accounted for, succeeded, before the arrival of the coercing force, in restoring order; and, what was quite unparalleled, in inducing the 7th to deliver up the writers of the treasonable letter before named, and to promise the surrender of forty other ringleaders. The approach of Sir Henry Lawrence and his staff, with the European troops, renewed the excitement which had nearly subsided. The terrified sepoys watched the position taken up by the European artillery and infantry. It was bright moonlight, when an artillery sergeant, by some mistake, lighted a port-fire. The 7th thought an order for their extermination had been given. About 120 men stood firm, but the great mass of the regiment flung down their arms and fled. A squadron of light cavalry (native) was sent off to intercept the fugitives, and many of them were brought back. Sir Henry rode up to the remaining men, spoke calmly to them, and bade them place on the ground their muskets and accoutrements. The order was unhesitatingly obeyed. The sepoys laid down their pieces, and took off their cross-belts with subdued exclamations of good-will to the service, resting satisfied with Sir Henry's assurance, that though government would be asked to disband the corps, those found guiltless might be re-enlisted.‡ The disarmed men were directed to recall the runaways, which they did; and

by about noon on the following day (the 4th), the entire regiment had returned and reoccupied its lines.

The views taken of the matter by the members of the Supreme Council differed materially; nevertheless, they all agreed with the governor-general in censuring the re-enlistment proposed by Sir Henry Lawrence, and in seeing "no reason, in the tardy contrition of the regiment, for hesitating to confirm the punishment of all who were guilty."

Mr. Dorin wrote a minute on the subject; which must suffice to exempt him, as senior member of council, from any portion of the censure heaped on Lord Canning for undue "moderation." He pronounced disbandment an insufficient punishment; adding—"The sooner this epidemic of mutiny is put a stop to, the better." (The conclusion is indisputable; but it was formed some months too late to be acted on.) "Mild measures won't do it. A severe example is wanted. * * * I would try the whole of the men concerned, for mutiny, and punish them with the utmost rigour of military law. * * * My theory is, that no corps mutinies that is well commanded. If it should turn out that the officers of the 7th have been negligent in their duty, I would remand every one of them to their own regiments." This is a pretty compliment to regimental officers in general; perhaps some of them had their theory also, and held that no people rebel who are well governed. If so, they might reasonably inquire whether there were no means of "remanding" a civilian of sixty years of age, described as being "in all his habits a very Sybarite;" who "in no other country but India, and in no other service but the civil service, would have attained any but the most subordinate position;"§ but who, nevertheless, in the event of any casualty occurring to Lord Canning, would become, by rule of seniority, the actual and despotic sovereign of the Anglo-Indian empire. To return to the case in point. Mr. Dorin concluded his minute by declaring, that the biting of the cartridge could only have been an excuse for mutiny; an assertion which corroborates the opinion expressed by the writer above quoted—that despite Mr. Dorin's thirty-three years' service in Calcutta (and he had never been fifty miles beyond it), he was "practically ignorant of

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 30.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 211.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 210.

§ *Mutiny in the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 13.

the manners, and customs, and peculiar requirements of the people of India.”* General Low, whose experience of native character was second to that of no man in India, frankly pointed out the order to bite the cartridge as the cause, not the pretext, of mutiny. Had the energy of the general been equal to his judgment and integrity, a much wiser course would probably have long before been adopted by the council: but fifty-seven years’ service in India can hardly be expected to leave a man the physical strength needful to the lucid exposition of his views, and to the maintenance and vindication of his own ripened convictions in antagonism to the prejudices of younger colleagues.

Mr. Grant, a civilian, of thirty years’ standing, and a man of unquestioned talent, agreed with General Low in attributing the conduct of the men to an “unfeigned dread of losing caste, engendered by the stories regarding cartridges, which have been running like wildfire through the country lately.” Sepoys are, he added, very much like children; and “acts which, on the part of European soldiers, would be proof of the blackest disloyalty, may have a very different signification when done by these credulous and inconsiderate, but generally not ill-disposed beings.” He concurred with Mr. Dorin in censuring the officers; and considered that the mere fact of making cartridge-biting a point, after it had been purposely dropped from the authorised system of drill, merely for “rifle practice, was a presumption for any imaginable degree of perverse management.” Lord Canning also seems to have been puzzled on this point; for he remarks, that “it appears that the revised instructions for the platoon exercise, by which the biting of the cartridge is dispensed with, had not come into operation at Lucknow.” The mischief would have been prevented had the government publicly and entirely withdrawn, instead of privately and partially “dropped,” the obnoxious practice: but even as the case stands, it is unaccountable that a subaltern, left in charge of a regiment, should, on his own responsibility, have issued an order manifestly provocative of mutiny, without any apparent object whatever. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary

it is much more probable that he acted on orders emanating from Simla.

Whatever the cause of the *émeute*, Mr. Grant (who has been satirically described as belonging “to a family distinguished for obstructive ability”)† advised that the same “calm, just, considerate, and dignified course” which had been adopted in each of the cases of the 19th and 34th Native infantry, should be followed now; and he suggested “the dismissal of the bad men, with the trial, by court-martial, of a few of the worst men a month hence.”‡

Fortunately for the lives of every European in India (not excepting that of Mr. Grant), Sir Henry Lawrence was not the man to stand with folded arms, watching the progress of a devouring flame, and waiting orders regarding the most calm and dignified course to be adopted for its extinction “a month hence.” He poured water on at once, and quenched the flames so effectively, that Oude, the very centre of combustion, did not again catch fire until long after the “severe example,” desired by Mr. Dorin, had taken place in Meerut, and set all India in a blaze.

The conduct of Sir Henry was so utterly opposed to that of a model official, that there can be little doubt he would have received something worse than the “severe wiggings”§ given to General Hearsey, for his prompt reward of native fidelity, had not one of those crises been at hand, which, while they last, secure unchecked authority to the men who have nerve and skill to weather the storm. While the council were deliberating, Sir Henry was acting. He forthwith appointed a court of inquiry, to investigate the cause, and attendant circumstances, of the so-called mutiny; and then, instead of disbanding the regiment, according to his first impulse, he dismissed all the Native officers (with one or two exceptions) and about fifteen sepoy, and forgave the rest; re-arming about 200 (probably those who stood firm, or were first to return to their duty), and awaiting the orders of government with regard to the others. He promoted several whose good conduct had been conspicuous. The Native officers and sepoy who brought him the treasonable letter from the 7th, were made the objects of special favour; as was also a sepoy of the

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 13.

† *Mead’s Sepoy Revolt*, p. 21.

‡ † Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 213.

§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 25. See also *ante*, p. 133; and Lord Derby’s speeches in the India debates of December 3rd and 7th, 1857.

13th Native infantry, whose loyalty had been evidenced by the surrender of two Lucknow citizens, who had endeavoured to stir up mutiny in the cantonments. A grand durbar, or state reception, was held at the chief commissioner's residence, in the Muriaon cantonments (whither Sir Henry had removed from the Lucknow residency, on account of the heat). All the chief civilians and military men were present, and chairs were provided for the Native officers of the troops in the cantonments, as also for the leading people of Lucknow. Sir Henry spoke ably and emphatically on the religious toleration of the British government, and appealed to the history of an entire century, for evidence of the improbability of any interference being now attempted. He reminded his hearers that Mussulman rulers at Delhi had persecuted Hindoos; and Hindoo rulers, at Lahore, had persecuted Mussulmans; but that the British had equally protected both parties. Some evil-disposed persons seeing only a few Europeans here and there, imagined that, by circulating false reports, the government might be easily overthrown; but the power which had sent 50,000 Europeans to fight against Russia, could, in the space of three months, land twice that number in India. Then calling forth the natives who had given proof of fidelity, he bestowed on them khelats or dresses of honour, swords, and purses of money; and cordially shaking hands with the recipients, wished them long life to enjoy the honours they had richly deserved. The tone taken by Sir Henry was adopted by the other Europeans. They mixed freely with the Native officers; and such as could understand one another conversed together in groups, on the momentous affairs of the period. Sir Henry Lawrence gained time by this judicious policy, and used it wisely in preparing for the struggle which he had delayed, but could not avert.

Disbandment of 34th at Barrackpoor.—It is now necessary to notice the course adopted by the governor-general in council, with regard to the 34th regiment—a course which Mr. Grant, in a minute dated as late as the 7th of May, applauded in the highest terms, as having been “neither too hasty

nor too dilatory;” adding, “it appears to me, to have had the best effects, and to have been generally approved by sensible men.”* There were, however, not a few leading men in India who took a very different view of the case, and quoted the long-deferred decision regarding the 34th, in illustration of the assertion of an Indian journal (*Calcutta Englishman*), that of two stamps in the Calcutta post-office, respectively marked “insufficient,” and “too late,” one or both ought to have been impressed upon every act of the Supreme government.

Some five weeks after the memorable Sunday afternoon on which 400 men of the 34th Native infantry witnessed, with more than tacit approval, a murderous attack on two of their European officers, the government resolved† on disbanding the seven companies of that regiment present at the time. The remaining three companies, stationed at Chittagong, were in no way implicated; but had, on the contrary, proffered assurances of continued allegiance, and of regret for the misconduct of their comrades.‡ On the 6th of May, at five in the morning, in presence of all the troops within two marches of the station, the seven companies were paraded, and commanded to pile their arms and strip off the uniform they had disgraced. They obeyed; the payment of arrears was then commenced; and in about two hours the men, no longer soldiers, were marched off to Pultha ghaut for conveyance to Chinsurah. General Hearsey, who gave so interesting an account of the disbandment of the 19th, abstained from furnishing any particulars in the case of the 34th; but his very silence is significant, and lends weight to a circumstance quoted by a military author, in evidence of the bitter feelings of the latter corps. The sepoys wore Kilmarnock caps, which, having paid for themselves, they were allowed to keep. Before crossing the river, many of them were seen to take off their caps, dash them on the ground, and trample them in the mud,§ as if in angry defiance of their late masters. The order for their disbandment was directed to be read on parade, at the head of every regiment in

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 213.

† This resolve, tardy as it was, is said to have been hastened by telegraphic tidings of the *Émeute* in Oude on the 3rd. The government order was dated the 4th of May; the punishment of the 34th being of imperative necessity before the disaffection

of the 7th irregular infantry could become publicly known at Barrackpoor. Lord Derby commented on the want of foresight and vigour evidenced by Lord Canning's advisers in these proceedings.—*Times*, Dec. 4th, 1857.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 147.
§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*, p. 33.

India, still unaccompanied by any assurance of the withdrawal of the abhorred cartridges. Either for this or some other reason, Sir Henry Lawrence would not allow the order to be read to the troops in Oude, fearing that it would hasten rather than repress an outbreak.*

We have now reached the end of the "passive, respectful mutinies," which our own blind inconsistencies provoked and fostered. The name of Meerut stands at the head of a new series, the history of which might be fitly written in characters of blood.

CHAPTER III.

MEERUT—23RD APRIL TO 11TH MAY, 1858.

THE cantonment of Meerut, two miles distant from the town, was divided into two parts by a branch of the Calce Nuddee river, and was chiefly remarkable for its great extent, five miles long by two broad, and for a fine parade-ground, four miles long by one broad. It had a very large bazaar, abounding in "budmashes" (literally, men of bad livelihood), near which stood a gaol crowded with convicts. The road to Delhi (thirty-two miles distant) lay close to the Native lines. The troops stationed here consisted of H.M.'s 6th dragoon guards (carabineers); H.M.'s 60th rifles (one battalion); a light field battery; a party of horse artillery; 3rd Native light cavalry; 11th and 20th Native infantry; some sappers and miners. The European troops (exclusive of the sappers and miners), amounted to 1,863 including 132 commissioned officers. The Natives numbered 2,912, including only 52 commissioned officers.†

The chief purpose of stationing an unusually large proportion of Europeans here, was to keep in check the Native garrison of Delhi; but this very proportion seems to have rendered the authorities more than commonly indifferent to the feelings of the sepoys, and to the dissatisfaction which manifested itself in the form of determined disobedience to orders as early as the 24th of April. The cause and pretext (cause with the credulous, pretext with the designing) was of course the cartridge, which had by this time become the recognised *bête noir* of the whole Bengal army.

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 34.

† Parl. Paper.—(Commons), 9th February, 1858; p. 3.

‡ According to the *East India Register and Army List* the colonel of the regiment, Colonel H. Thomson was absent "on furlough." The *East*

The 3rd Native cavalry was a leading regiment. It had been greatly valued by Lord Lake, for service rendered at Delhi, Laswaree, Deig, and Bhurtpoor; since then Afghanistan, Ghuznee, Aliwal, and Sobraon, had been added to its list of battles. It contained a large proportion of men of good family and high-caste. The general weapon was the sword; but fifteen in each troop were taught to use fire-arms, and distinguished as carabineers or skirmishers. There were a few bad characters among the carabineers, but the majority were the flower of a remarkably fine corps. To these men their commanding officer‡ suddenly resolved to teach the mode of tearing instead of biting the cartridges, in anticipation of the new kind coming out; and on the afternoon of the 23rd, he issued an order for a parade of all the skirmishers on the following morning. The order created great excitement; and an old Hindoo havildar, named Heerah Sing, waited on Captain Craigie, the captain of his troop, and, in the name of his comrades, besought that the skirmishers might be excused from parade, because the name of the regiment would suffer in the estimation of other corps, if they were to use the cartridges during the present excitement on the subject. They did not threaten to refuse to fire them, but only sued for delay. Captain Craigie reasoned with Heerah Sing on the absurdity of being influenced by groundless rumours; but he knew that the feeling was real, however unreasonable the cause; and

India Register dates his first appointment at 1798; and, therefore, after sixty years' service the veteran officer may be supposed to have been warranted in retiring from active service for the remainder of his life. In the *Army List* the name of the officer in command is given as Colonel G. M. C. Smyth, and the date of his first commission as 1819.

it being then nearly ten o'clock, he wrote a private note to the adjutant of the regiment, stating the request which had been made to him, and urging compliance with it, as, "if disregarded, the regiment might immediately be in a state of mutiny." Other officers had meanwhile reported on the distress of the regiment, and the colonel seemed inclined to put off the parade, when the adjutant unluckily suggested, that if he did so the men would say that he was afraid of them. The fear of being accused of fear decided the colonel on leaving his order uncanceled. In the course of the evening, the house of the orderly (the hated favourite of the colonel) was set on fire; also an empty horse hospital; and the men kept aloof, in evident disaffection.

Next morning, at daybreak, the skirmishers appeared on parade, and the fated cartridges were brought forward in bundles. The colonel harangued the men in bad Hindustani, and endeavoured to explain to them that the cartridges were to be used by tearing, not biting; and assured the troopers that if they obeyed, he would report them to head-quarters, and make them famous. But "there was no confidence towards him in their hearts, and his words only mystified them." Heerah Sing, and four other troopers, took the cartridges; the other eighty-five refused them. The colonel then dismissed the parade, and reported what had occurred to General Hewitt. A court of inquiry was held, and the disobedient skirmishers were put off duty, and directed to remain in the lines till further orders. The European officers of the 3rd anxiously waited instructions from the commander-in-chief on the subject, anticipating, as an extreme sentence, that, "the skirmishers

might be dismissed without defence; in which case, it was whispered that the whole corps would mutiny, and be joined by the other Native troops in the station." The letter from which the above circumstances are quoted, was written on the 30th of April. The writer adds—"We are strongly garrisoned by European troops here; but what a horrible idea that they should be required to defend us!"

The 3rd of May came, and brought no word from head-quarters, and the alarm began to subside: but between the 3rd and the 6th, orders on the subject must have been sent; for a despatch was written from Simla on the latter day (from the adjutant-general to the secretary of government), informing the authorities at Calcutta that General Anson had directed the trial, by a general court-martial, of eighty-five men of the 3rd cavalry, who had refused to receive the cartridges tendered to them. It further stated, that a squad of artillery recruits (seventeen in number) having in like manner refused "the carbine cartridges ordered to be served out to them for use at the drill," had been at once summarily dismissed by the officer commanding the artillery at the station—a punishment which the commander-in-chief censured as incommensurate to the offence.* No report of the general court-martial has been made public up to the present time (December, 1858).†

In previous instances, the commander-in-chief had vainly endeavoured to compel Native courts-martial to adjudge penalties commensurate with his notions of the heinousness of sepoy offences: it is therefore necessary that some explanation should be given for the unaccountable severity of the present sentence. In the first place, did

* Despatch, May 6th.—Appendix to the first series of Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, p. 373. This is the only parliamentary document yet published which contains any reference to the events preceding the 9th of May. The above account is based on the graphic and succinct narrative, evidently written, though not signed, by the wife of Captain Craigie, dated April 30th, and published in the *Daily News* of 29th July, 1857. Mrs. Craigie adds—"General (Hewitt), commanding here, was extremely angry on learning the crisis which Colonel (Smyth) had brought on, bitterly blaming his having ordered that parade. . . . Of course, ordering the parade at all, under the present excitement, was a lamentable piece of indiscretion; but even when that had been done, the colonel might have extricated himself without humiliation. Henry feels convinced that he could have got the men to fire, or the parade might have been turned into an explanation of the new cartridge, without any firing being proposed.

Henry, as a troop captain, had nothing to do beyond his own troop; but thither he rode at daybreak on that fatal morning, and remained for hours among his men, enjoining them to keep steady, and withstand any impulse to join others in excitement; bidding them do nothing without consulting him, and assuring them that, though differing from them in faith, he was one of them—their friend and protector, as long as they were true to their duty; and the men felt that he spoke the truth. They would have fired for him: they told him they would, though unwillingly."

† It was held on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of May, and the court was composed of six Mohammedan and nine Native officers, and presided over by the deputy-judge-advocate-general. For the latter piece of information, I am indebted to the courtesy of Sir Archdale Wilson, and for the former portion of the paragraph to that of Mr. Philip Melville, late head of the military department of the East India House.

the Native officers actually decree the entire sentence of hard labour *in irons*?* and if so, under what amount of direct or indirect coercion was it pronounced? Had the court received any private intimation of the decision at which they were expected to arrive? In what terms did the judge sum up the proceedings, and dictate or suggest the sentence; and had it or had it not been previously suggested to him? Sufficient evidence has oozed out to prove that the commander-in-chief gave very decided instructions on the conduct of the trial: the British public have a clear right to know precisely what they were, in order to ascertain what degree of general mismanagement, of individual crotchets in the governors, affecting the deepest religious convictions of the governed, and of petty tyranny, may be indulged in by future commanders-in-chief, without driving an Indian army too near the dizzy verge of mutiny. It appears, that some days before the assemblage of the court-martial, the European authorities knew the decision which would be arrived at, and anticipated its most natural result; for Mr. Greathed, the commissioner of Meerut, being called away to Alighur on political business, returned to his post on the 9th (a day earlier than he had at first intended),

* Since the above statement was written, some additional information has been published by government on the Meerut proceedings, under the title of *Further Papers relative to the Insurrection* (not *mutiny*, as heretofore styled by the authorities) *in the East Indies*. The papers only occupy six pages, and contain the usual amount of repetition and extraneous official matter. The proceedings of the court of inquiry and of the three days' court-martial are still withheld, and the only new light on the subject is afforded in a "Memorandum drawn up by the judge-advocate-general of the army, of the circumstances which apparently led to the mutiny of the Native army being precipitated." It is therein stated, that "by the votes of fourteen out of the fifteen Native officers who composed the court-martial, the whole of the accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for ten years each. But the court solicited favourable consideration for the prisoners, on account of the good character which they had hitherto borne, as testified to by their commanding officer; and on account of their having been misled by vague reports regarding the cartridges." Major-general Hewitt, however, declared he could find nothing in the conduct of the prisoners to warrant him in attending to the recommendation of the court. "Their former good conduct has been blasted by present misbehaviour, and their having allowed themselves to be influenced by vague reports, instead of attending to the advice, and obeying the orders of their European superiors, is the gist of the offence for which they have been condemned. * * * Some of them even had the insolence to desire that firing parades might be

because "he knew that imprisonment would follow the trial, and that an attempt to force the gaol and to liberate the prisoners might be expected."†

A private letter from Meerut says, it was understood that General Hewitt had been desired to treat the skirmishers with the "utmost severity." The trial was conducted accordingly. "The prisoners were charged with disobedience, which was undeniable, and which certainly demanded punishment. A few tried to plead, with little skill but considerable truth; but the principle adopted towards them seemed indifference to whatever they might have to say, and the men felt themselves condemned already in the minds of their court." They were all found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment in gaol and hard labour—eighty for ten and five for six years, the very noteworthy circumstance in the latter case being, that the favoured five had served under instead of above three years. Many of the former must have been able to plead a long term of faithful service; but that, it seems, was regarded as an aggravation, not an extenuation, of their fault.

General Hewitt had received orders to carry out the sentence of the court-martial, without waiting its confirmation by the deferred till the agitation about cartridges among the Native troops had come to a close. * * * Even now, they attempt to justify so gross an outrage upon discipline, by alleging that they had doubts of the cartridges; there has been no acknowledgment of error, no expression of regret, no pleading for mercy." This latter hinted aggravation is explained away by the testimony already quoted regarding the conviction entertained by the men, that nothing they could say would shake the foregone conclusion of the court. They persevered in asserting their belief that, by using the "new greased cartridges" urged upon them, they would forfeit caste. Major-general Hewitt declared, that to the majority of the prisoners no portion of the sentence would be remitted; but that some of them being very young, those who had not been above five years in the service, would be set free at the expiration of five instead of ten years. Not only was there no remission of the sentence, but a very cruel degradation was superadded, by the painful and ignominious fettering. Even General Anson, when informed of the prisoners having been "put in irons on parade-ground in the presence of their regiment, expressed his regret at this unusual procedure." Notwithstanding this qualification, it is evident that General Hewitt acted in accordance with the spirit, if not the letter, of his instructions. In the newly published papers, there is much in confirmation, and nothing in contradiction, of Mrs. Craigie's statement.

† *Letters written during the Siege of Delhi*; by H. H. Greathed, Esq., late of the Bengal civil service, and political agent of Delhi. Edited by his widow. Longman, 1858.—Introduction, p. xv.

commander-in-chief, and arrangements were made for its execution on the following morning, in the presence of all the troops at the station. A guard of European dragoons and rifles was ordered to keep watch over the prisoners during the night, and some difficulty was experienced in calming the excitement which the presence of the Europeans created in the Native lines. At day-break on the 9th of May, the troops assembled for this most memorable punishment parade. The "sunless and stormy" atmosphere, described by an eye-witness, bore but too close an analogy to the temper of the sepoys. The scene must have distressed the British officers of the 3rd; who, if not absolutely blinded by prejudice, must have felt for and with their men: but they were compelled to refrain from offering the slightest or most private and respectful warning, at this fearful crisis, by the "severe reprimand"* bestowed by the commander-in-chief on Captain Craigie, for his timely but neglected suggestions, given on the night before the parade of the 24th of April. After such a lesson, the subordinate officers could only watch, in silent amazement, the incendiary proceedings of their superiors. The uniform of the mutineers was stripped off, and the armourers' and smiths' departments of the horse artillery being in readiness, each man was heavily ironed and shackled, preparatory to being worked, for the allotted term of years, in gangs on the roads. These ill-omened proceedings occupied three long hours. The victims to our inconsistent policy showed the deepest sense of the degradation inflicted on them. But resistance would have been madness; the slightest attempt would have produced an exterminating fire from the guns manned by the Europeans, and pointed at them. Some clasped their hands together, and appealed to General Hewitt for mercy; their comrades stood looking on in gloomy silence, an order having been given that their offi-

cers only should attend on horseback. When the fettering had been at length accomplished, the men were marched off the field. As they passed the ranks of the 3rd they shouted blessings on Captain Craigie, and curses on their colonel,† and hurled reproaches at the dismounted troopers, for having suffered them to be thus degraded.‡ At length, when the military authorities had done their work, they coolly delivered over the mutineers to the civil magistrate, to be lodged in the common gaol, in company with some 1,200 convicts; the whole to be left under the sole guard of native burkandauz, or matchlockmen.

The sepoys returned to their lines apparently completely cowed. The Europeans were left masters of the situation; and the affair having gone off so quietly, the majority were probably disposed to view more favourably than ever, General Anson's resolve to trample under foot the caste scruples of the sepoys, and "never give in to their beastly prejudices."§ The phrase, not a very attractive one, has been quoted before; but it is necessary to repeat it, as the best explanation of the commander-in-chief's proceedings. Those about his person could, it is said, furnish other traits, equally striking and characteristic.

The mutineers were, as we have seen, marched off to prison; the men returned to their lines, and the Europeans to their bungalows, to take a siesta or a drive, to smoke or play billiards, till dinner-time. The officers of the 3rd had, however, a painful task assigned them—that of visiting the mutineers in prison to inquire about their debts, and arrange their affairs. The anxiety of the captives about their destitute families was most touching, and three of the officers resolved to set on foot a subscription to provide for the support of these innocent sufferers. But nothing transpired within the prison to give the visitors any idea of an intended revolt, or to lend weight to the rumours abroad. This same evening, Colonel

* The above fact is taken from a short unpublished paper, printed for private circulation, and entitled, *A Brief Account of the Mutiny of the 3rd Light Cavalry*; by Colonel Smyth. It appears that the colonel had, in the early part of April, received intelligence from a friend, regarding the feelings of a party of sepoys with whom he "had fallen in." They spoke strongly in favour of the disbanded 19th, and expressed themselves ready to join in a general mutiny. This information Colonel Smyth forwarded to General Anson about the middle of April; and, on the 23rd, he (Colonel Smyth) ordered a parade, intending to teach the men

to load without biting their cartridges, which he thought they would be pleased to learn. The cartridges were to be distributed over-night. The men refused to take them; and Colonel Smyth adds—"One of my officers (Captain Craigie) wrote to the adjutant in the strongest terms, urging me to put off the parade, for which he received a severe reprimand from the commander-in-chief."

† Testimony of an eye-witness.

‡ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by one who has served under Sir C. Napier; p. 35. See, also, letter of correspondent to *Calcutta Englishman*.

§ Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*; p. 37.

Finnis, of the 11th Native infantry, was seated at Colonel Custine's dinner table, when a lady remarked that placards were said to have been seen about the city, calling upon all true Mussulmans to rise and slaughter the English. "The threat," says Mrs. Greathed, "was treated by us all with indignant disbelief."*

If any of the party could have heard what was then passing in the widely scattered Native lines, it might have spoiled their sleep that night. As it was, no one—not even the commissioner, who had foreseen the probability of an attack on the gaol—seems to have manifested any anxiety regarding the temper of the Native soldiery, or inquired the workings of their mind upon an act calculated to fill them with shame and sorrow for their comrades, and with terror for themselves. The penalty of disbandment for refusing to use the abhorred cartridges, was changed, by the act of that morning, into the degrading punishment of a common felon: the recusants were doomed to labour for years, perhaps for life, in irons, for the profit of their foreign masters, while their wives and children were left to starve! Was there no alternative for them except the cruel one of forfeiture of caste, of virtual excommunication, with all its wretched consequences, its civil and religious disabilities? Both Mohammedans and Hindoos had, as has been shown, recent grievances rankling in their breasts: the present measure looked like part of a system to prostrate them in the dust, if not to wholly crush them; and when the humbled 3rd looked at the empty huts of their comrades, and thought of the crowded gaol (which the excessive cleanliness associated with high-caste renders specially disgusting) and of their forlorn families, no wonder their hearts sank within them. Beneath the general depression, there were, doubtless, under-currents; and the suggestions of the bolder or more intriguing, would naturally gain ready hearing. There must have been decided dissatisfaction; but there is no evidence to show that any plot was formed on the night of the 9th; it rather appears, that until late in the afternoon of Sunday, the 10th, the troops remained, as it were, paralysed, but ready to

be thrown into a state of panic by the most trifling occurrence. In fact, their excessive fear verged on despair: no report regarding the hostile intentions of the government was too absurd to be believed; and fancying themselves driven into a corner, they drugged themselves with bhang, and, to the amazement of the Europeans, suddenly changed their attitude of humble deprecation, for one of reckless, pitiless, unreasoning ferocity.

The best authority on the subject (General Hewitt) considers, that "the outbreak was not premeditated; but the result of a rumour that a party was parading to seize their arms; which was strengthened by the fact of the 60th rifles parading for evening service."†

The conclusion is evidently a just one; for had there been any combination, however secret, or however superficial, the sepoys would have waited till the Europeans were either in church, or in their beds. They had no superiority of numbers to presume upon; and the majority acted, beyond all doubt, on an ungovernable influence of rage and desperation. Shortly before six o'clock P.M., a body of the 3rd cavalry flung themselves on their horses, and galloped off to the gaol, where they released their comrades, and the other prisoners, amounting in number to 1,200. Of course, many of these latter played a leading part in the outrages of that terrible night; but some were so terrified by the madness of their new associates, that they came and voluntarily gave themselves up to the magistrates as soon as the first tumult had subsided. The rescued "eighty-five" were brought back in triumph to the Native lines. They had had enough of prison discipline to rouse, not quench, their fiercest passions. The degradation was fresh; their limbs were yet bruised and raw with the fetters. They proceeded to the compound of Captain Galloway, of the 3rd light cavalry, and compelled his blacksmith to remove their chains.‡ Then they went among their comrades, calling aloud for vengeance. The whole of the 3rd, except Captain Craigie's troop of fifty men, joined the mutineers: so did the 20th N.I.; but the 11th N.I. hung back, defended their officers, and such of them as were stationed on guard, remained at their posts.

The mass of the troops had now crossed the Rubicon, and knew that to recede or hesitate would be to ensure the death of

* Greathed's *Letters*; Introduction, p. xiv.

† Major-general Hewitt to adjutant-general of the army, May 11th, 1857.—Further Papers on Mutinies (Commons), No. 3; p. 9.

‡ Letter of the Rev. J. C. Smyth, one of the chaplains at Meerut.—*Times*, June 30th, 1857.

rebels, or the life of galley-slaves. The inflammable bungalows, mostly thatched with straw, were soon set on fire, including General Hewitt's. Dense clouds of smoke filled the hot night air, and volumes of flame were seen shooting up in columns to heaven, or rolling in billows along the ground. The bugle sounded the alarm; irregular discharges of musketry were heard on every side. The sepoy seemed to have turned in a moment from obedient children to infuriated madmen. The madness, too, was fearfully contagious; the impetus was irresistible. The 11th held out long, and stood by their officers, while their colonel reasoned with the mutineers. But, alas! the time was past for arguing the matter, save with swords and guns. A sepoy of the 20th Native infantry took aim at Colonel Finnis: the example was instantly followed; and the good and gallant officer fell dead from his horse, amid a shower of bullets. On this the 20th fired into the 11th; and the latter corps being no longer able to remain neutral,* reluctantly joined their countrymen, after having first placed their officers in safety. Then incendiarism, practised in detail at the musketry depôts ever since the hated cartridges were distributed, reached its height, the mutineers being "assisted by the population of the bazaar, the city, and the neighbouring villages." It was mutiny coupled with insurrection. The sepoy had, however, no leaders, and their movements were, to the last degree, irregular and disconnected. Kill, kill! was the cry of a few desperate fanatics maddened with bhang; booty, booty! was the all-comprehensive object of the budmashes of the city, and of the scum of the vast following which ever attends a large Indian cantonment, and which was now suddenly let loose on the affrighted European families. The scene was terrible; but it resembled rather the raid of insurgent villagers than the revolt of trained troops: there was, in fact, no fighting at all, properly so called; for the incensed 3rd cavalry mutineers (who, it must be remembered, were Mohammedans of high family) were anxious to reach Delhi, where they felt sure of the sympathy of their co-religionists; while the mass of the sepoy had joined the mutiny because they could not remain neutral; and the first flush of excitement passed, their great desire was to get out of the reach of the European guns. Eight women

and seven or eight children perished; and there were instances in which the dead bodies were horribly slashed and cut by the infuriated mob; but the highest official account of European lives lost, including officers and soldiers, does not reach forty.

The only considerable body of sepoy who remained thoroughly staunch during the night was Captain Craigie's troop of cavalry; but it required not merely his remarkable influence over his men, but consummate tact in using it, to prevent their being carried away by the torrent. Never was there a more conspicuous instance of the value of that "faculty for managing natives," spoken of by the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* as a "sixth sense, which can neither be communicated nor learnt."† Mrs. Craigie's account of the affair bears strong internal evidence of truthfulness, and is corroborated by contemporary official and private statements. She was driving to church with another lady, when, passing the mess of the 3rd regiment, they saw the servants leaning over the walls of the compound, all looking towards the road from the Native infantry lines. Several voices called out to the ladies to return, for there was a mutiny of the Native infantry, and a fight in the bazaar. Crowds of armed men were now seen hurrying towards the carriage. Its occupants drove back in great alarm; but soon overtaking an English private running for his life from several men (not sepoy) armed with lathes (long sticks), they stopped the carriage, and drew in the fugitive, his assailants continuing to strike at him; but the heroines held out their arms and pleaded for him, and were suffered to drive off in safety with the rescued soldier. On reaching her own bungalow, Mrs. Craigie found her husband in entire ignorance of what was occurring. He started off to the lines of the 3rd, and found that the three first troops had disappeared; but his own (the 4th), with the 5th and 6th, were still there. Another of the troop captains, whose name does not appear, but who was senior in rank to Captain Craigie, now joined him, and the two officers asked the men if they could rely on them. The answer was an eager declaration of fidelity. The men said they had heard there was fighting at the gaol to release the prisoners; and clustering round Captain Craigie, professed themselves ready to do whatever he might order. The officers

* General Hewitt's letter.

† *Times*, June 15th, 1857.

directed the troops to mount and follow them. Meanwhile, a gentleman, whose name is not stated, came up, and was asked if he had any orders from the colonel. The reply was, that "the colonel was flying for his life, and had given no orders."* The officers rode on with the three troops. Captain Craigie, anxiously occupied with his own men, discovered, after riding some distance, that he was alone with the 4th troop. He soon afterwards met the released cavalry mutineers with their irons broken. They were on their way to Delhi, and were mounted and in uniform, their comrades having given them their own equipments. The fugitives recognised Captain Craigie, shouted to him that they were free, and poured forth blessings on him. "He was," says his wife, "indeed their friend; and had he been listened to, these horrors might never have happened." Captain Craigie, seeing that it was too late to preserve the gaol, turned back, to try and save the standards of the 3rd from the lines. The roads were thronged with infantry mutineers and bazaar men, armed and firing. A lady† was driving by in a carriage, when a trooper came up with her and stabbed her. Captain Craigie cut the assassin down with his sword, but the victim was already dead. Soon after this, a ball whizzed by his own ear; and looking round, he saw a trooper out of uniform, with his head muffled, fire at him again. "Was that meant for me?" he shouted. "Yes!" said the trooper, "I will have your blood."

Captain Craigie's presence of mind did not desert him; he believed the men might mutiny from him if he fired; and turning to them, he asked if they would see him shot. They vociferated "No!" and forced the mutineer back again and again; but would neither kill nor seize him. A Christian trumpeter urged the captain to save himself by riding faster, and he dashed on to the lines; but passing his own house by the way, he asked who would go and defend

* "This statement is partially incorrect, for the colonel had directed Adjutant Clarke to order the men to stand to their horses, to be ready to mount if required." The order did not reach the men, and would evidently have exercised very little effect if it had; but the former portion of the quotation in question, is corroborated by Colonel Smyth's own words. "Six officers," he states, "came into my compound chased by infantry sepoy, and concealed themselves in my house. I then went to inform the general (Hewitt) of what was going on. I took my own orderly and the field officers with me. I told them to draw swords, as the road was getting crowded, and

his wife. The whole troop (at least all with him) raised their hands. He said he only wanted four men. "I, I, I," cried every one; so he sent the first four, and rode on with the others to the lines, where he found Major Richardson and two European officers, with a few remaining men of the other troops. The Native infantry were flying across the parade-ground, pursued by the European artillery. The officers, bidding their men follow, galloped into the open country, with three of the four regimental standards; and, on seeing them safe, Captain Craigie, by the permission of Major Richardson, returned to provide for the safety of his wife. She, poor lady! had endured an interval of terrible anxiety; but, like her husband, had retained perfect self-possession. The rescued European was one of the carabinieri—a guard of whom had been placed over the mutineers, and had thereby become the objects of especial hatred with the mob. She dressed him in her husband's clothes, and then she and her female companion watched the progress of the incendiary crew, and seeing bungalow after bungalow blazing round them, expected that the lines of fire would close them in. At length the mob reached the next compound, and set light to the stables. The groans of the horses were fearful; but soon the more terrible utterance of human agony was heard through the din; and Mrs. Craigie, looking from the upper part of her own dwelling, saw a lady (Mrs. Chambers) in the verandah of the next house. At her entreaty, the servants ran to try and bring their unfortunate neighbour over the low separating wall. But it was too late; the poor victim (who had but newly arrived in India, and was on the eve of her confinement) had been already killed, and cut horribly. This was fearful news for Mrs. Craigie and her companions; they soon saw men bringing a burning log from the next compound, and thought their own ordeal was at hand. Crowds gathered round; but the name of immediately galloped off as fast as I could, the bazaar people striking at me with swords and sticks, and shouting after me, which Mr. Rose, of the barrack department, witnessed. I went first to Mr. Greathed's, the gate of whose compound was open; but a man ran to it to shut it, I suppose; but I got in and rode up to the house, and gave the information to the servants, as I was informed Mr. Greathed was out. I then went on to the general's, and heard he had just left the house in his carriage."—Colonel Smyth's *Narrative*.

† Mrs. Courtenay, wife of the hotel keeper at Meerut.

Captain Craigie was frequently shouted in deprecation of any assault on his dwelling; and a few of the Hindoo servants who remained faithful, especially one Buctour, a tent lascar, ran to and fro, trying to clear the compound, and declaring that his master was "the people's friend," and no one should burn his house.

At this crisis the ladies saw the four troopers sent to guard them riding in, and, recognising the well-known uniform, though not the wearers, hailed them at once as deliverers. The troopers dismounted, and rushed eagerly upstairs; Mrs. Craigie strove to take their hands in her's, but they prostrated themselves before her, and touching her feet with their foreheads, swore to protect her at the hazard of their lives; which they actually did. They implored her to keep within shelter, and not expose herself on the verandah. But anxiety for her husband overpowered every other consideration, and she could not be restrained from gazing forth on the blazing cantonment in an agony of suspense, which prevented her from heeding the blinding, suffocating smoke, the parching heat, or even the shots fired at herself, until at length the brother of her young friend arrived in safety, and was soon followed by Captain Craigie, who having nobly performed his public duty, now came to rescue his heroic wife. Fearing that the house would be surrounded, the officers wrapped dark stable-blankets round the light muslin dresses of the ladies, to hide them from the glare of the flaming station, and lessen the risk of fire, and concealed them in a little thick-walled, single-doored temple, which stood on the grounds. There they remained several hours; during which time, a band of armed thieves broke into the house; but two of them were shot (one by Buctour), and the others fled. Cavalry troopers continued to join the party, including one of the condemned eighty-five, who offered to stay and defend the Europeans; but Captain Craigie said he must surrender him if he did; and, "after a time, the boy disappeared." The other troopers, to the number of about thirty, entreated Captain Craigie not to take his wife away, as they would protect her with their lives; but he dared not run the risk;* and when the roads became quieter, he put to the horses (all the stable-servants having

fled), and hurried the ladies off to the artillery lines, first allowing them to collect together a few clothes and their trinkets. The plate they could not get, the khitmutgar (Mohammedan steward) having run off with the keys. He had, however, buried the property in the first moments of alarm, and he subsequently brought the whole intact to his master. The troopers, gallantly as they had behaved, "looked very blank" at the idea of proceeding to the European lines. Instead of confidently expecting reward, they "feared being made prisoners;" and it was with the utmost difficulty that they were induced to venture within reach of the unreasoning fury of the British force. It is needful to remember this; for probably the excessive dread inspired by our policy, has been, with the vast majority of the Bengal army, the inciting cause of mutiny. Our very inconsistencies and vacillations have been ascribed by them to some hidden motive. At the outset, the only body of sepoys who kept together and obeyed orders during this terrible night, evidenced the most entire disbelief in the gratitude or justice of the military authorities, and ventured to remain in allegiance, wholly in dependence on the individual character of their captain. But for him, they too would have joined the mutineers.

During the night, many Europeans were saved by the fidelity and daring of native servants, at the risk of their own lives. The commissioner (Mr. Greathed) and his wife are among the number. On seeing the mob approach their house, they took shelter with two English ladies on the terrace roof; but the wood-work was soon set on fire, and no alternative apparently remained but to descend and surrender themselves, when Gholab Khan, their head gardener, succeeded in inciting the crowd to pillage a large storehouse at some distance, he affecting to share in the plunder.† Ladders were then placed against the opposite wall by others of the establishment, every member continuing faithful, and the whole party escaped off the roof (which, some few minutes later, fell in with a fearful crash), and took refuge in the garden. When day broke, the rioters having left the place, Gholab Khan brought a buggy, wherein the commissioner and his three companions proceeded in safety to the artillery school of instruction, whither, on the morning of the 11th, all the ladies of the cantonment, with their children and servants, were taken by

* Captain Craigie's house, and another, were the only ones left standing in the 3rd cavalry lines.

† Greathed's *Letters*, p. 291.

their husbands without any military escort. The school was a large, easily defensible enclosure, with lines of barracks; and here all the civilians and such of the staff as were not required outside took refuge, there being no fort at Meerut. Captain and Mrs. Macdonald (20th regiment) were both slain; but their ayah (nurse) seized the children, and conveyed them to a place of safety.

The following is the official list of the Europeans killed at Meerut, not already named. *3rd Light Cavalry*—Lieutenant McNabb (a youth of much promise, who had only just joined his regiment, and was returning home unarmed from the artillery mess); Veterinary Surgeons Phillips* and Dawson, Mrs. Dawson and children. *60th Rifles*—one corporal. *20th Native Infantry*—Captain Taylor, Lieutenant Henderson, Ensign Pattle, Mr. Tregear (inspector in the educational department). A gunner, two Chelsea pensioners, a fife-major of the 11th Native infantry, four children, five men, and two women (whose names were unknown), were all killed by the released convicts or bazaar people.†

There was, as has been before stated, no organised resistance; and the general opinion, pronounced almost without a dissentient voice by the press of England and of India, is, that the deficiency of the rebels in leaders was more than counterbalanced by the incapacity of the British authorities. After making all reasonable allowance for the suddenness of the shock, and the unpreparedness of the officers in command (although that is, in fact, rather an aggravation than an extenuation of their conduct), it is not possible to account satisfactorily either for the space of time occupied in getting the troops, especially the dragoons, under arms, or for the neglect of any attempt to forestal the mutineers in their undisguised plan of proceeding to Delhi, which everybody knew was strongly fortified, richly stored, and weakly garrisoned by Native troops; and the care of which was,

in fact, the one great reason for the maintenance of the costly and extensive Meerut cantonment. To begin with the first count, the 60th rifles were^{*} parading for evening service when the tumult began. They, therefore, ought to have been ready to act at once against the gathering crowds; while the European dragoons, if too late in mounting to save the gaol, should have been sent off either to intercept the fugitives or preoccupy the city.‡ Captain Craigie, who had acted on his own responsibility in proceeding with his troop to try and preserve the gaol, met several of the released prisoners, already on the road to Delhi, at that early hour of the evening. Even the 3rd cavalry do not appear to have gone off together in any large body, but rather in straggling parties; and it appears that they might have been cut off, or at least dispersed in detail. The effort ought to have been made at all hazards. There was no fort in Meerut; but the women and children might surely have been gathered together in the artillery school, under the escort of European soldiers, at the first outbreak of the mutiny, while the 11th—who long held back, and to the last protected the families of their officers—were yet obedient; and while one portion of the force remained to protect the cantonment, the cavalry and guns might have overtaken the fugitives, the greater number of whom were on foot.

Major-general Hewitt's own account of the affair is the best proof of the utter absence of any solicitude on his part, or, it would appear, of any suggestion on the part of those around him, for the preservation of Delhi. In acquainting the adjutant-general, in a letter dated May the 11th, with the events of the preceding night, he never even alludes to any plan of proceeding against the mutineers, or anticipates any other employment for the 1,863 European soldiers stationed at Meerut, than to take care of the half-burned cantonments, and mount guard over their wives and families, until reinforcements should arrive to help them

* This gentleman had calmly looked on during the punishment parade of the previous day, and had advocated the adoption of the sternest measures to compel the entire corps to use the new cartridges. He was shot while driving his buggy, and, it is said, mutilated by five troopers.—Letter of the Rev. J. C. Smyth, chaplain at Meerut.—*Times*. The governor of the gaol is said to have owed his life entirely to the gratitude of certain of the mutineers, to whom he had spoken kindly while under his charge.

† *Supplement to Gazette*, May 6th, 1858; p. 2262.

‡ The last witness on the subject is Mr. Russell, who, in October, 1858, examined Meerut in company with Colonel Johnson of the artillery, an officer present at the mutiny. Mr. Russell satisfied himself that there was indeed just ground, admitting the difficulty of the situation, and many embarrassing circumstances, "to deplore the want of energy of those who had ample means in their hands to punish the murderers on the spot, and to, in all probability, arrest or delay considerably the massacre and revolt at Delhi."—*Times*, 29th Nov., 1858.

hold their own, and assist in carrying out drum-head courts-martial for the punishment of the insurgent villagers and bazaar budmashes; as to the civil law and civil courts, they were swept away by the first breath of the storm.

Many a gallant spirit must have chafed and raged that night, asking, in bitterness of spirit, the question generally uppermost in the minds of British soldiers—"What will they say of us in England?" But then—and it is not the least strange point of the case—we hear of no single soldier or civilian offering to lead a party, or go, if need were, alone, to Delhi, if only to warn the defenceless families assembled there, of the danger by which they were menaced.

The ride was nothing; some thirty-six miles on a moonlight midsummer night: the bullet of a mutineer might bring it to a speedy close; but was that enough to deter soldiers from endeavouring to perform their duty to the state of which they were sworn defenders, or Englishmen from endeavouring to save a multitude of their countrywomen from evils more terrible than death? As individuals even, they might surely have done something, though perhaps not much, clogged as they were in a peculiar manner by the working of a system which, amid other defects, makes a general of fifty-five a phenomenon in India.* The commanding officer at Meerut was not a Napier or a Campbell, gifted beyond his fellows with immunity from the physical and mental inertia which threescore years and ten usually bring in their train. If General Hewitt had been ever characterised by vigour and decision, at least these qualities were not evidenced at Meerut. It is painful to animadvert on even the public conduct of a brave old officer; the more so, because the despatch which evidences what he failed to do, is particularly straightforward and manly. He states, without preface or apology, that "as soon as the alarm was given, the artillery, carabiniers, and 60th rifles were got under arms; but by the time we reached the Native infantry parade-ground, it was too dark to act with efficiency in that direction; consequently the troops retired to the north of the nullah" (small stream before alluded to), "so as to cover the barracks and officers' lines of the artillery, carabiniers, and 60th rifles, which were, with the exception of

one house, preserved, though the insurgents—for I believe the mutineers had at that time retired by the Alighur and Delhi roads—burnt the vacant sapper and miner lines. At break of day the force was divided: one-half on guard, and the other taken to patrol the Native lines." Then follows a statement of certain small parties of the 11th and 20th Native infantry who remained faithful, and of the fifty men of the 3rd cavalry; and the general adds—"Efficient measures are being taken to secure the treasure, ammunition, and barracks, and to place the females and European inhabitants in the greatest security obtainable. Nearly the whole of the cantonment and Zillah police have deserted."†

The delay which took place in bringing the 6th dragoons into action is quite unaccounted for. A medical officer, writing from Meerut on the 12th of May, says, that between five and six o'clock on the evening of the previous day, while preparing for a ride with Colonel Finnis, he heard a buzzing, murmuring noise, such as was common in case of fire; and shortly after, while putting on his uniform, the havildar-major of the 11th rushed into the room, exclaiming, "Fly! sahib, the regiments are in open mutiny; Colonel Finnis has just been shot in my arms. Ride to the European cavalry lines and give the alarm." The doctor did so; galloped off to the house of the colonel of the dragoon guards, which he had just left, and then on to the barrack lines, where Colonel Jones was engaged in ordering the men to saddle, arm, and mount forthwith. The remaining movements of the dragoons are best told in the words of this eyewitness, whose account is the only circumstantial one which has been made public, regarding the proceedings of a corps which, rightly used, might have saved Delhi, and thousands of lives.

"It took us a long time, in my opinion, to get ready, and it was dark before the dragoons were ready to start in a body; while by this time flames began to ascend in all directions from the lines, and the officers' bungalows of the 3rd cavalry and the 11th and 20th Native infantry; from public-buildings, mess-houses, private residences, and, in fact, every structure or thing that came within the reach of the torch, and the fury of the mutineers and of the bazaar *canaille*. * * * When the carabiniers were mounted we rode off at a brisk trot, through clouds of suffocating dust and darkness, in an easterly direction, and along a narrow road; not advancing in the direction of the conflagration, but, on the contrary, leaving it behind on our right rear. In this way we proceeded for some two or

* *Times*.—Calcutta correspondent, June 15th, 1858.

† *Parl. Papers on Mutinies* (No. 3), 1857; p. 9.

three miles, to my no small surprise, when suddenly the 'halt' was sounded, and we faced about, and, retracing our steps and verging off to our left, debouched on the left rear of the Native infantry lines, which were all in a blaze. Skirting along behind these lines we turned them at the western end, and wheeling to the left, came upon the 11th parade-ground, where, at a little distance, we found the horse artillery and H.M.'s 60th rifles. It appears that the three regiments of mutineers had by this time commenced dropping off to the eastward and to the Delhi-road; for here some firing took place between them and the rifles; and presently the horse artillery coming to the front and unlimbering, opened upon a copse or wood in which they had apparently found cover, with heavy discharges of grape and canister, which tore and rattled among the trees, and all was silent again. The horse artillery now limbered up and wheeled round, and here I joined them, having lost the dragoons in the darkness. By this time, however, the moon arose; 'we blessed her useful light' [so did the mutineers, no doubt]; and the horse artillery column, with rifles at its head, moving across the parade-ground, we entered the long street, turning from the southward behind the light cavalry lines. It was by this time past ten o'clock, and having made the entire circuit of the lines, we passed up to the eastward of them, and, joined by the dragoons and rifles, bivouacked for the night.*

At daybreak the doctor proceeded to visit the almost deserted hospital, where a few patients, prostrate with small-pox, alone remained. On his way he met a dhooly, and, stopping the bearers, inquired what they carried. They answered, "The colonel sahib." It was the body of poor Finnis (with whom the inquirer had been preparing to ride scarce twelve hours before) which had just been found where he fell, and was being carried towards the churchyard. No search had been made for him or for any other of the fallen Europeans, who, if not wholly killed by the insurgents, must have perished in needless misery. Colonel Smyth, on the following morning, saw ten or twelve European dead bodies on the Delhi-road, near the old gaol.†

The mutineers had abundant leisure to initiate, with a success they could never have anticipated, their first great step of systematic hostility. They were not, however, unanimous in their views. Many of the 20th Native infantry were still loyal at heart, and 120 of them turned back, and presented themselves at Meerut, where the influence of the officers and families whom they had protected, procured them a favour-

able reception. Several of the 3rd cavalry also appear to have returned and surrendered themselves, and many of them were met with, wandering about the country, longing, but not daring, to return to their homes. Meanwhile, the mass of the mutineers, counselled by a few more daring spirits, took care to cut off the telegraph communication between Meerut and Delhi, and to post a guard of a hundred troopers at a narrow suspension-bridge over the Hindun, one of the two rivers between them and Delhi; but which then, in the height of the hot season, was easily fordable. They knew that there was no other obstacle, the country being smooth as a bowling-green; and they took full advantage of the apathy of the British, by bivouacking for a brief rest, within six miles of the scene of their outrages; after which, they rose up and pursued their way without the slightest interruption. Their arrival at Delhi will be narrated in the following chapter. The Meerut catastrophe is sufficiently important to deserve what Nelson wished for—a gazette to itself.

The general opinion of the Indian press and public, declared it "certain that the severe sentences on the mutineers of the 3rd cavalry was the immediate cause of the Meerut massacre."‡ In England, the same conclusion was naturally and almost unavoidably arrived at. Colonel Sykes, ex-chairman of the East India Company, and also a high authority on the score of individual character and experience, declared in the most emphatic language, his "thorough conviction, that but for the fatal punishment of the eighty-five troopers at Meerut to ten years' confinement in irons, with hard labour as felons, for resisting the compulsory use of the suspected cartridges, the first instance in a hundred years, in Bengal, of sepoys in combination imbruing their hands in the blood of their officers, would not have occurred. In short, had the policy adopted by Colonel Montresor in the contingent force at Hyderabad in 1806, in abrogating a dangerous order upon his own responsibility, been adopted at Meerut, we might still have had a loyal Bengal army, as we still have a loyal Madras army, although the latter had, fifty-one years ago, revolted upon religious grounds."§

Again, in his place in the House of Commons, Colonel Sykes said, that at the moment of ironing the troopers on parade, "an electric shock of sympathy went through

* *Times*, June 29th, 1857.

† *Brief Account of the Mutiny*, p. 6.

‡ Letter from an eye-witness of the seizure of Delhi by the mutineers.—*Times*, July 14th, 1857.

§ Letter to the *Times*, October, 1857.

the whole army, and amongst their co-religionists in the contingents with native powers. Up to that time there had been doubts and alarms, but no common sympathy or understanding. Then, however, every sepoy in the Bengal army made the case of the condemned his own."*

Lord Ellenborough contrasted the promptitude manifested by Sir Henry Lawrence in Oude, with the shiftless incapacity displayed at Meerut. At the latter place, the mutineers, he said, rose at 6 p.m., and it was not until nightfall that H.M.'s carabinieri were able to move. "How did it happen that with a Queen's regiment of infantry, another of cavalry, and an overwhelming force of horse and foot artillery, the mutineers yet escaped without injury to Delhi, and made a march of thirty to forty miles?" Lord Ellenborough spoke forcibly on the power of individual character in influencing events in India; and, alluding to General Hewitt, he declared that no government was justified in placing in a most important position a man of whom the troops knew nothing, and with whose qualifications the government themselves were unacquainted. "Where," he added, "was the commander-in-chief upon this occasion? Why was not he in the midst of his troops? He must have been aware of all the difficulties which were growing up. He must have known the dangers by which he was beset. * * * He, however, went to the hills, leaving the dangers to which I refer behind him in the plain. Such is not the conduct which a man occupying the position of commander-in-chief ought to have pursued."†

The leading reviews and magazines took up the same tone; and the writer of an able and temperate article in one of them, gave a question and reply, which contain, in few words, the common-sense view of the matter. "Why was nothing done or attempted, before the insurgents reached Delhi, to arrest their murderous progress, and protect the unfortunate residents in that city? Why, but that our leaders were unequal to their duty, and that General Anson had rushed into a menacing display of authority, without troubling himself to consider the means or the persons by whom it was to be sustained."‡

In India, however, the Meerut authorities were not wholly without apologists, and even vindicators. Some intercepted sepoy

letters were said to show, that the entire Bengal army had resolved on a simultaneous rising on the 15th of May; consequently, the blundering cruelties practised at Meerut were supposed to have precipitated the insurrectionary movement, and prevented the intended co-operation of the widely dispersed troops. The evidence in favour of this supposition was little better than rumour; if there had been any of weight, the authorities would have been only too glad to publish it for the diminution of their own blame. But had such a plot existed, its development at Meerut would have been particularly unfortunate; for subsequent events showed, that in most other stations, the officers in command (whether soldiers or civilians) were ready to make public duty their paramount consideration; and proved, in many remarkable instances, no less conspicuous for the employment of their often slender resources for the public good, than the Meerut leaders had been for the misuse of their almost unparalleled advantages. The wantonly provoked catastrophe at Meerut was fitly followed by an access of stupefaction, which can alone account for the absence of any effort to save Delhi.

The following is an extract from a sermon preached on the occasion by Mr. Rotton, one of the chaplains of the Meerut station; who was subsequently attached to the besieging force sent against Delhi, where, according to Mr. Greathed, he was "well thought of," and "attentive to his duties."§ The tone indicates the view generally taken of the recent outbreak; for preaching of so very decided a character would, if not approved, scarcely be tolerated by any congregation.

"Think awhile of our past position and our brightening prospects. The mutiny came upon us most unexpectedly. The scene of its commencement was Meerut; and the circumstances which led to its outbreak here, were doubtless arranged by matchless wisdom and unbounded love. It seems, if report speaks truly, that a diabolical and deep-laid plot had been conceived, and was hourly maturing in detail, for the destruction of British supremacy in India." On this mere rumour, Mr. Rotton proceeded to ground a description of the "unparalleled skill" with which "the Mohammedan" had framed his alleged plot, and the

* Speech on proposed India Bill, Feb. 18th, 1858.

† India Debate.—*Times*, 30th June, 1857.

‡ Blackwood's *Edinburgh Magazine* for Sept., 1857.

§ Greathed's *Letters*, p. 188.

means adopted by Providence for its disclosure. "Hence, I say, He [the Almighty] arranged every incident connected with the mutiny of Native troops in this station [including, of course, the attempted enforcement of the polluting cartridges and the three hours' fettering]; and but for the solemn and sad warning which we received here, it is possible, yea, very probable, that the enemy's plans would have arrived at such maturity, that our destruction might have been certain and complete. Such are the convictions of men of experience and judgment in India. They look on the outbreak at Meerut as the salvation of India."

The above quotation is not a very encouraging one to lay before the religious portion of the British public, now earnestly striving, in an entirely opposite spirit, and with entirely different weapons, for the spiritual and temporal salvation of the people of India. But it is well that the zealous and self-denying supporters of missionary enterprise should fully recognise the dangers and difficulties, from within and without, which beset the progress of Christianity in India. Within the pale, an insidious spirit of formality, self-sufficiency, and belligerent intolerance is at work, which is diametrically opposed to the first principles of the gospel. The doctrine of a special Providence, for instance, as illustrated above, can happily do little harm to hearers accustomed from childhood to test human teaching by the standard of Holy Writ, and to rely on the assistance of Divine wisdom to enable them to arrive at a right judgment. "Christians of the Book," as General Hearsey aptly translated Protestants, may indeed well dispense with any other light than that reflected from their Bibles by the operation of the Holy Spirit; but if we send missionaries to India for the express purpose of expounding the Scriptures, we ought to be most careful that they be duly qualified for the work.

Such teachers should have, at least in measure, the zeal of Peter and the love of John united with the controversial power of Paul. It is no simple task to disentangle the subtle web of casuistry which modern Brahminism has woven round the great verities of their ancient faith, or to eradicate from the affections of the people the rank growth of impure idolatries, of superstitious and sensual customs founded on allegories originally more graceful and far more meta-

physical than those of Greece or Rome—and to graft in place of them simple faith in the Father of the spirits of all flesh, and in the One Mediator between God and man.

With the Mohammedans the difficulties are still greater. Their deep reverence for the great Head of our church would seem, at first sight, to facilitate their acceptance of Christianity; but it is not really so, for they view themselves as the objects of a further and fuller revelation than ours, which it is their duty to guard and propagate. Impressed with this conviction, they will not, like the Brahmins, engage in arguments, or view possible conversion to Christianity in any light than as a crime, which if not repented of, must be punished with death. Thus, and thus only, can the plague of apostasy be stayed among them.

There is no surer obstacle to Mohammedan conversion than an irreverent handling of the deepest mysteries of the Christian faith. Yet the more rash and incompetent the preacher, the more likely is he to "rush in where angels fear to tread." An example of this is quoted by Lord Hastings in the diary kept by him, when making a tour as governor-general in 1815. He went to church at Meerut, in the handsome and extensive structure, towards the recent erection of which the Begum Sumroo* (a Roman Catholic by profession) had been the chief contributor. "The tenor of the sermon was," he says, "to impress upon us a strict and defined repartition of functions between the different persons of the Trinity—a line which we were assured would be inviolably preserved from the indelicacy which each must feel would attend the trespassing of the prerogatives of another."†

The impediments to making proselytes in India will not, however, deter those from making the attempt who act in obedience to a Divine command, and in reliance on Divine aid. Still in this, as in all similar cases, we must do our utmost before venturing to expect a blessing on our labours. An inexperienced and slenderly-gifted man, who would preach to empty pews in England, is not likely to attract hearers among a people whom he addresses under all the drawbacks inseparable from the position of a stranger and a foreigner, who, unpractised in their language, and yet more so in their modes of thought, comes to tell his audience that they and their

* Her jaghire was included in what is now the Meerut district. See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 373.

† *Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings*: edited by the Marchioness of Bute; vol. ii., p. 329.

fathers, and their venerated priesthood, have long lain in ignorance and darkness. To a preacher thus situated, it must be no small advantage to be perfectly versed in the antecedents of his hearers: he can hardly know too much of their customs and prejudices, of their strength and their weakness: his store of information cannot be too great: he should, like Moses, be versed not only in Israelitish history, but in all the wisdom of the Egyptians. In fact, the preliminary course of study requisite for an Indian missionary is altogether an exceptional one. Controversy in Europe is usually exercised regarding minor points of form, doctrine, and discipline. In India, the first articles of our faith—the creation of the world according to the Book of Genesis, the incarnation of the Saviour the very existence of the “Christ of his-

tory,” are controverted points, before admitting the truth of which the Hindoos must unlearn the lessons of a lifetime, and disown traditions cherished for centuries as Divine revelations. Alas! will it please God to raise up the meek, holy scholars who, to human judgment, seem alone capable of the task. But we must not despair: India has had already a Schwartz, Carey, and Martyn, a Middleton and Heber. She has just lost an excellent bishop (in Dr. Wilson, the late venerable diocesan of Calcutta); and there are probably many now living, clergymen and laymen, whose labours, though comparatively unknown, are working out greater results than we dream of. Only when we send labourers into the vineyard, let them be our very best—clear-headed, large-hearted, gentle, men: no bigots, no sectarians, no formalists, no shams.

CHAPTER IV.

DELHI—MAY 11TH.

It would be very easy to write a full and glowing account of the seizure of Delhi and its terrible consequences, on the plan of selecting the most probable and interesting portions of the statements yet published, and discarding the improbable and conflicting ones; but it is difficult to frame even a brief narrative, grounded on authentic data, while the trial of the King of Delhi, with all the important evidence taken thereon, remains, like the Meerut court-martial, a sealed book to the general public, and the most important points have to be searched for bit by bit, through masses of Blue-Book verbiage, or received on the testimony of individuals, more or less discriminating in testing the accuracy of the intelligence they communicated to their friends in England.

It is from private letters only that we derive our information of the state of feeling in Delhi immediately before the outbreak, and of the excitement occasioned by the cartridge question among its immense population, but especially among the three Native regiments by which it was garrisoned. The census of 1846 states the population of the city, exclusive of its suburbs, at 137,977; of these, 71,530 were Hindoos, 66,120 Mohammedans, and 327 Christians (chiefly

Eurasians). Nowhere else in India was the proportion of Mohammedans to be compared with this: and although the British government might view the ancient capital of the Moguls as the shrine of buried greatness, interesting only to the poet, the antiquarian, or the artist, many a poverty-stricken Moslem noble, many a half-starved Rajpoot chieftain or ousted zemindar, remembered that a Great Mogul yet lived within the marble palaces of his ancestors, surrounded by a numerous offspring. Brahmins and Rajpoots had fought for the Moguls, and had filled the highest offices of the state, from which Hindoos and Mohammedans were alike excluded by the ungenerous policy of their present rulers. Men suffering under existing grievances, rarely think much of those of their predecessors from opposite causes; and it is only natural to suppose that there were many malcontents in India, who beheld the raj of the Feringhee with intense bitterness, and were well content to unite on common ground as natives, for the expulsion of the hated foreigners, and then fight out their own quarrels by themselves. Of course, the great mass of the people, who earn a scanty subsistence literally in the sweat of their

brow—who depend on daily toil for daily food, and who die by hundreds when anything occurs to interrupt their monotonous, resourceless industry—neither make, nor willingly take part in revolutions; for it is certain that, whichever side prevails, a multitude of the lowest classes will be trodden under foot by the combatants. Thus it was in all cases; but especially at Delhi, where thousands of peaceful citizens, with helpless families, had as good a right to expect from the British the benefits of a wise and strong administration, and protection against the mutinous spirit abroad amid the Bengal army, as any member of the covenanted service. The Indian population, could they but find hearing, have a right to initiate rather than echo the indignant question of their fellow-subjects in England—why did government “make Delhi a strong fortress, surround it with new bastions, excavate a deep ditch out of the granite rock, leave within it a hundred thousand muskets, two parks of the heaviest artillery in India, and powder enough to blaze away at any enemy for a year, and then place the whole in the sole charge of three Native regiments?”* and leave it there, while incendiary fires, in different stations, were telling, week by week and month by month, the spread of disaffection. The circulation of the chupatties has been compared to the Fiery Cross transmitted by the Scottish Highlanders. The burning bungalows at the musketry depôts ought to have afforded a far more significant warning of what was going on, written, as the information was, in characters of fire, which they who ran might read.

Letters dated almost simultaneously with the execution of that fatal sentence on the Meerut troopers (which was, in truth, the death-warrant of every European massacred in the following week), prove that some at least of the Delhi officers were anxiously watching the signs of the times. The three Native regiments—the 38th, 54th, and 74th Native infantry—consisted of about 3,500 men; there was also a company of Native artillery, comprising about 160 men. The Europeans numbered, in all, only fifty-two; of whom three commissioned officers and two sergeants belonged to the artillery.† They occupied the hottest cantonments in

India; the low rocky ridge on which modern Delhi is built, reflecting the intense glare of the fierce Indian sun, under which many sank down in fever; while their comrades had additional work to perform by day, with volunteer duty as nurses by night. Still, so far from being blinded by languor or fatigue to the temper of the Native troops, they noted it well; and their correspondence tells of a degree of excitement unparalleled for many years; of the disbanding of the 19th (the poor 19th, as those who know its history still sorrowfully term it); and of the unremoved persuasion of the sepoys, “that ox fat and hogs’ lard had been imposed upon them in their cartridges.” Where the officers could speak the language well, they reasoned with their men for a time successfully; but where, as in the majority of cases, this free communication did not exist, and “where the best speakers of native languages had been called away by staff appointments or for civil service, leaving only dumb novices, or even dumb elders behind them,” there mutiny most surely flourished. So said these letters, written some forty-eight hours before the outbreak. Want of head and of moral union among the disaffected, was, it was added, the only chance of safety left to the Europeans: and so it proved.‡

These vague apprehensions had, however, no connection with Meerut. That station was the last in all India to which the idea of danger was attached, and it was the special *point d'appui* for the Europeans at Delhi. At what hour the telegraphic communication was cut off between these posts, does not appear; but it is probable that the absence of any intimation of the disturbances, which commenced at Meerut as early or earlier than five o'clock on Sunday, was occasioned by the same miserable incapacity which marked the whole conduct of the authorities. The communication with Agra was not cut off till nine o'clock; for at that hour, intimation of what was occurring was dispatched to that city, in the form of a private message, by the postmaster's sister, to prevent her aunt from starting for Meerut, according to a previous engagement.§ Unhappily, no private emergency induced the sending of a similar communication to Delhi.

* *Times* (leader), July 24th, 1857.

† The parliamentary return, from which these statements are taken, gives sixty-five as the total number of “sick of all ranks;” but whether this heading is intended to include Europeans, or, as is

most probable, only the native patients in hospital, does not appear.—*Parl. Papers*, February 9th, 1858; p. 3.

‡ See *Daily News*, July 28th, 1857.

§ Appendix to *Parl. Papers* on Mutinies, p. 175.

The mutineers, on their part, do not appear to have sent on messengers; and there is no ground for believing that, at daybreak on Monday, the 11th of May, any individual of the vast population of the Mohammedan capital and its suburbs had received the slightest warning of the impending calamity.

The troops were paraded, in the cool of the early morning, to hear the sentences of the Barrackpoor courts-martial, which were read here as elsewhere, without any withdrawal of, or explanation regarding, the cartridges. After parade, the garrison guards were told-off, and the officers and men separated to perform their ordinary course of duty.

The first alarm appears to have been taken by Mr. Todd, of the telegraph office; who, finding the communication with Meerut interrupted, proceeded to the bridge of boats across the Jumna, near one of the seven gates of the city, and there met a party of the 3rd cavalry, and was murdered by them. His fate was not known until late in the day. The European authorities do not state the manner in which they first learned the arrival of the Meerut mutineers in Delhi; but it would seem that a few of the released troopers rode in at the river gate, as the forerunners of the disorganised bands then on the road. At about eight o'clock the resident, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, proceeded to the Delhi magazine, for the purpose of ordering two guns to be placed on the bridge, to arrest the progress of the mutineers. He found Lieutenant Willoughby, and the other European and Native members of the establishment, at their post; and on alighting from his buggy, Sir Theophilus, with Lieutenants Willoughby and Forrest, proceeded to a small bastion on the river face, which commanded a full view of the bridge, and there saw but too distinctly that the time for preoccupation was over; the mutineers had already posted a body of cavalry on the Delhi side, and were marching on in open column.

The resident and the lieutenant immediately proceeded to ascertain whether the river gate had been closed against the mutineers: this had been done, but to no purpose, and Lieutenant Willoughby hurried back to place the guns and howitzers in the best possible positions for the defence of the magazine. The nine Europeans* then re-

mained in quiet expectation of the worst, which, when it came, they met with such wise valour.

Meanwhile, it may be reasonably asked, who was the chief officer? and what orders did he give? The chief officer was Brigadier Graves; and it would appear that after parade he, like the other officers, went home to breakfast. When he learned the approach of the mutineers does not appear; but the first authentic mention of his presence, describes him as having proceeded with his staff to a circular brick building of some strength, whence the daily gun was fired, situated on an eminence near the cantonment, and within a short distance of the Moree and Cashmere gates. To this building, called the Flagstaff tower, the European women and civilians flocked for safety on the first alarm, and found Brigadier Graves watching from thence the movements of the rebel force on the north and western faces of the city. "He had," one of the party† writes, "no one to advise him, apparently; and I do not think any one present envied him his post." In truth, it was no easy task to know what to do for the defence of a city seven miles in circumference, when mutiny without met mutiny within. Probably the brigadier was anxiously looking for reinforcements: indeed, one of the officers of the 38th, says—"What puzzled us was the non-appearance of Europeans from Meerut, in pursuit of the insurgents." An expectation of this kind alone explains the absence of any plan for the removal of the ladies and children to Kurnaul or Meerut, instead of suffering them to remain in the tower from morning till evening, although the obstacles against escape were multiplying every hour. The length of time occupied by the Delhi tragedy is not its least painful feature. The massacre was not a general one, but a series of murders, which might have been cut short at any moment by the arrival of a regiment, or even a troop of European cavalry; for the rebels made no attempt to seize the guns till nearly sunset; nor did any considerable body of the Delhi troops join the mutineers until after the disorderly flight of the European officers and their families. The total disorganisation was, perhaps, inevitable; but the accounts of many of the sufferers evidence the absence of any clear

* Lieutenants Willoughby, Forrest, and Raynor; Conductors Buckley, Shaw, Scully, and Acting Sub-Conductor Crow; Sergeants Edwards and Stewart.

† Mrs. Peile, the wife of a lieutenant in the 38th; who had been very ill, and was about leaving Delhi on sick leave.—*Times*, September 25th, 1857.



SHAHJAHAN, EMPEROR OF INDIA.

TITULAR KING OF DELHI.

REIGNED 1627-1658.

REIGNED 1627-1658.



understanding between Brigadier Graves and the officers commanding Native corps.

To form a just idea of the events of this miserable day, they must be detailed, as far as possible, in the order of their occurrence. The next victim after Mr. Todd, was the commissioner, Mr. Fraser; and the only circumstantial account of his death yet published, is given by a native eye-witness, whose narrative, corroborated in various essential points by the official documents, serves to relieve what the *Journal des Débats* terms their "incomparable aridity."

Early in the morning of the 11th, a party of Hindoos, bound for a well-known place of Brahminical pilgrimage, started from Delhi for Mussoorie. Shortly after crossing the bridge of boats they met eighteen troopers, who inquired their business. "Pilgrims proceeding to Hurdwar," was the reply. The troopers ordered them to turn back on peril of their lives: they obeyed, and witnessed the mutineers enter the city by the Delhi gate, after killing a European (probably Mr. Todd) whom they met on the bridge. The cavalry cantered in, uttering protestations of good-will to the native inhabitants, but death to the Europeans. They appear to have found the gate open, and to have ridden through without opposition; but it was closed after them. The cutwal, or native magistrate, sent word to Mr. Fraser, who immediately ordered the records of his office to be removed from the palace; and getting into a buggy, with a double-barrelled gun loaded, with two mounted (native) orderlies, proceeded towards the mutineers. They saw and advanced to meet him, calling out to his escort—"Are you for the Feringhee (the foreigner), or for the faith?" "Deen, deen!" (the faith, the faith!) was the reply. Mr. Fraser heard the ominous Mohammedan war-cry once more raised in Delhi; and as the mutineers approached him, he fired twice, shooting one man through the head, and wounding the horse of another; then springing from his buggy, he rushed in at the Lahore gate of the palace, calling out to the subahdar on duty to close it as he passed, which was accordingly done.

A trooper now rode up, told the Meerut story, gained a hearing despite the efforts of Mr. Fraser and Captain Douglas (the commandant of the palace guards), and won over the subahdar and company of the 38th then on guard at the palace gate. The

subahdar, being reproached by the Europeans for treachery in holding a parley with the mutineers, turned angrily on his reprovers, and bade them seek safety in flight, at the same time opening the gate for the troopers. Mr. Fraser and Captain Douglas ran towards the interior of the palace, followed by the mutineers, one of whom fired a pistol after the fugitives, which took effect, for the commissioner staggered and leant against a wall; whereupon another trooper went up, and, with a sword, severed his head from his body at a stroke. Captain Douglas was slain at the same time; and the assassins proceeding to the king's hall of audience, found two other Europeans (one of whom was probably Mr. Nixon, Mr. Fraser's head-clerk), and killed them there. The Rev. M. J. Jennings and his daughter, who were living with Captain Douglas over the Lahore gate of the palace, are said to have perished at this time, as also their guest, a Miss Clifford. The mutineers attempted to open a negotiation with the king, who was, it must be remembered, with his family, wholly at their mercy, in that very palace where the eyes of his aged ancestor, Shah Alum, had been stabbed out by a Mohammedan freebooter. What could a pageant king, of above eighty years of age—surrounded by a progeny born and reared in an atmosphere of besotted sensuality, which we had never made one single effort to purify—do in such a case as this but temporise? So far as the tale has yet been told, the royal family, doubtless more from fear and interest than any affection for the British government, were extremely loth to countenance the insurgents, and cordially joined the Europeans in hoping for succour from Meerut. The king wrote a letter to Mr. Colvin, the lieutenant-governor at Agra, informing him that the town and fort of Delhi, and his own person, were in the hands of the rebel troops of the place, who, it was added, had opened the gates, and joined about 100 mutineers from Meerut. The fate of Mr. Fraser, of Captain Douglas, and of Miss Jennings, was also mentioned in this letter; and a telegram founded on it, was sent from Agra to Calcutta on the 14th.* The account thus given was one of the earliest received by the Supreme government.

The Delhi cantonment was two miles from the city. At about ten o'clock, tidings reached the lines of what had taken place at

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutinies, p. 178.

the palace, and the 54th regiment were ordered down to the city. One of the junior officers (a youth of nineteen, who wrote his touching tale home to his sister) says—"Of course, at this time, we had not the slightest doubt as to its loyalty." Happily for him, his company and one other were left to wait for two guns, with which Major Paterson was to follow as quickly as possible, the rest of the regiment marching on at once. A lady already mentioned (Mrs. Peile), who was then living close to the lines, watched the 54th pass the house; and she writes, that seeing "their cheerful appearance, and yet determined look, we congratulated ourselves on having such a brave set of fellows, as we thought, to go forward and fight for us."*

Colonel Ripley, the commandant of the regiment, led his men into the city without letting them load, intending to charge the mutineers with the bayonet. The 54th met the rebels advancing towards the cantonment, in numbers nowhere stated on authority, and, in private accounts, very variously from twenty to 150. The original invaders had been probably, by this time, reinforced by straggling parties of their own mutinous comrades, as also by the rabble of Delhi, and by the lawless Goojurs of the neighbouring villages—a predatory and semi-barbarous tribe, whose marauding propensities were, even in peace, very imperfectly kept in check by our defective system of police; and who, in disturbed times, were the indiscriminating enemy of every one who had anything to lose, whether European, Hindoo, or Mohammedan. The insurgents came on, and met Colonel Ripley's force at the English church,† near the Cashmere gate. They advanced without hesitation, calling out to the 54th, that their quarrel was not with them, but with their officers. The 54th first delayed firing on the plea of not being loaded; and, when they had loaded, their shots whistled harmlessly over the heads of the troopers. These galloping up, took deliberate aim in the faces of the Europeans, all of whom were unarmed except Colonel Ripley, who shot two of his assailants before he fell—hit by their pistols,

and bayoneted by a sepoy of his own corps. The countenances of the troopers are described as wearing the expression of maniacs; one was a mere youth, rushing about and flourishing his sword, and displaying all the fury of a man under the influence of bhang.‡ Captains Smith and Burrowes, Lieutenants Edwards and Waterfield, were killed, and Lieutenant Butler wounded. The Quartermaster-sergeant also fell. Dr. Stewart, the garrison surgeon, had a very narrow escape: "he tripped on a stone, which saved him from a shot; dodged behind a wall, and reached cantonments."§

It was long before the guns to support the 54th were ready; for the Native artillerymen, though neither disrespectful nor disobedient, were manifestly unwilling to take part against their countrymen. At length Major Paterson, with the remaining two companies and two pieces of artillery, passed through the Cashmere gate into the city. The mutineers fled at once, in wild disorder, through the streets. Major Paterson then returned through the Cashmere gate, and took up his position at a small fortified bastion, called the Main-guard, where he remained all day in momentary expectation of being attacked. The slaughtered Europeans were lying at a little distance, and the sepoys who had remained faithful brought in the bodies. "It was a most heartrending sight," says the young officer before quoted, "to see all our poor chaps, whom we had seen and been with that very morning, talking and laughing together at our coffee-shop, lying dead, side by side, and some of them dreadfully mutilated." Colonel Ripley had been previously carried back to the cantonments, and was found by two ladies (the wife of Major Paterson and Mrs. Peile), lying on a rude bed at the bells of arms. He pointed to a frightful wound on his left shoulder, and said that the men of his own regiment had bayoneted him. The colonel implored the native doctor to give him a dose of opium to deaden his sufferings, which, after some persuasion, was done; and the ladies, anxious for the safety of their children, returned to

* Letter.—*Times*, September 25th, 1857.

† The English church was erected at the cost of £10,000, by Lieutenant-colonel Skinner. This officer, one of the ablest commanders of irregular troops who ever served the E. I. Company, was a half-caste, and received an honorary lieutenant-colonelship from Lord Hastings in 1814, the motive being partly the governor-general's characteristic sense of

justice, and partly, as the marquis himself says, the fear of losing a most valuable public servant, by subjecting him to be placed under the orders of inexperienced European juniors.—Marquis of Hastings' *Private Journal*, vol. i., p. 285.

‡ Letter from an eye-witness.—*Delhi Gazette*, published at Agra (after the seizure of Delhi).

§ Private letter from an officer of the 38th.

their homes. On their way, they met men and women-servants, wandering about in the greatest confusion and distress. The servants begged them not to remain in the lines, as it was understood that the bungalows would be burned at night. The two ladies, therefore, packed up such property as they could in boxes, directed the natives to hide it, and left the lines about two o'clock, under the care of Lieutenant Peile, who first sought out Colonel Ripley, placed him in a dhooly, and rode by his side to the Flagstaff tower, which the whole party reached without encountering any molestation.

The assembled Europeans were grievously disappointed by the non-arrival of succour from Meerut;* and Surgeon Batson, of the 7th Native infantry, offered to attempt the conveyance thither of a request for assistance. Brigadier Graves accordingly wrote a despatch to this effect; and Mr. Batson, leaving his wife and three daughters in the tower, proceeded to his own house, where he dyed his face, hands, and feet; and, assuming the garb of a fakir, went through the city, intending to cross the bridge of boats; but, finding the bridge broken, he returned towards the cantonment, and tried to pass the Jumna at a ferry near the powder-magazine. The sowars, or troopers of the 3rd cavalry, had, however, preceded him, attended by crowds of Goojurs, who were plundering and firing the houses. Mr. Batson despaired of being able to reach Meerut, and rushed across the parade-ground. Either the act betrayed him, or his disguise was seen through, for the sepoy fired at him; but he succeeded in getting as far as the garden near the canal, where he was seized by some villagers, and "deprived of every particle of clothing." In this forlorn condition he proceeded on the road to Kurnaul, in hopes of overtaking some officers and ladies who had fled in that direction. Thus the only effort to communicate with Meerut was frustrated; for no other appears to have been attempted, even by the more promising means of native agency.

Had it been successful, it is not probable that the Meerut authorities would have made any effort, or encountered any risk, to remedy the evils their torpor had occa-

sioned. A message that a few scattered handfuls of men, women, and children were in momentary danger of being murdered some thirty-five miles off, would not have startled them into compassion; for the calamity had been foreseen on the Sunday night. The Rev. Mr. Rotton describes himself and his wife as watching their children "reposing in profound security beneath the paternal roof" (a bungalow in the European lines); gazing upon the shining moon, "and anticipating what would befall our Christian brethren in Delhi on the coming morn, who, less happy than ourselves, had no faithful and friendly European battalions to shield them from the bloodthirsty rage of the sepoy."†

Up till a late hour on Monday, the mass of the Delhi sepoy remained ostensibly true to their salt. On the departure of the 54th from the cantonment, the 74th moved on to the artillery parade, where Captain de Teissier was posted with a portion of his battery: the 38th were marched towards the Flagstaff tower, and formed in line along the high road. When Major Paterson took up his position at the Mainguard, he directed Captain Wallace to proceed to cantonments to bring down the 74th Native infantry, with two more guns.

Major Abbott, the commanding officer of the 74th, had previously heard that the men of the 54th had refused to act, and that their officers were being murdered. The intelligence reached him about eleven o'clock. He says—"I instantly rode off to the lines of my regiment, and got as many as there were in the lines together. I fully explained to them that it was a time to show themselves honest; and that as I intended to go down to the Cashmere gate of the city, I required good, honest men to follow me, and called for volunteers. Every man present stepped to the front, and being ordered to load, they obeyed promptly, and marched down in a spirited manner. On arriving at the Cashmere gate, we took possession of the post, drawn up in readiness to receive any attack that might be made. Up to 3 p.m. no enemy appeared, nor could we, during that period, get any information of the insurgents."†

The Meerut mutineers actually in Delhi at this time, were evidently but few: it is

* "It was so inexplicable to us why troops from Meerut did not arrive."—Lieutenant Gambier's Letter.—*Times*, August 6th, 1857.

† The Chaplain's *Narrative of Siege of Delhi*, p. 6.

† Despatch from Major Abbott to government; dated "Meerut, May 13th, 1857."—Further Parliamentary Papers on the Mutiny, No. 3 (Commons,) 1858; p. 10.

impossible to tell in what numbers, or to what extent, the 38th and 54th had as yet co-operated with them; but the dregs of the population of the city, suburbs, and villages, were thronging the streets, and especially around the magazine, the surrender of which was demanded by a party of the treacherous palace guards (the 38th), in the name of the king. No reply was given, whereupon the mutineers brought scaling-ladders from the palace, and placed them against the walls. The conduct of the native establishment had before this been suspicious; and a durwan, or doorkeeper, named Kurreem Buksh, appeared to be keeping up a communication with the enemy, greatly to the annoyance of Lieutenant Willoughby, who ordered Lieutenant Forrest to shoot him should he again approach the gate. The escalade from without was the signal for a similar movement from within; for the natives, having first hidden the priming-pouches, deserted the Europeans by climbing up the sloped sheds on the inside of the magazine, and descending the ladders on the outside.* The insurgents then gathered in crowds on the walls; but the besieged kept up an incessant fire of grape, which told well as long as a single round remained. At length, Conductor Buckley—who had been loading and firing with the same steadiness as if on parade, although the enemy were then some hundreds in number, and kept up a continual fire of musketry on the Europeans within forty or fifty yards—received a ball in his arm; and Lieutenant Forrest, who had been assisting him, was at the same time struck by two balls in the left hand. Further defence was hopeless. The idea of betraying their trust by capitulation never seems to have been entertained by the gallant little band. Conductor Scully had volunteered to fire the trains which had been laid hours before, in readiness to blow up the magazine as soon as the last round from the howitzers should be expended. The moment had arrived. Lieutenant Willoughby gave the order; Conductor Buckley, according to previous arrangement, raised his hat from his head, and Conductor Scully instantly fired the trains, and perished in the explosion, as did also Sergeant Edwards. The other Europeans, though all hurt, escaped from beneath the smoking ruins, and retreated through the sally-port on the river face. It is probable that many of the leading mutineers perished

here. "Lieutenant Willoughby estimated the number killed to be little short of 1,000 men."† The Hurdwar pilgrims before referred to, fix the same amount; but a native news-writer, in relating the same event, speaks of about 500 persons being killed in the different streets; adding—"The bullets fell in the houses of people to such a degree, that some children picked up two pounds, and some four pounds, from the yards of their houses."‡

The Europeans at the tower, and those on duty at the Mainguard, had listened to the heavy firing at the magazine with great anxiety. A little after three o'clock the explosion was heard; but it was not very loud, and they did not know whether it was the result of accident or design. The 38th Native infantry, on guard at the tower, seized their arms, crying out, "Deen, Deen!" The Europeans seeing this ominous movement, desired the sepoys to surrender their weapons, which they actually did, and the ladies assisted in passing the arms to the top of the tower. At four o'clock, the telegraphic communication to the northward being still uninterrupted, the brigadier dispatched the following message to Umballah, the second of three sent here from Delhi in the course of the day:—

"Telegram.—Cantonment in a state of siege. Mutineers from Meerut, 3rd light cavalry, numbers not known, said to be 150 men, cut off communication with Meerut; taken possession of the bridge of boats; 54th N. I. sent against them, but would not act. Several officers killed and wounded. City in a state of considerable excitement. Troops sent down, but nothing certain yet. Information will be forwarded."‡

The brigadier, so far from having yet resolved on evacuating Delhi, desired to defend the cantonments, and ordered Major Abbott to send back two guns. The major's reasons for not doing so, and the narrative of his subsequent conduct and escape to Meerut, may be best told in his own words. Interesting particulars, on official authority, regarding this memorable epoch, are extremely rare, and claim quotation *in extenso*, especially where, as in the present instance, the writer has occupied a responsible position in the affairs he describes.

"This order [for the return of the guns] I was on the point of carrying out, when

* Major Abbott's despatch. — Further Parl. Papers (No. 3), p. 10.

† *Lahore Chronicle*: republished in *Times*, September 18th, 1858.

‡ Further Papers, No. 3 (Commons), p. 5. The first telegram from Delhi is not given.

Major Paterson told me, if I did he would abandon the post, and entreated me not to go. He was supported by the civil officer, a deputy-collector, who had charge of the treasury, who said he had no confidence in the 54th men who were on guard at the treasury. Although I strongly objected to this act of, as it were, disobeying orders, yet as the deputy-collector begged for a delay of only a quarter of an hour, I acceded to his request. When the quarter of an hour was up, I made preparations for leaving the Mainguard, and was about to march out, when the two guns I had sent back to cantonments, under Second-lieutenant Aislabie, returned to the Mainguard with some men of the 38th light infantry. I inquired why they had come back, and was told, in reply, by the drivers, that the gunners had deserted the guns, therefore they could not go on. I inquired if any firing had taken place in cantonments. My orderly replied, he had heard several shots; and said, 'Sir, let us go up to cantonments immediately!' I then ordered the men to form sections. A jemadar said, 'Never mind sections, pray go on, sir.' My orderly havildar then called up, and said, 'Pray, sir, for God's sake leave this place—pray be quick!' I thought this referred to going up to the relief of cantonments, and accordingly gave the order to march. I had scarcely got a hundred paces beyond the gate, when I heard a brisk firing in the Mainguard. I said, 'What is that?' Some of the men replied, 'The 38th men are shooting the European officers.' I then ordered the men with me, about a hundred, to return to their assistance. The men said, 'Sir, it is useless; they are all killed by this time, and we shall not save any one. We have saved you, and we shall not allow you to go back and be murdered.' The men formed round me, and hurried me along the road on foot back to cantonments to our quarter-guard. I waited here for some time, and sent up to the saluting [Flagstaff] tower to make inquiries as to what was going on, and where the brigadier was; but got no reply."

To supply the hiatus in Major Abbott's story, as to what was going on at the tower, we must fall back on the statements of private persons.

At about five o'clock, a cart, drawn by bullocks, was seen approaching the building. An attempt had been made to hide its contents by throwing one or two woman's

gowns over them; but an arm hanging stiff and cold over the side of the cart, betrayed its use as the hearse of the officers who had been shot in the city. Happily, the ladies in the tower had little time, amid the momentarily increasing confusion, to dwell on this painful incident. One poor girl was anxiously enquiring of the officers who were now flocking in from various parts, if they knew anything of her step-brother, Captain Burrowes; but they shrank from her, knowing that all the while his corpse lay but a few hundred yards distant, at the gate under the window of the tower, covered over, like the bodies of his fallen comrades, with some article of feminine apparel. The men of Captain de Teissier's horse field battery were at length "persuaded to take part with the mutineers, but only when pressed round by them in overwhelming numbers, and unable to extricate themselves from their power."* The commandant had his horse shot under him; but he reached the tower in safety, and there found his wife, with her infant in her arms, watching in agony for him. The insurgents then took possession of two of the light guns. Major Paterson, and Ensign Elton of the 74th, came in about the same time from the quarter-guard, and said that the Europeans were being shot down. On receiving this intelligence, the brigadier† ordered a general retreat to Kurnaul, a distance of about seventy miles. Several ladies protested against quitting Delhi until they should be rejoined by their husbands, whom some of them had not seen since the morning. Alas! there was already at least one widow among their number.‡ But the night was closing in, and Captain Tytler, of the 38th, urged immediate departure, and went with Lieutenant Peile to get the men of that regiment together to accompany the Europeans. Carriages of all descriptions were in waiting at the foot of the tower; but, in some cases, the native servants had proved fearful or unfaithful; and the vehicles were insufficient for the fugitives, so that wounded men found themselves burdened with the charge of women and children, without any means of conveyance. Lieutenant Peile, having Dr. Wood of the 38th (who had been shot in the face), Mrs. Wood,

* Despatch from Lieutenant-governor Colvin, to the governor-general in council, May 22nd, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 312.

† Account by Lieut. Gambier, of the 38th N. I.

‡ Account by Mrs. Peile.—*Times*, Sept. 25th, 1857.

and his own wife and child to take care of, and "not knowing how he was to get on," sought counsel of the brigade-major, Captain Nicoll: the answer he received was, "The best way you can."*

Another lady† describes the general departure from the tower as taking place at about six o'clock; and states—"We got into Captain Nicoll's carriage [apparently meaning herself, her husband and child], and put in as many others as we could, and drove one pair of horses for fifty miles." A large number of Europeans, including Brigadier Graves, started at the same time, and some branched off to Meerut; while the others pursued the Kurnaul road, and arrived safely at Kurnaul on the following morning. Here a fresh separation took place, half the party, or about ten persons, going on to Umballah at once, the remaining ten following more slowly. The natives were "so unwilling" to assist them, "that," says the lady above quoted, "it was with the greatest difficulty we managed to get on at all; L—— [her husband] being obliged to threaten to shoot any one who refused to give us assistance." However, they did get on, and started from Thunessir, a dawk station on the Umballah road, at six o'clock P.M. on Wednesday, "in a cart drawn by coolies," reaching Umballah about eight o'clock on Thursday morning.‡

It would be unreasonable to criticise the measures of a man who saw the lives of his wife and infant in imminent peril. Only had the villagers been either cruel or vindictive, a few bullets or *lattees* would have quickly changed the aspect of affairs. The disinclination of the villagers to aid the Europeans, may possibly have some connection with the manner in which the English had recently assumed supremacy over the district of which Thunessir, or Thwanessur, is the chief town. That territory contains about a hundred villages, producing an annual revenue of £7,600 sterling. A moiety is said to have "escheated to the British government, by reason of the failure of heirs in 1833 and in 1851," and the remaining portions were soon afterwards confiscated, "in consequence of the failure of the chiefs in their allegiance."§

Very few of the fugitives had the chance

of carrying matters with such a high hand as "L." and his companions. So far from harnessing the natives to carts, Englishmen and Englishwomen, cold, naked, and hungry, were then in different villages, beseeching, even on their knees, for food, clothing, and shelter; literally begging—for they were penniless—a morsel of unleavened bread and a drop of water for their children, or a refuge from the night-dews, and the far more dreaded mutineers. The varied adventures of the scattered Europeans are deeply interesting and suggestive. Many an individual gained more experience of native character between Delhi and their haven of refuge in Umballah or Meerut, in that third week of May, 1857, than they would have obtained in a lifetime spent in the ordinary routine of Indian life, than which it is scarcely possible to conceive anything more superficial and conventional, or better calculated to foster arrogance and self-indulgence.

The next in order of flight to the brigade-major's party was Major Abbott, to whose narrative we return, as affording another link in the chain of events. After vainly attempting to get any orders from Brigadier Graves, his attention was directed to some carriages going up the Kurnaul road, among which he recognised his own, occupied by his wife and daughters. The men of his regiment, at the quarter-guard, assured him that the officers and their families were leaving the cantonment, and entreated him to do the same. The major states—"I yielded to their wishes, and told them, 'Very well, I am off to Meerut. Bring the colours, and let me see as many of you at Meerut as are not inclined to become traitors.' I then got up behind Captain Hawkey, on his horse, and rode to the guns, which were also proceeding in the direction the carriages had taken, and so rode on one of the waggons for about four miles, when the drivers refused to go any further, because, they said, 'we have left our families behind, and there are no artillerymen to serve the guns.' They then turned their horses, and went back towards cantonments. I was picked up by Captain Wallace, who also took Ensign Elton with him in the buggy.

* Account by Mrs. Peile.—*Times*, September 25th, 1857.

† Probably the wife of one of the law officers, Mr. L. Berkeley, the principal Sudder Ameen, who escaped to Kurnaul with his wife and infant. The

identification is of some interest, on account of an incident mentioned in the text.

‡ Letter published in the *Times*, July 17th, 1857.

§ Thornton's *Gazetteer*, on the authority of Indian Pol. Disp., 29th July, 1835; and 10th Sept., 1851.

"Ensign Elton informed me, that he and the rest of the officers of the 74th Native infantry were on the point of going to march out with a detachment, when he heard a shot, and, on looking round, saw Captain Gordon down dead; a second shot, almost simultaneously, laid Lieutenant Revelly low; he (Elton) then resolved to do something to save himself; and, making for the bastion of the fort, jumped over the parapet down into the ditch, ran up to the counterscarp, and made across the country to our lines, where he was received by our men, and there took the direction the rest had, mounted on a gun." The party with Major Abbott went up the Kurnaul road, until they came to the cross-road leading to Meerut, *viâ* the Bhagput Ghant, which they took, and arrived at Meerut about eight o'clock in the evening of the 12th.*

Regarding the origin of the outbreak, Major Abbott says—

"From all I could glean, there is not the slightest doubt that this insurrection has been originated and matured in the palace of the King of Delhi, and that with his full knowledge and sanction, in the mad attempt to establish himself in the sovereignty of this country. It is well known that he has called on the neighbouring states to co-operate with him in thus trying to subvert the existing government. The method he adopted appears to be to gain the sympathy of the 38th light infantry, by spreading the lying reports now going through the country, of the government having it in contemplation to upset their religion, and have them all forcibly inducted to Christianity.

"The 38th light infantry, by insidious and false arguments, quietly gained over the 54th and 74th Native infantry, each being unacquainted with the other's real sentiments. I am perfectly persuaded that the 54th and 74th Native infantry were forced to join the combination by threats that, on the one hand, the 38th and 54th would annihilate the 74th Native infantry if they refused, and *vice versâ*, the 38th taking the lead. I am almost convinced that had the 38th Native infantry men not been on guard at the Cashmere gate, the results would have been different. The men of the 74th Native infantry would have shot every man who had the temerity to assail the post.

"The post-office, electric telegraph, Delhi bank, the *Delhi Gazette* press, every house in cantonments and the lines, have been destroyed. Those who escaped the massacre fled with only what they had on their backs, unprovided with any provisions for the road, or money to purchase food. Every officer has lost all he possessed, and not one of us has even a change of clothes."

* Despatch dated May 13th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers on the Mutiny (No. 3), p. 10.

† In the letter from which the above facts are taken, the writer says, "young Metcalfe had fled in the morning." This is a mistake, for he was still in Delhi, as will be shown in a subsequent page.

Major Abbott's opinion of the conduct of the King of Delhi, does not appear justified by any evidence yet published; and his censure of the 38th hardly accords with the fact, that not one of the officers of that corps were killed.

Lieutenant Gambier, writing from Meerut on the 29th of May, says—

"Meer Munder Ali, and Sahye Sing [Native officers from Delhi], who came over for court-martial on the mutineers, declare that nothing of this outbreak was known before it occurred, and that if we two [himself and Colonel Knyvett] went to Delhi, the men would flock to us. I also believe our lives would be safe among the 38th, but the rascals would not stand by us; and I make no doubt that the garrison duty men, influenced by the example of the 54th, would have committed any excess."

The fugitives who escaped in carriages or carts, whether dragged by natives or quadrupeds, had probably little conception of the sufferings endured by the footsore and weary wanderers who had no such help on their perilous journey. When the sepoys at the Mainguard turned against their officers, the latter strove to escape as Ensign Elton describes himself to have done, but were interrupted by the screams of some ladies in the officers' quarters. The Europeans ran back, and making a rope with their handkerchiefs, assisted their terrified countrywomen to jump from the rampart into the ditch, and then with great difficulty, and nearly half-an-hour's labour, succeeded in enabling them to scramble up the opposite side. During the whole time not a shot was fired at them by the sepoys, and the party succeeded in making their way to a house on the banks of the river, belonging to Sir T. Metcalfe, where they obtained some food from the servants, who had not seen their master since the morning.† Here they stayed until they beheld the whole of the three cantonments on fire, and saw "a regular battle raging in that direction:"† they then, under cover of nightfall, ran to the river, and made their escape. The party then consisted of five officers and of five ladies—namely, Lieutenant Forrest, his wife, and three daughters; Lieutenant Procter, of the 38th; Lieutenant Vibart, of the 54th; Lieutenant Wilson, of the artillery; a Lieutenant Salkeld, of the engineers; and Mrs. Fraser, the wife of an

† This fact shows how far the sepoys were from acting on any plan, much less having any recognised leader; in which case, burning the cantonments and fighting among themselves, after getting rid of their European masters, would have been quite out of the question.

officer of the engineers, then absent on duty.* This poor lady, though shot through the shoulder at the time the Europeans were fired on in the Mainguard, bore up cheerfully, in the hope of finding her husband at Meerut. At an early period of their journey the party fell in with Major Knyvett and Lieutenant Gambier, to the latter of whom a peculiar interest attaches, because, after escaping from Delhi, he returned thither with the besieging force, and received his death wound at the hands of the mutineers. By his account, corroborated by other testimony, it seems that at the time of the evacuation of the Flagstaff tower, it was generally supposed that a considerable body, if not the greater portion, of the Native troops would accompany the fugitives to Meerut. They actually started for the purpose; but Lieutenant Gambier, who was in the rear, says the sepoys were soon seen streaming off by hundreds, till at length he and Colonel Knyvett found themselves alone with the colours of the 38th and about 150 men, who refused to proceed further, and, laying hold of the non-commissioned officers with the colours, went to their lines. The two Europeans followed them, sounded the "assembly," and implored them to fall in, but without effect; and the colonel, too grieved by the defection of his regiment to be heedful of personal danger, went in amongst them, and said, "If you wish to shoot me, here I am; you had better do it." The men vehemently denied any such intention, and then the two officers dismounted, not knowing what they ought to do. Lieutenant Gambier, who tells their adventures with the simplicity which characterises the highest class of bravery, adds—"I do not know whether we fully recognised the extent of the evil, but we then did not think of getting away. I had my bed sent down to the quarter-guard; and my kit [kitmutgar] went for some dinner." Wearied with fatigue and excitement he fell asleep, and it was night before he awoke. On looking round, he saw Lieutenants Peile and Addington (74th), and Mr. McWhirter, collector of Paniput (who was in ill-health, and had come on a visit to Delhi), with Mr. Marshall, an auctioneer and merchant, standing near him. The sepoys urgently pressed the officers to escape, offering shelter and concealment in their huts. Firing was now commencing in

the lines, and Peile and Gambier, each taking a colour, reached the door of the quarter-guard; but the sepoys thronged round and jerked the colours from the hands of the officers. Lieutenant Gambier, meeting Colonel Knyvett in the doorway, said, "We must be off." The colonel objected; but the lieutenant took him by the wrist, pulled him outside, and forced him away from the doomed regiment; on which the colonel looked back with something of the bitter yearning with which a sea-captain quits the sinking ship which has been for years his home, his pride, and his delight, the parting pang overpowering the sense of danger, even though a frail boat or a bare plank may offer the sole chance of escape from imminent personal peril. Neither the colonel nor his young companion had any ladies to protect, otherwise the feelings of husbands and fathers might naturally have neutralised the intense mortification and reluctance with which they turned their backs on Delhi. But though Mrs. Knyvett was safe at a distance, and the lieutenant was unmarried, yet the latter had his colonel to support and save. "We hurried on," he writes, "tripping and stumbling, till we reached a tree, under which we fell down exhausted. I feared I should get the colonel no further; he had touched nothing all day, and the sun had more or less affected him; but to remain was death; and after a few minutes' rest, we again started forward. So we passed all that dreadful night. The moon rose, and the blaze of cantonments on fire made it light as day, bringing out the colonel's scales and my scabbard and white clothing in most disadvantageous relief: as we lay, the colonel used to spread his blue pocket-handkerchief over my jacket, in order to conceal it as much as possible." The elder officer was unarmed and bareheaded; he was, besides, subject to the gout, an attack of which the distress of mind and bodily fatigue he was undergoing were well calculated to bring on. In the morning, some Brahmins coming to their work discovered the fugitives hiding in the long jungle grass, and after giving them some chupatties and milk, led them to a ford over a branch of the Jumna. They met on the road Mr. Marshall, with whom they had parted in the quarter-guard: he had wandered on alone; Mr. McWhirter having been, he believed, drowned in attempting to cross the canal cut at the back of the canton-

* Letter of officer of 54th (probably Lieutenant Vibart).—*Times*, July 23rd, 1857.

ments.* Soon afterwards the trio learned from a villager that there were other Europeans about a mile further on in the jungle. On proceeding thither, they came up with and joined Lieutenant Forrest's party, which raised their number to thirteen. The fording of the Jumna on the second night of their toilsome march, was the greatest obstacle they had to encounter. "The water was so deep, that whereas a tall man might just wade it, a short man must be drowned." The ladies, however, got over, supported by a native on one side, and a European on the other. Some of them lost their shoes in the river, and had to proceed barefoot over "a country composed exclusively of stubble-fields, thistles, and a low thorny bush." The treatment they met with was very varied: at one village they were given food, and suffered to rest awhile; then they were wilfully misled by their guides, because they had no means of paying them; and had nearly recrossed the Jumna in mistake for the Hindun, but were prevented by the presence of mind of Lieutenant Salkeld, in ascertaining the course of the stream by throwing some weeds into it. It was intensely cold on the river bank, and the wind seemed to pierce through the wet clothes of the fugitives into their very bones. They laid down side by side for a short time, silent, except for the noise of their chattering teeth; and then, after an hour or two's pause (for rest it could hardly be called), they resumed their weary journey. Next they encountered a party of Goojurs, who plundered and well-nigh stripped them; after which they fell in with some humane Brahmins, who brought them to a village called Bhekia or Khekra,† gave them charpoys to rest on, and chupatties and dholi (lentil pottage) to eat. Crowds gathered round the wanderers, "gaping in wonderment, and cracking coarse jokes" at their condition and chance of life. But the villagers, though rough and boorish in manner, were kind in act, until "a horrid hag" suddenly made her way to the Europeans, and flinging up her skinny arms, invoked the most fearful curses on them, tilted up their charpoys one by one,

* Second Supplement to the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858; p. 2241.

† In the copies of this letter printed for private circulation, from one of which the above statements are taken, the name of the village is given as Khekra; in the abstract published in the *Times*, August 6th, 1857, it is Bhekia.

‡ The faithful remnant of the 3rd did not, how-

and drove them away. A fakir proved more compassionate, and hid them in his dwelling; and here their number, though not their strength, was increased by two sergeants' wives and their babes. One of the latter was a cause of serious inconvenience and even danger; for at a time when the general safety depended on concealment, the poor child was incessantly on the point of compromising them, for it "roared all day, and howled all night." On the Thursday after leaving Delhi, a native volunteered to carry a letter to Meerut, and one (written in French) was accordingly entrusted to him. All Saturday they spent "grilling under some apologies for trees;" but towards evening a message arrived from a village named "Hurchundpoor," that one Francis Cohen, a European zemindar, would gladly receive and shelter them. With some difficulty they procured a hackery for the ladies, who were by this time completely crippled, and, escorted by about a dozen villagers, reached Hurchundpoor in safety, where they received the welcome greeting of "How d'ye do?—go inside—sit down." The speaker, Francis Cohen, though very like a native in appearance and habits, was a German, about eighty-five years of age, who had formerly served under the Begum Sumroo. He placed the upper story of his dwelling at the disposal of the fugitives, sent skirts and petticoats for the ladies, with pieces of stuff to cut into more, and provided the officers with various kinds of native attire; and once again they "ate off plates and sat on chairs." On Sunday, at sunset, while they were enjoying rest, after such a week's work as none of them had ever dreamed of enduring, the news came that a party of sowars (Native cavalry) were at the gate, sent by the King of Delhi to conduct the Europeans as prisoners to "the presence." The officers sprang up, and were hastily resuming the portions of their uniform which they still possessed, when two Europeans rode into the courtyard, announcing themselves as the leaders of thirty troopers from Meerut, come in answer to the letter sent thither by a native messenger.

Of course, troopers of the 3rd cavalry‡ ever, include Captain Craigie's entire troop. On his return to the parade-ground with his men, he found, as has been stated, Brevet-major Richardson with part of his troop, and Captain and Lieutenant Fairlie (brothers), with the remains of the 5th and 6th. Some hurried conversation ensued between the officers, which was interrupted by their being fired at. The mob of mutineers from the infantry

were the last persons looked to for deliverance: nevertheless, Lieutenant Gambier adds—"These fine fellows had ridden all day, first to Bhokia, and afterwards to Hurchundpoor, near forty miles, to our assistance." Under this escort, Colonel Knyvett and his companions succeeded in reaching Meerut at about 10 P.M.—the eighth night after leaving Delhi. The first question of Mrs. Fraser was for her husband. An officer, not knowing her, immediately communicated the fact of his death, the manner of which will be hereafter shown. The rest of the party were more fortunate, many friends coming in by degrees, who had been given up for lost.

All the officers of the 38th escaped; Lieutenant Peile and his wife encountered extreme peril, aggravated for a time by separation from each other, as well as from their child. The carriages had nearly all driven off from the Flagstaff tower, when a gentleman, seeing that Mrs. Peile had no conveyance, offered her a seat in his. She accepted his offer for her little boy, who reached Meerut some days before his parents, and while they were supposed to have perished. Then Mrs. Peile joined Dr. Wood and his wife. The doctor had been shot in the face, as is supposed by the men of his own regiment (the 38th), and his lower jaw was broken. The ladies with him were the last to leave Delhi; and they had scarcely started, when some natives came to them, and advised their turning back, declaring that the officers and others who had preceded them on the Kurnaul road had all been murdered. They returned accordingly to Delhi, and took refuge in the Company's gardens, where they found a gunner, who went to the hospital, at their request, to fetch a native doctor. Other natives brought a charpoy for the

wounded European to lie on; and in about an hour a coolie arrived with some lint and bandages from the hospital, accompanied by a message from the native doctors, that they would gladly have come, but that they were then starting in dhoolies by command of the King of Delhi, to attend on his wounded troops. A band of marauders discovered the trembling women and their helpless companion; carried off their horses, and broke up their carriages. Not daring to remain where they were, they started at midnight in search of a village near the artillery lines, where they were fed and concealed by the head man of the village—an aged Hindoo, who turned the cattle out of a cow-shed to make room for the distressed wayfarers. The next morning, the three started again on their travels; and after receiving great kindness at several villages, and narrowly escaping death at the hands of marauders, they at length reached a village inhabited by "the ranee of Balghur," probably a Rajpootni chieftainess, who received them in her house, bade her servants cook rice and milk for their dinner, and gave them leave to remain as long as they pleased. In the morning, however, she told them she could not protect them a second night, for her people would rise against her. This was on the 18th, and the fugitives were as yet only twenty-two miles from Delhi. Providentially, on that very day Major Paterson and Mr. Peile arrived separately at Balghur, from whence they all started together that evening. They met with some remarkable instances of kindness on the road. In one case, "the working men, seeing what difficulty we had in getting the doctor along, volunteered to carry him from village to village, where they could be relieved of their burden. This was a most kind offer,

lines were seen advancing, and the officers agreed to start with the standards for the European lines. Captain Craigie states, that owing to the deafening uproar, the intense excitement, and the bewildering confusion which prevailed, the advance sounded on the trumpet was scarcely audible, and the greater part of the still faithful troopers did not hear it, and were consequently left behind. A few men who were nearest the officers went with them to the European lines; and these, with some married troopers who had gone to place their wives in safety, with between twenty and thirty men of different troops who rallied round Captain Craigie, and assisted in defending his house and escorting him to the European lines, formed the remnant of the 3rd cavalry, which, with few exceptions, remained staunch during the mutiny, doing good ser-

vice on all occasions. They, and they only, of the Meerut sepoy were permitted to retain their arms; even the 150 faithful men of the 11th N. I. being disbanded, but taken into service by the magistrates. Major Smythe reported the state of the regiment, 31st of May, 1857, as follows:—

Remaining in camp	78
On furlough	83
On command	9
Dismissed the service	85
Invalided	7
Deserted	235

Total 497

The infant child of Captain and Mrs. Fraser was separated from its parents, and perished from exposure on the Kurnaul road.—*London Gazette*.

and was most gladly accepted by us." At length, Mrs. Peile, who had been robbed of her bonnet and shawl at the onset of their flight, began to feel her head affected; but a wet cloth bound round her temples relieved her, and enabled her to prosecute the remainder of the journey, which terminated in a very different manner to its commencement; for our staunch ally, the rajah of Putteeala, on learning the vicinity of Europeans in distress, sent forty horsemen, well-mounted and gaily dressed, to escort them into Kurnaul, where they arrived on the 20th. Mrs. Paterson and her two children had previously reached Simla in safety.

Surgeon Batson likewise, after wandering twenty-five days among the topes (groves of trees) and villages, eventually succeeded in joining the force before Delhi. He was an excellent linguist; but he vainly strove to pass as a Cashmere fakir. "No, no," said the Hindoos, "your blue eyes betray you; you are surely a Feringhee." They were, however, kind to him; but the Mohammedans would have killed him, had he not uttered "the most profound praises in behalf of their prophet Mahomet," and begged they would spare his life, "if they believed that the Imaum Mendhee would come to judge the world." The adjuration was effective, and Surgeon Batson's term of life was extended a little, and only a little, longer. His wife and daughters were among the more fortunate fugitives.*

The adventures of Sir T. Metcalfe have not been circumstantially related beyond that after leaving Lieutenant Willoughby, he was attacked by the rabble; but escaped from them, when he concealed himself in the city; and, after remaining there for three days, eventually succeeded in making his way to Hansi. Lieutenant Willoughby was less fortunate. He is supposed to have perished near the Hindun river. Lieutenant Gambier states—"There escaped with Willoughby, Osborne, B——, H——, and A——. Osborne's wound necessitated his being left in a ditch: he ultimately reached this place; they have not." From the account given by a native, it is believed that Lieutenant

Willoughby shot a Brahmin, on which the villagers attacked and murdered him.†

Mr. Wagentreiber, of the *Delhi Gazette*, fled with his wife and daughter, in his buggy. They were attacked five times. Mrs. Wagentreiber received some severe blows from iron-bound lattes; as he did also, besides a sword-cut on the arm. But the ladies loaded, and he fired at their assailants with so much effect, as to kill four, and wound two others; after which, the fugitives succeeded in making good their way to Kurnaul.‡

Mrs. Leeson, the wife of the deputy-collector, made her escape from Delhi on the morning of the 19th, after losing three children in the massacre.§ Two faithful natives accompanied and protected her; one of them perished by the hands of the mutineers in attempting to pass the Ajmere gate; the other accompanied her in her wanderings, till they reached the European picket at Subzie Mundie. The poor lady, who had nothing but a dirty piece of cloth round her body, and another piece, folded turban-fashion, on her head, on finding herself again in safety, knelt down, and thanked heaven for her deliverance.||

In the midst of all these tales of strife and misery, it is well that an English official has placed on record the following statement of the humanity evinced by the villagers generally. Mr. Greathead, the commissioner, writing from Meerut, in the very height of the excitement, states—"All the Delhi fugitives have to tell of some kind acts of protection and rough hospitality; and yesterday a fakir came in with a European child he had picked up on the Jumna. He had been a good deal mauled on the way, but he made good his point. He refused any present, but expressed a hope that a well might be made in his name, to commemorate the act. I promised to attend to his wishes; and Himam Bhartee, of Dhunoura, will, I hope, long live in the memory of man. The parents have not been discovered, but there are plenty of good Samaritans."

The loyalty of the nawab of Kurnaul largely contributed to the safety of the

* Surgeon H. S. Batson's Letter.—*Times*, August 18th, 1857.

† Lieutenant Gambier's account. The mother of Lieutenant Willoughby being left a widow with four children, appealed to Sir Charles Napier, on his return to England after the conquest of Sind, to aid in providing for her sons; and he, though a perfect stranger, interested himself in the case, and ob-

tained Addiscombe cadetships for two of the young men. Sir Charles, had he lived to see the career of his protégés, would have been richly rewarded for his disinterested kindness.—*United Service Gazette*.

‡ Lieut. Gambier's account.—*Times*, July 14, 1857.

§ Second Supplement to the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

|| Ball's *Indian Mutiny*, pp. 100—107.

fugitive Europeans, who chose the road to Umballah instead of to Meerut. Mr. le Bas, the Delhi judge, had a very interesting interview with this chief. There was at the time no European force in the neighbourhood of Kurnaul, to counteract the effect of the unmolested retreat of the mutineers from the head-quarters of the British artillery at Meerut, followed by their unopposed occupation of Delhi. Moreover, European women and children were known to have been left to perish there; and cherished wives and mothers, on whom crowds of servants had waited from the moment they set foot in India, were now seen ragged, hungry, and footsore, begging their way to the nearest stations. The chiefs, country-people, and ryots doubted if they were awake or dreaming; but if awake, then surely the British raj had come to an end. At all events, the Great Mogul was in Delhi, and from Delhi the British had fled in the wildest disorder; whereupon a native journalist thought fit to raise the following *To Pean*, which, like all similar effusions, whether indited by Europeans or Asiatics, is characterised by the most irreverent bigotry:—

“Oh! Lord the English have now seen a specimen of Thy power!

“To-day they were in a state of high power; to-morrow they wrapped themselves in blood, and began to fly. Notwithstanding that their forces were about three lacs strong in India, they began to yield up life like cowards. Forgetting their palanquins and carriages, they fled to the jungles without either boots or hats. Leaving their houses, they asked shelter from the meanest of men; and, abandoning their power, they fell into the hands of marauders.”*

The British cause was, in May, 1857, generally considered the losing one; and even those friendly to it, were for the most part anxious, in native phraseology, “to keep their feet in both stirrups.” There were, however, many brilliant exceptions—but for which, the sceptre of Queen Victoria would hardly now have much authority in Northern India. The nawab of Kurnaul was one of the first to identify himself with the British in the hour of their deepest humiliation.

Soon after the arrival of Mr. le Bas, the nawab came to him and said, “I have spent

a sleepless night in meditating on the state of affairs. I have decided to throw in my lot with your's. My sword, my purse, and my followers are at your disposal.” And he redeemed his promise in many ways; among others, by raising an efficient troop of 100 horse, which he armed and equipped on the model of the Punjab mounted police corps. Mr. le Bas subsequently presented the nawab with the favourite horse whose speed had saved his master's life.† It is to be hoped the British government will be similarly mindful of the service rendered by their faithful ally.

Many providential preservations have been related: the painful task remains of describing, as far as possible, the fate of the Europeans who were unable to effect their escape from Delhi. Among the victims was Colonel Ripley. His dhooly-bearers refused to carry him on with the first party of Europeans; and Lieutenant Peile, his former preserver, having left even his own wife and child to try and save the regimental colours, the wounded officer remained at the mercy of the native bearers, whose services are at the best of times little to be depended on; for, being frequently compulsory, they naturally take the first opportunity of escaping to their homes. They did not, however, give up the colonel to the mutineers, but hid him near the ice-pits at the cantonments. Here he remained for some days, until he was found and killed by a sepoy. This, at least, was the account given to Surgeon Batson, during his wanderings among the jungles.‡ Colonel Ripley's sufferings must have been fearful. His isolation, and the state of utter helplessness in which he awaited the violent death which at length terminated his protracted anguish, renders him the subject of a quite peculiar interest. The little that is narrated of him conveys the idea of a thoroughly brave man. He had need of all his natural courage, and of the far higher strength imparted from Above, to enable him to resist the temptation to suicide; to which, later in the rebellion, others yielded, under (so far as human judgment can decide) much less temptation.

The mutineers found it very difficult to convince the king, and probably still more so to convince themselves, that European troops were not already marching on Delhi. It is positively asserted, on European

* *Parsee Reformer*: quoted in *Bombay Telegraph*.
—See *Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

† *Raikes' Revolt in N.W. Provinces*, pp. 91, 92.

‡ *Times*, August 18th, 1857.

authority, that "the king sent a sowaree camel* down to the Meerut road, to report how near the British troops were to his city. When the messenger returned, saying there were certainly no European soldiers within twenty miles of Delhi, the spirit of mutiny could restrain itself no longer."†

A native, writing to the vakeel of one of the Rajpootana chiefs, says that it was at ten at night two pultuns (regiments) arrived from Meerut, and fired a royal salute of twenty-one guns; but he adds, that "it was not until the following day, about three in the afternoon, that the empire was proclaimed under the King of Delhi, and the imperial flag hoisted at the Cutwallee, or chief police-station." But the authority thus proclaimed, was at first at least almost entirely nominal; and later testimony tends to confirm the statement of the native eye-witness previously quoted; who, writing on the 18th of May, says—"There is now no ruler in the city, and no order. Everyone has to defend his house. An attack was made on the great banker, Mungnee Ram; but he had assembled so many defenders, that after much fighting, the attack was unsuccessful. Other bankers' establishments were pillaged; hundreds of wealthy men have become beggars; hundreds of vagabonds have become men of mark. When an heir to the city arises, then the public market will be reopened, and order be restored. For these two days thousands have remained fasting; such of the shops as are left unpillaged, being closed. * * * Hundreds of corpses are lying under the magazine. The burners of the dead wander about to recognise the looked-for faces, and give them funeral rites. * * * The mutineers roam about the city, sacking it on every side. The post is stopped. The electric wires have been cut. There is not a European face to be seen. Where have they gone, and how many have been killed?" This last question has been but imperfectly answered. The following statement is compiled from the report furnished by the magistrate of Delhi, and other government returns:—

List of the European victims (not before named) who perished on the 11th of May, or at some unknown date, in Delhi.

Mr. Hutchinson, officiating magistrate and collector, after going to cantonments for assistance,

* Meaning a trooper on a camel.

† Statement of Delhi deputy-collector.—*Rotton's Narrative of the Siege of Delhi*, p. 12.

rejoined Mr. Fraser, and is believed to have been killed at the Calcutta gate, on duty.

Mr. A. Galloway, joint magistrate and deputy-collector, perished at the Cutchery, on duty.

The Rev. A. Hubbard, missionary. *Mr. L. Sandys*, the head-master of the Delhi mission school, and *Mr. L. Cock*, or *Koehe*, were killed at the school or at the bank.

Mr. F. Taylor, principal of the Delhi college, and *Mr. R. Stewart*, the second master, are thought to have been in the magazine until the explosion, and then to have taken refuge with Moolvee Bakir Ali, who gave them up to the mutineers.

Mr. J. McNally, second clerk in the commissioner's office, was killed on his way thither. *Messrs. Montreux* and *Fleming*, fifth and sixth clerks, perished, but the particulars of their death are not known.

Mr. Beresford, the manager of the Delhi bank, would not quit his post, though warned by his servants; he was murdered there with his wife and three young children, and the money seized on by the mob. *Mr. Churcher*, the deputy-manager, likewise perished.

Mr. Dalton, inspector of post-offices, and *Mr. C. Bayley*, the deputy-postmaster, were cut down at their post.

Sergeant Edwards, of the ordnance department, perished at the magazine on duty, and *Sergeant Hoyle* is supposed to have been killed on his way thither.

Mr. T. Corbett, of the medical department, was on a visit to *Mr. McNally*; and he also perished on the 11th of May.

Mr. T. W. Collins fled to the Cutchery, and was killed there; his wife and three children were murdered in the college compound, but on what day is not known.

Mr. Staines, the head-clerk of the treasury office, and two youths of the same name, were killed, the former at the Cutchery, and the latter at Deria-gunge.

Mr. E. Staines, draftsman, railway department, also fell in Delhi.

Mrs. Thompson, the widow of a Baptist missionary, with her two daughters, and a *Mrs. Hunt*, were killed in the city.

Mr. G. White, head-clerk of the political agency office, was murdered in Delhi, but on what day is not known.

Sergeant Dennis, of the canal department, with his wife, his son, and *Mrs. White*, were killed at his house on the canal banks.

Mr. J. Rennell, pensioner, his wife, two daughters and his son-in-law, and *Mr. G. Skinner*, were massacred in the city, but the date of the latter crime has not been ascertained.

Sergeant Foulan, of the public works' department, and *Mr. Thomas*, agent of the Inland Transit Company, and an Italian showman and his wife, named *Georsetti*, engaged in exhibiting wax-work figures, were massacred near the Hindun river.

Three persons surnamed *George*—one a youth who had received pay from the King of Delhi for some service not known—were massacred in Delhi; as was also a Portuguese music-master, named *Perez*, and a *Mr. O'Brien*.

Father Zacharias, a Roman Catholic priest, was murdered in the city.

Mrs. (Major) Foster, and her sister, *Mrs. Fuller*, endeavoured to escape, and got "into the city ditch"

(probably near the Mainguard). *Mrs. Foster* was unable to proceed any further, and her sister would not leave her; they are supposed to have been found and murdered there. *Mrs. Hickie* (described as a half-servant, probably a half-caste), in attendance on *Mrs. Foster*, was killed in the city.

Chummum Lall, the native assistant-surgeon, was one of the earliest victims of the outbreak.

Mr. Phillips, a pensioner, was killed in Delhi, but on what day is not known. A *Mr. Clarke*, a pensioner, occupied a two-story house in the Cashmere bazaar, with his wife and child, in conjunction with a *Mr.* and *Mrs. Morley*, and their three children, and was murdered there on the 11th.

In a letter signed "James Morley," and published when the public excitement was at its height, the following horrible particulars were related concerning the murder of *Mr. Clarke* and his family. The *Gazette* makes no mention of the circumstances; but the statement is important, as one of the exceptional ones made by a European eyewitness, of massacre aggravated by wanton cruelty.

Mr. Morley states, that after the blowing up of the magazine, he crept from his hiding-place in the city, and went to his own house, near the door of which he found a faithful old Hindoo [a dhoby, or washerman], sitting and crying bitterly. The Hindoo said that a large crowd, armed with sticks, swords, and spears, had entered the compound, pushed past *Mr. Clarke*, and began to "loot" or break everything. At length one man went up to *Mrs. Clarke*, "and touched her face, and spoke bad words to her." The enraged husband called the wretch by the most opprobrious epithet which can be applied to a Mohammedan (you pig!), and shot him dead; then, after discharging the contents of the second barrel into the body of another of the insurgents, he began fighting with the butt-end of his gun. The old Hindoo, knowing that the doom of both husband and wife was now sealed, ran off in search of his own mistress and her children; but they were already in the hands of the mob, who drove off the dhoby with blows, and threatened to kill him if he did not keep away. *Morley* went into the house with his servant, and found *Mr.* and *Mrs. Clarke* (she far advanced in pregnancy) lying side by side, and their little boy pinned to the wall, with a pool of blood at his feet. Turning away from this sickening sight, *Morley* rushed on towards the bath-room, at the door of which the old man stood wringing his hands. The fear of seeing his own wife as he had seen *Mrs. Clarke*, deterred him, he says,

from ascertaining for himself the fate of *Mrs. Morley* and his children. When the first shock was over, he put on a petticoat and veil belonging to the wife of the Hindoo, and succeeded, accompanied by the latter, in reaching Kurnaul in six days. In the course of the journey, he states himself to have seen "the body of a European woman lying shockingly mutilated by the road-side; and it made me sick to see a vulture come flying along with a shrill cry. I saw another body of one of our countrymen. It was that of a lad about sixteen. He had been evidently killed with the blow of a stick. I buried him; but it was but a shallow grave I could give him. I heard, on the road, of a party of Europeans being some distance ahead of me, and tried to overtake them, but could not." It is rather strange that the parties who preceded *Mr. Morley*, should neither have seen nor heard of the murdered man and woman; and it is still more strange, that this one European should narrate horrors so far exceeding any which the other fugitives encountered, or heard of. Stories of mutilation, together with violation of the most abominable description, were certainly published in the Indian and English papers of 1857; but they were almost exclusively founded on bazaar reports, or, what is much the same thing, the accounts of the lowest class of natives, who knew quite well, that the more highly coloured the narrative, the more attention it was likely to excite. Perhaps reporters of a higher class were not uninfluenced by a similar desire to gratify the morbid curiosity of the moment; for the atrocities alleged to have been committed, were such as only the most practised imagination could conceive, or the most incarnate fiends have perpetrated. It should be remembered, that so far as indignities to Englishwomen were concerned, the least aggravated of the alleged offences would have cost the high-caste, or twice-born Hindoos, whether Brahmin or Rajpoot, the irremediable forfeiture of caste. Besides, the class of crime is one utterly opposed to their character and habits, and scarcely less so to that of the Goojurs, who, in fact, had no passion either of lust or revenge to indulge—nothing but an absorbing love of loot, which might tempt them to rob a lady of the cherished wedding-ring, but not to defile the purity of the sacred union it symbolised. With the Mohammedans the case may be different: but whatever we may think of

the unwarrantable license given by the Koran, it may be doubted whether the scenes recorded in the history of cities sacked in European warfare by nominally Christian conquerors, have not afforded sufficient evidence of lust and rapine to explain why we looked to hear of such things, almost as necessary incidents, in a calamity like that of Delhi. But happily for us, our foes were not a united body of soldiers; far from this, the great mass of the sepoy, and even of the escaped convicts, were a disorderly, panic-struck crew; and it was only the long interval of rest which elapsed while the authorities were making up their minds how to prepare for action, that taught the sepoys the value of the advantages which our superlative folly had given them, and the importance of their position in the eyes of their countrymen throughout India. At first their leading thought was, "let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die;" and it was during this phase of their career that they broke open the gaol, and released some 500 convicts. Gradually a few of the more capable of the mutineers began to think that there was a chance for them, and that that chance lay in the extirpation of "the seed of the accursed Feringhee" from the land. Conscious of their own weakness, they naturally adopted a cowardly and merciless, but not vindictive or wantonly cruel policy. The Europeans slain on the 11th of May, or subsequently at an unknown date, have been enumerated. The following is the—

List of the Delhi victims killed on the 12th, 13th, and 16th of May.

Mr. T. Jones, of the collector's office, and *Mr. T. Leonard*, of the magistrate's office, with his wife, and two youths of the same, held out in the house which they occupied together near the Moree gate, until some time on the 12th, when they perished by the hands of the insurgents.

A much larger party defended themselves until the 13th, at Deriagunge, in a house belonging to the rajah of Bullubghur, but rented by a *Mr. Aldwell*. Here *Mr. Nolan*, one of the conductors of the ordnance department, was killed on the 12th by a grapeshot. On the 13th, a man named *Azeezullah* enticed the whole party from their retreat by saying that the king had sent him to fetch them safely to the palace. The Europeans, who were probably holding out in hopes of succour from Meerut, were deceived by the traitor, and were thus spared a longer period of sickening suspense, with despair as its climax. The official record states, that *Mr. A. G. Aldwell*, son of the gentleman who rented the house; *Mr. F. Davies*, third clerk of the commissioner's office; *Mr. T. Davies*, head-clerk of the agency office, and *Miss J. Davies*; *Mr. J. B. Hanley*, another agency clerk, with his wife and four of his family; *Mr. Mackey*, a Baptist mis-

sionary; *Mrs. Wilson*, and her son; *Mrs. Nolan*, and her six children; *Mr. Settle*, conductor of ordnance; *Mrs. and Miss Settle*; *Mrs. Crowe*, and her two daughters; *Sergeants Connor, Hoyle, and Stewart*, of the ordnance department, with a child belonging to the last; *Mrs. Buckley*, and her three children; *Mrs. Prince*; *Mrs. Riley*, and her son; *Mrs. Ives*, and *Mrs. Foulan*—were all slaughtered on the 13th, in a bullock-shed near the house.

After this horrible butchery, no Europeans were found in Delhi until the 16th; and on that day, a party who had taken refuge in the palace on the 11th, were now delivered up to the insurgents, and put to death. The native authority above quoted, describes the victims as having been tied to a tree and shot, after which the bodies were burned.

Mr. E. Roberts, head-master of the Delhi college, and his son, together with *Mrs. S. S. Stewart*, two *Misses Stewart* and their brother, are said to have been massacred "at the instigation of Zeenath Mahal." The two *Misses Beresford*; *Mrs. Shaw*, and her two children; *Mrs. Glynn*; *Mrs. Scully*; *Mrs. Edwards*, and her three children; *Mrs. Molloy*, the wife of the band-master of the 54th Native infantry, and her two sons; *Mr. J. Smith*, head-clerk of the Delhi magazine; *Mrs. Corbett*, and her child; *Mrs. E. P. Staines*; the two *Misses Hunt*, and their young brother; *Mrs. Cochran*; *Mr. and Miss Sheehan*, government pensioners; *Miss C. Staines*, and *Miss Louisa Ryley*—are recorded as having been murdered, without any particulars being given of the attendant circumstances.*

The above statements are taken from the *Gazette*. A native gives the following somewhat different account of particulars which he describes himself as having actually witnessed:—"On the third day, the mutineers went back to the house [*Mr. Aldwell's*] near the mosque, where some Europeans had taken refuge. As they were without water, &c., for several days, they called for a subahdar and five others, and asked them to take their oaths that they would give them water and take them alive to the king; he might kill them if he liked. On this oath the Europeans came out: the mutineers placed water before them, and said, 'Lay down your arms, and then you get water.' They gave over two guns, all they had. The mutineers gave no water. They seized eleven children (among them infants), eight ladies, and eight gentlemen. They took them to the cattle-sheds. One lady, who seemed more self-possessed than the rest, observed that they were not taking them to the palace; they replied, they were taking them *via* Derya Gunje. Deponent says that he saw all this, and saw them placed in a row and shot. One woman entreated them to give her child water, though they might kill her. A sepoy took her child and dashed it on the ground. The people looked on in dismay, and feared for Delhi."†

An anonymous writer, who describes

* Second Supplement to the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

† Statement made to deputy-commissioner Farrington, of Jullundur, by three servants of Kaporthella rajah.—*Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

himself as having been in Delhi at the outbreak, but who does not state either the time or the manner of his own escape, writes—"Several Europeans, said to number forty-eight, were taken to the palace, or perhaps went there for protection. These were taken care of by the King of Delhi; but the sowars of the 3rd cavalry, whose thirst for European blood had not been quenched, rested not till they were all given up to them, when they murdered them one by one in cold blood." The narrator adds, that the troopers were said "to have pointed to their legs before they murdered their victims, and called attention to the marks of their manacles, asking if they were not justified in what they were doing."*

In a separate and evidently incorrect list, published in the same *Gazette* as that from which the above account has been framed, several names are given in addition to, or in mistake for, those already stated.† Among others, a "*Mrs. Morgan and her grand-child*" are said to have been among the victims of this most horrible butchery, in which maid and matron, the grandame and the babe, were alike mercilessly hewn down. It must, however, be remembered, that many put down in the official records as massacred at Delhi, were probably killed after escaping from the city.

We have not, and probably never shall have, any authentic statement of the number of Eurasians who perished at this period, nor of the amount of native life lost in the struggle between the citizens of Delhi and the ruthless insurgents. The mutineers, it is said, "asked the king either to give them two months' pay, or their daily rations. The king summoned all the shroffs and mahajuns (bankers and money-changers), telling them, if they did not meet the demand of the mutineers they would be murdered; on which the shroffs agreed to give them dhol rottee for twenty days; adding, they could not afford more. The mutineers replied—"We have determined to die; how can we eat dhol rottee for the few days we have to live in this world."‡ The cavalry, consequently, received one rupee, and the infantry four annas a day. With every offensive weapon

Delhi was abundantly stocked. After the escape of Lieutenant Willoughby and his companions, the mutineers (according to a native news-writer previously quoted), "together with the low people of the city, entered the magazine compound and began to plunder weapons, accoutrements, gun-caps, &c. The 'loot' continued for three days; each sepoy took three or four muskets, and as many swords and bayonets as he could. The Classics filled their houses with fine blacksmiths' tools, weapons, and gun-caps, which they sell by degrees at the rate of two seers per rupee. In these successful days, the highest price of a musket was eight annas, or one shilling; however, the people feared to buy it: a fine English sword was dear for four annas, and one anna was too much for a good bayonet. Pouches and belts were so common, that the owners could not get anything for this booty of theirs."§ Lieutenant Willoughby and his companions had succeeded in destroying a portion of the stores in the Delhi arsenal; but abundance of shot and shell remained behind, and the cantonments afforded large stores of gunpowder. From native testimony we further learn, that "the Derya Gunje Bazaar was turned into an encampment for the mutineers. Shops were plundered in the Chandnee Chouk|| and Diereeba Bazaar. The shops were shut for five days. The king refused to go upon the throne. The mutineers assured him that a similar massacre had taken place up to Peshawur and down to Calcutta. He agreed, and commenced to give orders: went through the city, and told the people to open their shops. On the fifth day, notice was given that if any one concealed a European he would be destroyed. People disguised many, and sent them off; but many were killed that day, mostly by people of the city. A tailor concealed no less than five Europeans. * * * The mutineers say, when the army approaches they will fight, and that the Native troops with the army are sure to join them. Many mutineers who tried to get away with plunder were robbed; this has prevented many others from leaving."¶

This latter statement accords with a

* *Times*, July 14th, 1857.

† The same persons are given under different names: Koehe in one, is Cock in the other; Aldwell in one, is Aidwell in the other; with other mistakes of a similar character. Compare page 2220 with pages 2238 to 2241 of *Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

‡ Statement of Hurdwar pilgrims, before quoted.

§ See *Times*, September 18th, 1857.

|| The principal street in Delhi.

¶ Statement made to deputy-commissioner Farrington, of Jullundur, by three servants of the rajah of Kaporthella.—*Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

prominent feature in the character of the Hindoos—namely, their strong attachment to their native village. All experienced magistrates know, that however great a crime a Hindoo may have committed; he will, sooner or later, risk even death for the sake of revisiting his early home. Their domestic affections are likewise very powerful; and, undoubtedly, the combination against us would have been far stronger, but for the temporarily successful attempts of many, and the unsuccessful attempts of many more, to escape to their wives and children from the vortex of destruction towards which they had been impelled. Hundreds, and probably thousands, remained in Delhi because their sole chance of life lay in combined resistance. The sepoys, as a body, felt that they would be held answerable for the slaughter at the "bullock-shed," and for atrocities which, there is every reason to believe, were never perpetrated by them; but which, in the words of an English officer, "were committed by the scum of the earth, that never comes forth but on such occasions of murder and rapine, whose existence most people are ignorant of."*

We know, however, that this scum exists even in England; the daily police reports give us occasional glimpses of it: those whose professional duties compel them to examine the records of our penal settlements (Norfolk Island for instance), see its most hideous aspect; while others who have witnessed the class which appears with the barricades in Paris, and disappears with them, can easily imagine the bloody vengeance a mass of released convicts would be likely to inflict on their foreign masters. Many of the sepoys, especially of the 3rd cavalry, would gladly have returned to their allegiance. Captain Craigie received earnest solicitations to this effect from men whom he knew to have been completely carried away by the current; but it was too late: they were taught to consider their doom sealed; there was for them no hope of escape, no mitigation of their sentence, the execution of which might tarry, but would never be voluntarily abandoned. A most horrible epoch of crime and suffering, pillage, destruction, bloodshed and starvation, had commenced for Delhi. The escaped Europeans shuddered as they thought of the probable fate of those they had left behind: but far more torturing were the apprehen-

sions of the natives who had accompanied the flight of their English mistresses and foster-children, not simply at the risk of their lives, but at the cost of forsaking their own husbands and families. So soon as they had seen the Europeans in safety, their natural yearnings became irresistible, and they persisted in returning to ascertain the fate of their relatives. A lady who arrived at Meerut on the evening of the 12th of May, with her husband and children, having, she writes, "come the whole distance with our own poor horses, only stopping day or night to bait for an hour or two here and there," and had since learned that her house had been burnt to the ground; adds—"Of all our poor servants we have not since been able to hear a word; four came with us; but of the rest we know nothing; and I have many fears as to what became of them, as, if all had been right, I feel sure that they would have followed us in some way, several of them having been with us ever since we came out. Our coachman and children's ayah (nurse) set off to Delhi three days ago, dressing themselves as beggars, in order to make some inquiries about their families. We begged them not to enter Delhi, and they promised not to do so. Should they do so they will be almost sure to be killed; they will return to us in a few days we hope."†

This melancholy chapter can hardly have a more soothing conclusion. The writer depicts herself lodged in the artillery school at Meerut, in a "centre strip" of a large arched building partitioned off with matting. It is night—her husband and children are in their beds, and the rain is pouring down "in plenty of places; but that is nothing." Afraid of being late for the post the next day, she sits writing to England; and it is after mentioning very briefly that she and her husband have "lost everything they had," that she expresses, at much greater length, her solicitude for the lives of her faithful household. The host of admirable letters written for home circles, but generously published to gratify the earnest longing of the British nation for Indian intelligence, do not furnish a more charming picture of the quiet courage and cheerfulness, under circumstances of peril and privation, which we proudly believe to characterise our countrywomen, than the one thus unconsciously afforded.

* *Diary of an Officer in Calcutta.*—*Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

† Letter from the wife of a Delhi officer.—*Times* September 3rd, 1857.

CHAPTER V.

UMBALLAH—KURNAUL—MEERUT—FEROZPOOR.—MAY, 1857.

UMBALLAH is a military station, fifty-five miles north of Kurnaul, 120 miles N.N.W. of Delhi, and 1,020 N.W. of Calcutta. The district known by this name was formerly in the possession of a Seik sirdar, but "has escheated to the East India Company in default of rightful heirs."* The large walled town of Umballah has a fort, under the walls of which lies the encamping-ground of the British troops. The actual force stationed here at the time of the outbreak, was as follows:—

Two troops of artillery. *Europeans*—12 commissioned officers, 19 sergeants, 207 rank and file. *Native*—2 havildars, 54 rank and file, and 15 sick of all ranks.

One regiment of H.M.'s dragoons, 9th lancers. *Europeans*—24 commissioned officers, 48 sergeants, 563 rank and file; 27 sick of all ranks.

One regiment of Native light cavalry. *Europeans*—14 commissioned officers, 2 sergeants. *Native*—11 commissioned officers, 25 havildars, 421 rank and file; 20 sick of all ranks.

The 5th and 60th regiments of Native infantry. 29 commissioned officers, 4 sergeants. *Native*—40 commissioned officers, 117 havildars, 2,116 rank and file; 43 sick of all ranks. Detachment of irregular cavalry. [No *European* officer.] *Native*—3 commissioned officers, 1 havildar, and 89 rank and file.†

Thus, at Umballah, there were, exclusive of the sick, about 2,290 Europeans to 2,819 Natives. Here, as at Meerut, the strength of the Europeans appears to have rendered them indifferent to the mutinous feeling exhibited in the conflagrations already noticed as occurring in March, April, and the opening days of May, 1857. The cause of the disaffection was notorious, and was nowhere more clearly evidenced than in the immediate circle of the commander-in-chief. The circumstances have not been made public; and, as they are of importance, they are given here in the words in which they were communicated to the author.

"In the commencement of 1857, each regiment of Native infantry received instructions to detach one smart officer, and a party of sepoys, to the school of instruction, for practice in the use of the Enfield rifle.

"The 36th Native infantry, at the time of

the issue of these instructions, composed part of the escort of the commander-in-chief. The quota furnished by this corps left General Anson's camp at Agra for the school of musketry at Umballah, commanded by a promising young officer, Lieutenant A. W. Craigie, since dead of wounds received in the encounter with the Joudpoor legion. The commander-in-chief continued his tour of inspection, and, after passing through Bareilly, arrived at Umballah in March. The detachment of the 36th came out to meet their regiment on its marching into the station; but were repulsed by their comrades, and by the Native officers of their regiment, and declared '*Hookah panee bund*' (excommunicated), in consequence of their having lost caste by the use of the polluted cartridges at the school. The men explained to their regiment that there was nothing polluting in the cartridges, and nothing which any Hindoo or Mussulman could object to. The regiment was deaf to their explanations, and treated them as outcasts. The unhappy men then repaired to their officer, Lieutenant Craigie, and informed him of the fact. Wringing their hands, and with tears in their eyes, they described their miserable state. They said that they were convinced of the purity of the cartridges, but that they were ruined for ever, as their families would refuse to receive them after what had happened in the regiment.

"The circumstances were brought to the notice of the officers commanding the dépôt, who communicated with the officer commanding the 36th Native infantry. This officer, assembling the Native officers, stated to them the facts, as reported to him, and censured them severely for permitting such unwarrantable treatment to the men. The Native officers replied, that there was no substance in the complaint, and that the refusal to eat, or smoke the hookah, with the men of the dépôt, had been simply a jest! Here, unfortunately, the matter was permitted to rest; and such was the prevailing conviction in the minds of the natives on

* Thornton's *Gazetteer*; and Prinsep's *Life of Runjeet Sing*, p. 215.

† Parl. Papers (Commons), 9th February, 1858; pp. 4, 5.

this question, that the unhappy detachment of the 36th Native infantry attending the school, were never acknowledged again by the regiment."

It was after this memorable warning, and in defiance of increasing incendiarism, that General Anson persisted in enforcing the use of the obnoxious cartridges. In fact, he fairly launched the sepoys on the stream of mutiny, and left them to drift on towards the engulfing vortex at their own time and discretion, while he went off "on a shooting excursion among the hills,"* no one knew exactly where; nor was the point of much importance until it became necessary to acquaint him of the massacres of Meerut and Delhi, and of the rapidity with which the Bengal army "was relieving itself of the benefit of his command."†

It appears that the Umballah regiments were with difficulty restrained from following out the course taken at Meerut. No official account has been published of the Umballah *émeute*; but private letters show that the authorities acted with considerable energy and discretion. An officer of the Lancers, writing on the 14th, gives the following description of the scenes in which he took part.

"Last Sunday, after we had returned from church and just finished our breakfast, at about 10 A.M., the alarm sounded for the regiment to turn out. The men were lying in the barracks undressed, and most of them asleep; but in an almost incredibly short time they were all on parade, mounted, and fully equipped; the artillery were ready nearly as soon. When on the parade-ground, we found that the 60th Native infantry had mutinied, and turned out with their arms; but we could not go down, because they had their officers prisoners, and threatened to shoot them if we came down; but that if we did not they would return quietly. If our men had had the chance to go in at them, they would have made short work of them, they are so enraged at having had so much night-work lately, in consequence of the fires, which are all attributed to the sepoys. They (*i.e.*, our men) only get about two nights a-week in bed. At twelve o'clock (noon) we were turned out again in consequence of the 5th Native infantry having turned out; but we were again disappointed. They appeared to think us too attentive, and returned to their barracks. For the last two nights the wives of married officers are sent down to the canteen for better security. An officer remains at the Main-guard all night, and an artillery officer with the guns, which are loaded; and ammunition is served out every hour. Two patrols go out every hour; and all is alert. Yesterday (May 13th), three companies of the 75th (H.M.) marched up from Kussowlee. They started at noon

on Tuesday, and arrived at about 2 P.M. on Wednesday. The distance is forty-eight miles—a wonderful march under an Indian sun, when the thermometer was 92° to 94° in the shade: there was not a single straggler."

A young civilian, attached to the Punjab district, who also witnessed the incipient mutiny at Umballah, and claims to have been the first to convey the tidings of the general revolt to the commander-in-chief, thus narrates what he saw and did:—

"On Monday we received the painful news of what was going on at Delhi. It was heartrending to know that our countrymen and countrywomen were actually being murdered at the very moment we received the intelligence. The news came in by electric telegraph. * * * Towards afternoon we received another message, mentioning the names of some of the unfortunates.

"On Tuesday came the news from Meerut, which took longer in coming, as it had to come by post instead of telegraph. But it was not a quiet night that we passed at Umballah. We had intelligence, which, thank God, turned out to be false, that on this night all the natives were to rise. Though three miles from cantonments, we were best off at the civil lines, as we had only our treasury guard of about fifty men of the 5th Native infantry to dread, while we had 200 faithful Sikhs to back us up. We patrolled the city all night, and the people in the cantonments kept a sharp look-out. All was quiet. But it seemed to us, in our excitement, a quiet of ill omen.

"On Monday, the commander-in-chief, who was up at Simla, about ninety miles from Umballah, was written to, to send down troops at once from the hills, where three regiments of Europeans are stationed.

"On Tuesday, the first of the Delhi fugitives came creeping in; and on Wednesday evening there came a letter from a small band of misérables, who were collected at Kurnaul (eighty miles from Delhi, whence they had escaped), asking for aid. This letter, and another calling for immediate assistance in Europeans, I volunteered to take up to the commander-in-chief at Simla, and, after a hot ride through the heat of the day, and the best part of the night, I reached the commander-in-chief at about half-past four in the morning of Thursday. I turned him out of bed; they held a council of war, and at half-past ten, we were all riding back again. On reaching the foot of the hills, I was knocked up—the sun, and want of sleep for two nights, added to a ride of 130 miles, having been too much for me. By this time the last European had left the hills, and on Sunday morning all were cantoned in Umballah. I reached Umballah myself on Saturday."‡

The first telegram referred to in the above letter, has been given in the preceding chapter; the second is undated, and appears to have been sent by the members of the telegraph establishment on their private responsibility, just before taking flight.

Second (or third) Telegram from Delhi (May 11th).

"We must leave office. All the bungalows are

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 73.

† *The Bengal Mutiny*. Blackwood's *Edinburgh Magazine*, 1858; p. 387.

‡ *Times*, September 18th, 1857.

burning down by the sepoys from Meerut. They came in this morning—we are off—don't—

"To-day Mr. C. Todd is dead, I think. He went out this morning, and has not returned yet. We heard that nine Europeans were killed. Good-bye."

This intelligence was promptly conveyed from the Umballah office to the neighbouring station at Dehra, and was sent on from thence by Major-general Sir Henry Barnard, the officer in command of the Sirhind division, to the adjutant-general at Simla, with the following comment thereon:—

"As Delhi has a large magazine, and only Native troops in cantonments there, the intelligence may be of importance. * * * Philloor, also, with a large magazine, has only Native troops, who have been in a state of disorganisation. As it is possible this may be a combined movement, I have sent private despatches to the officers in command in the hills, to hold their men ready (quietly) to move at the shortest notice. I have also sent on to Jullundur and Philloor; and should the officer in command at Philloor be under any apprehension, I have authorised him to apply to Jullundur by telegraph for assistance. * * * It may be possible that the message is greatly exaggerated; but coming at the present crisis, and from the authority of Europeans attached to the telegraph, I have deemed precaution desirable, and that his excellency should be made acquainted with the circumstances without delay. I send by my aide-de-camp, Captain Barnard."*

Whether Captain Barnard or the young civilian had the honour of first communicating the above intelligence to General Anson, does not appear; but the adjutant-general (Colonel Chester), on the 14th of May, forwarded it to the secretary to the government at Calcutta, with a very brief notice of the state of affairs at Umballah, and the measures initiated by the commander-in-chief.

After recapitulating the Meerut and Delhi intelligence, Colonel Chester adds—

"Circumstances have also taken place at Umballah which render it impossible to rely on the perfect fidelity of the 5th and 60th regiments of N.I. His excellency, therefore, has made the following arrangements to meet the existing state of affairs:—

"The 75th foot marched yesterday from Kusowlee for Umballah, which place they will reach

to-morrow morning. The 1st European fusiliers from Dugshaie have been ordered to follow the 75th foot with all practicable expedition. The 2nd European fusiliers are held in readiness to move at the shortest notice. The Sirmoor battalion has been ordered from Dehra to Meerut. Two companies of the 8th foot from Jullundur have been ordered to proceed from Lahore to Govindghur. The officer commanding at Ferozepoor has been ordered to place a detachment of European troops in charge of the magazine.

"General Anson, I am to add, is anxiously looking for further intelligence, which will enable him to decide on the advisability of his at once moving down to Umballah."†

The above despatch took a long time in reaching its destination; for it is asserted that, for three weeks after the Meerut mutiny, no direct intelligence of the movements of the commander-in-chief was received at Calcutta.‡. Before those three weeks had elapsed, General Anson was dead. The interval preceding his demise must have been one of intense mental suffering. His fatal misconception of the temper of the Bengal army, ceased just at the moment when the policy founded on it was in full bearing. Sir John Lawrence,§ and Lieutenant-governor Colvin, addressed such cogent arguments to him on the subject, warning him that the irregulars would follow the example of the regular corps, that the commander-in-chief followed up the proclamation issued by him on the 14th of May (withdrawing the cartridges), with another and far stronger one; in which, after expressing his hope that the former order would have calmed the prevailing excitement, he confesses his mistake. The general order of the 19th contains the following singular admissions:—

"He [General Anson] still perceives that the very name of the new cartridges causes agitation; and he has been informed, that some of those sepoys who entertain the strongest attachment and loyalty to government, and are ready at any moment to obey its orders, would still be apprehensive that their families would not believe that they were not in some way or other contaminated by its use. * * * His excellency, therefore, has determined that the new cartridge shall be discontinued. He announces this to the Native army, in the full confidence that all will

* Further Papers on the Mutiny (No. 3), p. 6.

† *Ibid.*, p. 5.

‡ Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 73. This assertion is partially corroborated by a telegram dated "Calcutta, May 26th, 1857," in which the Supreme gov-

ernment asks, whether, "notwithstanding the failure of the dawk and telegraph, some means might not be devised of communicating with the commander-in-chief."—Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 320. § Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 373.

now perform their duty free from anxiety and care, and be prepared to stand and shed the last drop of their blood, as they have formerly done, by the side of the British troops, and in defence of their country."

This climax is simply absurd: the contest now unhappily commenced had none of the elements of defensive warfare in it, but involved the most revolting attributes of civil strife. Mohammedans and Hindoos, if true to their salt, were called on to fight, in support of Christian supremacy, against their co-religionists—it might be, against their own relatives. The general order, however, need not be discussed: before it could be promulgated, the process of dissolution of the Bengal army was well-nigh complete—the vitality, the coherence, quite extinct.

General Anson, grievously as he had erred, was both brave and energetic. His energy and his ignorance, together with his utter inexperience in military life, had combined in producing the present state of affairs. His fatal innovations were such as Generals Hewitt and Wilson would not have attempted; but had he been at Meerut on the 10th, the mutineers would probably never have reached Delhi: as it was, he no sooner learned the fate of the city, than he earnestly desired to press forward for its immediate recapture. He reached Umballah on the 15th of May. A council of war was held, composed of five members, none of whom lived to see the capture of Delhi. Generals Anson and Barnard, Brigadier Halifax, and Colonel Mowatt, died of cholera; Colonel Chester, the adjutant, was killed in action. Anson proposed to march on to Delhi at once, without waiting for reinforcements. "The guns might follow, he thought; but it was pointed out to him that there was no commissariat, no camels, not a day's allowance of provisions for troops in the field;" and, to crown the whole, not a single medicine-chest available.

"We cannot move at present," General Anson himself says, in an undated telegram addressed to the governor-general,

* Neither the date of the despatch nor of the receipt of this telegram is given in the Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 372.

† Despatch to Major-general Hewitt.—Further Papers (No. 3), pp. 19, 20.

‡ *Times*, 26th September, 1857. It is worthy of remark, that on the 26th ult., the day previous to General Anson's death, and again on the following

"for want of tents and carriage; it would destroy Europeans to march without both, and we have no men to spare. I see the risk of going to Delhi with such small means as we have—perhaps 2,500 Europeans; for should they suffer any loss, it would be serious, having nothing more to depend upon in the North-West Provinces; but it must be done."*

On the 23rd, he writes from Umballah, that he proposes advancing towards Delhi from Kurnaul on the 1st of June, and hopes to be joined by reinforcements (including 120 artillerymen, to work the small siege-train already on the road from Loodiana) from Meerut, under General Hewitt, at Bhagput on the 5th. He adds—"It is reported here that a detachment of the mutineers, with two guns, are posted on the Meerut side of the river. They should be captured, and no mercy must be shown to the mutineers."†

At half-past two on the morning of the 27th, General Anson died of cholera at Kurnaul,‡ a few hours after his first seizure, and was buried that same evening at sunset. One of the Delhi fugitives who was at Kurnaul at the time, says, "I do not know why it was, but he was laid in his grave without a military honour." Lieutenant-governor Colvin, in the telegram reporting this intelligence to the Supreme government, mentions that a copy of the order withdrawing all new cartridges came by the same express. Mr. Colvin adds—"The issue of an immediate nomination to the command-in-chief of the army proceeding fast on Delhi, under General Anson's orders, is solicited. Indian ability and experience will be very valuable; but time is before all; every hour is precious."§

The government announcement of the death of the commander-in-chief, declares that, "in General Anson, the army has lost a commander than whom none was ever more earnest and indefatigable in labouring to improve the condition, extend the comforts, and increase the efficiency of every branch of the service committed to his charge."||

An official notice of the death of a leading personage generally follows the rule of day, when the event took place, there was a report in the bazaars here that the general had died either by assassination or a stroke of the sun, according to different accounts. The notion had taken a strong hold of the natives, and was generally entertained by them.—*Bengal Hurkaru*, June 5th.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 363.

|| Gen. Order, 5th June, 1857.—*London Gazette*.

tombstone inscriptions, and describes "not what he was, but what he should have been." Yet the praise, so far as the European branch of the service is concerned, was probably not undeserved; for, in reviewing the various regiments, he is described by the officers as having been keenly alive to their discipline; and even as giving the example of diligent application to the study of native languages—a mark of no small energy in a man who was some fifty-five years of age when he first set foot in India. Whatever progress he made in the native languages, it is certain he manifested a most lamentable ignorance of the native character; and there were probably few men in India in May, 1857, who, however well they individually liked the commander-in-chief, did not agree with Major-general Tucker, that "both the results of his (General Anson's) command and his antecedents, are in proof that a vast weight of responsibility rests upon those who appointed to this important command a general so utterly inexperienced in practical military affairs. * * * I venture to say," Major-general Tucker adds, "it will be found, on inquiry, that he was quite unequal to the occasion; and painful as it is to point to the weakness of one who was talented, amiable, and gentlemanly, it is yet due to the country, and to those whose sons and daughters, and kith and kin, are being sacrificed in India, to expose the favouritism which in high places has led to many such appointments."*

Major-general Tucker writes, it must be recollected, as one whose past position under General Anson, as adjutant-general, entitles his opinion to consideration. The Indian correspondence of the period confirms his observations; but gives further, and certainly exaggerated, views of the late commander-in-chief's notorious unfitness. One writer, apparently an Indian official of a certain rank, asserts—"General Anson's death saved him from assassination. He was hated by the troops, and they burnt his tents. He was quite unfitted for his post. Horses and gaming appear to have been his pursuits; and, as a gentleman said, 'No court pet flunky ought to come to India.' Every one gave a sigh of relief when they heard he was gone. Pat Grant is come over from Madras, to head the army till orders come from England. Henry Lawrence (also a brigadier-general) has been

named for the appointment, but he cannot be spared from Oude."†

The term "court pet flunky" is not fairly applicable to the officer in question; but it is quoted here because expressions such as these, emanating from one of the masters of India, exercise an influence in the native mind, the effect of which can hardly be over-estimated. Englishmen at the dinner-table are not famed for diplomatic reserve: it follows that, through the servants in attendance (as well as in many other ways), the quick-witted natives are enabled to form a pretty clear notion of the views of the *sahib logue* (literally *master-people*) regarding their chief functionaries. Thus we know, on the authority of Mr. Raikes, that in February, 1857, a native journal had the audacity to declare—"Now is the time for India to rise, with a governor-general who has had no experience of public affairs in this country, and a commander-in-chief who has had no experience of war in any country."‡

This is nearly correct. General Anson (son of the first Viscount Anson, and brother of the first Earl of Lichfield) had been a commissioned officer in the 3rd or Scots fusilier guards, with which regiment he served at the battle of Waterloo, in the baggage guard, being then eighteen years of age. Ten years later he was placed on half pay as a lieutenant-colonel by brevet.

The *Times* describes his election to parliament, as member for Great Yarmouth, in 1818, and his acceptance of the Chiltern Hundreds in 1853, on his departure for Madras. The local rank of general was conferred on him in 1855; and in December, 1856, he was nominated to the colonelcy of the 55th regiment of foot. His occupation as Clerk of the Ordnance (from 1846 to 1852) has been already adverted to; and he had previously filled the office of principal Storekeeper of the Ordnance, under the administration of Viscount Melbourne. "He was by hereditary descent, and by personal conviction, a liberal in politics, and invariably sided with the whig leaders." This sentence probably explains why her majesty's ministers considered Colonel Anson eligible for one of the most lucrative appointments in their gift, despite the manifest impropriety of confiding the charge of a large army to an officer who had never commanded a regiment; and the conclud-

* Letter of Major-general Tucker to the editor of the *Times*, July 19th, 1857.

† *Daily News*, August 5th, 1857.

‡ Raikes, p. 173.

ing statement of the obituary, that Colonel Anson "was a zealous patron of the turf,"* shows why the far-away appointment was eligible to a most popular man about town. Only, had Sir Charles Napier's words been deemed worth attention, the government would have felt that a character of an altogether different type was needed to influence, by precept and example, European officers in India, where gentlemanly vices (and especially gaming, and the pleasures of the table) are peculiarly seductive, as enlivening the monotony of military routine, in a most enervating climate, during a period of profound peace. As to the Native army, it is the less to be wondered at that utter inexperience was not deemed a disqualification for its command; because the authorities, if they thought of it at all, viewed it as a huge, clumsy, old-fashioned, but very safe machine, not quite fitted for the requirements of the times, but altogether too great an affair to be meddled with by persons entrusted with political powers of certainly very precarious, and possibly ephemeral, existence.

So the army was supplemented with "irregular" corps, which in many points resembled what the old regiments had been in, and long after, the days of Clive. These additions complicated the working of the original machine, the constructors of which had long ago died, and, it would seem, their plans with them; for when the whole concern was suddenly found to be dropping in pieces, the chief engineer proved utterly incapable of pointing out, much less of counteracting, the cause of the mischief.

The *Friend of India*, the best known of Indian journals, in a leader published on

* *Times*, July 14th, 1857.

† In the year 1857, the *Times*, in alluding to the manner in which this sum had been diverted from its original destination, remarked—"We should be glad if the widows and families of those persons who have distinguished themselves in war, in diplomacy, or in administration, could be provided for from some other fund; for certainly the sum of £1,200 a-year is no great amount for such a country as England to expend upon the relief of science and literature in distress." To the widow of Mr. Gilbert A'Beckett a pension of £100 per annum was allotted, "in consideration of the literary merits of her husband, also of the eminent public services rendered by him in his capacity of a police magistrate in the metropolis, and of the destitute circumstances in which his widow and their children are now placed."—(*Times*, July 9th, 1857). In this case, it would appear that a conjunction of reasons are deemed necessary to justify the pension of a single hundred a-year to the widow of a distinguished *littérateur*. A pension of £70 to the widow

the 14th of May, 1857 (while General Anson was yet alive), says—

"An army has often been likened to a machine; and we wish the comparison were thoroughly accepted. When your engine goes wrong, it is found needful to have at hand a man who understands every portion of it. Being able to place his hand on the defective spot, he knows exactly what is required in the way of reparation, and how to set about the work. But we never, except by chance, have a capable engineer in the person of the exalted official who has to guide the vast and powerful mechanism that holds the soil and collects the revenues of India. It is hard to divine in most cases the cause of his appointment—harder still to justify the fact of it. It is a miserable thing to say that the state gains by the idleness of a commander-in-chief; and yet, in most cases, all ranks of the community would join in wishing that he would fold his hands, and only open them to clutch what ought to be the recompense of zeal, intellect, and energy."

It is asserted, that immediately before his seizure, General Anson, finding that his utter inexperience in warfare disqualified him for conducting the attack on Delhi, had formally communicated to General Barnard, through the adjutant-general, the intention to resign the command of the army.

One other circumstance remains to be noticed, in illustration of the ill-advised "favouritism" which Major-general Tucker denounces as exercising so baneful an influence in India. About the same time, when the "good-service pension" of £100 a-year was meted out to the gallant Havelock, an intimation appeared that the widow of General Anson had, in addition to the pension on account of her late husband's rank in the service, been granted a stipend of £200 a-year out of the annual sum of £1,200 granted by parliament, and known as the "Literary Fund."†

of Hugh Millar, is likewise accorded on the double ground of his eminent literary services and her poverty. In 1858, a pension of £100 per annum was allotted from the same fund to the widow of Douglas Jerrold; £50 per annum to each of the two Miss Landers, "in consideration of the eminent services of their father, the late Mr. John Lander, who died from the effects of the climate while exploring the river Niger, and of the straitened circumstances in which they are placed at his decease;" £40 per annum to the daughter of James Hogg, the Ettrick Shepherd; and £50 to the aged widow of the late Dr. Dick, the author of the *Christian Philosopher* and other admirable works, "in consideration of the merits of her late husband as a moral and theological writer, and of the straitened circumstances in which she is now placed." Then follows—£200 per annum to the Hon. Isabella Elizabeth Annabella Anson, in consideration of the services of her husband, the late General the Hon. George Anson; and £200 per annum to Dame Isabella Letitia Barnard, in consideration of the services of her husband, the

It seems to be an inevitable necessity that, save in some rare cases, the rank of those who serve, rather than the value of the service rendered, is to be the rule of the reward. The East India Company have been accused of carrying this principle to an extreme, by their rigid adherence to the seniority system; but it would be hard to bring against them any more direct instance (so far as the Europeans are concerned) of robbing poor Peter to pay rich Paul than that above noticed.

The Indian crisis, however, for the moment, laid favouritism, patronage, and seniority together on the shelf, and the question was earnestly and eagerly discussed, "Who is the fittest man to command the forces?" The emergency was far greater than that which had previously issued in the sending out of General Napier; but the result was partially the same; for as the war was ended before Sir Charles reached the scene of action, so, in 1857, the news of the recapture of Delhi greeted Sir Colin Campbell on his arrival at Calcutta. The prediction of Lieutenant-governor Colvin had, in fact, been fulfilled—"John Lawrence and his Sikhs had saved India."*

Pending the decision of the Calcutta government regarding the vacant position of commander-in-chief, the command devolved on Major-general Barnard, who was himself summoned, by a telegraph, from a sick bed to receive the last instructions of General Anson regarding the intended march on Delhi. New delays are said to have arisen, in consequence of the detention of Brigadier Archdale Wilson, and the reinforcements expected from Meerut, by the orders of Mr. Greathed; so that General Barnard, disappointed of the artillery and gunners which were to have joined the Delhi column according to General Anson's arrangements, was compelled to send elephants to Meerut to bring on the troops from thence.† The authorities at that unfortunate cantonment had not yet recovered from the paralytic panic which had seized them on the 10th. In fact, they had had a new shock; for a fresh mutiny had broken out among a body of 600 Native sappers and miners, who had been sent

in from Roorkee to repair and strengthen the Meerut station. They arrived on the 15th of May. On the 16th about 400 of them rose in a body, and after murdering their commandant (Captain Fraser), they made off towards Delhi, but being pursued by two squadrons of the carabineers, were overtaken about six miles off, and forty-seven of them slain. The remainder continued their flight. One of the carabineers was killed, and two or three wounded, including Colonel Hogge, an active and energetic officer, who led the pursuit, and received a ball in his thigh, which unfortunately laid him up at a time when his services could be ill-spared. The remaining two companies were disarmed, and continued perfectly quiet.

Two days later, a sapper detachment, about 300 strong, mutinied at Roorkee. A company had been detached to join the commander-in-chief's column, and had got half-way to Seharunpore, when tidings reached it of the collision at Meerut, in which Captain Fraser lost his life. It would advance no farther, but marched back to the cantonment at Roorkee, bringing the European officers, and treating them personally with respect. When the men returned, Lieutenants Drummond, Bingham, and Fulford, had already left cantonments at the earnest request of the Native officers, and had been escorted to the college by them; and a body of old sepoy's resolutely resisted the attempts of a small party among the men, who urged the massacre of the Europeans.‡

On the 13th, intelligence reached Meerut that *Sirdhana*, formerly the chief place of the Begum Sumroo's jaghire, had been devastated by the villagers, and that the nuns and children of the convent there were actually in a state of siege. The postmaster at Meerut, having female relations at *Sirdhana*, asked for a small escort to go to their relief. The authorities replied, that not a single European soldier could be spared from the station, but that four Native troopers would be allowed to accompany him. Even these he could not get; but he armed three or four of his office people, started off at half-past four on the Thursday

late Major-general Sir H. W. Barnard, K.C.B. (*Times*, July 28th, 1858). In the two last-named cases, the allusion to "straitened circumstances" is omitted. Yet it is the only conceivable excuse for placing these two ladies on the Literary Fund. In the case of Mrs. Dick and others, it would surely have been more gracious to have accorded their slender pittance as a token of public respect

to the merits of the departed, and not as a charitable dole, their claim to which needed to be eked out by poverty.

* *Raikes' Revolt in the N. W. Provinces.*

† See *Memoir of General Barnard's Services*; by a near connexion.—*Times*, December 25th, 1857.

‡ Bombay correspondent: *Daily News*, July 15th, 1857.

evening, and returned a little after seven, with five females and girls. The nuns would not abandon the children, but had entreated him to try and send them some help. The Rev. Mr. Smythe, who was at Meerut at the time, says—"The postmaster tried all he could to get a guard to escort them to this station, but did not succeed; and yesterday morning (the 15th), having given up the idea of procuring a guard from the military authorities, he went round, and by speaking to some gentlemen, got about fifteen persons to volunteer their services to go and rescue the poor nuns and children from Sirdhana; and, I am happy to say, they succeeded in their charitable errand without any one having been injured."*

The authorities subsequently took care to publish the rescue of the defenceless women and children, but were discreetly silent as to the individual gallantry by which it had been accomplished. Neither did they mention an offer made, according to the Rev. Mr. Rotton, on the evening of the mutiny, by an officer of the carabineers, to pursue the fugitives, but "declined by the general commanding the Meerut division."†

Mr. Raikes also, in describing the course of events at Agra, records "the indignation with which, on Thursday evening, we learned that the mutineers, after firing the station, murdering our countrymen, women, and children, and breaking the gaol, had been permitted to retire quietly on Delhi, taking their barbers, water-carriers, bag and baggage, just as if they had been on an ordinary march;" and adds, "I now know that Major Rosser, of H.M.'s 6th carabineers, asked permission to follow them with cavalry and guns. If he had been allowed to do so, it is quite possible, and indeed probable, that the mutiny, for the present at least, might have been crushed."‡ The Calcutta government were not insensible of the supineness indulged in at Meerut; for the governor-

general in council, in a telegram dated June 1st, 1857, entreated Mr. Colvin to endeavour "to keep up communication with the south;" adding, "this, like everything else, has been culpably neglected at Meerut."§

Ferozpoor.—The next outbreak after that at Delhi, occurred at Ferozpoor, an important city, which long formed our frontier station in the north-west, and which, in May, 1857, contained an intrenched magazine of the largest class, filled with military stores scarcely inferior in amount to those in the arsenal of Fort William. Ferozpoor commands one high road from Lahore to Delhi, as Umritsir does the other.

The troops stationed there consisted of H.M.'s 61st foot, about 1,000 strong; two companies of artillery, composed of a nearly equal number of Europeans, about 300 in all; the 10th Native light cavalry, under 500 men; and the 45th and 57th Native infantry. Brigadier Innes|| assumed the command at Ferozpoor on the 11th of May; on the 12th, he learned the events which had occurred at Meerut; and, on the following morning, he ordered a general parade, with the view of ascertaining the temper of the troops; which, on reviewing them, he thought "haughty." At noon, information arrived of the occupation of Delhi (seventy-three miles distant) by the rebels. The intrenchments were at this time held by a company of the 57th Native infantry; but a detachment of H.M.'s 61st, under Major Redmond, was immediately dispatched thither. The brigadier likewise resolved "to move the Native troops out of cantonments;" and the European artillery, with twelve guns, was ordered down, "to overawe or destroy the two Native corps"—that is, of infantry; the cavalry being considered perfectly reliable, and entrusted with the care of the [new] arsenal, its magazine, and contents. The preliminary arrangements were completed by five o'clock; and

mit the greatest outrages in consequence of this simple fact."—(p. 4.) It is, however, alleged that General Hewitt cannot justly be held responsible for this tardiness, because although he was general of the Meerut division, Brigadier Wilson was in command of the station; and it is urged, that of the proceedings of the latter officer during the memorable night of the outbreak, not one word, good, bad, or indifferent, is on record.

† *Revolt in the N.W. Provinces*, p. 13.

§ Appendix to Papers on Mutiny, p. 355.

|| Printed "James" in Further Papers on Mutiny (No. 3, p. 8), by one of the unaccountable blunders with which the Indian and Colonial Blue Books abound.

* Letters of Rev. Mr. Smythe, dated 16th and 17th May, 1857.

† The Chaplain's *Narrative of the Siege of Delhi*, p. 7. Mr. Rotton (whose book is far more moderate in tone than might have been expected from the extract from his sermon given in Colonel Smythe's *Narrative*, and quoted at p. 154) says, that "in truth, our military authorities were paralysed. No one knew what was best to do, and nothing accordingly was done. The rebels had it all their own way." Mr Rotton also adverts to the "one thing which impressed every one—the delay in leading the troops from the grand parade-ground to the scene of mutiny and bloodshed. The native soldiery, and the fellows of baser sort in the bazaars, had ample time to com-

the Native troops being assembled on the parade-ground at that hour, the brigadier formed them up in quarter-distance columns, addressed them, and ordered the two regiments to move off in contrary directions. Both obeyed without hesitation; but the road the 45th were directed to take to the place where they were to encamp, lay close to the intrenched camp; on reaching which, the men broke into open mutiny, loaded their muskets, and, heedless of the entreaties of their officers, ran to the north-west bastion of the magazine, and stood still, apparently hesitating what to do next. At this moment, scaling-ladders were thrown out to them by the company of the 57th, who had been left there to avoid raising the suspicions of their comrades before the parade. The 45th commenced climbing the parapet; and some 300 of them having succeeded in making their way over, attacked a company of the 61st, which was hurriedly drawn up to receive them. Major Redmond was wounded in repulsing the mutineers, who made a second attempt; but, being again defeated, broke up, and dispersed themselves through the bazaars and cantonments. A body of about 150 men continued to obey Colonel Liptrap and their other officers, and encamped in the place pointed out to them; the rest were deaf to threats and entreaties. Instead of acting on the offensive, and immediately following the mutineers, Brigadier Innes, according to his report, assumed an exclusively defensive attitude. He desired the Europeans to leave the cantonments, and come into the barracks; and suffered a portion of H.M.'s 61st to remain in their lines, while the mutineers, having carried their dead to the Mohammedan burying-ground, returned in small bodies to the cantonments, and burned the church, Roman Catholic chapel, two vacant hospitals, the mess-house of the 61st, and sixteen bungalows. Two merchants (Messrs. Coates and Hughes) positively refused to abandon their houses, and, collecting their servants, successfully defended themselves; Mr. Hughes' son, a mere boy, shooting one of the assailants. The fact of there being "20,000 barrels of gunpowder in the arsenal"* to care for, is alleged in excuse for the sacrifice of the buildings. The next measure

was still more extraordinary. Brigadier Innes states—

"On hearing from Colonel Liptrap that the 45th intended to seize their magazine on the morning of the 14th, I determined to blow up the magazines both of the 45th and 57th. * * * The blowing up of the magazines so enraged the 45th, that they immediately seized their colours, and marched off towards Furreed Kote. On Colonel Liptrap reporting this, I desired him to march in with those that stood faithful, and lay down their arms to the 61st; 133 of all ranks did so. Three troops of the 10th light cavalry, under Majors Beatson and Harvey, and two guns, I sent in pursuit of the mutineers.

"Major Marsden, deputy-commissioner, having volunteered his services, and from his knowledge of the country, I entrusted to him the command of the whole. He followed them for about twelve miles. They dispersed in all directions, throwing away their arms and colours into wells and other places. A few were made prisoners, and the country-people have since brought in several.

"The above occurrences took place on the 14th. In the early part of the day, I acquainted Colonel Darvall that I would receive such men of his regiment as would come in and lay down their arms: the light company, under Captain Salmon, and owing to his exertions, almost to a man did so. On laying down their arms, I permitted them to return to their lines. It was immediately reported that stragglers from the 45th had entered their lines and threatened them, on which a company of the 61st cleared their lines. Unfortunately, the 57th, seeing European troops in their lines, believed that their light company were being made prisoners, which caused a panic in the 57th, and prevented their coming in to lay down their arms, which Colonel Darvall reported they intended to have done. On regaining confidence, several parties came in under their officers; and in the evening Colonel Darvall brought in — of all ranks, with his colours, and I required them to lay down their arms, which they did without hesitation, but with a haughty air.

"I am unable to furnish present states, but I believe that, of the 57th, about 520 men are present, and about half that number of the 45th.

"It is gratifying to state that the 25th Native light cavalry have remained staunch, and have done good service. The greatest credit is due to Major M'Donnell and his officers for keeping his regiment together, for this corps must have the same ideas as the other portions of the Native army. * * * The 10th cavalry are constantly in the saddle."†

Such is the account given, by the leading authority, of an affair which occasioned his "summary removal from the list of brigadiers," and materially strengthened the rebel cause.

Mr. Cooper remarks that, "on the 28th of May, the remainder of the 45th were turned ingloriously out of cantonments, and escorted to the boundaries of the district. They probably combated with no diminished acrimony against us at Delhi, from having been allowed to reach it alive, without money and without food."‡

* Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 13.

† Brigadier Innes' despatch, May 16th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 3), p. 7.

‡ *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 13.

CHAPTER VI.

AGRA, ALIGHUR, MYNPOORIE, NEEMUCH, AND NUSSEERABAD.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

AGRA.—Nowhere could the tidings of the rebellion be more calculated to excite alarm than in the stately city of Agra—the rival of Delhi in the palmy days of the Mogul empire, and now the chief place in the division of the British dominions known as the N. W. Provinces. Agra is situated on the banks of the Jumna, 139 miles south-east of Delhi.

The troops in the station consisted of one company of artillery (chiefly Europeans), H.M.'s 3rd foot, the 44th and 67th regiments of Native infantry, and a detachment of irregular cavalry, consisting of thirty-seven men, commanded by two Native officers. Intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut was published in Agra on the morning of the 11th of May; but the newspaper announcement was accompanied by a remark, on the part of the editor, that, "in a station like Meerut, with the 6th dragoons, 60th rifles, and European artillery, it might be presumed that the mutineers had a very short race of it."* It was not until three days later that the Europeans at Agra became acquainted with the extent of the calamity.

Lieutenant-governor Colvin was, happily, a man of experience and discretion. While the cloud was as yet no bigger than a man's hand, he recognised the tempest it portended; and, slowly as the intelligence reached Agra, he was more ready for the worst than some who had had longer warning. On the 13th he dispatched a telegram to Calcutta, suggesting that "the force returning from the Persian gulf, or a considerable portion of it, should be summoned in straight to Calcutta, and thence sent up the country." On the 14th, he wrote urging that martial law should be proclaimed in the Meerut district; which, as we have seen, was done, and necessarily so, for our civil and criminal courts, always detested by the natives, were swept away by the first blast of the storm; and, a few days later, Lieutenant-governor Colvin reported that, "around Meerut, the state of license

in the villages, caused by the absence of all government, spread for about twenty or twenty-five miles south, and about the same limit, or somewhat more, north. Within this belt, unchecked license reigned from the Jumna to the Ganges. The absence of any light cavalry, or effective means of scouring the country in this severely hot weather, paralysed the attempts of the Meerut force to maintain any regularity or order beyond the immediate line of its pickets."†

The question of holding the various small stations scattered throughout the disturbed provinces, became early one of anxious interest. They could be retained only at imminent risk to the handful of Europeans who were placed there; nevertheless, the general good could scarcely be more effectively served, than by each man standing to his post at all hazards, sooner than seem to fly before the rebels. Every one who knew the Asiatic character, concurred in this opinion; and none stated it more clearly than Lieutenant-governor Colvin. His view of the conduct of the collector of Goorgaon—a district, the chief place of which (also named Goorgaon) is only eighteen miles from Delhi—shows how stern a sense he had of the duty of even civilians under new and trying circumstances. In describing the state of affairs in the North-Western Provinces, he writes:—

"On the evening of the 13th instant [May], Mr. Ford, and his assistant, Mr. W. Clifford, having no support beyond their police and a party of the contingent of the Jhujjur horse, whose tone and conduct became rapidly menacing, thought that no good object would be attained by their staying at Goorgaon. The lieutenant-governor regrets the determination to quit the station on Mr. Ford's part, because he does not doubt that the best mode, especially in India, of staying violent outbursts against authority of this kind, is to remain at the post to the last, even at the direct risk of life.

"Withdrawal from a post, except under immediate attack and irresistible compulsion, at once destroys all authority, which, in our civil administration, in its strength is respected, if exercised only by a Chupprassei; while in the event of any general resistance, accompanied by defection of our military force, it has in truth no solid foundation to rest upon: but the lieutenant-governor has not thought

* *Mofussilite (extra)*; May 11th, 1857.

† Despatch from Lieutenant-governor Colvin, May 22nd, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 311.

it necessary on this account, after such alarmingly emergent circumstances as had occurred at Delhi, to censure Mr. Ford for the course which he adopted.

"The introduction of general disorder into the villages of the Goorgaon district, soon communicated itself to the northern portion of Muttra; and the isolated customs' patrol officers, whose duties render them necessarily unpopular, fell back from their posts with their men. This spread further the impression of a cessation of all government, and was having a very injurious effect up to the very walls of the important town of Muttra.

"This state of things has, however, greatly altered for the better by the advance of an effective portion of the Bhurtpoor troops, which has now taken up a position on the Muttra and Goorgaon frontier."

The Jhujjur and Bhurtpoor troops mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, consisted partly of a contingent or subsidiary force, furnished by the chiefs of those territories to the British government, and partly of their own immediate retainers, who, being a kind of feudal militia, were perfectly trustworthy; whereas the former, whether contingent or subsidiary, were essentially a portion of the Bengal army, drawn from the same sources, disciplined in the same manner, and officered by Europeans—having in all respects a fellow-feeling with the Delhi mutineers. At first, a degree of confidence was reposed in the fidelity of the native contingents, which was neither warranted by their antecedents, nor supported by their subsequent conduct; for they were false to us, in defiance of the strenuous endeavours of the native princes, on whom we had forced them under a mistaken view of our own interests. Sindia, Holcar, the rajah of Bhurtpoor, and other princes, never wavered in their opinion of the disaffection of the subsidiary troops, and gave conspicuous and self-sacrificing tokens of their personal fidelity, by placing their own retainers at the disposal of the British. As early as the 14th of May, Colvin received a message from Sindia, that his body-guard of 400 cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery, would be ready to start from Gwalior for Agra on the following evening. The offer was gladly accepted.

On the 15th, the lieutenant-governor reviewed the troops stationed at Agra, having previously ascertained, from undoubted authority, that a deep and genuine conviction had seized the mind of the sepoy army, that the government was steadily bent on causing a general forfeiture of caste by the compulsory handling of impure things. Privately, and on parade, the men assured the lieutenant-governor, that "all they wanted to be

certain of," was the non-existence of the suspected plot: he therefore addressed the Supreme government by telegraph, urging the immediate issue of a proclamation containing a simple and direct assurance that no attempt whatever would be made against the caste of the Native troops. He added—"An inducement, too, is wanted for not joining the mutineers, and for leaving them. I am in the thick of it, and know what is wanted. I earnestly beg this, to strengthen me."*

On the 16th, the governor-general in council sent a telegraphic reply, promising that the desired proclamation should be issued, and encouraging Colvin in the course he was pursuing, by the following cordial expression of approval:—"I thank you sincerely for all you have so admirably done, and for your stout heart."†

No proclamation, properly so called, appears to have been issued; but, according to the inaccurate and hasty summary of events sent to the Court of Directors from Calcutta, "a circular was issued on the 29th, explaining that none of the new cartridges had been issued to Native regiments." This statement was, as has been before stated, in complete opposition to that of General Anson, who had, some days before, formally withdrawn the identical cartridges which Lord Canning declared had never been issued. To complicate the matter still further, the same page of the Calcutta intelligence which contains the notice of the circular of the Supreme government, states, also, as the latest intelligence from Umritsir, that "the 59th N.I. do not object to the new cartridges."‡

The position of Colvin was most harassing. He never received any communication whatever from General Anson—the regular posts being stopped, and the general not fertile in expedients for the conveyance or obtainment of intelligence. A council of war was held at the Agra government-house on the 13th of May: and even at this early period, Mr. Raikes describes the lieutenant-governor as "exposed to that rush of alarm, advice, suggestion, expostulation, and threat, which went on increasing for nearly two months, until he was driven nearly broken-hearted into the fort." The officers naturally urged advice with especial earnestness on a civil governor, and "every

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857; p. 181.

† *Ibid.*, p. 193.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

man was anxious to do his best, but to do it his own way.”*

Long experience of native character, however, had given Mr. Colvin an insight into the causes of the mutiny, which convinced him of the paramount influence that panic, and the feeling of being irremediably compromised by the misconduct of others, had exercised, and were still exercising, in the minds of the sepoys. In the excitement of the crisis his policy was the subject of sweeping censure; but, eventually, measures of a similar tendency were resorted to, as the sole means of healing a breach which he strove to narrow and close at its commencement. With regard to the Europeans, the attitude he advised and adopted was most unflinching. The same feeling which induced him to blame the abandonment of Goorgaon, led him to declare, a week later, when the danger was fast increasing—

“It is a vitally useful lesson to be learnt from the experience of present events, that not one step should be yielded in retreat, on an outbreak in India, which can be avoided with any safety. Plunder and general license immediately commence, and all useful tenure of the country is annihilated. It is not by shutting ourselves in forts in India that our power can be upheld; and I will decidedly oppose myself to any proposal for throwing the European force into the fort except in the very last extremity.”†

With regard to the Native army, he believed one measure, and only one, remained which might arrest the plague of mutiny by affording opportunity for repentance before war *à l'outrance* should be declared against the Europeans. Addressing the governor-general by telegraph on the 24th of May, he writes:—

“On the mode of dealing with the mutineers, I would strenuously oppose general severity towards all. Such a course would, as we are unanimously convinced by a knowledge of the feeling of the people, acquired among them from a variety of sources, estrange the remainder of the army. Hope, I am firmly convinced, should be held out to all those who were not ringleaders or actively concerned in murder and violence. Many are in the rebels' ranks because they could not get away; many certainly thought we were tricking them out of their caste; and this opinion is held, however unwisely, by the mass of the population, and even by some of the more intelligent classes. Never was delusion more wide or deep. Many of the best soldiers in the army—among others, of its most faithful section,

the irregular cavalry—show a marked reluctance to engage in a war against men whom they believe to have been misled on the point of religious honour. A tone of general menace would, I am persuaded, be wrong. The commander-in-chief should, in my view, be authorised to act upon the above line of policy; and when means of escape are thus open to those who can be admitted to mercy, the remnant will be considered obstinate traitors even by their own countrymen, who will have no hesitation in siding against them.”

On the following day, Mr. Colvin reported to the governor-general that he had himself taken the decisive step:—

“Impressed by the knowledge of the feelings of the native population, as communicated in my message of yesterday, and supported by the unanimous opinion of all officers of experience here, that this mutiny is not one to be put down by high-handed authority; and thinking it essential at present to give a favourable turn to the feelings of the sepoys who have not yet entered against us, I have taken the grave responsibility of issuing, on my own authority, the following proclamation. A weighty reason with me has been the total dissolution of order, and the loss of every means of control in many districts. My latest letter from Meerut is now seven days old, and not a single letter has reached me from the commander-in-chief.

“PROCLAMATION.

“Soldiers engaged in the late disturbances, who are desirous of going to their own homes, and who give up their arms at the nearest government civil or military post, and retire quietly, shall be permitted to do so unmolested.

“Many faithful soldiers have been driven into resistance to government only because they were in the ranks and could not escape from them, and because they really thought their feelings of religion and honour injured by the measures of government. This feeling was wholly a mistake; but it acted on men's minds. A proclamation of the governor-general now issued is perfectly explicit, and will remove all doubts on these points.

“Every evil-minded instigator in the disturbance, and those guilty of heinous crimes against private persons, shall be punished. All those who appear in arms against the government after this notification is known shall be treated as open enemies.”‡

The proclamation, according to Sir Charles Trevelyan, “was universally approved at Agra.” He adds, that “its object was to apply a solvent to reduce the compact mass of rebellion to its elements, and to give to the well-disposed an opportunity of returning to their allegiance, leaving the guilty remainder to their well-deserved fate.”§

The governor-general in council took a different view of the subject; and a telegram, dated May 26th, declared that the

Mutiny, p. 313; the third, omitted in the Blue Book, is given by “Indophilus” in his Letter to the *Times*, Dec. 25th, 1857.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857.

§ *Times*, December 25th, 1857.

* Raikes' *Revolt in the N.W. Provinces*, p. 10.

† Mr. Colvin to the governor-general, May 22nd, 1857.—The first two sentences of the quotation from Mr. Colvin's despatch to the governor-general, are quoted from the Appendix to Parl. Papers on

proclamation was disapproved, and that the embarrassment in which it would place the government and the commander-in-chief was very great. Everything was therefore to be done to stop its operation. Mr. Colvin protested against the repudiation of the proclamation, and denied the justice of the chief ground on which it was denounced by the governor-general in council—namely, that it offered means of escape to the men who murdered their officers. Lord Canning persisted in ordering its withdrawal, and directed that the following proclamation should be issued in its stead:—

“Every soldier of a regiment which, although it has deserted its post, has not committed outrages, will receive a free pardon and permission to proceed to his home, if he immediately delivers up his arms to the civil or military authority, and if no heinous crime is shown to have been perpetrated by himself personally.

“This offer of free and unconditional pardon cannot be extended to those regiments which have killed or wounded their officers or other persons, or which have been concerned in the commission of cruel outrages.

“The men of such regiments must submit themselves unconditionally to the authority and justice of the government of India.

“Any proclamations offering pardon to soldiers engaged in the late disturbances, which may have been issued by local authorities previously to the promulgation of the present proclamation, will thereupon cease to have effect; but all persons who may have availed themselves of the offer made in such proclamations, shall enjoy the benefit thereof.”*

It was clearly impolitic to issue orders and counter-orders which, to the natives, would bear the semblance of vacillation of purpose, if not of double-dealing. But in the excitement of the period, it is probable that nothing short of an explicit offer of amnesty to all who could not be proved to have actually shed blood, or been notorious ringleaders, would have sufficed to arrest the course of mutiny. The government of India, true to the motto of their policy, “insufficient or too late,” could not yet understand the urgency of the case, and went so far as to blame the lieutenant-governor for having taken upon himself the responsibility of an important measure, “without necessity for any extreme haste.” And this to a man who heard the “crash of regiments” on every side.

Lord Elphinstone, the governor of Bombay, dispatched a telegram to Lord Canning on the 17th of May, proposing to send an officer in a fast steamer, to overtake the

mail, which had left Bombay four days previously. The governor-general rejected the offer as unnecessary, although it involved the saving of twenty-eight days in the appeal for reinforcements from England. About the same time, intelligence reached Agra that the treaty of peace was ratified with Persia, and that three European regiments, and a portion of the European artillery, were to return to India immediately. Mr. Colvin entreated that the troops, on arriving at Calcutta, might be immediately dispatched to the Upper Provinces; but the answer he received was, that many weeks must elapse before the force could reach India; in the meantime, a European regiment had been called for from Madras, and one from Pegu; but these were not expected at Calcutta under a fortnight, and not a single European could be spared until then. In the event of being severely pressed, Mr. Colvin was to apply to the rajah of Putteeala, or to the rajah of Jheend, for aid. The services of both these chiefs had already been volunteered, and immediately accepted and employed.

The rajah of Putteeala has been mentioned as sending cavalry to the rescue of the fugitives from Delhi. His name will recur frequently, in the course of the narrative, as that of “a constant, honourable, and invaluable ally.” His principality is one of the most important of those known as the Seik protected states; and its extent has been recently increased by grants from the British government, bestowed in reward of his fidelity during the war with Lahore, on condition of his making and maintaining in repair a military road, and abolishing Suttee, infanticide, and slave-dealing in his dominions.

The latest parliamentary return on the subject states the area of Putteeala at 4,448 miles, and the population at 662,752 persons. The territory is very fertile, and exports large quantities of grain across the Sutlej to Lahore and Umritsir. The chief place, also named Putteeala (twenty miles from Umballah), is a densely peopled and compact town, with a small citadel, in which the rajah, or, as he is more generally called, the maharajah, resides. He is described as “a man in the prime of life, of some thirty-three or thirty-four years of age, of commanding stature and fine presence, inclining to obesity; a handsome oval face, black flowing beard, moustache, and whiskers; Grecian nose, and large dark

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857; pp. 334-5.

eyes of the almond shape, which is so much admired by the Asiatics. His court is the last which is left in the north-west of India, and is maintained with Oriental magnificence. As a governor he is absolute in his own dominions, which he rules vigorously and energetically with his own hands.”*

The position of Putteeala, the resources and energy of its ruler, and the disaffection of many of his subjects towards British supremacy, rendered the question of his allegiance one of extreme importance. His decision was immediate and unqualified; and he assisted the British government, not only with troops and supplies of provision, but actually with a loan of money to the amount of £210,000.† The Umballah cantonment was in so disorganised a condition at the time of the general mutiny, that, according to Mr. Raikes, it could hardly have been preserved without the help of the Putteeala rajah. When summoned thither, he came clad in a suit of mail, driving his own elephant, and spared no exertion to prove his zeal.‡

Jheend is another, but much smaller, Cis-Sutlej state, part of which was annexed on the failure of direct heirs; but the remainder was suffered to pass into the possession of a collateral heir in 1837. Its limits were increased after the conclusion of the war with Lahore, on the same terms as those of Putteeala, and for the same reason—namely, the good service rendered by its rajah. Jheend comprises an area of 376 square miles, and a population of about 56,000 persons. The rajah had an early opportunity of manifesting his determined allegiance to the English. It is said, that a deputation from Delhi sought him while reviewing his troops in his chief place, and that, on learning their errand, he immediately ordered every man of the messengers to be cut down.§

These were the allies to whom Lord Canning bade Mr. Colvin turn for the help; and to them, among other benefits, we owe the aid of our first Seik levies.||

As the month of May wore on, affairs in Agra began to assume a gloomier aspect. The detachments of the Gwalior contingent, sent as reinforcements, speedily betrayed their sympathy with the mutineers against

whom they were expected to act, by asking whether the flour supplied to their camp was from the government stores. If so, they would not touch it, having been informed that cows' bones had been pulverised and mixed with the otta sold in the bazaars.¶ These indications of disaffection were marked by the Europeans with great uneasiness, the general feeling being, that the Hindoos were completely under the influence of the Mussulmans, who “were all, or nearly all, thirsting for English blood.” And, indeed, the feeling against them became so general and indiscriminating, that Mohammedan, in the North-West Provinces, was viewed as only “another word for a rebel.”** The news from outstations gave additional cause for alarm and distrust.

Alighur lies between Delhi and Agra, about fifty-one miles to the north of the latter city. The position was very important, as it commanded the communications up and down the country. It was garrisoned by three or four companies of the 9th N.I., “the men of which behaved very steadily and well; and, in this manner, broke the shock of the insurrection for a few days.”†† On the 19th of May, a religious mendicant appeared in the lines, and endeavoured to incite the men to mutiny. Two of the sepoys whom he addressed, seized and carried him before the commanding officer, who ordered a court-martial to be instantly assembled. The Native officers found the prisoner guilty, and sentenced him to death. On the following morning the troops were assembled, and the offender brought out and hung, no opposition or displeasure being evinced at his fate; but before the men were marched off the ground, the rifle company, which had just been relieved from the outpost of Bolundshuhur, made their appearance; and a Brahmin sepoy, stepping out from the ranks, upbraided his comrades for having betrayed a holy man, who came to save them from disgrace in this world, and eternal perdition in the next.‡‡ The men listened, debated, wavered, and finally broke up with loud shouts, declaring their intention of joining their comrades at Delhi, which they actually did; for it is stated,

* *Times* (Mr. Russell), 29th November, 1858.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Raikes' Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*, pp. 88, 89.

§ *Daily News*, June 29th, 1857

|| *Murray's Quarterly Review*, 1858; p. 226.

¶ *Raikes' Revolt in N. W. Provinces*, p. 14.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 53; 173.

†† Lieutenant-governor Colvin to governor-general; May 22nd, 1857.—Appendix, p. 313.

‡‡ *Mead's Sepoy Revolt*, p. 148.

that the regimental number of the 9th was found on the bodies of some of the most daring opponents of the British army.* The officers, and Europeans generally, were neither injured nor insulted; but, on their departure, the treasury was seized, the gaol broken open, and the bungalows burned. The officials, both civil and military, retreated to Hattrass, a station about twenty miles distant; but some persons fled in different directions; and Mr. Raikes describes Lady Outram (the wife of General Sir James Outram) as reaching Agra on the 23rd, "foot-sore, from Alighur, having fled part of the way without her shoes."

The fall of Alighur, recounted with all imaginable exaggerations, became the immediate topic of conversation in Agra. The budmashes twisted their moustachios significantly in the bazaars, and the Englishmen handled their swords or revolvers. Mr. Raikes mentions a singular exception to the prevailing panic. The Church Missionary College, he writes, "was about the last to close, and the first to reopen, of all our public institutions at Agra during the period of the revolt. There Dr. French, the principal, sat calmly, hundreds of young natives at his feet, hanging on the lips which taught them the simple lessons of the Bible. The students at the government, and still more the missionary schools, kept steadily to their classes; and when others doubted or fled, they trusted implicitly to their teachers, and openly espoused the Christian cause."

Their exemplary conduct did not excite any special rancour against them on the part of the insurgents; on the contrary, it is asserted as "a curious fact, that at Agra, Alighur, Mynpoorie, Futtehghur, and other places, less danger was done to the churches than to the private dwellings of the English."† This was also the case at Meerut. Three companies of the 9th Native infantry, stationed at Mynpoorie, mutinied there on the 23rd of May. Mynpoorie is the chief town of a district of the same name, ceded by Dowlut Rao Sindia to the East India Company, in 1803. The population are chiefly Hindoos of high caste. One of the Meerut mutineers (a Rajpoot, named Rajnath Sing) escaped to his native village. The magistrate sent some police and a detachment of the 9th to apprehend their countryman and co-religionist; instead of which,

they, as might have been expected, enabled him to escape. The news of the mutiny at Alighur reached Mynpoorie on the evening of the 22nd, and created great excitement, which, being reported to the magistrate, he immediately made arrangements for sending the European females (sixteen in number), with their children, to Agra, seventy miles distant, which city they reached in safety.

Being thus relieved from the office of protecting a helpless crowd, the leading Europeans prepared to lay down their lives in defence of their public charge. Their presence of mind and moderation was crowned with extraordinary success. The particulars of the affair are thus narrated by Mr. J. Power, the magistrate of Mynpoorie. After the departure of the women, he writes—

"Mr. Cocks and I proceeded to the house of Lieutenant Crawford, commanding the station, and this officer agreed directly to take the detachment out of the station and march them to Bhowgaon. After leaving a small guard at the treasury and quarter-guard, which I visited with him, Lieutenant Crawford then left the station, and I then returned to my house, where I found Dr. Watson [surgeon], the Rev. Mr. Kellner, and Mr Cocks assembled.

"This was about four or five in the morning; and I had not retired to rest more than ten minutes, before Lieutenant Crawford galloped back to my house, and informed me that his men had broken out into open mutiny, and, after refusing to obey him, had fired at him with their muskets.

"Lieutenant Crawford stated he had then found it useless to attempt commanding his men, and that he had thought it best to hurry back to Mynpoorie to warn the station, and that he believed Lieutenant de Kantzow was killed. Mr. Cocks and the Rev. Mr. Kellner immediately decided on leaving, and the former tried to induce me to leave also: as I informed him that I did not desire to leave my post, he honoured me by terming my conduct 'romantic,' and immediately departed in company with the Rev. Mr. Kellner. I then left my house, which I had no means of defending, and which I was informed the sepoys meant to attack, and proceeded to the large bridge over the Eesun, on the grand trunk road. My brother determined on accompanying me, and to share my fate; and I shall not be accused of favouritism, I hope, when I state that his coolness and determination were of the greatest aid and comfort to me throughout this trying occasion.

"On proceeding to the bridge, I was joined by Dr. Watson, and shortly afterwards by Rao Bhowanee Sing, the first cousin of the rajah of Mynpoorie, with a small force of horse and foot; Sergeants Mitchell, Scott, and Montgomery, of the road and canal departments; and Mr. McGlone, clerk in the Mynpoorie magistrate's office, also joined me at the bridge.

"I was, at this time, most doubtful of the fate of Mr. de Kantzow, for I had not coincided in Lieutenant Crawford's opinion that he had been killed, Lieutenant Crawford not having seen him fall; and on this account I was unwilling to leave the position

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 148.

† Raikes' *Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*, pp. 15, 16; 94.

I had taken, though strongly urged to do so. The sepoys returned at this time to the station, having utterly thrown off all control, dragging (as I afterwards learnt) Lieutenant de Kantzow with them. They passed the dāk bungalow, and fired a volley into the house of Sergeant Montgomery (which was close by), the inmates of which had fortunately left, and they then searched the whole house over, with the view of finding money; they also fired at Dr. Watson's house, who had, as I have mentioned, joined me; and they then proceeded to the rear-guard, the magazine of which they broke open, plundering it completely of its contents.

"Lieutenant de Kantzow informed me that the rebels took the whole of the ammunition away, and being unable to carry it themselves, they procured two government camels for that purpose from the lines; each man must have supplied himself with some 300 rounds or more; and an immense quantity of other government stores was taken by them besides. Lieutenant de Kantzow informs me that his life stood in the greatest danger at the rear-guard at this time. The men fired at random, and muskets were levelled at him, but dashed aside by some better-disposed of the infuriated brutes, who remembered, perhaps, even in that moment of madness, the kind and generous disposition of their brave young officer. Lieutenant de Kantzow stood up before his men; he showed the utmost coolness and presence of mind; he urged them to reflect on the lawlessness of their acts, and evinced the utmost indifference of his own life in his zeal to make the sepoys return to their duty. The men turned from the rear-guard to the Cutchery, dragging the lieutenant with them. They were met at the treasury by my gaol guard, who were prepared to oppose them and fire on them; but Mr. de Kantzow prevented them from firing, and his order has certainly prevented an immense loss of life.

"A fearful scene here occurred; the sepoys tried to force open the iron gates of the treasury, and were opposed by the gaol guard and some of the gaol officials; the latter rallied round Mr. de Kantzow, and did their best to assist him; but they, though behaving excellently, were only a handful of twenty or thirty (if so many), and poorly armed, against the infuriated sepoys, who were well and completely armed and in full force.

"It is impossible to describe, accurately, the continuation of the scene of the disturbance at the treasury; left by his superior officer, unaided by the presence of any European, jostled with cruel and insulting violence, buffeted by the hands of men who had received innumerable kindnesses from him, and who had obeyed him but a few hours before with crawling servility, Lieutenant de Kantzow stood for three dreary hours against the rebels at the imminent peril of life.

"It was not till long after he had thus been situated at the treasury, that I learnt of his being there. I was anxious with all my heart to help him, but was deterred from going by the urgent advice of Rao Bhowanee Sing, who informed me that it was impossible to face the sepoys with the small force at my disposal; and I received at this time a brief note from Lieutenant de Kantzow himself, by a trustworthy emissary I sent to him, desiring me not to come to the treasury, as the sepoys were getting quieted, and that my presence would only make matters worse, as the beasts were yelling for my life. At this time, the most signal service was done

by Rao Bhowanee Sing, who went alone to the rebels, volunteering to use his own influence and persuasion to make them retire. It is unnecessary to lengthen the account; Rao Bhowanee Sing succeeded ably in his efforts, drew off, and then accompanied the rebels to the lines; where, after a space of time, they broke open and looted the bells of arms, the quarter-guard carrying off, it is supposed, 6,000 rupees in money, and all the arms, &c., they found of use to them.

"I had retired, and the Europeans with me, to the rajah of Mynpoorie's fort, on the departure of Rao Bhowanee Sing, according to his advice; and shortly after the sepoys left the treasury, Lieutenant de Kantzow joined me, and I again took possession of the Cutchery. I found, on my return, the whole of the Malkhana looted, the sepoys having helped themselves to swords, iron-bound sticks, &c., which had accumulated during ages past. The staples of the stout iron doors of the treasury had alone given way, but the coors themselves stood firm.

"My motives in taking up a position at the bridge were, first, that I might keep the high road open; second, to keep the sepoys from proceeding to the city, and the budmashes of the city from joining the sepoys. The effect of the victory (if I may use such a term) over the sepoys, trifling though it may appear, has been of incalculable benefit. It has restored confidence in the city and district, and among the panic-stricken inhabitants; and I hope the safety of the treasure, amounting to three lacs, will prove an advantage in these troubled times to government. . . . Rao Bhowanee Sing's conduct has been deserving in the extreme; I believe he has saved the station and our lives by his coolness and tact, and has supported the ancient character of his race for loyalty to the British government.

"During the insurrection of the sepoys, I was joined by Dumber Sing, Risaldar, of the 2nd irregulars—a fine old Rajpoot, who did me right good service; and by Pylad Sing, Duffadar, of the 8th irregulars. These men guarded the gaol, which the sepoys threatened to break into. Their conduct I beg to bring to the special notice of his honour the lieutenant-governor. These officers have since raised for me a most excellent body of horse, composed chiefly of irregulars, which I have placed under the care of the Risaldar."

The magistrate concluded by stating, that he and his companions had fortified the office, and could "easily stand a siege in it."*

Mr. Colvin was delighted by a spirit so congenial to his own, and hastened to lay the whole account before the governor-general; who, besides sending Lieutenant de Kantzow the thanks of government, wrote him a private note, declaring that he (Lord Canning) could not adequately describe the admiration and respect with which he had read the report of the magistrate of Mynpoorie, concerning the "noble example of courage, patience, good judgment, and temper, exhibited by the young officer."†

* Letter of magistrate of Mynpoorie, May 25th, 1857.—Appendix, pp. 54, 55.

† Lord Canning, June 7th, 1857.

Another detachment of the 9th Native infantry, stationed at Etawah, likewise mutinied and marched off to Delhi, after plundering the treasury and burning the bungalows. No blood was shed. Mr. Hume, the magistrate, escaped in the dress of a native woman. A chief, spoken of as the Etawah or Elah rajah, took part with the mutineers. The post between Agra and Allahabad was by this means interrupted; while the evacuation of Alighur broke off the communication between Meerut and Agra, and between the former place and Cawnpoor.

Immediately before the outbreak at Alighur, 233 of the irregular Gwalior cavalry were sent from Agra thither, under the command of Lieutenant Cockburn. They arrived just in time to assist in escorting the Europeans to Hattrass. After accomplishing this, eighty of the Gwalior horse broke into open mutiny, formed, and rode round the camp, entreating their comrades to join them by every plea of temporal and eternal interest; but finding their argument of no avail, they went off by themselves to Delhi. With a party now reduced to 123 men, and in a disturbed, if not absolutely hostile, country, Lieutenant Cockburn and his troopers contrived to do good service. Hearing that a party of 500 men had collected near Hattrass, and were plundering the neighbouring country, the lieutenant procured a curtained bullock-cart, such as coloured women travel in up the country; and having let down the curtains, and persuaded four of his troopers to enter it with loaded carbines, and go forward, he himself, with twenty men, followed at a distance, screened by the shade of some trees. The plot succeeded. The marauders, on seeing the cart, rushed forward to attack and plunder the women whom they believed to be concealed inside. The foremost of them was shot dead; and Lieutenant Cockburn's party, on hearing the report, advanced instantly on the insurgents, and rapidly dispersed them—killing forty-eight, wounding three, and taking ten prisoners; while others, in the extremity of their fear, flung themselves into wells, to avoid falling into the hands of their pursuers.*

A subsequent expedition, attempted for the purpose of attacking the Elah rajah, and reopening the Alighur road, had a very different termination. The expedition con-

sisted of 200 men of the 2nd irregular cavalry, under Captain Fletcher Hayes (military secretary to Sir H. Lawrence), who was accompanied by Captain Carey, of the 17th N.I., and two other Europeans, Adjutant Barber and Mr. Fayer. The detachment reached Bowgous on Saturday, May 30th; and Captains Hayes and Carey, leaving their men in charge of the adjutant, proceeded, on the same evening, to Mynpoorie, eight miles distant, to consult with the magistrate (Power) on their proposed movements, and remained there until the following Monday. In the meantime, the thanadar of Bowgous sent a message to Captain Hayes regarding the disaffection of the men; but he attributing it to annoyance at long and frequent marches, paid little heed to the warning, and started, according to his previous intention, on Monday morning, to join the men at the appointed place. The two officers—Hayes and Carey—"cantered along all merrily," writes the survivor, "and after riding about eleven miles, came in sight of the troopers going quietly along a parallel road." The officers crossed an intervening plain, to join the men, who faced round, and halted at their approach; but one or two of the Native officers rode forward, and said, in an under tone, "Fly, Sahibs, fly!" "Upon this," Captain Carey states, "poor Hayes said to me, as we wheeled round our horses, 'Well, we must now fly for our lives;' and away we went, with the two troops after us like demons yelling, and sending the bullets from their carbines flying all round us." Hayes was cut down from his saddle by one blow from a Native officer; his Arab horse dashed on riderless. Carey escaped unhurt. He was chased for about two miles by two horsemen; and after they had relinquished the pursuit, his own mare was unable to proceed further, and he was saved by meeting opportunely one of the troopers, who appears to have lagged behind his comrades, and who took the European up on his own horse till they overtook Captain Hayes' Arab, which Captain Carey mounted, and reached Mynpoorie in safety. An old Seik sirdar, with two followers, who had accompanied the expedition, and remained faithful to the British, said that Barber and Fayer had been murdered ten minutes before the arrival of the other two Europeans. A sowar (trooper) stole behind young Fayer as he was drinking at a well, and with one blow of his tulwar half severed the head

* *Friend of India*; quoted in *Times*, August 6th, 1857.

from the body of his victim. Barber fled up the road, several mutineers giving chase; he shot one horse and two of the troopers, when he was hit with a ball, and then cut down. The three bodies were brought in to the cantonment in the course of the evening: the head of poor Hayes was frightfully hacked about; his right hand cut off, and his left fearfully lacerated; his watch, ring, boots, all gone, and his clothes cut and torn to pieces. The murderers made off for Delhi.

The gallant band at Mynpoorie, undaunted by this terrible catastrophe, continued to maintain their position. The Cutchery, or court-house, was a large brick building, from the top of which they were prepared to make a good fight if no guns were brought by the enemy. Their force consisted of 100 of the Gwalior horse, under Major Raikes (the brother of the judge at Agra), who raised cavalry and infantry in all directions. At the commencement of June the recruits numbered about 100; and the total defence was completed by a few men of the 9th Native infantry, who had remained true to their salt.*

Troops could not be spared from Agra for the reoccupation of Alighur; but a party of volunteers, headed by Captain Watson, and accompanied by Mr. Cocks, of the civil service,† proceeded thither, and succeeded in making themselves literally "masters of the situation," and in reopening the road between them and Agra.

The extremely "irregular" character of the warfare carried on in the highways and byeways of the North-West Provinces, may be understood from the following extract from a private letter from the "Volunteers' Camp, Alighur," dated June 5th, 1857:—

"Some two nights ago we made a *dour* (a foray or raid) to the village of Khyr, where a Rao† had possessed himself of the place, and was defying British authority. We fell upon the village, after travelling all night, at about 8 A.M.; surrounded it, and one party entered and asked the Rao to surrender. He at first refused; but, on being threatened and told that his stronghold should be burst open, he opened the doors, and was immediately taken prisoner with thirteen of his adherents. The little army he had assembled had dispersed early in the morning, not expecting we should have been there so soon. We walked by the side of the prisoner from the place where he was taken, to a mango tope

out of the village, where he was tried. We reached it in half-an-hour, when he was tried and hung for rebellion.

"Last evening, again, we received information that some 150 Goojurs had assembled eight or ten miles from this to intercept the dawk. We were ordered out at once in pursuit, and came upon them about 5 P.M. They got sight of us at a distance, and took to their heels, and we after them. Several of them were shot or cut down. We were then ordered to fire their villages, which some of us did by dismounting and applying our cigars to what was combustible. We then returned to Alighur, and have not the slightest idea what will be our next move. The road is perfectly safe from Agra to this."§

While the volunteers were hanging real or suspected rebels by drum-head courts-martial, and setting villages on fire by the aid of their cigars, Mr. Colvin was striving to check the insurrectionary spirit fast spreading through his government, by endeavouring to enlist the landholders on his side. The *Agra Gazette Extraordinary* contained a distinct pledge, the redemption of which is now anxiously looked for by those who have fulfilled the preliminary conditions. There is no mistaking language so distinct as this:—

"Whereas it has been ascertained that in the districts of Meerut, and in and immediately round Delhi, some short-sighted rebels have dared to raise resistance to the British government: it is hereby declared, that every talookdar, zemindar, or other owner of land, who may join in such resistance, will forfeit all rights in landed property, which will be confiscated, and transferred in perpetuity to the faithful talookdars and zemindars of the same quarter, who may show by their acts of obedience to the government, and exertions for the maintenance of tranquillity, that they deserve reward and favour from the state."||

The close of May arrived, and the Native troops at Agra (the 44th and 67th), although they had been restrained from open mutiny, had yet, by nightly fires and secret meetings, given indications of decided disaffection. A company of one of these regiments was sent from Agra to *Muttra*, a distance of thirty-five miles, to relieve another company on duty at that ancient and once wealthy Hindoo city. On the 30th, both companies, relieving and relieved,

and that the volunteers were led by Mr. Watson, magistrate of Alighur, and Lieutenant Greathed.—*Times*, July 15th, 1857.

§ *Times*, July 14th, 1857.

|| Quoted in *Times*, June 29th, 1857.

* Letter of Captain Carey, 17th Native infantry; dated, "Mynpoorie, June 2nd, 1857."

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 298.

‡ The Bombay correspondent of the *Times* states that this chief was Rao Bhoosah Sing, of Burtowlee,

threw off their allegiance, plundered the treasury, and marched to Delhi. This circumstance decided Mr. Colvin on the disarmament of the 44th and 67th, which was accomplished on the morning of the 31st, and the men were dismissed to their homes on two months' leave of absence.

Rajpootana, or Rajast'han.—While the events just recorded disturbed the peace of Agra and the N.W. Provinces from within, dangers were arising in the neighbouring territories of Rajpootana, or the Saugor District (as the revenue officers term that country), which threatened to bring an overwhelming number of mutineers to bear upon the scattered Europeans.

The stations of *Nusseerabad* (near Ajmeer) and *Neemuch*, usually garrisoned from Bombay, had been, at the beginning of the year, drained of the infantry and guns of the army of that presidency by the pressure of the Persian war. There remained a wing of the 1st Bombay light cavalry (Lancers) cantoned at Nusseerabad; but that station received for infantry the 15th Bengal Native regiment from Meerut, and the 30th from Agra; and for artillery, a company of the 7th Bengal battalion. To Neemuch, the 72nd Native infantry, and a troop of Native horse artillery, were sent from Agra, and a wing of the 1st Bengal light cavalry from Mhow. Great excitement had been caused at both stations by the tidings from Delhi and Meerut; and at half-past three in the afternoon of the 28th of May, the 15th Native infantry, at Nusseerabad, broke into open mutiny by seizing the guns of Captain Timbrell's battery, while the horses of the troop, with the men, had gone to water. Captain Hardy, and the other officers of the lancers, hastened to their lines, and, in a few minutes, the troopers were mounted, formed into open column, and led against the mutineers, who opened the guns upon their assailants. Captain Spottiswoode was killed at the head of his troop, after getting into the battery. Cornet Newberry was also shot while in the act of charging; and Captain Hardy was wounded, with several officers. Other charges were made, but without success, until Colonel Penny ordered the troops to desist, and form in readiness to act upon the mutineers, in case they should leave their lines and come into the plain. About five o'clock the officers of the 15th Native infantry took refuge in the lines of the Lancers, having been expelled by their own

men, but not injured, though they are reported to have been fired at. The 30th Native infantry remained neutral, neither obeying orders nor joining the mutineers. The aspect of affairs seemed so alarming, that the immediate evacuation of the station was resolved on, and the ladies and children were moved out while light remained. The party retreated towards Beawur, halting half-way at midnight, to rest and let stragglers assemble; and here the dead body of Colonel Penny was brought in. The colonel had been too ill on the previous night to give orders for the retreat, and had apparently fallen off his horse and died on the road from exhaustion. The other fugitives reached Beawur in safety. Eleven of the Lancers joined the rebels; the conduct of the remainder was most exemplary. "Cantonment with two mutinous regiments, the regiment has," Captain Hardy reports, "been nightly on duty for a fortnight past, and entirely responsible for the safety of the cantonment. They have been constantly assailed with abuse, with no other result than telling their officers. They turned out in the promptest way to attack the mutineers; and they marched out of camp, when ordered, as they stood, leaving their families and everything they had in the world behind them. They are now without tents in a hot plain, and without any possibility of being comfortable; but up to this time all has been most cheerfully borne, and all duty correctly performed."*

The governor-general directed that the Native officers who had most distinguished themselves at Nusseerabad should be promoted, and liberal compensation "awarded for the loss of property abandoned in the cantonment and subsequently destroyed, when the lancers, in obedience to orders, marched out to protect the families of the European officers, leaving their own unguarded in cantonments." At night the Nusseerabad lines were set on fire, and on the following morning the rebels started for the favourite rendezvous of Delhi.

The tidings of the revolt at Nusseerabad turned the scale at Neemuch, where the officers had been exerting themselves to the uttermost to check the evident tendency of the men, by affecting a confidence which they were far from feeling. Colonel Abbott slept every night in a tent in the lines of

* Despatch from Captain Hardy to the Major of Brigade, Rajpootana field force, May 30th, 1857.

his regiment, without a guard or sentry; and, latterly, all officers did the same even with their families. One wing of the 7th regiment Gwalior contingent held the fortified square and treasury; the other wing was encamped close to, but outside, the walls. Towards the close of May the utmost panic had prevailed in the Sudder Bazaar; and, among the current reports, was that of an intended attack on Neemuch by a British force, which was a perversion of a plan for the protection of Jawud (a walled town, about twelve miles from Neemuch), by the movement there of the Kotah force, under Major Burton.

On the morning of the 2nd of June, Colonel Abbott received information of the state of feeling in the Native lines, and warned Captain Lloyd, the superintendent, that the outbreak could not be delayed beyond a few hours. Captain Lloyd made arrangements for securing a few of the most valuable records, and for insuring a line of retreat for fugitives by the Oodipoor road, by means of a detachment of mounted police. Meanwhile, Colonel Abbott assembled the Native officers, and, after some discussion, induced them to swear (the Mohammedans on the Koran, the Brahmins on Ganges-water) that they now trusted each other (want of mutual confidence having been previously believed to exist), and would remain true to their salt. The commanding officer was requested to take an oath of faith in their good intentions, which he did; and the meeting was thus concluded, apparently to the satisfaction of all parties. That day, and the following one, passed quietly; but, on the second night, symptoms of mutiny were shown by the Native artillerymen; and at eleven o'clock several of them rushed to the guns, and, loading them, fired two off, evidently as a preconcerted signal. The cavalry rushed from their lines, and the 72nd followed the example. The wing of the 7th Gwalior regiment was marched inside on the report of the guns, and rewards of 100, 300, and 500 rupees each were offered to the sepoys, naiks, and havildars respectively, on condition of their successfully defending the fort and treasury. For nearly three hours the garrison remained firm, watching the mutineers thrusting lighted torches, fastened to long poles, into the thatch of the bungalows. At the expiration of that time two more guns were fired; when an old Rajpoot, of fifty years'

standing in the service, ordered his men to open the gates, desired the officers to save themselves, and eventually caused them to be escorted to a place of comparative safety. Captain Macdonald and his companions resisted, but were told, that if they did not hasten to escape, they would assuredly be massacred by the sepoys of other regiments, and those of their own would be unable to defend them. The manner of the flight which ensued was not unlike that from Delhi, only the number of the fugitives was far smaller, and the road shorter and less perilous. Mrs. Burton (the wife of the commanding officer of the Kotah force) states, that having timely notice of the mutiny, she quitted Neemuch immediately before the outbreak, and took refuge at the small fort of Jawud, which was under the charge of her eldest son. The next morning fifteen officers, three ladies, and three young children came to the gates, having escaped on foot from Neemuch. An hour later, Major Burton and two of his sons arrived, having preceded the force under his charge, consisting, according to Mrs. Burton's account, of 1,500 men, who had already marched "ninety miles in three days," and, being quite exhausted, were left to rest by their leader, while he proceeded to Jawud, to provide for the safety of his wife and other children. A report came that the rebels were advancing to attack Jawud, attended by a retinue of convicts released from the Neemuch gaol; and Major Burton, considering the fort utterly incapable of resisting guns, abandoned it, and marched off with the small garrison and the Europeans who had taken refuge there, to his own camp, sixteen miles distant. The next morning the major advanced against the mutineers; but they had learned his intention, and were gone with the guns in the direction of Agra.

The treasury had been sacked; every bungalow but one had been burned to the ground; and the native inhabitants had so completely shared the misfortunes of the Europeans, that Mrs. Burton writes—"The shopkeepers have lost everything, so that we have not the means of buying common clothes."*

It does not appear that any massacre took place, though this was at first asserted. The carriage of Mrs. Walker, the wife of an artillery officer, was fired into by mounted troopers, but neither she nor her

* Letter published in the *Times*, August 7th, 1857.

child are stated to have been injured. The rana of Oodipoor dispatched a force of his best troops against the mutineers, under Captain Showers, the political agent for Mewar; and behaved with princely generosity to the fugitives who took refuge in his dominions. He sent escorts to meet them; gave up a palace at Oodipoor for their reception; supplied them with food and clothing as long as they chose to stay; furnished them with escorts to the different stations they desired to reach; and even visited them in person—a very unusual compliment from the representative of a most ancient and haughty Hindoo dynasty. The chivalry of the Rajpoots was manifested equally in the villages as in the capital of Mewar. One of the fugitives, Dr. Murray, surgeon of the 72nd Native infantry, has given a graphic account of his escape with Dr. Gane to Kussaunda. It was a bright moonlight night, and the distance from Neemuch only five miles; but the ground was heavy; and beside being wearied with previous excitement, the two Europeans were parched with thirst. They therefore awakened the villagers, and asked to be taken to the head man, which was immediately done; and they found him in a small fort, with some half-dozen companions. He received the wanderers with great courtesy; had a place cleared for them in his own house; set milk, chupatties, dhol, rice, and mangoes before them; after partaking of which they lay down to rest. About nine o'clock next morning, a party of the 1st light cavalry, who were scouring the country, arrived, and shouting

"Death to the Feringhees!" insisted on their surrender. The two doctors thought their case hopeless; but the Rajpoots put them in a dilapidated shed on one of the bastions, saying—"You have eaten with us, and are our guests; and now, if you were our greatest enemy we would defend you." The troopers threatened to attack the village; but the Rajpoots replied—"Kussaunda belongs to the rana; we are his subjects; and if you molest us he will send 10,000 soldiers after you." On this, the troopers went away much enraged, threatening to return with the guns in the evening, and blow the little fort to pieces. The fugitives, fearing the rebels might keep their word, did not await their threatened return, but started afresh on their journey, escorted by several Rajpoots. At a Bheel village named Bheeliya Kegaon, situated in the heart of the jungle, great hospitality was evinced. On reaching Burra Sadree, on the 5th of June, the adventurers found the majority of the officers of the 7th Gwalior contingent of the 1st cavalry and artillery, assembled there in safety with their wives and children. The party moved from Burra Sadree to Doongla on the 7th, and, on the 9th, were joined by the Oodipoor force under Captain Showers, who was proceeding in pursuit of the mutineers. The officers (now "unattached" by the mutiny of their men) accompanied the expedition, except a few who went with the women and children to Oodipoor, where they remained, from the 12th to the 22nd of June, in perfect safety, until they were able to rejoin their countrymen.*

CHAPTER VII.

THE PUNJAB AND THE PESHAWUR VALLEY.—MAY, 1857.

LAHORE.—A telegraphic message reached the great political capital of the Punjab on the morning of the 12th of May, conveying an exaggerated account of the massacres which had taken place at Meerut and

Delhi; and declaring that, at the latter place, every man, woman, and child, having the appearance or dress of a Christian, had been massacred. The troops stationed at Lahore and at *Meean-Meer* (the large

* The government return published on May 6th, 1858, of all Europeans killed during the rebellion, gives the wife and three children of Sergeant Supple as having been "burnt to death in boxes." They

appear to have been the only victims of the outbreak at Neemuch; and it is therefore probable that they had hidden themselves, and perished in the general conflagration.

military cantonment, five or six miles from the city), are thus stated in the government report:—

"H.M.'s 81st foot, 881 strong; and 54 in hospital. Two troops of horse artillery, comprising—Europeans, 215; Natives, 56; and 11 in hospital. Four companies of foot artillery—Europeans, 282; Natives, 143; 21 in hospital. The 8th light cavalry—Europeans, 16; Natives, 498; exclusive of five in hospital. The 16th (grenadiers), 26th (light), and 49th Native infantry regiments—European officers, 47; Natives, 3,176; exclusive of 121 in hospital. A detachment of 54 rank and file (Native infantry), with three Native officers, posted at Googaira; and of 93, with seven officers (one European and six Native), at Jutog."*

There do not appear to have been any indications of disaffection exhibited at Lahore, either by incendiary fires or night meetings; still the Europeans could not but anxiously question the degree to which the sepoys might be disposed to sympathise with the cause of revolt. The city itself had a population of 100,000 persons, of whom a large proportion were hereditary soldiers—Seiks and Mohammedans; from the former class the spirit of the *Sing Guru*, and "the Baptism of the Sword," had not wholly passed away; while many of the latter, subjected first by the Seiks, and subsequently by the British, would, it was believed, be only too ready to follow the example of insurrection. The Persian treaty had been scarcely ratified; and the inflammatory proclamation of the Shah, calling on all the faithful to free the land from the yoke of "the treacherous tribe of the British," was yet fresh in the public mind.†

Sir John Lawrence, the chief commissioner, was absent at Rawul Pindee; but it was "the essence of the Punjab administration to have good subordinate officers,"‡ energetic in action, and not afraid of responsibility.

Immediately on receipt of the telegraphic message of the 12th of May, Mr. Montgomery, the judicial commissioner, assembled in council the following gentlemen:—

Mr. D. McLeod, the Financial Commissioner; Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner; Mr. A. Roberts, Commissioner of the Lahore Division; Colonel R. Lawrence, Commandant of the Punjab Police; Major Ommaney, Chief Engineer of the Punjab; Captain Hutchinson, Assistant Engineer.

All concurred in the necessity for prompt

titude; and Mr. Montgomery, accompanied by Colonel Macpherson, proceeded at once to Meean-Meer, to inform Brigadier Corbett of the telegraphic intelligence, and devise means of meeting the danger. His plan was, to deprive the Native troops of their ammunition and gun-caps, and to throw additional Europeans into the fort; but this intention was supplanted by the necessity for more decisive measures, consequent on the discovery made, during the day, by a Seik non-commissioned officer in the police corps, of a conspiracy formed by the Meean-Meer Native troops, "involving the safety of the Lahore fort, and the lives of all the European residents in the cantonment and the civil station of Anarkullee."

The statement of an actual conspiracy is distinctly made both by Mr. Cooper and by a gentleman writing from Lahore, whose narrative forms the staple of the following account.§ According to the former authority, "intercepted correspondence" was the channel by which the information recorded by him was obtained; but neither writer gives any exact data on the subject. It is possible, therefore, that the scheme which they speak of as digested and approved, amounted in reality to nothing beyond the crude suggestions of one or two discontented sepoys. In the absence, however, of officially recorded particulars, the anonymous narrative of one of the actors in the proceedings at Lahore, is very interesting.

The fort itself, situated within the city walls, was ordinarily garrisoned by one company, a European regiment, one of foot artillery, and a wing of one of the Native regiments from Meean-Meer; the chief object of this force being to keep a check on the city, and to guard the government treasury.

During the former half of May, the 26th Native infantry had furnished the wing on guard, which was, in due course, to be relieved, on the 15th of the month, by a wing of the 49th Native infantry. It was arranged by the conspirators, that while the wings of both regiments were in the fort together, in the act of relief, the united force, amounting to about 1,100 men (all detachments sent on guard being made up to their full strength), were to rush on their officers, seize the gates, and take possession

* Parl. Papers (Commons), February 9th, 1858; p. 4.

† *Crisis in the Punjab*; by Frederick Cooper, Esq., deputy-commissioner of Umritsir; p. xiii.

‡ Letter of *Times*' correspondent, dated "Lahore, May 28th."

§ Blackwood's *Edinburgh Magazine*, January, 1858: article entitled "Poorbeah Mutiny."

of the citadel, the magazine, and the treasury. The small body of Europeans, not above 150 in all, consisting of eighty of H.M.'s 81st, and seventy of the artillery, would, it was expected, be easily overwhelmed; and then an empty hospital close by, in the deserted lines at Anarkullee, was to be set on fire, as a signal to the rebels at Meean-Meer, of the success of the opening scene of the plot. The rise was expected to become general in the cantonments; the guns were to be seized, the central gaol forced, its 2,000 prisoners liberated; and the triumph was to terminate in a promiscuous massacre of Europeans.

Information subsequently obtained, is alleged to have shown that the plot extended much beyond Lahore, and included Ferozpoor, Phillour, Jullundur, and Umritsir.

The officers of the Native regiments were, in this, as in almost every instance, slow to believe the unwelcome tidings. Each one was disposed to repudiate, on behalf of his own men, the charge of complicity; yet the brigadier resolved on the bold and unprecedented step of disarming the whole of the Native troops in the station. The following morning was fixed for the time of the proposed *coup d'état*, and arrangements were made with anxious secrecy. That evening (the 12th) a ball was to be given by the station to the officers of H.M.'s 81st regiment. The fear of affording any cause of suspicion to the sepoys, prevented its being postponed. The Europeans assembled according to previous arrangements, and the dancing was carried on with more spirit than gaiety. The ladies could not but glance at the "piled arms" in the corners of the rooms. Their partners could not but watch the doors and windows in readiness to seize each one his ready weapon. But all continued quiet; and at two in the morning the party broke up; and after a few more anxious hours, the gentlemen assembled on the parade-ground.

Civilians and soldiers—all were there. The real point at issue was one on which the lives of themselves, their wives and children, depended; but even the avowed cause of the parade was an important and an anxious one. The Europeans had long viewed the sepoy army as the bulwark of British power in India; and its continued allegiance was confidently expected, as ensured by the mutual interest of the employers and the employed. Now that a new light

was thrown on the subject, the officers looked with strangely mingled feelings upon the men they had trained and disciplined, as they marched up and stood in order, to hear the general order for the disbandment of a portion of the Native infantry at Barrackpoor.

The order was read at the heads of the several Native regiments: then, as if to form a part of the brigade manœuvres of the day, the whole of the troops were counter-marched, so as to face inwards—on one side the Native regiments at quarter-column distance, and in front of them the 81st Queen's (only five companies) in line, with the guns along their rear. The crisis had arrived; and Lieutenant Mocatta, adjutant of the 26th Native infantry, stepped forward, and read an address to the sepoys, explaining how the mutinous spirit, which had been so unexpectedly found to pervade other regiments, had determined the brigadier to take prompt measures to prevent its spread among those under his control—his object being not so much the peace of the country, which the British could themselves maintain, but rather the preservation of the good name of regiments whose colours told of many glorious battle-fields. It was therefore desirable to prevent the men from involving themselves in a ruinous mutiny. The exordium was sufficiently significant. While it was being read, the 81st, according to a pre-arrangement, formed into subdivisions, and fell back between the guns; so that when the address ended with two short words—"Pile arms"—the 16th grenadiers (to whom the order was first given) found themselves confronted, not by a thin line of European soldiers, but by twelve guns loaded with grape, and portfires burning.

The 16th was no common regiment; its men had been numbered among General Nott's "noble sepoys" at Candahar and Ghuznee. They had served with distinction in Cabool, Maharajpoor, Moodkee, Ferozshuhur, Soobraon; and, in evidence of their earlier exploits, had an embroidered star on their colours, in memory of their presence at Seringapatam; and a royal tiger under a banian tree, for Mysore. A slight hesitation and delay were perceptible among their ranks; but the clear voice of Colonel Renny ordering his men to load, with the ringing response of each ramrod as it drove home its ball-cartridge, denounced, with irresistible force, the madness of resistance. The waverers sullenly piled arms, as did also the

49th Native infantry and a portion of the 26th light infantry. The 8th cavalry unbuckled and dropped their sabres. Thus, to the unspeakable relief of the 600 Europeans, the 2,500 soldiers stood disarmed, and were marched off to their lines comparatively harmless. The troops no longer to be trusted with arms, had been actively employed in the conquest of the country. The sepoys in the fort were dealt with in an equally summary manner. Major Spencer, who commanded the wing of the 26th light infantry in the fort, was privately informed that his men would be relieved on the morning of the 14th, instead of on the 15th, as before ordered. At daybreak on the 14th, three companies of the 81st, under Colonel Smith, entered the fort, to the utter dismay of the sepoys, who obeyed without demur the order to lay down their arms, and were speedily marched off to their own lines at Meean-Meer.

The immediate danger being thus averted, provision was made for the future in the same masterly manner. Very happy was Lahore, alike in its chief military and civil authority; and especially so in the cordial co-operation of the soldier and the "political." Brigadier Corbett is described as a man to whom seven-and-thirty years of Indian service had given ripe experience, yet robbed of none of the mental and physical vigour necessary to cope with unprecedented difficulties. Responsibility, the bugbear of so many Indian officials, had no terrors for him; and he devoted himself to the detail of the great military movements which were about to be made; while his coadjutor, Montgomery, acting for the absent chief commissioner, procured the stoppage of all sepoys' letters passing through the post-offices, and the removal of all treasure from the smaller civil stations to places of greater security; having it immediately taken out of the charge of Hindoostanee guards, and escorted by Punjabee police. Montgomery urged on the district officers (in a circular very like those issued by General Wellesley, while engaged in the pacification of Malabar in 1803), that "no signs of alarm or excitement should be exhibited, but that each functionary should be prepared to act, and careful to obtain the best information from every possible source." To Frederick Cooper, the deputy-commissioner at Umritsir, he wrote privately on the 12th of May, urging him to keep the strictest watch on the sepoys stationed there (the 59th Native infantry, and

a company of foot artillery), as also on the state of feeling among the population; and to take every possible precaution, "so as to be ready in case of a row."

Umritsir was the holy city of the Seiks. The adjacent fort of Govindghur was named after their great general, judge, and priest, Govind Sing. The *Koh-i-Noor* had been deposited here previous to its seizure by the British; and the possession of the fort, like that of the famous gem, was looked upon as a talismanic pledge of power. The question arose, whether the "Khalsa,"* shaken in their confidence in the "Ikbal" (luck or good fortune) of the English, might not be induced to co-operate even with the hated Mohammedan and despised Hindoo, for the expulsion of the foreigners who had equally humbled every native power? Mr. Cooper possessed much personal influence, which he used in controlling the Seik and Mohammedan leaders. Besides this, the harvest in the Punjab had been singularly abundant; and the Jat, or agricultural population, contented themselves, had no sympathy with the grievances of the "Poorbeahs," or Easterns, as the Bengal sepoys were usually called in Western India, on account of their being raised chiefly from territory situated to the east of the Ganges. In the evening of the 14th, an express from Lahore brought warning of the rumoured intention of the disarmed regiments of Meean-Meer to fly somewhere—possibly in the direction of Ferozpoor; but more probably to attack Govindghur, in reliance on the fraternal feeling of the sepoy garrison.

Mr. Macnaghten, the assistant-commissioner, volunteered to go midway on the road to Lahore, and raise a band of villagers to intercept the expected rebels. The country-people responded with enthusiasm. About midnight, Mr. Macnaghten, hearing a great tramp, mustered his volunteers, and formed a barricade across the road. The villagers suggested that the oxen and bullocks should remain, because the Hindoos would not cut through them; but the experiment was not tried; for, happily, the new-comers proved to be about eighty of H.M.'s 81st, who had been sent off from Lahore, thirty miles distant, on the previous morning, in *ekkas*, or light native carts, drawn by ponies. The safety of *Phillour*, the chief place in the Jullundur or Trans-Sutlej division, was

* The Khalsa (literally, the elect or chosen), was the proud title assumed by the Seiks on conquering the Punjab.

obtained by stationing a strong European detachment within the fort, which had previously been wholly left in the hands of the natives; not a single European sleeping within its walls. The care of the civil lines, and the peace of the town, was the next important object; and the first consideration of the officer in charge (the deputy-commissioner, Captain Farrington) was, what course would be taken by Rajah Rundheer Sing, whose territory lay between Jullundur and the river Beas. The Kaporthella chief was one of the Seik sirdars whose estates were partly confiscated by the English on the annexation of the Jullundur Doab in 1846. The present rajah succeeded his father in 1853, and is described as a handsome young man of about six-and-twenty, who, "with the manly bearing and address of a Seik noble, combines a general intelligence far beyond his class, and a deep sympathy with English modes of life and thought." Captain Farrington immediately sent to Kaporthella for assistance. The rajah had been absent on a pilgrimage to Hurdwar, but was on his return home, and reached Phillour on the 11th of May, where his minister met him with tidings of the telegraphic intelligence, and appeal for aid. This was heartily given: the rajah marched straight into Jullundur, placed his escort at the disposal of the British, and furnished, besides, about 500 men and two guns, which force Captain Farrington distributed for the defence of the treasury, gaol, and other public buildings.

In the course of the first eventful week of the mutiny, it became evident that the Seiks and Jats of the Punjab, generally, had no intention of making common cause with the Bengal army. On the contrary, they had old scores of their own, which they hoped to have an opportunity of wiping off. It is said they were specially eager to aid in the capture of Delhi, in consequence of the existence of a prophecy, that they, in conjunction with the "topee wallahs" (hat wearers) who should come over the sea, would lay the head of the son of the Delhi sovereign on the very same spot where that of their Guru (spiritual chief) had been exposed 180 years before, by order of the emperor Aurungzebe; and this, as the course of the narrative will show, they actually accomplished.

The Peshawur Valley was a point the security of which was of extreme impor-

tance. The force stationed at Peshawur, Nowshera, Murdaun, and the frontier forts at the foot of the surrounding hills, comprised nearly 14,000 men of all arms, of whom less than a third were Europeans. The exact proportions of the Native troops in the Peshawur district have not been stated; but according to a valuable state paper recently published by the Punjab government, the total Native force then serving in the Punjab and Delhi territory, consisted of 24,000 Punjabees and 41,000 Hindoostanees.*

Of the artillery, twenty-four light field guns were partially manned and driven by Hindoostanees, and the eight guns of the mountain-train battery entirely so.

Very early in the crisis, Rajah Sahib Dyal, an old and faithful adherent of government, asked Cooper, of Umritsir, "how matters looked at Peshawur?" The reply was satisfactory. "Otherwise——," said the questioner; and he took up the skirt of his muslin robe, and rolled it significantly up, as if preparing for flight.† Nor were his fears unreasonable.

The city of Peshawur is situated forty miles from the Indus, and ten from the mouth of the Khyber Pass, which is itself formed and guarded by the central and highest of the snow-capped mountains that surround the fertile horse-shoe valley of Peshawur. The predominating characteristics of the city are Indian; yet many indications exist there of Afghan life and manners—such as the trees planted throughout the streets; the western fruits exposed for sale; the strict seclusion of the women; above all, the prevalence of the stern aquiline Jewish physiognomy among the population. The cantonments resembled all other Indian ones, being only remarkable for extent. The parade-ground was sufficient for 6,000 soldiers. There were the same white houses, each in its own enclosure; the same straight lines of road; the same red brick barracks for the Europeans; the same mud huts for the Native troops.‡ Like Agra, Peshawur had a fanatical Mohammedan population; a crowded bazaar, with its reckless, ruthless mob; and an additional danger existed in the host of poor and plunder-loving tribes

* Quoted in *Overland Indian Mail*; January 8th, 1859.

† Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*. p. 57.

‡ Article on "Peshawur," in *Fraser's Magazine*; January, 1859.

who inhabited the surrounding hills, and, in the event of a struggle, would assuredly take part with the stronger. The wilds and hilly fastnesses, which extend north and south along our frontier for 800 miles, were in the hands of some thirty or more different tribes. The political management of these rested with Colonel Nicholson and Major Edwardes, under the supervision of Sir John Lawrence.

On the 13th of May, a court-martial met at Peshawur, consisting of General Reid, Brigadier Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Colonel Edwardes, and Colonel Nicholson, and resolved that the troops in the hills should be concentrated in Jhelum, the central point of the Punjab. In accordance with this resolution, H.M.'s 27th foot from the hills at Nowshera, H.M.'s 24th foot from Rawul Pindee, one European troop of horse artillery from Peshawur, the Guide corps from Murdaun, 16th irregular cavalry from Rawul Pindee, the native Kumaon battalion from the same place, the 1st Punjab infantry from Bunnoo, a wing of the 2nd Punjab cavalry from Kohat, and half a company of sappers from Attock, were ordered to concentrate at Jhelum, for the purpose of forming a movable column, in readiness to quell mutiny wherever it might appear.

The danger which menaced the Punjab was fully appreciated by Sir John Lawrence; but without waiting to test the temper of the Seiks, and even while considering (as he afterwards stated) that "no man could hope, much less foresee, that they would withstand the temptation of avenging the loss of their national independence,"* he nevertheless urged on the commander-in-chief, in the earliest days of the mutiny, the paramount necessity of wresting Delhi from the hands of the rebels, at any hazard and any sacrifice, before the example of successful resistance should become known in India—before reinforcements of mutineers should flock to the imperial city, and thus teach its present craven occupants the value of the *prestige* they had so undeservedly obtained, and of the advantages they at first evinced so little capacity of using.

General Anson, on relinquishing his idea of marching immediately on Delhi, seriously

discussed the advisability of fortifying Umballah; and asked the advice of Sir John Lawrence, whose reply, given in the language of the whist table—with which the commander-in-chief was notoriously more conversant than with that of war, offensive or defensive†—was simply this: "When in doubt, win the trick. Clubs are trumps; not spades."‡ To render his advice practicable, Sir John Lawrence strained every nerve in raising corps for reinforcements, and even parted with the famous Guide corps; sending it, the Kumaon battalion, and other portions of the movable column, to join the army moving on Delhi, and recruiting his own ranks as best he could.

The Peshawur residency, although deemed unsafe for habitation, was, at this critical period, richly stored. Twenty-five lacs of rupees, or £250,000, intended as a subsidy for Dost Mohammed, had been most opportunely deposited there; for, in the financial paralysis consequent on the crisis, this money proved of the greatest service in enabling the authorities to meet the heavy commissariat expenses.§ To retain it in the residency was, however, only to offer a strong temptation to the lowest classes of the population; and it was therefore sent for safety to the strong and famous old fort of *Attock*, which commands the passage of the Indus, whose waters wash its walls. The fort was garrisoned by a wing of H.M.'s 27th foot; provisioned for a siege, and its weak points strengthened. The communication between Attock and Peshawur (a distance of forty miles) was protected by sending the 55th Native infantry, and part of the 10th irregular cavalry, from Nowshera, on the Attock road, across the Cabool river to Murdaun, a station left vacant by the departure of the Guides. The men suspected that they had been sent there because their loyalty was distrusted; and taunted their colonel, Spottiswoode, with having brought them to a prison. The colonel, who firmly believed in the integrity of his regiment, assured them to the contrary, and promised to forward to head-quarters any petition they might draw up. They accordingly framed one; and the most prominent grievance of which they complained, was the breaking up in practice, though not in name, of the invalid establishment.||

* Letter from Sir J. Lawrence to Mr. Raikes. — *Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*, p. 75.

† General Anson is said to have been the author of a well-known Hand-book on Whist, by "Major A."

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‡ Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 45.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

|| See Introductory Chapter to narrative of Mutiny, p. 111.

Meanwhile, the 24th and 27th Native infantry, at Peshawur, had held a midnight meeting; and the 51st Native infantry, and 5th light cavalry, had likewise given evidence of disaffection. The 27th had Nicholson for their colonel—the mighty man of war, to whom the native chiefs now applied the title once given to Runjeet Sing—the Lion of the Punjab. Nicholson earnestly recommended the disarming of the suspected regiments; but Brigadier Cotton hesitated, until Colonel Edwardes, arriving at the critical moment at Peshawur, from Calcutta, strenuously urged the adoption of the measure, which was successfully carried through on the morning of the 21st of May. The fidelity of the 21st Native infantry was deemed perfectly trustworthy; and subsequent events proved it so. Among the intercepted letters, there were none which in any way compromised this regiment: on the contrary, an old subahdar was found, in reply to some mutinous proposition, to have urged the sepoys to stand by their salt, as, though the mutineers might have their way for three months, after that the British would be supreme again. The tone of the other letters was different, though the sentiments of the writers were often veiled in allegorical expressions. "Pearls," or white-faces, were quoted as low in the market; "red wheat," or coloured faces, as looking up.

When intelligence reached Peshawur concerning the state of the 55th at Murdaun, a European detachment was sent off thither under Colonel Chute, who, on arriving there, found a body of the 55th Native infantry, consisting of about 120 men, drawn up to receive him. This was the faithful remnant of the 55th; the rest of the sepoys having broken up and taken to flight, without attempting to injure their officers. Colonel Spottiswoode, in the first bitterness of disappointment, committed suicide. Colonel Nicholson, with a troop of horse artillery, the 18th irregular cavalry, one hundred Punjab infantry, and forty of his personal escort, started off in pursuit of the mutineers, and captured 150 of them, with the colours, and upwards of 200 stand of arms. "Nicholson was in the saddle twenty hours, having gone over some seventy miles. The terror of his name spread throughout the valley, and gave additional emphasis to the moral effect of the disarming policy." The zemindars of Huzara, through which district the mutineers strove to escape to Hindoostan,

brought most of them in to the government, with their money all safe. The conduct of the Punjab infantry (the 5th) in this first encounter was very satisfactory; it seemed like a pledge of the fidelity of the whole Punjab force.

The 10th irregular cavalry had refused to act against the 55th. They were, consequently, disarmed and disbanded. The first person executed for mutiny at Peshawur was a subahdar-major of the 51st Native infantry, who was captured and hanged. He boasted that he had been a rebel for more than a year, and that the English rule was at an end. Twelve men of the same regiment were hanged two days afterwards, in a row, on full parade of all the troops; and, subsequently, the fearful penalty of blowing away from guns was inflicted upon forty of the 55th Native infantry.

The number of mutineers caught, and brought in by the hill tribes, must have been considerable; but no official statement has been published on the subject. The peculiar tenets and practice of the Seiks, were regarded as calculated to prevent coalition between them and the frontier Mohammedans. The two classes were therefore eliminated from the disarmed masses, and formed into a new corps. A Patan regiment was also raised. Ten men out of every European company were at once instructed in gun drill, and the Peshawur light horse sprang into existence, mounted on horses from the 5th light cavalry and the disbanded 10th irregulars.

Some of the officers employed in the laborious and responsible labour of assembling and drilling recruits, have become deservedly famous, and their names are now household words in the homes of England and her colonies. Others have been less fortunate, especially the members of the civil service, many of whom, with John Lawrence and Robert Montgomery for leaders, acted most zealously as recruiting sergeants. The "Letters" published since the death of Major Hodson, throw considerable light on the exploits of this officer and his gallant comrades. On the 19th of May he received orders to raise and command a new regiment, afterwards well known as Hodson's Horse; which he was well fitted to do, from the ability he had previously shown while connected with the Guides. "On the 20th of May, having been placed in charge of the Intelligence Department, he started

from Kurnaul at nine in the evening, with one led horse and an escort of Seik cavalry; arrived at Meerut about daybreak; delivered the commander-in-chief's despatches to General Wilson; had a bath, breakfast, and two hours' sleep, and then rode back the seventy-six miles, thirty miles of the distance lying through a hostile country."*

General van Cortlandt is another commander of irregular troops, whose name will

frequently appear in the course of the narrative. He was serving the British government in a civil capacity at the time of the outbreak, but was then called on to levy recruits. The nucleus of his force consisted of 300 Dogras (short built, sturdy men), belonging to Rajah Jowahir Sing, of Lahore. This number he increased to 1,000; and the Dogras did good service under their veteran leader.

CHAPTER VIII.

MARCH OF BRITISH FORCES, AND SIEGE OF DELHI.—MAY 27TH TO JUNE 24TH, 1857.

ADVANCE ON DELHI.—The terrible turning-point passed, and the fact proved that, in the hands of Sir John Lawrence and his lieutenants, the Punjab was not a source of danger, but a mine of strength, affairs at head-quarters assumed a new aspect; and the arrival of the Seik reinforcements was of invaluable assistance to the small band of Europeans on whom alone reliance could previously be placed, it having been found necessary to disarm the 5th Native infantry at Umballah on the morning of May 29th, the day before General Barnard, with the staff of the army, started from Kurnaul for Delhi. The 60th Native infantry were detached to Rohtuck, it being considered too great a trial of fidelity to employ this Hindoostanee corps in besieging their countrymen and co-religionists.

Encounter at the Hindun.—The small detachment of troops from Meerut, under Brigadier Wilson, marched thence on the 27th of May, to join the main body, and, on the morning of the 30th, encamped at Ghazi-u-deen Nuggur, a small but strongly fortified position on the river Hindun, about ten miles from Delhi. The troops were weary with night marches, and enfeebled by the intensity of the hot winds. No one entertained any suspicion of the vicinity of the enemy. At about four o'clock in the afternoon, when officers and men were for the most part asleep, a picket of

irregulars, stationed beyond the suspension-bridge, gave the alarm of an approaching foe. The bugles sounded, and the Rifles had scarcely formed before an 18-pounder shot burst into the British camp, and took one leg from each of two native palkee-bearers, who were sitting at the tent door of the Carabineers' hospital. The attacking force consisted of a strong detachment of mutineers from Delhi, who had succeeded in bringing their heavy guns to bear on the British camp before even their vicinity was suspected. Two 18-pounders were speedily opened to meet the hostile fire; the Rifles crossed the bridge, and were soon actively engaged in front; while the horse artillery, under Lieutenant-colonel Mackenzie, turned the left flank of the enemy, who thereupon commenced a retreat, leaving behind them five guns (two of large calibre),† and carts full of intrenching tools and sand-bags. The long delay of the British had evidently given time to the rebels to plan, but not to execute, the occupation of a fortified position on the Hindun. The numbers engaged are but vaguely stated. The chaplain who accompanied the expedition, speaks of 700 Englishmen attacking a force seven times their number.‡ The loss on the British side, in killed and wounded, did not exceed forty-four men; and was chiefly occasioned by the explosion of a cart-full of ammunition near the toll-bar, which a havildar of the 11th (a Meerut mutineer) fired into when the rout began. He was instantly bayoneted. Captain Andrews, of the Rifles, was killed

* *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India*, p. 7.

† Greathed's *Letters*, p. 6.

‡ The Chaplain's *Narrative*, p. 26.

while cheering his men to the charge; and a young lieutenant of the same regiment, Napier by name, and of the true lion breed, was shot in the leg. Amputation was performed, and the sufferer sank slowly under its effects; exclaiming often, with bitter tears, "I shall never lead the Rifles again! I shall never lead the Rifles again!"

Captain Dickson had a narrow escape. His horse ran away during the pursuit, and carried him far ahead of his troop, into the midst of the fugitives; but he cut down two sepoys, and returned unhurt. The loss of life, on the part of the mutineers, must have been very heavy. Some took refuge in a village, which was burnt; many were destroyed by the Carabineers; and about fifty were found "concealed in a ditch, not one of whom was permitted to escape."*

The following day (Whit-Sunday) opened with the burial of the slain. At noon a second attack was made by the rebels, who were defeated, driven out of two villages, and forced to retire from ridge to ridge, until they disappeared in the distance, in full retreat to Delhi. They succeeded, however, in carrying off their cannon, consisting of two heavy pieces and five light guns, the remains of Captain de Teissier's battery; the excessive heat and want of water hindering the pursuit of the Rifles. The European loss, in killed and wounded, amounted to twenty-four: of these, ten were sun-struck.†

The conduct of the Goorkas was considered extremely satisfactory. A false alarm being given on the 3rd of June, they were so delighted at the chance of getting a fight, that "they threw somersaults and cut capers." Mr. Greathed adds—"We feel quite safe about the Goorkas; their grog-drinking propensities are a great bond with the British soldier."

Notwithstanding the resemblance between the two races in the point which of all other most mars the efficiency of the British army, very strong doubts had been entertained, previous to the march of the force, regarding the fidelity of the hardy little mountaineers. In fact, a general panic had been occasioned at Simla by a report that the Nusseeree battalion stationed at Jutog, seven miles off, were in open mutiny, and had refused to march when ordered down by the commander-in-chief.

* The Chaplain's *Narrative*, p. 27.

† Return, by Brigadier Wilson.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857; pp. 119 to 121.

Simla, very shortly after its original occupation, became, to the leading Calcutta functionaries, what the lovely valley of Cashmere had been to the Great Moguls. The civilians of highest rank in the East India Company's service, with their wives and families, resorted thither; several governors-general almost lived there; and officers on leave of absence helped to make up a population of a quite peculiar character. The feeling of security had been, up to May, 1857, general and uninterrupted; ladies had travelled from Calcutta to Simla, and, indeed, through all parts of India, under an exclusively native escort, without one thought of danger; but the news from Meerut and Delhi broke with startling force on the mind of a very weak and very wealthy community, and led the residents to regard with anxiety every indication of the temper of the troops. Simla was not a military station; and the neighbouring one of Jutog, seven miles distant, was held by the Nusseeree battalion, containing nearly 800 Goorkas and six European officers. The 1st European Bengal Fusiliers were cantoned at the sanitary station of Dugshai (in Sirmoor; a Rajpoot hill-state, adjoining Putteeala), sixteen miles south of Simla; and H.M.'s 75th foot at Kussowlie, another sanatorium, forty miles distant: but the frightened population had no reason to place confidence in any prompt measures being adopted for their protection in the event of an *émeute*, after the incapacity evinced at Meerut. The fidelity of the Goorkas was the uppermost question with them; and it was not without cause that they were at one moment convinced that the sword was suspended over their defenceless heads by something little stronger than a hair.

The Nusseeree battalion, says an authority who may be supposed to know the truth of what he affirms, "was distinctly disaffected on the cartridge question." The order for the entire battalion to march down into the plains, was an unprecedented one; a company having been, on all previous occasions, left to protect their families during their absence. The precautions adopted by the residents at Simla, were indignantly denounced by the Goorkas as evincing mistrust in them, especially the removal of the Goorka guard from the government treasury, and the measures adopted for its defence. They demanded, as an evidence of confidence, that they should be

put on guard over and in the bank, in which lay some 80,000 Company's rupees. "The critical state of affairs," Mr. Cooper states, "may be judged not only from the audacity of their demands, but the undisguised audacity of their bearing. They demanded to be shown the actual treasure; and their swarthy features lit up with glee unpleasant to the eye of the bystander, when they saw the shining pieces. One sepoy tossed back the flap of the coat of a gentleman present, and made a queer remark on the revolver he saw worn underneath."* At Kussowlie, just above Umballah, a party of Goorkas actually robbed the treasury, and the rest broke into open bloodshed. Captain Blackall was about to order a party of H.M.'s 75th to act against the Goorkas; when Mr. Taylor, the assistant-commissioner, represented to him, that the safety of the helpless community of Simla depended on the avoidance of an outbreak. Captain Blackall acknowledged the force of the argument, and contented himself with adopting purely defensive measures, although actually surrounded by the Goorkas, and taunted with such expressions as "Shot for shot!" "Life for life!" In fact, the wise counsel of Mr. Taylor, and the address and temper evinced by Captain Blackall, proved the means of preserving Simla from being the scene of "horrors, in which, in enormities, perhaps Cawnpore would have been outdone."† The wisdom of the conciliation policy practised at Kussowlie, was not at first appreciated at Simla; and the replacement of the government treasury under the charge of the Goorkas, was viewed, naturally enough, as a perilous confession of weakness. "The panic reached its climax, and general and precipitate flight commenced. Officers, in high employ, rushed into ladies' houses, shouting, 'Fly for your lives! the Goorkas are upon us!' Simla was in a state of consternation: shoals of half-crazed fugitives, timid ladies, hopeless invalids, sickly children hardly able to totter—whole families burst forth, and poured helter-skelter down on Dugshai and Kussowlie. Some ran down steep khuds [ravines] and places marked only by the footprints of the mountain herds, and remained all night. Never had those stately pines looked down upon, or those sullen glens and mossy retreats

echoed with, such a tumult and hubbub. Ladies, who are now placidly pursuing ordinary domestic duties, wrote off perhaps for the last time to their distracted husbands in the plains: then, snatching up their little ones, fled away, anywhere out of the Simla world. Extraordinary feats were performed; some walked thirty miles! Some, alas! died from the effects of exhaustion and fear." The Mohammedan servants exulted in the belief that the European raj was about to close; and among the many anecdotes current during the panic, was one of a little boy being jeeringly told that his mamma would soon be grinding gram for the King of Delhi!‡

The news reached the commander-in-chief (Anson) at the time when the scales had just fallen from his eyes, and when the massacres of Meerut and Delhi, and the remonstrances of Sir John Lawrence and Colvin, had convinced him of the miserable error of his past proceedings. The plan of coercing and disbanding regiments had worse than failed with the Poorbeahs: it was not likely to succeed with the Goorkas. The Jutog troops were on the point, if not in the act, of mutiny; and, if not arrested, their example of defection or rebellion might be followed by the Kumaon and Sirmoor battalions, and the 66th (Napier's corps);§ and thus the resources of government would be lessened, and its difficulties greatly increased. In this strait, General Anson selected Captain Briggs, superintendent of roads, who possessed an intimate knowledge of the habits, customs, and feelings of the Goorkas, and desired him to hold communication with them, and secure their adherence even at the price of wholesale condonation of mutiny. This was actually done. A free pardon was given to the regiment generally, the only exception being a subahdar, named Chunderbun, described by Major Bagot as one of the best soldiers in the corps, and who had been absent at the time of the mutiny, but who had irretrievably offended his comrades by stating that they had no objection to use the new cartridges. Two men, "dismissed by order of court-martial" for taunting the school of musketry, "were restored to the service." These extraordinary concessions proved as successful as the opposite policy (commenced by the disbandment of the unfortunate 19th N. I.) had been disastrous. The advance on Delhi during the intense heat was as trying to the Goorkas as to the

* Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 103.

† *Ibid.*, p. 104.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

§ See page 107, *ante*.

Europeans. Yet they never showed any symptoms of disaffection. "The men," says Captain Chester, writing on the 17th of June, "have marched double marches; from their small numbers, every man, in addition, has been on daily duty. They have suffered severely from fever and cholera without a murmur." In fact, it was deemed politic to dwell exclusively on the bright side of the Goorka character. The Simla panic was talked of as if there had been no reasonable ground for any apprehension whatever; and the case being now changed, the "savage little demons," who had been conquered in a recent war by our "faithful Hindoostanee sepoys," became recognised as the "gallant hardy mountaineers," whose inveterate hatred to the "treacherous Poorbeahs" was alone a virtue calculated to counterbalance every less desirable characteristic. More unscrupulous auxiliaries in offensive warfare could scarcely have been found; no Pindarree of olden times ever loved pillage better than a modern Goorka, and probably none had so keen a zest for the work of destruction. No pen has traced, or perhaps ever can trace, even a sketch of the misery which must have been inflicted by the British army, and its hasty heterogeneous assemblage of irregular troops—with its terrible requirements of compulsory, and often unpaid, always ill-paid, labour from man and beast, and its other almost inevitable accompaniments of violence and pillage—on the helpless population of India. It is only an incidental remark here and there, which affords a glimpse of the working of what are termed military operations in a densely populated country. Mr. Greathed, for instance, mentions, that shortly after the second encounter at Ghazi-u-deen, while riding about the scene of action, he noticed that "a party of our people were destroying the village of Urthulla, to prevent the enemy from getting under cover in it in case of another attack. The elephants were engaged in pushing down the walls. The poor inhabitants are certainly to be pitied; but the destruction is a necessity: they were unluckily Jats, who are for the most part our friends."* No compensation appears to have been thought necessary in this case; if it had been, Mr. Greathed, as political agent specially attached to the field force, would hardly have left so important a point unnoticed. On the contrary, he speaks of the

"baggage people" being employed "in plundering the village of Urthulla" quite as a matter of course, not at all requiring the intervention of the provost-marshal, or the sharp correctives the mention of which are familiar to the readers of the Indian despatches of General Wellesley.

On the night of the 5th June, Brigadier Wilson and the Meerut force crossed the Jumna at Bhagput by a bridge of boats, "and slept like so many alligators on the sand till dawn."† On Sunday, the 7th, they joined the main body under Sir Henry Barnard at Alipoor, ten miles from Delhi. After the junction, the force in camp comprised about 600 cavalry, and 2,400 infantry, with twenty-two guns, besides the siege-train. The details were as follows:—

Sixteen horse artillery guns (Europeans); six horse battery guns (ditto); 9th Lancers; two squadrons Carabineers; six companies 60th Rifles; 75th foot; 1st Fusiliers; six companies 2nd Fusiliers; head-quarters Sirmoor battalion; and the portion of the sappers and miners which had not yet mutinied—about 150 in number. The siege-train consisted of eight 18-pounder guns, four 8-inch howitzers, four 8-inch mortars, and twelve 5½-inch mortars; and had attached to it a weak company of European artillery (4th of 6th battalion), and 100 European artillery recruits.

At 2 A.M. on the 8th of June, the troops marched from Alipoor to attack the enemy's advanced intrenched position at Badulee-ke-Serai, four miles from Delhi. The baggage was left behind until the result of the attack should be known, under the charge of a squadron of the Carabineers, a company of the Fusiliers, and the chief part of the contingent of the rajah of Jheend. The Serai (or open building for the reception of travellers) held by the mutineers, lay on the right of the Trunk road, and was defended by a sand-bag battery, erected on a small natural elevation. The main assault was made in front just as the day broke, and the lights in the enemy's camp became visible. The flank attack was delayed by the difficulty experienced by Brigadier Grant in getting his guns over some watercourses, and the fire of the enemy's heavy battery began to tell seriously on the main body; the men fell fast: and the staff offering a tempting mark, two officers, Colonel Chester (the adjutant-general) and Captain Russell, were mortally wounded by the same shot, and several horses were hit in the course of one or two minutes. When Colonel Chester fell, with his horse also mortally wounded under him, Captain Barnard, the son of the general,

* Greathed's *Letters*, p. 15.

† *Ibid.*, p. 24.

raised the head of the wounded man, and enabled him to see the nature of his injury; after which, knowing his case hopeless, he bade young Barnard leave him, and expired. The sufferings of Captain Russell were far more protracted: his leg had been shot off above the knee, and he lived for some hours in great bodily agony. But his mind was clear; and he died praying, in the words of the publican, "God be merciful to me a sinner."* After these officers were shot, the 75th were ordered to charge and take the heavy battery. The corps, led by Brigadier Showers and Colonel Herbert, accomplished this duty with the assistance of the 1st Fusiliers, and the insurgents fell back, abandoning their camp and several guns. The British pushed on in pursuit, clearing many gardens until they reached the cross-roads, one of which led to the city through the Subzee Munde (or vegetable market) suburb, and the other to the cantonments. Here the troops divided into two columns, each of which marched on till they met on either side of a ridge, on which stood the Flagstaff tower, Hindoo Rao's house, and a mosque midway between these two afterwards famous positions. The insurgents had posted three guns at the Flagstaff tower, and from thence a cannonade was opened on the advancing force; but the guns were soon silenced by Sir Henry Barnard's column, which proceeded along the crest of the ridge, carrying all before it, until, on reaching Hindoo Rao's house, a junction was effected with Brigadier Wilson's column, which had come by the Subzee Munde suburb, had been opposed on the way, and had captured an 18-pounder gun. The action terminated at about half-past nine.

The British camp was pitched on the parade-ground, having its rear protected by the canal, with the advantage of bridges on either extreme, which the enemy had previously attempted to destroy with only partial success. Several batteries were established on the ridge; but the nearest of them was 1,200 yards, or upwards, from the walls; deficiency in the number of troops, and character of ordnance, rendering it unsafe to approach nearer.† The main picket was at Hindoo Rao's house, a building which formerly belonged to a rich old Hindoo,

and had verandahs, outhouses, and every other accommodation on a most extensive scale. During the siege it is said to have afforded "a sort of protection to 800 troops, besides 200 or 300 coolies, servants, and camp-followers of all kinds;" and being built in the strong native fashion, it withstood, in the most surprising manner, the constant cannonading directed against it.‡ The picket was commanded from the very first by Major Reid, of the Sirmoor battalion; who never left his post even to come into camp, from the time he assumed command of it till the 14th of September, the day of the storming operations, when he was severely wounded.

The total loss on the side of the British, in the action of the 8th of June, was 51 killed, 132 wounded, and two missing. It has been asserted, that a thousand of the mutineers who came out never returned to Delhi. Their killed and wounded are supposed to have amounted to three or four hundred; and many took the opportunity of decamping to their homes after or during the battle. Thirteen guns were captured.

Major-general Reid, the provincial commander-in-chief, arrived at Alipoor, from Rawul Pindie, on the 8th of June, just as the troops were marching. Unwell and greatly fatigued by a rapid journey during intense heat, he took no part in the action, and never assumed command until after the death of Sir Henry Barnard, though his advice in matters of moment was freely sought and given.

On the morning of the 9th of June, the Guide corps—the first reinforcement sent from the Punjab by Lawrence—reached Delhi, under the command of Captain Daly. It consisted of three troops of cavalry and six companies of infantry, and had marched from Murdaun, on the Peshawur frontier, to Delhi, 580 miles in twenty-two of the hottest days in the year; and though the infantry were occasionally assisted with camels or ponies on the line of road, the march was a surprising one even for cavalry. The men showed extreme delight at finding their old commandant, Lieutenant Hodson, in camp; and, surrounding him with exclamations of "Burra serai-wallah" (great in battle), they seized his bridle, dress, hands, and feet, and flung themselves down before his horse, frantic with joy. It seems that some unfortunate misunderstanding with the authorities, concerning the regimental accounts, had led to his removal from the

* The Chaplain's Narrative, p. 43.

† Campaign of the Delhi Army, by Major H. W. Norman, deputy adjutant-general; p. 12.

‡ Letter from Lieutenant Hawes, of the Guide corps.—Star, Sept. 18th, 1857.

corps two years before; and they rejoiced in his restoration to them, as much as he did in the prospect of again leading "the dear old Guides." He had not long to wait before hearing their well-known cheer as they followed him to battle, though under the immediate command of Captain Daly. That same afternoon the mutineers marched out of Delhi, and attacked the Hindoo Rao picket. The Guides moved up to support the position, and the insurgents were driven back into the city with considerable slaughter. Several lives were lost on the side of the British, including that of Quintin Battye, the youthful commandant of the Guides' cavalry—a popular and enthusiastic soldier, to whose amiable qualities Hodson bears full testimony; adding, "The brave boy died with a smile on his lip, and a Latin quotation on his tongue."*

No correct estimate could be formed of the strength of the force in Delhi. Besides the mutinous garrison, the Meerut rebels, and those who had flocked from Roorkee, Alighur, Boolundshuhur, Muttra, Ferozpoor, and Umballah, a strong reinforcement had immediately preceded the besieging army—namely, the Hurriana light infantry battalion, and the 4th irregular cavalry, which had mutinied at Hansi, Hissar, and Sirsa.

Hansi is a strong town, which, towards the close of the last century, was the chief place in the jaghire of the successful adventurer, George Thomas. It is situated eighty-nine miles north-west of Delhi. *Hissar* and *Sirsa* (two military stations of minor importance) lie fifteen and forty-five miles, respectively, further in the same direction. The circumstances of the outbreak have not been officially related; but, from private sources, it appears to have been sudden and unexpected. Mr. Taylor, the assistant in charge of the government cattle-farm at Hissar, was sitting playing chess at noon on the 30th of May, with another European in the civil service of the Company, when a servant rushed into the room, and announced the arrival of some sowars from Delhi. The Native troops and population seem to have risen immediately. The majority of the Europeans sought and found safety in flight. Mr. Taylor received several wounds, but succeeded in effecting his escape. Seven European men and seven women, with fifteen children and two Eurasian women, are stated to have perished in the return furnished by the officiating

* See p. 118, ante.

commissioner of Hissar; but Mr. Taylor's list, likewise published by authority, and apparently grounded on more accurate data, gives the total number at fourteen. The magistrate, Mr. Wedderburn, and Lieutenant Barwell, adjutant of the Hurriana light cavalry, fell by the hands of the mutineers; while Mrs. Wedderburn, her child, and Mrs. Barwell, are thought to have been murdered by the customs' peons.†

The rajah of Putteeala acted in the most noble manner towards the Hansi and Hissar fugitives. He sent out troops to search for them and cover their retreat; furnished them with every necessary, in the way of money, food, and clothing; and desired that whatever they might call for should be supplied gratis. The effect of this conduct was most beneficial to the British, and warrants the strong expression used by Mr. Douglas Forsyth, deputy-commissioner of the Umballah and adjacent districts—that "if it had not been for the rajah of Putteeala, none of us in these Cis-Sutlej States would now be alive."

At Hissar several lives are also alleged to have been lost; but the official records are silent on the subject. The mutineers, after plundering the Hissar treasury, which contained about a lac of rupees (£10,000), marched off unopposed to Delhi. They arrived there, as has been stated, before General Barnard; but had it been otherwise, their entrance to the city could not have been prevented, at least not by means compatible with the rules adopted for the conduct of the campaign by the military commanders. Sir John, or Sir Henry Lawrence, or Nicholson, or any soldier or civilian acquainted with the native character, and alive to the paramount importance of wresting Delhi from the hands of the rebels in their first moment of weakness and utter incapacity, would probably, had they been entrusted with the direction of affairs, have marched on the city at all hazards, trusting to promptitude and energy, free pardons and liberal rewards, as the best mode of dealing with a frightened, excited, unreasoning multitude—without leaders, without a plan, and evidently without confidence in one another.

The distressing and humiliating position in which the British found themselves on sitting down before Delhi, was indeed calculated to teach "a terrible lesson on the

† *London Gazette* (2nd supplement), May 6th, 1858.

evils of delay." Any advantage gained thereby was, as ought to have been foreseen, more than counterbalanced by the rapid growth of the enemy's resources.*

Before a siege-train could be procured, a marked change had taken place in the attitude of the mutineers. The name of Delhi in revolt offered to discontented adventurers throughout India, and especially to Mohammedans, an almost irresistible attraction; and while the British raised regiments of doubtful or dangerous character with toil, by dint of the most unremitting energy, and at an enormous cost, thousands flocked in at the open gates of the city, and seized the weapons and manned the guns left ready to their hand.

The long waited for siege-train, when it arrived, proved quite insufficient for the work required. "No one," as Mr. Greathed naïvely remarks, "seems to have thought that the guns at the disposal of the mutineers are 24-pounders, and that the 18-pounders we brought with us were not likely to silence them; and it is for this reason our approach to the town is rendered so difficult. There was certainly an entire miscalculation of the power of resistance afforded to the rebels by their command of the Delhi arsenal."†

In fact, the British troops, instead of the besiegers, became literally the besieged, and were thankful for the shelter offered by the ridge on which the advanced pickets stood, and which enabled them to say—"Here we are in camp, as secure against assaults as if we were in Delhi, and the mutineers outside."‡ Even this was not always the case; for at sunrise on the morning of the 12th of June, the most advanced picket, that at the Flagstaff tower, was fiercely attacked, and nearly carried by surprise, by a large body of mutineers who had contrived to approach unobserved under cover of night, and conceal themselves in the ravines in the compound or grounds attached to Sir T. Metcalfe's late house, situated between the Flagstaff tower and the river. The picket was hard pressed; the two artillery guns were nearly taken; Captain Knox, and several of the 75th foot, were killed: the enemy even descended the camp side of the ridge; and three of the rebels were killed in the sepoy lines, within a short distance of the tents, before rein-

forcements could be brought up to support the disputed position, and drive off the insurgents. To prevent the recurrence of a similar danger, a large picket was sent to occupy Metcalfe's house—a precaution which would have been taken earlier but for the difficulty of providing relief, and which threw up, as it were, a left flank to the British defences, and rendered it almost impossible for the enemy to pass round to attack the camp on that side. The attempt upon the Flagstaff tower had hardly been repulsed, when other bodies of insurgents advanced against Hindoo Rao's house, and through the Subzee Mundee, into the gardens on the right flank of the camp. The first of these movements was inconsiderable; but supports of all arms had to be moved up to oppose the second. Major Jacob led the 1st Fusiliers against the rebels, and drove them out of the gardens with much slaughter.§

The manifest insufficiency of the British force to besiege, much less blockade, Delhi, led certain of the officers to desire to attempt its capture by a *coup-de-main*; and Sir Henry Barnard directed three engineer officers (Wilberforce Greathed, Chesney, and Maunsell), assisted by Hodson, to form a project of attack, of which, when laid before the general, he highly approved.|| Two gates of the city were to be blown in by powder-bags, by which means two columns of the attacking force (comprising some 1,700 or 1,800 infantry) were to effect an entrance. Early on the morning of the 13th of June, corps were formed in readiness; and the Rifles had actually got within 400 or 500 yards of the city wall, unperceived by the enemy, when they were recalled in consequence of "the mistake of a superior officer in delaying the withdrawal of the pickets, without which the infantry regiments were mere skeletons." The abandonment of the plan became inevitable, as daylight was fast approaching, and it was felt that success could not be anticipated except as the result of surprise. Major Norman pronounces the accident which hindered the attempt, an interposition of Providence on behalf of the British; and considers that defeat, or even partial success, would have been ruin; while complete success would not have achieved the results subsequently obtained.¶ Considerable difference of opinion, however, prevailed on the subject.

* Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 198.

† Greathed's *Letters*, p. 18.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

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§ Norman's *Campaign of the Delhi Army*, p. 13.

|| Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 203.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Commissioner Greathed lamented the failure of the scheme, believing that an important opportunity had been lost through "the obtusity of one individual."* It was, however, a plan which could not be revived after having once been abandoned; for the enemy, though not aware of the near approach of the European troops at the time, must, it was considered, have subsequently heard of it by some channel or other, and would be more on their guard for the future. Moreover, General Barnard probably repented of having sanctioned the attempt; for he is accused of having been induced, by his Crimean experience, to over-estimate the amount of resistance to be expected within the walls, and to be "disposed to treat the Pandies as Russians."† From this period almost daily sallies were made from Delhi; the British troops were much harassed, and their losses bore "a sadly large proportion to their successes."‡ The rainy season was approaching; the hospitals were full; some cases of cholera had appeared in camp; and while crippled in all their operations by the deficiency in the calibre and number of their guns, and also of men to work them, the British had the mortification of seeing constant reinforcements arriving, like tributary streams, to feed the great reservoir of revolt. The 60th Native infantry regiment reached Delhi on the 13th of June, having mutinied at Rohtuck. Colonel Seaton and the officers, though fired on by their men, succeeded in gaining the British camp in safety after a ride of fifty miles. Three or four days later, the Nusseerabad brigade joined the rebel garrison, bringing in triumph the Jellalabad field battery, under the charge of the famous company of artillery which, by Lord Ellenborough's decree, was never to be separated from the guns it had once served so gallantly. On the 19th of June, those very guns, decorated (also by Lord Ellenborough's order) with a mural crown, were turned with fatal effect against

the Europeans. An hour before sunset, an attack was made by a strong body of the enemy, consisting chiefly of the Nusseerabad mutineers, on the rear of the British. The action continued some time after dark. The firing on both sides then gradually ceased, and the combatants quitted the field. Our loss was twenty killed, and seventy-seven wounded. Three officers fell, including Major Yule, of the 9th Lancers. His body was found covered with gashes, and four of his men lay dead beside him. Captain Daly, the gallant commandant of the Guide corps, was badly wounded, and Lieutenant Hodson was appointed to supply his place. Brigadier Hope Grant, who led the troops, had his horse shot under him, and was only saved by the devotion of two men of his own regiment, and two orderly sowars of the 4th irregular cavalry. A very serious accident occurred by reason of the darkness, our own guns firing into our own men.§

At a council of war held on the 17th, it had been formally resolved to wait for reinforcements, and, in the interim, to "do nothing but fire away long shots|| at the distance of a mile, and repel the enemy's attacks"—a mode of procedure which excited the intense disgust of the younger and more enterprising officers, who exclaimed with Hodson, "If only Sir Henry Lawrence were in camp!" Hodson adds—"The mismanagement of affairs is perfectly sickening. Nothing the rebels can do will equal the evils arising from incapacity and indecision."¶

The action of the 19th exercised a depressing influence on the British camp; and it was currently reported, "that the general conceived misgivings as to the wisdom of the force continuing before Delhi."** On the 22nd, reinforcements from the Punjab, amounting to about 850 men and five guns, reached the British camp; but the ranks of the mutinous garrison were also replenished by the arrival of bands of rebels

* Greathed's *Letters*, p. 44. The obtuse individual in question is not named; but it was probably the brigadier on duty, who refused to withdraw the pickets guarding the guns on the height on any authority less than a written command from General Barnard. Hodson speaks of him as "the man who first lost Delhi, and has now, by folly, prevented its being recaptured."—Rotton's *Narrative*, p. 72. Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 208.

† Greathed's *Letters*, p. 92.

‡ Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 217.

§ Rotton's *Narrative*, p. 92.

|| The round shot from the enemy's batteries occasionally did much damage to the advanced pickets. One, according to Mr. Rotton, was fired, on the 17th of June, into Hindoo Rao's house, which killed Ensign Wheatley, of the 54th N. I., as he lay asleep in his own apartment, and, in its course, struck down eight other men, of whom six died on the spot, and the other two were mortally wounded.—*Narrative of the Siege of Delhi*, p. 86.

¶ Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 216.

** Rotton's *Narrative*, p. 92.

from Jullundur and Phillour, composed of the 6th light cavalry, the 3rd, 36th, and 61st N.I., which regiments had mutinied during the first week of June.

The 23rd of June being the centenary of Plassy, was anxiously expected, both within and without the walls of Delhi, on account of an alleged prophecy of wide circulation, that the British raj was to expire after a hundred years' existence. The enemy issued forth in considerable force, occupied the Subzee Mundee suburb, and attacked the Hindoo Rao ridge. The contest lasted eleven hours (from 6 P.M. to 5 A.M.) before the rebels were finally compelled to retreat, Subzee Mundee being carried by the Rifles, Goorkas, and Guides. The British casualties were—one officer (Lieutenant Jackson, of the Fusiliers) and thirty-eight men killed, and 118 wounded. The mutineers were said to have lost 400 killed and 300 wounded. Among the incidents of the battle talked over that night in camp, the most popular was a grim practical joke, enacted while the rebels were being gradually driven out of the Subzee Mundee suburb. A Poorbeah, thinking all was over, put his head out of the window of one of the houses, in the shade of which a few Europeans and Goorkas were resting. Quick as thought, a Goorka sprang up, seized the rebel by his hair, and, with one sweep of his "kookery" (crooked sword), took off his head.* From this time an advanced picket was stationed in Subzee Mundee, and maintained during the rest of the siege; consisting of 180 Europeans, posted between a serai on one side, and a Hindoo temple on the other side of the Great Trunk road, both of which were strengthened and rendered defensible by the engineers.

The new adjutant-general, Colonel Chester's successor, reached the camp on the 24th of June, which the annalists of the siege mark as a red-letter day for that reason. Hodson writes—"Neville Chamberlain has arrived, and he ought to be worth a thousand men to us;" but the entry in his diary for that same day, records

* Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 215.

† *Ibid.*, p. 216.

‡ *Ibid.* debate, June 29th, 1857.

§ In the debate of June 23rd, Mr. Smith had informed the house that the 19th N.I. had been disbanded on account of its mutinous behaviour, but there was no intention of disbanding any other portion of the Native army. The Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* (June 24th) likewise stated, "The

the arrival of the following telegram from Agra:—"Heavy firing at Cawnpoor; result not known."†

It is strange now to look back on the deep gloom, the horrible uncertainty, which overshadowed the prospects of the Europeans in Northern India; and to contrast it with the easy matter-of-course manner in which the authorities in London received the startling intelligence of mutiny, massacre, and the occupation of Delhi. While Sir John Lawrence, the actual viceroy of Northern India, was using all means, and running all hazards, to increase the force before Delhi, and was urging the maintenance of the siege, not simply as the means of preserving the power, but of saving the lives of his widely-scattered countrymen—Mr. Vernon Smith, the president of the India Board, was assuring the House of Commons that it was "notorious that Delhi might be easily surrounded, so that the place could be reduced by famine, if not by force." For his own part, however, Mr. Smith entertained no doubt that it would be reduced by force immediately that a man of the well-known vigour of his gallant friend, General Anson, should appear before the walls. The mail had brought advices, that an "ample force" of infantry, cavalry, and artillery would shortly be before the town. "Unfortunately," Mr. Smith added, "I cannot therefore apprise the house that the fort of Delhi has been razed to the ground; but I hope that ample retribution has been by this time inflicted on the mutineers."‡

The next Indian mail brought tidings calculated to convince even the most ignorant or indifferent, that the capture, whether by storm or blockade, of a large, strong, well-fortified, and abundantly supplied city, with a river running beneath its walls, was not an easy matter: other news followed, which spread grief and fear throughout the United Kingdom; telling the rapid spread of mutiny, in its most terrible form, throughout the entire Bengal army.§

sepooy army is not in revolt; it does not even appear that it is discontented:" and this in utter contempt of the warning of General Hearsey, and of the vicinity to the seat of government of Barrackpoor, where the "greased cartridges" had already produced rampant mutiny, manifested in the act of Mungul Pandey—the first of the Pandies—and the more than tacit approval of his comrades.

CHAPTER IX.

ROHILCUND, BAREILLY, MORADABAD, SEHARUNPOOR, SHAHJEHANPOOR, BUDAON,
AND ALMORA.—MAY 21ST TO JUNE 3RD, 1857.

ROHILCUND lies between Oude and the Ganges, which river separates it from the Dooab. The five military stations of this province contained the following troops at the time of the outbreak :—

BAREILLY.—The 18th and 68th N.I.—*Europeans*, 28; *Natives*, 2,317. The 8th irregular cavalry—*Europeans*, 3; *Natives*, 547. The 6th company of Bengal Native artillery—4 *Europeans*, and 110 *Natives*. There were, besides, 52 of all ranks in hospital.

MORADABAD.—The 29th N.I.—*Europeans*, 16; *Natives*, 1,078. Sick of all ranks in hospital, 43. Detail of foot artillery—*European*, 1; *Natives*, 50.

SEHARUNPOOR.—Detachment of N. I.—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 82.

SHAHJEHANPOOR.—28th N. I.—*Europeans*, 16; *Natives*, 1,106. Sick of all ranks in hospital, 11. Detail of foot artillery—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 29.

BUDAON.—Detachment of N. I.—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 50.

The military arrangements for the Kumaon district, were under the charge of the same officer (Brigadier Sibbald) as those of Rohilcund; and both Kumaon and Rohilcund were included in the Meerut division. Almora, the chief place of Kumaon, was memorable for having been the scene of the decisive contest with the Goorkas in 1815.

ALMORA.—66th N. I. (Goorkas)—*Europeans*, 48; *Natives*, 680. Sick of all ranks, 22. Detachment of Sirmoor battalion—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 28. Company of artillery—*Europeans*, 2; *Natives*, 105.

The whole of the above troops, excepting the Goorkas, rebelled in the course of a few days.

Bareilly, the head-quarters of the Rohilcund division, is only 152 miles from Delhi; and the tidings of the assertion of Mohammedan supremacy in the imperial city, travelled fast, and created great excitement among the Rohillas generally. "A very bad and uneasy feeling" was considered, by Brigadier Sibbald, to be prevalent among the Bareilly soldiery; but he attributed its origin to distrust of the intentions of the British government; and on the 21st of May, he ordered a general parade of the troops in

the cantonments, and begged them to dismiss from their minds the causeless dread that prevailed among them. The sepoy appeared much relieved by his assurances, and said they "had commenced a new life." In a despatch dated May 23rd, the brigadier stated that the reports from Moradabad, Shahjehanpoor, and Almora, were most satisfactory, and that the conduct of the 8th irregular cavalry was "beyond praise."* This last point was remarkable, inasmuch as the regiment in question consisted chiefly of Patans taken from the neighbourhood of Delhi. With regard to Moradabad, it is evident that the brigadier thought it best to take a very lenient view of the outbreak which had occurred there. A party of the 29th N.I. had actually broken open the gaol, and released a great number of prisoners; including a notorious villain named Nujjoo Khan, who was under sentence of transportation for life (for having attempted to murder a European magistrate), and who subsequently became a rebel leader of some note.† The brigadier does not enter into particulars; but he urges, that "a free pardon from the highest authorities" should be extended to the troops in general; and he adds, that the 29th were "proving their repentance for the outbreak of bad men among them." The temper of the population was, however, far less promising: indeed, throughout Rohilcund, disorganisation in the civil government seems to have preceded mutiny in the cantonments. Mr. Edwards, the magistrate and collector of the Budaon district, says, that as early as the 19th of May, the infection had "spread from the tracts on the right bank of the Ganges, which were by that time in open rebellion. Bands of marauders sprang up, as it were, by magic, and commenced plundering on the roads; and sacking and plundering villages."‡ The officers and civilians became alarmed, and sent their wives and children to Nynsee Tal, a sanitary station, seventy miles distant, in the Kumaon district. The sepoy remonstrated against

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 64.

† *Personal Adventures during the Indian Rebellion in Rohilcund, Futteghur, and Oude*; by William

Edwards, judge of Benares, and late magistrate and collector of Budaon, in Rohilcund; p. 3.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

this evidence of distrust, but happily in vain. In the 8th irregular cavalry, however, such perfect reliance continued to be placed, that their commandant, Captain Mackenzie, was empowered to raise additional troops for permanent service; and the cavalry lines were appointed as the place of rendezvous in the event of an outbreak.

Nor was this confidence without foundation. The corps, it is true, succumbed; but it is evident the men had no systematic treachery in view, but were simply carried away by what to them must have been an irresistible impulse. At Bareilly there yet remained a lineal descendant of the brave but ill-fated Hafiz Rehmet, the Rohilla chief who fell when British bayonets were hired out by Warren Hastings, to enable Shujah Dowlah, of Oude, to "annex" a neighbouring country. Khan Bahadoor Khan was a venerable-looking man, of dignified manners, and considerable ability—much respected by both Europeans and natives. Being a pensioner of government in his double capacity as representative of the former ruler of the country, and also as a retired Principal Sudder Ameen (or native judge), the old man was considered, by the commissioner and collector, as identified with British interests; and he was daily closeted with them as a counsellor in their anxious discussions regarding the state of affairs.* From subsequent events, he is believed to have been instrumental in fomenting disaffection, rather than to have been carried away by the torrent; but no very conclusive evidence has yet appeared on the subject. On the 29th of May, some of the Native officers reported to Colonel Troup, the second in command, that whilst bathing in the river, the men of the 18th and 68th N.I. had sworn to rise in the middle of the day and massacre the Europeans. Notice was immediately given to Captain Mackenzie; under whom the irregular cavalry turned out with the utmost promptitude, and appeared quite resolved to stand by the Europeans.†

No outbreak occurred during this or the following day; but great numbers of the 45th mutineers, from Ferozpoor, passed through Bareilly on both these days, and spread alarm among the yet obedient troops,

by assuring them that a large European force, with artillery, had been concentrated in the vicinity of the station, and that the destruction of the whole of the Native regiments had been resolved on by the "*gora logue*" (white people). The Native lines were a scene of confusion throughout the night of Saturday the 30th; few of the men retired to their own huts; and the Europeans were in a state of extreme anxiety, having received warning of the determination at which the irregular cavalry had arrived—of remaining strictly neutral in the approaching struggle, and neither raising their hands against their countrymen nor the Europeans. The confidence of some of the officers in their men was unbroken to the last. For instance, at nine o'clock on the Sunday morning, Major Pearson, who was in command of the 18th, called on Colonel Troup, and assured him that his men were all right. Two hours later a gun was fired by the artillery, and immediately afterwards the sepoy began firing on the officers' bungalows. Brigadier Sibbald mounted his horse, and rode towards the cavalry lines, but was met by a party of infantry, who shot him in the chest: the brave old soldier rode on till he reached the appointed rendezvous, and then dropped dead from his horse. Ensign Tucker perished while endeavouring to save the life of the sergeant-major. The chief part of the Europeans, civil and military, reached the cavalry lines in safety, and agreed to retire on Nynsee Tal. The troopers were assembled in readiness to join in the retreat, when Captain Mackenzie came up, and asked Colonel Troup's permission to comply with the wishes of the men, who desired "to have a crack at the mutineers." They returned accordingly, and soon came in sight of the rebels. The result may be readily guessed. The sight of the green flag—the symbol of their faith—sufficed to turn the scale with the troopers; and when directed to charge upon their co-religionists, they halted, began to murmur, and ended by turning their horses' heads, and ranging themselves around the same banner. The officers (Captain Mackenzie and Lieutenant Becher), with a faithful remnant of their late regiment,‡ were compelled to rejoin the party proceeding to

three motherless boys, who were left in the lines of the mutineers. The old man grasped the hand of his commander, and, looking up to heaven with tears in his eyes, exclaimed, "No, I will go on with you,

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*, p. 198.

† Col. Troup's report.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 138.

‡ Mohammed Nizam, a Native officer, was told by Captain Mackenzie to go back and look after his

Nynce Tal. Mr. Alexander, the commissioner, had a very narrow escape. He was ill and in bed, when the gun, the signal for mutiny, was fired. His native servant rushed in, and begged him to fly. The commissioner declared himself unable to ride, but was lifted on to his saddle in an almost fainting state, by his attendant. The horse took fright at the firing, and ran away, happily taking the Nynce Tal road, and thus saving the life of its rider. The fate of those who did not succeed in effecting their escape has not been fully ascertained. Six officers—namely, Major Pearson, Captains Richardson and Hathorn, Lieutenant Stewart, and Ensign Dyson, at first believed to be concealed in a village seven miles from Delhi—are stated, in the *Gazette* of May 6th, 1858, as still missing, and supposed to have been killed by the villagers. Messrs. Robertson and Raikes, judges of Bareilly; Dr. Hay, son-in-law to the late Lieutenant-governor Thomason; Mr. Wyatt, the deputy-collector; and Dr. Carl Buch, principal of the Bareilly college, remained behind. They are alleged to have been formally tried by the mutineers, who omitted none of the usual forms, and made Khan Bahadoor Khan act as the judge. A jury was sworn, witnesses were examined, a conviction obtained, and sentence of death passed with affected solemnity on the unfortunate gentlemen, who were then publicly hanged in front of the gaol. To appreciate the force of this horrible sarcasm, it must be remembered that our administration of justice, both civil and criminal, was detested by the natives; and that a Rohilcund magistrate had been, for more than a year before the outbreak, representing "the great abuse of the power of the civil courts, and the reckless manner in which they decreed the sale of rights and interests connected with the soil, in satisfaction of petty debts, and the dangerous dislocation of society which was in consequence being produced."* Moreover, one of the victims, Mr. Wyatt, had himself published, anonymously, a book entitled *Revelations respecting the Police, Magistracy, and Criminal Courts*,† which sufficiently accounts for the deep-rooted animosity excited by our system, and which naturally extended to its administrators.

and do my duty." The children did not perish, but suffered much from poverty and neglect.—Raikes' *Revolt*, p. 155.

* Edwards' *Personal Adventures*, p. 14.

Dr. Hansbrow, the medical officer in charge of the gaol, ascended to the roof of that building, and attempted to resist the insurgents, but was overpowered and put to death. The prisoners, to the number of about 4,000, were released.‡ The treasury was plundered, the cantonments fired, and many lives were lost in the contest for booty, which ensued between the sepoys and the population.

At *Shahjehanpoor*, a mutiny occurred on the same Sunday, of which no official account has ever been furnished; for those whose duty it would have been to report the details to government, were themselves among the victims. The 28th N.I. rose *en masse* during the time of morning service, and some of the men entered the church, murdered the collector (Mr. Ricketts) and Dr. Bowling, and wounded Ensign Spens. Captain James, the officer in command of the regiment, was killed while endeavouring to recall his men to a sense of duty; Captain Salmon was wounded while running to the parade-ground; but he, with Ensign Spens and twenty-six other persons, including eight ladies and four children, made their escape to Mohumdee, a station in Oude, where their arrival caused great excitement among the Native troops, and accelerated the catastrophe in which they perished.

The account here given is derived from a letter written by the assistant-commissioner of Mohumdee, Captain Patrick Orr, to his brother at Lucknow.§ Circumstantial narratives of the Shahjehanpoor mutiny were published in various Indian journals; but they contradict one another in important particulars, and are probably all equally fictitious.

Budaon is about thirty miles from Bareilly. In the afternoon of Sunday, the 31st, intelligence was received that crowds of released convicts were thronging the Bareilly road, and were already within eight miles of Budaon; and further, that a detachment of the mutineers were in full march thither, in the assurance of being joined by the treasury guard in plundering and burning the station. The magistrate, Mr. Edwards, whose narrative has been already quoted, felt that the discontent of the population rendered it hopeless to attempt to oppose the insurgents. Mr. Phillips, the

† Ostensibly by "Orderly Panchkooree Khan."

‡ Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 2.

§ Gubbins' *Mutiny in Oudh*, p. 123; Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 48.





magistrate of Etah, was at this time at Budaon, having come thus far on his way to Bareilly, whither he was proceeding to procure military aid to put down disturbances in his own district. On learning what had occurred, he mounted his horse, and with an escort composed of a dozen horsemen (some belonging to different regiments of irregular horse, others common police sowars), dashed off at full gallop, in order to reach the Ghauts across the Ganges before the convicts or rebels could close the road, and prevent his return to Etah. Edwards was sorely tempted to make his escape also. His wife and child had previously found refuge at Nynce Tal; but he considered it his duty "to stick to the ship as long as she floated." He remained the only European officer in charge of a district, containing a lawless population of nearly 1,100 souls, with a Mohammedan deputy-collector for his sole assistant. "I went," he says, "into my room, and prayed earnestly that God would protect and guide me, and enable me to do my duty. I then summoned my kotwal, and arranged with him as best we could, for maintaining, as long as possible, the peace of the town." At ten at night, Mr. Donald, an indigo planter, and his son; Mr. Gibson, a patrol in the customs department, temporarily on duty in the district; and Mr. Stewart and his wife and family (Eurasians), sought protection in Mr. Edwards' house. By congregating together, however, they rather increased than diminished their mutual danger, by attracting attention, which was the more to be deprecated, "as some of the party were at feud with the people of the district, in consequence of having purchased estates, sold under harsh circumstances by decrees of our civil courts." This statement is followed by others, which deserve quotation in full, as illustrating the gulf that opened at the feet of the governing race the moment the Bengal mercenaries hoisted the standard of revolt.

"To the large number of these sales during the past twelve or fifteen years, and the operation of our revenue system, which has had the result of destroying the gentry of the country, and breaking up the village communities, I attribute solely the disorganisation of this and the neighbouring districts in these provinces. By fraud or chicanery, a vast number of the estates of families of rank and influence have been alienated, either wholly or in part, and have been purchased by new men, chiefly traders or government officials, without character or influence over their tenantry. . . . The very first people who came in to me, imploring aid, were of this new proprietary body, to whom I had a

right to look for vigorous and efficient efforts in the maintenance of order. On the other hand, those who really could control the vast masses of the rural population, were interested in bringing about a state of disturbance and general anarchy."

In adverting to the manufacture and distribution of the chupatties in the North-Western Provinces, Mr. Edwards says—"I truly believe that the rural population of all classes among whom these cakes spread, were as ignorant as I was myself of their real object; but it was clear they were a secret sign to be on the alert; and the minds of the people were, through them, kept watchful and excited. As soon as the disturbances broke out at Meerut and Delhi, the cakes explained themselves, and the people at once perceived what was expected from them. In Budaon, the mass of the population rose in a body, and the entire district became a scene of anarchy and confusion. The ancient proprietary body took the opportunity of murdering or expelling the auction purchasers, and resumed possession of their hereditary estates. . . . The rural classes would never have joined in rebelling with the sepoys, whom they hated, had not these causes of discontent already existed. They evinced no sympathy whatever about the cartridges, or flour said to be made of human bones, and could not have been acted on by any cry of their religion being in danger. It is questions involving their rights and interests in the soil, and hereditary holdings invariably termed by them '*jan se azees*' (*dearer than life*), which excite them to a dangerous degree."

At six o'clock on Monday afternoon, the company of the 68th N.I., on guard at the treasury, broke into open mutiny, released 300 prisoners confined in the gaol, and seized the money entrusted to their charge, amounting to about £15,000. The smallness of the sum was a great disappointment: they had expected to find £70,000 in the treasury; and would have done so, had not Mr. Edwards, anticipating the outbreak, refused to receive the customary payments of the zemindars. Directly after the rise of the guard, a party of the Bareilly mutineers entered the station, and the Native police threw away their badges and fraternised with the rebels. The released convicts issued from the gaol, and proceeded, hooting and yelling, to the magistrate's house. The Europeans heard the ominous sounds; and mounting the horses which had been standing saddled all the day, rode for their lives. Mr. Edwards and the two Donalds succeeded in forcing their way, revolver in hand, through the crowd; but Mr. Gibson was killed. The others were subsequently protected by Mooltan Khan—a "fine powerful Patan, between forty and fifty years of age," related to, and in the service of, a petty chief, known as the nawab of Shumsabad, a place

* Edwards' *Personal Adventures*, pp. 13—17.

near the Ganges. Mooltan Khan told the fugitives that their escape was impossible, on account of the state of the country; and he seemed inclined either to leave them to their fate, or to allow the half-a-dozen troopers appointed by the nawab to escort the Europeans on their way, to dispose of them summarily. Edwards saw that a crisis had arrived; and riding up to Mooltan Khan, he laid his hand on his shoulder, saying, "Have you a family, and little children?" The Patan nodded. "Are they not dependent on you for bread?" "Yes," was the answer. "Well," rejoined Edwards, "so have I; and I am confident you are not the man to take my life and destroy their means of support." Mooltan Khan hesitated a moment, and then said, "I will save your life if I can; follow me." He set off at a gallop, the three Europeans after him; and despite the remonstrances of the troopers, who desired the death of the fugitives, Mooltan Khan conveyed them by a circuitous cross-country route, avoiding the hostile villagers, and enabled them to reach a place of temporary safety; that is to say, a station not then submerged beneath the flood of mutiny. During Mr. Edwards' wanderings, he was attended with unwavering fidelity by an Afghan servant, and by a Seik named Wuzer Sing, who had retired from the 29th regiment of N.I. in April, 1857, to join a small band of native Christians resident at Budaon, and had subsequently been employed as an orderly.

Moradabad.—News of the outbreak and massacre at Bareilly reached Moradabad on the 2nd of June, and a marked alteration took place in the demeanour of the 29th N.I., and in that of the population. The treasury, containing 75,000 rupees, was under the charge of the sepoy, who commenced plundering it on the 3rd of June. The sepoy, disappointed by the smallness of the booty, seized the treasurer, carried him up to the guns, and threatened to blow him away unless he disclosed where the supposed remainder was hidden. Mr. Saunders (the magistrate) and Mr. Wilson (the judge) succeeded in rescuing their countryman, but not without danger to themselves; for a few of the mutineers put the percussion-caps on their muskets, and took deliberate aim at the retreating Europeans. Some of the Native officers rushed forward, and reminding the men that they had taken an oath to refrain from bloodshedding, persuaded them to drop their weapons.

Mr. Wilson had great influence with the 29th N.I.; his knowledge of the language having enabled him both to harangue them publicly, and converse familiarly with them in their lines. To this cause, and the nerve and moderation evinced by both officers and civilians, may be attributed the absence of the tragic excesses committed in other stations. The regiment, and artillery detachment, proceeded quietly to appropriate the government treasure, the opium, and all the plate-chests, and other valuable property of private individuals, which had been sent for security to the government treasury. The Native police withdrew, and hid themselves; and the Europeans, with their wives and children, quitted the station; some proceeding to Meerut, others to Nynnee Tal. There were at Moradabad several Native officers on leave from their regiments, whose services had been previously placed at the disposal of the local authorities. They volunteered to escort the Europeans to Meerut; the offer was accepted, and the promise fulfilled.*

The various mutinous regiments of Rohilcund united, and marched to Delhi, where their co-operation was much desired, as we learn from the following characteristic episode, intercepted at Haupper (near Meerut):—

*"From the Officers of the Army at Delhi, to the Officers of the Bareilly and Moradabad Regiments.—*If you are coming to help us, it is incumbent on you that if you eat your food there, you wash your hands here, for here the fight is going on with the English; and by the goodness of God, even one defeat to us is ten to them, and our troops are assembled here in large numbers. It is now necessary for you to come here; for large rewards will be conferred by the king of kings, the centre of prosperity, the King of Delhi. We are looking out most anxiously for you, like fasters watching for the call of the mezzin [the signal that the fast is ended].

"Come, come for there is no rose

Without the spring of your presence.

The opening bud with drought

Is as an infant without milk."†

On the 1st of July, the longing eyes of the rebel Delhi garrison were gladdened, and those of the besiegers mortified, by the sight of the Rohilcund mutineers, who were watched by friends and foes crossing the Jumna in boats (the bridge being broken), and marching into one of the seven gates of the city in military array, with infantry, cavalry, artillery, and some hundred cart-loads of treasure.

* Further Parl. Papers, pp. 9—11.

† *Daily News*, August 17th, 1857. Bombay Special Correspondent.

CHAPTER X.

OUDE, LUCKNOW, SEETÁPOOR, MOHUMDEE, MULLAON, BAHRAETCH, GONDÁH,
MULLAPOOR, FYZABAD, SALONE, AND DURIABAD.—MAY 16TH TO JULY 4TH, 1857.

OUDE.—The efforts of Sir Henry Lawrence were successful in preserving the tranquillity of Oude up to the end of May. In the meantime, he had taken precautions in anticipation of a calamity which he considered nothing short of the speedy recapture of Delhi could avert. On the 16th of May, he requested the Supreme government, by telegraph, to entrust him with plenary military power in Oude; which was immediately granted.* He was appointed brigadier-general, and he lost not a moment in entirely changing the disposition of the troops. Arrangements for Lucknow, he considered, might be satisfactorily made; but the unprotected condition of Allahabad, Benares, and especially of Cawnpoor, filled him with alarm; and he wrote urgently to the governor-general, entreating that no expense might be spared in sending Europeans to reinforce that place. At midnight on the 20th, an application for aid was dispatched from thence to Lucknow (fifty miles distant), and was answered by the immediate dispatch of fifty men of H.M.'s 32nd, and two squadrons of Native cavalry. The cavalry were not needed at Cawnpoor; and Captain Fletcher Hayes projected, and obtained leave to attempt, the expedition against the Étah rajah, the melancholy result of which has been already related.

Lucknow itself needed every precaution which Sir Henry Lawrence had the means of taking. It extended along the right bank of the Goomtee for four miles, and its buildings covered an area of seven miles. It contained, according to Mr. Raikes, 200,000 fighting-men, and as many more armed citizens. Sleeman estimated the total population at 1,000,000 persons;† others have placed it at 1,200,000: but no census had been attempted either by the Native or European government. The rising of the Lucknow people was anticipated by the resident Europeans as a very probable event, for the plain reason that, in the words of one of the annalists of the siege, "we

had done very little to merit their love, and much to merit their detestation;" and "the people in general, and especially the poor, were dissatisfied, because they were taxed directly and indirectly in every way."‡ The mutiny of the Native troops was still more confidently expected; and Sir Henry Lawrence was urged to prevent it by disarming them: but he considered that this measure, though practicable and even desirable had the capital only required to be cared for, might precipitate an outbreak at Cawnpoor and at the out-stations of Oude, and therefore ought not to be adopted except in the last extremity. In the distribution of the forces, the chief object had been to station the Europeans where they would suffer least from exposure to the climate; and the natives had been entrusted with the sole charge of several important positions. It became necessary to make a new arrangement, and likewise to reduce the number of stations, that, in the event of an outbreak, the Europeans might not be cut off in detail. "We had eight posts," writes Sir H. Lawrence to Sir Hugh Wheeler, on the 20th of May: "as Sir C. Napier would say, we were like chips in porridge. We have given up four posts, and greatly strengthened three."§

Of these three, the *Muchee Bhawn* was the one which was at the onset most relied on. This fort, which derives its name of Muchee (fish)|| from the device over the gateway, and Bhawn (Sanskrit for house), had the appearance of a formidable and secure stronghold, and was held by the natives to be almost impregnable. It occupied a commanding position with regard to the town; and advantage was taken of this by planting cannon on its walls; or where that could not be done, supplying the deficiency with "jingals," or immense blunderbusses moving on pivots. All the magazine stores, previously under the charge of sepoy, were removed into the Muchee Bhawn, and a company of Europeans placed on guard there; supplies of wheat, and all sorts of

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 187.

† Raikes' *Revolt*, p. 104. Sleeman's *Oude*, vol. i., p. 136.

‡ Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 34.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 311.

|| The order of the Fish was the highest and most coveted distinction in the Mogul empire.

provisions, were laid in, and also very largely into the Residency, which was the post next in strength. At the treasury, within the Residency compound, were stationed 130 Europeans, 200 Natives, and six guns: the sepoys were allowed to remain on guard at the treasury tent; but the guns were so disposed as to give the Europeans complete command over the tent, in the event of an attempt upon it.

A copy of the proclamation issued at Agra, promising immunity from punishment to all sepoys not concerned in the murderous attacks upon Europeans, now reached Lucknow. Sir Henry Lawrence followed the example of Mr. Colvin, by directing the judicial commissioner to prepare, and issue throughout Oude, a notification holding out still stronger assurances of clemency. This policy was generally approved at Lucknow, as it had been at Agra, on the ground that it was just possible the dreaded combination of the Native troops might be stopped by timely conciliation.*

While a semblance of order was maintained among the troops, some hope remained of averting the danger; and even after the outbreak, the necessity of stopping the process of coalition and combination among the rebels was so manifest, that, despite the fierce cry for vengeance which speedily arose, some voices were still raised in favour of a rule of action more befitting a Christian people, than the adoption of the Draconian principle, that death was to be the indiscriminating punishment of every grade of mutiny or insurrection. For instance, a letter written from Simla on the 23rd of June, descriptive of the tone of feeling prevalent there, states that "Lord William Hay, deputy-commissioner up here, and Mr. Campbell, say if the mutineers would now lay down their arms, and promise to go to their homes, we should be most thankful to grasp at the proposal."† If this opinion could be formed by a person of such sound judgment and intimate acquaintance with native character as Lord William Hay, at the latter end of June, much more might of course be urged in favour of the view taken by Sir Henry Lawrence before the explosion which took place at Lucknow at the close of May.

The Mohammedan festival of the "Eed," or "New Moon," fell on the 24th of May;

and considerable apprehension was felt during its celebration. On the preceding evening, a telegram from General Wheeler had stated it as almost certain that the troops would rise that night at Cawnpore; and it was believed that the example would be immediately followed at Lucknow. Incendiarism had everywhere marked the first movements of the mutineers at other stations; and, from the beginning of the month, had shown itself at Lucknow. Placards, inviting all true Hindoos and Mussulmans to exterminate the Feringhees, were posted up at night in several places. Reports that the 71st regiment was in actual mutiny, had more than once got about; and, on one occasion, Sir Henry Lawrence and the military staff had been called down to the lines in the middle of the day by an alarm of the kind.

The Eed, however, passed off without any disturbance. Still it was thought advisable that the ladies and children should leave cantonments, and take shelter in the Residency and adjacent houses comprehended within the intrenchments, afterwards so gallantly defended. Mr. Gubbins, the commissioner for Oude, had used all possible precautions against the anticipated siege. His house, solidly built of masonry, comprised two stories, and was exposed on three sides to the city. Masonry parapets, pierced with loopholes, were erected all around the roof; the verandahs and doorways were similarly protected with walls of masonry; and strong doors, cased with sheet-iron on the outside, were fixed upon the entrances on the ground floor. Mr. Gubbins commenced his fortifications at a time when few other Europeans in Lucknow seriously contemplated an attack on the Residency; and his preparations were not carried on without exciting the mirth of some of his neighbours;‡ while others imitated his example.

Throughout the whole month of May, Sir Henry Lawrence is described as having been "untiring in his exertions. He generally visited the Muchee Bhawn every morning, and any other post that called for his attention. From breakfast until dark he was consulting with his military subordinates, closeted with Native officers, or at work with his pen."§ He was the mainspring of the entire community. Military men and civilians, covenanted and uncovenanted;

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 43.

† *Daily News*, August 23rd, 1857.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 27.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

merchants, tradespeople, servants, the Eurasians, and all the loyal natives, vied with each other in loving and trusting Henry Lawrence. The uncovenanted assistants, comprising clerks, copyists, &c., were embodied as special constables, and cheerfully took night duty; each man feeling that his services, if well performed, however subordinate in character, would not pass unnoticed or unrewarded. Rees says, "the uncovenanted, particularly, had a kind friend in Sir Henry; and with the common soldier he was equally, if not even more popular."* The enthusiasm displayed when he removed the head-quarters of his office from cantonments into the Residency (31st May), was very striking. The sight of his attenuated but soldier-like form—the eyes already sunken with sleeplessness, the forehead furrowed with anxious thought, the soft hair cut short on the head, the long wavy beard descending to his breast—all the well-known features of probably the most generally beloved man in India—called forth a perfect storm of acclamation. Loud "hurrahs!" and shouts of "Long life to Sir Henry!" continued until he had passed out of sight into the Residency, where he was soon to receive his death-wound.

On the afternoon of Saturday, the 30th, he wrote a private letter to Mr. Raikes at Agra, by the last regular post that left Lucknow for nearly a year; in which he observes—"If the commander-in-chief delay much longer, he may have to recover Cawnpore, Lucknow, and Allahabad; indeed, all down to Calcutta. * * * While we are intrenching two posts in the city, we are virtually besieging four regiments (in a quiet way) with 300 Europeans. Not very pleasant diversion from my civil duties. I am daily in the town, four miles off, for some hours; but reside in the cantonments, guarded by the gentlemen we are besieging. * * * What I most fear are risings in the districts, and the irregulars getting tainted."†

Both these evils were manifesting themselves at the time when the above paragraph was written. The disorganised condition of the Doab districts was reacting on the Oude border. Up to the 25th of May, no overt act of insurrection occurred; but then several of the dispossessed talookdars began to resume possession of the

villages from whence they had been ejected; and the zemindars of Mulheeabad and its neighbourhood, distant about eighteen miles from Lucknow, evinced undisguised disaffection. These people were the descendants of Afreedees, who came from the Khyber mountains, and are described as "greedy, poor, and idle." They began assembling in their villages, and threatened the local treasury at Mulheeabad. To repress them, a party of police, under Captain Weston, was detached from Lucknow, with temporary good effect.

Another interesting letter reached Mr. Raikes by the same post, from his son-in-law, Mr. Christian, an able and experienced revenue officer, who expressed a hope that the eyes of government would now be opened to the effect of the levelling policy, by the state of affairs in the disturbed provinces, where they had hardly a single man of influence to look to for help, all being equal in their poverty. He added, however, as far as Lucknow was concerned—"Sir Henry Lawrence has arranged admirably; and, come what will, we are prepared."‡

That is to say, about 930 Europeans held themselves in readiness for the very possible contingency of a hand-to-hand struggle with above 4,000 of their own trained troops.

That same evening (30th May), the nine o'clock gun gave the signal for mutiny to a portion of the Native troops. A party of the 71st N.I. had been removed from the Muchee Bhawn a few days before, on account of their suspected disaffection, and were stationed in the city. It was not, however, these men, but those of another company of the same regiment in cantonments, who turned out and commenced firing, while a body of about forty made straight for the mess-house, ransacked, and set it on fire. The officers everywhere were on the alert, and left their messes upon the first shot being fired. Sir Henry rode at once to the European camp. Brigadier Handscomb, a fine old soldier, advanced on the lines of the 71st with a company of H.M.'s 32nd. The word to "fix bayonets" was given, and the Europeans could scarcely be restrained from charging without orders. The brigadier withheld them, saying, "You might kill friends." Then bidding them halt, he advanced alone, intending, despite the darkness and confusion, to address the mutineers; but was fired on, and fell from his horse dead. The sepoy of the 71st,

* Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 39.

† Raikes' *Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*, p. 22.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

becoming more bold, marched upon a body of H.M.'s 32nd foot and four guns, posted to the right of them in the European camp; but a volley of grape soon drove them back into their lines. Lieutenant Grant, of the 71st N.I., was killed while on picket duty at another part of the cantonments. The subahdar on guard had concealed him under a charpoy, or four-legged native bed, when some of the mutineers rushed in. The subahdar told them that the lieutenant had escaped; but a havildar of the same guard, merciless in his intense bigotry, pointed to the place of concealment,* and the unfortunate officer was immediately dragged forth, and pierced through by bayonets and musket-balls.

The 71st mutineers possessed themselves both of the colours and treasure of their regiment. The 13th N.I. were assembled on their own parade, and detained there for a considerable time by the exertions of Major Bruère. Many of the men, however, broke away and forced open the magazine. The adjutant, Lieutenant Chambers, tried to prevent the plunder of the ammunition, but was fired upon, and severely wounded in the leg. Finding his men deserting him, Major Bruère at length marched off a remnant of the 13th with the colours, and took post with about 200 men by the side of H.M.'s 32nd. The treasure was very gallantly saved by Lieutenant Loughnan, assisted by the Seiks of the regiment.

While Major Bruère was thus performing his public duty, his wife and children were exposed to extreme danger. Mrs. Bruère had returned to cantonments against orders, and was in her bungalow when the mutiny took place. Some faithful sepoys of her husband's regiment, saved her by putting her through a hole in the wall, which they made while the mutineers were calling for her. She and her little ones fled into the open country, and after passing the night in an open ditch, succeeded next morning in safely reaching the Residency.

The 48th N.I. likewise assembled on their parade, under Colonel Palmer, who proposed to march to the European camp; but this the men would not do; and when several of the officers proposed going thither themselves to ascertain the state of affairs,

the sepoys withheld them, saying that they were sure to be killed. It is stated by Mr. Gubbins, but without any explanation of so strange a fact, that after it had become evident that the 48th would not act against the mutineers, the magazine was opened, and ammunition served out to them. He adds, that while engaged in this duty, Lieutenant Ousely was struck down by one of his men with a bludgeon, and they then helped themselves. Finding that numbers were deserting, and that the corps would not face the mutineers, Colonel Palmer proposed to march to the Residency in the city; but by the time he reached the iron bridge, only fifty-seven men remained around the colours.

The lines of the 7th light cavalry were at Moodkeepoor, about three miles from the cantonments. Not above 150 troopers were there when the mutiny broke out. These were immediately called out by their officers; when some twenty-five† of them, before line could be formed, dashed off at full speed towards the cantonments; the rest patrolled during the night, and drew up, after daybreak, on the right of the 32nd regiment.

While these movements were going on, the bungalows in cantonments presented a scene of general uproar and devastation. Lieutenant Hardinge, with his irregular cavalry, patrolled along the main street of the cantonments, and was wounded in his unavailing efforts to stop the general plunder, which extended to the native bazaars. The Residency bungalow, and a few others, were the only ones in cantonments not fired.

After daybreak, the 7th cavalry were directed to move towards Moodkeepoor, where the officers' houses and the troopers' lines had been seized and fired by the mutineers. They found the post occupied by the enemy in force. A horseman rode from the rebel ranks and waved his sword before the yet loyal cavalry, on which forty of them, as if moved by an irresistible impulse, spurring their horses, galloped across, and ranged themselves on the side of the enemy. The rest appear to have remained firm until Sir Henry Lawrence arrived at Moodkeepoor, about 4 A.M., with four guns and two companies of H.M.'s 32nd. The mutineers amounted to about 1,000 men, chiefly infantry, assembled in disorderly masses. The guns opened upon them at the distance of a mile with round shot, and, after a few

* *Mutiny of Bengal Army*; by one who served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 77.

† Gubbins says forty (p. 105); Sir Henry Lawrence twenty-five, in his first telegraphic despatch of May 30th, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 348.

discharges, they broke up and fled precipitately. The guns followed slowly with the infantry: the troopers might have overtaken the fugitive crowds; but they had evidently no desire to do so, notwithstanding the promise of 100 rupees for every mutineer captured or slain; and, after proceeding a few miles further, the pursuit was abandoned. Thirty prisoners were taken. The Europeans were at first surprised by seeing numbers of men and women running in all directions, with bundles on their heads; but they soon discovered that these were villagers and camp-followers making off with booty obtained in the cantonments during the preceding night. Some of the plunderers were seized by Commissioner Gubbins, who, with his own orderly and three of Fisher's horse, got detached from the rest of the cavalry; but what to do with his prisoners the commissioner knew not; for, he adds, "we had not yet learnt to kill in cold blood." Neither had the sepoy learned to expect it: they would have been more daring had they been more desperate. Gubbins and his four native followers came suddenly on six of the fugitives, and captured them in the following singular manner. "Coming up with them, they threw down their loaded muskets and drew their swords, of which several had two. Threatening them with our fire-arms, we called upon them to throw down their arms, which presently they did. One of them declared himself to be a havildar; and I made him pinion tightly his five comrades, using their turbans and waistbands for the purpose. One of the troopers then dismounted and tied the havildar's arms. Three of the men belonged to the 48th N.I., three to the 13th N.I., and one man was a Seik. One of the prisoners wore three English shirts over his native dress. The arms were collected and laden on a couple of peasants summoned from the village, and the six prisoners were sent back in charge of a single horseman." Mr. Gubbins rode on, and, in his own words, "gave chase" to two or three more fugitives, and had nearly overtaken them, when his orderly perceived a number of sepoy heads behind a low wall, at the entrance of a village they were about to enter. This changed the aspect of affairs; and, amid a shower of bullets, the commissioner turned his horse's head, and, with his three followers, rode back with all speed to the Residency bungalow in cantonments, where he arrived about eleven

o'clock, Sir Henry Lawrence and the artillery having returned an hour before.

The trooper entrusted with the prisoners brought them duly in, and he and his three companions received the promised reward of 600 rupees. While waiting for their money in the house of Mr. Gubbins, they talked with the servants on the state of affairs. The three who belonged to Fisher's horse, said, "We like our colonel [Fisher], and will not allow him to be harmed; but if the whole army turns, we must turn too!" The events of a few days showed the significance of these words: the authority of the "Fauj ki Bheera," or general will of the army, was to individuals, and even to regiments, almost irresistible.*

In the afternoon of the 31st, an insurrection took place in a quarter of the city called Hoseynabad, near the Dowlutkhana. An Indian "budmash" is little less turbulent than an Italian "bravo;" and the class may well be supposed to have abounded in a city where every man engaged in the ordinary business of life, wore his tulwar, or short bent sword, and the poorest idler in the streets swaggered along with his shield of buffalo-hide and his matchlock or pistols. It appeared that the city budmashes, to the number of 6,000 men, had crossed the river in the morning with the intention of joining the mutineers in the cantonments; but their plans had been disconcerted by the promptitude with which Sir Henry Lawrence had pursued and dispersed their intended allies. Finding the mutineers gone, the budmashes returned to the city, and commenced a disturbance, but were put down by the efforts of the police, assisted by a few faithful companies of irregular infantry. Many of the insurgents were killed, and several prisoners taken, and, together with those previously captured, were lodged in the Muchee Bhawn, to the number of forty. A court-martial was assembled for their trial, and the majority were executed by hanging, including the six sepoy seized by Commissioner Gubbins, the traitor who betrayed Lieutenant Grant's hiding-place, and the subahdar, who had a month before been raised to that rank, and presented with a dress of honour and a thousand rupees, as a reward for his fidelity. The sentences passed by the court were not, however, all confirmed by Sir Henry Lawrence, for "he inclined much to clemency."† The

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 111. † *Ibid.*, p. 115.

executions took place near the upper gate of the Muchee Bhawn, at the crossing of the four roads, one of which led directly to the stone bridge. The gallows once erected, became in Lucknow, as in so many other British stations, a standing institution: the surrounding space was commanded by the guns of the fort; and more effectually to awe the people, an 18-pounder gun was removed to the road outside, kept constantly loaded with grape, and pointed down the principal thoroughfare.

The advisability of disarming the remainder of the Native troops, was warmly discussed at Lucknow. On the night of the 30th of May, less than 500 men had proved actively faithful; but in the course of a short time, about 1,200 had gathered round their colours, some of whom had crept quietly back to their lines; but the greater number consisted of the detached guards stationed at the Residency, and at different parts of the city: and these, although they had not taken part with the mutineers, were believed to have been withheld from doing so, rather by the fear of the European infantry and guns, than by any feeling of duty or attachment. But Sir Henry Lawrence persisted in considering the question as he had already done that of the holding of Lucknow itself, primarily as regarded the maintenance of British supremacy in Northern India. Every disbanded regiment helped to swell the tide of mutiny, to fill the ranks of the Delhi garrison, or, as might reasonably have been expected, to form an army, such as that which Sevajee and his successors had formed, and led against the Mogul emperors. The want of leaders—a deficiency which might at any moment have been supplied—saved us from this imminent danger until we had become strong enough to grapple with it. There was another reason against disarmament. It was a measure which could be taken only in stations which possessed a certain proportion of British troops and artillery. No such resource was available at the numerous outposts, where a few British officers were at the mercy of exclusively Native corps: and such a manifestation of distrust could scarcely fail to aggravate their disaffection, and tempt them to commit the very crime to which they were believed to be inclined. The position of the officers was everywhere exceedingly trying; for, according to a regulation which appears to have been gen-

eral, they were directed to sleep in the Native lines. The object was, of course, to prevent or check conspiracy, and show confidence in the sepoys; but it may be doubted whether this end was answered in a degree at all commensurate with the anxiety occasioned, and actual hazard incurred by the measure. An officer (Lieutenant Farquhar) of the 7th light cavalry, writing to his mother, gives a description of the state of feeling at the Lucknow camp, which is probably applicable to the majority of European officers under similar circumstances. "The officers of each regiment had to sleep together, armed to the teeth; and two of each regiment had to remain awake, taking two hours at a time to watch their own men. We kept these watches strictly; and, I believe, by these means saved our throats. Every officer here has slept in his clothes since the mutiny began."* At the gaol, also, Captain Adolphe Orr, and three other Europeans, slept nightly among the Native police.†

On the 9th of June, Sir Henry Lawrence became alarmingly ill, from sheer exhaustion, aggravated by the depressing effect of the rapid progress of mutiny throughout the province. Dr. Fayrer, the Residency surgeon, declared that at least forty-eight hours of complete rest were required to preserve his life; and a provisional council was formed, composed of Messrs. Gubbins and Ommaney, Major Banks, Colonel Inglis, and Major Anderson, the chief engineer. By their decree the Native troops were paraded, disarmed, and dispatched to their homes, on leave of absence, until November. The men demurred, and their commanders likewise opposed the measure; but the council persevered, and all the sepoys were sent away except 350, who had given recent evidence of fidelity, and many of whom were Sikhs. All the 7th light cavalry were sent away, except the Native officers. The horses were brought up, and picketed near the Residency; and the arms were brought in by hundreds, and stored in some of the Residency buildings.

The first ten days of June had sufficed to disorganise the whole of Oude. After that time, the British authority was confined to Lucknow and its immediate neighbourhood. The people had everywhere continued orderly until the troops rose; and when the successive mutinies had occurred, the

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 442.

† Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 54.

"refugees had, with few exceptions, experienced at their hands kindness and good treatment."^{*}

At Seetapoor, the head-quarters of the Khyrabad division, of which Mr. G. J. Christian was commissioner, the troops rose on the 3rd of June. They consisted of the 41st N.I. (1,067 men, with sixteen European officers), and a wing of irregular cavalry (250 Natives, with a single European officer). There were also the 9th and 10th regiments of Oude irregular infantry, and the 2nd regiment of military police. The commissioner distrusted the troops; and, anticipating an outbreak, collected the civilians and their families at his house, which he proposed to defend by the aid of a strong guard of the regiment of military police, then believed to be staunch. He advised his military friends to send their wives to him for safety. Only one of these came. This lady, Mrs. Stewart, with rare prudence, looked around her, and perceived that the small river Sureyan flowed on two sides of Mr. Christian's compound, and that there was no means of reaching the high road but through the military cantonment; whereupon she pronounced the position unsafe, returned to her home, and was one of the first party of refugees.

The officers generally did not distrust their men. Colonel Birch had such entire confidence in the 41st N.I., that when a cry arose in their lines that the 10th irregulars were plundering the treasury, he called out the two most suspected companies, and led them to the scene of the alleged disturbance. All there was found to be quiet, and the order was given to return, when a sepoy of the guard stepped out of the ranks, and took deliberate aim at the colonel, who fell from his horse dead. Lieutenant Smalley and the sergeant-major were then killed. The adjutant, Lieutenant Graves, escaped wounded. The irregulars were not long in following the example of mutiny; and in the massacre which ensued, Captain Gowan and his wife, Captain Dorin, Lieutenants Greene and Bax,† Surgeon Hill, and Lieutenant Snell, with his wife and child, perished. Mrs. Greene escaped, as did also Mrs. Dorin. The latter, after witnessing the murder

of her husband, fled in the dress of a native, in the company of Mr. Dudman (a clerk) and his family, with several other East Indians. The party were protected by a neighbouring zemindar for more than a fortnight, and then sent on in a native cart to Lucknow, escorted by a few villagers. Mrs. Dorin was received into the house of Commissioner Gubbins; where, on the 20th of July, she was shot through the head by a matchlock ball, which, entering by a window, traversed two sets of apartments before it reached that in which she was standing. The fate of the Seetapoor civilians is, thus described by Mr. Gubbins, whose information was derived from the lips of the survivors.

"At the commencement of the outbreak, Mr. Christian proceeded outside his bungalow, to put in readiness the guard of military police, in whom he confided. The wretches immediately turned and fired upon him. Flying back into the house, he alarmed the assembled inmates, and the men, ladies, and children, fled out of the bungalow on the side which faced the river, pursued and fired upon by the miscreants of the military police, and of other regiments which now joined them. Some were shot down before they reached the stream: others were killed in it. A few perished on the opposite bank. Two or three only escaped—viz., Sir Mountstuart Jackson and his two sisters, and little Sophy Christian [a child three years of age], who was saved by Sergeant-major Morton. There fell Mr. and Mrs. Christian and child, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Thornhill and their children, and several others. Those who escaped broke into two parties. Lieutenant Burns, Sir Mountstuart and Miss Madeline Jackson, Sergeant-major Morton, and little Sophy Christian, found refuge, though an unwilling one, with Rajah Lonee Sing, at his fort of Mithowlee. Mrs. Greene, Miss Jackson, and Captain John Hearsey [of the military police, who had been saved by them], fled northward, and, after being joined by other refugees, found shelter at Mutheearree, with the rajah of Dhoreyrah."[‡]

Mr. Gubbins gives no enumeration of those who perished, nor of those (happily far more numerous) who escaped;§ neither is any such list included in the returns published in the *Gazette*.

The main body of the Seetapoor fugitives, consisting of twelve officers, six ladies, and as many children, with a number of the families of civilians (about fifty in all),|| escorted by thirty faithful sepoys of the 41st, managed to send news of their position to Lucknow on the morning of the 4th; and a party of volunteer and Seik cavalry, with every carriage,

his house, where they remained throughout the siege—(p. 119).

|| See account given in the *Times*, August 29th, 1857, on the authority of one of the party, an officer of the 41st N.I.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 143.

† Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 46.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 122.

§ Mr. Gubbins mentions receiving Mrs. Abthorp and three children, and Mrs. and Miss Birch, into

buggy, and available conveyance, was immediately sent out to bring them in. The sepoy were cordially received; yet within one fortnight, even these men could no longer be trusted. A Christian drummer overheard some mutinous discourse, and it was thought best to tender them the option of retiring to their homes. When this offer was made, it was accepted by all without exception; and not a man remained with Major Abthorp and the officers whose lives they had before saved.

Mohumdee, the second station in the Khyrabad division, was guarded by a company of the 9th Oude infantry. The arrival of the Shahjehanpoor refugees, on Monday, June 1st, caused great excitement among the sepoy; and when Captain Patrick Orr questioned them separately regarding their intentions, "each one said he could not answer for what some of the bad characters might do." The reply appeared so unsatisfactory, that the officer immediately sent off his wife to Rajah Lonee Sing, at Mithowlee. Still no outbreak took place until the Thursday morning, when a detachment of fifty men came in from Seetapoor, sent by Mr. Christian, as an escort for the Shahjehanpoor refugees. These men declared that a company of their regiment had been destroyed by the Europeans at Lucknow, and that they were resolved on taking vengeance. Captain Orr, seeing the state of things, assembled the Native officers, and desired to know what they intended doing. After some discussion, they decided on marching to Seetapoor, and proceeded to release the prisoners from the gaol and to plunder the treasury, in which they found about 110,000 rupees; but they took a solemn oath to spare the lives of the Europeans. In the course of the afternoon, Mr. Thomason and Captain Orr, with the Shahjehanpoor party, quitted Mohumdee in company with the mutineers. The names of the unfortunate Europeans were—

Captains Sneyd, Lysaght, and Salmon; Lieutenants Key, Robertson, Scott, Pitt, and Rutherford; Ensigns Spens, Johnston, and Scott; Quartermaster-sergeant Grant; band-master and one drummer; Lieutenant Sheils, veteran establishment; and Mr. Jenkins, of the civil service. *Ladies*—Mrs. Scott, Miss Scott, Mrs. Lysaght, Mrs. Key, Mrs. Bowling, Mrs. Sheils, Mrs. Grant, Mrs. Pereira, and her four children.

A buggy and some baggage carts were procured: the ladies were placed thereon;

and, after five hours' travelling, they reached Burwar, and there spent the night. Next morning they marched towards Aurungabad; but after proceeding in that direction for about four miles, a halt was sounded, and a trooper told the Europeans to go ahead wherever they pleased. They went on for some distance with all possible expedition, but were at length overtaken by a most bloodthirsty party of mutineers. Captain Orr writes—"When within a mile of Aurungabad, a sepoy rushed forward and snatched Key's gun from him, and shot down poor old Sheils, who was riding my horse. Then the most infernal carnage ever witnessed by man began. We all collected under a tree close by, and took the ladies down from the buggy. Shots were fired from various directions, amid the most hideous yells. The poor ladies all joined in prayer, coolly and undauntedly awaiting their fate. [The fourteen gentlemen were murdered one by one; the gentlewomen—they were truly such—assembled together in one body, and were shot down while kneeling and singing a hymn].* I stopped for about three minutes among them; but, thinking of my wife and child here, I endeavoured to save my life for their sakes. I rushed out towards the insurgents; and one of my men, Goordhun, of the 6th company, called out to me to throw down my pistol, and he would save me. I did so; when he put himself between me and the men, and several others followed his example. In about ten minutes more they completed their hellish work. I was 300 yards off at the utmost. Poor Lysaght was kneeling out in the open ground, with his arms folded across his chest; and though not using his fire-arms, the cowardly wretches would not go to the spot until they shot him; and then rushing up, they killed the wounded and children, butchering them in a most cruel way. With the exception of the drummer-boy, every one was killed of the above list; and, besides, poor good Thomason and one or two clerks."

Captain Orr was sent, under a guard, to Mithowlee, from whence he dispatched to Lucknow the letter from which the above particulars are extracted.† In a postscript dated the 9th of June, he mentions having

* Mr. Rees quotes this touching particular from the letter of Capt. Patrick to his brother Capt. Adolphe Orr, which was shown him by the latter officer.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 123.

heard of the vicinity of Sir M. Jackson and his companions; and Captain Orr and his wife appear to have joined them, and, with them, to have fallen into the hands of the mutineers, who detained them in protracted captivity, the issue of which belongs to a later period of the narrative.

At *Mullaon*, a party of the 41st N.I., and the 4th Oude irregular infantry, became so turbulent, that the deputy-commissioner (Mr. Capper), perceiving mutiny impending, rode away, and reached Lucknow in safety.

At *Secroa*—a military station in the Bahraetch division of Oude, of which Mr. Wingfield was commissioner—a mutiny broke out, and the treasury was rifled; but all the Europeans escaped safely to Lucknow, from whence a strong party of volunteer and Seik cavalry, with elephants and dhoolies, were sent to bring in the ladies and children, which was safely accomplished on the 9th of June.

At *Gondah*, where the milder course of mutiny and plunder without massacre was adopted, the commandant (Captain Miles), and other officers of the 3rd Oude irregulars stationed there, were obliged to fly, and were, with Mr. Wingfield, protected for several days by the rajah of Bulrampoor, and then escorted by his troops across the Oude frontier into the Goruckpoor district, where they were kindly received by the rajah of Bansie, and enabled to reach Goruckpoor.

At *Bahraetch* itself, two civil servants were stationed—Mr. Cunliffe, deputy-commissioner, and his assistant, Mr. Jordan, with two companies of the 3rd irregular infantry, under Lieutenant Longueville Clarke. When mutiny appeared, the three Europeans rode off to Nanpara, intending to rest there, and proceed thence to the hills; but, on reaching that place, they were refused admittance. The reason given was connected with the *be-duk-ilee*, or dispossession grievance, which had produced so much disaffection throughout Oude. According to the British view of the question as stated by Mr. Gubbins, the rajah of Nanpara, being a minor, had fallen under the tutelage of a kinsman who had mismanaged the estate and dissipated the property. He had accordingly been removed by the authorities, and a new agent appointed; but when the insurrection commenced, the old administrator killed the government nominee, and resumed his former position. No injury was done to the fugitives at Nanpara. They retraced their steps to Bahraetch,

and disguising themselves as natives, strove to reach Lucknow, where Mr. Cunliffe expected to meet his affianced bride. Unfortunately they rode to the chief ferry, that of Byram Ghaut, which was guarded by the Secroa mutineers, by whom the disguised Europeans were discovered and put to death. Such, at least, was the statement made by several native witnesses, and which, Mr. Gubbins affirms, was believed at Lucknow by all except the betrothed girl, who hoped against hope, throughout the weary siege, that her lover yet survived. She might well do so; for during that terrible time, many persons were asserted to be dead, and details of the most revolting description related regarding their sufferings, who afterwards were discovered to be alive and wholly uninjured, save by fear, fatigue, and exposure to the weather.

Mr. Rees, who was connected by marriage with poor Clarke, mentions three different statements of the fate of the Bahraetch fugitives. One was, that they were "tried by the rebels for the murder of Fuzil Ali, and shot." A military author, who is a very graphic describer, but who gives few and scanty references to his sources of information, narrates the catastrophe with much precision. Lieutenant Clarke had been especially active in the apprehension of Fuzil Ali, a rebel chief and notorious outlaw, well-known in the annals of Oude. The irregular infantry had assisted in the capture of the bandit, who was tried and executed for the murder of a Bengal civilian: but when they mutinied, they sent word to the 17th N.I. (which regiment was in their immediate vicinity), to know what should be done with the murderer of the chieftain? "Behead him," was the reply; and the unfortunate officer, and another European with him, were immediately executed.*

Mr. Rees states, that the sword and pistols of Lieutenant Clarke were taken to his father, a well-known barrister of the same name, at Calcutta, by an old native dependent, who transmitted them in obedience to the order of his late master.

At *Mullapoor*, the last station of the Bahraetch division, there were no troops to mutiny; but the complete disorganisation of the district, compelled the officers there, Mr. Gonne, of the civil service, and Captain Hastings, to leave the place, and take

* *Mutiny of Bengal Army*; by one who served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 82.

refuge in a fort called Mutheearce, belonging to the rajah of Dhoreyrah, a minor. Three fugitives from Seetapoor (Captain John Hearsey, Mrs. Greene, and Miss Jackson), with two gentlemen (Messrs. Brand and Carew), who had escaped at the time of the destruction of the large sugar factory at Rosa, near Shahjehanpoor, accompanied the Mullapoor officers; but the disaffection of the rajah's people, soon compelled the Europeans to quit Mutheearce. Mrs. Greene, Miss Jackson, and Mr. Carew, fell into the hands of the enemy, and no certain information was obtained of their fate;* the others escaped to Puddaha, in the Nepaul hills, where Koolraj Sing received them kindly, but could not shield them from the deadly climate of the Terai, under which all but Captain Hearsey sank; and he eventually joined Jung Bahadur's camp at Goruckpoor.

The Fyzabad division comprised the station of that name, and two others—Sultanpoor and Salone.

At *Fyzabad*, so much anxiety had been felt, that the commissioner, Colonel Goldney, whose head-quarters and family were at Sultanpoor, removed thence to the former place on account of the importance of that position, and the danger by which it was menaced. The troops consisted of the 22nd N.I., under Colonel Lennox; the 6th Oude irregular infantry, under Colonel O'Brien; and a Native light field battery, under Major Mill.

The cantonments were, as usual, at some distance from the town, which had been the seat of government for the nawabs of Oude previous to the accession of Asuf ad Dowlah, in 1775; who removed to Lucknow, then but a small village—the reason assigned by Sleeman being, that the new sovereign “disliked living near his mother.”† About three miles distant are the ruins of Ayodha, or Oude, the capital of the ancient Hindoo kingdom—a spot still resorted to as a place of pilgrimage from all parts of India.

Shahgunje, a town twelve miles from Fyzabad, with no fallen majesty or legendary fame to boast of, is, however, a name far more familiar to English ears. It is the chief place in the territories of Rajah Maun Sing, and is surrounded by a mud wall thirty feet high and forty feet thick, and a

ditch three miles round, containing some six or seven feet of water. The wall, built of the mud taken from the ditch, had twenty-four bastions for guns. Horrible tales were told of atrocities committed within the fortress. Sleeman records the current rumour regarding a disgraced court favourite, named Gholab Sing, in the time of Nuseer-oo-Deen; who, having displeased the wayward drunken monarch, was flogged, and made to suffer severe torments by hunger and thirst. The females of his family were likewise cruelly ill-treated; and the British resident was compelled, in common humanity, to interfere; whereupon the king, to rid himself of unwelcome importunities, and yet wreak his malice on his victim, gave the latter into the custody of his foe and rival, Rajah Dursun Sing, the father of Maun Sing, who took him in an iron cage to Shahgunje, and kept him there, with snakes and scorpions for his companions.

For the relief of the reader, it may be well to add, that the wretched captive survived his confinement despite all its aggravations, and, at the death of Nuseer-oo-Deen, was released on the payment of four lacs of rupees, and a promise of three lacs more if restored to office; which actually occurred. Gholab Sing was, in 1831, again appointed to a place of trust at court, and died peaceably at Lucknow in 1851, at eighty years of age.‡

This episode may be excused as an illustration of life in Oude, shortly before the British government took upon itself the task of total reformation. The parentage and personal antecedents of Maun Sing, have a direct bearing on the present state of Oude. In the introductory chapter, a description has been given of the two opposite classes included under the general name of talookdars: first, the ancient Rajpoot chiefs, the representatives of clans which had existed before Mohammed was born; and who had been forced, or intrigued, or persuaded into an acknowledgment of the Oude nawabs as their suzerains: secondly, the new men, who, as government officials, had contrived, generally by fraud and oppression, to become farmers of the revenue, and large landed proprietors.

The family of Maun Sing had risen to consequence by the latter process. Bukhtawar Sing, the founder of his family, was a trooper in the service of the East India Company in the beginning of the present

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 132.

† Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, p. 137.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 155 to 162.

century. While still a very young man, remarkably tall and handsome, he came home on furlough, and attracted the attention of the nawab of Oude, Sadut Ali, whom he attended on a sporting excursion. He became one of the nawab's favourite orderlies; and having saved his sovereign's life from the sword of an assassin, was promoted to the command of a squadron. He sent for his three brothers to court, and they became orderlies one after the other, and rose to high civil and military rank. Being childless, he adopted Maun Sing, the son of his brother Dursun Sing, who, next to himself, was the most powerful subject in Oude, and by far the wealthier, having steadily followed the opportunities of adding field to field and lac to lac, at the command of a very clever revenue contractor; with powerful friends at court, and quite unfettered by any notions of honour or humanity. Sleeman, in his diary (December, 1849), describes Maun Sing as a small, slight man; but shrewd, active, energetic, and as unscrupulous as a man could be. "Indeed," he adds, "old Bukhtawar Sing himself is the only member of the family that was ever troubled with scruples of any kind whatever. All his brothers and nephews were bred up in the camp of an Oude revenue collector—a school specially adapted for training thoroughbred ruffians." He proceeds to adduce the most startling instances of treacherous rapacity, of murder committed, and torture applied, to wrest money or estates from the rightful proprietors. The worst of these outrages were committed in the name of the Oude government; for whenever the court found the barons in any district grow refractory under weak governors, they gave the contract of it to Dursun Sing, as the only officer who could reduce them to order; and thus he was enabled to carry out his private ends in the king's name. In 1842, under pretence of compelling the payment of arrears of revenue in the districts of Gondah and Bahraetch, he proceeded to seize and plunder the lands of the great proprietors one after the other, and put their estates under the management of his own officers.

The territory of the young rajah of Bulrampoor was seized in this manner during his absence, the garrison of his little stronghold being taken by surprise. The rajah fled to Nepaul, where the minister, his personal friend, gave him a small garden for an

asylum, near the village of Maharaj Gunje, in the Nepaulese dominions. Knowing the unscrupulous and enterprising character of his foe, the rajah took advantage of the rainy season to surround his abode with a deep ditch; and thus, when Dursun Sing marched against it, the rajah was enabled to make his escape; whereupon Dursun Sing's party took all the property they could find, and plundered Maharaj Gunje. The rajah (one of our few staunch friends in Oude in the late disasters) was a dashing sportsman, and in this capacity had won the liking of one of his new neighbours, a sturdy landholder, who, rallying his armed followers, sorely harassed the retreat of the invaders. The court of Nepaul took up the matter, and demanded the dismissal of Dursun Sing from office, and the payment of compensation in money. The governor-general (Lord Ellenborough) seconded the latter requisition, which was fulfilled; and the numerous enemies of the powerful chief had nearly succeeded in inducing the king to comply with the former also, the three queens especially advocating a measure which would involve the confiscation of the estates of the offender, and, consequently, much profit and patronage to themselves. Bukhtawar Sing pleaded for his brother; and the minister, Monowur ood Dowlah,* advised levying a heavy fine on Dursun Sing, and reinstating him in his former position; as, if he were crushed altogether, no means would remain for controlling the refractory and turbulent barons; the rest would all become unmanageable, and pay no revenue whatever to the exchequer. The British resident admitted the truth of the king's assertion, that Dursun Sing "was a notorious and terrible tyrant;" but supported the counsel of the minister. Dursun Sing was banished, and took refuge in the British district of Goruckpoor; but, before two months had expired, his recall was rendered necessary, by the refusal of the tenants and cultivators of his confiscated estates, to pay any other person but him; and the Oude government were too weak to coerce them.

Dursun Sing was recalled, presented to the king (May 30th, 1844), and made inspector-general of all Oude, with most comprehensive orders "to make a settlement of the land revenue at an increased rate; to

* The nobleman of whose loyalty and bravery Mr. Gubbins speaks so highly at the time of the investment of Lucknow.—*Oudh*, pp. vi., and 40.

cut down all the jungles, and bring all the waste lands into tillage; to seize all refractory barons, destroy all their forts, and seize and send into store all the cannon mounted upon them." Such duties, and others scarcely less onerous, could of course only be performed by a person entrusted with unlimited powers. Armed with these, Dursun Sing went heartily to work; but he soon fell ill, and retired to Fyzabad, where he died, August 20th, leaving the barons of Oude in possession of their forts, their cannon, and their jungles, and bequeathing to his three sons—Rama Deen, Rugbur Sing, and Maun Sing—an immense accumulation of lands and money to fight for. The determination which his dependents exhibited of standing by him during his exile, cannot be exclusively attributed to the fear he inspired. Sleeman states, that "Dursun Sing systematically plundered and kept down the great landholders throughout the districts under his charge, but protected the cultivators, and even the smaller landed proprietors, whose estates could not be conveniently added to his own."* In traversing the lands in the vicinity of Shahgunje, in 1850, the resident was particularly struck by the "richness of the cultivation, and the contented and prosperous appearance of the peasantry, who came out to him from numerous villages, in crowds, and expressed their satisfaction at the security and comfort they enjoyed under their present rulers." "Of the fraud and violence, abuse of power, and collusion with local authorities, by which Maun Sing and his father seized upon the lands of so many hundreds of old proprietors, there can be no doubt; but to attempt to make the family restore them now, under such a government [Wajid Ali was then king], would create great disorder, drive off all the better classes of cultivators, and desolate the face of the country which they have rendered so beautiful by an efficient system of administration."†

Such testimony as this ought to have had great weight with the gentlemen entrusted with the settlement of Oude after its forcible occupation by the British government. It appears, on the contrary, that the notoriously unfit and inexperienced revenue officers, nominated hap-hazard in the multiplication of civil appointments consequent on Lord Dalhousie's series of annexations, treated Maun Sing and his relatives

simply as usurping adventurers, without any regard to their position under the late dynasty, to the acknowledgment of that position by the British authorities, or to their characters as efficient administrators of territories; in the possession of which they had been legally, though not righteously confirmed. It was, indeed, easy to denounce Maun Sing as the oppressor of the Lady Sogura, the impoverished and imprisoned heiress of Munneapoor; and as the murderer of his fellow-usurper, Hurpaul Sing, whom he caused to be dispatched at an interview to which he had enticed him, by swearing by the holy Ganges, and the head of Mahadeo, that he should suffer no harm.‡ These and other such histories (more or less exaggerated, but, unfortunately, all possible and probable) might have been taken in proof of Maun Sing's unworthiness to retain the possessions he and his father had seized. Still, had these allegations been susceptible of proof, even-handed justice required that considerable allowance should be made by the new rulers for deeds of oppression and extortion which had been condoned, if not sanctioned, by the government under which they were committed. In the disorganised state of Oude, where strife and bloodshed seemed essential conditions of the life of the chieftains, there were few whose tenure of property was not complicated by the incidents and consequences of internecine hostility. There is no evidence to show that the newly-appointed revenue officials attempted to lay down any satisfactory principle on which to ground their decisions; on the contrary, they appear to have set about their work piece-meal, discussing such small points of detail as the native "omlah" chose to bewilder them with, and being far too ignorant of the history and customs of the new province, or of its actual condition, to be able to form a clear opinion on the cases before them. The "utter inversion of the rights of property," which is alleged to have been involved in the settlement of the North-West Provinces, in 1844,§ could scarcely fail to recur in Oude, where the settlement was made under the most unpropitious circumstances. The cry for revision and reconsideration became so urgent, and the injustice of the proceedings so flagrant, that, as we have seen, Sir Henry Lawrence was stopped on his way to England on sick leave, when

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. I., p. 58.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 150 and 186.

‡ Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 145.

§ See p. 84, ante.

suffering under "a dozen different complaints," and sent to Oude. Unhappily, the opportunity for pacification there, had been worse than lost. The landed proprietary had been driven, by our revenue and judicial system, into union on the single point of hostility towards the British. Among the talookdars, there were many chiefs entirely opposed in character to Maun Sing; but few had suffered such spoliation as he had, inasmuch as few had so much to lose. The dealings of government with him have never been succinctly stated. Mr. Russell (whose authorities in India are, from the quite peculiar position in which his talents and honesty have placed him, of the very highest class) asserts that, in 1856, Maun Sing was chased out of his estates by a regiment of cavalry, for non-payment of head-rent, or assessment to government. When he fled, many original proprietors came forward to claim portions of his estates (comprising, in all, 761 villages), and received them from the British administrators.* From a passage in a despatch written by Commissioner Wingfield, it appears that Maun Sing was absolutely in distress for money, and unable to borrow any, having "lost every village at the summary settlement."†

A man so situated was not unlikely to turn rebel. The Supreme government and the Lucknow authorities received intelligence which they deemed conclusive; and in accordance with a telegram from Calcutta, Maun Sing was arrested at Fyzabad in May, and remained in confinement till the beginning of June, when he sent for Colonel Goldney, warned him that the troops would rise, and offered, if released, to give the Europeans shelter at Shahgunje. Colonel Goldney appears to have rightly appreciated the motives of his interlocutor, which were simply a desire to be on the stronger side—that of the British; to obtain from them the best possible terms; and, at the same time, not to render himself unnecessarily obnoxious to his countrymen. Maun Sing was neither the fiery Rajpoot of Rajasthan (so well and so truly portrayed by Todd), nor the mild Hindoo of Bengal; nor, happily for us, was he a vengeful Mahratta like Nana Sahib: he was a shrewd, wary man, "wise in his generation," and made

himself "master of the situation," in a very wriggling, serpent-like fashion. He had no particular temptation to join either party. The ancient barons of Oude detested him and his family, as adventurers and *parvenus* of the most unprincipled description, who had grown wealthy on their spoils; and Maun Sing, in accordance with the proverb, that "the injurer never forgives," probably entertained a deeper aversion and distrust towards them than towards the English, by whom he had himself been despoiled. The event justified the policy adopted by Colonel Goldney in releasing the chief, with permission to strengthen his fort (which was greatly out of repair), and raise levies: but these measures he had little time to adopt; for before many days had elapsed, the expected mutiny took place, and was conducted in a manner which proved that, in the present instance, the sepoys were acting on a settled plan. On the morning of the 8th of June, intelligence was received that a rebel force (the 17th N.I., with a body of irregular cavalry and two guns from Azimghur) were encamped at Begum Gunje, ten miles from Fyzabad, and intended marching into the station on the following morning. The Europeans now prepared for the worst. The civilians and the non-commissioned officers sent their families to Shahgunje; to which place, Captain J. Reid, Captain Alexander Orr, and Mr. Bradford, followed them. Colonel Goldney, though also filling a civil appointment, remained behind. He had every confidence in the 22nd N.I., which he had formerly commanded; and he maintained a most gallant bearing to the moment of his death. Mrs. Lennox and her daughter (Mrs. Morgan), with the wife and children of Major Mill, remained in cantonments, in reliance on the solemn oath of the Native officers of the 22nd, that no injury should be done them. The European officers went to their respective posts; but soon found themselves prisoners, not being allowed to move twelve paces without being followed by a guard with fixed bayonets.

A risaldar of cavalry took command of the mutineers, and proceeded to release a moolvee, who had been confined in the quarter-guard, and in whose honour they fired a salute. This man was a Mohammedan of good family, who had traversed a considerable part of Upper India, preaching sedition. He had been expelled from Agra

* Times, 17th January, 1859.

† Despatch to secretary to government, dated July 14th, 1857.—Parl. Papers on Mutinies (regarding Maun Sing), March 18th, 1858; p. 3.

—a measure which only helped to give him the notoriety he sought. In April, he appeared with several followers at Fyzabad, where he circulated seditious papers, and openly advocated a religious war. The police were ordered to arrest him; but he and his followers resisted with arms: the military were called in, and several lives were lost on the side of the moolvee, before his capture was effected. He was tried, and sentence of death would have been pronounced and executed upon him, but for some informality which delayed the proceedings.

Colonel Lennox remained in his bungalow all night with his wife and daughter, under a strong sepoy guard. Two officers strove to escape, but were fired at by the cavalry patrols, and brought back into the lines unhurt, where they were desired to remain quietly until daybreak, when they would be sent off, under an escort, to the place of embarkation, placed in boats, and dispatched down the Gogra river.*

The account, thus far, rests on official information. Private letters state that the mutineers held a council of war during the night, and that the irregular cavalry, who were nearly all Mussulmans, proposed to kill the officers; but the 22nd N.I. objected; and it was ultimately decided that the officers should be allowed to leave unharmed, and to carry away all their private arms and property, but no treasure, as that belonged to the King of Oude.

An officer who escaped, gives a different account of the language held to him by a subahdar of his own regiment: but both statements may possibly be true, as the sepoys may have been disposed in favour of the Delhi or of the Oude family, according to their birth and prejudices. The speech of the subahdar was very remarkable. Seeing his late superior about to depart, he said—"As you are going away for ever, I will tell you all about our plans. We halt at Fyzabad five days, and march through Duriabad upon Lucknow, where we expect to be joined by the people of the city." Proclamations, he added, had been received from the King of Delhi, announcing that he was again seated on the throne of his fathers, and desired the whole army to

join his standard. The subahdar declared that Rajah Maun Sing had been appointed commander-in-chief in Oude: and he concluded his communications by remarking—"You English have been a long time in India, but you know little of us. We have nothing to do with Wajid Ali, or any of his relations; the kings of Lucknow were made by you: the only ruler in India empowered to give sunnuds, is the King of Delhi; he never made a King of Oude: and it is from him only that we shall receive our orders."†

The officers were allowed to depart at daybreak on the morning of the 9th, and were escorted to the river side, and directed to enter four boats which had been provided by the insurgents, and proceed down the river. Whilst still at the ghaut, or landing-place, intelligence was brought to the escort, that their comrades in cantonments were plundering the treasure; whereupon the whole party immediately hurried off thither. The Europeans then entered the boats; and, there being no boatmen, proceeded to man them themselves. According to the testimony of a survivor, the four boats were filled in the following manner:—

First Boat.—Colonel Goldney; Lieutenants Currie, Cautley, Ritchie, Parsons; Sergeants Matthews, Edwards, Busher.

Second Boat.—Major Mill; Sergeant-major Hulme and his wife; Quartermaster-sergeant Russel; and Bugler Williamson.

Third Boat.—Colonel O'Brien; Captain Gordon; Lieutenants Anderson and Percivall; and Surgeon Collison.

Fourth Boat.—Lieutenants Thomas, Lindsay, and English.

While dropping down the river, the Europeans perceived a canoe following them. It contained a sepoy of the 22nd N.I., named Teg Ali Khan, who requested to be suffered to accompany his officers. He was taken in by Colonel Goldney; and, on approaching a village, he procured rowers for two of the boats, and proved himself, in the words of the credentials subsequently given him by Colonel Lennox, a "loyal and true man."‡

Boats one and two distanced the others, and passed Ayodha, where the third boat was seen to put in. After proceeding

* Despatch of Colonel Lennox, July 1st, 1857.—Further Parliamentary Papers on Mutinies (No. 4), p. 46. See also letter dated August 1st: published in *Times*, September 29th, 1857.

† Letter from an officer of one of the Fyzabad

regiments. Quoted by Bombay Correspondent of *Daily News*, August 17th, 1857.

‡ Long roll and certificate of character, dated July 1st, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers on the Mutinies (No. 4), p. 53.

about three miles further, Colonel Goldney and Major Mill waited, in hopes of being rejoined by their comrades; but spending two hours in vain, they resumed their voyage down stream, and at length reached a spot which they approached without any idea of danger, apparently not knowing that it was Begum Gunje, the place where the 17th N.I. were encamped, and beneath which the current of the Gogra swept past.* Here the fugitives observed natives running along the bank, and evidently giving notice of their approach. From the various accounts of the whole sad business, it seems that some of the more sanguinary and desperate of the Fyzabad mutineers, thwarted in their purpose of themselves slaying and plundering the Europeans by the determined opposition of the 22nd N.I., gave notice to the rebels at Begum Gunje to intercept the officers. Accordingly, just at the narrowest part of the stream, a body of infantry and cavalry were drawn up in readiness; and, as the boats approached, they were fired into, and Matthews, who was rowing, was killed. Colonel Goldney desired the officers to lay aside their arms, and try to come to terms with the mutineers, who entered some boats which lay along the shore, and pushing off into the middle of the stream, recommenced firing. Seeing this, Colonel Goldney urged all around him to jump into the water, and try to gain the opposite bank; he was, he said, "too old to run," and there was no other prospect of escape. His advice was followed. The gallant veteran and the dead sergeant remained alone; the other passengers, together with all those in the second boat, strove to swim to shore. Major Mill, Lieutenants Currie and Parsons, were drowned in the attempt.

The fortunes of the party in the first boat are described in a report by Sergeant Busher, who succeeded in effecting his escape, as did also Teg Ali Khan. In the course of Busher's wanderings, he met with the officers who had embarked in the fourth boat; but they escaped the rebel force only to perish by the hands of insurgent villagers.† Lieutenants Cautley,

Ritchie, and Bright, are thought to have met a similar fate.‡ The remainder of the Fyzabad fugitives, whose fate has not been mentioned, escaped, excepting Colonel Goldney, who was, it is alleged, brought to land, and led to the mutineer camp. "I am an old man," he said; "will you disgrace yourselves by my murder?" They shot him down.§

The gentlemen in the third boat put in shore, and obtained a large boat and some rowers. The natives were, however, so terrified, that they would have run away, had they not been compelled to embark "at the point of the sword." The Europeans exhausted with fatigue, fell asleep, and when they awoke the boatmen had disappeared. They had, however, by this time reached a village called Gola, near which a native prince and French indigo planter resided. The planter, "seeing the whole country up around him," started with the officers on the following morning for Dinapoor, whither the whole party arrived safely, under the escort of thirty armed men, sent with them by the rajah. Mr. Collison, on whose authority the above details are given, says, that the ladies from Fyzabad arrived at Dinapoor on June 29th, in a pitiful condition. They had been robbed of everything at Goruckpoor, whither they had been safely sent by Maun Sing, and only escaped with their lives. They had been imprisoned in a fort on the river for a week, and almost starved to death.|| In the official notice of the Fyzabad mutiny, it is expressly stated, that no acts of violence were committed by the troops on the occasion; on the contrary, the majority, it is said, conducted themselves respectfully towards their officers to the last; and even those requiring money for travelling expenses, were supplied with it by the mutineers.¶

The adventures of Colonel Lennox remain to be told. After the officers had left, the moulvee sent the native apothecary of the dispensary to say, that he was sorry that the colonel should be obliged to fly, as, through his kindness, he had been well cared-for while confined for three months in the quarter-guard, and had been allowed mentions the colonel's name among the list of the missing, whose fate had not been ascertained.

|| Letter from Assistant-surgeon Collison, dated "Dinapoor, June 30th"—*Times*, August 29th, 1857.

¶ Despatch from Major-general Lloyd, dated "Dinapoor, June 19, 1857."—Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), p. 35.

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 135.

† Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 48.

‡ *London Gazette* (second supplement), May 6th, 1858.

§ Mr. Gubbins, from whom the above statement regarding the fate of Col. Goldney is derived (p. 135), does not give his authority. The government *Gazette*

his hookah; and that if the colonel and his family would remain in cantonments for a few days, he would take care of them. The subahdar, Dhuleep Sing, on the contrary, advised their immediate flight before the arrival of the 17th N.I.; and as the sepoys on guard at the bungalow were becoming insolent and riotous, Colonel Lennox judged it best to quit Fyzabad immediately, which he did with his wife and daughter, starting during the intense heat of the afternoon. Two faithful sepoys accompanied them, and were happily on their guard against the danger to be expected at Begum Gunje. At Ayodha, however, they encountered an unexpected difficulty, the place being held by a rebel picket. They were twice compelled to stop, under threats of being fired upon; but after being questioned, were suffered to proceed. At half-past ten they passed the enemy's camp unseen; but on rounding a sand-bank, they came upon another picket. By the advice of the sepoys and boatmen, they went on shore, and crept along the side of the bank for two hours; at the expiration of that time they re-entered the boat, which the native boatmen had risked their lives to bring round. Colonel Lennox and the ladies crossed the river at midnight, and landed in the Goruckpoor district. At sunrise on the following morning, they started on foot for Goruckpoor, with their khitmutgar (steward or table attendant) and ayah (lady's maid), and had walked about six miles, when they reached a village, where, having procured a draught of milk, they prepared to rest during the mid-day heat; but were soon disturbed by a horseman, armed to the teeth, with a huge horse-pistol in his hand, which he cocked and held to the head of Colonel Lennox, desiring him to proceed with his wife and daughter to the camp of the 17th N.I., as he expected to get a reward of 500 rupees for each of their heads. The fugitives wearily retraced their steps; but had not gone above a mile when a lad met them, whom the horseman recognised, and whose appearance made him strive to compel the ladies to quicken their pace. The lad, however, prevailed on him to let them drink some water and rest awhile, near a village; and during the interval he contrived to

send a boy to call friends to their assistance. It appeared that a nazim, named Meer Mohammed Hussein Khan, and his nephew, Meer Mehndee, had a small fort less than a mile distant (in the Amorah district), from whence, on receiving intelligence of the danger of the Europeans, eight or ten men were dispatched to the rescue. The horseman was disarmed, and obliged to accompany his late captives to the residence of the nazim; but one of the party sent to save them, seemed by no means pleased with the task. He abused Colonel Lennox; and, "looking to his pistol and priming, swore he would shoot those Englishmen who had come to take away the caste of the natives and make them Christians."* Meer Mohammed was holding a council when the fugitives arrived. They were ushered into his presence, and he bade them rest and take some sherbet. One of his retainers hinted, that a stable close by would be a suitable abode for the dogs, who would be killed ere long. The nazim rebuked him, and told the Europeans not to fear, as they should be protected in the fort until the road to Goruckpoor was again open, so that the station could be reached in safety.

On the day after their arrival, their host, fearing that scouts of the 17th N.I. would obtain news of the locality of the refugees, desired them to assume native clothing; and dressing three of his own people in the discarded European garments, he sent them out at nine o'clock in the evening, under an escort, to deceive his outposts and the villagers. The disguised persons returned at midnight, in their own dresses; and all, except those in the secret, believed that the Europeans had been sent away, instead of being allowed to remain in a reed hut in rear of the zenana, treated very kindly and considerately, having plenty of food, and a daily visit from the nazim. Clothing for the ladies was supplied by the begum. On the 18th of June, an alarm was given that an enemy was approaching to attack the fort. The ladies were immediately concealed in the zenana, and Colonel Lennox hidden in a dark-wood "godown," or caravan for the transport of goods. The troopers proved to be a party sent by the collector of Goruckpoor for the refugees, who gratefully

* The adventures of Colonel Lennox and his family, are given, as nearly as possible, in the words of the interesting official statement, drawn up by the colonel himself, and dated July 1st, 1857.—

Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), pp. 46—48. See also the somewhat fuller account, also written by him, and published in the *London Times*, of September 29th, 1857.

took leave of "the considerate and noble nazim." They reached Goruckpoor in safety; and, on their way, met Sergeant Busher, who had been also saved by Meer Mehndee's adherents.

The nazim afterwards visited the mutineers at Fyzabad, to learn their plan, which was to march to the attack of Lucknow, and then proceed to Delhi. They enquired very minutely concerning certain Europeans he had harboured. The nazim declared he had only fed and rested three Europeans, and then sent them on. To this the mutineers replied—"It is well; we are glad you took care of the colonel and his family."

Colonel Lennox concludes his narrative by earnestly recommending the nazim and his nephew to the favour of the British government. He had refrained from any description of his own sufferings, or those of his companions; but he evidently could not acknowledge the gratitude due to a fellow-creature, without making reverent mention of the merciful Providence which had supported, and eventually carried him through, perils under which the majority of his fellow-officers had sunk, though they were mostly young, strong, and unencumbered by the care of weak and defenceless women. His party escaped without a hair of their heads being injured. There is something very impressive in the quiet dignity with which Colonel Lennox declares—"Throughout this severe trial, I have found the promise fulfilled to me and to my family, 'And as thy day, so shall thy strength be.'"^{*}

The last Europeans left at Fyzabad, were the wife and children of Major Mill. For some unexplained cause, Mrs. Mill had neither accompanied the civilians to Shahgunje, nor her husband to the boats. She is alleged to have lost the opportunity of leaving the station with Colonel Lennox, from unwillingness to expose her three young children to the sun; but she subsequently made her way alone with them, wandering about for a fortnight, from village to village, till she reached Goruckpoor, where one of her little ones died of fatigue; and where, after passing through an agony of doubt, she learned at length the certainty of her widowhood.[†]

Sultanpoor.—This station was under the

^{*} Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 47.

[†] Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 136.

[‡] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

command of Colonel Fisher, an officer whose genial nature and keen enjoyment of field sports, had rendered him popular alike with Europeans and Natives. His own regiment (the 15th irregular horse) was posted at Sultanpoor, together with the 8th Oude infantry, under Captain W. Smith, and the 1st regiment of military police, under Captain Bunbury. Individual popularity could not, however, counteract general disaffection; and, even to its possessor, it brought dangers as well as advantages; for while the sepoy of each regiment were solicitous for, and did actually preserve, the lives of many favourite officers at the risk of their own, the worst disposed of other corps were specially anxious to remove such commanders as might influence the more moderate to repentance, and, at the same time, to compromise the entire Bengal army by implication in the commission of crimes which the majority had in all probability never contemplated. Colonel Fisher was not taken by surprise. He anticipated the coming outbreak, and sent off the ladies and children, on the night of the 7th of June, towards Allahabad, under care of Dr. Corbyn and Lieutenant Jenkyns. Three of the ladies (Mrs. Goldney, Mrs. Block, and Mrs. Stroyan) became separated from the rest, and were taken to the neighbouring fort of Amethie, where they were protected by Rajah Bainie Madhoo Sing; by whom, the Oude commissioner states, "they were very kindly treated. Madhoo," he adds, "sent us in their letters to Lucknow; furnished them with such comforts as he could procure himself; took charge of the articles which we wished to send; and, after sheltering the ladies for some days, forwarded them in safety to Allahabad. The rest of the party, joined by Lieutenant Grant, assistant-commissioner, found refuge for some days with a neighbouring zemindar, and were by him escorted in safety to Allahabad."[‡] This testimony is very strongly in favour of a rajah, whose fort, after being the sanctuary of Englishwomen in their deepest need, was soon to be besieged by the British commander-in-chief in person, and its master driven into exile and outlawry. The cause of this change is alleged to have been one which those who have watched the working of the centralisation system in India, will find little difficulty in understanding. It is not only that the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing, but that the head,

called by courtesy the Supreme government, is generally ignorant of the movements of either, until its own initiative and veto, exercised in an equally despotic and vacillating manner by successive orders and counter-orders, have issued in the hopeless bewilderment of its own functionaries, and the rebellion of its unfortunate subjects. The history of Bainie Madhoo's hostility is thus given by Mr. Russell. "The rajah," he writes (in November, 1858, from the British camp then advancing against Amethie), "is a Rajpoot of ancient family and large possessions. At the annexation, or rather after it, when that most fatal and pernicious resettlement of Oude took place, in which our officers played with estates and titles as if they were footballs, we took from the rajah a very large portion of territory, and gave it to rival claimants. The rajah, no doubt, was incensed against us; but still, when the mutiny and revolt broke out, he received the English refugees from Salone, and sheltered and forwarded them, men, women, and children, in safety to Allahabad. While he was doing this, the government was busy confiscating his property.* If I am rightly informed, the authorities, without any proof, took it for granted that the rajah was a rebel, and seized upon several lacs of rupees which he had at Benares; and, to his applications for redress, he received, in reply, a summons to come in and surrender himself."†

Other causes were not wanting to aggravate the natural aversion of the chief towards the government by which he had been so ill-treated; and these will be mentioned in their due order. Meanwhile, many intermediate events require to be narrated. The troops at Sultanpoor rose on the morning of the 9th of June, when Colonel Fisher, in returning from the lines of the military police, whom he had harangued and endeavoured to reduce to order, was shot in the back by one of that regiment, and died in the arms of Lieutenant C. Tucker. Captain Gibbins, the second in command, was attacked and killed by the troopers while on horse-back beside the dhooly in which Fisher had been placed. The men then shouted to

Lieutenant Tucker to go; and he rode off, crossed the river, and found shelter in the fort of Roostum Sah, at Deyrah, on the banks of the Goomtee. Here he was joined by the remainder of the Sultanpoor officers, and was, with them, safely escorted to Benares, by a party of natives sent from that city by the commissioner, Henry Carre Tucker.

Mr. Gubbins observes—"Roostum Sah is a fine specimen of the best kind of talooqdars in Oudh. Of old family, and long settled at Deyrah, he resides there in a fort very strongly situated in the ravines of the Goomtee, and surrounded by a thick jungle of large extent. It had never been taken by the troops of the native government, which had more than once been repulsed from before it. Roostum Sah deserves the more credit for his kind treatment of the refugees, as he had suffered unduly at the settlement, and had lost many villages which he should have been permitted to retain. I had seen him at Fyzabad in January, 1857; and, after discussing his case with the deputy-commissioner, Mr. W. A. Forbes, it had been settled that fresh inquiries should be made into the title of the villages which he had lost; and orders had been issued accordingly."‡

Whatever were the orders issued in January, they appear to have afforded no immediate relief to the ill-used talookdar; for, in the following June, when he received and sheltered the European fugitives, he was found to be supporting his family by the sale of the jewels of his female relatives.

Two young civilians§ were killed in endeavouring to escape. They took refuge with Yaseen Khan, zemindar of the town of Sultanpoor. He is alleged to have received them into his house, and then turned them out and caused them to be shot down, thereby perpetrating the only instance of treachery attributed to a petty zemindar of Oude.||

Salone.—The mutiny here was conducted without tumult or bloodshed. There were no Europeans at this station, but only six companies of the 1st Oude infantry, under Captain Thompson. The cantonments were

* Out of 223 villages, 119 were taken from him on the second revision after annexation. (Russell). —*Times*, Jan. 17th, 1858.

† *Times*, December 21st, 1858.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 139.

§ Mr. A. Block, C.S., and Mr. S. Stroyan, who had been recently married to a girl of seventeen.

|| *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 140. Mr. Gubbins does not give his authority for this statement regarding the conduct of Yaseen Khan.

at Pershadipoor. The conduct of the regiment is described by its commanding officer as continuing "most exemplary" up to June 9th, notwithstanding the trials to which the men had been subjected, by the false accounts of their friends and relatives in different disbanded and mutinous regiments. On the afternoon of that day, a sowar (trooper), who pretended to have escaped from a body of mutineers, galloped into the cantonments. In the night, he represented to the sepoys, that in the event of their remaining faithful, they would be overpowered by the revolted regiments; and his arguments, added to the impression already produced by the assertions of the 37th, 45th, and 57th N.I., that they had been first disarmed and then fired on by the Europeans, so wrought upon the minds of the Pershadipoor troops, that they resolved on throwing off their allegiance.*

The large sum known to be in the treasury, had probably its share in inciting them to mutiny, which they did on the morning of the 10th, by refusing to obey their officers, and warning them to depart. The Europeans knew that resistance was hopeless, and rode off, a few sepoys accompanying Captain Thompson, and remaining steadily with him; while some native subordinates attended the commissioner, Captain Barrow. As the party passed through the lines, several of the sepoys saluted them, but none uttered any threat. Outside the station, Lall Hunwunt Sing, talookdar of Dharoopoor, was found drawn up with his troopers, in accordance with a promise which he had given to be ready with aid in case of emergency. The whole of the refugees were received into his fort, and remained there nearly a fortnight, treated all the while with the greatest kindness. They were then conducted by their host and 500 of his followers to the ferry over the Ganges, opposite to Allahabad, and they reached the fort in safety. The refugees desired to give Hunwunt Sing some token of their gratitude; "but he would receive no present for his hospitality." The financial commissioner remarks—"The conduct of this man is the more deserving, as he had lost an undue number of villages; and his case, as well as that of Roostum Sah of Deyrah, was one that called for reconsideration."†

* Despatch of Captain Thompson to secretary of government, June 25th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 70.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 141.

At *Duriabad*, a station and district of the Lucknow division, the 5th Oude infantry were quartered, under Captain Hawes. There was a considerable amount of treasure here (about three lacs), the removal of which had been attempted in May, but resisted by some of the sepoys. On the 9th of June, Captain Hawes renewed the attempt. The treasure was placed in carts, and the men marched off cheering; but before they had proceeded half a mile, a disturbance took place. The disaffected men refused to convey the treasure any further, fired on those who opposed them, and succeeded in taking back the loaded carts in triumph to the station. The European residents fled immediately. Captain Hawes, though repeatedly fired on, escaped unhurt, galloped off across the country, was kindly received by Ram Sing, zemindar of Suhee, and from thence escaped to Lucknow. Lieutenants Grant and Fullerton placed their wives and children in a covered cart, and were walking by the side of it, when they were overtaken by a party of mutineers, and obliged to turn back. On their way towards Duriabad, messengers from cantonments met them, with leave to go where they pleased, as the regiment had no wish to do them harm. A double rifle, which had been taken from Lieutenant Grant, was restored to him; and the party reached the hospitable abode of Ram Sing, and proceeded thence to Lucknow without further molestation. Mr. Benson (the deputy-commissioner) and his wife took refuge with the talookdar of Huraha; were hospitably treated, and enabled to reach Lucknow.

The mutiny of all the Oude stations has now been told, except those of Cawnpoor and Futtehghur: they have a distinctive character; the massacre which followed them by far surpassing any outbreak of sepoy panic, ferocity, or fanaticism; and being, in fact, an episode formed by the ruthless, reckless vengeance of the wretch whose name is hateful to everybody possessed of common humanity, whether Christian, Mohammedan, or Hindoo.

Lucknow.—On the 11th of June, 1857, the capital of Oude, and Cawnpoor, were the only stations in the province still held by the British.

On the following day, Sir Henry Lawrence resumed his functions, and became as indefatigable as ever. He "seemed almost never to sleep. Often would he sally out in

disguise, and visit the most frequented parts of the native town, and make personal observations, and see how his orders were carried out. He several times had a thin bedding spread out near the guns at the Baillie Guard gate, and retired there among the artillerists; not to sleep, but to plan and meditate undisturbed. He appeared to be ubiquitous, and to be seen everywhere."*

The 12th of June was further marked by the mutiny of the 3rd regiment of military police, which furnished the mail guard, and took most of the civil duties. The sepoys abandoned their several posts, and marched off on the road to Sultanpore, plundering several houses belonging to Europeans in their way. They were pursued by a force under Colonel Inglis. The police superintendent (Captain Weston) outstripped the other Europeans, and endeavoured to bring the natives back to obedience. They treated him civilly, but refused to listen to his arguments, unless permitted to do so by the chief they had elected. The permission was refused, and one of the mutineers levelled his musket at Captain Weston. A dozen arms were thrust forward to strike down the weapon. "Who," said they, "would kill such a brave man as this?" The English officer rode back unharmed.† When the Europeans came up with the mutineers, they turned and fought, killing two of the Sikh troopers, and wounding several other persons. Two Europeans died of apoplexy. The loss, on the side of the mutineers, was fifteen killed and fifteen captured. On the return of the pursuers, the deputy-commissioner, Mr. Martin, who had formed one of the volunteer cavalry, urged the execution of the prisoners; but the tacit pledge given by some of the captors, who had held out their open hand in token of quarter, was nobly redeemed by Sir Henry Lawrence, and the prisoners were released. Levies of horse, foot, artillery, and police, were now raised. About eighty pensioned sepoys were called in by Sir Henry from the surrounding districts, and no suspicion ever attached to any of them during the siege. One, named Ungud, a native of Oude, performed some remarkable feats as a messenger. The mingled justice and conciliation of Sir Henry Lawrence's policy was markedly instrumental in obtaining the native auxiliaries, but for whom, Lucknow might have

been as Cawnpore. A striking illustration of this fact, is afforded by the circumstance of some hundreds of Native artillerists, formerly in the service of the King of Oude (who had refused to enter the service of the British government on the annexation of the country), now coming forward under their chief, Meer Furzund Ali, as volunteers. A number of them were enlisted; and Mr. Gubbins, who had sixteen of them in his own fortified house, says they worked the guns, under European supervision, during the whole siege, in which several of them were killed. He adds, that "the mutineers no sooner learnt that Furzund Ali was on our side, than they gutted his house, plundering it of a large amount of valuable property. Unless, therefore, some special compensation has been granted to him, Furzund Ali will not have gained much by his loyalty."‡ It seems strange that the "financial commissioner for Oude," writing in June, 1858, should not have been able to speak with somewhat greater certainty on the subject.

Ramadeen, an old Brahmin, also a native of Oude, was another helpful auxiliary. He had been employed as an overseer of roads; and when the disturbed state of the districts interrupted his labours, he came in to Lucknow with six of his brethren: they worked as foot soldiers; and no men ever behaved better. By night they assisted in constructing batteries; by day they fought whenever the enemy attacked. Ramadeen and two of his men were killed; the others survived, and were pensioned by government. There was a native architect named Pirana, of whom Mr. Gubbins says—"He was an excellent workman; and, but for his aid and that of Ramadeen, we could never have completed the works which we put up. Pirana used to work steadily under fire; and I have seen a brick, which he was about to lay, knocked out of his hand by a bullet."§ Before the siege began, there was an excellent native smith, named Golab, working in the engineering department. Captain Fulton gave him his option to go or stay. He chose the latter; and manifested strong personal attachment to his chief, following him everywhere in the face of great danger, and rendering invaluable service. On the very day on which the relieving force entered the Residency, he was killed by a round shot.

Such are a few among a crowd of

* Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 39.

† *Ibid.*, p. 61.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 166.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

instances of fidelity even unto death; individual attachment being usually the actuating motive.

Strenuous efforts were now made to strengthen the Residency position, and to throw up defences capable of resisting the assault of artillery. The Residency itself occupied the highest point of an elevated and irregular plateau, sloping down sharply towards the river. On the north side, a strong battery for heavy guns, afterwards called the Redan, was commenced on the 18th of June, by Captain Fulton. The Cawnpoor battery—so called from its position commanding the high road from that station—had been begun some days earlier by Lieutenant Anderson.

Among other precautions taken at this period, was the arrest of certain Mohammedans of high family, who it was supposed might be compelled or persuaded to join the rebel cause. One was Mustapha Ali Khan, the elder brother of the ex-king, who had been a state prisoner at the time of our occupation of Oude, and whose claims to the succession had been set aside on the plea of weak intellect. The other captives were two princes connected with the Delhi family—Nawab Rookun-ood-Dowlah, one of the surviving sons of the good old sovereign, Sadut Ali Khan; and the young rajah of Toolseepoor (in the Terai), a very turbulent character, who had previously been under surveillance, and was suspected of having caused the murder of his father.

On the 28th of June, Ali Reza Khan, who had formerly been kotwal of Lucknow under native rule, and had taken service under the British government, reported the existence of a large quantity of jewels in the late king's treasury, in the palace called the Kaiser Bagh; which, if not removed, would probably fall into the hands of the mutineers, or be plundered by some party or other. Major Banks was immediately dispatched with a military force to secure and bring in the treasure, which consisted of a richly ornamented throne, crowns thickly studded with gems, gold pieces from Venice and Spain, and a variety of necklaces, armlets, rings, and native ornaments, enclosed in cases so decayed with age, that they fell to pieces when touched; and the place was literally strewn with pearls and gold. The display was unfortunate; and during the subsequent siege, the receptacle in which these gewgaws were placed was more than once broken into, and "looted."

The men of the 32nd regiment were supposed to be the offenders. "Certainly they got hold of a large quantity of the jewels, and sold them freely to the natives of the garrison."* Deprat, a French merchant, who possessed some stores of wine, received offers of valuable gems in exchange for a dozen of brandy; and Mr. Gubbins writes—"I have myself seen diamonds and pearls which had been so bought." There were twenty-three lacs (£230,000) in the government treasury; and this sum was, in the middle of June, buried in front of the Residency, as the safest place of deposit.

The circulating medium had always been miserably insufficient for the wants of a teeming population; and the neglect of proper provision in that respect had been one of the leading defects of the Company's government. In Oude, early in the month of June, public securities fell to so low an ebb, that government promissory notes for a hundred rupees were offered for sale at half that sum. Confidence was partially restored by the authorities volunteering to buy as much as two lacs of paper at any rate under sixty per cent. The owners hesitated and wavered; and the only purchase actually made was effected by the financial commissioner, on Sir Henry Lawrence's private account, at seventy-five per cent. But during the last half of the month, the demand for gold increased rapidly. The mutinous sepoys at the out-stations had possessed themselves of large amounts of government treasure in silver, which was very bulky to carry about, and they exchanged it for gold at high rates, wherever the latter could be procured. At Lucknow all credit rapidly vanished. Not a native merchant could negotiate a "hoondie," or bill; the government treasury was vainly appealed to for aid; and as there was no longer any prospect of receiving money from the out-stations, it was ordered that the salaries of the government officials should cease to be paid in full, and that they should receive only such small present allowance as might suffice for necessary expenditure.

By this time the heat had become intense, and the rains were anxiously looked for. There had been several deaths from cholera in the Muchee Bhawn, and both cholera and small-pox had appeared in the Residency, where Sir Henry himself lived, in the midst of above a hundred ladies and

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 178.

children. The Residency also contained the sick, and women and children, of H.M.'s 32nd. "There are," Mrs. Harris states, "as many as eight and nine ladies, with a dozen children, in one room; and the heat is awful."* A heavy fall of rain on the 28th of June was hailed as a great relief; but the comfort thus afforded was counterbalanced by tidings from Cawnpoor.

At the time of the capitulation of General Wheeler to the Nana Sahib, a large body of mutineers were known to be assembled at Nawabgunje, twenty miles from Lucknow, which city they immediately marched towards. On the 29th of June, an advance guard of 500 infantry and 100 horse, was reported to Sir Henry Lawrence as having arrived at Chinhut (a town on the Fyzabad road, within eight miles of the Residency), to collect supplies for the force which was expected there on the following day. A body of cavalry was sent out to reconnoitre the position and numbers of the enemy, but returned without having accomplished this object, hostile pickets having been posted at a considerable distance from the town. Our intelligence was, perhaps unavoidably, as defective as that of the enemy was accurate. On the night of the 29th of June (and not on the 30th, as the spies employed by Mr. Gubbins, who had charge of the intelligence department, had declared would be the case), the rebel army reached Chinhut. In utter ignorance of this fact, Sir Henry Lawrence planned the expedition which proved so disastrous.

Such, at least, is the statement made by Mr. Rees, whose authority carries weight, because he had access to, and permission to use, the journal kept by the wife of Brigadier Inglis, the second in command; and probably gained his information from the brigadier himself, as well as from other officers engaged in the undertaking. Mr. Gubbins' account is less circumstantial, and is naturally not unprejudiced, because, owing to the unfortunate differences which existed between him and the other leading authorities, he was not even aware of the expedition until its disastrous issue became apparent.

* Mrs. Harris's *Siege of Lucknow*, pp. 23; 54.

† Raikes' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 67. Mr. Gubbins states, that upon his death-bed, Sir Henry referred to the disaster at Chinhut; and said, that he had acted against his own judgment from the fear of man, but did not mention the name of any individual adviser.—*Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 199.

The force moved out at 6 A.M. on the morning of the 30th, and consisted of about 350 Europeans, including a troop of volunteer cavalry, and about the same number of natives, with ten guns and an 8-inch howitzer. Brigadier Inglis, in his despatch, says that several reports had reached Sir Henry Lawrence, on the previous evening, that the rebel army, in no very considerable numbers, intended marching on Lucknow on the following morning; and Sir Henry therefore determined to make a strong *reconnaissance* in that direction, with a view, if possible, of meeting the enemy at a disadvantage, either at their entrance into the suburbs of the city, or at the bridge across the Kookrail—a small stream intersecting the Fyzabad road, about half-way between Lucknow and Chinhut. Thus far the road was metalled; but beyond it was a newly raised embankment, constructed of loose and sandy soil, in which, every now and then, gaps occurred, indicating the position of projected bridges. The troops halted at the bridge, and Sir Henry, it is said, proposed to draw up his little army in this position, and await the coming of the enemy; but he "unfortunately listened to the advisers who wished him to advance."† Raikes adds, there were rum-and-water and biscuits with the baggage; but no refreshment was served out to the soldiers, although the Europeans were suffering severely from the sun, which was shining right in their faces; and many of them had been drinking freely overnight.

Brigadier Inglis does not enter into particulars; but only states that the troops, misled by the reports of wayfarers (who asserted that there were few or no men between Lucknow and Chinhut),‡ proceeded somewhat further than had been intended, and suddenly fell in with the enemy, who had up to that time eluded the vigilance of the advanced guard by concealing themselves behind a long line of mango groves, in overwhelming numbers. Chinhut itself was a large village, situated in a plain, on the banks of a very extensive jheel, or lake, close to which stands a castle, formerly a favourite resort of the kings of Oude in their sporting excursions. The camp of the enemy lay to the left of Chinhut. The

† Another of the annalists of the siege, observes, that "Sir Henry was on the point of returning to the city; but, unfortunately, he was persuaded to advance, as it was said the enemy could not be in great number."—*Day by Day at Lucknow*; by the widow of Colonel Case, of H.M.'s 32nd; p. 49. London: Bentley, 1858.

village of Ishmaelpoor, where the action was really fought, lay to the left of the road by which the British were advancing, and was occupied by the enemy's sharpshooters. The howitzer was placed in the middle of the road, and fired with much effect; but the rebels, instead of retreating, only changed their tactics, and were soon seen advancing in two distinct masses of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, evidently intending to outflank the British on both sides. "The European force and the howitzer, with the Native infantry, held the foe in check for some time: and had the six guns of the Oude artillery been faithful, and the Seik cavalry shown a better front, the day would have been won in spite of an immense disparity in numbers. But the Oude artillerymen and drivers were traitors."* They overturned the guns into ditches, cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned them, regardless of the remonstrances and exertions of their own officers, and of those of Sir Henry Lawrence's staff, headed by the brigadier-general in person, who himself drew his sword upon these rebels. The cavalry were now ordered to charge. The European volunteers, few of whom had ever seen a shot fired, instantly obeyed the order; but the Seiks (numbering eighty sabres) behaved shamefully. Only two of them charged with the Europeans; the rest turned their horses' heads and galloped back to Lucknow. From behind the loopholed walls of Ishmaelpoor, a deadly fire was poured forth on the British. The 300 men of H.M.'s 32nd were ordered to clear the village. They advanced boldly under their gallant leader, Colonel Case; but he was struck to the ground by a bullet; whereupon the men suddenly laid themselves down under the shelter of a small undulation in the field, but continued firing at the enemy as fast as they could load their pieces.

The order for retreat was now given. The European artillery limbered up and went to the rear, and Sir Henry Lawrence ordered Lieutenant Bonham to retire with the howitzer. But the elephant which was to have carried it was half maddened by the fire; and while the gunners were striving to attach the trail of the howitzer to its carriage, the mutineers were pressing on. A bullet struck Lieutenant Bonham, who

was carried off by his men, and put upon a limber. The howitzer was abandoned; the rebels seized it, and, in the course of some forty-eight hours, fired from it the shot that killed Sir Henry Lawrence. The retreat had become general, when Captain Bassano, of the 32nd foot, who had been searching for Colonel Case, discovered that officer lying wounded, and offered to bring some of the men back to carry him away. "Leave me to die here," was the reply; "I have no need of assistance. Your place is at the head of your company."† The enemy were at this time in rapid pursuit; the Europeans and the sepoy infantry kept up a brisk fire as they retreated, and many fell on both sides. Colonel Case was last seen lying on the roadside with his eyes wide open, and his sword firmly grasped, in the midst of the corpses of his brave companions in arms.‡ Lieutenant Brackenbury was shot next; and Thompson, the adjutant, was mortally wounded. Captain Bassano was hit in the foot, but succeeded in safely reaching the Residency, by the aid of a sepoy of the 13th N.I., who carried the wounded officer for a considerable distance on his back. Major Bruère, also hurt, was saved in a similar manner. There were no dhoolies (litters) for the wounded. At the very beginning of the action, several bearers had been killed; whereupon all the others fled in dismay, leaving the dhoolies in the hands of the enemy. The water-carriers also had run away; and the European infantry were so exhausted from thirst and fatigue, that they could scarcely drag themselves along; and only did so by the aid of the cavalry volunteers, each one of whom was encumbered with two, three, and even four foot soldiers, holding on by the hand of the officer, or by his stirrup, or by the crupper or tail of his horse. The infantry laboured, moreover, under another disadvantage. Their muskets had been kept long loaded, and had become so foul, that it was not possible to discharge them. During the retreat, one of their officers called upon a private by name, and desired him to turn round and fire upon the enemy. "I will do so, sir, if you wish," said the man; "but its no use. I have already snapped six caps, and the piece won't go off."§ Happily, the Native infantry were better able to endure the heat, and

* Despatch of Brigadier Inglis. The Oude artillerymen here mentioned, are not those recently levied (see p. 236), but an old corps, the loyalty of which, according to Rees, there had been pre-

vicious ground for suspecting.—*Siege of Lucknow*, p. 53.

† Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 187.

‡ Rees' *Siege*, p. 72. § Gubbins' *Mutinies*, p. 180.

their weapons were in good order. They are described as having "behaved, for the most part, in the kindest manner to the wounded Europeans; taking up great numbers of them, and leaving their own wounded uncared-for on the battle-field. They had been suspected of being also tainted with the general disaffection, and were, therefore, anxious to regain the esteem and confidence of their European officers. They gave, indeed, the most striking proofs of their fidelity and loyalty on that day, showering volleys of musketry and (native like) of abuse on their assailants."*

On nearing the Kookrail bridge, a new danger presented itself. The road in front was seen to be occupied by a body of the rebel cavalry.† The guns were unlimbered, with the intention of pouring in a few rounds of grape on the enemy; but it was ascertained that not a single round of ammunition remained. The preparatory movement, however, produced the desired effect; the enemy hesitated, and, when charged by Captain Ratray and the handful of volunteers under his command, abandoned their position, and, ceasing to obstruct the road, contented themselves with harassing the rear of the retreating troops, whom they pursued even to the iron bridge near the Residency. Sir Henry Lawrence was seen in the most exposed parts of the field, riding about, giving directions, or speaking words of encouragement amidst a terrific fire of grape, round shot, and musketry, which struck down men at every step. While riding by his side, Captain James was shot through the thigh. Sir Henry remained untouched; but he must have suffered as only so good a man could, in witnessing the scene around him. Forgetful of himself, conscious only of the danger and distress of the troops, at the moment of the crisis near the Kookrail bridge, when his little force appeared about to be overwhelmed by the dead weight of opposing numbers, he wrung his hands in agony, and exclaimed, "My God, my God! and I brought them to this!"

Perhaps that bitter cry was heard and

* Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 78.

† According to Mr. Rees, the masses of rebel cavalry by which the British were outflanked near the Kookrail bridge, were "apparently commanded by some European, who was seen waving his sword, and attempting to make his men follow him and dash at ours. He was a handsome-looking man, well-built, fair, about twenty-five years of age, with

answered, uttered as it was by the lips of one whose character for Christian excellence stood unequalled among public men in India. At least, the retreat of the exhausted force from the Kookrail bridge to Lucknow, under all the circumstances of the case, is one of the most marvellous incidents in the insurrection. On approaching the suburbs, the natives, men, women, and children, rich and poor, crowded round the weary and wounded fugitives, bringing water in cool porous vessels, which was thankfully accepted, and greedily swallowed.

The news of the disaster had reached the city as early as 9 A.M.; a number of the recreant Sikh cavalry, and artillery drivers, having crossed the iron bridge at that hour, their horses covered with foam, and they themselves terrified, but not one of them wounded. The commissioner asked them reproachfully why they had fled. They replied only, that the enemy had surrounded them. Half-an-hour later, a messenger who had been sent to gain information, returned to Lucknow, bearing Sir Henry Lawrence's sword scabbard, and a message that he was unhurt. Shortly after the troops arrived; and then, as the wounded men lay faint and bleeding in the porch of the Residency, the horrors of war burst at once on the view of the British at Lucknow. The banqueting-hall was converted into an hospital; and instead of music and merriment, the wail of the widow, shrieks wrung from brave strong men by excruciating physical suffering, and the dull death-rattle, were heard on every side. The total loss, on the side of the British, consisted of—Europeans, 112 killed, and 44 wounded; Natives—nearly 200 killed and missing: only eleven wounded returned to the city. Besides the howitzer, we lost three field-pieces, with almost all the ammunition waggons of our native guns. No estimate could be formed of the loss of the enemy; but the total number engaged was calculated at 5,550 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 160 artillery.‡ These were the regiments which had mutinied at Fyzabad, Seetapoor, Sultanpoor, Secroora, Gondah,

light mustachios, wearing the undress uniform of a European cavalry officer, with a blue and gold-laced cap on his head." Mr. Rees suggests the possibility of this personage being "a Russian: one suspected to be such had been seized by the authorities, confined, and then released;"—or "a renegade Christian."—*Siege of Lucknow*, p. 76.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 189.

Salone, and Duriabad. The odds were fearful; and the cause for wonder is, not that half the British band should have perished, but that any portion of it should have escaped.

It is probable that Sir Henry Lawrence felt that the expedition had been a mistake, even independently of the fatal miscalculation of the strength of the enemy, which led him to advance to Chinhut. It had been undertaken without due preparation, without any settled plan of action; neither had any reserve been provided in the event of disaster. The European garrison, consisting of little above 900 men, was materially weakened by the result of the contest; and the easy victory gained by the rebels, emboldened them, and accelerated the besiegement of Lucknow.

The first effect of the return of the survivors was to produce a death-like silence throughout the city; but the stillness was of brief duration. The foe followed close on their heels, and the terrified ladies had scarcely time to welcome back their relatives, or, like poor Mrs. Case, to discover their bereavement, before the whistling of round shot was heard in the air. Mr. Gubbins went to search for Sir Henry Lawrence, and found him laying a howitzer at the Water gate (so called from its vicinity to the river Goomtee), to command the entrance to the Residency.

The siege of Lucknow had, in fact, commenced. The Europeans went on the terraces of their houses, and could see, through their telescopes, masses of the enemy crossing the Goomtee, at a considerable distance below the city (the guns on the Redan commanding the iron bridge); while troopers of the rebel cavalry were already galloping about the streets. The gaol, nearly opposite the Baillie Guard gate of the Residency, was left unwatched. The prisoners, some of whom on the previous day, and even on that very morning, had been working at the batteries, carrying beams and baskets of mud, were soon seen making their escape, holding-on by ropes (which they fastened on the barred windows), and swinging themselves down the high walls. In the course of the afternoon, Sir Henry Lawrence dispatched a messenger to Allahabad, with a brief notice of what had occurred. "We have been besieged," he states, "for four hours. Shall likely be surrounded to-night. Enemy very bold, and our Europeans very low."

* * * We shall be obliged to concen-

trate if we are able. We shall have to abandon much supplies, and blow up much powder; unless we are relieved in fifteen or twenty days, we shall hardly be able to maintain our ground."*

At the opening of the siege, there was, besides the two main posts at the Residency and the Muchee Bhawn, a third at the Dowlutkhana, a spacious mausoleum built in honour of a former King of Oude. The 4th and 7th regiments of irregular infantry, and four companies of the 1st irregular infantry, had not accompanied the force to Chinhut, but had remained at their post, under Brigadier Gray. No reliance had been placed on the fidelity of these men, and the guns had been previously removed from their charge. No surprise was therefore expressed when, on witnessing the return of the defeated troops, the sepoys at the Dowlutkhana broke out into mutiny with loud shouts, and commenced plundering the property of their officers, whom, however, they did not attempt to injure, but suffered to retire quietly to the Muchee Bhawn.

The Imaumbara—a building appropriated by Mohammedans of the Sheiah sect to the yearly celebration of the Mohurram, a series of services commemorative of the sufferings of the Imaum Hussein—was at this time filled with native police, who soon followed the example set them by the irregulars in joining the mutiny. The kotwal fled, and hid himself; but being discovered by the enemy, was seized, and eventually put to death.

The investment at once prevented the continuance of communication by letter between the Residency and the Muchee Bhawn; at least the commissioner could find no means of conveying despatches from Sir Henry Lawrence to Colonel Palmer, the commanding officer at the latter position; but Colonel Palmer managed to send intelligence to the Residency, that he was ill supplied with food, and even gun ammunition, shot, and shell. The total force available for defence had, moreover, been so reduced by the Chinhut affair, that there was barely sufficient to garrison the extended Residency position, in which it was now resolved to concentrate the troops. Telegraphic communication had been previously established,

* Telegraphic despatch from commanding officer at Allahabad, to governor-general, July 10th, 1857. —Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 110.

by Sir Henry Lawrence, between the two posts; and, on the evening of the 1st of July, he took this means of ordering the evacuation of the Muchee Bhawn. Captain Fulton (of the engineers), another officer, and a civilian, Mr. G. H. Lawrence (nephew of Sir Henry), ascended to the roof to perform this hazardous service. The machine was out of order, and had to be taken down and repaired—the three Europeans being all the time a mark for the bullets of the enemy; and having no other shield than the ornamental balustrade, in the Italian style, which surrounded the roof. But they accomplished their work surely and safely, each letter of the telegram being signalled in return by Colonel Palmer. The words were few, but weighty. "Spike the guns well, blow up the fort, and retire at midnight."

Much anxiety was felt about the success of the movement by those who knew what was intended; and those who did not, were for the most part panic-struck by the suddenness of the calamity which had befallen them. The "omlah," or writers, who resided in the city; the chuprassies,* or civil orderlies, and the workpeople engaged in the yet unfinished batteries, took to flight; and everything outside the intrenchments fell into the hands of the enemy. On the first day of the siege, musketry alone was fired by the rebel army; but, on the second, they had succeeded in placing their cannon in position, and took aim with precision and effect.

The Residency was the chief point of attack, both from its high position and as the head-quarters of Sir Henry Lawrence. Events proved that the rebels were perfectly acquainted with all the different apartments, their occupants, and uses, and directed their fire accordingly. The building was very extensive, and solidly built, with lofty rooms, fine verandahs, and spacious porticoes. The tyekhana, or underground rooms, designed to shelter the families of British residents at Lucknow from the heat of the sun, now served to shield a helpless crowd of women and children from a more deadly fire. Skylights and cellar windows, contrived with all care, made these chambers the most commodious in the Residency, as well as

the only safe ones. Indeed, in every other part, no building could have been less calculated for purposes of defence. The numberless lofty windows in its two upper stories offered unopposed entrance to the missiles of the foe. Colonel Palmer's daughter, a girl of about seventeen, engaged in marriage to a young officer, was sitting in one of the higher rooms on the afternoon of the 1st, when a round shot struck her, and nearly carried off her leg. Amputation was immediately had recourse to; but, on the following day, the poor girl died, as did every other patient on whom a similar operation was performed during the entire siege.† Sir Henry Lawrence had a narrow escape at nearly the same time. He occupied a room on the first story of the most exposed angle of the Residency. While engaged writing with his secretary, Mr. Couper, an 8-inch shell fell and burst close to both gentlemen, but injured neither. The whole of the staff entreated Sir Henry to leave the Residency, or at least to choose a different chamber; but he refused, observing that another shell would certainly never be pitched into that small room. He then resumed his anxious round of duty, visiting every post, however exposed its position, however hot the fire directed against it;‡ and taking precautions to facilitate the evacuation of the Muchee Bhawn, on which fortress the enemy had already opened a cannonade. Towards night, however, the firing ceased; and the enemy, believing the ancient stronghold to be well-nigh impregnable, had no idea of the necessity of blockading its garrison. The ruse of Sir Henry, in directing the batteries of the Residency to open fire shortly after midnight, was therefore completely successful. The guns of the Redan cleared the iron bridge of all intruders. The arrangements for the march had been admirably made by Colonel Palmer, and were as ably carried through by the subordinate officers, who were furnished with written orders. The force, comprising (according to Mr. Gubbins) 225 Europeans,§ moved out noiselessly at midnight, carrying their treasure and two or more 9-pounder guns with them, and, in fifteen minutes, traversed the three-quarters of a mile which separated the Muchee Bhawn from the Residency, without

* *Chuprassies*—so called from the chuprass or badge on their breasts, generally consisting of a broad plate of brass hanging from a handsome shoulder-belt. They are employed in carrying mes-

sages, and in general out-door work.—(Russell).

† *Memoir of Rev. H. S. Polehampton*; p. 337.

‡ *Rees' Siege of Lucknow*, p. 115.

§ *Further Parl. Papers*, p. 75.

having had a shot fired at them.* The train for the destruction of the fort had been laid by Lieutenant Thomas, of the Madras artillery: by his calculations the explosion was to take place half-an-hour after the departure of the garrison. Sir Henry Lawrence and the officers stood waiting the event. At the appointed time a blaze of fire shot up to the sky, followed by a loud report, which announced the destruction of 240 barrels of gunpowder, and 6,000,000 ball cartridges, together with the complete dismantlement of the fortress.† Many lacs of percussion-caps, and 250 boxes of small-arm ammunition, were sacrificed at the same time, together with a considerable amount of public stores, and much private property.

Still the measure was, beyond all question, a wise one; and the spirits of the garrison rose immediately at the accession of strength gained by the safe arrival of their countrymen. Very different to this easy entrance to the Residency, was the "Strait of Fire" through which the next British reinforcement had to run the gauntlet. Meanwhile a heavy trial was at hand. After welcoming the troops from the Muchee Bhawn, Sir Henry retired to rest in the same small chamber he had been vainly entreated to leave. The next morning, at half-past eight, he was sitting on his bed, listening to some papers read aloud by Captain Wilson, the deputy assistant-commissary-general, when another 8-inch shell entered by the window, and, bursting in the room, a large piece slightly injured Captain Wilson, but struck Sir Henry with such force as nearly to separate his left leg from the thigh. He was immediately brought over to the house of Dr. Fayrer, the Residency surgeon;‡ which was less exposed to the enemy's fire: but the removal appeared to be speedily discovered by the lynx-eyed rebels, and Fayrer's house became the target for their marksmen. The nature of the wound, and

the attenuated condition of the sufferer, forbade any attempt at amputation; but it was necessary to stay the bleeding by applying the tourniquet; and the agony thus occasioned was fearful to behold. The chief persons of the garrison, civil and military, stood round their gallant chief. Heedless of the sound of the bullets striking against the verandah, and of their own imminent danger, they thought only of the scene before them; and, in the words of one of them, found it "impossible to avoid sobbing like a child."§

Notwithstanding his extreme pain, Sir Henry was perfectly sensible, and characteristically unselfish. He appointed Brigadier Inglis to succeed him in command of the troops, and Major Banks in the office of chief commissioner. He specially enjoined those around him to be careful of the ammunition; and often repeated, "Save the ladies." He earnestly entreated that the aid of government should be solicited for the Hill Asylums, established by him for the education of the children of soldiers, and to the support of which, he had, by the most systematic self-denial, contributed at least £1,000 a-year from his official income: he had no other. He bade farewell to the gentlemen round him, pointed out the worthlessness of human distinctions, and recommended all to fix their thoughts upon a better world. Then turning to his nephew, who, he said, had been as a son to him,|| he sent messages to his children, and to each of his brothers and sisters, and tenderly alluded to the beloved wife,¶ dead some four years before, who had so cordially seconded all his schemes of public and private usefulness. He lingered till eight o'clock in the morning of the 4th, and then his paroxysms of anguish terminated in a peaceful, painless death. His last request was, that the inscription upon his tomb should be simply this—"Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to

* One man, however, was left behind, dead drunk. He remained during the explosion—was thrown into the air—fell asleep again, and, on awaking next morning, found himself amid a heap of deserted ruins; whereupon he proceeded quietly to the Residency, taking with him a cart of ammunition, drawn by two bullocks, and astonished the soldiers by calling out, "Arrah! open your gates." Rees, who narrates this anecdote, quotes the French proverb, "Il y'a un Dieu pour les ivrognes;" and suggests, that the serious injury to the adjacent houses, and probable destruction of many of the rebels stationed near the Muchee Bhawn, may account for so extraordinary an escape.—*Siege of Lucknow*, p. 121.

† Brigadier Inglis's despatch, Sept. 26th, 1857. It is asserted, that the destruction thus occasioned was much overrated.

‡ Brother to the volunteer of the same name, killed with Captain Fletcher Hayes. See p. 193.

§ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 199.

|| Mrs. Harris's *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 77.

¶ "The late Lady Lawrence shared all his benevolence and all his genius. His article in the *Calcutta Review*, on 'Woman in India,' is descriptive of her character; and the large subscription that was raised for the Lawrence Asylum after her death, was the best tribute to her worth."—*Friend of India*, July, 1857.

do his duty. May the Lord have mercy on his soul!"*

The words are very touching, when considered as the utterance of the man who will go down to posterity as the pacificator of the Punjab,† and to whose prudence, energy, and foresight, despite the disaster at Chinhut, the gallant survivors of the Lucknow garrison consider their success mainly attributable.‡ Indeed (in the emphatic words of Brigadier Inglis), but for the foresight and precautions of Henry Lawrence, every European in Lucknow might have slept in a bloody shroud.

Half-an-hour before Sir Henry's death, his nephew was shot through the shoulder, in the verandah. Mrs. Harris, the wife of the Residency chaplain, writes in her diary—"I have been nursing him to-day, poor fellow! It was so sad to see him lying there in the room with his uncle's body; looking so pale, and suffering." In the course of a few hours it became necessary to remove the corpse; and one of the soldiers called in for the purpose, lifting the sheet from the face, bent over and kissed it reverently. No military honours marked the funeral. A hurried prayer was read amidst the booming of cannon and the fire of musketry; and the remains of the good and great man were lowered into a pit, with several other lowlier companions in arms.

The death of Sir Henry Lawrence was kept secret for many days: he was even

reported to be recovering; but, at last, the truth could no longer be concealed; and the tidings were "received throughout the garrison with feelings of consternation only second to the grief which was inspired in the hearts of all, by the loss of a public benefactor and a warm personal friend."§

A well-known Indian journal (the *Friend of India*) writes—"The commissioner of Oude died, not before he had breathed into his little garrison somewhat of his own heroic spirit. Great actions are contagious, and gladly would they have died for him; but it was not so to be; *henceforth they will live only for vengeance.*" The English at Lucknow happily understood the spirit of their beloved chief much better. They had recognised in him a Christian, not an Homeric hero; and the pursuit of vengeance, "the real divinity of the *Iliad*," was, they well knew, utterly incompatible with the forgiving spirit which Sir Henry uniformly advocated as the very essence of vital Christianity. In fact, his true vocation was that of a lawgiver and an administrator, not a subjugator; his talent lay in preventing revolt, rather than in crushing it with the iron heel of the destroyer. Lord Canning|| showed considerable appreciation of Sir Henry Lawrence, when he dwelt on his loss as one which equally affected the Europeans and natives. This was true when it was written, in the very height of the struggle; but it is more striking now,

* See descriptive letterpress, by Mr. Couper (Sir Henry Lawrence's secretary), to Lieutenant Clifford H. Meham's charming *Sketches of Lucknow*.

† "What the memory of Tod is in Rajast'han—what Macpherson was to the Khonds, Outram to the Bheels, Napier to the Beloochees—that, and more, was Henry Lawrence to the fierce and haughty Seiks."—*Westminster Review*, October, 1858.

‡ See Gubbins, Rees, Polehampton, Case, &c.

§ Brigadier Inglis's despatch, Sept. 26th, 1857.

|| There is not, I am sure, an Englishman in India who does not regard the loss of Sir Henry Lawrence, in the present circumstances of the country, as one of the heaviest of public calamities. There is not, I believe, a native of the provinces where he has held authority, who will not remember his name as that of a friend and generous benefactor to the races of India."—[Lord Canning to the Court of Directors, Sept. 8th, 1857]. Lord Stanley, too, has borne high testimony to the rare merits of Sir Henry Lawrence. At a meeting held to promote the endowment of the schools founded by him for the education of soldiers' children at Kussowlie and Mount Aboo—the "two elder daughters," whose permanent establishment had been one main reason for his prolonged abode in India—Lord Stanley said—"Sir Henry Lawrence rose to eminence step by step, not by favour of any man, certainly not

by subserviency either to ruling authorities or to popular ideas, but simply by the operation of that natural law which in troubled times brings the strongest mind, be it where it may, to the post of highest command. I knew Sir H. Lawrence six years ago. Travelling in the Punjab, I passed a month in his camp, and it then seemed to me, as it does now, that his personal character was far above his career, eminent as that career has been. If he had died a private and undistinguished person, the impress of his mind would still have been left on all those who came personally into contact with him. I thought him, as far as I could judge, sagacious and far-seeing in matters of policy; and I had daily opportunity of witnessing, even under all the disadvantages of a long and rapid journey, his constant assiduity in the dispatch of business. But it was not the intellectual qualities of the man which made upon me the deepest impression. There was in him a rare union of determined purpose, of moral as well as physical courage, with a singular frankness and a courtesy of demeanour which was something more than we call courtesy; for it belonged not to manners, but to mind—a courtesy shown equally to Europeans and natives. Once know him, and you could not imagine him giving utterance to any sentiment which was harsh, or petty, or self-seeking."—*Times*, Feb. 8th, 1858.

when every one capable of looking below the surface, feels that the worst effect of the mutiny is the breach which it has so fearfully widened between the two races.

Avengers and subjugators have done their work: we want peace-makers now; but where can we look for such an one as Henry Lawrence?

CHAPTER XI.

CAWNPOOR.—MAY 16TH TO JUNE 27TH, 1857.

CAWNPOOR was selected by the East India Company, in 1775, as the station of the subsidiary troops, to be maintained for the use of the government of Oude. In 1801, the district and city of the same name, with other territory, amounting to half the kingdom, was ceded to the Company, under the circumstances already narrated.*

Caunpoor is not a place of ancient historic interest. The district had formerly an ill name, as the abode of Thugs and Phansigars, especially the western portion of it, where great numbers of murderous bands were said to have resided, ostensibly engaged in cultivating small spots of land, though, in fact, supported by the more lucrative profession of Thuggee.† These gangs had, however, been completely broken up, and the district freed from their hateful operations. The city appears to be of modern origin: there is no mention of it in the *Ayeen Akbery* (drawn up by Abul Fazil, towards the close of the 16th century); and its name—half Mohammedan, half Hindoo (*Caun*, or *Khan*, lord; and *poor*, town),‡ speaks its mixed character. The native town contained, before the mutiny, about 59,000 inhabitants; and the population of the cantonments, exclusive of the military, is stated by Thornton at 49,975, giving a total of 108,975. The cantonments extend, in a semicircle, for nearly five miles along the right bank of the Ganges; the bungalows of the officers and residents being situated in richly-planted compounds or inclosures, and having the most productive gardens in India; grapes, peaches, mangoes, shaddocks, plantains, melons, oranges, limes, guavas, and custard apples, growing there in perfection, together with most

European vegetables. Assembly-rooms, a theatre, and a race-course were early erected by the Europeans; and, about eighteen years ago, a church was raised by the joint means of a private subscription and a government grant of money and land.

The most attractive feature in Caunpoor is its ghaut, or landing-place, the traffic being very great. The Ganges, here a mile broad, is navigable down to the sea a distance of above 1,000 miles, and upwards to Sukertal, a distance of 300 miles. Numerous and strange descriptions of vessels are to be seen collected along the banks; and the craft, fastened to the shore, are so closely packed that they appear like one mass, and, from their thatched roofs and low entrances, might easily pass for a floating village.

Many an English lady, during the last half century, has stood at the ghaut, with her ayah and young children by her side, watching the ferry-boat plying across the stream, with its motley collection of passengers—travellers, merchants, and fakirs, camels, bullocks, and horses all crowded together; and may have turned away from the stately Ganges with a sigh, perhaps, for far-distant England, but still without so much as a passing doubt of personal safety in the luxurious abodes, where crowds of natives waited in readiness to minister to the comfort of the privileged “governing race.” The evidences of disaffection at Barrackpoor and elsewhere, appear to have had little or no effect in awakening a sense of danger; and at the time when the Meerut catastrophe became known at Caunpoor, the latter station was unusually thronged with ladies, who had come thither for the

* See Introductory Chapter, page 60.

† Sherwood on Phansigars.—*Asiatic Researches*, vol. xiii., p. 290.

‡ Hamilton's *Gazetteer*. Thornton, however, states, on the authority of Tod, that Caun is a corruption of Kanh, a name of Crishna.

purpose of being present at the balls given by the officers during the preceding month.

Tidings of the Meerut massacre were circulated at Cawnpoor on the 16th of May, and created a great sensation in the cantonments, where the greased cartridge question had already been discussed. The officer in command, Sir Hugh Massey Wheeler, was one of the most experienced and popular generals in the Company's service. He had spent nearly fifty-four years in India as a sepoy commander, and he had married an Indian lady. He had led Bengal troops, under Lord Lake, against their own countrymen; and they had followed him to Afghanistan, to oppose foreigners. In both the Seik campaigns, Wheeler and his sepoys had been conspicuous: in the second, he held a separate command. Lord Gough had esteemed him highly as an active and energetic officer, singularly fertile in resources. His despatches prove that he was fully alive to the probability of mutiny among the troops, and took his precautions accordingly; but he had not calculated on insurrection among the people, or on the defalcation, much less the treachery, of a neighbouring chief, in reliance on whose good faith he prepared to meet, and hoped to weather, the approaching storm. It has been affirmed, and not without cause, with respect to the proceedings at Cawnpoor, that "if the dispossessed princes and people of the land, farmers, yillagers, and ryots, had not made common cause with the sepoys, there is every reason to believe that but a portion of the force would have revolted: the certainty exists, that not a single officer would have been injured."*

The troops at Cawnpoor, at the time of the outbreak at Meerut, consisted of—

The 1st, 53rd, and 56th N.I.—*Europeans*, 46; *Natives*, 2,924. The second light cavalry regiment—*Europeans*, 21; *Natives*, 526. Three companies of artillery—*Europeans*, 88; *Natives*, 152. A detachment of H.M. 84th foot (100 men), including those in hospital.†

On the 16th of May, an incendiary fire occurred in the lines of the 1st N.I., and the artillery were moved up to the European barracks. On the 18th, Sir Hugh Wheeler telegraphed to Calcutta that considerable excitement was visible at Cawnpoor.‡ The

next day he was desired, by the Supreme government, to begin immediately to make all preparations for the accommodation of a European force, and to let it be known that he was doing so.§ This message led General Wheeler to believe that considerable detachments were on their road from Calcutta; and finding the agitation around him rapidly increasing, he dispatched a requisition to Lucknow, for a company of H.M. 32nd to be stationed at Cawnpoor, pending the arrival of the promised reinforcement.

On the night of the 20th, the cavalry sent emissaries to the infantry lines, asking the three regiments to stand by them, and asserting that the Europeans were about to take away their horses and accoutrements; in fact, to disarm and disband them—a course which the Europeans had no immediate opportunity of adopting, being few in number, and heavily encumbered with women and children. A struggle seemed inevitable: uproar and confusion prevailed throughout the 21st of May; and General Wheeler placed the guns in position, and prepared for the worst. The men were addressed and reasoned with, through the medium of the Native officers. They listened, seemed convinced, and retired quietly to their lines at about half-past seven. A few hours later, fifty-five of H.M. 32nd, and 240 Oude troopers, arrived from Lucknow. General Wheeler, after acquainting the Supreme government with the above particulars, adds—"This morning (22nd) two guns, and about 300 men of all arms, were brought in by the Maharajah of Bithoor. Being Mahrattas, they are not likely to coalesce with the others. Once the Europeans from Calcutta arrived, I should hope that all would be beyond danger. I have the most cordial co-operation from Mr. Hillersdon, the magistrate. At present things appear quiet; but it is impossible to say what a moment may bring forth."||

The temper of the reinforcement of Oude irregulars was not deemed satisfactory; and after they had been some days at Cawnpoor, they were dispatched on the expedition which issued in their mutinying and murdering Captain Hayes and two other Europeans.¶ Lieutenant Ashe was sent by Sir Hugh Wheeler, a day or two

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 126.

† Parliamentary Return, February 9th, 1858; p. 3.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny (1857), p. 199.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

|| Telegram, May 22nd.—Appendix, p. 310.

¶ Captain Hayes had a wife and five children at Lucknow. Mrs. Barbor, who had been three months married, was also there.—Polehampton's *Letters*, p. 274.

after the departure of the Oude irregulars, to join them with a half-battery of Oude horse artillery. A few marches from the station he met some Seiks of the irregulars, who had abandoned their mutinous comrades; and they marched to Cawnpoor with Lieutenant Ashe and the guns.*

The presence of the Mahrattas did not exercise any beneficial effect. Rumours were circulated that the polluting cartridges were to be served out on the 23rd, and that the artillery were to act against all who refused them. Much excitement was manifested; and, on the 24th of May (the Queen's birthday), it was deemed advisable to omit the usual salute.

On the 27th, General Wheeler writes—"All quiet; but I feel by no means confident it will continue so. The civil and military depending entirely upon me for advice and assistance just now, I regret I cannot find time at present to compile a detailed account of late occurrences in my division."†

On the 1st of June, he mentions that Enfield rifle ammunition had been detained in the Cawnpoor magazine, and would just do for the Madras Fusiliers.‡ This circumstance would not escape the distrustful and observant sepoys.

On the following day, two companies of H.M. 84th arrived from Allahabad; but, on the morning of the 3rd, General Wheeler, having heard of the uneasiness which prevailed at Lucknow, gave orders for one company of the 84th, made up to its full strength, together with the company of the 32nd, to march thither, retaining, for the defence of Cawnpoor, 204 Europeans—consisting of 60 men of the 84th regiment, 15 of the 1st Madras Fusiliers (armed with the Enfield rifle), 70 H.M. 32nd, invalids and sick, and 59 artillerymen, with six guns.§

The position now taken by Sir Hugh Wheeler can only be accounted for in one way. It is believed, that no officer of his known ability would have made the selection he did, except under the conviction that the Native troops, though they might desert, would not attack him.||

In this view of the case, it followed, that in looking round the overgrown cantonments for a place of shelter for the residents, convenient quarters for a temporary

refuge were desired, rather than such as would best stand a siege. Had the latter necessity been contemplated, the magazine would, in the absence of a fort, have been best qualified for defence, being a very large building, surrounded by a high masonry wall, and well supplied with every muniment of war. But then it was situated seven miles from the new native lines, close to the gaol, and on the Delhi road. To have concentrated the Europeans there, would have been to abandon all prospect of peaceable disarmament, which Sir Hugh Wheeler might have reasonably expected to accomplish by the aid of the European troops, whose arrival he anxiously expected, part of whom were stopped on the way by the mutiny at Allahabad, and the remainder are alleged to have been needlessly delayed at Calcutta by the tardy, shiftless proceedings of the Supreme government. He therefore fixed on two long barracks, standing in the centre of an extensive plain at the eastern end of the station; and, unhappily, commanded on all sides. The dépôt of the 32nd, consisting of the sick, invalids, women and children of the regiment, was already located in these two buildings, which were single-storied, and intended each for the accommodation of one hundred men. One of them was thatched, and both were surrounded by a flat-roofed arcade or verandah; the walls were of brick, an inch and a-half in thickness; a well and the usual out-offices were attached to the barracks.

The only defence attempted, or even practicable, in the time and under the circumstances of the stiffness of the soil from drought and the scarcity of labour, was to dig a trench, and throw up the earth on the outside so as to form a parapet, which might have been five feet high, but was not even bullet-proof at the crest. Open spaces were likewise left for the guns, which were thus entirely unprotected. It will be easily understood what slight cover an intrenchment of this kind would furnish either for the barracks or for men in the trenches; and there was plenty of cover both for musketry and guns within a short distance of the barracks, of which the mutineers soon availed themselves.

* These Seiks were immediately dismissed by General Wheeler.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 130.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857; p. 325.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

§ *Narrative of the Mutiny at Cawnpoor*; forwarded by governor-general to Court of Directors, apparently as an official statement.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), 1857; p. 129.

|| Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 177.

It is evident that the aid by which Sir Hugh and the English hoped to be enabled to tide over the expected crisis, was looked for from the chief, styled, in a foregoing despatch, the Maharajah of Bithoor. It is no small compliment to the native character, that, however little it may have been praised in words; in deeds, great reliance has been placed on allies, whose fidelity has been subjected to severe trials. In the present instance, implicit trust was evinced in the co-operation of one who notoriously considered himself an ill-used and aggrieved person, and who had lavished large sums of money in endeavouring to obtain, in England, the reversal of what he, and probably a large body of his countrymen, considered to be the unjust decision of the Indian government.

Dhoondia Rao Punt, commonly called the Nana Sahib (the son of a Brahmin), was adopted by the ex-Peishwa, Bajee Rao, in 1827, being then between two and three years of age. Bajee Rao died in January, 1851; and Nana Rao claimed from the British government the continuance of the pension of £80,000 a-year, granted as the condition of his adopted father's abdication of the sovereignty of Poona in 1818. The question here is not one of adoption; for had the Peishwa left issue of his own body, male and legitimate, the terms of the treaty of 1818 would not have warranted a demand, as of right, for the continuance of the stipend, of which a singular combination of circumstances had necessitated the concession. The treaty, framed by Sir John Malcolm, stipulated for the surrender of the person of Bajee Rao within twenty-four hours, and for the formal surrender of all political power to the British.

"The fourth article declares, that Bajee Rao shall, on his voluntarily agreeing to this arrangement, receive a liberal pension from the Company's government, for the support of *himself and his family*. The amount of this pension will be fixed by the governor-general; but Brigadier-general Malcolm takes upon himself to engage that it shall not be less than eight lacs of rupees per annum."*

Malcolm was much blamed for having named so large a sum as the minimum, and the Company most reluctantly redeemed the pledge he had given on their behalf:

but he maintained, that the stipend, "though princely for the support of Bajee Rao, his family, and numerous adherents, was nothing for purposes of ambition;" and that if "he had been reduced to a condition in point of allowances, respectability, and liberty, that degraded him in his own mind and that of others, he might have asked himself, 'Where can I be worse?'"†

Again, Malcolm asserts, that the Peishwa was neither destitute of the means of protracting the contest, nor disposed to throw himself unconditionally on the British government; and, after detailing his position and resources, he adds—"The article I purchased was worth the price I paid; I could not get it cheaper."‡ On various grounds he vindicates the policy of liberal dealing with the dethroned prince—namely, on account of "our own dignity, considerations for the feelings of Bajee Rao's adherents, and for the prejudices of the natives of India. We exist on impression; and, on occasions like this, where all are anxious spectators, we must play our part well, or we should be hissed."

In all the discussions regarding the stipend, it is evident that it was regarded simply as a life pension, and that the question of its continuance to the family was never entertained. But, nevertheless, the Indian authorities of that day—Lord Hastings, Adam, Elphinstone, and, most of all, Malcolm—would have been painfully surprised, could they have supposed that, on the death of the man known to them as the "first Hindoo prince in India," a governor-general would be found to declare that "the Peishwa's family have no claim upon the government, and that he would by no means consent to any portion of the public money being conferred on it." Yet this decision Lord Dalhousie pronounced without reference to the Court of Directors, who had, some years before, in answer to an application from the Peishwa on the subject of his family, simply deferred the consideration of the claim.

It is true that Bajee Rao had enjoyed his princely stipend much longer than could have been reasonably anticipated, considering that he was a man of feeble constitution and dissolute habits, far advanced in years at the time of his surrender. He made considerable savings, and actually assisted the government with the loan of six lacs, at the time of the

* *Kaye's Life of Malcolm*, vol. ii., p. 254.

† Letter to Mr. Adam—*Ibid.*, p. 258.

‡ Letter to Sir Thomas Munro—*Ibid.*, p. 257.

siege of Bhurtpoor, when the Cawnpoor treasury was totally devoid of assets, and the march of the troops was delayed in consequence. During his life he supported a multitude of adherents; and, at one time, had no less than 8,000 armed followers at Bithoor. Yet their conduct was so orderly, that the magistrate of Cawnpoor reported, that their presence had occasioned no perceptible increase of crime or disorder in his district. At the Peishwa's death, property said to amount to £160,000,* went to his adopted heir, and his wives and daughters were left in extreme distress; the Peishwa having confidently expected that some provision, more or less satisfactory, would be made for them, if only in deference to popular feeling. It was not, however, poverty only to which these ladies were reduced. The jaghire, or estate, granted to the Peishwa, was specially conceded to preserve the ex-royal family from coming under British jurisdiction: its sequestration at once rendered them liable to be dragged before our law courts—an indignity which natives of high rank have committed suicide to escape. "There was," it is alleged, "proof positive that their alarm on this head was no idle fear, as notices had already been served upon some of them to appear before the Supreme Court at Calcutta."† These grievances had not been borne in silence. The wealth of the Nana secured him plenty of counsellors and advocates. Among the best known of these was one Azim Oollah, who came to London; made himself extremely conspicuous in the parks and Belgravian drawing-rooms, and extremely troublesome at the public offices; lavished some thousands of his employer's money in presents, with a view to gain a favourable hearing in high quarters; and eventually returned to Bithoor, to pour into the Nana's ear his own exaggerated and malicious version of his costly failure in England.

Every guest who visited Bithoor heard the Nana's grievances; and if of any rank, was urged, on his or her return to England, to make an effort for their redress. Who could refuse so munificent a host as the Nana is represented to have been? and how many may have been tempted to overrate the very small influence they possessed,

and the efforts they were disposed to make in his behalf? The visitors' book bore the names of hundreds who had been sumptuously entertained at Bithoor for days, and even weeks. Since the tidings of the fearful crime with which his name has become inseparably associated, many descriptions of his person and abode have been published in the public journals. As to character, all who knew him at Cawnpoor agree in describing him as a person of decidedly second-rate ability, only remarkable for the consequence which his position as the representative of an honoured though fallen dynasty gave him with the natives, and his wealth and convivial disposition procured with the Europeans.

A writer in the *Illustrated Times*, who manifests considerable acquaintance with Indian politics and society, says—

"I knew Nana Sahib intimately, and always regarded him as one of the best and most hospitable natives in the Upper Provinces, and certainly one of the last men to have been guilty of the atrocities laid to his charge. As in the case with many natives of India, it may have been that Nana Sahib cultivated the acquaintance and friendship of the sahibs solely in the hope, that through their influence, direct and indirect, his grievances would be redressed. But the last time I saw Nana Sahib—it was in the cold weather of 1851; and he called upon me twice during my stay in Cawnpoor—he never once alluded to his grievances. His conversation at that time was directed to the Oude affair. The following questions, amongst others, I can remember he put to me:—'Why will not Lord Dalhousie pay a visit to the King of Oude? Lord Hardinge did so.' 'Do you think Colonel Sleeman will persuade Lord Dalhousie to seize the kingdom (of Oude)? He (Colonel Sleeman) has gone to the camp to do his best.'

"So far as I could glean, Nana Sahib wished for the annexation of Oude—albeit he expressed a very decided opinion that, in the event of that measure being resorted to, there would be a disturbance, and perhaps a war."

Another visitor, an English officer, gives an anecdote which is very characteristic of the barrier that obstructs the social intercourse of Europeans and natives. On the way to Bithoor, the visitor praised the equipage of his host, who rejoined—

"Not long ago, I had a carriage and horses very superior to these. They cost me 25,000 rupees; but I had to burn the carriage and kill the horses.'—'Why so?'—'The child of a certain sahib in Cawnpoor was very sick, and the sahib and the mem-sahib were bringing the child to Bithoor for a change of air. I sent my big carriage for them.

the English law courts had stepped in as trustees for his interests. A full and authentic statement of the case of the Peishwa's family, ought, ere now, to have been published by government.

* *Homeward Mail*, November 30th, 1857.

† *Ibid.* The Nana had been involved in several unsuccessful law-suits; for the younger adopted son of the Peishwa (the Nana's nephew being a minor,

On the road the child died; and, of course, as a dead body had been in the carriage, and as the horses had drawn that dead body in that carriage, I could never use them again.' (The reader must understand that a native of any rank considers it a disgrace to sell property).—'But could you not have given the horses to some friend—a Christian or a Mussulman?'—'No; had I done so, it might have come to the knowledge of the sahib, and his feelings would have been hurt at having occasioned me such a loss.' Such was the maharajah, commonly known as Nana Sahib. He appeared to be not a man of ability, nor a fool."

In person, the Nana was well described by one of his attendants as a *tring admee* (tight man). Corpulent, and of the middle height, with a complexion scarcely darker than the olive-coloured Spaniard; with bright bead-like eyes, a round face, a straight, well-cut nose, and sensual mouth and chin; his appearance would probably have been attractive to an ordinary observer, but for the effect of the caste-mark on his forehead. He spoke little English; neither is there any reason to suppose the British government had ever made any effort to influence Bajee Rao in the education of his adopted son, though brought up under their auspices. The Nana knew but very little English: but Azim Oollah was fluent in that language; and could speak, it is said, some French and German.

In April, 1857, the Nana visited Lucknow, "on pretence of seeing the sights there," accompanied by a numerous retinue, of course including the notorious Azim Oollah. Sir Henry Lawrence received him kindly, and ordered the authorities of the city to show him every attention. The Nana departed very suddenly; and this circumstance, together with his arrogant and presuming demeanour, excited the suspicions of Mr. Gubbins, who, after consulting with Sir Henry Lawrence, wrote, with his sanction, to convey to Sir Hugh Wheeler their joint impressions of the Mahratta chief. But the warning appears to have been totally unheeded. It was then believed that the Nana had a large portion of his inherited wealth, amounting to £500,000, vested in government securities; and it was not known till his treachery was consummated, that ever since the annexation of Oude, he had been secretly and gradually changing the disposition of his property, till only £30,000 remained to be

* He is asserted to have been addressed, in correspondence, as Maharajah Sree Nath Bahadur, and to have been called Nana Sahib, in accordance with the pet name given to him in the seraglio, being the first

sacrificed when he should think fit to throw off his allegiance. Being wholly unsuspected, his arrangements were never noticed; and despite his loudly trumpeted wrongs, he had so much to lose, that no one ever dreamt of his joining in revolt, even at the instigation of the Mephistopheles at his elbow. He continued to live at his castellated palace at Bithoor, a few miles N.W. of Cawnpoor; to keep six mounted guns, and as many followers as he chose. He gave sumptuous entertainments; made hunting parties for strangers of distinction; and was always ready to lend his elephants, and, as we have seen, his equipages also, for the use of the neighbouring "sahibs and mem-sahibs." In return, he was treated with much distinction, and styled the Maharajah—a title to which he had no rightful claim, and which he ought never to have been suffered to assume. Even that of the Nana Sahib* is a term too closely allied to Mahratta sovereignty, to have been a judicious designation for an avowed pretender to the inheritance of the last of the Peishwas. Nana is the Mahratta term for "maternal grandfather;" but recurs constantly in the annals of Mahrashtra, in a similar sense to that in which the designations of "Uncles of York," and "Cousins of Lancaster," are applied in our history.† To names and traditions the English have never been inclined to attach much importance; and the present generation have far surpassed their predecessors in contemptuous indifference to the influence which these things exercise on the minds of the natives of India.

Among those who were most completely deceived by the Nana's professions, was Mr. Hillersdon, the magistrate and collector; who, both in his public and private capacity, had many opportunities of knowing him. In one of the painfully interesting letters which describe the crisis at Cawnpoor (published, in deference to public feeling, by the parties to whom they were addressed), Mrs. Hillersdon writes:—

"There does not seem to be any immediate danger here; but should they mutiny, we should either go into cantonments, or to a place called Bithoor, about six miles from Cawnpoor, where the Peishwa's successor resides. He is a great friend of Charles's, and is a man of enormous wealth and influence; and

sound he distinctly articulated. The point has been already more discussed than it deserves. See *Daily News*, September 25th, 1857.

† See Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*.

he has assured Charles that we shall all be quite safe there. I myself would much prefer going to the cantonments, to be with the other ladies, but Charles thinks it would be better for me and our precious children to be at Bithoor.*

A proposition was also entertained, of sending other ladies there for safety;† but some reason, not specified, prevented its being carried into execution. On the 21st of May, a report was circulated that the Native troops would rise that night; whereupon Mr. and Mrs. Hillersdon, with their two children, abandoned their own compound, which was four miles from cantonments, and took refuge with Colonel Ewart, of the 1st N.I. The colonel went at night (as all the officers were subsequently directed to do) to sleep in the midst of his men, with the view of reassuring them by trusting his life with them, and also of aiding the well-disposed to hold the turbulent in check. At the same time, he declared that if his regiment mutinied, it might walk over his body, but he would never leave it.‡ Mr. Hillersdon was soon afterwards called away; and his wife and Mrs. Ewart, with their children and nurses, drove to the barracks, which had been assigned as a rendezvous in case of alarm.

For several days no change took place. In the morning the ladies went to their own houses; in the evening they returned to the "melancholy night quarters," graphically described by Mrs. Ewart, in the letters from whence the following passages are extracted:—

"Oh! such a scene! Men, officers, women and children, beds and chairs, all mingled together, inside and outside the barracks. Some talking, or even laughing; some frightened, some defiant, others despairing; three guns in front of our position, and three behind, and a trench in course of formation all round. * * * The general is busy now, and he has spiked the guns he could not use yesterday (26th May), and laid a train for blowing up the magazine, should any outbreak occur."

After alluding to the reported advance of the rebel force, Mrs. Ewart adds:—

"No outbreak is at present apprehended from any of the troops here; our danger lies now in what may come from outside. The appearance of successful insurgents amongst the regiments, would be the signal to rise; and all we could really depend upon for defence, is our position behind our guns, and the help of about 150 European soldiers, forty

railway people and merchants, and a few stragglers. There are two regiments of Oude irregulars; but I am not inclined to put faith in them. There are also some Mahrattas, with the rajah of Bithoor, who have come to our assistance; but I can scarcely feel a comfort at their presence either.

"For ourselves, I need only say, that even should our position be strong enough to hold out, there is the dreadful exposure to the heat of May and June, together with the privations and confinement of besieged sufferers, to render it very unlikely that we can survive the disasters which may fall upon us any day, any hour. My dear little child is looking very delicate; my prayer is that she may be spared much suffering. The bitterness of death has been tasted by us many, many times, during the last fortnight; and should the reality come, I hope we may find strength to meet it with a truly Christian courage. It is not hard to die oneself; but to see a dear child suffer and perish—that is the hard, the bitter trial, and the cup which I must drink, should God not deem it fit that it should pass from me. My companion, Mrs. Hillersdon, is delightful: poor young thing, she has such a gentle spirit, so uncomplaining, so desirous to meet the trial rightly, so unselfish and sweet in every way. Her husband is an excellent man, and of course very much exposed to danger, almost as much as mine. She has two children, and we feel that our duty to our little ones demands that we should exert ourselves to keep up health and spirits as much as possible. There is a reverse to this sad picture. Delhi may be retaken in a short time. Aid may come to us, and all may subside into tranquillity once more. * * * But it is useless to speculate upon what may happen. We can only take the present as it comes, and do its duties and meet its trials in the best spirit we can maintain. We are more cheerful, in spite of the great anxiety and suspense; our family party is really a charming one, and we feel better able to meet difficulties and dangers for being thus associated; at the worst we know that we are in God's hands, and He does not for an instant forsake us. He will be with us in the valley of the shadow of death also, and we need fear no evil. God bless you!"

The tone of Colonel Ewart is very similar to that of his admirable wife. He believed, that unless Delhi were speedily recaptured, little short of a miracle could keep the Native troops at Cawnpore quiet, or prevent mutiny at other stations. General Wheeler he describes as "an excellent officer; very determined; self-possessed in the midst of danger; fearless of responsibility." He mentions that an attempt was to be made to bring the treasure, amounting to ten or twelve lacs of rupees (£100,000 or £120,000), into the intrenched camp on the following day (June 1st).

In concluding his last letter, Colonel Ewart specially recommends his wife and infant to the protection of his sister, who already had a boy of his under her care. "If the troops," he writes, "should break out here, it is not probable that I shall

* *Times*, October, 1857.

† Letter to the *Times*, written by Captain Mowbray Thomson: dated September 8th, 1856.

‡ Letter by Mrs. Ewart, dated May 27th, 1857.

survive it. My post, and that of my officers, being with the colours of the regiment, in the last extremity some or all of us must needs be killed. If that should be my fate, you and all my friends will know, I trust, that I die in the execution of my duty. But I do not think they will venture to attack the intrenched position, which is held by the European troops. So I hope in God that my wife and child may be saved."

It appears from the narrative of Lieutenant Delafosse, that the Nana did not proffer, but was asked for assistance; whereupon "he sent some 200 cavalry, 400 infantry, and two guns, which force had the guarding of the treasury."* The Nana either accompanied or followed his troops to Cawnpoor, and took up his residence in a house not far from that abandoned by the collector. Lieutenant Thomson remarks—"His visit was made at the request of the resident magistrate; and such was the confidence placed in this infernal traitor, that the whole of the treasure (upwards of £100,000) was placed under his protection."† It appears, however, that General Wheeler did make the attempt, mentioned by Colonel Ewart as intended, for the removal of the treasure, and that he failed on this and previous occasions, from the determined resolve of the troops not to submit to what they chose to call a mark of distrust.‡ A lac of rupees

was, however, obtained and carried away to the intrenchments, under the plea of meeting the salaries of the troops and other current expenses.§

On the morning of the 4th of June, Sir Hugh Wheeler received information regarding the 2nd cavalry and 1st and 56th N.I., which induced him to order the European officers thereof to discontinue sleeping in the lines; but the 53rd N.I. being considered loyal, the officers were to remain at night with that corps. By this time the trenches were finished, the guns in position, and provisions for 1,000 persons, for twenty-five days, were declared to be in store.

It appears, however, owing to carelessness or knavery, that the quantity actually supplied fell far short of the indents. At 2 A.M. on the 6th of June,|| the 2nd cavalry rose together with a great shout, mounted their horses, and set fire to the bungalow of their quartermaster. The main body then proceeded towards the commissariat cattle-yard, and took possession of the government elephants, thirty-six in number; at the same time setting fire to the cattle-sergeant's dwelling. A few of the ring-leaders went to the lines of the 1st N.I., and persuaded the men—who, it is said, "were mostly young recruits, the old hands being away on leave or on command"—¶ to join in the mutiny. Either Colonel Ewart

* *Times*, October 15th, 1857.

† Letter to the *Times*, dated September 8th, 1858.

‡ See Account of Nerput, opium gomashtha, or broker.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 51.

§ Accounts of Nerput and of Mr. Shepherd.

|| See Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 130. The various accounts of the Cawnpoor mutiny and massacre differ considerably, sometimes in material points. The weightiest authorities are of course the telegrams and despatches written by Sir Hugh Wheeler, and the officers serving under him, to the Calcutta and Lucknow governments. The next in value are the testimonies of Lieutenants (now Captains) Thomson and Delafosse, published in letters of various dates in the *Times*. Mrs. Murray, another survivor (the widow of the band-sergeant of the 56th N.I., who perished at Cawnpoor, as did also her brother and two sons), has given a very circumstantial version (see *Times*, September 3rd, 1858) of what she saw and heard, which was "put into shape" for her by a literary gentleman; and is, Mr. Russell declares, "fiction founded on fact." That it is not Mrs. Murray's own inditing, is evident from the stilted and highly coloured style. A sergeant's wife would hardly talk of "Tartaric barbarity," or remark that, on "the arrival of General Havelock, the cowardly miscreants of Cawnpoor disappeared like stars at dawn of day, and the Nana Sour [Nana the pig] disappeared like a comet." In this case, as in most others of mingled fact and fiction, the latter predominates so largely as to neutralise the former:

and even independently of the internal evidence of the account, the contradiction given by Lieutenant Thomson to several of Mrs. Murray's most positive assertions regarding matters which she speaks of in the character of an eye-witness, quite invalidates her authority. Then there is the clear and connected account of Mr. Shepherd, an uncovenanted servant of the Company, and probably an Eurasian. His testimony is of considerable value as regards what he actually witnessed; but the value of his statements is diminished by his failing to separate information which he has acquired from personal observation, from that which he has accepted on hearsay. (Further Parl. Papers, No. 4; pp. 174 to 185). The same remark applies to the story of Nerput, an opium gomashtha, in the service of the E.I. Company, whose deposition was received by Colonel Neill, and forwarded by him to the Supreme government. (See Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), pp. 51 to 53). The diary of the "Nunna" nawab (a native of rank residing in Cawnpoor), is another document transmitted by the governor-general for the perusal of the home authorities (Further Parl. Papers, No. 7; pp. 133 to 138); together with a "Narrative of the Mutiny at Cawnpoor," drawn up apparently as an official summary, and already largely quoted. (*Ibid.*, pp. 129 to 133). An Eurasian girl, supposed at first to have perished, and one or two others, have likewise furnished some additional particulars.

¶ Mr. Shepherd's *Account of the Outbreak*.

and the other officers had persisted in sleeping in their lines, or else they had proceeded thither on the first sound of disturbance; for they were on the spot, and were earnest in their endeavours to preserve the allegiance of the regiment; but to no purpose: the men begged them to withdraw, and finally forced them into the intrenchment as the sole means of escape.*

The insurgents marched to the treasury and magazine, which the Nana's guards never even made a pretence of defending. They next entered the gaol, set the prisoners at liberty, and burnt all the adjacent public offices and records. Then they marched out to Kullianpoor, the first halting-place on the road to Delhi, where they were joined before noon by the men of the 53rd and 56th N.I.; but their own officers remained behind.

Mr. Shepherd says—

"The Native commissioned officers were then told to take their position in the artillery hospital barrack, opposite to us, on the east side, and to make an intrenchment for themselves there, and endeavour to draw back those of the sepoys and Native non-commissioned officers, who, they said, were not inclined to go, but were reluctantly compelled to join. These officers went away, with one or two exceptions, and we never heard any more about them; but I learnt afterwards that, fearing the resentment of the sepoys, they took the straight way to their homes, and never joined in the rebellion.

"Carts were sent at noon to bring in from the sepoy lines the muskets, &c., of the men on leave, and the baggage, &c., of the Christian drummers, who, with their families, had all come to seek protection in the intrenchment. The sick in hospital were also brought in, and the two barracks were very much crowded; so much so, that the drummers and their families, and native servants, had to remain in the open air at night, and under cover of the cook-house and other buildings during the heat of the day. At five o'clock in the evening, all the uncovenanted (myself and my brother included) were mustered, and directed to arm themselves with muskets, of which there was a great heap. This they did; and after receiving a sufficient quantity of ammunition, were told-off in different sections, under the command of several officers, who instructed us as to what we should have to do when occasion required it."

The Europeans breathed again; it seemed as if the crisis were over. Probably they considered that, in suffering the treasury to be robbed, the Mahratta guards had submitted to an overpowering force. Lieutenant Delafosse states only, that "next morning, the 7th of June, a letter was received from the rajah of Bithoor, who was

supposed to be on our side, saying he meant to attack us."

This was the first intimation of the hostility of the arch-traitor, who, it afterwards appeared, had taken advantage of the revolt to secure the lion's share of the government treasure, and had sent emissaries (probably the practised intriguer, Azim Oollah) to the camp of the rebels, urging them to return to Cawnpoor, destroy the garrison there, and thus perform a necessary act for their own security, and one which would procure them honour and reward from the King of Delhi. These arguments prevailed; the mutineers were lured back to the dastardly and murderous work of attacking their officers and families, with their veteran commander and his wife and children hemmed in, as they knew them to be, within that miserable earth-bank. These men were fitting followers for the shameless traitor who, on their return to Cawnpoor, placed himself at their head, saying—"I came in appearance to help the English; but am at heart their mortal enemy."†

Directions had been given by General Wheeler for the destruction of the magazine in the event of an outbreak, and a train had actually been laid for the purpose; but Nana Sahib's Mahrattas appear to have prevented the execution of this plan at the time of the mutiny; and after the troops had left the station, it is probable that its preservation was deemed advantageous. The Nana appreciated its value, and told the mutineers that the magazine was "well furnished with guns of all calibre, and ammunition enough to last a twelvemonth."‡

At ten o'clock A.M., June 7th, the siege commenced; the Nana having, with great speed, brought into position two of his own guns, and two heavy guns which he had procured from the magazine. Before many hours had elapsed, fourteen guns (three 24-pounders, two 18-pounders, seven 9-pounders, and two 6-pounders) were opened in a cannonade, which lasted twenty-two days; and the equal to which, Mowbray Thomson truly remarks, is hardly known in history.

At first the besieged replied briskly to the fire of the rebels, but without any signal success; for there were only eight 9-pounders in the intrenchments; and the dastardly foe did not approach within a thousand yards of the barracks. On the second day of the siege, the green flag was raised in the city (a proceeding in which Azim

* Mr. Shepherd's *Account of the Outbreak*, p. 175.

† Diary of Nerput, opium gomashita.

‡ Statement of Lieutenant Thomson.

Oollah's handiwork is sufficiently evident), and all true Mussulmans were directed to rally round it; and those who hesitated were threatened, insulted, or fined. The Nana's force augmented daily. With ammunition and ordnance in abundance, a full treasury, and the city bazaar in his hands, he soon rendered the position of the Europeans next to hopeless. An incessant fire of musketry was poured into the intrenchment from the nearest cover; guns of large calibre, drawing gradually nearer and nearer, sent their shot and shell, without intermission, against the brick walls of the buildings. On the evening of June 9th, the enemy succeeded, by means of heated shells, in setting fire to the thatched building, in which numbers of sick women and wounded men were huddled together. Many of these were burned alive; and the remainder sought such shelter as could be afforded in the other previously crowded barrack. The hospital stores were almost totally destroyed; the sick and wounded perished in cruel agony; and, to crown the whole, the ammunition was found to be running low, and the besieged were compelled to slacken their fire before the attack had lasted four days. There was a nullah or ditch some distance in front of the intrenchment, from which the enemy pushed on a sap towards the barracks, and by this means poured in a near and deadly fire. On the west of the besieged, an entirely new range of barracks had been in the course of construction; and behind the unfinished walls the rebels posted their matchlockmen, who, however, were dislodged by repeated sallies; and at length two of the barracks were held by pickets from the garrison. But the strength of the besieged was insufficient to prevent the rebels from placing their sharpshooters on other sides. Communication between the barracks became difficult; no one could move out of cover for an instant without becoming a mark for a score of muskets. There was only one well in the intrenchments, which was at first protected by a parapet; but this was easily knocked down; and the enemy kept up such an incessant fire upon the spot, both day and night, that "soon, not a drop of water could be obtained save at the risk of almost certain destruction."* This terrible difficulty diminished after the third day, as the rebels made it a

practice to cease firing at dusk for about two hours; and at that time the crowd round the well was very great. There was no place to shelter the live cattle. Horses of private gentlemen, as also those of the 3rd Oude battery, were obliged to be let loose. A few sheep and goats, as well as the bullocks kept for commissariat purposes, were shot off, and in the course of five or six days no meat was procurable for the Europeans. They, however, occasionally managed to get hold of a stray bullock or cow near the intrenchment at night, which served for a change; otherwise, dhol and chupatties were the common food of all. Several hogsheads of rum and malt liquor were broken open by the enemy's cannon; but of these there was a large quantity, and the loss was not felt.†

The half-destroyed walls of the barracks, or a barricade formed by piling up tents and casks, was the precarious but only shelter that could be obtained; food could not be carried from post to post by day; and the dead were removed at night, and thrown into a dry well outside the intrenchment, near the new unfinished barracks. There was no time to think of coffins or winding-sheets, let the age, sex, or rank of the departed have been what it might. The present agony of the wounded and the dying, the imminent danger and utter wretchedness of all, absorbed every minor consideration. The dead bodies of young and old—of brave men, fair women, delicate children—were laid outside the verandah in the ruins, there to remain until the fatigue party came round at nightfall to collect the corpses. A corner comparatively safe from gunshot was too precious to the living to be spared for the senseless remains of those who, we humbly hope, had passed away to a better life, escaping immediate misery, and the yet more terrible evil to come, which was to crown the sufferings of that fearful siege. Relief, under Colonel Neill, was expected on the 14th of June, but none arrived; and, on the evening of that day, General Wheeler wrote to Lucknow, describing his position. "The whole Christian population is with us in a temporary intrenchment, and our defence has been noble and wonderful; our loss, heavy and cruel. We want aid, aid, aid! If we had 200 men, we could punish the scoundrels, and aid you."‡

It would have been most hazardous at

* Statement sent by Supreme government to Court of Directors.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 131.

† Mr. Shepherd's *Account of the Outbreak*.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 443.

that time to have spared 200 Europeans from Lucknow; but Sir Henry Lawrence, writing to Mr. Tucker at Benares (June 16th), says—"I would risk the absence of so large a portion of our small force, could I see the smallest prospect of its being able to succour Sir Hugh Wheeler. But no individual here cognizant of facts, except Mr. Gubbins, thinks that we could carry a single man across the river, as the enemy holds all the boats, and completely commands the river. May God Almighty defend Cawnpoor, for no help can we afford."

* * * I have sent the pith of this to Colonel Neill, to urge him to relieve Cawnpoor, if in any way possible."*

On first learning news of the mutiny, Sir Henry had directed Captain Evans, the officer stationed at Onao (twelve miles from Cawnpoor), to secure all the boats he could. But the mutineers had forestalled us by breaking up the bridge at Cawnpoor, and securing the boats which had composed it, as well as those at other ferries on the further side of the stream. Captain Evans, with the aid of a Native officer, named Munsub Ali, and a party of mounted police, maintained his position till near the end of June, and patrolled the high road with unceasing energy, heedless of personal risk, as he well might be; for his wife and two children were within that shot-riddled earth-bank, hemmed in by thousands of pitiless foes.

On the 18th of June, Captain Moore, of H.M. 32nd foot, the officer second in command, dispatched to Lucknow the following official acknowledgment of the refusal of the entreaty for reinforcements:—

"Sir Hugh Wheeler regrets you cannot send him the 200 men, as he believes, with their assistance, we could drive the insurgents from Cawnpoor, and capture their guns.

"Our troops, officers, and volunteers, have acted most nobly; and on several occasions, a handful of men have driven hundreds before them. Our loss has been chiefly from the sun and their heavy guns. Our rations will last a fortnight, and we are still well supplied with ammunition. Our guns are serviceable. Report says that troops are advancing from Allahabad; and any assistance might save the garrison. We, of course, are prepared to hold out to the last. It is needless to mention the names of those who have been killed or died. We trust in God; and if our exertions here assist your safety, it will be a consolation to know that our friends appreciate our devotion. Any news of relief will cheer us."

There can be little doubt of the self-

* Further Parl. Papers, p. 66.

possession of an officer who could write so calmly under the circumstances in which he was placed. Captain Moore, young and energetic, was Sir Hugh's right hand. It was greatly owing to the determined attitude assumed by him, that the mutineers never ventured to attempt carrying by storm the frail barrier which interposed between them and their victims. Though himself severely wounded, he opposed the encroachment of the enemy with unceasing vigilance. Wherever the danger was the greatest, there was he, with his arm in a sling and a revolver in his belt, directing and heading the defence. Scouts, with eyeglasses, were stationed to watch every hostile movement, and, by their reports, the besieged directed an effective fire. The rebels had possession of the first of the three unfinished barracks; and from thence they often attempted to advance and overpower the British picket in the buildings nearest the intrenchment. On these occasions, Captain Moore, who was ever on the watch, would collect a number of volunteers from the intrenchment, and send them out, one at a time, to reinforce their comrades; the space which each man had to traverse being partly protected by carriages, bullock-trains, and such like, arranged as halting-places, between which Moore and his followers ran, exposed to a shower of bullets. Twice this gallant officer, under cover of night, led a party of Europeans, and spiked the guns of the enemy. These, however, were easily repaired or replaced by others from the arsenal.

On the 21st of June, a very great mob, including a number of Oude budmashes, was seen collecting round the intrenchment. The regular infantry corps are described as never coming out to fight in full uniform. This day, some few had on their jackets and caps; but the majority were dressed like recruits. For once, a systematic attack was made, under a recognised leader. The enemy brought forward huge bales of cotton, and attempted to push these on, and thus approach in two parties, under cover from the church compound on the one side, and the unfinished barracks on the other. But the indefatigable Captain Moore had witnessed the preparations, and was enabled to counteract them by a very able distribution of his small force. The rebel leader, "a well-made, powerful man," fell at the onset; and the enemy dispersed, with 200 or 300 killed and wounded.

The loss sustained by the British is not recorded. Several men had fallen from sun-stroke—a calamity of daily occurrence; and all were nearly prostrated by fatigue. At mid-day, when the action was over, one of the ammunition waggons exploded; and the rebels perceiving their advantage, directed a heavy fire against the spot, to hinder the Europeans from approaching to prevent the flames from spreading to the other waggons. In the midst of the cannonading, Lieutenant Delafosse approached the burning mass, laid himself down beneath it, pulled away the loose splinters, and flung earth on the flames. Two soldiers brought him buckets of water, which he threw around him; and, while the vessels were being refilled from the drinking-water of the men close by, he continued to throw earth on the burning wagon, with six cannon directed on the spot. The brave officer and his men accomplished their object, and escaped unhurt.*

The prisoners in the trenches were not the only sufferers. Besides several Europeans captured in the city, and the majority of the Christians (whether Eurasians or natives), many Hindoos and Mohammedans suspected of aiding or serving the British force, were put to death. A list was made of all the bankers, who were mulets of their wealth, and property of every description was plundered or wantonly destroyed.† Any attempt to carry intelligence or supplies to the besieged, was punished with death or mutilation; and, indeed, since the reoccupation of Cawnpoor, about twelve natives have proved, to the satisfaction of government, their claim to a pension, on the ground of having suffered mutilation of the hand or nose (and, in some instances, of both), by order of the Nana or his diabolical lieutenant, Azim Oollah, for bringing supplies to the British camp.‡ Sir Hugh Wheeler, in a letter previously quoted, speaks of all the Christian population taking refuge in the intrenchment; but this could not have been

possible, on account of the extremely limited space. The official, or semi-official, account§ states, that “there was a large number of Europeans resident in cantonments, many of whom were individuals connected with the civil, railway, canal, and other departments. There were, also, nearly the whole of the soldiers’ families of H.M. 32nd, which was stationed at Lucknow. The whole number of the European population, therefore, in Cawnpoor—men, women, and children—could not have amounted to less than 750 lives.” The number of Eurasians, of pensioners and natives attached to the British, within the camp, is nowhere officially stated;|| those who resided in the city, or were excluded from the intrenchment for want of space, were among the earliest of the Nana’s victims.

Lieutenant Delafosse has recorded some terrible scenes, to which he was an eyewitness during the siege; his only consolation under such distressing circumstances being, that he had no relatives, especially no female relatives, to grieve or tremble for. He describes one poor woman, named White, as walking in the trenches beside her husband, carrying her twin infants. The party was fired on, the father killed, and the mother’s arms were both broken. The children fell to the ground, one of them wounded; and the mother flung herself on the ground beside them. Again—an ayah, who had remained with her mistress, was sitting, as she thought, safely under the walls of the barrack, when suddenly she was knocked over by a round shot, and both her legs carried away. The child, though hurled from her arms, was taken up uninjured.

One poor lady was hit by a ball, which entered the face near the nostril, and passed through the palate and jaw. Her daughter, also severely injured in the shoulder, forgetting her own suffering, was seen striving to alleviate the greater agony endured by her mother. They both died from their wounds.¶ Notwithstanding all this misery, we are assured “there was not one

* Mr. Shepherd’s *Account*. Lieutenant Delafosse, in his narrative (*Times*, October 15th, 1857), omits all mention of this heroic and effective service.

† Statement forwarded by Supreme government of India to Court of Directors.

‡ Russell.—*Times*, February 24th, 1859.

§ Statement forwarded by Supreme government to Court of Directors.

|| Mr. Shepherd, writing from memory, gives the following classification of the besieged, whose total number he places at 900. The European

troops (already enumerated) he estimates at 210; officers of the three Native infantry, cavalry, and others, with the staff, 100; merchants, writers, and others, about 100; drummers, about 40; women and children of soldiers, about 160; women of writers, merchants, and drummers, 120; ladies and children of officers, 50; servants, cooks, and others, after a great number had absconded on hearing the enemy’s guns firing, 100; sick sepoy and Native officers who remained with us, 20.

¶ Statement of Lieutenant Thomson.

instance of dejection through cowardice. The very children seemed inspired with heroic patience, and our women behaved with a fortitude that only Englishwomen could have shown."* The pangs of hunger even were not wanting to complete the misery of the besieged. "One poor woman, who was in a wretched state, bordering on starvation, was seen to go out of the protection of the trenches, with a child in each hand, and stand where the fire was heaviest, hoping that some bullet might relieve her and her little ones from the troubles they were enduring. But she was brought back, poor thing! to die a more tedious death than she had intended."†

The sufferings of the soldiers' wives and children must have been fearful. After the burning of the thatched barracks, many of them had to remain in the trenches night and day.

Up to the very last the besieged kept up some communication with Lucknow, through the fidelity and courage of native messengers. Major Vibart, in a letter dated "Sunday night, 12 P.M., 21st June," writes—

"This evening, in three hours, upwards of thirty shells were thrown into the intrenchment. This has occurred daily for the last eight days: an idea may be formed of our casualties, and how little protection the barracks afford to women. Any aid, to be effective, must be immediate. In the event of rain falling, our position would be untenable. According to telegraphic despatches received previous to the outbreak, 1,000 Europeans were to have been here on the 14th. This force may be on its way up. Any assistance you can send might co-operate with it. Nine-pounder ammunition, chiefly cartridges, is required. Should the above force arrive, we can, in return, insure the safety of Lucknow. * * * We have lost about a third of our original number. The enemy are strongest in artillery. They appear not to have more than 400 or 500 infantry. They move their guns with great difficulty on account of the unbroken bullocks. The infantry are great cowards, and easily repulsed."‡

This appears to have been the last official letter received from Cawnpoor. It was conveyed by means of messengers retained by Mr. Gubbins, before the blockade of Lucknow. The men, thirty in number, were all "Passees"—a numerous class in Oude, armed with bows and arrows. They hire themselves out, sometimes singly, sometimes in parties, and have the character of being very faithful servants to their employers, but otherwise arrant thieves.§ The Passees contrived to cross the Ganges at

Cawnpoor, though the ferry was strictly guarded by the enemy; and conveyed Sir Henry Lawrence's despatches into Sir Hugh Wheeler's camp, and returned with his replies.|| Mr. Gubbins states, that it was understood that a private messenger from Sir Hugh, had delivered to Sir Henry, a day or two after the arrival of Major Vibart's letter, a packet containing a memorandum of Sir Hugh's last wishes, written when escape seemed hopeless.¶ Still later, a private letter from Lieut.-colonel Wiggins to Colonel Halford, dated "Cawnpoor, 24th June, 1857," after acknowledging the receipt of the colonel's "most welcome letter of the 21st," and the cleverness of the bearer, proceeds to describe Nana Sahib's attack as having "continued now for eighteen days and nights." The condition of misery experienced by the besieged, is declared to be "utterly beyond description. Death and mutilation, in all their forms of horror, have been daily before us. The numerical amount of casualties has been frightful. Among our casualties from sickness," the writer adds, "my poor dear wife and infant have been numbered. The former sank on the 12th, and the latter on the 19th. I am writing this on the floor, and in the midst of the greatest dirt, noise, and confusion." In conclusion, he urges the immediate dispatch of "*deux cents soldats Britanniques*."**

It is probable that the unvarying confidence expressed by the beleaguered Europeans at Cawnpoor, that 200 British soldiers would suffice to raise the siege, and enable them to disperse thrice as many thousand well-armed and well-supplied foes by whom they were hemmed in, had some effect in inducing Sir Henry Lawrence to proceed on the disastrous Chinhut expedition. Early on the 28th of June, Colonel Master (7th light cavalry) received a scrap of paper from his son, Lieutenant Master, 53rd N.I., conveyed through some private (native) channel. The few lines it contained were these:—

"Cawnpoor, June 25th, 8½ P.M.

"We have held out now for twenty-one days, under a tremendous fire. The rajah of Bithoor has offered to forward us in safety to Allahabad, and the general has accepted his terms. I am all right, though twice wounded. Charlotte Newnham and Bella Blair are dead. I'll write from Allahabad. God bless you!

"Your affectionate son,

"G. A. MASTER."

§ Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*, vol. i., p. 25.

|| Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 150.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

** *Ibid.*, p. 445.

* Statement of Lieutenant Thomson.

† Statement of Lieutenant Delafosse.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 444.

It was too true. Sir Hugh Wheeler, with his brave and gentle companions, had indeed given themselves over into the hand of their deadly foe. Sir Henry Lawrence at once anticipated treachery; and, judging by the event, it would have been better to have held out to the last extremity, and to have starved within the trenches, or been shot down or cut in pieces there, than to have capitulated to such pitiless wretches as the besiegers subsequently proved themselves to be. At that time, however, no one had any adequate conception of the ruthlessness of the monster with whom they had to do.

Mr. Shepherd mentions some interesting particulars regarding the crisis of the siege, in the *Account* already quoted.

"Many persons [he states] were exceedingly anxious to get out of the intrenchment and go into the city, thinking, from want of better information, that they would be very secure there: in fact, several went out quietly in the night under this impression, and, as I afterwards learnt, were murdered by the rebels.

"Among others, my own family (consisting of wife and a daughter, my infant daughter having died from a musket-shot in the head on the 18th), two nieces, Misses Frost and Batavia, both of seventeen years of age, a sister, and her infant son, a brother twenty-two years old, and two old ladies, wished very much to leave, but could not do so on account of our large number. It was therefore considered expedient that one should go and ascertain how matters stood in the city.

"With this view I applied to the general, on the 24th of June, for permission to go, at the same time offering to bring him all the current information that I might collect in the city, asking, as a condition, that on my return, if I should wish it, my family might be allowed to leave the intrenchment. This my request was granted, as the general wished very much to get such information, and for which purpose he had previously sent out two or three natives at different times, under promises of high rewards, but who never returned. He at the same time instructed me to try and negotiate with certain influential parties in the city, so as to bring about a rupture among the rebels, and cause them to leave off annoying us, authorising me to offer a lac of rupees as a reward, with handsome pensions for life, to any person who would bring about such a thing. This, I have every reason to think, could have been carried out successfully, had it pleased God to take me out unmolested; but it was not so ordained (it was merely a means, under God's providence, to save me from sharing the fate of the rest); for as I came out of the intrenchment disguised as a native cook, and, passing through the new unfinished barracks, had not gone very far when I was taken a prisoner, and under custody of four sepoys and a couple of sowars, all well armed, was escorted to the camp of the Nana, and was ordered to be placed under a

guard: here several questions were put to me concerning our intrenchment (not by the Nana himself, but by some of his people), to all of which I replied as I was previously instructed by our general; for I had taken the precaution of asking him what I should say in case I was taken. My answers were not considered satisfactory, and I was confronted with two women-servants who three days previously had been caught in making their escape from the intrenchment, and who gave a version of their own, making it appear that the English were starving and not able to hold out much longer, as their number was greatly reduced. I, however, stood firm to what I had first mentioned, and they did not know which party to believe. However, they let us alone. I was kept under custody up to the 12th of July, on which date my trial took place, and I was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in irons, with hard labour, from which I was released by the European troops on the morning of the 17th idem."

It is not surprising that the unfortunate besieged should have been anxious to escape from their filthy prison at almost any hazard. The effect of the intense heat was aggravated by the stench arising from the dead bodies of horses and other animals, which could not be removed; and the influx of flies added to the loathsomeness of the scene. Five or six men fell daily beneath sun-stroke; but women and children sickened and died faster still in an atmosphere saturated with pestilential vapours.

Shepherd says that, on the 24th of July, "there were provisions yet left to keep the people alive, on half rations, for the next fifteen or twenty days. Of gram† we had a large quantity, and it formed the principal food of all the natives with us, which they preferred to otta and dhol, as it gave them no trouble as regards cooking; for a little soaking in water was sufficient to make it fit to eat; and many scrupulous Hindoos lived the whole period entirely upon it."

James Stewart, a pensioner, formerly a Christian drummer in the 56th N.I., says, that he and the other drummers of the three regiments were charged with the removal of the dead, and received for their subsistence gram and a glass of brandy daily. "The only article of food was gram, which was steeped in four buckets, and placed in such a position that all could help themselves." He also bears witness to the "hourly encouragement" given to the besieged by General Wheeler.‡

Natives might exist where Europeans would perish of inanition. This was the

* Shepherd's *Brief Account of the Outbreak at Cawnpore*.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 4, 1857), pp. 173 to 185.

† Gram is a coarse kind of grain, commonly used for feeding horses. The word is given in the Blue

Book (Further Papers, No. 4, p. 181), as "grain," a blunder which involves a material mis-statement as regards the position of the besieged.

‡ Deposition of James Stewart.—*Friend of India*, August 27th, 1857.

case here. Lieutenant Thomson asserts, of his own knowledge, that "two persons died of starvation; a horse was greedily devoured, and some of my men were glad to feed upon a dog. Our daily supply of provisions, for twenty-two days, consisted of half a pint of pea-soup and two or three chupatties (or cakes made of flour); these last being, together, about the size of an Abernethy biscuit. Upon this diet, which was served to all without distinction—officers and privates, civilians or soldiers—the garrison was reduced to a company of spectres long before the period of capitulation; and when this took place there were only four days' rations, at the above rate of supply, in stock."

Lieutenant Delafosse asserts, that the besieged had been on half-rations some days before the close of the siege.*

Thus, the morning of the 25th of June found the besieged hopeless of timely relief, enduring the most complicated and aggravated sufferings in a building the walls of which were honey-combed with shot and shell, the doors knocked down or widely breached, and the angles of the walls shattered by incessant cannonading; while a few splintered rafters alone remained to show where verandahs had once been. Such was the state of affairs when Nana Sahib sent a letter to General Wheeler, some accounts say by an Eurasian prisoner named Jacobi, the wife of a watchmaker; others, by an aged widow named Greenaway, formerly the proprietress of the *Cawnpoor Press*; who, with her sons (merchants), had been seized at their zemindaree at Nujuffghur, sixteen miles from Cawnpoor.† The proposal for surrender was thus worded:—

"All soldiers and others unconnected with the acts of Lord Dalhousie, who will lay down their arms and give themselves up, shall be spared and sent to Allahabad."‡

General Wheeler consulted with his officers how to act. He was himself decidedly unwilling to surrender, and the younger soldiers advocated resistance to the last; but Captain Moore,§ whose fortitude (for it was a higher quality than courage) was unquestioned,

and who was the very life-sinews of the beleaguered band, represented strongly the state of the ladies and others maddened by suffering; reminded the general, that at least half their small force had fallen in the intrenchment; and that out of fifty-nine artillerymen, all but four or five had been killed at their guns.|| These arguments were irresistible; Sir Hugh reluctantly gave way, and empowered Captain Moore to consent to the proffered arrangement. The next steps are not clear. According to one account, Mrs. Greenaway appears to have returned to the Nana, and reported the success of her mission; whereupon she was again sent to the intrenchment, accompanied by Azim Oollah and another ringleader, styled Jowlah Persaud. Colonel Ewart subsequently came to the camp of the Nana, accompanied by other Europeans.¶

It is probable, however, that the meeting was not held within the intrenchment, but in the unfinished barracks outside. Azim Oollah, it is alleged, attempted to open the conversation in English, but was prevented from doing so by some of the Mussulman troopers of the 2nd light cavalry, who accompanied him.**

The treaty, signed on the evening of the 26th, stipulated, "That the garrison should give up their guns, ammunition, and treasure; should be allowed to carry their muskets and sixty rounds of cartridges with them; that the Nana should provide carriage for the sick, wounded, women and children, to the river's bank, where boats should be in readiness to convey all to Allahabad." A committee of officers and gentlemen went to the ghaut to see whether the necessary preparations were being made, and found everything in readiness.†† The besieged were eager to breathe purer air than that of a prison which had become almost a charnel-house. It appears that, after the capitulation, they were allowed to walk freely out of the intrenchment, and that they strolled about the neighbourhood that evening.‡‡ The thought of their approaching deliverance must have been embittered

* *Times*, October 15th, 1857.

† *Shepherd's Account*; Diary of the Nunna Nawab; and summary of events published in *Times*, October 15th, 1857.

‡ Statement sent by Supreme government to Court of Directors.

§ The wife of Captain Moore was with him in the intrenchment.

|| These and other important facts are enumerated in Captain (formerly Lieutenant) Mowbray Thom-

son's letter to the *Times*, dated Sept. 8th, 1858; written in contradiction of the mis-statements put forward in the name of Sergeant Murray's widow.

¶ Statement of the Nunna Nawab.

** *Shepherd's Account*.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 181.

†† Statement of Lieutenant Thomson.

‡‡ Russell mentions this circumstance as having been told him "by Sir John Inglis, on the authority of the excellent chaplain, the Rev. Mr. Moore."

by grief for those whom they expected to leave behind in that terrible burying-place the dry well. They little thought how soon their own bleeding bodies would find a similar destination.

Of those whose names have been mentioned in the course of the narrative, few, if any, but must have lost some dear friend or relative. The son of the general (Lieutenant Godfrey Richard Wheeler, of the 1st N.I.) had been killed by a round shot, while lying wounded by his mother's side;* Mrs. Ewart had seen her husband badly wounded, and her friend (Mrs. Hillersdon) sink, with her child, of fever and exhaustion; Brigadier Jack had died of fever, and Sir George Parker, Bart. (magistrate), of sun-stroke. The total number of those who had perished is not recorded; but Lieutenant Thomson states positively, "we lost 250 men in the intrenchment, principally by shells;" and women and children fell by this means, as well as by disease. Probably, therefore, not half the number of Europeans (750) who had entered the intrenchment, left it on the fatal morning of the 27th of June; and of the number of half-castes and natives who perished with and for the Europeans, no estimate has been formed.† It was about 8 A.M. when the British reached the landing-place, situated a mile and a-half from the station. Breakfast was laid out as had been arranged, and the embarkation was carried on without hindrance or hesitation. The Europeans laid down their muskets, and took off their coats. Some of the boats (thirty in all) pushed off from the shore; and the others were striving to get free from the sand in which they had been purposely imbedded, when, at a prearranged signal, the boatmen sprang into the water, leaving fire in the thatches of the boats; and two guns, before hidden, were run out and opened on the Europeans. The men, says Lieutenant Delafosse, jumped out of the boats; and, instead of trying to free them from their moorings, swam to the first boat they saw loose. A remark in Lieutenant Thomson's narrative shows that the attempt was unsuccessfully made. He states—"When the boat I first took shelter in was fired, I jumped out, with the rest, into the water, and tried to drag her off the sand-bank, but to no purpose; so I deserted her, and made across the river to the Oude side, where I

saw two of our boats." A third boat got safe over to the opposite side of the river; but all three were met there by two field-pieces, guarded by a number of cavalry and infantry. One of these boats was early swamped, and a round shot went through the second of them before it had proceeded a mile down the stream. The passengers were then taken on board the third boat, which, with a freight of fifty persons, continued its way for five or six miles, followed, on the Oude side, by about 2,000 mutineers (infantry and cavalry), with two guns. Captains Moore and Ashe (the leaders of the defence), Lieutenant-colonel Wiggins, and Lieutenants Burney, Glanville, Satchwell, and Bassilico, were killed; Major Vibart, Captain Turner, Lieutenants Thomson, Fagan, Mainwaring, and a youth named Henderson, were wounded. The boat grounded about nightfall; but the Europeans managed to get once more afloat, and to distance their pursuers, who followed along shore with torches and lighted arrows, trying to set the boat on fire; and so nearly succeeding, that the Europeans were compelled to throw overboard the thatched covering which had shielded them from the sun and rain. On the following day the boat again grounded on a sand-bank at Nujffghur; and here Captain Whiting, Lieutenant Harrison, and several privates were killed. Captain Turner was hit a second time. Captain Seppings was wounded, as was also his wife (the only female mentioned as having accompanied this party), and Lieutenants Daniel and Quin. A storm came on, and drove the boat down stream, until it again stuck at Soorajpoor, where, at daylight on the Monday morning, the fugitives were discovered and attacked by the retainers of a hostile zemindar. Lieutenants Thomson and Delafosse, with twelve men, went on shore to drive back their assailants, and thus enable their companions to get off the boat. This they did most effectually; but, proceeding too far inland, they were surrounded, and, being hotly pressed, lost sight of the boat, and were forced to take refuge in a small temple on the river-bank. At the door of the temple one of the party was killed: the remaining thirteen, after vainly attempting a parley, had recourse to their firelocks, and several of the enemy were soon killed or put *hors de*

450."—*Shepherd's Account*. How many Eurasians or natives may have been included in the capitulation, is matter of conjecture.

* *Memoir* of Rev. H. S. Polehampton, p. 315.

† "It is reported that the persons who came out that morning from the intrenchment, amounted to

combat. The rebels then brought a gun to bear on the little stronghold; but finding that it made no impression, they had recourse to heaping up firewood before the doorway. Unfortunately the temple was round, so that the party within could not prevent their pushing the wood round to the front. The fire, however, did not have the desired effect; handfuls of powder were therefore thrown upon it; and the smoke thereby produced nearly stifled the Europeans, who determined to sally forth and make for the river. On their charging out of the temple, the enemy fled in all directions. Six of the party (it is supposed because they could not swim) ran into the crowd, and sold their lives as dearly as they could; the remaining seven threw themselves into the Ganges. Two of these were shot ere long; a third, resting himself by swimming on his back, unwittingly approached too close to the bank, and was cut up; and the other four swam six miles down the river, three of them being wounded, till at last the weary Europeans were hailed by two or three sepoy belonging to a friendly chief, who proved to be Maharajah Deeg Beejah Sing, of Byswarrah in Oude. Exhausted by a three days' fast, and conceiving, from the freedom from pursuit that they had experienced during the last half mile of their flight that they were safe, the fugitives at once went to the rajah, who protected and fed them from the 29th of June to the 28th of July, and ultimately provided for their escort to the camp of a detachment of Europeans proceeding from Allahabad to Cawnpoor, to join the force under the command of Brigadier-general Havelock.* Lieutenant Thomson speaks of the avidity with which he and his companions devoured the "capital meal of dhol and chupatties," given them by the friendly rajah; and he remarks, that "to swim six miles is a great feat to accomplish at any time; but, after a three days' fast, it really must sound very like an impossibility. Nevertheless it is true!"

It appears that all the boats were brought back to Cawnpoor: and of the passengers, "many were killed at once; others, the wives and children of the European officers and soldiers, were placed as prisoners in a house in the cantonments: some of these were released from their sufferings by

death; others were suffered to remain alive until the arrival of the force under General Havelock sealed their death-warrant."† Among the persons who escaped from the boats were James Stewart, pensioner, 56th N.I., whose deposition has been already quoted, and who, with his wife and a Mrs. Lett, scrambled to shore from a foundering boat, and contrived to find their way to Allahabad. Mrs. Murray, a sergeant's wife, also escaped.‡

Concerning the actual massacre, much interesting information has been supplied by Myoor Tewarree, a sepoy of the 1st N.I., a man of considerable intelligence and proved fidelity. When the mutiny broke out at Cawnpoor, Myoor Tewarree was with three companies of his regiment at Banda. He had been instructed in the English language by Mr. Duncan, a writer; and, on the outbreak there, he concealed Mr. Duncan and his wife in his hut, and thus saved their lives. This act brought on him the suspicion of his comrades; and when he marched with them into Cawnpoor, he was seized by the Nana, robbed of all he possessed, and imprisoned, with four other suspected sepoys, in the same house with the Europeans.

He declares, that when the Nana's treachery became apparent, the boat with General Wheeler and his family on board, cut its cable, and dropped down the river, followed by two companies of infantry and two guns. At some little distance from Cawnpoor the boat grounded, was overtaken, and fired on. The traitors "could not manage the large gun, not knowing how to work the elevating screw;" but, with the small gun, they fired grape tied up in bags, and the infantry discharged their muskets. The Europeans responded with their rifles so effectually that they drove off the sepoys, and the storm which came on that night floated them off the sand-bank. They had, however, proceeded only a few miles before they were overtaken by several boatsful of Oude infantry, surrounded, and taken back captives to Cawnpoor. Fifty gentlemen, twenty-five ladies, a boy and three girls, were brought on shore. The Nana ordered the "memsahibs" to be separated from the sahibs, and shot by the 1st N.I. But the "Gillies Pultun,"§ the oldest regiment in the service, hardened as it had become in mutiny, refused to take part in the savage butchery. The men said, "We will not shoot Wheeler

* Statement sent by Supreme government. † *Ibid.*

‡ A Lieutenant Brown escaped from another boat, but perished from exhaustion.

§ Gallier's regiment. Introductory Chapter, p. 99.

Sahib, who has made the name of our Pultun great, and whose son is our quartermaster; neither will we shoot the other gentlemen [sahib-logue]: put them in prison." But the Oude sepoy said, "Put them in prison? No; we will kill them all." The male Europeans were then made to sit on the ground, and two companies of sepoy prepared to fire on them, when one of the ladies (the wife of either the superintending surgeon or medical storekeeper) rushed to her husband, and sitting down beside him, placed her arm round his waist, declaring, that if he must die, she would die with him. The other ladies followed her example; and all sat down close to their husbands, who said, "Go, go;" and vainly strove to drive their wives away. The Nana then directed the sepoy to part them by force, which was done; "but they could not pull away the doctor's wife, who there remained. Then, just as the sepoy were going to fire, the padre [Moncrieff was dead] called out to the Nana, and requested leave to read prayers before they died. The Nana granted it, and the padre's bonds were loosed so far as to allow him to take a small book from his pocket, from which he read; but at this time one of the sahibs, who was shot in the arm and leg, kept crying out to the sepoy, 'If you mean to kill us, why don't you set about it; be quick, and get the work done at once; why delay?' After the padre read a few prayers, he shut the book, and the sahibs shook hands all round. Then the sepoy fired. One sahib rolled one way, and one another; but they were not dead, only wounded. Then they went and finished them with their swords." After this, the whole of the women and children, including those taken out of the other boats, to the number of 122, were taken away to the house formerly used by the Europeans as an hospital, and afterwards inhabited by the Nana.

Myoor Tewarree was asked, "Were any of the women dishonoured?" He replied, "No, none that I am aware of, except in the case of General Wheeler's younger daughter; and about her I am not certain. When the rebels were taking the memsahibs out of the boat, a sowar (cavalry man) took her away with him to his house.

She went quietly; but at night she rose and got hold of the sowar's sword. He was asleep; his wife, his son, and his mother-in-law were sleeping in the house with him. She killed them all with the sword, and then she went and threw herself down the well behind the house. In the morning, when people came and found the dead in the house, the cry was, 'Who has done this?' Then a neighbour said, that in the night he had seen some one go and throw himself into the well. They went and looked, and there was Missce Baba, dead and swollen."*

That a young girl should kill two men and two women with a sword, is so glaringly improbable, that the wide circulation of this story, and its repeated assertion as a fact,† only proves the credulity with which all rumours, however wild and improbable, are received when they fall in with the prevailing tone of the public mind. But the evidence of another survivor and eye-witness of the Cawnpoor massacre, corroborates the first part of the story, as regards the seizure of Miss Wheeler by a trooper. Towards the end of the year 1858, a half-caste Christian, named Fitchett, or Fitchreht, presented himself to the local authorities at Meerut, as a candidate for admission into the police levy. The usual inquiries into his antecedents, led to the discovery that, when the mutiny broke out at Cawnpoor, he had been a musician in the band of one of the native regiments, and his life had been spared in consequence of his proclaiming his willingness to embrace Mohammedanism, which he did by an easy process, almost on the spot. He was enrolled in the rebel force, and witnessed the second massacre—that of the women and children—on the 16th of July; which cannot be narrated until the events which precipitated, if they did not cause it, have been told, and likewise the arrival of the Futtehghur fugitives, to swell the list of the Nana's victims. When the Nana fled to Futtehghur, Fitchett accompanied him thither; and he declares that he frequently saw Miss Wheeler; that she travelled with a trooper who had taken her from Cawnpoor; and that he was shown into the room where she was, and ordered to read extracts from the English newspapers, which the rebels received from

* Evidence taken at the Cawnpoor camp, August 15th, 1857.—*Friend of India*, September 3rd, 1857.

† Shepherd states, that a young lady, "reported to be General Wheeler's daughter," had been seized by a sowar, and killed four persons and herself: but

his giving this as a matter of fact, detracts from the value of his general evidence, except regarding matters which he actually witnessed; and he was a prisoner at the time of both the first and second Cawnpoor massacres.

Calcutta; he being employed by them for the purpose of translating the news, in which, particularly that relating to the progress of the war in China, they evinced much interest. She had a horse with an English side-saddle, which the trooper had procured for her, and she rode close beside him, with her face veiled, along the line of march. When the British approached Futtehghur, orders were sent to the sowar to give Miss Wheeler up; but he escaped with her at night, and it is supposed she went with him to Calpee. Mr. Russell, writing in October, 1858, remarks—"It is not at all improbable that the unfortunate young lady may be still alive, moving about with Tania Topee, and may yet be rescued."*

Two other girls, British or Eurasian, survived the Cawnpoor massacre. Georgiana Anderson, aged thirteen, received a sword-cut on the shoulder, but was rescued by a native doctor. All her relatives at the station were murdered. She lived among the natives, kindly nursed and cared for, during several weeks; at the expiration of which time she was sent safely into Cawnpoor, then reoccupied by the British, and is now living with her grandmother at Monghyr. The other girl, aged sixteen, was less fortunate; and her name is withheld by Mr. Russell, who instituted inquiries into the truth of her story, as published in the *Times*; the results of which partly corroborated and partly confuted her statements. "She is," he writes, "the daughter of a clerk; and is, I believe, an Eurasian, or has some Eurasian blood in her veins. It would be cruel to give her name, though the shame is not her's. She was obliged to travel about with a sowar; and, to escape persecution, became a Mohammedan."†

This is apparently the person whose narrative was published by Dr. Knighton, of the College, Ewell, Surrey. Her account of her escape is, that after seeing Kirkpatrick (an Eurasian merchant of Cawnpoor) and two little girls murdered in the boat, on the deck of which she was standing, and being herself rudely searched and robbed of the money and jewels she had brought from the barracks, she grew dizzy and fell down. The mutineers flung her into the river; she scrambled on shore, and crept along on her hands and knees till she reached a tree about half a mile inland. Soon, stealthy steps approached the spot. They were

those of Miss Wheeler, who had also been thrown into the river, the murderous sepoy thinking that, being insensible, she would sink to the bottom. In about an hour the fugitives were surprised by a party of the mutineers, and dragged off in different directions. What became of Miss Wheeler does not appear from this narrative, but the other unfortunate was dragged along till her clothes were almost entirely torn off; and her appeal for mercy to the troopers, was answered by a declaration that she had not long to live; but before being put to death, she would be made to feel some portion of the degradation their brethren felt at Meerut, when ironed and disgraced before the troops. After four hours' walking, she arrived at a place very near Bithoor, where some of the enemy were encamped. Here she sank on the ground, overcome with shame and exhaustion, while the heartless sepoy gathered round with mockery and reviling. An African eunuch, who had just brought some despatches from Ahmed-Oollah, the Moolvee of Fyzabad, to Nana Sahib, interfered for her protection; and, throwing a chuddar, or large native veil over her, had her conducted to a tent. She saw no more of him till she went to Lucknow, and was compelled to accompany the rebels in their progress through the North-West Provinces. She was at length released, and found her way to Calcutta, where she is now living with her friends.

And here we may close the record of the first Cawnpoor massacre, and turn to the scarcely less painful examination of the causes which delayed the arrival of forces from Calcutta, to a period when the brave defenders of Cawnpoor, heart-sick with hope deferred, had surrendered to their treacherous foe, with the bitter pang added to their sufferings, that when (as they concurred in declaring) 200 Europeans might have saved them, government had made no effort to send troops with the speed befitting an errand of life or death, but had treated the agonising appeal for "aid, aid, aid!" much in the same tone as that in which Mr. Colvin had been reproved for enacting, on his own responsibility, a measure which he thought might arrest, in its early stage, the avalanche of mutiny and massacre; but which the governor-general in council, taking a serenely distant view of the matter, blamed as manifesting "unnecessary haste."‡

* *Times*, Dec. 8th, 1858. † *Ibid.*, Feb. 24th, 1859.

‡ See page 188, *ante*.

In vain the leading men in the North-Western Provinces had combined in reiterating in successive telegrams—"Time is everything." "Spare no expense in sending reinforcements to Allahabad and Cawnpoor." The Supreme government moved with the utmost deliberation, maintaining, to the last possible moment, the position of dignified incredulity with which they had received the information of mutiny at Barrackpoor in the early spring of 1857; treating the most reasonable alarm as "a groundless panic," and being beaten inch by inch off the field of indolent security; even the capture and retention of Delhi by the rebels, being insufficient to rouse them to the conviction of the imminent danger of the Europeans at other stations, especially those most richly stored and weakly defended. The wretched incapacity manifested at Meerut, was at length appreciated at Calcutta, and General Hewitt was superseded. Now, it is pretty generally admitted, that had either of the Lawrences, Montgomery or Colvin, Herbert, Edwardes, or Nicholson—anybody acquainted with the native character, whether pro-native or anti-native in their tone—been in authority at Meerut, that cruel court-martial sentence would never have been ratified; and the presiding officer would not have written to a friend that night—"The court is over, and those fellows have got ten years a-piece. You will hear of no more mutinies."* These flippant words stand out in terrible contrast to the cries for mercy uttered by Englishmen and Englishwomen, and refused on the

plea of the tyrannical sentence, the felon's irons; adjudged as the penalty of what they deemed devotion to religious duty and maintenance of social rights, for both are united in that much misapplied word—caste.

The Calcutta despatches prove that the authorities there were not blind to the infatuation which produced the Meerut outbreak, or the incapacity which prevented its suppression. The "thirty troopers who revolutionised India," became a bye-word; and the Meerut authorities were severely censured for not instantly sending off a portion of the European troops, if not to maintain Delhi, at least to rescue their countrywomen and the children. Yet the Indian journals assert, that the blame attached to the Meerut authorities for having been so panic-struck by the effect of their own act, that they folded their hands quietly, while, as they had every reason to anticipate, a most unequal struggle was taking place within a three hours' ride of them—is equally attributable to the Supreme government, not only for leaving Delhi without so much as a European company to close its gates, but for not sending speedy reinforcements to Cawnpoor, when, by a vigorous effort, 2,000 men might have been dispatched there in time to raise the siege and to deliver the whole beleaguered band, instead of being the immediate cause of a massacre more terrible than that already related.

From the facts enumerated in the following chapter, the reader will judge how far the Supreme government can be justly reprobated for culpable delay.

CHAPTER XII.

CALCUTTA AND BARRACKPOOR.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

At Calcutta, the government on the one side, and the European population and press almost unanimously on the other, took an opposite view of affairs. The governor and council disbelieved in the ex-

istence of any general disaffection either among the troops or the people, which was a natural opinion for the party responsible for having caused, or at least not striven to remove, the alleged discontent, to abide by

* See a history of the Bengal Mutinies, dated "Umballah, August, 1857," and introduced in the *Times*, as the production of "a gentleman whose acquirements, experience, and position, admirably qualify him for the work of observation and re-

view."—*Times*, October 24th, 1857. This authority remarks, that the Native officers who composed the court-martial were as obedient as usual, but that every one of them was said to have been murdered during the outbreak.

as long as possible: the European citizens, on the contrary, accepted General Hearsey's conclusions to their fullest extent, and went far beyond them, believing that an organised conspiracy had been concocted by the Mohammedans, and assented to by the Hindoos, civil and military (or rather military and civil), for the extermination of the British. The one party exposed the fallacies of the other; while both misinterpreted the signs of the times, being far too prejudiced regarding the cause of the outbreak, to adopt vigorous measures for its suppression at the earliest possible moment, and with the smallest possible waste of gold and silver and of human life.

The public journals advocated the formation of volunteer corps; and the Trades' Association offered their services to government, either as special constables, or in any other manner that might seem desirable for "the preservation of order, and the protection of the Christian community of Calcutta." The Masonic fraternity, the Americans, and French inhabitants of Calcutta, the British Indian Association, with all the leading Mohammedans and Hindoos, followed the example; but the proffered co-operation was refused by government on the ground of its being unnecessary, no general disaffection having been evinced by the Bengal sepoys. Writing on the 25th of May, the governor-general in council avers, that "the mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic has been arrested; and there is every reason to hope that, in the course of a few days, tranquillity and confidence will be restored."*

Another body, the native Christians of Krishnaghur, proffered their services, and begged to be employed, themselves, their carts and bullocks, in carrying stores to the seat of war. Only those acquainted with the miserable deficiencies of the Indian commissariat, can understand the value or full meaning of the offer; yet the volunteers were refused any public acknowledgment of their loyalty by the governor-general, on the ground that they had volunteered as Christians, not as subjects.† With strange perversity, the Supreme government trampled on caste with one foot, and on Christianity with the other. For the needless, heedless offence given to caste, concessions

were made by the governor-general as by the commander-in-chief, long after the eleventh hour, by a proclamation which, in each case, "fell to the ground a blunted weapon." On the 29th of May, the military secretary, Colonel Birch, issued his first and only proclamation to the army on the subject of the greased cartridges. An officer, then at Calcutta, who certainly cannot be accused of advocating undue regard to native feelings or prejudices, says, had this statement been published in January, it would in all probability have been effective; but Colonel Birch and the government were dumb at that time. Yet at the close of May, "when every word falling from government was liable to be misconstrued, a full and complete explanation was offered regarding the substitution of the Enfield rifle for Brown Bess, and the whole question of the greased cartridges!‡ Alas, for that terrible 'Too late!' which attaches itself as the motto of statesmen without prescience or genius, of little men in great positions!"§

Lord Canning certainly deserves credit for the promptitude with which he acted on the suggestions of Sir Henry Lawrence, and all the leading functionaries in the North-West, of gathering together European troops with all speed from every possible quarter. Bombay, Madras, and Ceylon were sent to for troops, and a steamer was dispatched to the Straits of Sunda, to intercept the Chinese expedition. In the latter end of May, and the beginning of June, reinforcements entered Calcutta in rapid succession. The well-known 1st Fusiliers hastened from Madras, the 64th and 78th Highlanders from Persia, the 35th from Moulmein; a wing of the 37th, and a company of royal artillery, from Ceylon. By the 10th of June, 3,400 men were at the orders of the governor-general, independent of H.M. 53rd in Fort William, 800 strong; from 1,500 to 2,000 sailors, and all the European inhabitants who had tendered their services.

The conduct of the authorities was altogether unaccountable. Instead of being glad to notify the arrival of these reinforcements, and to strengthen the hands of the well-disposed, confirm the allegiance of the waverers, and overawe incipient mutiny, the European troops were, it is alleged by

* Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, 1857 (No. 2).

† Asserted by Lord Shaftesbury at Exeter Hall, January 5th, 1858.

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‡ For government circular, see Appendix, p. 340.

§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 73.

the writer recently quoted, smuggled in like contraband goods. "For instance," he adds, "if it were known that the *Auckland*, or some other war steamer, was bringing troops, and the public were in consequence naturally on the tiptoe of excitement respecting her, orders would be transmitted, that on the arrival of the *Auckland*, the telegraph should announce the *Sarah Sands*, or a similar *nom-de-guerre*. The ship thus came up unnoticed; the troops generally landed in the dark, and were smuggled into the fort."*

On the 24th of May, the governor-general informed Sir Henry Lawrence, in reply to his urgent solicitations on behalf of Cawnpoor, that it was impossible to place a wing of Europeans there in less time than twenty-five days.† Sir Henry was far from being convinced of the impossibility of the measure: moreover, he was not silenced by Lord Canning's explicit statement of what could and could not be done; and, on receiving it, he instantly sent off another telegram in the following words:—

"I strongly advise that as many ekka daks be laid as possible from Raneegunje to Cawnpoor, to bring up European troops. Spare no expense."‡

The director-general of post-offices at Raneegunje, having probably been informed of Sir Henry Lawrence's opinion, sent a telegram to Calcutta on the same day (May 26th), in which he remarks—"Ekkas are not, I think, adapted for Europeans, nor do I think that time would be gained."§

On the 27th of May, the secretary to government sent off two telegrams, each dated 8.30 P.M. One of these conveyed the thanks of the governor-general in council to Sir Hugh Wheeler, for "his very effective exertions," and assured him "that no measures had been neglected to give him aid." The other curtly informed Sir Henry Lawrence—"Every horse and carriage, bullock and cart, which could be brought upon the road, has been collected, and no means of increasing the number will be neglected."||

The special point of the previous tele-

gram—namely, the ekkas—is slurred over; and it appears as if the Calcutta authorities were not a little annoyed by the perpetual jogs on the elbow of their subordinates in the North-West, and were more inclined to accept the dictum of the "post-master-general," which accorded with their own ideas of "possibility," than by strenuous efforts to comply with the earnest appeals of Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Hugh Wheeler. Yet Lord Canning, in his instructions to the army then only advancing against Delhi, does not fail to enforce the point so vainly pressed on him. "Time is everything," he writes to the commander-in-chief, "and I beg you to make short work of Delhi." The commander-in-chief might, with good reason, have retaliated by entreating the governor-general to strengthen his hands by making "short work" of Cawnpoor.

A considerable portion of the public and press of Calcutta were extremely dissatisfied at the proceedings of the government, and severely censured the supineness to which they deemed the fate of Cawnpoor attributable, notwithstanding the unexpected detention of the Fusiliers at Allahabad.

The then acting editor of the *Friend of India*, has written a small volume on the mutiny, in which he thus states what was probably the popular view of the question:—

"A thousand English volunteer infantry, 400 cavalry, and 1,500 sailors, were at the disposal of government a week after the revolt became known. * * * The waters of the Ganges do not rise until the latter end of June; and it would have been scarcely advisable to push troops up by that route so long as there was a prospect that the vessels might get aground.

"The railway and the road offered the greatest facilities for the transit of men, guns and stores; and both were in the best condition. The line was opened to Raneegunje, 120 miles from Calcutta; and, up to that point, there was no difficulty in sending a couple of regiments by a single train. Whilst the volunteers were learning how to load and fire, and the merchant seamen were being instructed in the use of artillery, government might have placed on the road, from the terminus to Cawnpoor, a line of stations for horses and bullocks, at intervals of five miles, guarded, if necessary, by posts of armed men; the streets and the course of Calcutta could

* "One who has served under Sir Charles Napier," gives as his authority, "personal observation, the telegraphic reports, and the notice of the circumstance by the local press."—(p. 99).

† Telegram, May 24th, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 315.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 322.

This telegram is twice printed in the course of three pages. The first time (p. 322), the word "ekas" (country cart) is given incorrectly; the second, it is printed as "extra"—of course entirely altering the meaning. The value of the Papers printed for Parliament is seriously diminished by the frequency of these blunders.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 324.

have supplied any number of horses. There were 1,600 siege bullocks at Allahabad, and 600 at Cawnpore; carriages and commissariat stores of all kinds might have been collected, for the use of a division, with seven days' hard work; and had government only consented to do, just a fortnight beforehand, what they were coerced to do on the 14th of June, they might have had, on the first day of that month, a force of 2,000 Europeans at Raneegunje, fully equipped with guns and stores, the infantry capable of being pushed on at the rate of 120 miles a-day, and the artillery, drawn by horses, elephants, and bullocks, in turns, following at a speed of two miles an hour, day and night.*

The *Friend of India* avers, that a column of 500 men might safely have left Calcutta, and reached Cawnpore, by the 8th of June at latest; and the guns, escorted by half a wing of a European regiment, might have joined them seven days afterwards.

The news from the North-West Provinces at length convinced the Calcutta government, that if they desired to have territory left to rule over, it was necessary to adopt measures for its defence. The Calcutta volunteers were given to understand that their services would now be accepted; but, according to their own testimony, the majority suffered a feeling of pique, at the previous refusal, to outweigh their sense of public duty; and, "in consequence of the discouragement offered by the government, only 800 were enrolled in the Volunteer Guard, horse and foot; whereas, had their first proposition been accepted, the number would have amounted to between three and four thousand."†

On the following day, the unpopularity of Lord Canning was brought to its climax by the enactment of a law involving the re-institution of the licensing system, and a rigid censorship of the press (English and native), for the ensuing twelve months. The reasons for this measure have been already stated,‡ and need not be recapitulated here. Great excitement was occasioned; and the infraction of the liberty of the press—that is, the European portion of it—was loudly denounced. The English journalists were, of course, quite convinced of the necessity of arresting the torrent of sedition poured forth by the native papers; but they could not see the slightest necessity, notwithstanding the imminent danger with which they professed to believe Calcutta menaced, for placing any check upon the abuse which

was daily poured forth on the government, collectively and individually, nor on the fierce invectives against the natives of India generally, which the government foresaw might goad the entire population into rebellion. The angry journalists expected to find great sympathy in England; but, on the contrary, the necessity of the measure was generally appreciated by both parliament and the press.

The Arms Act, passed at the same time, was another and equally unreasonable cause of dissatisfaction. The extreme anti-native party in Calcutta had pressed for the establishment of martial law, which the government had wisely refused. It was then urged that there had been an unusual importation of arms into Calcutta, and that purchases of these had been largely made by natives. An act was therefore passed, empowering the government to demand from the inhabitants of any district a list of the arms each man possessed, with a view to the granting of a licence for the retention of any reasonable amount. Lord Grey, in vindicating the "impartial policy of the Arms Act," intimated that "it had been resorted to from sheer necessity, and to prevent a trade which might, and there was no doubt would, have been carried on between the natives and some bad Europeans, had the latter been allowed to possess arms to any extent." Lord Granville stated, that a suggestion had been made to Lord Canning that Christians should be exempted from the Act; but he had most properly felt that, since many of the native rajahs, zemindars, and their retainers, had exposed their lives and property in order to stand by the cause of the government, any act subjecting them to a disarmament from which all Europeans and Christians were expressly exempted, would have been a most unwise and impolitic measure. In the course of the same debate, Lord Ellenborough likened "our position in India to that of the Normans in Saxon England," and declared that the Anglo-Indians must, for a time at least, "assume the appearance of an armed militia." The comparison and phraseology were altogether unfortunate. The cases are totally dissimilar: and even passing over the anomaly of a so-called armed militia maintaining a military despotism over 180 millions of disaffected subjects, the prospect thus opened is hardly a pleasant one for the British merchants and traders, who look to India for an increased

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 84.

† Calcutta petition to the Queen, for the recall of Lord Canning.

‡ Introductory Chapter, p. 22.

outlet for their commerce, and hope to find their hands strengthened by receiving the valuable products which she could so cheaply and so plentifully supply, provided only her rulers can manage to govern her peacefully, and employ her revenues in developing her resources, and irrigating her fertile plains with the fair water of her noble rivers, instead of deluging the land with blood and tears. An important admission was, however, made by Lord Ellenborough in speaking of a provision of the Press Act, regarding the suppression of any passage in a public journal calculated "to weaken the friendship of native princes towards us." After bearing testimony to the important results which had attended the fidelity of the rajahs of Rewah and Gwalior, the ex-governor-general added, that if the Indian newspapers, "in the spirit which too much animates persons in that country, had expressed a hope that, when our rule was re-established, there would be further and further annexations, I assure you that every part of Central India, chiefs as well as subjects, would have been in arms against us."*

The tone thus denounced had, however, been taken by many journals, and it was most necessary that Lord Canning should possess some counteracting power. The Anglo-Indian papers did not always originate incendiary articles: they occasionally copied articles issued by the London press, written hastily on a very partial and prejudiced view of the subject, and without regard to the effect likely to result from their reproduction in India. It is a fact that the Indian princes study European politics with avidity, and watch their bearing on England. Much more do they examine, through the medium of their interpreters, the language held regarding them in the English papers, and the comments made thereon by the local press.

The first despatches which conveyed to England tidings of the Meerut and Delhi catastrophe, narrated also the admirable conduct of Sindia and Holar, of the rajahs of Bhurtpoor, Jheend, and Putteala. An Anglo-Indian correspondent of the *Times*, mentioned the death of the ill-used Nizam,† and the accession to the musnud of his son, Afzool-ood-Dowla, a prince of thirty years of age, "born to the purple of Hyderabad,

and proportionately dull, ignorant, and sensual."

The *Times*, commenting on this information, in evident ignorance of the vital importance to the British government of the policy which might be adopted by the Hyderabad durbar, remarked—"The fact seems to be, that we have arrived at that point in our Indian career, when the total subjection of the native element, and the organisation of all that we have conquered, becomes a matter of necessity. We have gone so far in the conquest of the country, that it is now necessary to complete the task. * * * We would even hope that the death of the Nizam may be the occasion of the Deccan being brought more completely under British sovereignty. We cannot now refuse our part or change our destiny. To retain power in India, we must sweep away every political establishment and every social usage which may prevent our influence from being universal and complete."‡

In the course of another mail or two, when the extent of the danger became better understood, a different tone was adopted, as it was soon seen that the native durbar—that is to say, the Nizam, under the guidance of his able minister, Salar Jung, and his venerable uncle, Shums-ool-Omrah,§ had remained faithful to the British government, in opposition to the desire of the great mass of his fanatical Mussulman subjects.

From this and many similar circumstances, it seems evident that an imperative sense of duty was Lord Canning's motive in placing a temporary restriction on the press. The censorship was enacted only for a year, and expired then without the slightest effort being made for its renewal. Lords Elphinstone and Harris earnestly seconded its imposition; the Calcutta council were unanimous regarding its necessity: yet the great weight of censure was poured out on the governor-general, who, from being, "personally, extremely popular," and praised as "a conscientious, hard-working man, and no jobber (a wonderful merit in that country),"|| became the object of the most sweeping and unqualified animadversion. Lord Canning conducted himself with much dignity, exercising the censorship he had felt it necessary to

* Indian debate, as reported in *Times*, December 8th, 1857.

† See Introductory Chapter, p. 55.

‡ *Times*, June 29th, 1857.

§ *Ibid.*

|| Speech of the Earl of Ellenborough.—*Times*, December 8th, 1857.

assume, without anger and without fear, although aware that a petition was being framed in Calcutta, addressed to the Queen, soliciting his recall, which petition was eventually sent to England by the hand of Mr. Mead, the ex-editor of the *Friend of India*—removed from that office on the ground of his infractions of the conditions of the Press Act.

Among the difficulties which beset the Indian government, not the least pressing was that of finance. This was ever a weak point. In the palmiest days of peace, the revenue could never be made, by British rulers, to meet the expenditure: in war, no better expedient had presented itself than to inflict on the helpless people of India a debt similar to that with which England is burdened. One of the ablest and most eloquent of living statesmen, has repeatedly drawn attention to the unjust expedient to which successive governors-general have resorted, to supply an ever-recurring deficit at the expense of those who are not allowed to have any voice in the levying or expenditure of money which they and their children are heavily taxed to supply.

Mr. Gladstone denounced the Indian debt as being "charged upon a country whose revenues we are drawing in this country by virtue of the power of the sword." But (he added) "apart from that, I say it is most unjust that the executive government should have, for any purpose of its own, or for any purpose of the people of England, the power of entailing these tremendous charges upon the people of India."*

* *Times*, April 27th, 1858.

† Report of Indian debate.—*Times*, July 7th, 1858.

‡ A London journal, the *Press*, November 28th, 1857, has the following remarks:—"Lord Dalhousie's measure sent down the whole public funds of India from ninety-seven, at which they stood at the time, to eighty at a stroke. Every existing fundholder was therefore irretrievably compromised; and no one was thereafter able to realise except at a sacrifice of from seventeen to twenty per cent. It was not, be it observed, the conversion of the five per cents. into fours that the fundholders complained of; for that, by raising the value of the four per cents. to par, was a benefit to the old holders, while those who accepted the conversion had no reason to complain, as they might, if they liked, have taken cash. To the moneyed class in particular, the conversion itself was a thing almost immaterial; for, as mere temporary holders, they cared comparatively little about the rate of interest except in so far as it affected the market price of their stock. It was because the conversion—followed almost imme-

diately by the opening of a new five per cent. loan at par—made this stock absolutely unsaleable, that they with cause complained. It made it unsaleable, at least, except at a rate of discount that was ruin to them; and the consequence has been to close the pocket of the Indian capitalist to the government ever since. The remedy which the Indian government has endeavoured to apply—namely, that of raising the amount of interest without providing for the redemption of the stock that is thus depreciated—only aggravates the evil which it is meant to cure. Because, although the rate now offered be sufficient in itself, it but the more assures the lender of the fact, that his capital, if so invested, will be invested beyond recall; for if the Company can see no way to relief but by constantly raising its interest, a five per cent. loan must very soon be followed by a six per cent., and a six per cent. by a seven per cent., as its wants increase. And with each rise in the rate of interest the stock of the old holders will fall in market value, and be utterly unsaleable except at a price far below the sum which the owner lent."

On a subsequent occasion, he adverted indignantly to the twelve or fifteen millions sterling imposed as a permanent burden on the people of India by the Afghan war.†

The manner of effecting loans in India does not appear to have been calculated to lessen the dissatisfaction which the wealthier natives could not but feel at being denied any voice in their appropriation. An important step taken by Lord Dalhousie, is thus described in his famous farewell minute. After stating several facts which seemed "to promise well for the financial prosperity of the country," his lordship adds—

"A measure which was carried into effect in 1853-'54, was calculated to contribute further to that end. During those years the five per cent. debt of India was entirely extinguished. Excepting the payment of a comparatively small sum in cash, the whole of the five per cent. debt was either converted into a four per cent. debt, or replaced in the open four per cent. loan. The saving of interest which was effected by this operation, amounted to upwards of £300,000 per annum.

"At a later period, by a combination of many unfavourable circumstances, which could not have been anticipated, and which were not foreseen in England any more than by us in India, the government has again been obliged to borrow at the high rate of five per cent. But the operation of 1853-'54 was not the less politic or less successful in itself; while the financial relief it afforded was timely and effectual."

The Calcutta Chamber of Commerce took a different view of the matter,‡ and maintained that the lenders were ill-used. The government, instead of having a large surplus available for the operation, were, they asserted, obliged, not from any unforeseen causes, but in the natural course of things

(financial difficulty being the chronic condition of the Anglo-Indian government), immediately to open a new loan at five per cent. Money to the amount of four millions was borrowed by government, between the conversion of the five per cent. into a four per cent. debt in 1854, and the close of 1856, chiefly at five per cent., but partly at four-and-a-half per cent.

The four-and-a-half per cent. loan was suppressed, and a five per cent. loan opened in January, 1857—a measure which gave rise to much distrust, and seriously impeded the operations of the executive, when the sudden emergency occasioned by the revolt had to be met.

An officer, describing to a friend in England the state of affairs in Calcutta, 12th of June, 1857, says—"The Company's paper is down very low; the new five per cent. loan few subscribe to, and the four per cents. were yesterday at twenty discount; and I see, by the newspaper, that at Benares it was at forty-two discount. We must have a new loan, and you must give us the money, I expect. Out of the treasuries alone that have been robbed, I should think nearly two millions of money have been taken; and then fancy the expense of the transport of all these Europeans."*

On the evening of the day on which the Arms and Press Acts had been passed, a message from Major-general Hearsey reached Calcutta, desiring the aid of European troops to disarm the Native troops at Barrackpore, as he believed their fidelity could not be relied on. The request was immediately complied with; and, on the afternoon of Sunday, the 14th, the sepoys at Barrackpore, and also all except the body-guard of the governor-general in Fort William, Calcutta, and the neighbourhood, were quietly disarmed. The necessity for this measure must have greatly increased Lord Canning's perplexities. Although "Pandyism" had originated at Barrackpore, it was thought to have been trodden out there, and the government actually intended to dispatch troops from thence to join the force against Delhi, heedless of the opinion expressed by Lieutenant-governor Colvin at Agra, and his policy of "preserving the peace by not permitting Native troops to meet and directly fight their brethren."† It would have

been objectionable on the lowest ground of expediency, as a most dangerous experiment, to send men to fight against their countrymen, co-religionists, and, in many cases, their own relations. Even supposing them to have started for Delhi in all good faith, it was not in human nature to resist such combined temptations as those which would have met them on the road, or on reaching their destination. Sooner or later they would, rather than have fired on, have fraternised with their mutinous comrades. There were excellent British officers at Barrackpore; and they were, perhaps, disposed to overrate their own influence with the men. The accounts sent to England by the Indian government, do not clearly show what intimations were made to the troops to induce them to volunteer to march against Delhi, and to use the new rifle; but it would appear that they were given to understand that, by so doing, they would gain great credit, and place themselves beyond suspicion. For the offer to march against Delhi, the 70th N.I. were thanked by the governor-general in person; and it was subsequent to this that they professed their readiness to use the new cartridges. In an address to government, dated June 5th, and forwarded by the colonel (Kennedy) commanding the 70th N.I., the petitioners aver—

"We have thought over the subject; and as we are now going up country, we beg that the new rifles, about which there has been so much said in the army and all over the country, may be served out to us. By using them in its service, we hope to prove beyond a doubt our fidelity to government; and we will explain to all we meet, that there is nothing objectionable in them."‡

The petition of the 70th N.I. to join the force before Delhi, was read aloud, by Lord Canning's order, at the head of various Native corps, and the effect it produced was apparently beneficial. For instance, the 63rd N.I., at Berhampore, expressed themselves (in very English phraseology, but with very un-English feeling) "prepared and ready, with heart and hand, to go wherever, and against whomsoever you may please to send us, should it even be against our own kinsmen."§ The governor-general in council desired Major-general Hearsey to thank the 63rd N.I. publicly, "for this soldier-like expression of their

* Diary of officer in Calcutta.—*Times*, Aug. 3, 1857.

† Appendix to Papers on Mutiny, p. 188.

‡ Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 46.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

loyalty and attachment to the government.”*

The offer may have been honestly made; for the natives are the veriest children of impulse; but few who knew them would doubt that the reaction would be sudden and strong, and that mercenary troops so peculiarly situated, would, when brought face to face—father with son, brother with brother—lose all notion of being “true to their salt” in the natural feelings of humanity. The very expression of being ready to oppose their own kinsmen, suggests that the possibility of being placed in such a cruel position had already occurred to them.

On the 9th of June, a Mussulman of the 70th N.I. came to Captain Greene, and the following very remarkable conversation ensued regarding the intended march from Barrackpoor to Delhi:—

“‘Whatever you do,’ said the sepoy, ‘do not take your lady with you.’ I asked him, ‘Why?’ He said, ‘Because the mind of the natives, *kala admi* (black men), was now in a state of inquietude, and it would be better to let the lady remain here till everything was settled in the country, as there was no knowing what might happen.’ On my asking him if he had any reason to doubt the loyalty of the regiment, he replied, ‘Who can tell the hearts of a thousand men?’ He said that he believed the greater portion of the men of the regiment were sound, and in favour of our rule; but that a few evil men might persuade a number of good men to do an evil deed.

“I then asked him the meaning of all this about the cartridges. He said, ‘That when first the report was spread about, it was generally believed by the men; but that subsequently it had been a well understood thing that the cartridge question was merely raised for the sake of exciting the men, with a view of getting the whole army to mutiny, and thereby upset the English government; that they argued, that as we were turned out of Cabool, and had never returned to that place, so, if once we were entirely turned out of India, our rule would cease, and we should never return.’ Such is the opinion of a great bulk of the people. A Native officer also warned me that it would be better not to take up Mr. —. He said that if I went he would sleep by my bed, and protect me with his own life.”

Captain Greene adds, that a Hindoo had told him that the Mussulmans generally, in all regiments, were in the habit of talking to the effect that their “‘raj’ was coming round again.”†

It is evident, from the foregoing state-

ment, that a dangerous degree of excitement existed among the Barrackpoor troops. Matters were brought to an issue by a report being made to Colonel Kennedy, that a man of the 70th N.I. had been heard to say, “Let us go beyond Pultah, and then you will hear what we will do.” General Hearsey made inquiries, and convinced himself that “some villains in the corps were trying to incite the good men and true to mutiny.” He endeavoured to persuade the men to find out and deliver over the offenders: they would not do this; and he resolved on disarming the entire brigade of four regiments.‡ The officers of the 70th strenuously opposed the measure, declaring that “the reported speech must have been made by some budmash, and that Colonel Kennedy, being new to the regiment, did not and could not know the real and devoted sentiments of the Native officers and men with respect to their fealty.”§

The brigadier wisely persisted in a step which must have been most painful to him; and he adds, what will readily be believed, that he spoke “very, very kindly” to the men at the time of the disarming. The officers of the 70th were deeply affected by the grief evinced by their men. They went to the lines on the following day, and tried to comfort them, and induce them to take food. They found that the banyans (native dealers) had, in some instances, refused to give further credit, under the impression that the regiment would soon be paid up, and discharged altogether; while a large number were preparing to desert, in consequence of a bazaar report that handcuffs and manacles had been sent for. Captain Greene pleaded earnestly with Major-general Hearsey in favour of the regiment, which “had been for nigh twenty-five years his pride and his home;” declaring, “all of us, black and white, would be so thankful to you if you could get us back our arms, and send us away from this at once.”||

Of course the petition could not be granted. The safety of such officers as these was far too valuable to be thus risked. Probably their noble confidence, and that evinced by many others similarly

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 71.

† *Ibid.*, p. 8.

‡ Letter from Major-general Hearsey to his sister; dated, “Barrackpoor, June 16th, 1857.”—*Daily News*, August 6th, 1857.

§ Major-general Hearsey to secretary to government, June 15th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), p. 6.

|| Letters of Captain Greene to Major-general Hearsey, June 14th and 15th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, pp. 6, 7.

circumstanced, will be called sheer infatuation, and no allowance made for circumstances under which zeal might easily outrun discretion. But let it be remembered it was their own lives, nothing more, nothing less, that they were so willing to hazard losing; and the cause, which rendered them heedless of personal danger, was an absorbing desire for the honour of their corps, the welfare of their men, and the service of their country.

And most effective has their devotion been. No mere human wisdom, under whatever specious name it may be disguised—discretion, policy, expediency—could have done what the fearless faith of these gallant sepoy leaders did to break the first shock of the mutiny, to stop a simultaneous rising, to buy, when “time was everything,” a few weeks’ days’, hours’ respite, at the cost of their life-blood. It was extreme coercion that lit the fires at Meerut and Delhi; it was extreme conciliation that saved Simla and Lucknow. If some officers carried their confidence too far, and did not see that the time for conciliatory measures had for the moment passed, it must be recollected that they could not know the full extent of the secret influences brought to bear on the minds of their men; far less could they counteract the effect of panic caused, in repeated instances, by the cruel blundering of the highest local authorities, where these happened to be incapacitated for the exercise of sound judgment, by infirmity of mind and body (as has been shown at Meerut), or by the indiscriminating rashness of a hasty spirit (as is alleged to have been the case at Benares).

The panic in the lines of the Barrackpoor sepoys, on the evening of Sunday, the 14th, was far outdone by that which seized on the minds of the Calcutta population, in anticipation of the possible consequences of the measure which, after all, was so peaceably accomplished. The fact of the sepoys having allowed themselves to be disarmed without resistance, could not be denied; but the newsmongers and alarmists made amends for having no struggle to narrate, by enlarging on the imminent danger which had been averted. An order had been given by the governor-general to

search the lines, after the disarming should have been accomplished,* for tulwars (native swords), or other weapons. Brigadier Hearsay did so, and acquainted the governor-general with the fact of the order having been obeyed. He makes no mention of any weapons having been found; but only adds—“All quiet.”† The description of the condition of the troops on the following day, has been shown; as also the entreaty of the officers of the 70th N.I., for the re-arming of their regiment. Yet Dr. Duff, writing to England, says, that “when, after disarming, the sepoys’ huts were searched, they were found to be filled with instruments of the most murderous description—huge knives of various shapes, two-handed swords, poniards, and battle-axes; many of the swords being serrated, and evidently intended for the perpetration of torturing cruelties on their European victims—cruelties over which, in their anticipation, these ruthless savages, while fed and nurtured by the government, had doubtless fondly gloated!”‡ Of course, the official statements since laid before parliament, prove all this to be idle rumour; but it is quoted here as showing what fables were accepted as facts, and indorsed as such by men of note in Calcutta. The Europeans, moreover, believed themselves to have escaped, by a peculiar providence, a plot laid for their destruction by some undetected Mussulman Guy Fawkes. The maharajah of Gwalior had been visiting Calcutta shortly before the mutiny, and had invited the whole European community to an exhibition of fireworks, across the river, at the Botanic Gardens. The entertainment was postponed on account of a violent storm; and it was afterwards alleged that a scheme had been thereby thwarted, of seizing that night on Fort William, and massacring the Christian community.§ New rumours of a similar character were spread abroad in every direction. As at Simla, so at Calcutta, nothing was too palpably absurd to be related and received as possible and probable. True, the year 1857 will go down to posterity as one of previously unparalleled crime and disaster. But it will also take its place as a year of “canards.”

The native tendency to exaggeration and

on the subject. He states that some of the conspirators underwent the penalty of death. It is strange that other writers have not mentioned so remarkable and important event, if anything of the kind really occurred.

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 52.

† *Ibid.*, p. 59.

‡ See Dr. Duff's *Letters on India*, p. 37.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 2. Dr. Duff speaks very decidedly

high colouring was well known. Every Englishman in India, every educated European, must have learned in childhood to appreciate the story-telling propensities of the Asiatics. The *Arabian Nights* are a standing memorial of their powers of imagination. In composition or in conversation, they adopt a florid, fervid style, natural to them, but bewildering to Europeans in general, and peculiarly distasteful to the Anglo-Saxon mind. In the limited intercourse between superior and inferior, master and servant, the "sahibs" would cut short the Oriental jargon very quickly; but when, in the fever of excitement, domestic servants, khitmutgars or ayahs, a favourite syce (groom) or some personal attendant, came full of a bazaar report of horrors perpetrated at stations hundreds of miles off, they were listened to as if every syllable had been Gospel truth; and, through similar channels, the newspaper columns were filled with the most circumstantial details of often imaginary, always exaggerated, atrocities.

Strange that the experience of a hundred years had had so little effect in giving the rulers of India an insight into native character, and in enabling them to view the real dangers and difficulties of their position, unclouded by imaginary evils. But no! the tales of mutilation and violation publicly told, and the still fouler horrors privately whispered, though now for the most part denounced and disowned, then made many a brave man pale with alarm, as he looked on his wife and children. Fear is even more credulous than hope; and the majority, while under the bewildering influence of excitement, probably believed in the alleged abominations. It seems likely, however, that some of the retailers of these things must have had sufficient experience of the untrustworthiness of the hearsay evidence on which they rested, to understand their true character. If so, and if, indeed, they promulgated lies, knowing or suspecting them to be such, they committed a deadly sin; and on their heads rests, in measure, the blood of every man who, wild with terror, rushed from the pre-

sence of his fellow-creatures to the tribunal of his God, or proved, in the presence of assembled heathens, his disbelief in the existence of an ever-present Saviour, by destroying his wife or child. Several instances of suicide occurred during the mutiny.* Of wife or child-murder there are few, if any, attested instances; but it is sufficiently terrible to know, that the thought of escaping the endurance of suffering by the commission of sin, was deliberately sanctioned, as will be shown by a subsequent chapter, even by ministers, or at least by a minister, of the Christian religion.

It was well for England and for India, that the governor-general was a man of rare moral and physical courage. No amount of energy could have compensated for a want of self-reliance, which might have placed him at the mercy of rash advisers, and induced the adoption of coercive measures likely to turn possible rebels into real ones, instead of such as were calculated to reassure the timid and decide the wavering, by the attitude of calm dignity so important in a strong foreign government. General Mansfield, then in Calcutta, wrote home, that "the one calm head in Calcutta was that upon Lord Canning's shoulders."† The assertion seems, however, too sweeping. Certainly there was another exception. The viceroy's wife was as little susceptible of panic as her lord, and continued to reside in a palace guarded by natives, and to drive about, attended by a sepoy escort, with a gentle, fearless bearing, which well befitted her position.

Lord Canning was much blamed for not immediately exchanging his sepoy for a European guard: but Earl Granville defended him very happily, on grounds on which the sepoy officers may equally base their justification. "I think," said Lord Granville, "that at a moment when great panic existed in Calcutta, Lord Canning was rash in intrusting himself to troops whose fidelity might be suspected; but it was at a time when he felt, that as our dominion in India depended upon the belief in our self-confidence and courage, it was of the greatest importance that the head of

hardly deserve the sole blame: suicide is usually the termination of the lives of persons who have habitually disregarded the revealed will of God, by sensual indulgence, or what is commonly termed the laws of nature—by long-continued mental effort, to the neglect of their physical requirements.

† Stated by Earl Granville in India debate.—*Times*, December 8th, 1857.

* Mrs. Coopland, in the narrative of her *Escape from Gwalior*, remarks—"We heard of the shocking suicides of the commodore of the *Mary* and of General Stalker. The reason we heard assigned for this, both in the papers and by people who ought to know, is that the climate so upsets people's nerves, as to render them unfit for any great excitement or responsibility."—(p. 76.) The climate can

the Europeans in that country should not be thought to be deficient in those qualities. And I am quite sure, that among Englishmen even, too great an indifference to personal danger is not likely very long to tell against Lord Canning."*

It is probable that the governor-general hoped, by retaining his sepoy guard, to counteract in some degree the dangerous tendency of the alarm manifested by his countrymen. An officer "who witnessed the living panorama of Calcutta on the 14th of June,"† has drawn a lively sketch of the prevailing disorder and dismay.

He declares—

"It was all but universally credited that the Barrackpoor brigade was in full march against Calcutta; that the people in the suburbs had already risen; that the King of Oude, with his followers, were plundering Garden-reach. Those highest in office were the first to give the alarm. There were secretaries to government running over to members of council, loading their pistols, barricading the doors, sleeping on sofas; members of council abandoning their houses with their families, and taking refuge on board ship: crowds of lesser celebrities, impelled by these examples, having hastily collected their valuables, were rushing to the fort, only too happy to be permitted to sleep under the fort guns. Horses, carriages, palanquins, vehicles of every sort and kind, were put into requisition to convey panic-stricken fugitives out of the reach of imaginary cut-throats. In the suburbs, almost every house belonging to the Christian population was abandoned. Half-a-dozen determined fanatics could have burned down three parts of the town. A score of London thieves would have made their fortunes by plundering the houses in the neighbourhood of Chowringhee (the patrician quarter of the city), which had been abandoned by their inmates."‡

The writer adds—"It must in fairness be admitted, that whilst his advisers—the patricians of Leadenhall-street—were hiding under sofas, and secreting themselves in the holds of the vessels in port, Lord Canning himself maintained a dignified attitude." The admission is worth noting. It is only to be regretted that other exceptions were not made; for it is scarcely possible but that there were such. Only, to

* Stated by Earl Granville in India debate.—*Times*, December 8th, 1857.

† See also similar statements published in Indian correspondence of *Times*, *Daily News*, and other papers of August, 1857. Dr. Duff says—"The panic throughout Sunday night rose to an inconceivable height. With the exception of another couple, Mrs. Duff and myself were the only British subjects in Cornwallis-square on that night."—*Letters*, p. 24.

‡ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 105.

§ An officer employed on the expedition, remarks, that the 37th wore "the small forage-cap, fit only

have singled them out would have been to stigmatise the unnamed.

At daybreak on the 15th of June, the King of Oude, with Ali Nukki Khan, and other leading adherents, were arrested, and lodged as prisoners in Fort William. The official intimation simply relates the fact, without stating the reason of the arrest, or the manner in which it was performed. Private authorities state that it was accomplished as a surprise. The force employed consisted of 500 men of H.M. 37th foot (which had arrived a few days before from Ceylon, and had been present at the disarming at Barrackpoor),§ and a company of the royal artillery. Mr. Edmonstone, the foreign secretary, then went forward to the residence of the ex-minister. He seemed startled by the sight of the soldiers, but surrendered himself to their custody without a word of remonstrance. His house was searched, and his papers secured. The party then proceeded to arrest the king, telling him that the governor-general had reason to believe him connected with the mutiny. Wajid Ali behaved on this occasion, as on that of his deposition, with much dignity. Taking off his jewelled turban, and placing it before the foreign secretary, he said—"If I have, by word, by deed, or in any way whatever encouraged the mutineers, I am worthy of any punishment that can be devised: I am ready to go wherever the governor-general thinks fit." The apartments were then searched; and, in the words of one of the officers engaged, "the king, his prime minister, and the whole batch, papers and all, were seized."||

The Calcutta population viewed this measure, which was simply a precautionary one, as undoubted evidence of a discovered conspiracy. Dr. Duff, writing from Calcutta, and deeply imbued with the fever of the time (as from the nature of his rare gift of popular eloquence he would be likely to be), enters very fully into the subject.¶

for the barrack-square in England, affording no protection whatever from the sun. They had white jackets on, I was glad to see; but even then, the heat was so great that the cross-belt was wet through from perspiration. Stocks of course."—*Times*, August 3rd, 1857.

|| *Times*—*Ibid*.

¶ These letters, addressed to Dr. Tweedie, Convener of the Free Church of Scotland's Foreign Mission Committee, were published in 1858, under the title of *The Indian Rebellion; its Causes and Results*; and "the views and opinions which they embody," are described in the preface as "the ripe result of

"On Monday morning," he writes, "the ex-King of Oude and his treasonable crew were arrested, and safely quartered in Fort William. Since then various parties connected with the Oude family, and other influential Mohammedans, have been arrested; and on them have been found several important documents, tending to throw light on the desperate plans of treason which have been seriously projected. Among others has been found a map of Calcutta, so sketched out as to divide the whole of the town into sections. A general rise was planned to take place on the 3rd instant, the anniversary of the battle of Plassey. The city was to be taken, and the Feringhi Kaffirs [foreign infidels], or British and other Christian inhabitants, to be all massacred. Hereafter, parties who swore on the Koran, and proved that they had taken an active share in the butchery and pillage of the Europeans, were to have certain sections of the town allotted to them for their own special benefit!" All this, and much more of a similar sort, Dr. Duff declares to have been "timeously and providentially revealed." That is to say, all this was firmly believed during the panic; but very little, if any, has been established by subsequent examination, or is now on record.

Time, the revealer of secrets, has brought nothing to light to the disparagement of the King of Oude. On the contrary, many of the accusations brought against him have been disproved. Impartial observers assert, that "there is not a shadow of a shade of evidence to connect him with the rebellion."* Whether from his own convictions, or by the advice of the queen-mother (a woman of unquestioned ability), he appears to have steadily adhered to the policy which alone admitted a prospect of redress—that of submission under protest.

Mr. Russell, writing from Lucknow in February, 1859, remarks—"It is now universally admitted, that it was owing to his influence no outbreak took place at the time of the annexation."† Up to the period of the mutiny, and, indeed, to the present moment, he has firmly refused to thirty years' observation." It is added, that the most fastidious critic will hardly require any apology for the want of the author's revision; because the letters are "tense with the emotions, and all aflame with the tidings of that terrible season." It is not, however, a question of style, but of fact. Misstatements like the one regarding the Barrackpoor sepoy and the King of Oude, with many other stories

accept any allowance from the British government. He may be our prisoner; he will not be our pensioner: but has continued, by the sale of his jewels, to support himself and the royal family. The anomalous position of the deposed king certainly did not strengthen the British government during the mutiny; and when Wajid Ali heard of the fall of Cawnpoor, and the precarious tenure of Lucknow, the magnificent capital of his dynasty (held by a slender garrison of the usurping race, against their own revolted mercenaries), he might well feel that the seizure of his misgoverned kingdom had been followed by a speedy retribution. In the hands of a native government, Oude would have been, as in every previous war, a source of strength to the British government; now it threatened to be like the "Spanish ulcer" of Napoleon Buonaparte. If Wajid Ali yearned for vengeance, he had it in no stinted measure, though a prisoner. Vengeful, however, none of his house appear to have been: their vices were altogether of another order. Perhaps he had himself benefited by the sharp lessons of adversity; and while becoming sensible of the folly of his past career of sensuality and indolence, might hope that the English would profit by the same stern teaching, and learn the expediency of being just.

On the 17th of June, Sir Patrick Grant, the newly-appointed commander-in-chief, arrived at Calcutta from Madras, and with him Colonel Havelock, who had just returned from Persia. Both were experienced Indian officers. Sir Patrick Grant commenced his career in the Bengal army, and had early distinguished himself by raising the Hurrianah light infantry—a local battalion, which he commanded for many years: he subsequently married a daughter of Lord Gough; became adjutant-general; and was from thence raised to the command of the Madras army, being the first officer in the Company's service who had ever attained that position.

Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Havelock was a Queen's officer, who had seen service in Burmah and Afghanistan, in the calculated to set the British mind "afire" against the natives, ought in justice to have been recanted. Dr. Duff is a well-known and respected minister, of unquestioned ability; and his errors cannot, in justice to the cause of truth, be passed unnoticed, even though under the pressure of an important avocation: they may have escaped his memory.

* Russell.—*Times*, March 28th, 1859. † *Ibid*.

Gwalior campaign of 1843, and the Sutlej campaigns of 1845-'6; after which he became quartermaster-general, and, subsequently, adjutant-general of her Majesty's forces in India. In 1829 he married the third daughter of Dr. Marshman, the companion of the apostolic Carey in founding the Baptist Mission at Serampoor; and, in the following year, he openly joined that denomination of Christians, receiving public baptism in the manner deemed by them most scriptural. The step drew on him much ridicule from those who, having never had any deep religious convictions, could not understand their paramount influence on a loftier spirit. It was not, however, a measure likely to hinder his advancement in his profession; although, if it had been, Havelock was a brave and honest man, and much too strongly convinced of the paramount importance of things eternal, to have hazarded them for any worldly advantage. At the same time, it is certain he made no sacrifice of things temporal by allying himself with the once despised but afterwards powerful party, which exercised remarkable influence through the *Friend of India*, of which paper Dr. Marshman was the proprietor. As a boy, he is said to have been called "old Phlos" by his playfellows at the Charter-house, on account of his grave, philosophic demeanour. In after years, he delighted in expounding the Scriptures to his men, and in warning them against the besetting sins of a soldier's daily life, drunkenness and its attendant vice. His efforts were crowned with success. At a critical moment during the campaign in Burmah, Sir Archibald Campbell gave an order to a particular corps, which could not be carried out, owing to the number of men unfitted for duty by intoxication. The general was informed of the fact. "Then," said he, "call out Havelock's saints; they are never drunk, and he is always ready."*

Again—when, in 1835, Havelock sought the appointment of adjutant to the 13th light infantry, opposition was made from various quarters, on the ground that he was

a fanatic and an enthusiast. Lord William Bentinck examined the punishment roll of the regiment; and finding that the men of Havelock's company, and those who joined them in their religious exercises, were the most sober and the best-behaved in the regiment, he gave Havelock the solicited appointment; remarking, that he "only wished the whole regiment was Baptist."†

Colonel Havelock's personal habits were simple, even to austerity; and to these, but still more to his habitual trust in an overruling Providence, may be attributed the spring of energy which enabled him to declare, on the morning of his sixty-second birthday—"Nearly every hair on my head and face is as grey as my first charger; but my soul and mind are young and fresh."‡ Military honours he coveted to a degree which appears to have rendered him comparatively insensible to the horrors of war; and it is strange to contrast the irrepressible disgust with which Sir Charles Napier chronicles the scenes of slaughter through which he had cut his way to fame and fortune, with the almost unalloyed satisfaction which Havelock seems to have found in a similar career.

These two veterans (each of whom attained eminence after toiling up-hill, past the mile-stones of threescore years) have left on record widely different opinions. Napier uniformly denounced war as "hellish work."§ Havelock, "having no scruples about the compatibility of war with Christianity,"|| prayed constantly, from his school-days to advanced age, "to live to command in a successful action."¶ This single sentence, which conveys the cherished desire of a lifetime, is one of those utterances that reveal, beyond all possibility of error, the character, even the inner being, of the writer. Lord Hardinge is said to have pronounced Havelock, "every inch a soldier, and every inch a Christian."** And this praise was true in its degree; for Lord Hardinge†† measured Havelock by his own standard of Christianity; and Havelock himself steadily pursued what he believed

* Rev. William Brock's *Biographical Sketch of Sir Henry Havelock*, p. 37.

† *Ibid.*, p. 45.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

§ *Life of Sir Charles Napier*: by Sir William Napier.—Vol. iii., p. 410.

|| Rev. W. Brock's *Biographical Sketch of Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B.*—p. 18.

¶ Letter to Mrs. Havelock; July 13th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, p. 163.

** Brock's *Havelock*.—Preface.

†† Napier writes—"Hardinge is very religious; he had prayers on the field of battle! Thou shalt not kill, is the order; and it seems strange, in the heat of disobedience, to pray and make parade."—*Life*, vol. iii., p. 368. It must, however, be remembered, that to pray to be protected in battle, and to be led into it, are totally different petitions.





to be the path of duty. Still, that a Christian far advanced in years, should, after long experience of offensive warfare (the Afghan campaign for instance), continue to pray to be at the head of a battle, is startling, and would be incomprehensible, had we not daily evidence how apt men are (in Archbishop Whateley's words) to let their opinions or practices bend the rule by which they measure them.

These comments would be superfluous but for the extreme interest excited by the closing passages of Havelock's life, on which we are now entering, and which, from their peculiar character, have thrown an interest round the chief actor, scarcely warranted by the relative importance of his proceedings as compared with those of other Indian leaders, several of whom have been strangely underrated.* It is frequently asserted that Havelock resembled the Puritans of English history: his spare small figure, and worn and thoughtful face, helps the comparison; and it is asserted, in words of more discriminating praise than those previously quoted, that "a more simple-minded, upright, God-fearing soldier, was not among Cromwell's Ironsides."† But it must be remembered that the Puritans fought for civil and religious liberty, for themselves and for their children; and Havelock, employed in repeated foreign wars of conquest and subjugation, might as well be compared to the gallant Baptist missionaries, Knibb and his coadjutors (who struggled so efficiently, amid poverty, calumny, and cruel persecution, for the anti-slavery cause in the West Indies), as to an English Round-head.

The arrival of Sir Patrick Grant may be supposed to have removed from the governor-general the chief responsibility of the military measures now urgently required. Tidings from Neil at Allahabad, told that the course of mutiny, instead of being arrested, was growing daily stronger; and Sir Henry Lawrence continued to urge on the governor-general the extreme peril of the Cawnpoor garrison. When Grant and Havelock reached Calcutta on the 17th of June, there was yet time, by efforts such as Warren Hastings or Marquis Wellesley would have made, to have sent a force

which might have forestalled the capitulation. The regular rate of dawk travelling is eight miles an hour, night and day; and there was no good reason why the 508 miles between the railway terminus at Raneegunje and Cawnpoor, should have been such a stumblingblock. Had Sir Henry Lawrence's suggestion of the *ekkas* been adopted by Sir P. Grant immediately on his arrival at Calcutta, Cawnpoor might still have been saved, the troops might have slept under cover the whole day, with their arms and ammunition by their side, and arrived fresh and strong at the scene of action. It was no fear of their being cut off in detail that prevented the attempt being made; for they went up the country all through June, July, and August, in parties of fourteen, twelve, and, on one occasion, of eight men;‡ yet not a single detachment was ever cut off. Far different was the energy displayed in Northern India, where, as we have seen, the Guides marched 750 miles, at the rate of twenty-seven miles a-day, and went into action immediately afterwards.

The supineness of the Supreme government regarding Cawnpoor, is by far the most serious charge brought against them by the press. The refusal of the co-operation of the Goorkas is a branch of the same subject; but it is not difficult to conjecture the motive of the Supreme government for desiring to dispense with such dangerous auxiliaries. The well-known Jung Bahadur, the first minister and virtual ruler of Nepaul, had, at the beginning of the mutiny, offered to send a force to the assistance of the English. The proposal was accepted; and three thousand troops, with Jung himself at their head, came down from the hills in forced marches, in the highest possible spirits at the thought of paying off old scores on the sepoys, and sharing the grog and loot of the English soldiers. Second thoughts, or circumstances which have not been made public,§ induced the Supreme government to alter their determination with regard to the Goorkas; and the force, after passing through the Terai (the deadly jungle which lies at the foot of their hills), were arrested by a message of recall. They had expected

* One of Havelock's biographers declares, that he set forth to command "the avenging column," having "received his commission from the Lord of Hosts. He had by long training been prepared for the 'strange work' of judgment against the mur-

derous hosts of India."—Owen's *Havelock*, p. 195.

† *Westminster Review*, October, 1858.

‡ Appendix to Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 350.

§ The original offer is said to have been accepted by an unauthorised functionary.

to reach Oude by the 15th of June; but on learning that their services could be dispensed with, they started back to Khatmandoo, the capital of Nepaul; which they reached, after suffering greatly from sickness and fatigue. Scarcely had they returned, before another summons arrived from Calcutta, requesting that they should be again sent to Oude, and the march was recommenced on the 29th of June. When they at length reached British territory, much reduced by death and disease, Lawrence and Wheeler had been dead a fortnight.

Jung Bahadoor is said to have expressed his indignation very decidedly; and in writing to his friend Mr. Hodgson, late of the Bengal civil service, he concluded his narrative of the affair by exclaiming—"You see how I am treated. How do you expect to keep India with such rulers as these?"*

Still, as has been stated, Lord Canning may have had good reason for desiring the recall of the Goorkas; and the very fact of being subsequently compelled to avail himself of their services, would account for his silence regarding the apparent incertitude of his previous policy. The fact, pointed out by Lord Dalhousie, that the Nepaulese government always armed and made hostile preparations when war broke out in Europe, and the strong suspicions entertained of an intimate understanding existing between the courts of Russia and Nepaul, were arguments calculated to increase the repugnance any civilised government must have felt in accepting the aid of a horde of half-civilised mountaineers, whose fidelity in the case of a reverse would be extremely doubtful, and who, in the event of success, would unquestionably prove a scourge to the unoffending agriculturists, whom the British government was bound to protect. The consideration of this point, therefore, only strengthens the conclusion, that want of energy in relieving Cawnpoor, is by far the most important of the errors attributed to the Supreme government during the crisis. The measures recommended by the Lawrences† for the rapid collection of troops at Calcutta, had been taken; but the good to be derived therefrom was neutralised by their apparently unjustifiable detention in Bengal. It is further asserted by Mr. Mead (who, at the time of which he writes, edited the

Friend of India), that a question of military etiquette was another impediment to the dispatch of relief for the protracted agony then being endured in the Cawnpoor trenches. "The fiery Neil," it is asserted, "having quelled mutiny at Benares, and punished it at Allahabad, chafed impatiently till a force of men, properly equipped, could be got together for the relief of Cawnpoor; but he was not allowed, in this instance, to follow the impulse of his daring nature. Colonel Havelock had arrived in Calcutta; and the rules of the service would not allow a junior officer to be at the head of an enterprise, however fit he might be to carry it to a successful conclusion. Time was lost to enable Colonel Havelock to join at Allahabad."‡ There is nothing in Havelock's published letters to show, that on arriving at Calcutta, he himself, or indeed any one round him, felt the intense anxiety which the telegrams of Lawrence and Wheeler were calculated to excite. He writes under date, "Calcutta, Sunday, June 21st," to Mrs. Havelock (then, happily for all parties, far from the scene of strife, educating her younger children "under the shadow of the Drachenfels"), that he had been reappointed brigadier-general, and had been recommended by Sir P. Grant for an "important command; the object for which is to relieve Cawnpoor, where Sir Hugh Wheeler is threatened; and support Lucknow, where Sir Henry Lawrence is somewhat pressed."§

An officer of great promise, Captain Stuart Beatson, came to Calcutta about the same time as Sir Patrick Grant. Beatson had been sent to Persia, on the outbreak of the war, to raise a regiment of Arab horse; but on the conclusion of peace he returned to India, and found that his own regiment, the 1st cavalry, had mutinied. Being thus at liberty, he made inquiry, and saw reason to believe that a corps of Eurasian horse might be raised on the spot; and he accordingly framed a scheme, by which each man was to receive forty rupees (£4) per month, nett pay; horse, arms, and accoutrements being furnished by government. The scheme was rejected, and Captain Beatson was informed that "the government had no need of his services." One month later, when the want of cavalry was

* Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 89.

† Sir Henry begged Lord Canning, on the 24th of May, to get "all the Goorkas from the hills;" but probably he referred to those under our own

rule, not to the Nepaulese.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 315.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

§ Brock's *Havelock*, p. 141.

an acknowledged grievance, and the price of horses had risen enormously, the authorities were compelled to raise a corps on the basis of one hundred rupees per mensem for each trooper, who was not the less supplied with horse, arms, accoutrements, and camp equipage.*

That Captain Beatson was an officer of ability and character, is proved by his being selected by Brigadier-general Havelock for the highest position in his gift, that of adjutant-general. The government having at length issued their tardy orders, Havelock

and Beatson quitted Calcutta on the 23rd of June, leaving the entire population in a relapse of panic—that day being the centenary of Plassy; and there being a prophecy which the Mohammedans were asserted to have resolved on verifying—that the raj of the East India Company would then expire. As on a previous occasion, the day passed quietly; and both Europeans and natives having mutually anticipated violence, were, the *Friend of India* states, equally “rejoiced at finding their necks sound on the following morning.”

CHAPTER XIII.

AZIMGHUR, BENARES, JAUNPOOR, AND ALLAHABAD.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

It is necessary to return to the northward, and follow the course of mutiny in what General Havelock, in the letter lately quoted, terms the “disturbed provinces”—a very gentle phrase, inasmuch as the whole country to which he refers was at that time in a state of total disorganisation, the officers of government holding out in hourly peril of their lives, or hiding, with their wives and babes, among the villagers or in the jungle; the native farmers and peasantry themselves pillaged and harassed by mutineers and dacoits; strife and oppression characterising the present state of things, with famine and pestilence brooding over the future.

Azimghur is the chief place of a district in the province of Allahabad, about fifty-six miles north-east of Benares. The headquarters and eight companies of the 17th N.I. were stationed here. There were no European soldiers. The commandant, Major Burroughs, was an experienced officer, proud of his regiment, but quite aware of the trial to which its fidelity would be exposed, and sedulously watchful to remove every temptation. Up to the 18th of May, the most favourable opinion was entertained of the 17th N.I.; and the judge of Azimghur, Mr. Astell, writing to its command-

ing officer, congratulated him on the great love and respect entertained for him personally.† Many sepoys, of various regiments, were in the Azimghur district. The 17th N.I. had been quartered with the 19th and 34th at Lucknow, in 1855; and when the latter regiments were disbanded (at Berhampoor and Barrackpoor), Major Burroughs, fearing the consequence of the renewal of intercourse between them and his own men, issued an order forbidding strangers to visit the lines without special permission. But as communication outside the cantonment could not be prevented, the major addressed his regiment, on the 20th of May, in forcible language. He spoke of his thirty years' connection with that corps; reminded the men that many of them had been enlisted by him during the twelve years he had filled the position of adjutant; and declared that they knew he had never misled or refused to listen to them. Unfortunately (considering the critical position of affairs), he concluded his address by requiring them to be ready to use the new cartridge—by tearing it, however, with their hands, not biting it with their teeth.

Previous to this parade, and, indeed, immediately after the reception of the Meerut intelligence, such measures as were practicable had been taken for the defence of the treasury (which contained £70,000), and for the protection of the ladies and

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 109.

† Report of Major Burroughs' Return of regiments which have mutinied.—Parl. Papers (Commons), 15th March, 1859; p. 25.

children. The Cutcherry and public offices had been partially enclosed by a breast-work, and "the post guns, under a select guard, had been placed at the treasury for its defence." On the 1st of June, two warnings were secretly and separately given, by a sepoy and a pay havildar, that the grenadiers were arming with the intent of attacking the treasury. The adjutant rode down to the lines, found all quiet, and the report was disbelieved. At sunset on the 3rd, the treasure was marched off towards Benares, by two companies of the 17th, and eighty of the 13th irregular cavalry, under Lieutenant Palliser, sent to Azimghur for that purpose.* It does not seem to have occurred to the officers that the measure was likely to produce excitement or dissatisfaction. According to the statement of one of these (Lieutenant Constable, 17th N.I.), they were all at mess, and had the ladies with them, when nine o'clock struck, and two muskets were fired on parade, evidently as a signal; then, "whirr went the drums—all knew that the regiment was in revolt." The Europeans rushed from the mess-room to the Cutcherry, placed the ladies on the top of it, and directed the gunners to prepare for service. The reply was an unqualified refusal to fire themselves, or let any one fire on their countrymen. The mutineers approached with deafening shouts. The officers went to meet them. There was an interval of intense anxiety; but it was soon over. The men "behaved with romantic courtesy. They formed a square round their officers, and said they not only would not touch, but would protect them, only that there were some of the mutineers who had sworn the death of particular officers; therefore they begged the whole party to take to their carriages, and be off at once. 'But how are we to get to our carriages,' said the Europeans, 'seeing that they are scattered all through the station?' 'Ah! we will fetch them,' replied the sepoys. And so they did; and gave the party an escort for ten miles out of the station, on the road to Ghazipoor,"† which place (forty miles from Azimghur) the fugitives reached quite unmolested. The only blood shed was

that of Quartermaster Hutchinson, who was deliberately shot down by a sepoy.

The doors of the gaol were opened, and about 800 prisoners let loose to plunder the deserted European dwellings, and then to band themselves together as dacoits, and infest the country districts. The gaol and treasury guards, and the Native artillerymen with the two guns, went off with the 17th N.I., in pursuit of the treasure escort, which was soon overtaken. The two companies of the 17th immediately fraternised with the mutineers, who seized the treasure. The Irregulars would not act against their countrymen, neither would they join them, despite the temptation of sharing the plunder: on the contrary, they rallied round their officers, and brought them safely to Benares. There were in Azimghur, as in almost every other scene of mutiny, Eurasians and native Christians who were left at the mercy of the mutineers; while the Europeans, especially of the higher class, having carriages and horses, money and influence, with a numerous retinue of servants, were able to effect their escape. No English missionary was stationed here; but there was a flourishing school under the charge of Timothy Luther, a native Christian of experience, ability, and piety. Mr. Tucker took great interest both in the school and schoolmaster; and it is said that, after the mutiny, he and his family were brought away from Azimghur, where they had lain concealed, "by an escort kindly dispatched from Benares."‡ A temporarily successful attempt was made, by a private person, for the reoccupation and maintenance of the station. Mr. Venables, a wealthy indigo-planter (one of the European "interlopers" for whom the East India Company had small respect), possessed a large estate at Doorie Ghaut, twenty-two miles on the Goruckpoor side of Azimghur. He had, from the nature of his occupation, great influence with the respectable and industrious portion of the agricultural community, who had all to lose, and nothing to gain, from an irruption of revolted mercenaries and escaped convicts. The natives cheerfully rallied round him: he procured arms for their use, marched at their head, and reoccupied Azimghur, which the mutineers had already deserted. A detachment of one hundred men of the 65th N.I., and fifty of the 12th irregular cavalry, were sent to support him; and with these he held his position for some weeks, as a flood-gate against the waves of

* Report of Brigadier J. Christie.—Parl. Papers (Commons), 15th March, 1859; p. 25.

† Statement of Lieutenant Constable.—*Times*, August 6th, 1857.

‡ Rev. M. A. Sherring's *Indian Church during the Great Rebellion*, p. 283.

mutiny; collecting the revenue, and maintaining a certain degree of order.

Benares—the famous seat of Brahminical lore, the holy city of the Hindoos, dear to them as Mecca to the Moslem—occupies an elevated position on a curve of the Ganges, 460 miles from Calcutta, and eighty-three from Allahabad. Its ancient name was *Casi*, or “the splendid,” which it still retains. It was also called *Varanashi*, from two streams, *Vara* and *Nashi*; so termed in Sanscrit: the Mohammedans pronounced the word “Benares,” a corruption followed by the English. Benares is full of structures, which are as finger-posts, marking the various phases of Indian history. They stand peculiarly secure; for the Hindoos assert that no earthquake is ever felt within the limits of the hallowed city. The temple to Siva tells of the palmy days of Brahminism; the ruins of a once world-famous observatory, attest the devotion to science of *Rajah Jey Sing*, of *Jeypoor*; and the mosque built by *Aurangzebe*, on the spot where a Hindoo temple had been razed to the ground by his orders, remains in evidence of the only persecutor of his dynasty, and the ruler whose united ambition and bigotry increased the superstructure of his empire, but irreparably injured its foundation.

A few miles distant stands a more interesting, and probably more ancient, monument than even Siva's temple. It is the *Sara Nath*—a solid mass of masonry, from forty to fifty feet in diameter, originally shaped like a bee-hive, and supposed to be a Buddhistic structure. Then there is the public college for Hindoo literature, instituted during the residency of the easy, kind-hearted scholar, *Jonathan Duncan* (the “Brahminised Englishman,” as *Macintosh* called him), afterwards governor of Bombay. Teachers of Hindoo and Mohammedan law and literature abound. The former trust habitually for their support to the voluntary contributions of pilgrims of rank, and to stipends allowed them by different Hindoo and Mahratta princes. They do not impart religious instruction for money, owing to the prevailing idea that the Vedas, their sacred books, would be profaned by being used for the obtaining of pecuniary advantage.

The population of Benares was estimated at about 300,000, of whom four-fifths were Hindoos. It included a considerable number of ex-royal families and disinherited jaghire-

dars. Altogether, the city seemed as well calculated to be a hotbed of disaffection for the Hindoos, as Delhi had proved for the Mohammedans. If a fear of conversion to Christianity had been a deep-rooted, popular feeling, it would surely have found expression here. The commissioner, *Henry Carre Tucker*, was a man who desired the promulgation of the Gospel above every other object in life. The Benares citizens knew this well; but they also knew that his views were incompatible with the furtherance of any project for the forcible or fraudulent violation of caste. He was one of those whose daily life bore witness to a pure and self-denying creed; and refuted, better than volumes of proclamations could have done, the assertions of *Nana Sahib* and his followers, that the so-called Christians were cow-killing, pig-eating infidels, without religion themselves, and with no respect for that of others. In his public capacity, Mr. Tucker had been singularly just, patient, and painstaking; and his private character, in its peacefulness, its unimpeachable morality, and its abounding charity, peculiarly fitted him for authority in a city the sanctity of which was jealously watched by the Hindoos. When the mutiny broke out, he found his reward in the power of usefulness, insured to him by his hold on the respect and affections of the people: and it is worthy of remark, that while so many civilians perished revolver in hand, the very man who “had never fired a shot in his life, and had not a weapon of any kind in the house,”* escaped with his female relatives and young children uninjured.

In May, 1857, there were at Benares the 37th N.I., an irregular cavalry regiment of Seiks from *Loodiana*, and about thirty European artillerymen. Some excitement was manifested in the lines of the 37th, on learning what had occurred at Meerut and Delhi; but this apparently subsided. Mr. Tucker, however, urged on the government the necessity of having “a nucleus of Europeans” at Benares, and 150 of H.M. 10th foot were sent thither from *Dinapoor*. On the 23rd of May, the commissioner reported to the Supreme government—“Every thing perfectly quiet, both in the lines and city of Benares, and in the whole Benares division; and likely, with God's blessing, to continue so. I am quite easy and confident.”† The position of affairs continued

* *Times*, August 18th, 1857.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 314.

equally satisfactory until the 3rd of June, when Colonel Neil arrived with a detachment of the 1st Madras Fusiliers. Sixty men of that regiment, with three officers, had reached Benares on the previous day, and four companies were on the road. Colonel Neil was a man of extraordinary energy and determination; but these predominant qualities naturally inclined him to act on general conclusions, with little regard for the peculiarities of the case in point, or for any opinion that differed from his own. Such, at least, is the impression which a review of the public documents regarding his brief career in North-Western India, is calculated to produce; and if the evidence of his coadjutors may be trusted, "the fiery Neil," despite his courage, his honesty, and, above all, his anxiety for the besieged at Cawnpore, was instrumental in lighting flames which he was compelled to stay and extinguish at the cost of leaving Sir Hugh Wheeler and his companions to perish. The charge is a very serious one. It is brought by Major-general Lloyd, not as a personal attack, but indirectly against "the military authorities at Benares;" for proceedings which "caused the instant revolt of the 6th regiment at Allahabad, on the 6th of June, and at Fyzabad on the 8th of June."* The responsibility of that policy is declared by Colonel Neil himself to have been his own, he having taken his measures not only without consulting the civil authorities, but by overruling the judgment of the officer commanding at the station, Brigadier Ponsoby.† In fact, from the very outset, Colonel Neil (a Madras officer) manifested a defiant distrust of every regiment of the Bengal army, and evinced very little desire to protect the unoffending agricultural population of the districts through which he passed, from the aggressions of his soldiers and camp-followers. In former wars, it had been the proudest boast of our generals, that the villagers never fled from British troops, but were eager to bring them supplies, being assured of protection and liberal payment. Colonel Wilks, in contrasting the campaigns conducted by Mohammedan conquerors, with those of Cornwallis, Lake, and Wellesley, dwells forcibly on the misery inflicted by the former, and revealed by the existence of the well-known phrase *Wulsa*, which signified the departure of the entire

population of a village, or even of a district; children, the aged and the sick, being borne off to take shelter in the nearest woods or jungles, braving hunger and wild beasts sooner than the presence of an armed force. Great loss of life invariably attended these migrations, which were especially frequent in Mysoor in the days of Hyder Ali. The Indian despatches of General Wellesley testify, in almost every dozen pages, to the unceasing forethought with which he strove to maintain a good understanding with the population: and any one who will compare the manner in which his troops were fed and sheltered, with the suffering endured in the campaign of 1857, before the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, will understand that the indiscriminate burning of villages, and the pillaging of "niggers," was the most costly amusement Europeans in India could indulge in.

Colonel Neil commenced the expedition with what the newspapers called an "example of *zubberdustee*—the phrase for small tyrannies." The term, however, is not fairly applicable to an act which was, in the best sense of the word, expedient, though it seems to have been accompanied with needless discourtesy. While he was preparing to enter the railway with a detachment of Madras Fusiliers, intending to proceed from Calcutta to Raneegunge, one of the officials said that the train was already behind time, and if the men could not be got into the carriages in two or three minutes, they would be left behind. Colonel Neil, without making any reply, ordered a file of men to take his informant into custody. "The man shouted for assistance; and the stokers, guards, and station-master crowded round to see what was the matter, and were each in turn stuck up against the wall, with a couple of bearded red-coats standing sentry over them. The colonel next took possession of the engine; and by this series of strong measures, delayed the departure of the train until the whole of his men were safely stowed away in the carriages." The *Friend of India* related this instance of martial law with warm approbation; adding—"We would back that servant of the Company as being equal to an emergency."‡ Of the details of Neil's march little has been related. He has been frequently compared to "an avenging

* Letter from Major-general Lloyd to his brother, the Rev. A. J. Lloyd, Sept. 3rd, 1857.—*Daily News*, October 30th, 1857.

† Colonel Neil to Adjutant-general.—Parl. Papers, p. 57.

‡ Mead's *Sepoy Revolt*, p. 125.

angel;" and his track was marked by desolation; for Havelock's force, in its subsequent advance, found the line of road almost deserted by the villagers, who had dismantled their dwellings,* and fled with their little property. Colonel Neil reached Benares, as has been stated, on the 3rd of June. He had intended starting with a detachment for Cawnpoor on the following afternoon; but shortly before the appointed time, intelligence was received from Lieutenant Palliser, of the outbreak which had taken place at Azimghur; and, as usual, the affair was greatly exaggerated, four officers being described as killed.† Brigadier Ponsonby consulted with Colonel Neil regarding the state of the Native troops at Benares. The Seiks, and the 13th Native cavalry, were believed to be staunch, but doubts were entertained of the 37th N.I.; and the brigadier proposed that, on the following morning, their muskets should be taken away, leaving them their side-arms. The colonel urged immediate disarmament: the brigadier gave way; and the two officers parted to make the necessary arrangements. At 5 p.m., Neil was on the ground with 150 of H.M. 10th, and three officers; sixty of the Madras Fusiliers, and three officers; three guns and thirty men. At this time no intimation had been received by any officer, of the corps being disposed to mutiny: on the contrary, Lieutenant-colonel Spottiswoode, the commanding officer of the 13th, declares that his European non-commissioned staff, "observed nothing doubtful in the conduct of the men;" but that, "up to the very last moment, every man was most obedient and civil to all authorities."‡ The brigadier came on parade at the appointed hour; but Neil observed, that "he appeared far from well, and perfectly unable to act with energy, or the vigour required on the emergency."§ The account given by the colonel of the ensuing proceedings is too long for quotation, and too general and confused to afford materials for a summary of facts. With regard to his assuming the lead, he says he did so after the firing commenced, by desire of the brigadier, who "was on his back on the ground, seemingly struck by a stroke of the sun, and declared himself

quite unfit for anything."|| Between the incapacity of one commander, and the vigour of the other, the sepoy were driven wild with panic, and the European officers nearly killed by the hands of their own countrymen. Brigadier Ponsonby's private letter recounting the affair, was published by his friends in the *Times*, in vindication of that officer's "foresight and judgment." He does not mention having consulted with Neil at all; but speaks of "Colonel Gordon, my second in command," as having advised the immediate disarmament of the 37th foot; to which the brigadier adds—"After some discussion, I agreed. We had no time (it being between 4 and 5 p.m.) to lose, and but little arrangement could be made (fortunately)." There is no explanation given why the haste and disorder which characterised the proceedings should be termed fortunate. The personal feelings of the military authorities towards one another could not be so called. Ponsonby expressly asserts that he conducted the entire disarmament; and takes credit for the panic inspired "by the suddenness of our attack." "Something very like a *coup de soleil*" obliged him, he says, "to make over the command to the next senior officer, but not until everything was quiet."¶ This statement is, of course, in direct opposition to Neil's assertion, that, during the crisis, the brigadier was "on his back," utterly prostrate in mind and body. A perusal of the official reports of the various subordinate officers, and of the private Indian correspondence of the time, concerning this single case, would well repay any reader desirous of obtaining an insight into the actual working of our military system in India in 1857. Incidental revelations are unwittingly made, which, though of no interest to the general reader, are invaluable to those whose duty it is to provide, as far as may be, against the recurrence of so awful a calamity as the mutiny of the Bengal army. There are other accounts of the affair—a private and circumstantial, but clear one, by Ensign Tweedie, who was dangerously wounded on the occasion; and an official one by Lieutenant-colonel Spottiswoode. Young Tweedie has no leaning to the sepoy; but as the

* *Journal of an English Officer in India*: by Major North, 60th Rifles; p. 13.

† Appendix to Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 372.

‡ Parliamentary Return of regiments which have mutinied (15th March, 1859); p. 28.

§ Lieutenant-colonel Neil to Adjutant-general, June 6th, 1857.—Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 57.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¶ Letter from Brigadier Ponsonby; Benares, June 13th, 1857—*Times*, August 18th, 1857.

Meerut authorities considered that their blunder had been the salvation of India, so he thought that, "although the sepoys might have been quietly disbanded, the mistake that provoked the row was a most fortunate one." The disarming, he believes, "might have been effected in perfect peace and quietness, had it been gone about in a less abrupt and threatening manner." The 37th were drawn up in front of their lines, with the cannon pointed at them. The Europeans were posted within musket range, and the Seiks and irregular cavalry within sight. The 37th, seeing themselves hemmed in with musketry and artillery, naturally suspected that they were to be blown to pieces; and all the assurances of their officers proved insufficient to keep them composed. They were ordered to put their muskets into the little stone buildings called *kotes*, or bells. The majority of their number obeyed at once, and European soldiers were then marched towards the bells of arms, with the view of securing them from any attempt which the sepoys might make to recover them. This movement accelerated the crisis. Ensign Tweedie states—

"The sepoys were beforehand with the Europeans, and, making a sudden rush at the bells of arms, recovered their muskets, and fired at once upon their own officers and upon the advancing Europeans, retiring at the same time within their lines, and thence keeping up a brisk fire upon the Europeans. Up to this time, however, no officer had been hit. The sepoys of the 37th ensconced themselves for the most part behind their huts, some of them behind the bells of arms. The majority of their officers had fallen back at once upon the European column. Major Barrett, however, indignant at the way in which what he believed to be good sepoys had been dealt with, resolved, as he told them, to share their fate, and, along with the European sergeant-major, remained exposed to the fire opened from the half-battery, as also from the European musketry upon the huts. But the sepoys' worst blood was up, and several of their number fired upon him, others attacking him with their fixed bayonets. He was compelled to flee for his life, and a guard of faithful sepoys (principally of the grenadier company) having formed round his person, conducted him in safety to his bungalow in the cantonments. The sergeant-major also was saved by the same faithful escort. In the meantime, Captain Guise, of the 13th Irregulars, was only leaving his bungalow, and rashly attempted to reach the parade-ground, where his troop was drawn up, by riding through the lines of the 37th N.I. His chest was positively riddled with bullets in the attempt. Of course, his death was instantaneous.

"The sepoys still kept up a smart fire upon the scanty Europeans, who were labouring under the great disadvantage of having to deal with an enemy effectually secured behind their huts from obser-

vation. The officers of the 37th were posted with the European musketry, and were exposed, of course, to a smart fire. Several privates were knocked over within five yards of me, and yet not a single officer got touched. For about twenty minutes we remained under this fire. But our brave fellows began to drop off rather fast, and accordingly it was resolved to charge the huts. As a preliminary to this, a party was dispatched to set them on fire; and in the meantime, we officers of the 37th retired, and took our place beside the Seiks, who, we understood, were to take part in the charge. They form an irregular corps, and have only two officers attached to them—viz., a commandant (Colonel Gordon) and an adjutant. As both of these were mounted, there was need of our services in the ranks.

"Here I remained for about ten minutes, in the momentary expectation of the charge being ordered. The brigade-major, Captain Dodgson, then galloped across the parade-ground, and, placing himself at the head of the irregular cavalry, informed them that their commandant, Captain Guise, had been killed, and that he had been sent by Brigadier Ponsonby to supply his place. They flashed their swords in reply, giving vent, at the same time, to a low murmur, which struck me as somewhat equivocal. Captain Dodgson had scarce ceased addressing them when one of their number fired upon him with a pistol. The bullet only grazed the elbow of his sword arm, just at that point where the ulnar nerve passing over a process of bone is so easily irritated as to have gained for that piece of bone the common name of 'funny-bone.' The consequence was complete paralysis of the hand and arm; his sword dropped powerless across his saddle, and the rascal who had fired the shot rushed upon him to cut him down, but another of the troop interfered to rescue him, and, being well mounted, he succeeded in escaping from the *mêlée*."

These particulars are very striking, narrated as they are by a youth evidently possessed of unusual powers of observation, and on whose mind a scene so novel and exciting would naturally make a lively impression. One point, however, he has possibly mistaken; for an officer of the 13th, writing to inform the widow of Captain Guise of her bereavement, says—"Your dear husband was at his post, as he ever was; and, at the head of his regiment, he entered vigorously on the work of cutting up the rebels. His horse being fleetier than those of his men, he got in advance, and was only followed by Mix Bund Khan, an Afghan. Your husband followed a 37th rebel closely, and came up with him in the Sudder Bazaar, where the miscreant turned round, and fired his musket." The writer proceeds to say that the horse was wounded, and fell; that Captain Guise vainly strove to reach the sepoy with his sword, being

* Ensign Tweedie's Letter.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

entangled with the trappings of the fallen horse; that his follower "did his best to get at the man, but, owing to the narrow position they were in, he could not manage it;" and the mutineer found time to reload his musket, and shoot the officer through the heart. The Afghan trooper attempted to follow the perpetrators of the foul deed; but, owing to the intricacies of the place, they quickly escaped. "More than one sepoy came up before the deed of death was completed, and they are also implicated, perhaps, in the murder."* The statement of the unfortunate officer's having got in advance of his men in attacking the 37th, rests on the authority of a brother officer, and would be received without hesitation, but for strong contradictory evidence. The remaining portion of the narrative is highly improbable. Captain Guise would hardly have been so rash as to follow a single rebel into the Sudder Bazaar, leaving the regiment which he commanded to mutiny in his absence. Besides, Ensign Tweedie's assertion of the captain's chest being riddled with bullets, is confirmed by the official record of casualties, which describes the body as bearing the marks of "gunshot wounds in head, chest, abdomen, and both arms; and two very deep sabre-cuts on left side of the head."

Colonel Neil's statement is most positive. He asserts that Captain Guise "was killed before reaching parade, by the men of the 37th N.I."† The circumstance is of some importance, because the death or absence of their leader had evident influence with the irregular cavalry: moreover, the relatives of Captain Guise have publicly repudiated a statement which they consider calculated to injure his reputation.

When Guise fell, Brigadier Ponsonby directed Captain Dodgson to assume command of the 13th.‡ He was, as has been shown, immediately fired on by a trooper, and the others then broke into revolt. At the same moment, the Seiks, who had been watching the Europeans as they knelt and fired into the 37th, suddenly dashed forward, and rushed madly on the guns. A corporal of H.M. 10th writes home—"The Seik regiment turned on the artillery; but you never saw such a sight in

your life: they were mowed down, and got several rounds of grapeshot into them when out of our range."§ In a very short space of time, the whole body of the mutineers, 37th foot, 13th cavalry, and Loodiana Seiks, were dispersed with great slaughter.

A civilian (Mr. Spencer) who was present, says—"The sum total was, that the 37th were utterly smashed, and the Seiks and cavalry frightened out of their wits." He adds—"Many of the officers are furious, and say we have been shedding innocent blood; and the whole thing was a blunder."||

Major-general Lloyd asserts, in the most unqualified terms, "that though the men of the 37th had lodged their arms in their bells of arms, they were fired on with grape and musketry; the Seiks present, and most of the 13th irregular cavalry, joined them in resisting the attack, and it was everywhere stigmatised as 'Feringhee ka Dag-hah.'"¶

Colonel Spottiswoode offers evidence to the same effect, in his narrative of his own proceedings during the *émeute*. Writing on the 11th of March, 1858, he states—

"Up to this moment I am still not convinced that the 414 sepoys that stood on parade, and near 400 on detached duty on the afternoon of the 4th June, 1857, were all mutinous, or were not well-disposed towards government; and from what I have since heard from the men that are with the regiment now, that the evil-disposed did not amount to 150; for when I called on the men to lodge their arms in their bells of arms, I commenced with the grenadiers; and so readily were my orders attended to, that in a very short time I had got down as far as No. 6 company, and was talking to one man who appeared to be in a very mutinous mood; so much so, that I was just debating in my own mind whether I should shoot him, as I was quite close, and had my pistol in my pocket: I was disturbed by some of the men, for there were two or three voices calling out, 'Our officers are deceiving us; they want us to give up our arms, that the Europeans who are coming up may shoot us down.' I called out, 'It is false;' and I appealed to the Native officers, who have known me for upwards of thirty-three years, whether I ever deceived any man in the regiment; when many a voice replied, 'Never; you have always been a good father to us.' However, I saw the men were getting very excited at the approach of the Europeans, when I told them to keep quiet, and I would stop their advance; I galloped forward, and made signs to the party not to advance, calling out, 'Don't come on.' Fancying they had halted, I went

* Extract of letter published in the *Times*, September 3rd, 1857; by Mr. W. V. Guise, brother to the deceased officer.

† Colonel Neil's despatch, June 6th, 1857. ‡ *Ibid.*

§ Letter published in the *Times*, Sept. 11th, 1857.

|| *Ibid.*, August 10th, 1857.

¶ Extract of a letter from Major-general Lloyd.—*Daily News*, Oct. 30th, 1857.

back to the lines, and had only just got among my men, when I heard one solitary shot, followed immediately by two others in succession; those three were fired from the 37th lines, and from No. 2 company, and, as I afterwards heard, were fired by the pay havildar of 2nd company: immediately a rush was made at the bells of arms, which were opened by this man; a general fire commenced; while I and all my officers were in the lines among our men, without receiving any insult or molestation; indeed, many of the officers were surrounded and protected by the men of their respective companies, among whom the grenadiers were conspicuous."

Colonel Spottiswoode proceeds to state that, after the firing commenced, he succeeded in joining the guns and European detachment; and seeing there was no chance of clearing the lines by the present proceedings, he offered to fire them, which duty he performed by order of Brigadier Ponsonby, who, on his return, he found incapacitated by a sun-stroke. Spottiswoode then proceeded, with a party of Europeans, to scour the cantonments, and to bring in all the women and children to the Old Mint, a large building previously chosen for the purpose. No sign of mutiny was made by the Sikhs on guard at the treasury. While Colonel Spottiswoode was gathering in the civilians and ladies, he had occasion to pass the regimental paymaster's office, where fourteen of his own men were on duty. They immediately rushed to him, and begged that he would enable them to protect the treasure committed to their charge. The colonel spoke a few words of encouragement, and proceeded on his immediate duty, which, having satisfactorily accomplished, he returned to the paymaster's compound, and there found the men in a state of extreme alarm and confusion; for they had been joined in the interim by a party of fugitives belonging to the 37th N.I., who had been burnt out of their lines, "and who seemed to think that our object was to destroy indiscriminately every sepoy we could come across." The result of a long conversation with these men, convinced the colonel that the majority of the men were entirely ignorant of the intentions of the turbulent characters, who were only a very small minority; and he declares, that even those who contrived to join Colonel Neil and the guns, expressed the same opinion as his own fugitive men, of surprise at the fire being opened on men who had surrendered their arms; saying—"You drove away all the good men who were anxious

to join their officers, but could not in consequence of the very heavy fire that was opened, and they only ran away for shelter." A further circumstance adduced by Colonel Spottiswoode is, that a company of the 37th, then on duty at the fort of Chunar, fifteen miles distant, remained there perfectly stanch for six months, at the expiration of which time they returned to headquarters.* After the Benares affair, a party of the men who remained with their officers were sent, under their tried friend Major Barrett, to join their comrades at Chunar.

The Europeans resident at Benares, of course, spent the night in great alarm, as there seemed every probability that the sepoys might return and blockade them. One of the party at the Mint says—

"We slept on the roof—ladies, children, ayas, and punkah coolies; officers lying down dressed, and their wives sitting up by them fanning them; gentlemen in the most fearless *dishabille*, sleeping surrounded by ladies. In the compound or enclosure below there is a little handful of Europeans—perhaps 150 altogether; others are at the barracks half a mile off. There is a large collection of carriages and horses; little bedsteads all over the place; and two circular quick-hedges, with flower-gardens inside, are falling victims to the sheep and goats which have been brought in to provision the place; add to this a heap of more beer-boxes than your English imagination can take in, and throw over all the strong black and white of a full moonlight, and you have the Mint as it looked when the English of Benares had sought refuge in it."†

This writer adds, that there was "a picnicy, gipsified look about the whole affair," which rendered it difficult to realise the fact, that "the lives of the small congregation were upon the toss-up of the next events." Another witness says—"The choice of a sleeping-place lay between an awfully heated room and the roof. The commissioner slept with his family in a room, on shakedown, with other families sleeping round them; and there, from night to night, they continued to sleep."‡ The terrible characteristics of war were, however, not long wanting, for the wounded and dying were soon brought in; and, from the window, the sight that greeted the eye was "a row of gallowses, on which the energetic colonel was hanging mutineer after

* Parliamentary Return regarding regiments which have mutinied: March 15th, 1859; p. 30.

† *Times*, August 10th, 1857.

‡ Letter of the Rev. James Kennedy.—*Times*, August 8th, 1857.

mutineer, as they were brought in.”* Besides the casualties already noted, the assistant-surgeon and two men of H.M. 10th had been killed, and two ensigns and nine privates wounded. Young Tweedie was fetched from his bungalow in cantonments at two in the morning. He had dragged himself thither after being severely wounded, a bullet having gone clear through his shoulder and back; two others passing harmlessly through his forage-cap, and three through his trousers, of which one only inflicted any injury, and that but slightly grazing the thigh.†

Towards daybreak on the morning of the 5th, when the wearied crowd huddled together at the Mint were falling asleep from sheer exhaustion, they were aroused by the news, “The magistrate has just been sent for—the city is rising.” The kotwal had sent to ask aid: but the answer was, “Do your best; we cannot spare a man.”‡ and he appears to have succeeded marvellously well in subduing the riots. The nominal rajah of Benares was the representative of the family reduced by Warren Hastings to the condition of stipendiaries, when, after taking possession of the city, the governor-general found himself in such imminent danger, that he was glad to fly by night to the fortress of Chunar.§ The present rajah, on leaving Benares, took refuge in Ramnagar—the fort and palace where Cheyte Sing, the last prince *de facto*, had been assaulted and slain in 1781. The Europeans at the Missionary College,|| being afraid to attempt reaching the Mint, fled to Ramnagar, where they were kindly received and sent on, under the escort of the rajah’s sepoy guard, to Chunar.¶ All the natives of rank then in Benares appear to have been true to us; but one of them is mentioned by the judge (Mr. Frederick Gubbins) as having rendered essential service. Rajah Soorut Sing, a

Seik chieftain, under “a slight surveillance” at the time of the outbreak, went to the Seik guard stationed at the Mint, and, by his example and influence, prevented the men from rising against the civilians and ladies collected there, and seizing the treasure—amounting to about £60,000. A writer who enters very fully into the conduct of Mr. Gubbins at this crisis, and appears to possess private and direct information thereon, says, that the rajah’s interference was most opportune; for “already the Seiks began to feel that they at least were capable of avenging their comrades; when Soorut Sing, going amongst them, pointed out to them that the attack must at all events have been unpremeditated, or the civilians would not have placed themselves and their families in their power.”** The same authority pays a high and deserved tribute to the fidelity of the rajah of Benares; and likewise to that of another Hindoo, Rao Deo Narrain Sing, who, in addition to “great wealth and immense influence,” possessed “strong sense and ability of no common order.” “After the mutiny, the Rao and the Seik sirdar, Soorut Sing, actually lived in the same house with Mr. Gubbins. The former procured for us excellent spies, first-rate information, and placed all his resources (and they were great) at the service of our government.” The rajah, “although not so personally active as the Rao, was equally liberal with his resources, which were even greater; and never, in our darkest hour, did he hang back from assisting us.” The name of Mr. Gubbins was, it is said, a proverb for “swift stern justice.”†† and if that phrase is intended to bear the signification commonly attached to it by Europeans in India in the year of grace 1857, it seems certainly fortunate that there were some natives of influence to reason with their countrymen against the panic which a

* Letter from a clergyman, dated “Bangalore, July 4th.”—*Times*, August 25th, 1857. The reverend gentleman, in another part of his communication, reverts to the “scores and scores of prisoners” whom the “indefatigable Colonel Neil” was hanging; and is anxious about the state of feeling in England, “lest there should be any squeamishness about the punishment in store for the brutal and diabolical mutineers.”

† Ensign Tweedie’s Letter (*Times*, August 25th, 1857); and Rev. James Kennedy’s Letter.—*Times*, August 8th, 1857.

‡ Kennedy’s Letter.—*Ibid*.

§ See *Indian Empire*, vol. I., p. 361.

|| There were eleven European missionary families

in Benares—six attached to the Church of England Mission, two to the London Mission, and three to the Baptist Mission. The aggregate property of these establishments amounted to upwards of £20,000.—Sherring’s *Indian Church*, p. 251.

¶ Letter from the chief missionary in charge of the Benares College.—*Times*, August 6th, 1857.

** *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by One who has served under Sir C. Napier; p. 90. The Europeans afterwards subscribed £100 to present Soorut Sing with a set of fire-arms.—Statements of Mr. John Gubbins, on the authority of his brother at Benares.—*Times*, September 2nd, 1857.

†† Rev. James Kennedy.—*Times*, August 21st, 1857.

newly erected row of gibbets (three separate gibbets, with three ropes to each)* was calculated to produce. The people of Benares are described, in the correspondence of the period, as "petrified with fear of our soldiers being let loose on them." Martial law was speedily proclaimed; and on the 29th of June, the Rev. James Kennedy writes—"Scarcely a day passed without some poor wretches being hurled into eternity. Such is the state of things here, that even fine delicate ladies may be heard expressing their joy at the vigour with which the miscreants are dealt with."† The number of sepoys killed on the night of the 4th has not been estimated,‡ neither is there any record of the number of natives executed on the scaffold, or destroyed by the far more barbarous process of burning down villages, in which the sick and aged must often have fallen victims, or escaped to perish, in utter destitution, by more lingering pangs. The dread of the European soldiers, which seized on the people in consequence of the occurrences of the 4th of June, was viewed as most salutary; and the writer last quoted (a clergyman), remarks, that the natives "think them, the European soldiers, demons in human form; and to this opinion our safety is in a degree traceable."

The Europeans at Benares were reinforced by detachments of the 78th Highlanders, a regiment which, from the strangeness of its costume, created great excitement among the natives.

On the 22nd of June, a report was received that a body of mutineers were encamped about thirty miles from the city. On the evening of the 26th, a force consisting of 200 of the 78th Highlanders, the Loodiana regiment, and thirty troopers of the 13th, were sent from Benares in search of them. One of the party, in narrating the expedition, writes—"The rascals, of course, fled for life on the approach of the gallant Highlanders. You will, however, be gratified to learn, that twenty-four of the rebels were cut up by the cavalry and infantry, twenty-three caught and hung on the spot, twenty villages razed to the ground, and from forty to fifty villagers flogged, in order to cool their thieving propensities. A few days before the detachment left, the magis-

trate offered a reward of 1,000 rupees for the head or person of the leader of the rebels, who is well known to the natives."

The villagers did not betray the rebel leader. Indeed, it is remarkable how rarely, in the case of either Europeans or natives, they ever earned "blood-money," even though habitually wretchedly poor, and now almost starving, in consequence of the desolation wrought by the government and insurgent forces. The leader was, nevertheless, captured by the troops, and "hung up on a tree, to keep nine others company that had been hung there the same morning." The Europeans returned to camp "in high spirits."§ The newly arrived soldiers, however, who had not been accustomed to such warfare, had not had their houses burned, and were accustomed to view their lives as held on a precarious tenure; did not set about the task of destruction with quite such unalloyed satisfaction as is displayed in the correspondence of the civil amateurs. There is a lengthy, but most graphic, account of the early experience of a Highlander, which will not bear condensing or abstracting. Perhaps with the exception of Mowbray Thomson's *Story of Cawnpore*, nothing more touching in its simplicity has been written regarding any scene of the mutiny.

Few can read the Highlander's narrative without remembering that he and his detachment ought (if all concerned had done their duty) to have been already at Cawnpore, instead of starting, on the very evening of that fatal 27th of June, on such an expedition as he describes.

The hanging and the flogging, the blood-money and the burning villages; the old man "trying to trail out a bed" from his cottage, at the risk of perishing in the flames; the group of young children standing in the midst of a little courtyard, the decrepit man and aged woman, the young mother in a hot fever, with a babe "five or six hours old," wrapped in her bosom; all waiting together till the fire should consume them, and end their hopeless, helpless misery—these and other cases (of which there must have been hundreds unrecorded), are surely enough to quench the thirst for vengeance in any human breast, or at least to prove the necessity of striving to mitigate, not increase, the miseries of intestine strife;

* *Times*, August 21st, 1857.

† *Ibid.*

‡ The clergyman, whose letter, dated "Bangalore, July 4th," has been recently quoted, states, on the authority of an officer engaged in the Benares affair,

that 100 of the Madras Fusiliers, under Colonel Neil, killed 650 of the mutineers.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

§ Letter dated "Benares, June 29th, 1857."

remembering ever, that even without the cruel aggravation of village-burning, every outcast sepy was punished many times over in his starving family.

"We arrived at Benares on the 25th of June, a distance of 421 miles, in eight days and nine nights. On the evening of the 27th of June, there were 240 of the 78th (I was one of them), 100 of the Seiks, and 30 of the sowars—that is, Native cavalry—went out of Benares in carts, except the horsemen. At 3 o'clock P.M., next day, we were divided in three lots to scour the country. The division I was in went to a village, which was deserted. We set fire to it and burned it to the ground. We were coming back, when a gentleman came to us, and said, that a village over about two miles was full of them, and they were drawn up to give us battle. We marched, or rather ran to them; we got within 300 yards of them, when they ran. We fired after them, and shot eight of them. We were going to the village, when a man came running out to us, and up with his hand and saluted our officer. We shouted, that he was a sepy, and to seize him. He was taken, and about twelve more. We came back to the carts on the road, and an old man came to us, and wanted to be paid for the village we had burned. We had a magistrate with us, who found he had been harbouring the villains and giving them arms and food. Five minutes settled it; the sepy and the man that wanted money were taken to the roadside, and hanged to a branch of a tree. We lay on the road all night beside the two men hanging. Next morning, we got up and marched some miles through the fields, the rain pouring down in torrents. We came to another village, set fire to it, and came back to the road. During this time the other divisions were not idle. They had done as much as us. When we came back, the water was running in at our necks, and coming out at our heels. There were about eighty prisoners; six were hung that day, and about sixty of them flogged. After that, the magistrate said that there was a Holdar that he would give 2,000 rupees to get, dead or alive. We slept on the road that night, and the six men hanging beside us. At 5 o'clock P.M. the bugle sounded 'fall-in.' The rain came down in torrents. We fell-in, and off we marched, up to the knees in clay and water. We came to a village and set it on fire. The sun came out, and we got dry; but we soon got wet again with sweat. We came to a large village, and it was full of people. We took about 200 of them out, and set fire to it. I went in, and it was all in flames. I saw an old man trying to trail out a bed. He was not able to walk, far less to carry out the cot. I ordered him out of the village, and pointed to the flames, and told him, as well as I could, that if he did not he would be burned. I took the cot, and dragged him out. I came round a corner of a street or lane, and could see nothing but smoke and flames. I stood for a moment to think which way I should go. Just as I was looking round, I saw the flames bursting out of the walls of a house, and, to my surprise, observed a little boy, about four years old, looking out at the door. I pointed the way out to the old man, and told him if he did not go I would shoot him. I then rushed to the house I saw the little boy at. The door was by that time in flames. I thought not of myself, but of the poor helpless child. I rushed in;

and after I got in, there was a sort of square, and all round this were houses, and they were all in flames; and instead of seeing the helpless child, I beheld six children from eight to two years old, an old dotal woman, an old man, not able to walk without help, and a young woman, about twenty years old, with a child wrapped up in her bosom. I am sure the child was not above five or six hours old. The mother was in a hot fever. I stood and looked; but looking at that time would not do. I tried to get the little boys to go away, but they would not. I took the infant; the mother would have it; so I gave it back. I then took the woman and her infant in my arms to carry her and her babe out. The children led the old woman and old man. I took the lead, knowing they would follow. I came to a place that it was impossible to see whereabouts I was, for the flames. I dashed through, and called on the others to follow. After a hard struggle, I got them all safe out, but that was all. Even coming through the fire, part of their clothes, that did not cover half of their body, was burned. I set them down in the field, and went in at another place. I saw nothing but flames all round. A little further I saw a poor old woman trying to come out. She could not walk; she only could creep on her hands and feet. I went up to her, and told her I would carry her out; but no, she would not allow me to do it; but, when I saw it was no use to trifle with her, I took her up in my arms and carried her out. I went in at the other end, and came across a woman about twenty-two years old. She was sitting over a man that, to all appearance, would not see the day out. She was wetting his lips with some *siste*. The fire was coming fast, and the others all round were in flames. Not far from this I saw four women. I ran up to them, and asked them to come and help the sick man and woman out; but they thought they had enough to do; and so they had, poor things; but, to save the woman and the dying man, I drew my bayonet, and told them if they did not I would kill them. They came, carried them out, and laid them under a tree. I left them. To look on, any one would have said that the flames were in the clouds. When I went to the other side of the village, there were about 140 women and about sixty children, all crying and lamenting what had been done. The old woman of that small family I took out, came to me, and I thought she would have kissed the ground I stood on. I offered them some biscuit I had for my day's rations; but they would not take it; it would break their caste, they said. The assembly sounded, and back I went with as many blessings as they could pour out on anything nearest their heart. Out of the prisoners that were taken, the man for whom the 2,000 rupees were offered was taken by us for nothing. We hanged ten of them on the spot, and flogged a great many—about sixty. We burned another village that night. Oh, if you had seen the ten march round the grove, and seen them looking the same as if nothing was going to happen to them! There was one of them fell; the rope broke, and down he came. He rose up, and looked all around; he was hung up again. After they were hanged, all the others were taken round to see them. Then we came marching back to the carts. Left Benares on the 6th of July, or rather the night of the 5th. We had to turn out and lie with our belts on. On the 6th we, numbering 180, went out against 2,000. We came up close to them; they were drawn up in three lines; it looked too many

for us; but on we dashed, and in a short time they began to run. We set fire to a large village that was full of them; we surrounded it, and as they came rushing out of the flames, shot them. We took eighteen of them prisoners; they were all tied together, and we fired a volley at them and shot them on the spot. We came home that night, after marching twenty miles, and fighting nearly thirty to one. In this country, we are told that we had killed 500 of them: our loss was one man and one horse killed, and one man and one horse wounded."

The news of the disarmed 37th having been fired into by the European artillery, told as it probably was with exaggeration, and without mention of the mutinous conduct of a portion of the regiment, spread rapidly among the Native troops at the neighbouring stations, and placed a new weapon in the hands of the plotting and discontented, by rendering it more easy for them to persuade their well-disposed but credulous comrades, that the breach between them and the English could never be healed, and that their disbandment and probable destruction was only a question of time and opportunity. At Allahabad the effect was sudden and terrible, and likewise at the intermediate post of Jaunpoor.

Jaunpoor is the chief place of a district of the same name, acquired by the East India Company in 1775. It stands on the banks of the river Goomtee, 35 miles north-west from Benares, and 55 miles north-east from Allahabad. There is a large stone fort here, which has been used for a prison. The cantonment, situated at the east of the town, was on the 5th of June, 1857, held by a detachment of the Loodiana Seiks from Allahabad, 169 in number, with a single European officer, Lieutenant Mara.

As Brigadier Gordon declared of the regiment at Benares, so with the detachment at Jaunpoor; the loyalty of the men had "never been suspected by any one, civil or military."* The officer in command at Benares (Glasse), declares that the European guns were turned on the Loodiana corps, without its having given one token of mutiny; that the lives of several officers were in the power of the men, and nothing would have been easier than to shoot them, had the regiment been actuated by a mutinous spirit; but that with the exception of one

man, who fired at Colonel Gordon, and whose shot was received in the arm by a faithful havildar (Chur Sing, who risked his life in the defence of his officer), no such attempt was made. It will be evident, he adds, that after grape had once been poured into the regiment, it would be almost excusable if some men, though conscious of the innocence and rectitude of their own intentions, should be hurried into the belief that the government, conceiving the whole native race actuated by the same spirit of treachery, had resolved to deal the same punishment to all.†

There is reason to believe, that the sole and simple motive of the *émeute* at Jaunpoor, was a conviction that the British had betrayed, at Benares, their resolve to exterminate the entire Bengal army at the first convenient opportunity, without distinction of race or creed—regular or irregular, Hindoo or Mohammedan, Seik or Poorbeah. A similar report had nearly occasioned a Goorka mutiny at Simla, and was counteracted with extreme difficulty. It is possible, that had a true and timely account of what had taken place at Benares been received at Jaunpoor, Lieutenant Mara would have been enabled to explain away, at least to some extent, the exaggerated accounts which were sure to find circulation in the native lines. No such warning was given. A bazaar report reached the residents, on the 4th of June, that the troops at Azimghur had mutinied on the previous evening. On the following morning there was no post from Benares; and about eight o'clock, three Europeans rode in from the Bubcha factory, two miles and a-half from Jaunpoor, stating that the factory had been attacked by a party of the 37th mutineers, and that they had made their escape through a shower of bullets. Mr. Cæsar, the head-master of the Mission school,‡ said to Lieutenant Mara, "The 37th are upon us." The officer replied, "What have we to fear from the 37th; our own men will keep them off."§ The Europeans and Eurasians assembled together in the Cutcherry, and the Seiks were placed under arms, awaiting the arrival of the mutineers; until, about noon, news arrived, that after plundering and burning

* Return of regiments which have mutinied, p. 33.

† *Ibid.*, p. 32.

‡ The Church Missionary Society had a station at Jaunpoor, under the superintendence of the Rev. C. Reuther. They supported a church and five schools, with about 600 scholars in all. The

majority of the people of Jaunpoor were Mohammedans; and the conversions are always more rare among them than among the Hindoos, notwithstanding the barrier of caste.

§ Letter from a gentleman in charge of the Missionary College at Benares.—*Times*, Aug. 6th, 1857.

the Bubcha factory, they had gone along the Lucknow road. The Europeans did not quit the Cutcherry; but being relieved from immediate apprehension, they ordered dinner, and made other arrangements. "About half-past two," Mr. Cæsar writes, "Lieutenant Mara, myself, and some others, were in the verandah, when, as I was giving orders to a servant, a shot was fired, and on looking round, I saw that poor Mara had been shot through the chest." There is no European testimony on the subject, but the deed is assumed to have been done by one of Mara's own men. Mr. Cæsar continues—"We ran inside the building; and just within the doorway, Mara fell on the ground. Other shots being fired into the rooms, we retired into the joint magistrate's Cutcherry, and barricaded the doors: we did this with little hopes of escaping from the mutineers. They were about 140 in number; while the gentlemen in the room (for some were absent) were only nine or ten. We fully expected a rush to be made into the apartment, and all of us to be killed. The hour of death seemed to have arrived. The greater part of us were kneeling or crouching down, and some few were engaged in prayer."

The mutineers were not, however, blood-thirsty. They soon ceased firing, and began plundering the treasury, which contained £26,000; and when the Europeans ventured to fetch the lieutenant from the outer room, and to look forth, they saw the plunderers walking off with bags of money on their shoulders. Two of the planters saddled their own horses and fled. The rest of the party prepared to depart together. Lieutenant Mara was still living, and was carried some distance on a charpoy. Mr. Cæsar, who gives a circumstantial account of their flight, does not mention when the unfortunate officer was abandoned to his fate; but it appears that, being considered mortally wounded, they left him on the road; for Mr. Spencer, a civilian, writing from Benares a few days later, says—"They left poor O'Mara* dying, and got into their carriages and drove away."† This is not, however, quite correct; for the party (or at least most of them) left the Cutcherry on foot; Mrs. Mara, the wife of the fallen officer, having difficulty in moving on with any rapidity on account of her stoutness. The

corpse of Mr. Cuppage, the joint magistrate, lay at the gate. The fugitives hurried on, and were passing the doctor's house, when his carriage was brought out, apparently without orders, by faithful native servants. Five ladies, eight children, an ayah, the coachman, with Messrs. Reuther and Cæsar (the latter, revolver in hand), found room therein, and proceeded towards Ghazipoor. There were also three gentlemen on horseback, and two on foot; but while stopping to drink water by the road-side, Mrs. Mara's carriage overtook the party, the native coachman having brought it unbidden; and all the fugitives were thus enabled to proceed with ease. They crossed the Goomtee at the ferry, with their horses and carriages, observed, but not molested, by a crowd of natives, one of whom asked a European for his watch, saying that he might as well give it him, as he would soon lose it. But this seems to have been a vulgar jest, such as all mobs delight in, and no insult was offered to the women or children. It would be superfluous to narrate in detail the adventures of the fugitives. Mrs. Mara died of apoplexy; the others safely reached Karrakut, a large town on the left bank of the Goomtee. Here Hingun Lall, a Hindoo of some rank and influence, and of most noble nature, invited them to his house. "He stated," says Mr. Cæsar, "that he had a few armed men, and that the enemy should cut his throat first, before they reached us." His hospitality was gratefully accepted, and a "sumptuous repast" was in preparation for the weary guests, when the clashing of weapons was heard, and "the Lalla," as he is termed, placed the ladies and children in an inner room, and bade the men prepare for defence. But although the town was three times plundered by distinct bodies of the enemy, the Lalla's house was not attacked. The mutineers knew that to attempt to drag the refugees from so time-honoured a sanctuary as the dwelling of a Rajpoot, would have been to draw on themselves the vengeance of the majority of the Oude chiefs, who were as yet neutral. The Europeans, therefore, remained unharmed. On the evening of the 8th, a letter was brought them, addressed to "Any Europeans hiding at Karrakut." It came from Mr. Tucker, the Benares commissioner, who was as remarkable for his efforts to preserve the lives of his countrymen, as some of his coadjutors were to avenge their deaths. He offered rewards for the heads of living

* The name is variously spelt, but is given in the *East India Register* as "Patrick Mara."

† Letter published in *Times*, August 10th, 1857.

friends rather than for those of dead foes; and his policy was decidedly the more successful of the two; for the villagers generally proved willing to hazard the vengeance of the hostile forces by saving life, but could rarely, if ever, be induced by threats or promises to earn blood-money.

An escort of twelve volunteers, and as many of the 13th irregular cavalry, arrived on the following day; and, before night, the rescued party joined the Benares community in the Mint. Four persons (either Europeans or East Indians), left behind at Jaunpoor, are said to have perished. These were Mr. and Mrs. Thriepland, the deputy-magistrate and his wife, who, after hiding themselves during the night of the outbreak in the house of one of the native police, were discovered and slaughtered by the irregular cavalry; a pensioned sergeant named Bignold; and a Mr. Davis, formerly an indigo-planter's assistant, supposed to have been put to death by the villagers.*

"A life pension of 100 rupees (£10) per mensem," was granted by government to Hingun Lall, with the honorary title of deputy-magistrate; with permission, as the Lalla was an old man, to commute the pension to a life jaghire, to be extended to a second life on easy terms.†

Allahabad is built on a spot which possesses rare natural advantages for the purposes of commerce and defence, and has been, from a very early period, the site of a strongly fortified city. The ancient Pali-bothra is said to have formerly stood here; and the Brahmins still attach importance to the place, on account of the Prayaga, or sacred confluence of three most holy streams, which unite at Allahabad—namely, the Ganges, Jumna, and Sreeswati. By bathing at one favoured spot, the pilgrim is supposed to receive the same benefit that he would have derived from separate immersion in each stream; and this is no mere saving of trouble, inasmuch as the Sreeswati is elsewhere inaccessible to mortal touch, and everywhere invisible to mortal sight: but the Hindoos assert that it joins the other rivers by a subterranean channel. Devotees come here and wait, in boats, the precise period of the moon when, according to their creed, ablutions, duly performed, will wash from their souls the defilement of

sin; and the hopelessly sick, or extremely aged, come hither also, and, fastening three vessels of water round their bodies, calmly step into the water and quit this life, passing by what they believe to be a divinely appointed road, into the world beyond the grave. The emperor Akber, who patronised all religions, and practised none, was popular with both Mohammedans and Hindoos. He built the modern Allahabad (the city of God), intending it as a stronghold to overawe the surrounding countries. The lofty and extensive fort stands on a tongue of land washed on one side by the Ganges, on the other by the Jumna, and completely commands the navigation of both rivers. As a British station, it occupies a position of peculiar importance. It is the first in the Upper Provinces, all to the eastward being called down-country. It is situated on the Grand Trunk road, 498 miles from Calcutta, 1,151 from Madras, 831 from Bombay, and 74 from Benares. Add to these advantages a richly stored arsenal, and a treasury containing £190,000; ‡ and it may be easily understood that its security ought to have been a primary consideration: yet, at the time of the Meerut outbreak, there was not a European soldier in Allahabad. The fort, and extensive cantonments some four miles distant, were occupied by the 6th N.I., a battery of Native artillery, and five companies of the Seik regiment of Ferozpoor, under Lieutenant Brasyer, an officer of remarkable nerve and tact.

Sir Henry Lawrence early pressed on the government the importance of strengthening Allahabad with Europeans: § and seventy-four invalid artillerymen were consequently detached from Chunar, and arrived at Allahabad in the latter part of May. Two troops of the 3rd Oude irregular cavalry were sent by Sir H. Lawrence for the further protection of the fort. || Several detachments of H.M. 84th marched through Allahabad between the time of the arrival of the Chunar artillerymen and the outbreak of the mutiny; and the officer in command of the station had discretionary orders to detain them if he deemed their presence needful; but there was nothing in the manner of the Native troops to occasion any doubt of their fidelity, or justify the detention of the Europeans. On the

Mutiny at Allahabad.—See *Times*, August 26th, 1857.

§ Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, p. 187.

|| *Ibid.*

* Mr. Cæsar's Narrative. *Vide* Sherring's *Indian Church*, pp. 267 to 276.

† Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857 (No. 7), p. 118.

‡ Lieutenant-colonel Simpson's account of the

contrary, remarkable tranquillity prevailed; and there is no record of incendiary fires or midnight meetings, such as usually preceded mutiny. Two men, who attempted to tamper with the 6th N.I., were delivered up to the authorities, and the entire regiment volunteered to march against Delhi. The governor-general in council issued a general order, thanking the 6th for their loyalty, and directed that "the tender of their services should be placed on the records of government, and read at the head of every regiment and company of the Bengal army, at a parade ordered for the purpose."* The order reached Allahabad, by telegraph, on the afternoon of the 4th of June. It was received with enthusiasm both by officers and men, and a parade was ordered, and carried through apparently to the satisfaction of all parties. But this state of things was of brief duration. On the 5th of June, ominous messages came to Colonel Simpson (the commandant at the fort), of external dangers. Sir Henry Lawrence desired that the civilians should retire within the fort for the present; and Sir Hugh Wheeler likewise sent word from Cawnpore, "to man the fort with every available European, and make a good stand." Then came the tidings of what had occurred at Benares; the Europeans learning that the sepoy, instead of quietly surrendering their arms, had resisted and fled, and were reported to be marching against Allahabad; while the native version of the story was—that the 37th, after being disarmed, had been faithlessly massacred by the Europeans. There was a certain foundation of fact for both these statements. The well-disposed sepoy, who were the majority, had (as is stated by the best authority) quietly obeyed the order for disarmament: the turbulent minority had resisted; and their revolt, precipitated, if not caused, by what the European officers call the mistake of one commander, and the incapacity of another (disabled by a sun-stroke), involved many loyal sepoy in the mutiny. It does not appear that the officers and men at Allahabad had any explanation, or arrived at any mutual understanding, with regard to the proceedings at Benares; only it was taken for granted by the former, that the latter would be ready to fight, as foes, the countrymen whom they had, until then, regarded as comrades in arms, identified with them in feeling and in interest.

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on the Mutiny, p. 361.

On the night of the 5th (Friday), nearly all the Europeans slept in the fort; and the civilians, covenanted and uncovenanted, formed themselves into a volunteer company about a hundred strong. Two guns, and two companies of the 6th N.I., were ordered down to the bridge of boats, which crosses the Jumna beneath the fort, in order to be ready to play upon the Benares insurgents; the guns of the fort were at the same time pointed on to the Benares road. Captain Alexander, with two squadrons of Oude cavalry, was posted in the Alopee Bagh—a large encamping-ground, under the walls of the fort, which commanded all the roads to the station. The main body of the 6th remained in their lines, in readiness to move anywhere at the shortest notice.

Saturday evening came, and the Europeans were relieved by the non-arrival of the mutineers. Colonel Simpson and the chief part of the officers sat together at mess at nine o'clock; and the volunteers who were to keep watch during the night were lying down to rest, and wait their summons. The volunteers were all safe in the fort; but there were two officers, less prudent or less fortunate, outside the gates. Captain Birch, the fort-adjutant (a married man with a family), had preferred remaining in his own bungalow; and Lieutenant Innes, the executive engineer, lay sick in his, having resigned his appointment on the previous day from ill-health. There were, besides, some Europeans and many Eurasians, merchants' clerks, and such like, in their own dwellings. None of them seem to have entertained any suspicion of what was going on in the lines of the 6th N.I., to which several Benares mutineers had found their way, and succeeded in inducing the 6th to join the mutiny. A Mohammedan, who acted, or affected to act, as an agent of the king of Delhi, was very active in heightening the panic and excitement. He is generally supposed to have been a Moolvee, or Moslem teacher; but some said he was a Native officer; others, that he was a weaver by trade. As the "Moolvee of Allahabad" he subsequently contrived to obtain notoriety.

The discussions in the lines of the 6th N.I. were brought to an issue by a bugler rushing on parade, and sounding an alarm. Colonel Simpson had just quitted the mess, and was walking to the fort, when he heard the signal. Ordering his horse, he mounted, and galloped to the parade, where he

"found the officers trying to fall-in their men." The colonel had previously ordered the two guns to be brought from the bridge of boats to the fort, under the charge of an artillery officer (Lieutenant Harward) and a Native guard. Instead of obeying the order, the men had insisted on taking them to cantonments. Harward sought the assistance of Lieutenant Alexander, who sprang on his horse, and, hastily ordering his men to follow him, rode up to the mutineers, "and, rushing on the guns, was killed on the spot."* Harward was likewise fired on; and, seeing that resistance was hopeless, he galloped into the fort, where he found the civilians assembled on the ramparts, listening to what they believed to be the attack of the Benares mutineers. One of the civilians writes—"The firing grew heavier, and we all thought that the insurgents had entered the station, and were being beaten off by the regiment, so steady was the musketry—regular file firing. On, on it continued, volley after volley. 'Oh!' we all said, 'those gallant sepoys are beating off the rebels;' for the firing grew fainter in the distance, as if they were driving a force out of the station. But before long the sad truth was known."†

First, Lieutenant Harward rode in, and told what he witnessed. Colonel Simpson arrived shortly after, and narrated the open mutiny of the regiment and the firing on the officers, of whom Captain Plunkett, Lieutenants Stewart and Haines, Ensigns Pringle and Munro, and two sergeants, were slaughtered on parade. The colonel himself had had a narrow escape. A havildar and some sepoys surrounded and hurried him off the field. He rode to the treasury, with the view of saving its contents, but was at once fired on by the sentry, and afterwards "received a regular volley from the guard of thirty men on one side, with another volley from a night picket of thirty men on the other. A guard of poor Alexander's Irregulars stood passive." The colonel adds—"I galloped past the mess-house, where the guard was drawn out at the gate and fired at me. Here my horse got seriously wounded, and nearly fell;

but I managed to spur him to the fort (two miles) without further impediment. There the horse died shortly after of three musket-shot wounds. On reaching the fort I immediately disarmed the guards of the 6th regiment on duty and turned them out, leaving the Seik regiment to hold it, the only European troops being seventy-four invalid artillery, got from Chunar. The Madras European regiment began to pour in a few days after, and the command devolved on the lieutenant-colonel [Neil] of that corps."‡

No mention is made by Colonel Simpson of the horrible scene which is alleged to have taken place in the mess-room, after he and the senior officers had left it. Eight unposted ensigns,§ mere boys fresh from England, and doing duty with the 6th N.I., were bayoneted there; and three of the officers who escaped heard their cries as they passed.||

When the poor youths were left for dead, one of them, said to be Ensign Cheek (a son of the town-clerk of Evesham in Worcestershire), although severely injured, contrived to escape in the darkness to a neighbouring ravine, where he concealed himself for several days and nights, taking refuge from the heat of the sun by day, and wild beasts by night, amid the branches of a tree, and supporting life solely by the water of a neighbouring stream. On the night of the mutiny, no Europeans dared stir out of the fort to rescue those outside, or bring in the wounded. Their own position was extremely critical; the personal influence of Lieutenant Brasyer with the Seiks, being chiefly instrumental in preserving their fidelity.¶ The temptation of plunder was very great, and the work of destruction was carried on with temporary impunity. The treasury was looted, the gaol thrown open, and reckless bands of convicts were poured forth on the cantonments and city. Captain Birch and Lieutenant Innes, who had intended passing the night in the same bungalow, fled together towards the Ganges, and are supposed to have been murdered by the mutineers or insurgents. Lieutenant Hicks

* Lieutenant-colonel Simpson's account.—*Times*, August 26th, 1857.

† Letter of Allahabad civilian.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

‡ Lieutenant-colonel Simpson's account.

§ The "Allahabad civilian" speaks of nine; but the official returns name eight—Ensigns Cheek, Codd, Way, Beaumont, Bailiff, Scott, and two Smiths.—

Supplement to the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

|| Letter of Allahabad civilian.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

¶ Mr. Hay, an American missionary, in Allahabad at the time of the mutiny, and who was personally acquainted with Lieutenant Brasyer, says that he "rose from the ranks."—*Times*, September, 1857.

and two young ensigns, left with the guns when Lieutenant Harward went to seek the aid of Captain Alexander, were not injured by the sepoys. They did not venture to take the direct road to the fort; but plunged into the Ganges, and, after some time, presented themselves at the gate in safety, having first blackened their bodies with mud, in default of any other covering. Eleven European men (uncovenanted servants, railway inspectors, and others), three women, and four children, are mentioned in the *Gazette* as having perished. No list of the Eurasians or natives murdered is given; but six drummers (Christians) of the 6th N.I. are stated as having been killed, it was supposed on the night of the mutiny, "whilst attempting to bury the murdered officers."* The 6th N.I. quitted the city on the morning after the *émeute*; but the Moolvee had still a considerable host around his standard; and the European garrison, though reinforced by successive detachments of the Madras Fusiliers, had, during the first days after the mutiny, quite enough to do to hold their own within the fort, against the internal dangers of drunkenness and insubordination. Consequently, no efforts seem to have been made, and no rewards offered, for the missing Europeans; and the brave young ensign remained in his tree, with his undressed wounds, sinking with hunger and exhaustion, and listening anxiously, through four live-long days and nights, for the sound of friendly voices. On the fifth day he was discovered by the rebels, and taken to a serai, or sleeping-place for travellers, where he found Conductor Coleman and his family in confinement, and also a well-known native preacher named Gopinath, who had escaped with his wife and family from Futtehpore. When the poor youth was brought in, he nearly fainted. Gopinath gave him some gruel, and afterwards water, to allay his burning thirst. The agony of his wounds being increased by lying on the hard boards, Gopinath prevailed on the daroga who had charge of the prisoners, to give Ensign Cheek a charpoy to lie on. This was done, and the sufferer related to his native friend all he had undergone, and bade him, if he escaped, write to his mother in England,

and to his aunt at Bancoorah. At length the daroga, jealous of the intercourse between the captives, placed Gopinath in the stocks, separating him from the others, and even from his own family. A body of armed Mohammedans came in and tried to tempt or terrify him into a recantation. His wife clung to him, and was dragged away by the hair of her head, receiving a severe blow on the forehead during the struggle. The ensign, who lay watching the scene, heard the offer of immediate release made to the native, on condition of apostasy, and, mastering his anguish and his weakness, called out, in a loud voice, "Padre, padre, be firm; do not give way." The prisoners remained some days longer in hourly expectation of death. At length the Moolvee himself visited them. But they all held their faith; and at length, the approach of Lieutenant Brasyer, with a detachment of Seiks, put the fanatics to flight. The conductor and the catechist, with their families, were brought safely into the fort. The ensign survived just long enough to be restored to his countrymen. Before sunset on the same day (17th June), the spirit that had not yet spent seventeen summers on earth, entered into rest with something of the halo of martyrdom upon it.†

It was well that Colonel Neil had arrived at Allahabad; for martial law had been proclaimed there immediately after the mutiny; and the system adopted by individual Europeans, of treating disturbed districts with the license of a conquering army in an enemy's country, had fostered evils which were totally subversive of all discipline.

Among the documents sent to England by the governor-general in council, in proof of the spirit of turbulent and indiscriminate vengeance which it had been found necessary to check, is an extract from a letter, communicating the strange and humiliating fact, that it was needful to restrain British functionaries from the indiscriminate destruction, not only of innocent men, but even of "aged women and children;" and this before the occurrence of the second, or the publication of the first, massacre at Cawnpoor. The name of the

* Supplement to *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

† The authority relied on regarding Ensign Cheek, is the Narrative of Gopinath Nundy, and of the Rev. J. Owen, of the American Board of Missions, a society which has expended a considerable

sum of money in Allahabad. Another account, more graphic, but less authentic, was published—as an extract of a letter from an officer in the service of the Company—in the *Times*, of September 7th, 1857.

writer of the letter, and of the persons therein mentioned, are all withheld by government; and the quotation begins abruptly.

"— has adopted a policy of burning villages, which is, in my opinion, the most suicidal and mischievous that can be devised; it prevents the possibility of order being restored; the aged, women and children, are sacrificed, as well as those guilty of rebellion. Cultivation is impossible; a famine is consequently almost certain. The sternest measures are doubtless necessary, and every possible endeavour should be made to apprehend and punish those actually engaged in plunder or rebellion; but here there seems to be no discrimination. A railway officer, whose report you will probably see, did excellent service, and seems to have behaved very gallantly when sent with a small guard to restore the railway where it might have been injured; but, in accordance with the custom, as he met with opposition from some plunderers and mutineers, he burnt ten villages, which he found deserted. The Trunk road now passes through a desert; the inhabitants have fled to a distance of four or five miles; and it seems to me to be obviously the proper policy to encourage all peaceable persons to return, not to destroy the villages and render the return of the people impossible. Some five persons have been invested with the powers of life and death in the station of Allahabad; each sits separately, and there are also courts-martial in the fort.

"You will do the state service if you can check the indiscriminate burning of villages, and secure the hanging of the influential offenders, instead of those who cannot pay the police for their safety."*

In a subsequent letter, written probably by the same person, but evidently by a civilian of rank, the following passage occurs:—"You have no conception of the dangers and difficulties created by lawless and reckless Europeans here. One of them cocked his pistol at Lieutenant Brasyer in the fort. The ruffian was as likely as not to have pulled the trigger; and, in that case, as Lieutenant Brasyer himself observed to me, his Seiks would have slain every European in the fort. This was before Colonel Neil took the command: if it had happened in his time, the probability is that the offender would have been tried and hanged."†

An Allahabad "civil servant"—one of the five persons already mentioned as invested with powers of life and death, and who speaks of himself as having been subsequently appointed by the commis-

sioner, Mr. Chester, as "the political agent with the force," which, from the date of his letter (June 28th) must have been Neil's—gives the following account of the proceedings after the arrival of the Fusiliers, before, and after, the arrival of their colonel. He writes—

"We dared not leave the fort; for who knows what the Seiks would have done if it had been left empty? However, let us not breathe one word of suspicion against them, for they behaved splendidly, though they are regular devils. We lived on in this way till the Madras Fusiliers came up, and then our fun began. We 'volunteers' were parted off into divisions, three in number; and your humble servant was promoted to the command of one, the 'flagstaff division,' with thirty railroad men under his command, right good stout fellows, every one of whom had been plundered, and were consequently as bloodthirsty as any demons need be. We sallied forth several times with the Seiks into the city, and had several skirmishes in the streets, when we spared no one. We had several volleys poured into us; but their firing was so wild that their bullets passed over and around us harmlessly. The 'flagstaff' was always to the front; and they were so daring and reckless, that 'the flagstaff boys' became a byword in the fort. Every rascality that was performed was put down to them; and, in the end, the volunteers got a bad name for plundering. The Seiks were great hands at it, and, in spite of all precaution, brought a great amount of property into the fort. Such scenes of drunkenness I never beheld. Seiks were to be seen drunk on duty on the ramparts, unable to hold their muskets. No one could blame them, for they are such jolly, jovial fellows, so different from other sepoys.

"When we could once get out of the fort we were all over the place, cutting down all natives who showed any signs of opposition; we enjoyed these trips very much, so pleasant it was to get out of that horrid fort for a few hours. One trip I enjoyed amazingly: we got on board a steamer with a gun, while the Seiks and Fusiliers marched to the city; we steamed up, throwing shot right and left, till we got up to the bad places, when we went on shore and peppered away with our guns, my old double-barrel that I brought out bringing down several niggers, so thirsty for vengeance was I. We fired the places right and left, and the flames shot up to the heavens as they spread, fanned by the breeze, showing that the day of vengeance had fallen on the treacherous villains."‡

The luckless British residents (not to speak of the native shopkeepers) were most shamefully treated by their defenders. What the city thieves and sepoys left, was looted by the Europeans and Seiks, who apparently could recognise no difference

* Letter, dated July 6th, 1857.—Parl. Papers (Commons), February 4th, 1857. Moved for by Henry D. Seymour. Showing the proceedings "taken for the punishment of those who have been guilty of mutiny, desertion, and rebellion" in India; and the reason why the country generally was not put under martial law "after the mutinies"—a measure,

the non-adoption of which is stated by the governor-general in council, to have "been made a matter of complaint against the Indian government."—p. 2.

† Letter dated "Allahabad, July 22nd, 1857."—*Ibid.*, p. 23.

‡ Letter of Allahabad civilian, dated, June 28th, 1857.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857.

between friend and foe in this respect. The work of destruction was carried on with impunity under the very walls of the fort. Costly furniture, of no value to the plunderers, was smashed to pieces for the mere love of mischief. These did for private, what the enemy had done for public, property. Drunkenness was all but universal, and riot reigned supreme.

The Rev. J. Owen, a clergyman who had resided many years in Allahabad, and had been the founder of the establishment supported in that city by the American Board of Missions—writes in his journal on the 10th of June—

"Our affairs in the fort are just now in a very bad way. A day or two since, some Europeans went out with a body of Seiks to the godowns, near the steamer ghaut, where large quantities of stores are lying. The Europeans began to plunder. The Seiks, ever ready for anything of the kind, seeing this, instantly followed the example. The thing has gone on from bad to worse, until it is now quite impossible to restrain the Seiks, untamed savages as they are.

"The day before yesterday, a poor man came to me, saying that he had had nothing to eat that day, and had been working hard as a volunteer in the militia. The colonel (Simpson) happened to be passing at the time. I took the man to him, telling him that the poor fellow was working hard, and willing to work, in defence of the fort; but that he and his wife were starving. The colonel went with me at once to the commissariat; and there, notwithstanding many objections on the ground of formality, assisted me in getting for him a loaf of bread. * * * One of the commissariat officers told me yesterday morning, that he did not know how those widows and children who came in on Monday night, could be supplied with rations, for they were not fighting-men! Everything is as badly managed as can be; indeed, there seems to be no management at all."

The arrival of Colonel Neil changed the aspect of affairs. He had rapidly, though with much difficulty, made his way from Benares, which he left on the evening of the 9th, reaching Allahabad on the afternoon of the 11th, with an officer and forty-three of the Madras Fusiliers. The line of road was deserted; the terrified villagers had departed in the old "Wulsa" style; scarcely any horses could be procured; and coolies, to assist in dragging the dawk carriages, were with difficulty obtained. Colonel Neil (always ready to give praise where he deemed it due) says—"Had it not been for the assistance ren-

dered by the magistrate at Mirzapoor (Mr. S. G. Tucker), we should have been obliged to have marched on and left our baggage. We found the country between this [Allahabad] and Mirzapoor infested with bands of plunderers, the villages deserted, and none of the authorities remaining. Major Stephenson, who left Benares the same evening with a hundred Fusiliers by bullock-van, experienced the same difficulties. Many of the soldiers have been laid up in consequence of the exposure and fatigue; four have died suddenly."† The officer who accompanied Colonel Neil, says they accomplished "upwards of seventy miles in two nights, by the aid of a lot of natives pushing our men along in light four-wheeled carriages."‡

Colonel Neil had probably received no adequate information of the state of Allahabad. The telegraphic communication between that place and Benares had been completely cut off. The "lightning dawk" had been speedily destroyed by the mutineers; and at a later stage they had an additional incentive to its destruction, some of the more ingenious among them having discovered that the hollow iron posts which supported the wires, would make a good substitute for guns,§ and the wire, cut up in pieces, could be fired instead of lead. In fact, the whole of the proceedings which followed the Allahabad mutiny, were by far the most systematic of any until then taken by the rebels. Colonel Neil found the fort itself nearly blockaded; and the bridge of boats over the Ganges was in the hands of the mob in the village of Daragunje, and partly broken. "I was fortunate," he states, "to bribe some natives to bring a boat over to the left bank of the Ganges, in which I embarked part of my men: the people of the fort having by this time seen us, sent over boats some way down. By these means we all got into the fort, almost completely exhausted from over-long nights' march|| and the intense heat." The men might rest; but for the colonel, it would seem, there was important work to do, which admitted not of an hour's delay. Assuming the command (superseding Colonel Simpson), he assembled his staff and held a council of war, at which he determined to

* *Sherer's Indian Church*, p. 214.

† Despatch from Colonel Neil to government, June 14th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers relative to the Mutinies, 1857 (not numbered), p. 60.

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‡ Letter dated "Allahabad, June 23rd."—*Times*, August 26th, 1857.

§ Colonel Neil's despatch, June 17th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 57.

|| *Sic in orig.*

attack Daragunje next morning. He then paraded the volunteers, addressed them in very plain language regarding their "recent disgraceful acts of robbery and drinking," and threatened to turn the next transgressor out of the fort. On the following morning, sixty Fusiliers, three hundred Seiks, and thirty cavalry, marched out under his own command. "I opened fire," Colonel Neil writes, "with several round shots, on those parts of Daragunje occupied by the worst description of natives; attacked the place with detachments of Fusiliers and Seiks, drove the enemy out with considerable loss, burnt part of the village, and took possession of a repaired bridge, placing a company of Seiks at its head for its protection."* Thus he reopened the communication across the Ganges.

On the 12th, Major Stephenson's detachment arrived. On the 13th, Colonel Neil attacked the insurgents in the village of Kydgunge, on the left bank of the Jumna, and drove them out with loss. A few days later he sent a steamer with a howitzer to clear the river, some distance up the country—an expedition which, he says, "did much execution." Before, however, he could act with any efficiency against the mutineers, he had found it necessary to reorganise the Allahabad garrison. On the 14th, he writes—"I have now 270 Fusiliers in high health and spirits, but suffering from the intense heat." Yet on that day, he adds, "I could do little or nothing." He accomplished, however, important work within the fort, by checking, with an energy like that of Clive, the prevailing debauchery and insubordination. From his first arrival he had "observed great drinking among the Seiks, and the Europeans of all classes;" and he soon learned the lawlessness which had proceeded even to the extent of the open plunder of the godowns belonging to the Steam Navigation Company, and of the stores of private merchants; the Seiks bringing quantities of fermented liquor, spirit, and wine into the fort, and selling their "loot" at four annas, or sixpence the bottle all round, beer or brandy, sherry or champagne. Colonel Neil did not share the previously quoted opinion of one of the civilians of the hanging committee, regard-

ing the "jolly Seiks;" on the contrary, he thought their devilry dangerous to friends as well as to foes; and was extremely anxious at the idea of their continuing in the same range of barracks with the Fusiliers. They had been, he said, "coaxed into loyalty; they had become overbearing, and knew their power;" and he felt obliged to temporise with them, by directing the commissariat to purchase all the liquor they had to sell. He further sent down the only two carts he had, to empty what remained in the godowns into the commissariat stores, and to destroy all that could be otherwise obtained. The next move was a more difficult one—namely, to get the Seiks out of the fort. They were very unwilling to go; and, at one time, it seemed likely to be a question of forcible ejection—"it was a very near thing indeed." The influence of Captain Brasyer (who, Colonel Neil says, "alone has kept the regiment together and all right here") again prevailed, and the Seiks took up their position outside the fort, and were consoled for being forbidden to loot European property, by constant employment on forays against suspected villages, the prospect of plunder being their spring of action.† Even after their ejection, it was no easy matter to keep them from the fort, and prevent the re-establishment of the boon companionship, which was so manifestly deteriorating the morality and discipline of both parties. The colonel declared that the Seiks had been running in and out like cats; he had blocked up some of their ways, but there were still too many sallyports; and, in writing to government, he states—"There is no engineer officer here; there ought to be; and one should be sent sharp."‡

Colonel Neil now resolved on forwarding the majority of the women and children to Calcutta. The fort was still crowded, notwithstanding the expulsion of the Seiks; and in a state of extreme filth, the native low-caste servants having fled. On the 15th and 17th of June, he sent down, by two steamers, fifty women and forty-six children, "all the wives, children, widows, or orphans of persons (several ladies and gentlemen) who have been plundered of all they had, and barely escaped with their lives." Seventeen men accompanied the

* Despatch from Colonel Neil to government, June 17th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 46.

† Despatches of Colonel Neil, Allahabad, June 14th,

17th, and 19th, 1857.—Further Papers for 1857 (not numbered), pp. 46, 48, and 60.

‡ Colonel Neil's despatch, June 17th, 1857; p. 61.

party, the crews of the steamers (Mohamedans) being suspected. The voyage was safely accomplished, and was attended by an interesting circumstance. One of the persons selected to take charge of the Englishwomen and their children, and who performed the office with great ability and tenderness, was a Hindoo convert, named Shamacharum Mukerjee, by birth a Brahmin of high-caste. He had been baptized in early youth by Scotch missionaries, and had from that time pursued, with rare determination of purpose, a most difficult course. He worked his passage to England on board a sailing ship; lauded with a single letter of introduction from Dr. Duff; got into an engineering establishment, for the sake of learning that business; bore up, amid all the discouragements that await an alien with a dark skin and an empty purse; endured the chilling winds and dense fogs of an uncongenial climate, rising at six, and going regularly to his work, till, his object being accomplished, he was enabled to return to India, where he was fortunate in procuring an appointment.*

To return to Allahabad. On the 17th of June, Neil writes—"The Moolvee has fled, and two of his men of rank were slain on the 15th." One of the insurgent leaders was captured, and brought before Captain Brasyer. He was a young man, magnificently dressed, and said to be a nephew to the Moolvee. Some questions were put to him, and he was ordered into confinement. The Seiks were about to take him away, when, suddenly, by a violent effort, he freed his hands, which had been fastened at his back, seized a sword, and made a thrust at one of his captors. Captain Brasyer sprang forward, wrested the weapon from his hand, and flung him on the ground; and "the enraged Seiks, while the chief was prostrate, placed their heels on his head, and literally crushed out his brains, and the body was thrown outside the gates."† Colonel Neil mentions, that "some Christian children" had been "sent in" at this date; but he does not say by whom.

On the 19th of June, he states—"Two hundred bullocks, with drivers, were brought

in here yesterday: this is all our public carriage at present. Our commissariat officer is away; and that department is, in consequence, inefficient." There was an utter absence of ordinary stores: the commonest articles of food could with difficulty be obtained, and great scarcity of medicine was felt here and at Benares. No information is given regarding the 1,600 siege-train bullocks, which, on the 28th of the previous month, the commissariat officer at Allahabad was ready, "if allowed, to give for the immediate conveyance of Europeans from the river Sone to Cawnpoor."‡ In fact, the state of things at Allahabad, as incidentally described in the public despatches and private correspondence of the period, is most discreditable to those responsible for it. From the middle of May to the 6th of June, the local authorities were totally unmolested. At least, they might have laid in supplies to the fort, and prepared in every possible way for the speedy and easy conveyance of a few hundred British troops, the short distance of 120 miles. Cawnpoor was only thus far off; and this fact makes it more terrible to think of the three weeks' maintenance of the intrenchments, from the 6th to the 27th of June, and the yet more exhausting agony endured by the bereaved women and children, from the 27th of June to the 16th of July. Their condition could not have been known to their countrymen without some immediate effort being made for their relief; and it could scarcely have remained unknown had our system of intelligence been less generally defective. There were some marked exceptions; but at Allahabad they had no system at all. Setting apart Colonel Neil, Captain Brasyer, the magistrate (Mr. Court), and a few others, whose influence may be traced, the majority of the Europeans seem to have concentrated their energies on indiscriminate slaughter. The preservation of their countrymen in scattered stations, and even of British dominion in India; the conciliation and protection of the agricultural classes, as a means of facilitating the advance of the relieving force; the inducing the villagers and itinerant traders of all sorts, especially grain merchants, to come forward fearlessly to our aid, certain of payment and reward for the various services they had it in their power to render, and, above all, of being shielded from the exactions of Seiks and Goorkas, or even lawless Europeans;—these, it is to be feared, were

* *Missionary Sketches in Northern India*; by Mrs. Weithrecht; p. 97.

† Rev. Mr. Hay's account of Allahabad Mutiny. *Times*, September, 1857.

‡ Telegram from Allahabad to Calcutta.—Appendix to Parl. Papers, p. 327.

considerations quite beyond the ordinary class of volunteers. An able military leader anywhere, but specially in India, must needs be also a statesman and financier. Neil's occupation of a separate command was too brief to show to what extent he might have possessed these qualities; and his eager panegyrists have praised his "vigour," and boasted of the panic it inspired among the natives, in a manner which is calculated to detract undeservedly from his fame, when, the thirst for vengeance being assuaged, posterity shall learn to look calmly on the Indian mutiny of 1857, and weigh the deeds of the chief actors with a steadier hand than contemporary judges are likely to possess. Then it may, perhaps, be deemed that Neil's best services were not those which earned him temporary popularity; and that his admirers may be glad to palliate the "village-burning" and "unlimited hanging" system pursued by him before the capitulation of Cawnpoor, as having been, perhaps, a mistaken policy, adopted in the hope of terrifying the wavering into submission, and so bringing the war to a speedy close. The very reverse was the case. The worst massacres occurred after the firing into the disarmed troops at Benares; and, strange to say, a similar cruel blunder is declared by Captain Thomson, in his *Story of Cawnpoor*, to have driven the 53rd N.I. into rebellion. He declares, most positively, that the men were quietly cooking their

food in their lines, when General Wheeler (of whom he speaks as a once admirable, but worn-out, commander), under the influence of some extraordinary misconception, gave the fatal order to Lieutenant Ashe, of the artillery, which caused the 53rd to be dispersed and driven from the station with 9-pounders.* These facts must be borne in mind; because the "esprit de corps," evinced by the mutineers, is to some extent explained by the fact, that several of the revolted regiments asserted, at different periods, each one its own special grievance, and urged it, too, upon the consideration of their own officers, when, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, the fortune of war brought them into communication. The difficulties with which Colonel Neil had to contend at Allahabad, have been very insufficiently appreciated. Disease, drunkenness, and insubordination among the Europeans and Seiks, were more dangerous foes than the Moolvee and his rabble host, though stated to amount to three or four thousand. Cholera appeared among the Fusiliers on the evening of the 18th, when several men came into hospital with the disease in its worst form. Before midnight eight men were buried, and twenty more died during the following day.† All the cholera patients were carried to the Masonic lodge, a short distance from the fort, which had been converted into an hospital; but the want of comforts for the sick was painfully felt. "The barracks,"

* Since the publication of the chapter containing the account of the siege and first massacre of Cawnpoor, Captain Thomson has issued a most interesting work on the subject, reiterating his previous statements, with important additional particulars. The 2nd cavalry were, he says, the first to rise. The old subahdar-major of the regiment defended the colours and treasure in the quarter-guard as long as he could, and was found, in the morning, lying beside the empty regimental chest, weltering in his blood. He recovered, however, but was killed by a shell while defending the intrenchment. "An hour or two after the flight of the cavalry, the 1st N.I. also bolted, leaving their officers untouched upon the parade-ground. The 56th N.I. followed the next morning. The 53rd remained, till, by some error of the general, they were fired into. I am at an utter loss to account for this proceeding. The men were peacefully occupied in their lines, cooking; no signs of mutiny had appeared amongst their ranks; they had refused all the solicitations of the deserters to accompany them, and seemed quite steadfast, when Ashe's battery opened upon them by Sir Hugh Wheeler's command, and they were literally driven from us by 9-pounders. The only signal that had preceded this step was the calling into the intrenchments of the Native officers of the regiment. The whole

of them cast in their lot with us, besides 150 privates, most of them belonging to the grenadier company. The detachment of the 53rd, posted at the treasury, held their ground against the rebels about four hours. We could hear their musketry in the distance, but were not allowed to attempt their relief. The faithful little band that had joined our desperate fortunes was ordered to occupy the military hospital, about 600 yards to the east of our position, and they held it for nine days; when, in consequence of its being set on fire, they were compelled to evacuate. They applied for admission to the intrenchments, but were told that we had not food sufficient to allow of an increase to our number." They were, consequently, dismissed to care for their own safety as they best could; Major Hillersden giving each man a few rupees, and a certificate of fidelity.—*Story of Cawnpoor*; by Captain Mowbray Thomson; pp. 39, 40.

† The American missionary, Owen, notes in his diary, June 19th, the deaths of three ladies on that day—named Hodgson, Purser, and Williams—of cholera; adding, "I predicted that the filth allowed to accumulate about the doors and in the drains, would breed disease of some kind. The authorities have now commenced the work of cleansing and sprinkling them with lime."—*Sherer's Indian Church*, p. 226.

the colonel writes, "are in bad order, followers of any description being almost unprocurable; there are but few punkahs, and no tatties;* the men have, therefore, not the proper advantages of barrack accommodation for this hot season. I regret to add, that the supply of medicines here has failed; there appears to have been little or none kept in Allahabad; and our detachments only brought up sufficient for the march."† On the 19th, he writes—"I hope no time will be lost in sending up here an efficient commissariat department; such should be here. We are most badly off in that respect; and the want of bread, &c., for the Europeans, may no doubt increase the disease."‡ On the 22nd, he announces, by telegram, the decrease of cholera, and the arrival of the head-quarters of H.M. 84th, and 240 more of the Fusiliers; adding—"Davidson, of commissariat, arrived; now hope to get something done. Endeavouring to equip, with carriage and provisions, 400 Europeans, with two guns, to push on towards Cawnpoor."§ Two days later, it was discovered that there were but sixteen dhoolies, or litters, available (although a considerable number of these was a primary requisite for the projected expedition), and that all materials for making others were wanting, as well as workmen: a supply was therefore telegraphed for, and ordered by government, the order being given at Calcutta, on the day of the capitulation of Cawnpoor.

An officer of the Fusiliers writes to England on the 23rd—"He (the colonel) is now hard at work getting his force together to move on to the assistance of Cawnpoor and Lucknow, both places being in the greatest danger, for all the sepoys that have run away are now gathering around Lucknow. Our reports concerning that city and Cawnpoor are most gloomy; but reports in this country and at this time are always against us. You can have no idea of the awful weather, and of our sufferings from the heat; we sit with wet clothes over our heads, but the deaths from sun-stroke continue large: that dreadful scourge cholera has also broken out, and we have lost already seventy fighting-men. We buried twenty, three nights ago, at one funeral; and the shrieks of the dying were some-

thing awful: two poor ladies who were living over the hospital died, I believe, from fright. We have now got about 400 men outside the fort, and the disease is certainly on the decline. Up to to-day we have had little to eat; indeed, I would not have fed a dog with my yesterday's breakfast; but our mess and the head-quarters arrived yesterday, and our fare was much better to-day. All the village people ran away; and any one who had worked for the Europeans, these murderers killed; so if the population was to a man against us, we should stand but a bad chance. A poor baker was found with both his hands cut off, and his nose slit, because he had sent in bread to us."||

The extreme hatred evinced for the English, must have been aggravated by the policy planned by Neil, and carried through by his subordinates without the slightest discrimination. This was to "completely destroy all the villages close to, and forming the suburbs of, the city;" and to make a severe example by "laying the city under the heaviest possible contribution, to save it from destruction also." He expected great service from the gentlemen of the railway engineers, who formed the volunteer corps already alluded to; as these, with the faithful Native troopers, would enable him to strike a few blows against the zemindars and parties of insurgents he could not otherwise reach.¶ The leader of the volunteers, the "civilian" already quoted, undertook the mission with vengeful zest. He writes—"Every day we have had expeditions to burn and destroy disaffected villages, and we have taken our revenge. I have been appointed chief of a commission for the trial of all natives charged with offences against government and persons; day by day we have strung up eight and ten men. We have the power of life and death in our hands, and I assure you we spare not. A very summary trial is all that takes place; the condemned culprit is placed under a tree with a rope round his neck, on the top of a carriage; and, when it is pulled away, off he swings."**

One of the "rank and file" volunteers, a railway official, has also furnished an account of the proceedings of the corps; which entirely agrees with that of its leader.

|| Letter published in the *Times*, August 26th, 1857.

¶ Colonel Neil's despatch, June 17th, 1857.

** Letter of Allahabad civilian, June 28th, 1857.

* *Tatties*, thatched screens wetted to cool the air.

† Further Parl. Papers relative to the Mutinies, 1857 (not numbered), p. 48.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

After relating the outbreak of cholera, he proceeds to state—

"Colonel Neil immediately ordered all us civilians out of the fort. Stern and harsh as the order appeared, I verily believe that it was our salvation. The night we were turned out we slept on the ground on the glacis of the fort, under the shelter of the guns, all the males taking their turn as sentries to guard the women and children. Every native that appeared in sight was shot down without question, and in the morning Colonel Neil sent out parties of his regiment, although the poor fellows could hardly walk from fatigue and exhaustion, and burned all the villages near where the ruins of our bungalows stood, and hung every native they could catch, on the trees that lined the road. Another party of soldiers penetrated into the native city and set fire to it, whilst volley after volley of grape and canister was poured into the fugitives as they fled from their burning houses. In a few hours, such was the terror inspired, that it was deemed safe for us to go up to the station. Of course we never go out unarmed; and all men (natives) we employ are provided with a pass. Any man found without one, is strung up by the neck to the nearest tree."

The civilians were, perhaps, naturally more inveterate and indiscriminating in their vengeance than the military; having suffered greater destruction of property; but both combined to scourge the wretched peasantry. The official and private letters of the time have been largely and literally quoted in evidence of facts which would hardly be believed on other authority than that of the chief actors. The reinforcements of Fusiliers marked their way, from Benares to Allahabad, in blood and flame, not following the regular track, for that was almost deserted; but making *dours*, or forays, in the direction of suspected villages. Captain Fraser's detachment was joined by two civilians—Mr. Chapman and Mr. Moore, the magistrate of Mirzapoor. The troops were out some four or five days; leaving Benares on the 13th, and reaching Allahabad on the 19th of June. The account is too long for insertion; but it begins and ends with "burning villages"—a process to which civilians in general (being almost all of them, in some way or other, connected with the collection of the revenue) would probably not have been so partial, had they been fundholders instead of stipendiaries. Two villages near Gopeegunje were first visited with destruction. Their inhabitants were accused of having plundered grain. Captain Fraser and a party of Fusiliers proceeded thither, called on the principal persons to appear, and, finding they had escaped, set

fire to the houses. Next came the turn of three zemindars, accused of having proclaimed themselves rajahs, and of plundering. Lieutenant Palliser, who, with eighty of the 13th irregular cavalry, had joined Fraser near Gopeegunje, went, with fifty of his men and Messrs. Chapman and Moore, to a village three miles off. They captured the zemindars, brought them into camp, tried them by court-martial, and hanged them before eight o'clock the same evening. At daybreak on the 16th, Fraser, with a hundred Fusiliers and the eighty Irregulars, marched in pursuit of "a man named Belour Sing, who, with 1,200 followers, was reported to be in a village five miles from the Grand Trunk road." For the leader of 180 men to endeavour to apprehend the leader of 1,200 men, would seem somewhat rash; but Belour Sing did not abide the struggle; he fled, leaving his house and village, named Dobaar, to be burned by the Europeans. Everything was found to have been carried off except some grain and a small quantity of gunpowder. A reward of 200 rupees was offered by Mr. Chapman for the capture of the chief.

There was one gratifying incident in this expedition. A zemindar came to the camp one evening with a Native officer. The latter, who was in command of twelve sepoy, said that he and his companions had succeeded in preserving some government treasure, amounting to 12,000 rupees, although they had been attacked by dacoits, and the village burned. Captain Fraser proceeded to the spot, about a mile off the road between Baroad and Sydadab, and there found the faithful sepoy at their post.

There were a few more court-martial sentences, a village burned by the Fusiliers, and two by the irregular cavalry, before the series of murderous raids were brought to a conclusion by the arrival of the party, all unharmed, at Allahabad.† This sort of service may be spirited work for amateurs; but it is doubtful whether it does not materially injure the discipline, which is the soul of efficiency in a regular army. Shortly afterwards, as will be shown, Palliser's Irregulars, to his rage and disgust, refused to follow him in fair fight.

On the 30th of June, Neil states (in a private letter), that, for want of food and

* Letter of railway official, Allahabad, June 23rd. —*Daily News*, August 25th, 1857.

† Captain Fraser's despatch, Allahabad, June 19th, 1857.—*Further Papers*, 1857 (not numbered), p. 47.

carriage, he had been unable to send a single man to relieve Cawnpoor; for the awful heat rendered it certain death to have moved troops without, or with only a few, tents. Besides, he adds—"I could not leave this, the most important fortress in India, insecure. To cover all, cholera has attacked us with fearful virulence. Within three days there were 121 cases in the Fusiliers alone, and fifty-seven deaths. I was so exhausted for a few days, I was obliged to lie down constantly, and only able to get up when the attacks were going on, and then I was obliged to sit down on the batteries to give my orders and directions."

On the afternoon of the same day, a column marched for Cawnpoor, under the direction of Major Renaud, "a gallant and

most intelligent officer,"* "brave even to rashness."† It consisted of 400 Europeans, 300 Seiks, 100 irregular cavalry, under Palliser, and two guns, under Lieutenant Harwood.

The first day's march was extremely trying, for the troops had to encounter a hot wind, "like the breath of a furnace." They had, besides, hot work to do, for "some villages were fired; and any native found in arms, who could not prove his asserted innocence, was summarily hanged, such being the instructions under which we acted."‡ On the 4th of July, the march was arrested by a brief message from Sir Henry Lawrence—"Halt where you now stand; or, if necessary, fall back."§ The reason was, that Cawnpoor had capitulated, and all the besieged were supposed to have perished.

CHAPTER XIV.

JHANSI, NOWGONG, CHUTTERPOOR, LOGASSEE, CHIRKAREE, KUBRAI, ADJYGHUR, BANDA, FUTTEHPOOR, HUMEERPOOR, JALOUN, OORAI, AND SUMPTER.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

ANOTHER district in the Cawnpoor (military) division was destined to take the second rank, amid the dreary scenes of mutiny, in connection with a treacherous, pitiless massacre, perpetrated at the instigation of an angry and ambitious woman, upon all the Europeans placed by the flood of revolt within her reach.

The annexation of Jhansi, and the contempt with which the lately reigning family were treated, have been shown in the introductory chapter. The independence of the little principality was gone beyond redemption, if English supremacy continued; and when the Ranee heard that the vast mercenary army of the Feringhees had revolted, she resolved to cast in her lot with them in a war of extermination. In the prime of life (some years under thirty), exceedingly beautiful, vigorous in mind and body, Lakshmi Bye had all the pride of the famous Rajpoot prince,|| who—

"rather than be less,
Cared not to be at all."

* *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 122.

† *Journal of Major North, 60th Rifles*; p. 26.

She was a heathen: the forgiveness of injuries was no article in her creed; and believing herself deeply injured by the infraction of the Hindoo laws of adoption and inheritance, she threw aside every consideration of tenderness for sex or age, and committed herself to a deadly struggle with the Supreme government, by an act, for which, as she must have well known, her own life would, in all human probability, pay the forfeit. Her relatives (that is, her father and sister) fought for and with her; but there is no proof that she had any able counsellor, but rather that she was herself the originator of the entire proceedings which made Jhansi an important episode in the war, from the time when the Ranee flung down the gauntlet by a reckless, ruthless massacre of men, women, and children of the hated usurping race, till the moment when she fell lifeless from her white war-horse, by the side of her dead sister.

Nowhere was the overweening confidence

† *Ibid.*, p. 28.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

|| The Rana Umra, the opponent of the Emperor Jehanghere.—*Tod's Rajasthan*, vol. i., p. 367.

of the English more remarkable than at Jhansi, which, as the residence of a Native court, had attained some importance for its trade and manufactures. The former rajah had paid great attention to the regulation of its streets and bazaars, which were remarkably clean and orderly.* Sleeman estimated its population at 60,000†—a very large number in proportion to the size of the place, and the state of which it was the capital. Jhansi town is situated among tanks and groves of fine timber trees, and is surrounded by a good wall. The palace was itself a fortress, built on a rock overlooking the town; and the imposing appearance of this lofty mass of stone, surmounted by a huge round tower, was justified by the number of cannon it possessed, said to amount to some thirty or forty pieces. The government had had repeated warning of the bitter discontent which the annexation of any state, however small, caused in the capital, by drying up the main source of income of the citizens, who depended for a livelihood on the expenditure of the court; yet Jhansi was left, fort and all, without a single European soldier.

Jhansi lies on the route from Agra to Saugor, 142 miles south of the former, 130 north of the latter, and 245 west of Allahabad. The troops in the station consisted of—

Detail of Foot Artillery—*Europeans*, none; *Natives*, 27. Wing of the 12th N.I.—*Europeans*, 6; *Natives*, 522. Head-quarters and wing of 14th Irregular Cavalry—*Europeans*, 5; *Natives*, 332.

In all—11 Europeans to 881 Natives.

In the spring of the year the cartridge question had been the pretext, or the cause, of excitement and disaffection; but the infantry at Jhansi and at Nowgong (the nearest military station), are asserted "to have become ashamed at the mention of it;" and the burning of empty bungalows had ceased some time before the outbreak of the mutiny.‡ Captain Dunlop, the officer in command of the station, had no distrust of the troops; and the commissioner, Captain Skene, and the deputy-commissioner, Captain Gordon, concurred, up to the last, in ridiculing the precautions taken at Nowgong. Such, at least, is the

* Thornton's *Gazetteer*.

† Sleeman's *Rambles and Recollections*, vol. i., p. 282.

‡ Captain Scot, 12th N.I., to deputy-adjutant-general.—*Parl. Papers on Mutinies* (No. 4), p. 121.

statement of the case by Captain Scot, of the 12th N.I., then on duty at the latter station.§ Unfortunately, he writes from memory only; for the documents which would have shown, beyond the possibility of doubt, the state of affairs at Jhansi and Nowgong, were destroyed, with the other records, in the conflagration which took place at both places; and the accounts sent to Cawnpoor met a similar fate.

Captain Scot, however, states from his own knowledge, that some days before the mutiny occurred, Captain Dunlop sent over to Major Kirke, the officer in command at Nowgong, letters from Skene and Gordon, declaring that they had learned, from separate sources, that one Luckmun Rao (the servant of the Ranee of Jhansi) was doing his best to induce the 12th N.I. to mutiny; but whether with or without the authority of the Ranee, had not been ascertained. Subsequent letters spoke of spies, or agents of sedition, finding their way to the Native lines, and being strongly opposed by some of the more loyal and zealous sepoys. Of the fidelity of the Irregulars no suspicion appears to have been entertained; and, indeed, both at Jhansi and Nowgong, the infantry revolted first, though "the cavalry were the most bloodthirsty" afterwards.

The only European testimony on record regarding the mutiny, is a brief and scarcely legible note from Captain Dunlop. Concerning the massacre which ensued, there is none; for no European witness survived to tell the tale. The note runs thus:—

"To the Officer commanding at Nowgong.

"Jhansi, June 4th, 1857; 4 P.M.

"Sir,—The artillery and infantry have broken into mutiny, and have entered the Star Fort. No one has been hurt as yet. Look out for stragglers.

"Yours, &c.,

"J. DUNLOP."

This communication reached Major Kirke, by express, at eleven o'clock on the following day.

On the 10th, a letter in English came from Tewarry Hossein, the tehsildar of Mowraneepeer (thirty miles from Nowgong), stating that he had heard of the murder of every European at Jhansi, and had received a perwannah, to the effect that the Ranee was seated on the gadi (Hindoo

§ See despatch last quoted; and a long letter published in the *Times*, September 11th, 1857; not signed, but evidently written by Captain Scot, to the wife of Lieutenant Ryves, acquainting her with that officer's escape to Gwalior and Agra.

throne), and that he was to carry on business as hitherto. He added, that he meant to leave the place at once; and he did so. The same afternoon, the mails that had been sent towards Jhansi on the 5th and subsequent days, were brought back in one bag, the runners having feared to enter the station.*

Many weeks elapsed before any authentic statements could be obtained of the proceedings at Jhansi, after the transmission of Captain Dunlop's note. At length Captain Scot ascertained and communicated to government the following account, which he obtained from three natives, one of whom was with the Europeans during the whole of the outbreak. The evidence was given by the three witnesses separately at Nowgong, Mahoba, and Banda; and agreed so nearly as to be received as trustworthy.

Only one company (7th) of the 12th N.I. mutinied on the 4th of June. Headed by a havildar, named Goor Bux, the men marched into the Star fort. This was a small building, where the guns and treasure were kept, close to the infantry guns.

Captain Dunlop paraded the rest of the 12th N.I., with the cavalry; and they all said they would stand by him. Disarming them, of course, was out of the question. Captain Dunlop was an energetic officer, and had been reported, by General Wheeler, a few days before, as "a man for the present crisis." Seeing that all continued quiet, he employed himself, on the 6th of June, in preparing shells at the quarter-guard of the 12th N.I. He then posted some letters; and in returning from the office, with Ensign Taylor, crossed or approached the parade. Here he and his companion were shot dead by some of the 12th. The poor ensign had only arrived at Jhansi a few days before, having made great haste to rejoin his regiment, when the mutiny began. Lieutenant Campbell, 15th N.I., serving with the 14th Irregulars, escaped to the palace-fort, where Lieutenant Burgess, of the revenue survey department, with

several English and Eurasian subordinates, had been for some time residing. On the evening of the 4th of June, they were joined by Captain Skene, his wife and two children; Lieutenant Gordon, Dr. M'Egan, his wife and sister; Lieutenant Powys, his wife and child; Mrs. G. Browne, her sister and child; and the English and Eurasian *employés* in the Civil and Canal departments, and Salt excise. Lieutenant G. Browne, the deputy-commissioner, fled to Oorai, with Ensign Browne and Lieutenant Lamb.† Lieutenant Ryves‡ and another European, named McKellar, escaped to Gwalior. Lieutenant Turnbull took refuge in a tree, but was discovered and shot down. Whether the Europeans in the fort held any communication with the Ranee is not known; but they are stated to have remained unmolested till the 7th of June, and to have been employed, during the interval, in endeavouring to get provisions and ammunition into the fort (though with very partial success), and in piling stones against the gates to prevent their being opened. Unhappily there were traitors within, as well as rebels without. Lieutenant Powys was found by Captain Burgess, lying bleeding from a wound in the neck. He survived just long enough to point out the four assassins who had attacked him. These were Mussulmans employed in the revenue survey; they were immediately put to death.§ When attacked, the Europeans are said to have made great havoc among the besiegers with rifles and guns; but to have themselves lost only one of their number, Captain Gordon, who was shot through the head while leaning over the parapet, pulling up a bucket which a syce in the lower enclosure had filled with wheat. The little garrison appears to have been totally unprovisioned for a siege. The letters written by Dunlop to Kirke, before the partial mutiny on the 4th, prove this; and afterwards, it was probably as much as the officers could do to obtain supplies for the party within the walls. Attempts were vainly made to send word to Nagode and

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 125.

† Statement of Commissioner Erskine.—*London Gazette*, May 6th, 1857; p. 2248.

‡ In the *East India Army List* for 1858, Lieutenant Ryves is mentioned as having been killed on the 6th at Jhansi; but this must be an error. He quitted Jhansi, with a detachment, two or three days before the mutiny; and although he may have returned there, he certainly reached both Gwalior and Agra some time later.—Officer's Letters, in *Times*, September 3rd and 11th, 1857.

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§ This is the account given by the native with the Europeans in the fort; but according to the statement of another native in the city at the time, the immediate incentive to the murder of Lieutenant Powys was, that that officer seeing Captain Burgess' *khitmutgar* (table-attendant) attempting to pull down the stones that secured the gates, shot him; whereupon, the brother of the fallen man cut down the officer with his tulwar, and was instantly put to death by Lieutenant Burgess.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 132.

to Gwalior for help: some of the clerks tried to escape in native clothes, letting themselves down by ropes; but they were caught and killed.

Kala Khan, risaldar of the 14th cavalry, was active in the assault. Ahmed Hossein, the tehsildar of Jhansi, likewise took a leading part, in connection with the adherents of the Ranee. The men employed in the Salt excise joined in the attack. The Europeans felt that the struggle was hopeless, and the Hindoos and Mohammedans are alleged to have induced them to surrender, by swearing that their lives should be spared. Captain Skene opened the gates, and marched out.* The traitors instantly threw their vows to the wind; and, separating the men from the women, tied the former in a row by ropes, took the whole party into a garden in or near the city, and there beheaded them all except John Newton, the quartermaster of the 12th N.I. (a very dark half-caste), his wife, and four little children. This family was spared by the rebels, and carried off by them when they were driven from Jhansi. Lieutenant Powys is thought to have died in the fort. He could not walk out with the rest of the party. His wife was torn from him, and fell in the general massacre. "The men died first," writes Captain Scot; "Burgess taking the lead, his elbows tied behind his back, and a prayer-book in his hands. What a sad end for so kind-hearted and unselfish a man! But to die confessing the faith is a noble death. The rest died in the same way. They tried hard to get the women and children saved." But it was in vain. The Ranee does not appear to have been appealed to; but it is too probable that it was by the orders of this ambitious and childless widow—disinherited herself, and prohibited from exercising the right of adoption—that the ruthless deed was consummated. The women, we are told, "stood with their babes in their arms, and the older children holding their gowns. They had to see the men killed;" but there was every reason to believe "they were spared any violence save death."†

The care bestowed by Captain Scot, in his official capacity, in sifting and collecting evidence from every available source, would, under any circumstances, be very commendable; but is specially satisfactory,

as refuting the painful story which went the round of the English and Indian journals at the time, with regard to the fate of Captain Skene and his young wife. Their friends may be sure they joined with their fellow-Christians in "confessing the faith;" and were probably better prepared to meet death by the sword, than many of their countrymen might be to struggle with the great adversary on their beds in England. But the long interval which elapsed before the particulars above related were ascertained, gave room for the wildest rumours. Captain Scot's account was not published until August. In the meantime, the following extract from a letter, said to have been written from India to a relative of the maligned officer, was published far and wide:—

"Frank Gordon, Alic Skene, his wife, and a few peons, managed to get into a small round tower when the disturbance began; the children and all the rest were in other parts of the fort—altogether, sixty. Gordon had a regular battery of guns, also revolvers; and he and Skene picked off the rebels as fast as they could fire, Mrs. Skene loading for them. The peons say they never missed once; and before it was all over they killed thirty-seven, besides many wounded. The rebels, after butchering all in the fort, brought ladders against the tower, and commenced swarming up. Frank Gordon was shot through the forehead, and killed at once. Skene then saw it was no use going on any more, so he kissed his wife, shot her, and then himself."

Information subsequently obtained, regarding the massacre, tended to confirm the evidence adduced against the Ranee. Mr. Thornton, the deputy-collector, writing on the 18th of August, states it as the general impression, that the mutineers, after killing their own officers and plundering the treasury (which contained about £45,000), were going off; and it was wholly at the instigation of the Jhansi princess, with a view to her obtaining possession of the district, that they, together with other armed men furnished by the Ranee, attacked the fort. He adds, that they induced the Europeans to surrender, by solemnly swearing to allow them to depart unmolested; notwithstanding which, "they allowed them to be massacred by the Ranee's people in their presence, in a most cruel and brutal manner, having no regard to sex or age. For this act, the mutineers are said to have received from her 35,000 rupees in cash, two elephants, and five horses. The Ranee has now raised a body of about 14,000 men, and has twenty guns, which had been kept concealed by the former Jhansi chief, by being buried within

* The day on which the surrender was made, appears to have been the 8th of June.

† Captain Scot's Letter.—*Times*, Sept. 11th, 1857.

the fort, and of which nothing was known to our officers. I am not certain whether she intends to make any resistance in case our troops come to this quarter; but none of the other native chiefs in Bundelcund have as yet turned against our government.”*

Leaving the Ranee to possess, for a brief space, the blood-stained gadi of Jhansi, we follow the stream of revolt in the sister-station of

Nowgong.—The troops stationed here were almost the counterpart of those at Jhansi; but happily there was no vindictive princess at Nowgong to urge them on to imbrue their hands in the blood of their officers, or their helpless families. The troops consisted of—

A company of Artillery—*Europeans*, 2; *Natives*, 105. Head-quarters and right wing of 12th N.I.—*Europeans*, 6; *Natives*, 604. Left wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry—*Europeans*, 1; *Natives*, 273.†

In all—nine Europeans to 982 Natives.

The first symptoms of disaffection were manifested by the burning of empty bungalows, which commenced on the 23rd of April, and was evidently the work of incendiaries, though the guilty persons could not be discovered. The excitement subsided, and matters went on quietly until the 23rd of May, up to which time the Europeans were very imperfectly informed of the fatal events which had occurred in other stations. On that day, the risaldar in command of the cavalry, informed Major Kirke that his corps had learned, by letter from Delhi, the murder of every Christian in that city. He appeared to wonder at the little the Europeans knew of the proceedings in Delhi, while he and his companions were so well-informed on the subject. On the same day, Major Kirke's orderly, a sepoy of the 12th N.I., rushed into the major's house, and told him that he had just got away from a party of twenty or so Poorbeahs and Boondelas, who had asked him to point out the officers' mess-house. They seemed to be disappointed in the non-appearance of an accomplice to guide them. The orderly said he had made an excuse and got away from them. Major Kirke, with his adjutant, his son, and one or two armed sepoys, went to the spot indicated, after having caused it to be surrounded by sowars (under the command of

the risaldar before mentioned), that no person might escape. Only three men were captured: one ran off; and rather than stop, or make a reply, beyond saying he was a sepoy, let himself be fired at three times: the two others found a hiding-place in a hollow tree, till the party had passed, and then darted off towards the artillery lines, which were afterwards vainly searched for the fugitives. The risaldar was believed to have connived at their escape; and he endeavoured to persuade the Europeans that the orderly's story was altogether a fabrication; but Major Kirke considered that the sepoy had made up a story to put the officers on their guard, not choosing to reveal the actual circumstances. From that night the Irregulars, both officers and men, behaved in a most unsatisfactory manner; the former with the “freezing politeness which Mohammedans well know how to assume;” the latter doing duty in a gay, careless fashion, as much as to say, “It will soon be at an end—we are merely amusing ourselves obeying orders;” while even the sick in the hospital were insolent to the doctors, until a few days before the mutiny, when the ill-feeling either subsided or was disguised. The 12th N.I. were most suspected; but the officers slept nightly in their lines; and in the first few days of June, mutual confidence appeared restored. The Europeans, relieved by the altered tone of the sowars, considered that the news of the massacre of the Christians at Delhi, had possibly roused a fanatical feeling, which had subsequently given place to a conviction “that their pay and earthly prospects were not to be despised.”‡ This was deemed the case with the risaldar, who had been specially distrusted. He was a grey-headed man, of delicate constitution, and his rank and pay were important considerations; and he evinced much distress on hearing the state of affairs at Jhansi, as communicated in Captain Dunlop's letter, received at 11 A.M. on the 5th of June. The Europeans reminded him that no word had come of the Irregulars mutinying; but he said he much feared they would do so, as they had very few officers, European or Native, and most of the men were very young. Before the Jhansi news reached Nowgong, four out of five companies of the wing of the 12th N.I. (following the example of the 70th N.I.) had volunteered

* Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 169.

† Parl. Return, 9th February, 1858; p. 3.

‡ Report of Captain Scot.—Further Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 122.

to serve against the mutineers. Major Kirke, on the reception of Captain Dunlop's letter, ordered a parade; and after addressing the 12th on the subject of their offer, and promising to communicate this evidence of their loyalty to government, he proceeded to announce to the troops the news of partial mutiny just received. "The right wing, 12th N.I., when asked if they would stand by the colours, rushed forward to them as one man, and were enthusiastic in their expressions of fidelity. The artillery company embraced their guns with expressions of devotion. The men of the 14th said at once they would be true to the government. They expressed no enthusiasm."*

The officers were much gratified by the conduct of the men, especially of the artillery. Some few days previously, four of their company had been seized on an accusation of mutiny, and sent off as prisoners to Chutterpoor. On the same evening (June 1st), Major Kirke had the whole of the guns of the battery brought in front of the quarter-guard of the 12th N.I., and the same precaution was continued every night. The artillery company had "been cheerful and well-disposed" until then; but they are described as feeling "affronted and humiliated by this measure."

Early on the 5th, before the parade, forty of the 14th Irregulars, under a Native officer, had been dispatched to Lullutpoor, and a similar party to Jhansi. The latter marched to within ten miles of that place; and then, on learning the mutiny of the infantry, turned back. The first tidings regarding the fate of Captain Dunlop and Ensign Taylor, were brought by the shepherd of the left wing mess. "The 12th men, at Nowgong, seemed horrified at the news:" most certainly (Captain Scot adds) "they were sincerely so;" but the bazaar people were very anxious to send away their women and children, which Major Kirke would not allow them to do. For some time the Europeans had been looking round them for the means of escape; and the government camels, only eight in number, had been called for and examined. Murmurs immediately arose that the camels had been sent for to remove the treasure, and that it was actually being drawn

out in small sums, with the intention of placing the whole under the charge of "the Gurowlee rajah."† The treasure was felt to be "the danger all along." The 12th continued to manifest good-will, attachment, and respect to their officers; and the senior survivor of these (Captain Scot) gives the greater number credit for sincerity, considering that they mutinied under intimidation, and from an infatuated feeling that mutiny was a matter of destiny, Benares Brahmins having predicted it.

All continued quiet till sunset on the 10th of June. The officers had for some time dined at 4 o'clock, with the view of going early to the lines to prevent mischief. On the evening in question, some had left the mess-room; but others remained discussing the engrossing topic of public and private interest. Dr. Mawe (assistant-surgeon) urged on Captain Scot the advisability of abandoning the station, because it "was impossible that the men at Nowgong would stand fast after their brothers at Jhansi had rebelled, and were still so near."

As if in confirmation of this opinion, several musket-shots were heard. Lieutenant Townsend, of the artillery, and Lieutenant Ewart, mounted their horses, and galloped straight to the lines, arriving just in time to see the guns in the hands of the mutineers. Mrs. Mawe, Lieutenant Franks, Mr. Smalley, and other Europeans, had witnessed the outbreak. It occurred at the moment when the six artillery guns were as usual brought to the 12th N.I. brigade, and preparations were being made for relieving guard. "A tall, dare-devil Seik" walked forward, followed by two others. Loading his piece, he took deliberate aim at the havildar-major, a brave and faithful officer, and shot him dead. The three Seiks then rushed on the guns. The artillery sergeant made some attempt to defend them, but none of the gunners stood by him; and when the European officers tried to rally their men, and induce them to follow them in making a dash at the guns, no one would move: all were panic-stricken or mutinous. Major Kirke, finding that about 100 men had assembled at the mess-house, strove to induce them to march with him against the mutineers; and when compelled to relinquish this idea, he insisted on holding the mess-house. The arguments of the officers on the utter hopelessness of such a proceeding, were effectively seconded by the appearance of a 9-pounder, brought by

* Report of Captain Scot.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 124.

† *Ibid.*, p. 125.

the rebels to expedite the retreat of the Feringhees, not one of whom were injured. The sepoy with Major Kirke showed strong attachment to his person; and several Native officers, with eighty-seven non-commissioned officers and men of the 12th, one artilleryman, and about twenty bandmen and their families, accompanied the Europeans in their flight. Besides these, there were others who would gladly have shared the perils of the fugitives, had they been able to escape with them. One "noble old man," an invalided subahdar of fifty years' service, had willingly remained with his company, and had done everything that lay in his power to avert a mutiny. When the news arrived of the outbreak at Jhansi, he stood beside the guns with spikes and a hammer, ready to render them useless in the event of immediate revolt. Sirdar Khan, a pay havildar, and a private, Seeta Ram (steward of the stores), excited the wrath of the mutineers by their determined loyalty, and would have been killed but that the guns could not be worked without them. Sirdar Khan was taken from Nowgong, tied on a charpoy, by the rebels; and as those guns were subsequently captured at Futtehpour, it is probable that he perished on that occasion—one of the many innocent victims during this fatal epoch.

None of the English officers* at Nowgong had any female relatives to protect—whether from being unmarried, or from having sent their wives away, does not appear; but the sergeants, bandmaster, clerks, and others, had their families with them; so that, altogether, there were forty women and children to be cared for. The number of the male Europeans is not stated by Captain Scot, but it was probably considerably less than that of their helpless companions. At daybreak on the following morning, by means of a scanty supply of horse and camel conveyances, the party reached *Chutterpoor*, the capital of a small Hindoo state of the same name, happily not included in our recent annexations. The experience of the Nowgong officials, contrasts forcibly with that of their ill-fated neighbours at Jhansi. *Chutterpoor* was governed by the mother of the young heir;

and although the mutineers sent threatening messages to the regent, forbidding her to shelter the Europeans, yet the "Ranee, ruling for her son, did not mind them," but showed the fugitives much kindness, and allotted for their use the handsome serai built by the late rajah for the accommodation of travellers. Before the mutiny, she had sent word to Major Kirke, that her guns and treasury were at his service whenever he might require them; and he now borrowed a thousand rupees from her, there being very little money among the party.† Some of her chief officers being Mohammedans, were displeased at this, and said that the troops had risen for "deen" (the faith), and that the Ranee did wrong in taking part with the Feringhees; but she was firm: and when, during the night, some sepoy coming to join their officers, caused an alarm that the rebels were approaching, a large force turned out to oppose them. Captain Scot remarks—"I mention this to show that the Ranee was determined to defend us." On the 12th of June, Major Kirke sent two officers back to Nowgong, to obtain some mess-stores. The mutineers were gone, the government treasury had been plundered of 1,21,494 rupees, the artillery magazine was quite empty, and the magazine of the 12th N.I. had been blown up.‡ All the thatched bungalows had been burned, but the artillery and cavalry lines were uninjured; and although an attempt had been made to fire the lines of the 12th N.I., little harm had been done, the huts being tiled. Hundreds of villagers were busy stripping the roofs of the public buildings, and carrying off the timber; and although a guard from *Chutterpoor* had been sent to protect the station, the men contented themselves with watching over some grain in the Sudder bazaar, and did not seem to think it worth while to prevent the plunder of the wood-work, which Captain Scot says they might easily have done; "for Lieutenant Townsend and myself cleared the station by firing a few shots so as not to hurt any one." He adds, however, that "the official in charge thought our rule was over, and the station his Ranee's for the future; and my orders were listened to, but not carried out." Before leaving Nowgong,

* Major Kirke and his son, Scot, Townsend, Jackson, Remington, Ewart, Franks, and Barber.

† Letter written by Mrs. Mawe.—*Star*, Oct. 29, 1857.

‡ The 12th N.I. obtained in the magazines at Nowgong and Jhansi, 1,225 lbs. of gunpowder for

musketry, besides some barrels of coarse powder for cannon; 360,000 percussion-caps; 130,000 ball-cartridges, 20,000 blank cartridges, and about 10,000 carbine ball-cartridges; left by the 6th light cavalry.—*Parl. Papers* (No. 4), p. 131.

the two officers made provision for the necessities of a dying sepoy, whom they found in one of the hospitals; and for an old bedridden woman, the grandmother of a sepoy musician, who had gone off with the rebels. They then proceeded to "the Logassee rajah's, nine miles off;" and there found Major Kirke. He had started with the other Europeans from Chutterpoor; but suddenly losing his senses,* had imagined the sepoys wanted to murder him; quitted the party without giving any warning, and fled alone by night to *Logassee*—the chief place of another small Bundelcund state, on the route from Calpee to Jubbulpoor. In 1808, the then rajah, a chief of ancient Boondela lineage, had been confirmed in possession of his little fort and territory of twenty-nine square miles in extent, on condition of obedience to the British government. The present rajah treated the fugitives "most kindly," and they passed the night under his protection; yet the major could not be soothed, but persisted in imagining all sorts of horrible deeds were being meditated by his host. The three officers left Logassee on the following morning, under a guard furnished by another Bundelcund chieftainess, the Rancee of Nyagong.

Meantime, the Europeans and sepoys had marched on to Mahoba, where they arrived on the 15th, expecting to overtake Major Kirke. The sepoys expressed great dissatisfaction at his prolonged absence, murmuring that all their officers intended leaving them gradually, and declaring that they would not proceed till they had found their major. A pressing letter was addressed to him on the subject;† and it appears to have reached him; for he and his two companions joined the party at Mahoba on the 16th, bringing with them a cartload of wine, tea, and other supplies from Nowgong. The sepoys welcomed their officers most joyfully. They had been distressed by a report of their having been murdered; and "were actually weeping" with suspense and sorrow when the major arrived. The original destination of the party had been Allahabad; but news of the disturbances at Banda and Humeerpoor induced a change of route; and, on the evening of the 17th,

they proceeded towards Kallinger and Mirzapoor. Mr. Carne, the deputy-collector of Mahoba, accompanied the fugitives, making arrangements with the rajah of *Chirkaree* (another Bundelcund dependent state, under the rule of a Rajpoot family) for the charge of the Mahoba district, and obtaining from the rajah a sum of money for the expenses of the journey. A heavy demand was soon made on this fund. At mid-day on the 18th, during a halt under some trees, at a little distance from a pass between two hills, through which the road lay, a message was received from a man called Pran Sing, the leader of a party of dacoits, demanding 1,000 rupees as the price of escorting the fugitives in safety to Kallinger. At first, a refusal was resolved on; but the Native officers and men urged the payment of the money; and, as they had been most obedient and anxious to please, the Europeans let them have their own way in the matter. "The men accordingly paid down 300 rupees to the head of the party, and applied to the officers for 400 rupees, to make up the advance agreed on. It was given them, and the whole paid to Pran Sing," to whom 300 more were promised on reaching Kallinger.

The next morning, before daybreak, as the Europeans were preparing to move on without Pran Sing (who had not appeared), the camp was fired into from a tree between it and the pass. The sepoys began to fire wildly in return; and the treacherous dacoits commenced in earnest. "The major now came to his senses, and was himself, from being a child who spoke of a mango, or something to eat and drink, as if it were his life." He went among the sepoys, striving to induce them to force the pass; but they were utterly disheartened, and complained that their guns could not carry so far; while the matchlockmen were picking them off from the hills. Lieutenant Townsend fell, shot through the heart; and the party retreated towards Mahoba, leaving their buggies and carts in the hands of the robbers. Some of the Europeans fled on horseback; others on foot. Dr. Mawe and Mr. Smalley, the band-sergeant, walked from daylight till past noon, keeping up with the main body. The sepoys remained close to Major Kirke, who, as soon as the excitement of the skirmish had subsided, relapsed into imbecility; and, on reaching the outskirts of a village three miles from Mahoba, fell from his horse, and expired

* Captain Scot says, Major Kirke's "health had been failing; and now, from want of tea, and wine, and beer, he was quite gone."—*Times*, September 11th, 1857.

† Statement of Sergeant Kirchoff.—Further Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857 (not numbered), p. 77.

shortly after. Several others perished, but the major only was buried; the sepoy, true to the last, digging his grave with their bayonets, under a tree near the spot where he fell. A sergeant (Raite), overcome with the effects of previous drunkenness, would proceed no further, but went into a deserted toll-house on the road-side to sleep, and was left behind. Sergeant-major Lucas, a very large, heavy man, was suddenly struck by the sun. He fell; then rose; staggered a few paces—fell again, and never stirred more. Mrs. Langdale, the wife of a writer, was lost on the road; she had great difficulty in walking, being extremely stout: at last, Captain Scot says, "her husband left her, and she died or was killed." Captain Scot himself was at one time in the rear, and lost sight of the main body. He sent on Lieutenant Ewart, who was with him, to the front; but Ewart became delirious from the sun, and told the corps that the captain was close to them, when he was, in reality, miles behind. The column, therefore, pushed on, leaving Scot, hampered with women and children, to follow as best he could. He had brought away Lieutenant Townsend's horse, as well as his own; and by this means he was enabled to convey his helpless companions. In his official report, he scarcely refers to his own doings; but, writing privately to England, he says—"My work that day was terrible. I had to try to lug along two fat old women, while I carried three children on my horse, and tried to keep back the sepoy who were with me. The senior havildar got more and more savage, and wanted me to leave the children and the women; but I would not; and, thank God, they did not leave us. I came at last to Mr. Smalley, sitting beside his wife. She seemed dead, but it was doubtful; so I took her up before me, and gave a boy (one of the three children before mentioned) to my writer, who had got hold of my horse. It was a most arduous task to keep the utterly inert body on the horse, as I placed her as women ride; but after a while she seemed dead. I held a consultation about it, and we left the body. I then got on foot. I was lame from an awful kick of a horse, and had only a strip of cloth on one foot;

but poor Smalley was worse off, and he got on my horse, and Mrs. Tierney behind; her two children each got a seat on the two horses; and thus I reached the main body."*

The sepoy had halted at a well, waiting for the arrival of Captain Scot, now their senior officer. At three o'clock the party entered *Kubrai* (a small town in Jaloun), twenty-four miles from Banda, where a "Nana Sahib" had usurped authority; this being supposed to be a title assumed by an agent of the Nana of Bithoor. The tacit ill-will shown in several villages through which the fugitives had passed, led the sepoy to request their officers to deliver up their arms, and to suffer themselves to be escorted as prisoners. This they did; and the sepoy described themselves as rebels, and bade the townspeople bring food for the captives, and forage for the horses, on pain of incurring the displeasure of the King of Delhi, by whose order the Europeans were being taken to the nawab of Banda. The townspeople assented, and brought chupatties and sweetmeats for the Europeans, who sat on the ground surrounded by hundreds of natives. "Not one said an uncivil word. Some," Captain Scot writes, "said our rule had been very just; some expressed sorrow; some, it struck me, did their utmost to get a few of us killed for the amusement of the city." When it grew dark the crowd dispersed; and the sepoy, being alone with the Europeans, told them that the trick of their pretended hostility had been discovered; that the Christian drummers had been seized and taken into the town by a rebel moonshee and a Mohammedan officer; and that, as the whole country was against the Europeans, it would be better for them to separate and shift for themselves. They spoke "sadly and respectfully." Their plan was adopted; certificates of loyalty were given to the whole of the eighty-seven sepoy, and they all made their way to Allahabad, thirty-five of them meeting Mr. Corregan (superintendent of roads) with a party escaping from Futtehpore, and escorting them to Allahabad.†

The original Nowgong fugitives had considerably diminished before reaching Kubrai. Mr. Carne had quitted them, and sought and found refuge with the rajah of Chirkaree. A writer, named Johnson, preferred remaining to take his chance at Kubrai; and the Mrs. Tierney, before mentioned, was also left behind with

* Letter dated June 24th.—*Times*, September 11th, 1857.

† Letter from commissioner of Allahabad, July 4th.—Further Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857 (not numbered), p. 130.

her two children. "She was," Captain Scot remarks, "the wife of some sergeant that she had deserted for our sergeant-major:" "she had no chance of her life with us; and I had good hopes she would not be injured at Kubrai." Mrs. Tierney made her way to Mutoun, a large place between Kubrai and Banda. Sergeant Raite did the same. Mr. Langdale and another writer, named Johnson, also proceeded thither, and were protected, and most kindly treated, by an influential zemindar.

The other Europeans resumed their flight, in accordance with the advice of the sepoys. There were eleven adults and two children, and only nine horses. A Sergeant Kirchoff, who had been employed in the Canal department, under Lieutenant Powys, had joined them at Mahoba, with his wife, on foot; and their arrival increased the difficulties of the journey. On the following morning, while moving along the Banda road, the villagers came out, armed with long bamboos, and attacked the fugitives. Captain Scot was bringing up the rear, with Lieutenant Ewart; and they turned, and fired their pistols at the yelling mob, but without effect. At last two troopers and some armed foot joined the rabble, and Mrs. Kirchoff fell from the horse on which she had been placed. Her husband "seemed quite unable to put her on again;" and Captain Scot, feeling that they could not desert her, strove to dismount and fight on foot, being unable to do anything on horseback, hampered as he was with Mr. Smalley behind him, and "little Lottie," a girl of two years old, in his arms. He had just taken the poor child from her parents, Dr. and Mrs. Mawe, who were riding together on one horse, and scarcely able to support themselves. His intention of dismounting was frustrated. His horse, a runaway by habit, being pierced by a spear flung by one of the assailants, galloped off at full speed, with the weapon sticking in its right hock, and stopped only on reaching a water-course it could not leap. Lieutenant Franks soon came up: a loose horse had attacked him and his mare, and, after chasing him round the combatants, had compelled him to gallop off. Lieutenant Remington had followed. The four took counsel, and, believing that their late companions had perished or escaped in another direction, they went sadly on their way. Little Lottie was safe; her preserver had thrown away his pistol in order to hold her fast.

As they proceeded, they continued to find "the villagers in the British territory most hostile," with one exception—that of a very poor man, named Ferukh Khan, who sheltered and fed them. At noon on Sunday, the 21st, while lying under some trees, they became aware of the vicinity of a concourse of armed men. Captain Scot snatched up the child, but, knowing that his horse was worn out, made no attempt at escape. The other Europeans had mounted, and got off a few yards: he entreated them to ride away, but they returned to share his fate. They were all taken to a village, where, Captain Scot says, "one old rascal looked at me maliciously, and made a hacking movement with his hand against his throat, as a suggestion of what we deserved, and what we should get." On reaching Banda, they fully expected to be put to death, having "only a very faint hope that God might spare them." They went through thousands of zealous Mohammedans to the nawab's palace; and then, to their inexpressible relief, were "pulled inside the gate," and assured they were safe.

The rest of the party were at first more fortunate than had been anticipated, for they succeeded in driving off the villagers, and escaping uninjured. Lieutenant Jackson shot the man who speared Captain Scot's horse; and Mrs. Kirchoff's horse having run off, he took her up behind him, and rode away, followed by the other Europeans; she sitting astride, and being tied to him, from the 20th to the 24th, when they reached Adjyghur. The fatigue must have been excessive, for they went forty miles one day.* By the 21st they had crossed the river Cane, five miles below Banda, and were resting near a nullah in that neighbourhood, when, being threatened by some villagers, they remounted and resumed their flight. Dr. and Mrs. Mawe were left behind: they fell together from their horse; and Sergeant Kirchoff, who had been previously holding it while they mounted, let the bridle go, having to attend to his own wife. Lieutenant Barber soon afterwards fell from his horse as if shot, and was left by the way, dead or dying. Lieutenant Ewart was struck by the sun on the 22nd, and lay senseless on the ground. He was "the most fearless of men;"† and even in their extreme peril and exhaustion, his companions made an effort to save him.

* Captain Scot.—*Times*, September 11th, 1857.

† *Ibid*.

Harvey Kirke (the son of the late major) went to a village for some water, but came back with a hooting rabble at his heels, and the Europeans were compelled to leave their brave comrade to breathe his last among foes. Shortly after this they alighted at a village to rest; but Lieutenant Jackson having observed something suspicious in the manner of the natives, passed the word to mount and ride off. Kirchoff, after helping his wife to her seat behind Lieutenant Jackson, and lifting a little child of Mr. Smalley's into the arms of Harvey Kirke (who had taken charge of it), went to loose his own horse; but before he was well in his saddle, several blows from lattes, or long sticks, caused him to fall to the ground. The other three adults escaped, and entered a village in the Adjyghur territory; but the child died on the road.

Adjyghur,—is a dependent native state, with an area of 340 square miles; bounded on the north by the native state of Chirkaree and the British district of Banda; on the south and east by the native state of Punnah; and on the west by Chutterpoor. The inauguration of British supremacy, about half a century before, had been attended by one of the terrible tragedies characteristic of the proud Rajpoot race. The fort of Adjyghur was surrendered in February, 1809, by Luchmun Sing Dowa, to the British, on condition of receiving an equivalent in lands in the plain. In the following June, Luchmun Sing proceeded to Calcutta, without giving notice of his intention to the British authorities at Adjyghur: they distrusted him, and resolved on imprisoning in the fort his female relatives, whom he had left at Tirowni, in the immediate vicinity. The father-in-law of the chief, being directed to make arrangements for removing the ladies, entered their dwelling, and fastened the door after him. A considerable time elapsed, yet he did not return. At length, no sound of life being heard, an entrance was effected by the roof, and all the inmates of the house—women, children, and the old man himself, were found with their throats cut. Not a cry or groan had been heard by the listeners outside, who were keeping watch to prevent the possibility of escape. The members of the heroic household, misled by an erroneous creed, had sacrificed themselves with one accord to preserve inviolate the honour of their house and their personal purity. After this catastrophe, Luchmun Sing was pronounced a

usurper, and Adjyghur, after being overrun by British troops, was made over to a chief named Bukht Khan (who claimed to be its legitimate rajah), on condition of the payment to the E. I. Company of an annual tribute of 7,750 rupees.*

Probably the three Nowgong fugitives had little acquaintance with the antecedents of their nation in Adjyghur. At all events they were kindly received there; and after resting some days, were sent on to Nagode, which they reached on the 29th of June. At this place they found Kirchoff, who, after being plundered by the villagers, had been suffered to depart, and had reached another village in Adjyghur, where he had been well treated, and sent on immediately.

It remains only to notice the fate of Dr. and Mrs. Mawe. Their horse having galloped off, they sat down on the ground, expecting to be killed. Dr. Mawe was quite prepared for death, having previously taken leave of his wife, and communicated to her his last wishes respecting their "four little girls in Ireland." Some natives came up and plundered them; and shortly after this, Dr. Mawe died. He had lost his hat, and had suffered fearfully in the head in consequence, until his wife found a sepoy's cap on the ground, and gave it him (being herself bareheaded all the time): but he retained his senses; and his last words were, "Poor Lottie! I am glad to know she is safe with Scot." The new-made widow, scarcely knowing what she did, bound his head and face in her dress—"for there was no earth to bury him;" and then went to the nullah, and sat down in the water on a stone, to cool her burning feet. Some more natives came up, and searched her for money. She got away from them (with her wedding-ring hidden in her hair), and walked barefooted three miles to a village, where she remained that night, and was sent to the nawab of Banda on the following morning, there to be greeted by the child who had been almost miraculously preserved.† Captain Scot remarks, regarding the baby-heroine of his tale—"How that child, two years old, lived, I know not; angels must have had their wings over it. On the 19th and 20th, its head was for hours bare to the sun. On the 22nd, I made a rag into a sort of turban. She,

* Thornton's *Gazetteer*; and *Asiatic Annual Register*, for 1809.

† Narrative of Mrs. Mawe.

aged three years in mind, during her ride, was as healthy as any child in England. She felt more horrified than Leonora after her ride with William, and could not endure my approach after her mother came."*

The begum of Banda had sent for the child immediately on her arrival, and provided English clothes and other necessities for her use; making her a present of twenty rupees. She extended her kindness to Mrs. Mawe, who remained a fortnight at Banda, and to whom the begum gave, at their parting interview, a pair of earrings, on a little silver plate. Mrs. Mawe and her child went to Calcutta, and thence to England.

Thus ends the history of the escape from Nowgong, in the course of which many Europeans perished; but not one of them by the hands of the sepoys. The only blood shed by the Nowgong mutineers, was that of a Christian drummer named George Dick, an African.

Banda,—is a British district in Bundelcund, bounded by Futtehpore on the north, and Humeerpoore on the west. The nawab, who protected the Nowgong fugitives, was a merely nominal prince, residing at Banda (the chief place of the district), in a handsome and strong palace, with an income of £40,000 a-year, guaranteed to the family by the East India Company in 1812; and maintaining a force of between four and five hundred men, comprising infantry, cavalry, and artillery, dressed and equipped in imitation of the British troops. The cantonments of the latter were situated on the east bank of the river Cane, or Keyn, and were occupied in June, 1857, by about 250 of the 1st N.I.†

The information published regarding the outbreak here, is very defective. The notices scattered through the Blue Books, are few and conflicting; and the Banda officials do not appear to have, either in their public or private capacity, furnished evidence regarding the reason of their sudden evacuation

of the station. The summary of events dispatched to England by the Supreme government, states, that "the civilians and officers were forced to quit the station on the 14th, the two companies of the 1st N.I. having taken possession of the treasury. All had arrived at Nagode. By the latest accounts, the party of the 1st N.I. appear to be still in charge of the treasure."‡

On the 16th, the fugitives—civilians, officers, and ladies—reached Nagode in safety; and the nawab of Banda was written to by Major Ellis, the Nagode commissioner, and urged to exert himself to the utmost in recovering all plundered property belonging to either government or private persons.§ On the 22nd of June, Major Ellis writes to the secretary of government at Calcutta, declaring that he "cannot get any intelligence from Banda;" but that, according to bazaar reports, only two bungalows had been burnt there, and that the treasure was still all safe; "the two companies of the 1st regiment of N.I. standing sentry over it in the lines." On the strength of this "bazaar report," he urges that the nawab of Banda "should be warned that he will be held responsible for it [the treasure], as well as for his conduct in having ordered the Banda officers out of his house, though they do all speak well of him."||

It appears, however, that the nawab needed every encouragement that could be held out to induce him to continue in the loyal course he had hitherto held, considering that no European troops could be sent to his assistance, and that the feelings of the Banda population and of the Boondelas in general, were fiercely hostile to the British. The story of the sepoys guarding the treasure, seems doubtful: so also is the fate of the joint magistrate, Mr. Cockerell, who is declared, in one official document, to have been killed at a place called Kirlace;¶ and in another, to have come into Banda the morning after the other residents had left, and to have been murdered by the troopers

* Letter of Captain Scot.—*Times*, September 11th, 1857.

† Letter of Major Ellis, from Nagode. The Nagode commissioner, in separate despatches (June and September), asserts that it was two companies of the 50th, at Banda, who "mutinied, and plundered the treasure;" but this seems altogether a mistake.—Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), p. 11; and Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 272. The Parliamentary Return (House of Commons, February 9th, 1858), which gives the number and description of troops at each station at the time of the mutiny at

Meerut, does not specify the regiments to which they belonged.

‡ Further Parl. Papers on the Mutiny, 1857 (not numbered), p. 2.

§ Letter of Major Ellis, June 16th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, p. 10.

|| Further Parl. Papers relative to the Mutinies, 1857 (not numbered), p. 64.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 106. Kirlace is evidently a Blue-Book blunder: possibly the same town is intended as the "Kirwee" of the *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858; where Mr. Cockerell is said to have been stationed.

and armed followers of the nawab, Ali Bahadur, at the gateway of the palace, where the corpse, stripped of its clothing, was exposed in the most ignominious manner, and then dragged away by the sweepers, and thrown into a ditch on the nawab's parade-ground. Several Europeans in the nawab's service—namely, Captain St. George Benjamin and his wife; a Mr. Bruce, with his mother; and a Mr. Lloyd, with two or three of his children—are alleged to have been “killed on the nawab's parade-ground, by his followers and other rebels.”*

It is very strange that Captain Scot and his companions, who were taken to the nawab's palace on the 21st of June, and remained there several weeks, most kindly treated,† should not have heard, or having heard, should not have communicated to government the fate of Cockerell and the other Europeans. Thus much, however, is certain—that the nawab preserved the lives of the Nowgong fugitives, in opposition to the feelings of the Banda population, and to that of his own retainers, who had probably viewed with jealousy the English persons employed by him. The experiences of a member of an Oriental household, as given in the *Life of an Eastern King*, illustrate the jealous feelings with which the natives regard such interlopers; and in times of tumult, these foreign favourites would naturally be the first victims of popular vengeance. Yet Captain Scot, writing to government from Nagode on the 28th of July, and from Rewah on the 16th of August, mentions the request he had made to the nawab of Banda, to send parties to Mutoun in search of Sergeant Raite, Mrs. Tierney and her two children, and the writers Langdale and Johnson, with some native Christians, who had been protected by a friendly zemindar, and to bring them thence to Banda and advance them money.‡ This arrangement he would hardly have made, had he not considered the nawab both able and willing to protect the fugitives. Be this as it may, a long interval elapsed from the time Captain Scot and the other Europeans quitted the nawab, before any certain intelligence was heard from Banda; and the government

reports ceased to give any information under that head.

Futtehpoor,—a British district, named from its chief place, is divided from the Banda district by the Jumna, and is bounded on the east by Allahabad, and on the north-west by Cawnpoor. It was taken by the East India Company from the nawab of Oude, by the treaty of 1801. At the time of the outbreak, Futtehpoor was a large and thriving town, with a population of between 15,000 and 16,000 persons. A considerable proportion of these were Mussulmans, and the district furnished many cavalry recruits. The residents consisted of the judge, the magistrate, and collector; the assistant-magistrate, the opium agent, salt agent, the doctor, and three or four gentlemen connected with the railway. The deputy-magistrate was a Mohammedan, named Hikmut Oollah Khan; and there were the usual number of ill-paid native underlings. There was a flourishing mission here; the number of converts was on the increase in the villages; but, according to Gopinath Nundy (the fellow-captive of Ensign Cheek), “the townspeople, especially the Mohammedans, often raised objections as at other places.” Hikmut evinced a special animosity towards the mission, and instigated several attempts to retard its progress. One of these was the circulation of a report, that the Christians had resolved upon the destruction of caste throughout the town, by polluting the wells with cartloads of the pulverised bones of pigs and cows. Some of the officials told the magistrate of the report; but he laughed at them, and told them that the Christian religion did not allow of compulsory conversion, and that its teachers could not be guilty of such an act.§

This incident tends to account for the excitement manifested by the Futtehpoor population, and the excessive alarm evinced by the Europeans, on hearing of the Meerut catastrophe. The troops at the station were a detachment of fifty men of the 6th, under Native officers: the head-quarters of the regiment was, as will be remembered, at Allahabad; and considerable reliance was placed in its loyalty. It was a popular

* Report furnished by F. O. Mayne, deputy-collector of Banda.—*London Gazette*, May 6th, 1857; p. 2231.

† “Captain Scot and party were all well at Banda on 29th ultimo; he writes in terms of great praise of the nawab's kindness to them.”—Political as-

sistant of Nagode to government: “Nagode, July 8th, 1857.”—Further Parl. Papers, p. 111.

‡ Further Parl. Papers on the Mutiny, 1857 (No. 4), pp. 131; 156.

§ Narrative of Gopinath Nundy.—*Sherer's Indian Church*, p. 187.

outbreak that was dreaded; and for this reason, the European ladies and children were sent to Allahabad, and the native Christians were advised, as early as the 24th of May, to send their families to some safer place. Futtehpoor lies on the high road between Allahabad and Cawnpoor, and is only forty miles from the latter. The heavy firing heard in that direction on the 5th of June, confirmed the fears of the residents; and in expectation of an attack from a body of mutineers (2nd cavalry and 56th N.I.), said to be on their way to Cawnpoor, the Europeans assembled on the roof of the magistrate's house, as the most defensible position at their command. The rebels arrived, and made an attempt on the treasury; but being repulsed by the 6th N.I. detachment, went on to Cawnpoor. On Sunday, the 7th, news arrived of the mutiny at Allahabad, upon which the Futtehpoor detachment marched off to Cawnpoor in the most orderly manner. The Europeans, who were ten in number, hearing a rumour of the approach of a body of rebels and released convicts from Allahabad, resolved on quitting the station; and on the evening of the 9th of June, nine of them mounted their horses, and rode off, accompanied by four faithful sowars. The tenth remained behind. This was the judge, Robert Tucker, the brother of the Benares commissioner, and of "Charlie Tucker," of the irregular cavalry—the young soldier who, when bullets were falling round him at Sultanpoor, had held the wounded Fisher in his arms, cut out the fatal ball, and only complied with the entreaties of his men to ride off, when, after the lapse of half-an-hour, he saw his brave colonel past the reach of human sympathy or cruelty. Charlie lived to return to his young wife;* the Futtehpoor judge died at his post. After the other Europeans were gone, he rode fearlessly about the streets, endeavouring to stem the tide of insurrection, by promising rewards to such natives as should render good service and be true to the government. The circumstances of his death are only known from native report. One of his last remarks is said to have been, "I am going to put myself at the head of my brave legionaries;" meaning the police guard, on which he relied to keep off the

enemy. According to one account, he sent for Hikmut, who, accompanied by the police guard, and bearing the green flag (the emblem of Mohammedanism), entered the Cutcherry compound, and called upon the judge to abjure Christianity and become a Mussulman. This Mr. Tucker, of course, refused; and when they advanced towards him, he fired on them with such deadly precision, that fourteen or sixteen fell before he was overpowered and slain.†

Another account (an official one, but resting equally on native report) says, that the gaol was broken open, and the treasury plundered, at about 9 A.M. on the 10th, and an attack was made on Mr. Tucker in the afternoon, by a number of fanatical Mohammedans, headed by one Seyed Mohammed Hossein. Mr. Tucker took refuge on the roof of his Cutcherry, and was able for some time to keep off his assailants: they, however, eventually set fire to the building, and, under cover of the smoke, succeeded in mounting the roof and dispatching their victim.‡

The *Times*, in commenting on "the chivalrous sense of duty" which actuated Mr. Tucker, spoke of him as one of the most generous and high-minded of the Company's servants; adding, that "it had been his custom, for years, personally to administer to the wants of the poor natives—the sick, the blind, and the leper; and many of those who were fed by his bounty, will have cause to mourn him who has died the death of a hero, animated by the firm courage of a Christian."§

The other Europeans reached Banda in safety; whence, after much fatigue and many hair-breadth escapes, they proceeded to Kallinger, thence to Nagode, thence to Mirzapoor, and thence to Allahabad, which they reached in twenty-two days; having traversed a distance of upwards of three hundred miles.

Humeerpoor,—is the chief place of a British district of the same name, divided from Etawa, Cawnpoor, and Futtehpoor, by the river Jumna, and bounded on the east by Banda, on the south by the native states of Chirkaree and Chutterpoor, and on the west by the British districts of Jhansi and Jaloun. The town of Humeerpoor lies on the route from Banda to Cawnpoor; thirty-six miles from the former, and thirty-nine from the latter. The only troops at the station were a detachment of the 56th N.I., under Native officers. Mr. Loyd, the

* Mrs. Tucker's Letter.—*Times*, August 18th, 1857.

† Sherer's *Indian Church*, p. 183.

‡ Report of officiating magistrate of Futtehpoor (W. J. Probyn).—*London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858.

§ *Times*, August 18th, 1857.

magistrate, distrusted the fidelity of the sepoy of the treasure-guard; and "enter-tained a numerous additional police; carefully guarded the ghauts; impounded the boats on the Jumna; gave strict orders for the apprehension of fugitive rebel sepoy; and got assistance in men and guns from the neighbouring Bundelcund chiefs." After the outbreak at Cawnpoor and Jhansi, the position of affairs at Humeerpoor became very critical; but the magistrate continued to rely on the 330 Boondela auxiliaries, as affording the means of "overcoming the sepoy and all disaffected men."*

On the 14th of June, Lieutenant Raikes and Ensign Browne sought shelter here. They had been sent from Cawnpoor by General Wheeler, with two companies of the 56th N.I., to reinforce Oorai, a place about eighty miles distant. On the fourth day of their march, the troops hearing that their regiment had mutinied, did the same, and the officers rode off towards Calpee. Before reaching this place they had been robbed by villagers of their weapons and rings. At Humeerpoor they had little time to rest; for, within three hours of their arrival, the sepoy and the Boondelas fraternised; plundered the treasury, broke open the gaol, and were seen approaching the bungalow where the two officers, with Mr. Loyd and his assistant, Duncan Grant, had assembled. The four Europeans entered a boat moored under the house, and succeeded in crossing the Jumna in safety, though under a heavy fire of musketry and matchlocks. On reaching the opposite shore they fell in with some natives, who plundered them of 300 rupees: after this, they feared to approach the villages, and remained in the jungle, supporting life on a few chupatties they had with them. Ensign Browne, in a private letter to England, states, that for an entire day and night they failed in procuring a drop of water. He adds—"Towards evening, poor Raikes began to lose his senses; and, to cut the sad tale short, we had, when all hope was gone, to leave the poor fellow, and he must have died a pitiable death. After much exertion, we succeeded in getting to the river, and I cannot describe our

joy and thankfulness in getting water. Next day, I left Loyd and Grant, and swam down the river three or four miles; and from the time I parted with them, on the 15th of June, until I joined the English army at Futtehpore on the 13th of July, I wandered about from village to village in native clothes, and for several days without shoes and stockings.† I am thankful to say that I did not forget my God, but prayed fervently for you all and myself."‡

Messrs. Loyd and Grant are believed to have fallen into the hands of the sepoy, and been murdered by them. Several other Europeans who were unable to escape from Humeerpoor, perished there, including Mr. Murray, a landholder or zemindar; two clerks, Messrs. Crawford and Banter, with the wife of the latter; and a pensioner, named Anderson, with his wife and four children. The same feature which had distinguished the conduct of the mutineers at Delhi, was conspicuous here. They did not divide the government treasure among themselves, and depart each man to his home, or seek safety in obscurity; but they kept guard over the money, until, on the 20th of June, a troop of rebel cavalry and a company of infantry were sent by the Nana to assist in its removal. They considered themselves bound to abide by the general will of the army, as expressed by just any one who might be enabled by circumstances, whether of position or ability, to become its exponent. The cause to which they had devoted themselves was vague and intangible in the extreme; but their very devotion, together with the power of combination, which was a marked portion of the sepoy character, rendered them dangerous, even though generally without artillery, with few and second-rate gunners, separated from their European officers, and with no native leaders possessing the *prestige* which follows success.

Oorai,—is a small town in Jaloun, on the route from Calpee to Jhansi. *Jaloun* itself is one of our comparatively recent annexations. In 1806, a treaty was made with its Mahratta ruler, Nana Govind Rao, independently of the authority of the Peishwa, and territory was received by the British

* Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 203.

† A subahdar of the 2nd N.I. (Bombay) was mainly instrumental in saving Ensign Browne.

‡ Letter dated "Cawnpoor, July 24th."—*Times*, September 21st, 1857. This officer is evidently the same person as the one who was at first supposed to

have escaped from the Nana. (See Note to p. 261). Mowbray Thomson says, that Ensign Browne joined the volunteers on the arrival of Havelock; shared all the battles of the first advance to Lucknow, came back to Cawnpoor, and there died of cholera.—*Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 227.

government from Jaloun. In 1817, a new treaty was made with the Nana, acknowledging him the hereditary ruler of the lands then in his actual possession.* In 1832, adoption by the widow of the chief was sanctioned, "because it was agreeable to the people."† In 1838, the British government thought fit to take the management of affairs into their own hands. The army of the state was disbanded, and a "legion" formed, with two European officers as commanding officer and adjutant. It appears that the British authorities never seriously contemplated surrendering the sceptre to the heir whom they had acknowledged; but any difficulty on this score was removed by his death. "The infant chief did not live to the period when the propriety of committing the administration of the country to his charge could become a subject of discussion."‡ In 1840, Jaloun was declared to have "lapsed, as a matter of course, to the East India Company as paramount lord;"§ the feelings of the population at the extinction of their small remains of nationality being quite disregarded. As soon as the news of the revolt at Jhansi reached Jaloun, the example was followed; and the towns of Jaloun, Calpee, and Oorai, rose against the Europeans—not, however, imitating the ruthless extermination perpetrated at Jhansi, but quietly expelling the obnoxious rulers.

At the end of May, 1857, there were in Oorai two companies of the 53rd N.I., under Captain Alexander: these were to be relieved, in due course, by two companies of the 56th N.I., which left Cawnpoor for the purpose on the 2nd of June. The deputy-commissioner of Jaloun, Lieutenant G. Browne, had previously received a private letter from Cawnpoor, warning him that the loyalty of the 56th was considered doubtful, and that the men ought not to be trusted with the care of the treasury if it could possibly be avoided. He immediately addressed a remonstrance to General Wheeler regarding the dispatch of suspected troops to guard a large treasury; but, receiving no answer,

* *Treaties with Native Powers*, p. 405.

† Note by J. P. Grant.—*Vide* Parl. Papers on Jhansi, July 27th, 1855.

‡ Thornton's *Gazetteer*: article "Jaloun."

§ *Ibid.*

|| Lieutenant Browne, writing from Jaloun, September 21st, 1857, says—"Lieutenant Tomkinson's fate is unknown."—Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 154. Captain Thomson, writing in June, 1859, states, on the authority of a Gwalior artilleryman

he sent off every rupee he could spare, amounting to £52,000, to Gwalior on the 4th of June, under the escort of Lieutenant Tomkinson and a company of the 53rd N.I. The mission was faithfully performed, and the money delivered over to a guard sent from Gwalior to receive it. Lieutenant Tomkinson, hearing of the mutiny at Cawnpoor, wished to proceed to Gwalior with his men; but this the Gwalior authorities would not permit. He commenced retracing his steps; his company became mutinous, and demanded to be led to Cawnpoor. This he, of course, would not consent to; and the sepoys then told him he must not stay with them, as they could not answer for his life. Lieutenant Tomkinson rode off and left them. His fate was long uncertain; but his name does not appear in the list of casualties in the *Army List* or *Gazette*; and he probably, like many other fugitives supposed to be killed, was found, when tranquillity was partially restored, to be alive in concealment.||

On the 6th of June, news of a partial mutiny among the Jhansi troops reached Oorai, and Lieutenant Browne sent to ask assistance from Captain Cosserat, who was in command of two companies of the grenadier regiment belonging to the Gwalior contingent, stationed at Orya, in the Etawa district.

Captain Cosserat arrived next morning by means of forced marches. The men were suffering from heat and fatigue; it was therefore resolved that they should rest until the following evening, and then proceed to Jhansi, where the Europeans were supposed to be still holding out with a portion of the Native troops. On the 8th of June, a force arrived from the Sumpter rajah, to whom Lieutenant Browne states that he had written (in his own words), "to send me in all his guns, some infantry and cavalry, to go with me to the relief of Jhansi."¶

Sumpter,—is a small native state in Bundelcund, placed under British protection by a treaty made in 1817. It is 175 square miles

who had been taken prisoner, that Lieutenant Tomkinson, when his men mutinied, "put spurs to his horse and rode as far as Jaloun, where he was kept in safety by a Thakoor, from June to November." In the latter month he was seized and put to death by the mutinous Gwalior contingent.—*Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 119.

¶ Despatch from deputy-commissioner of Jaloun, September 21st, 1857.—Parl. Papers relative to the Mutinies, 1858 (No. 7), p. 154.

in extent, with a population of 28,000. The entire revenue, in 1837, was estimated at £45,000; and its ruler cannot, therefore, have been supposed to maintain a very large force; nevertheless he obeyed the commissioner's bidding, by at once placing a field gun, 150 infantry, and sixty or seventy horse, at his disposal. On the afternoon of the 8th, Captain Cosserat started for Jhansi, with his own and the Sumpter troops, leaving Lieutenant Browne to follow at night. It was not deemed safe either to take the 53rd men to Jhansi, or to leave them at Oorai; and Captain Alexander offered to lead them to Calpee, where the deputy-collector, Sheo Pershaud, was striving, with very inefficient means, to keep down insurrection. Captain Alexander had not left the Oorai gate before the 53rd threw off their allegiance, but did not offer to harm the Europeans or plunder the treasury. The official account* is not explicit; but it appears that the men escorted Captain Alexander and his wife to Calpee, and then marched off to join the mutineers at Cawnpoor, and assist in blockading the wretched mud wall, inside which the mother and sisters of Mrs. Alexander (Mrs. Browne and her daughters) were cooped up with their fellow-sufferers. Captain and Mrs. Alexander remained at Calpee until the 13th, and rejoined Captain Cosserat's party on the 15th. They had some difficulty in effecting their escape; for the fort guard, and the whole of the police at Calpee, mutinied on the 12th. Sheo Pershaud held his ground some days longer. Writing to Lieutenant Browne, he declares—"Under your instructions, I had kept my post till the danger pressed very hard. On the night of the 18th of June, when I heard that the jaghiredar and the mutinous troops would arrive early in the morning, I was obliged to leave Calpee, leaving all my property, which, I am sorry to say, has all been plundered; my tables, chairs, almyrahs (?), and all English furniture, were broken to pieces; my buggy and palkee gharry taken away; my valuable library, which you had seen, was destroyed; in fact, nothing was left beyond a suit of clothes, with which

I escaped. The chief, the sepoys, the towns-people, and my own police, plundered me, and did all the mischief they could; the rebels had offered a reward of 500 rupees for my apprehension, but the Great God saved me."†

The jaghiredar mentioned by Sheo Pershaud, is styled by Lieutenant Browne, the chief of Goorserai—a town between Humeroor and Jhansi. The news of the massacre at the latter place did not reach Oorai until after the departure of Captain Cosserat; and an express was immediately sent off to request that officer to return forthwith; but this he could not do, having in the interim received peremptory orders to proceed to Etawa. Lieutenant Browne resolved on quitting Oorai. He therefore wrote to the Goorserai chief (who held high testimonials from various civil and military officers), to come over to Oorai, and assist in keeping order there, and also in Calpee, Koonch, and other places in the Jaloun district and neighbourhood, till British reinforcements should arrive. Authority for this purpose was delegated in a paper dictated by Browne to a native official; but the clerk is said to have wilfully misrepresented the extent of power to be conveyed; and the deputy-commissioner, being ignorant of the language, signed a letter constituting the Goorserai chief ruler of the Jaloun district. On discovering the trick or error, Lieutenant Browne at once repudiated the sanction he had unwittingly given, but had no means of coercing the chief.‡ All the police and custom-house chuprassees had risen on hearing of the Jhansi massacre; and Lieutenants Browne and Lamb quitted Oorai on the 10th of June, intending to proceed to Gwalior. On the way they received news of the mutiny at that place, and turned their steps towards Etawa; but, before arriving there, tidings met them of the mutiny of the grenadiers, and the abandonment of the station by the Europeans. They therefore started off towards Agra, where they arrived in safety on the 20th, overtaking the Etawa fugitives, together with an equestrian company

* Mowbray Thomson says, the Native officers declared that they had assumed the entire command; but it was not their intention to injure their old friends. "They provided Alexander and his wife with a camel, and advised them to make their way to Agra, which they did."—*Story of Cawnpoor*. Captain Thomson, as an officer of the 53rd, would be interested in acquiring accurate information re-

garding the mutiny of the different companies, and the fate of their officers. His account of the Oorai outbreak resembles that of the deputy-commissioner's in its general features, but differs widely in particulars.

† Letter from Moonshee Sheo Pershaud, August 26th, 1857.—Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 161.

‡ Letter from deputy-commissioner Browne.—*Ibid.*, p. 165.

belonging to a Monsieur Jourdain, and other stragglers.

On the 14th, a body of mutineers from Jhansi came over to pillage Oorai, and murdered two Europeans who fell into their hands—Mr. Hemming, an assistant-surgeon; and Mr. Double, Lieutenant Browne's clerk. The former is said to have been trying to escape in native clothes, and was killed by a sepoy of the 12th N.I., while drinking at a well near the cutcherry. Messrs. Passano and Griffiths, deputy-collectors, fell into the hands of the rebels, but saved their lives by becoming Mohammedans; after which, they were allowed to

depart. A female relative of Passano's (either his mother or sister) was killed; but whether she nobly chose martyrdom rather than apostasy, or, like the majority of the victims, had no alternative offered, is not stated.*

Mrs. Hemming and her family appear to have escaped to Calpee, from which place they were sent on to Cawnpoor, after its recapture by the English, escorted by 500 of the Sumpter troops. The rajah was himself faithful to us; and his troops being a feudal militia, not a subsidiary force, were under his control, and proved perfectly trustworthy.

CHAPTER XV.

FUTTEGHUR AND FURRUCKABAD.—MAY AND JUNE, 1857.

FUTTEGHUR is a military station on the Ganges, in the Furruckabad district; three miles from the city from which the district takes its name. Mohammed Khan Bangash, a Patan noble, founded this city, which he named in honour of the reigning emperor, Feroksheer. *Ferok*, or *Faruck*, signifies happy; and *abad*, town. "The happy" was an epithet not in any sense applicable to the ill-fated patron of Mr. Hamilton and the E. I. Company;† but the town merited the appellation, being handsome, healthy, and cleanly; well supplied with provisions by reason of its position in the midst of a fertile and well-cultivated country, and possessing great commercial advantages from its situation within two or three miles of the Ganges, which is navigable thence upwards for 200 miles, and downwards to the sea. Its nawabs are accused of having thought more of war than trade; yet Furruckabad became the emporium, for this part of India, of all commodities from Delhi, Cashmere, Bengal, and Surat;‡ and as late as 1824, it had a mint, and the Furruckabad rupees circulated extensively through the North-West Provinces.

In 1802, according to Mr. Thornton, "the Company assumed actual possession of Furruckabad, liquidating the claims of the tributary Patan nawab by a fixed monthly stipend of 9,000 rupees; in addition to which, an annual sum of nearly 180,000 rupees was bestowed, in pensions and charitable allowances to his dependents." The fact was, that under the Wellesley administration, native princes were so liberally provided for, and so courteously treated, that neither they nor their dependents felt the sting of poverty, much less the deep humiliation which has been their lot since the new system of annexation came into fashion, with its curt official notifications, its confiscation of personal property, and its exposure to sale of "the dresses and wardrobes" of disinherited princesses, "like a bankrupt's stock in the haberdashers' shops of Calcutta—a thing likely to incense and horrify the people of India who witnessed it."§ Under the old system, the nawabs of Furruckabad (although Patan turbulence was proverbial) seem to have submitted quietly to their foreign rulers, and to have found consolation for the loss of

* Letters from commissioner of Saugor; deputy-commissioner of Jaloun; and Sheo Pershaud.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 7), pp. 150—156.

† See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 239.

‡ Tieffenthaler's *Beschreibung von Hindustan*, vol. i.

p. 139. Quoted in Thornton's *Gazetteer*: article, "Furruckabad."

§ Speech of Mr. Bright—House of Commons' debate on second reading of the India Bill, June 24th, 1858.

power in the enjoyment of titular rank and great wealth. Of their recent proceedings little is on record, the Supreme government having become profoundly indifferent to the character and condition of dependent princes, unless, as in the case of Oude, their shortcomings could be construed as affording a reason for the appropriation of their kingdoms. A native prince might be, if it pleased Providence to work a miracle in his behalf, a paragon of sense and discretion; or he might be, as there was every reason to expect, a besotted sensualist. In the latter case, it was usually deemed expedient to reduce him, with his family and dependents, to obscure poverty: in the former, virtue was left to be its own reward; for the ancient policy, of "India for the E. I. Company," like the modern graft of "India for the English oligarchy," was one which rendered natives of rank liable to many degrees of punishment, but debarred them from all hope of honours or rewards, civil or military. When the mutiny broke out, the position of the nawab of Furruckabad was, to the Europeans at Futtehghur, somewhat like that of Nana Sahib, of Bithoor, to the unfortunate people at Cawnpoor. It does not, however, seem that the nawab was viewed as a person likely to become of importance, either as a friend or an enemy. Of his proceedings prior to, and during the meeting at Futtehghur, we know very little: indeed, the only circumstantial account published by government regarding the events at that station, is given in the form of an anonymous and rather lengthy paper drawn up by one of the surviving Europeans. The writer, from internal evidence, must have been Mr. Jones, the younger of two brothers, engaged as planters and merchants. His interesting narrative, after being widely circulated by the London and Indian journals, was published in a Blue Book for 1857; and republished in another Blue Book for 1858, with a little variety in the form of type, and in the names of persons and places. The latter circumstance will not surprise any one accustomed to examine parliamentary papers; for, whereas editors and compilers in general, endeavour to attain, even on Indian subjects, some degree of uniformity and correctness; our public documents, instead of being an authority on these points, abound in glaring blunders. Were the Indian Blue Books to be indexed, the process, besides its direct advantages, would probably induce some improvement

in the arrangement of their contents. If important papers must needs be withheld or garbled, at least unimportant ones, and duplicates, might be weeded out, and the public spared the expense of needless repetition. The nation is greatly indebted to private individuals, for the frank fearlessness with which they have published the letters of their relatives and friends. Without this aid, the chronicles of the mutiny would have been wearisome and painful in the extreme; with it, they are deeply interesting and full of variety. Besides, these private letters bear a stamp of authority which cannot be conceded to anonymous compositions. They are not such; for though unsigned, there are few of any importance which cannot, with a little care and the aid of the *East India Directory*, be traced to their true source. Perhaps some apology is due for the manner in which the names, both of the writers and the persons alluded to, have been sought for and applied, instead of being left in blank, as in the newspapers. But this identification seems to the author indispensable to a correct appreciation of the evidence thus afforded. It is not enough that he should understand the position of the witness: it appears to him needful that the reader should possess a similar advantage, and be able to make due allowance for the bias of the commander of European or of Native troops; the covenanted or uncovenanted civilian; the planter or the railway *employé*; and for that of the wives and daughters of these various persons; for, in many instances, a lady's pen, as at Meerut, has given the first and best account of an eventful epoch.

To return to Futtehghur. The troops stationed there consisted of—

The 10th N.I.—*Europeans*, 16; *Natives*, 1,169. Detail of Native Artillery—no *Europeans*; *Natives*, 28.

There were, therefore, sixteen European officers to 1,197 Natives.

The news of the Meerut mutiny arrived on the 16th of May; and from that time alarm and excitement prevailed. The wife of Lieutenant Monckton, of the Bengal engineers, wrote to England, on that day, a letter intended to prepare her friends for the worst, and which could hardly fail to reconcile them to the mysterious dispensation of Providence, in ordaining the perfection, through suffering, of one already so exemplary. Anticipating

calmly (like Mrs. Ewart of Cawnpoor) the speedy and violent death which awaited her, her husband and child, Mrs. Monckton writes—

"We cannot say, 'Pray for us.' Ere you get this, we shall be delivered one way or another. Should we be cut to pieces, you have, my precious parents, the knowledge that we go to Jesus, and can picture us happier and holier than in this distant land; therefore, why should you grieve for us? You know not what may befall us here; but there you know all is joy and peace, and we shall not be lost, but be gone before you; and should our lives be spared, I trust we may live more as the children of the Most High, and think less about hedging ourselves in with the comforts which may vanish in a moment. * * * Good-bye, my own dear parents, sisters, and friends. The Lord reigns! He sitteth above the water-flood. We are in the hollow of His hand, and nothing can harm us. The body may become a prey, but the souls that He has redeemed never can."

A few days later, she describes the terror excited by the report of the breaking open of another gaol besides that of Meerut, and the enlargement of many murderers.

"We went to church; very few people were there, and fear seemed written on every face—it was most noticeable; everybody felt that death was staring them in the face, and every countenance was pale. Mr. Fisher [the Company's chaplain] preached on the text, 'What time I am afraid, I will trust in thee.' * * * We are quite prepared for the worst; and feel that to depart and be with Christ, is far better. The flesh a little revolts from cold-blooded assassination; but God can make it bear up."

On the 1st of June, she wrote home some last words, which well deserve a place in the history of a great national epoch, as illustrating the spirit of grateful, loving trust in which our Christian countrywomen awaited death, even though the inventions and gross exaggerations current at the time, must have led them to anticipate that their passage through "the dark valley" would be attended by every possible aggravation which could render it terrible to feminine purity, as well as to the tenderest feelings of a wife and a mother.

"I often wish our dear Mary was now in England; but God can take care of her too, or He will save her from troubles to come by removing her to

* *Edwards' Rebellion in Rohilcund, Futteghur, and Oude*, p. 67.

† *Sherer's Indian Rebellion*, p. 138.

‡ The American Board of Missions had a very important station at Futteghur. The self-supporting Orphan Asylum, established at the time of the famine in 1837, had a tent and carpet factory, and also a weaving department, in which cloth was

Himself. * * * I am so thankful I came out to India, to be a comfort to my beloved John, and a companion to one who has so given his heart to the Lord."

On the 3rd of June, information was received that the Native troops at Shahjehanpore and Bareilly had mutinied, and that a body of the Oude mutineers, consisting of an infantry and cavalry corps, were marching to Futteghur. Mr. Probyn, the collector, states, that Colonel Smith and the officers had disregarded his advice to provision the fort, and garrison it with pensioners, and others to be depended on.* Ishuree Dass, a native preacher, connected with the American Mission, likewise remarks, that it was believed; that "had the majority of the old Native officers, who retired on pension only a few weeks before, been there; half the regiment at least would have gone into the fort with the Europeans. The recruits were the ones who were constantly on the point of breaking out, and were only kept down by the elder sepoys. So sure was the commanding officer of the fidelity of these men, that only two or three days before the regiment mutinied, he told us there was no occasion for fear, and that we might make our minds at ease."† This is quite contrary to the testimony of Mr. Jones, who asserts, that "the 10th were known to be mutinously disposed; for they had given out, that as soon as another corps arrived, they would rise and murder all the Europeans, only sparing their own officers." Mrs. Freeman, the wife of one of the four missionaries stationed by the zealous and munificent American Presbyterians at Futteghur,‡ writes home, that "no one placed the least confidence in the 10th; for the men had told Colonel Smith that they would not fight against their 'bhai logue' (brethren) if they came, but they would not turn against their own officers." This lady adds—"Some of our catechists were once Mussulmans; and whenever they have gone to the city for the last two or three weeks, they have been treated with taunting and insolence. The native Christians think, that should they, the insurgents, come here, and our regiment join them,

woven in European looms. A church had been erected in 1856, at the cost of £1,000. The Mission high-school had 250 pupils; there were also two orphan schools (for boys and girls), and seven bazaar schools, in connection with the Mission. Ten village schools, supported by Dhuleep Sing, were likewise under the management of the missionaries.

our little church and ourselves will be the first attacked; but we are in God's hand, and we know that He reigns. * * * He may suffer our bodies to be slain; and if He does, we know He has wise reasons for it. I sometimes think our deaths would do more good than we would do in all our lives; if so, His will be done."*

On the night of the 4th of June, the whole of the European population, excepting the officers of the 10th, with the women and children (in all, 166 persons), resolved on leaving Futteghur. By land they were surrounded by mutinous stations; but the Ganges was still open, and they hoped to escape to Cawnpoor. They started in boats at 1 A.M., and were unmolested during that day and the following night. The next morning they were joined by four officers of the 10th, who reported that the regiment had mutinied, seized the treasure, abused the colonel, and fired on one or two of their officers; and that there was little chance of any of those who had remained behind having escaped.†

This intelligence was untrue. The fact was, that an attempt had been made by the convicts to break out of the gaol: some of them had succeeded, had fired a portion of the station, and advanced towards the cantonment. The four officers, hearing the tumult, and trusting to report for the cause, fled by the river. Had they remained, they would have seen their own men turning out willingly, and beating back the newly escaped criminals, killing several, and securing the others.‡ Soon after being joined by the officers, the fugitives were fired on by some villagers, and one of the party was slightly wounded. The next day they were told that a body of Oude mutineers was crossing one of the ghauts, a few miles below. The man at the ferry denied this. A consultation was held as to

what should be done; and, as the party was very large, it was agreed that it would be safer to separate. Hurdeo Buksh, an old Rajpoot zemindar of influence and remarkable intelligence, had previously offered to receive and protect Mr. Probyn (the collector), and any of his friends, in his fort of Dhurumpoor, about ten miles from Futteghur. Mr. Probyn, with his wife and children; two out of the four officers; Mr. Thornhill, the judge; Mr. Fisher, Mr. Jones and his brother, and other Europeans, with their wives and families, to the number of forty, resolved on seeking shelter with Hurdeo Buksh; the remaining 126 persons went on downwards towards Cawnpoor, where they arrived on the 12th of June. Their fate will be told on resuming the narrative of events at that station.

Mr. Probyn and his companions proceeded towards Dhurumpoor; but learning, on the way, that the 10th N.I., far from having mutinied, had quelled a riot, the collector and the two officers rode to Futteghur, leaving the rest of the party to finish the journey to Dhurumpoor.

On the morning of the 9th of June, the Budaon§ fugitives, Mr. Edwards, and the Messrs. Donald, reached Furruckabad. There they were told all was as yet quiet, the regiment still standing; but that the station had been deserted by the civilians, with the exception of Probyn, who was still at his post. Thither Edwards and his companions proceeded, and found the collector, who told them that he himself placed no dependence on the 10th; but that Colonel Smith was very sanguine regarding the fidelity of the regiment; and Major Vibart|| (of the 2nd light cavalry), who had commanded the party employed in quelling the gaol outbreak, was of the same opinion. Edwards and his companions were most desirous of

* Sherer's *Indian Rebellion*, p. 126.

† Statement of Mr. Jones.—Further Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1858 (No. 7), p. 138.

‡ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*; by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 155. This writer speaks of three officers having fled from Futteghur, deceived by a false report. Jones says there were four; but the names of the officers are not given by either authority.

§ See p. 216.

|| There would appear to have been two officers of the name of Vibart in the 2nd Cavalry. The *East India Register*, and the *London Gazette* (p. 2216), state that Captain and Brevet-major Edward Vibart was killed at Cawnpoor on the 27th of June; but, at another page (2235), the

Gazette gives Captain Vibart, 2nd Cavalry, as murdered at Cawnpoor on the 15th of July. Mowbray Thomson asserts, that Major Vibart was the last officer in the Cawnpoor intrenchment; and that some of the 2nd Cavalry mutineers "insisted on carrying out the property which belonged to him. They loaded a bullock-cart with boxes, and escorted the major's wife and family down to the boats with the most profuse demonstrations of respect."—*Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 165. Mr. Edwards speaks of Major Vibart, of the 2nd Cavalry, as having called upon him at Futteghur on the 9th of June; adding, that this officer, "when on his way to join his own regiment at Cawnpoor, had volunteered to remain with Colonel Smith, who gladly availed himself of the offer." Jones names Capt. Vibart as one of the Futteghur garrison.

proceeding down to Cawnpoor by boat; but the news of the mutiny at that station, reached them just in time to save them from flinging themselves into the power of Nana Sahib and Azim Oollah. On the 10th of June they crossed the Ganges with Mr. Probyn, and joined the refugees at Dhurumpoor. All these persons, including the judge, were extremely dissatisfied with their position. The crowded fort was scarcely tolerable during the intense heat; and the defences were so dilapidated, as to render it hopeless to expect to hold them against any organised attack of the mutineers. The conduct of the 10th N.I., in the matter of the gaol outbreak, determined the Europeans on returning in a body to Futteghur, notwithstanding the remonstrances of Mr. Probyn, who, with his wife and four children, resolved upon remaining under the protection of Hurdeo Buksh—a decision which the party leaving considered one of extreme foolhardiness. Edwards hesitated, but eventually resolved on remaining at Dhurumpoor.

For some days after the return of the Europeans to Futteghur, all went well. The 10th N.I. gave a fresh instance of fidelity by handing to Colonel Smith a letter written by the subahdar of the 41st N.I., announcing the march of that mutinous corps from Seetapoor, to a position a few miles on the opposite side of the river, and requesting the 10th N.I. to rise, murder their officers, and seize the treasure. The answer asserted to have been given was, that the 10th had resolved on being true to their salt, and would certainly oppose the mutineers if they persisted in advancing. The 10th cheerfully obeyed their officers in breaking up the bridge of boats, and sinking all other boats at the different ghauts, to prevent the mutineers from crossing to Futteghur.* They succeeded, nevertheless, in effecting a passage at dawn of day on the 18th of June, and entered the city walls unopposed. A company of the 10th, and the artillerymen with the two guns, stationed on the parade guarding the treasure, are said to have marched to the nawab, placed him on the "gadi" (cushion of sovereignty), laid the colours at his feet, and fired a royal salute of twenty-one guns.† Their next proceedings are not known. It is uncertain

what reply the nawab made them; but apparently not a satisfactory one; for the sepoys returned to the parade-ground, saluted their colours, shared the treasure among themselves, divided into two parties, and left Futteghur, after breaking open the gaol, and releasing the prisoners. All this time the Europeans remained unmolested in the fort, where they always slept from the first period of alarm. The few sepoys on guard there, remained obedient to orders until the seizure of the treasure, and then departed quietly, one or two returning at intervals to fetch their lotahs and other articles left behind in the fort. A European officer quitted Futteghur with the mutineers, trusting to them for safe-conduct to some distant station: at least this seems the meaning of the statement made by Mr. Jones, and published by government without explanation or comment. After mentioning the breaking-up of the regiment, he adds, that "the Poorbeahs crossed over at once to Oude, with intention to make for their homes, accompanied by Captain Bignell. We afterwards learnt that this body had been plundered by the villagers, and Captain Bignell killed: others went off by twos and threes to their homes; and those who remained were killed by the 41st, because they were not allowed a share in the public money. Thus this regiment was completely disorganised and destroyed."‡

The Europeans knew not how to act: some suggested entering the boats; but the river was very low; and it was decided to hold the fort, and prepare for attack. They numbered, in all, upwards of a hundred; but of these only thirty-three were able-bodied men. A 6-pounder, loaded with grape, was mounted over the gateway; and, in the course of the next few days, they succeeded in bringing six more guns into position. The godowns were searched for ammunition for the guns and muskets, and a few (muster) round shot and shells were found, together with six boxes of ball cartridge, and an equal quantity of blank. The latter was broken up and used for the guns; while nuts, screws, hammer-heads, and such like, were collected, to serve as grape and round. The ladies, women and children, were placed in the house of Major Robertson (the head of the gun-carriage agency), inside the walls, where they were comparatively safe. On the 28th of June, the 41st N.I. opened two guns on the fort; and, taking up a position behind trees, bushes, and any cover

* Account by Mr. Jones.—Parl. Papers (No. 7), p. 138.

† *Ibid.*, p. 139.

‡ *Ibid.*

available, commenced a heavy fire of musketry.

For four days the enemy's guns and muskets played on in this manner, doing little direct injury to the defences or persons of the besieged, but exhausting their strength and ammunition. Colonel Smith, who was an unerring marksman, killed numbers of the mutineers, with a pea rifle, from his post on the wall, which he never left. Major Vibart was described as being the real commandant of the fort, going about, amid the thickest of the fire, directing and encouraging all.* On the fifth day the assailants changed their mode of attack: a company of riflemen posted themselves on the tops of the houses in an adjacent village; and others found shelter in a small outhouse, about seventy or eighty yards from the fort. They loop-holed the walls, and kept up a harassing fire from them, which rendered the garrison guns useless, as the men dared not lift their heads to fire. Mr. Jones (the elder) was shot while covering Conductor Ahern (the best gunner in the garrison) with his rifle. Colonel Thomas Tudor Tucker (8th light cavalry, then employed in the clothing agency) was killed on the same spot a day later; and Ahern himself was shot through the head while laying a gun.† Mr. Thornhill had been incapacitated for military action from the beginning of the siege, having been severely wounded in the hand and arm by the discharge of his musket, in the act of loading it. While the garrison had been weakened by casualties and fatigue, the rebel ranks had been strengthened by an influx of Patans from Mhow and elsewhere. Among these was Mooltan Khan, the preserver of Mr. Edwards in his flight from Budaon.‡ The assailants succeeded in springing a mine, and considerably injuring one of the bastions. Two attempts were made to enter by the breach. The second storming party was led by Mooltan Khan. He was shot dead on the top of the breach, by Mr. Fisher; and his followers fell back. The enemy commenced another mine, and brought a gun to bear upon the bungalow containing the women and children.

The besieged felt further defence to be hopeless. The river had risen considerably

by the rains, and they had three boats in readiness. Therefore, about 2 A.M., July 4th, they evacuated the fort, having first spiked the guns and destroyed their remaining ammunition. No sooner had they passed the walls than the sepoys caught sight of them, and shouting that the Feringhees were running away, followed them for about a mile along the banks, firing at random and without effect. The fugitives had not proceeded far before they found one of the boats too large and heavy for their management. It was therefore abandoned, and the passengers distributed between the other two. The delay thus occasioned enabled the sepoys to come up with them; but they escaped again, and proceeded as far as a place called Singhee Rampore. Here they were fired on by the villagers: one boat, with Colonel Smith on board, passed on safely; but the other grounded on a sand-bank, and could not be moved. About half-an-hour was spent in fruitless efforts: at the expiration of that time, two boats, apparently empty, were seen coming down the stream. They proved to be filled with sepoys, who opened a heavy fire on the Europeans. Mr. Churcher, senior, was shot through the chest; Major Robertson, Mr. Fisher, and Mr. Jones were wounded. The sepoys came alongside, and strove to board the stranded boat; some of them succeeded. "Major Robertson, seeing no hope, begged the ladies to come into the water, rather than to fall into their hands." Mr. Jones swam on after the other boat, giving a parting look to his late companions. Lieutenant Fitzgerald sat still in the boat—a loaded musket, with the bayonet fixed, in his hand; his wife and child by his side. Mr. Churcher, senior, lay near them weltering in his blood. The others had all got into the water. Major and Mrs. Robertson, with their child and Miss Thompson, were standing close to each other beside the boat; Lieutenant Simpson and Mr. Churcher, junior, at a little distance; Mr. Fisher, who had been shot through the thigh, held his son (a beautiful boy of eight or nine years old) in one arm, and with the other was striving to support his wife, who could not stand against the current, her dress acting like a sail and

* Edwards' *Personal Adventures*, p. 81.

† A native messenger, dispatched by Mr. Edwards to Futtehghur, who succeeded in communicating with Mr. Thornhill, said that Mrs. Ahern had

avenged her husband's death, by killing many of the mutineers with a rifle from the bastion where she stood, until she was herself shot down.—Edwards' *Personal Adventures*, p. 81.

‡ See p. 216.

throwing her down. Major Phillot, Ensign Eckford, and a few others, Mr. Jones did not see, but supposes them to have been killed. After about an hour's swimming he reached the other boat, which had also been fired on, and Colonel Goldie's youngest daughter, a Mr. Rohan, and a native boatman, had been killed, and several others wounded. The voyage was continued that night, without further molestation. Early the next morning a European voice was heard from the shore, hailing the boat. It was Mr. Fisher, who was lifted on board, delirious with mental and bodily suffering; raving about his wife and child, who had been drowned in his arms. In the evening the party reached a village in the territories of Hurdeo Buksh—opposite Koosoomkhore, in Oude. The inhabitants came out, with offers of assistance and protection. After some hesitation, from fear of treachery, the hungry and weary passengers came on shore, and fed thankfully on the chupatties and buffaloes' milk brought them by the herdsmen. A poor Brahmin took Jones with him to his home, and gave him food and a charpoy, or native bed, to rest on. In the course of two or three hours, a message came from Colonel Smith, saying the boat was about to start. The wounded man was, however, unequal to any further exertion, and he persisted in staying with the friendly thakoor native. The Europeans were unwilling to leave their countryman behind, and sent again and again to beg him to join them. At last they started, and nothing more was heard of the boat for several days, till the manjee, or head man, who took her down, returned, and gave out that Nana Sahib had fired upon them at Cawnpore, and all on board had perished.

The herdsmen, in their dread of the probable consequence of harbouring a European, hid the fugitive so closely, that Hurdeo Buksh was himself many days in ignorance of the fact that Jones was in his territory; but as soon as he became acquainted with it, he took care to provide him with food and clothing. In the meantime the poor young man had suffered terribly from his wound, which threatened to mortify. In his extremity, he thought of the parable of Lazarus. A little puppy came frequently to the shed when he was at his meals, to pick up any crumbs that might fall: he induced it to lick the wound night and morning; the inflammation diminished im-

mediately, and the hurt was nearly healed before the fugitive ventured forth to join his countrymen.* He thought himself the sole survivor from the boats; but this was not the case; Major Robertson, after having had his wife washed out of his arms, swam away with his boy on his shoulder. The child appears to have perished, but the father found refuge in a village, about four miles from that in which Jones lay hidden. Mr. Churcher, junior, had likewise escaped, and was concealed in an "aheer," or herdsmen's village, at a considerable distance from the places in which his countrymen were. Mrs. Jones (the widow of the gentleman killed during the siege) and her daughter, Mrs. Fitzgerald, and a single lady, whose name is not given, had been taken from the boat, and given over to the nawab, who held them in captivity. None of the Europeans sheltered by friendly natives, were permitted to see, or communicate with, each other, except the Probyn family and Mr. Edwards, who refused to separate, even though urged to do so, as a means of increasing their small chance of escape. The record of their adventures affords much insight into the condition of Oude and the feeling of the people. The loyalty of Hurdeo Buksh was greatly strengthened by his personal attachment to Probyn, who, he said, had invariably treated him as a gentleman. Of Mr. Christian (of Seetapore), he also spoke in terms of respect; but the ill-paid, needy, grasping "omlahs," who were introduced in such shoals in Oude immediately after the annexation, had proved the curse of the country, and, in his plain-spoken phrase, had made the British rule "to stink in the nostrils of the people." The person of the chief accorded well with the manly independence of his character. Mr. Russell has since described him as a very tall, well-built man, about thirty years of age; standing upwards of six feet high, with square broad shoulders; regular features, very resolute in their expression; and dignified and graceful manners.

A body of the 10th N.I., 250 in number, actually crossed the Ganges during the time their comrades were besieging the Futtehghur fort; and it was said that a large number of mutineers would follow, to attack Dhurumpoor, put the Europeans to death, and seize some lacs of government treasure, which, according to a false, but

* Edwards' *Personal Adventures*, p. 138.

very generally believed report, had been placed there for safety. The defensive preparation made by Hurdeo Buksh, initiated his guests into some of the secrets of Rajpoot diplomacy. While sitting in an inner room, anxious to avoid notice (their unpopularity being at its height, as they were viewed as the cause of the expected attack), they heard a knocking and digging at one of the outer walls in their immediate vicinity, which continued for many hours. The noise suddenly ceased; and when suffered to leave their chamber in the evening, they were surprised to see that a fine 18-pounder gun had been dug from the place where it had lain concealed since the proclamation issued in the preceding year by the Lucknow authorities, requiring the talookdars of Oude to surrender all their ordnance. A 24-pounder was simultaneously produced from a field; and the wheels and other portions of the carriages were fished up from wells. Four other guns, of different sizes, were brought in from the chief villages in the neighbourhood; and all six were mounted and in position in the courtyard, ready for service, by nightfall. It was said that more could be produced if need were. Messengers were dispatched in all haste, in different directions, to summon the chief's adherents; and in an incredibly short space of time, nearly 1,000 people, all armed with some weapon or another, had assembled at the fort, for its defence. Hurdeo Buksh now told the Europeans that they must leave him and proceed to a small village across the Ramgunga, three miles off, where some connections of his own would receive and conceal them. Then, if the mutineers really came, they might be shown the interior of the fort, in proof that there were no Europeans there. Edwards, in reply, went up to him, and seizing his right hand, said they would go, if he would pledge his honour as a Rajpoot for their safety. He did so heartily; saying, "My blood shall be shed before a hair of your heads is touched. After I am gone, of course my power is at an end; I can help you no longer." In well-founded reliance on this assurance, the party started. A few weeks before, no European official went on a journey without a numerous body-guard of attendant natives to precede and follow him. Now, fortunate indeed were those whose gentleness in prosperity had attached to them so much as one tried follower in adversity. Towards midnight, the fugitives quitted Dhurum-

poor, Probyn carrying three guns and ammunition, his wife one child, his servant another, Edwards the baby, and the faithful Wuzer Sing the fourth child, and a gun. They reached the village of Kussowrah, and were very civilly received by "the Thakoors," who were uncles of Hurdeo Buksh, but of inferior rank, as their mother had never been married to their father.

The Thakoors had been great sufferers from the revenue arrangements consequent on annexation. One of them, named Kussuree, declared, that "he had paid a thousand rupees in petitions alone, not one of which ever reached Christian [the commissioner]; notwithstanding which, he had lost the villages farmed by him and his ancestors for many generations, and had been assessed so highly for those he had left, that he had only been able to pay his rent the preceding year by the sale of some of his family jewels, and a mare he highly valued; and this year, he said, he would no doubt have been a defaulter, and been sold up, had not the rebellion fortunately occurred."*

The hiding-place of the Europeans was a cattle-pen. The first intelligence they received was cheering. The sepoys who had threatened Dhurumpoor, had turned off, when within a short distance of that place, towards Lucknow. They had with them three lacs of treasure, which they had contrived to remove from Futtehghur without the knowledge of their comrades, who were deceived by their story that they were only going to Dhurumpoor, and would return the next day. Hurdeo's adherents desired to attack and plunder this party; but he wisely forbade them, because, as he subsequently told the Europeans, he "feared that if once his people got the taste of plunder, he would never after be able to restrain them." The sepoys accordingly passed through his estate without molestation; but as soon as they crossed his border, they were attacked by the villagers of the next talooka, plundered, and destroyed. Edwards, who makes this statement, throws further light on the fate of Captain Bignell, by remarking, that "they were accompanied by an officer of the 10th N.I., whom they had promised to convey safely into Lucknow; and, on being attacked by the villagers, they desired this officer to leave them, as they said it was on his account they were attacked. This he was forced to

* Edwards' *Personal Adventures*, p. 167.

do; and, after wandering about for some time, as we afterwards learned, he received a sun-stroke while crossing a stream, and was carried in a dying state into a village, where he shortly after expired." The wretchedness of the fugitives at Kussowrah was increased by intense anxiety regarding Futtehghur. While sitting, one afternoon, listening to the firing, a note was brought them from the judge (R. Thornhill), written in haste and depression, describing the worn-out state of the garrison, and imploring Probyn to induce Hurdeo Buksh to go to their aid. The messenger who brought the note had eluded the besiegers by dropping from the wall of the fort into the Ganges, and swimming across. The retainers of the rajah, although willing to peril their lives in defence of the refugees under the protection of their chief, or in repelling any attack on Dhurumpoor, were determined not to cross the Ganges, or provoke a contest with the mutineers; and the messenger returned to Futtehghur with this sad reply. At the same time, Probyn advised Thornhill to endeavour to get the assistance of a body of men in Furruckabad, called "Sadhs"—a fighting class of religionists, who were supposed to be very hostile to the sepoys. After the evacuation of Futtehghur, the two subahdars in command of the 41st, appear to have made a mere puppet of the nawab of Furruckabad, and to have compelled him to issue what orders they pleased. A message was sent, in the name of the nawab, to Hurdeo Buksh, informing him that the English rule was at an end, and demanding from him an advance of a lac of rupees, as his contribution towards the expenses of the new raj, or, in lieu of it, the heads of the two collectors, Probyn and Edwards. Several days elapsed, during which the fugitives were kept in constant alarm, by rumours of detachments being on the march to Kussowrah, for their apprehension. At length Hurdeo came to them by night; and, though quite resolved on opposing to the death any attempt which might be made to seize them, he said he had been obliged to treat with the nawab, in the hope of gaining time; as, so soon as the rains should fall, the Ramgunga and Ganges would rise in flood, and the whole country be inundated, so that "Dhurumpoor and Kussowrah would become islands surrounded with water for miles; he might then defy the sepoys, as it would be impos-

sible for them to bring guns against him, and they would not dare to move without artillery." In the meantime his own position was extremely critical, and fully justified his anxiety about his family; for the mutineers threatened, if he did not immediately surrender the Europeans, to take very complete revenge both on himself and his people. Speedy succour could not be expected; the most important stations looked for it in vain. The hearts of the fugitives sank within them, as, pent up in the cow-house, they heard from Hurdeo Buksh, "that Nana Sahib had assumed command of the mutineers at Cawnpoor, where the English had been so completely destroyed, that not a dog remained in the cantonment; that Agra was besieged; that the troops at Delhi had been beaten back, and were in a state of siege on the top of a hill near there; that the troops in Oude had also mutinied, and Lucknow was closely invested."

It was highly probable that the rebels, and especially some of the escaped convicts, to whom Probyn and Edwards had been obnoxious in their capacity of magistrates, would immediately come and search Kussowrah. Near the village there was a tract of jungle, many miles in extent, in the midst of which was a hamlet of some four or five houses, inhabited by a few herdsmen,* and called by the fitting name of *Runjpoora*, the place of affliction. This village, during the rainy season, became a complete island of about a hundred yards square. The only pasturage, on sufficiently high land to escape being submerged, was about three miles distant, and both cattle and aheers proceeded to-and-fro by swimming—a mode of progression which habit appeared to have made as natural to them as walking on dry land to ordinary herds and herdsmen. To Runjpoora the party proceeded, after some discussion regarding the advisability of separating, as a means of escaping observation. The Thakoors offered to take charge of the children, promising to do their utmost for them; and urged that, by parting, the lives of all might be saved; but that if, unhappily, "the children did perish, their loss might be repaired—their parents might have a second family; but they could never get second lives, if they

* Edwards mentions a singular fact with regard to this little community. On Sundays, the aheers would on no account part with the milk of their cattle, but always used it themselves.—(p. 116.)

once lost those they had." This argument failed to induce the mother to leave her children; and Probyn would not part from her. Edwards endeavoured to persuade his follower, Wuzeer Sing, to provide for his own safety; but he persisted in his fidelity; and Edwards himself would not desert the Probyns, especially his "poor little friend the baby," who sank, day by day, for want of proper nourishment, until one night its protector missing the accustomed sound of the heavy breathing, started up, and found it dead by the side of its mother, who had fallen into the deep sleep of exhaustion; believing that her efforts had procured the infant an interval of relief. Edwards and Wuzeer Sing went out, and with difficulty found a dry spot under some trees, in which to dig a grave; and there the bereaved parents came and laid the little body, feeling, even in the first freshness of their grief, "grateful that their infant's death had been natural, and not by the hands of assassins." Another of their children, a beautiful and healthy girl, drooped rapidly under the privations endured at Runjpoora, and died in consequence, after the fugitives, at the end of a fortnight, quitted that place, and returned to Kussowrah. During their stay at Runjpoora, Edwards induced a native, named Rohna, to take a letter from him to his wife at Nynee Tal. By means of a little bit of loose lead, left in the stump of a pencil, he contrived to write a few words on a piece of paper about an inch square, which he steeped in milk, and left to dry in the sun. A crow pounced on it, and carried it off. Edwards was in despair, for he had no more paper, and no means of getting any; but the watchful Wuzeer Sing had followed the bird, and after a chase of about an hour, saw the note drop, and picked it up uninjured. The messenger carried it safely, reached Nynee Tal on the 27th of July, and brought back an answer. The lady and the child, Rohna said, were both well; but when he reached the house, the "Mem Sahib" was dressed in black. On receiving the letter, she went away and put on a white dress. During the interval of Rohna's absence, the fugitives passed through many phases of hope and fear. One day they distinctly heard a military band playing English airs in Futtehghur; the wind carrying the sound across the water, and reminding them of the near proximity of foes who were thirsting for

their blood. Another morning (Edwards thought the 23rd of July, but had by that time become confused in his reckoning), they were startled by the firing of heavy guns in Furruckabad. The sound continued at irregular intervals for about an hour, when it entirely ceased. The Europeans listened with joy, for they had heard from a poor Brahmin (who had shown great compassion for their sufferings, depriving his own family of milk, to give it to Probyn's children), that the victorious advance of the British troops, and the terrible vengeance taken by them, had excited the greatest alarm at Furruckabad; they therefore believed that the firing was that of their countrymen, and that deliverance was at hand. Seeta Ram, the Brahmin, went for them to the city, and returned with the sad tidings that the sounds they had listened to so cheerfully, "had been caused by the blowing away from guns, and the shooting down with grape, under the orders of the nawab, of the poor ladies already mentioned as having been saved from the boat, and brought back to Futtehghur; and of many native Christians." The number was at first stated at sixty-five or seventy persons; but afterwards at twenty-two. The Nana's soldiers, infuriated by their defeat, had been the chief instigators of this atrocity, Mrs. Jones's little daughter, of about nine years old, had, Seeta Ram said, remained untouched after several discharges of grape, and a sepoy rushed up and cut her in pieces with his sword.

On the 2nd of August, the Europeans, while concealed in the cattle-pen at Kussowrah—which they looked upon as a palace compared with Runjpoora—saw a tall, emaciated looking figure approach them, dripping with water, and naked, except a piece of cloth wrapped round his waist. This was Mr. Jones, who, in consequence of the improved prospects of the British, had been at length permitted by his protectors to join his countrymen. He was very weak, and burst into tears at hearing the sound of his own language. The danger was, however, far from being past. The first shock of the mutiny was, indeed, over by this time; but the insurrection in Oude was only commencing. On the 22nd of August, Hurdeo Buksh, who usually visited the fugitives in the dead of night, came to tell them that he had received a copy of a proclamation, issued by the subahdars in command of the mutineers at Delhi and

Lucknow, to all the chief landowners in Oude. In this document, they expressed their surprise and sorrow that, although the army had risen in defence of their religion and for the common good, the landowners had not co-operated with the soldiers, or given them the aid they counted on when they rose. In consequence of this backwardness, the army now found themselves unable to contend successfully against the British. The subahdars, therefore, thought it right to warn all the chief men of influence and rank in Oude, that it was the intention of the British, as soon as they had destroyed the army, to collect all the high-caste men and sweepers in the province at one enormous feast, and make them all eat together. The subahdars, consequently, deemed it their duty to give the chiefs fair warning of the intentions of the British government, and to entreat them, for the sake of their common faith, to aid the army with their forces, and to rise and exterminate the infidels, and avoid so fearful a catastrophe as the loss of their caste.

Hurdeo Buksh remarked to Edwards—"You and I know that this is all nonsense and folly, but the proclamation is a highly dangerous and inflammable document; for its contents are implicitly believed by the common people, who are, consequently, much exasperated against the English." His own people were, he added, particularly excited by orders issued by the nawab and subahdar in Futteghur, to prevent their crossing the Ganges, or getting any supplies from Furruckabad, of salt, sugar, or other necessities usually procured from thence. Besides this, the inundation was daily diminishing; and when the waters subsided, the power of the Rao to protect the fugitives would be at an end. They had sent repeated letters by Seeta Ram to General Havelock (who was an old friend of Edwards'), without obtaining any reply: at length they received one, advising them to stay where they were, and watch events, as the rebels infested all the roads, and rendered travelling highly dangerous—almost impossible. The fugitives believed the hazard of remaining where they were, greater than that of attempting to join the British camp, since Hurdeo Buksh could with difficulty restrain his subjects. He had already offered to send the Europeans by land, "Teehun teehun;" that is, from friend's house to friend's

house—all pledged to secrecy. One of the chiefs who had promised safe-conduct through his territory, was Jussah Sing, one of the most notorious insurrectionary leaders. Hurdeo Buksh admitted that Nana Sahib had taken refuge with him; but said that there need be no fear of treachery; for a Rajpoot was never known to break his word to a fellow-chief. The refugees, however, preferred the Ganges route, and started on Sunday, August 30th, under an escort of eleven matchlockmen, with eight rowers—the party being commanded by the brother-in-law of Hurdeo Buksh, Thakoor Pirthee Pal Sing; the chief known in the subsequent Oude campaign, as "Pretty Poll Sing." Hurdeo Buksh himself, with the Thakoors and other leading men of the village, came down to the boat, which was ostensibly intended to convey the female relatives of Pirthee Pal, on a visit to a different branch of the family at Tirrowah Pulleah, a lonely place on the Oude side of the Ganges, belonging to a talookdar named Dhunna Sing. After remaining two hours waiting for Major Robertson and Mr. Churcher, who at length resolved on remaining in their hiding-places—Edwards, Probyn, his wife, and the two surviving children, started on their perilous enterprise. Hurdeo Buksh had taken every possible precaution, at considerable risk to himself. All the boats at the ferries, both on the Ganges and Ramgunga, within the limits of his domain, had been seized the night before, for the sake of cutting off communication with Furruckabad; and, to secure the fidelity of the boatmen, he had taken their families into custody, with the intention of retaining them until the Europeans should have safely reached their destination. There were 150 miles of river-way to be accomplished. For the first twenty down the Ramgunga the risk was small, the influence of Hurdeo Buksh predominating thus far. For the last thirty, until the river joins the Ganges, the danger was great. Messengers, however, were waiting at stated places along the bank, to give information to the voyagers. At one point they were nearly wrecked, coming on a rapid, with an abrupt fall of almost four feet. The stream, notwithstanding the swiftness of its current, was so shallow, that the boat stuck in the middle, and, for ten minutes, remained as it were on an inclined plane, the water roaring and surging

round; while the fugitives, closely packed in the small covered space allotted to them, dared not make any effort for fear of discovery.

At length this difficulty was surmounted, and, at sunset, they floated out into the Ganges, there about a mile broad. The majestic river was still in flood, and carried the boat swiftly along to a ferry near a large village, where the stream narrowed considerably.

For a long series of years before the mutiny, fleets had been passing up and down the Ganges without intermission; but not a single boat (except those at the ferries) had been seen by the villagers since the arrival of the ill-fated crew from Futtehghur. The sight of the present vessel, with the armed men on the roof and deck, attracted the attention of the people collected with the intention of crossing the river; and the guards, as they approached, got their cartridge-boxes and powder-horns ready for action.

In reply to a challenge from shore, Pirthee Pal stated that he was taking his family down to Tirrowah Pulleah, and could not stop. A voice cried, "You have Feringhees concealed in that boat; come ashore at once." "Feringhees on board!" said the Thakoor; "I wish we had, and we should soon dispose of them and get their plunder." "Stop, and come ashore," was repeated; but, by this, the boat had floated past, and at nightfall anchored safely at a desolate place, from which the stronghold of Dhunna Sing lay about a mile and a-half distant inland. After an anxious interval of two or three hours, Dhunna Sing (in accordance with the arrangement made with his sworn friend Hurdeo Buksh) came on board with a few followers. The hearts of the weary fugitives rose at his appearance. They knew him to be possessed of considerable influence on both sides of the river as far as Cawnpoor; and when they saw the white-headed old chief, and noticed his wiry and athletic frame, his frank and self-possessed manner, they felt him to be "the right sort of man" for the work in hand. His men, in answer to repeated challenges from either bank, replied that the boat belonged to Dhunna Sing, who was taking his family to bathe at a celebrated ghaut near Cawnpoor. When this explanation failed to satisfy the inquirers, and a peremptory summons was given to stop and pull ashore, the chief himself came forward, and

the very sound of his powerful and peculiarly harsh voice stopped further questioning. The Mehndee ghaut, the principal ferry between Oude and the Futtehghur side of the river, was a great place of resort for the rebels. As the fugitives approached the dreaded spot, the moon became overclouded, the rowers shipped their oars, and the boat glided rapidly past unnoticed in the timely darkness. Again and again they grounded: once they remained an hour on a sand-bank, at a crisis when moments were precious, it being most important to pass certain dangerous localities before morning. This they failed to accomplish; and at broad daylight they found themselves approaching a place where a body of the enemy were said to be posted, and which they had calculated on passing during the night. To their great relief, they found the place deserted. After proceeding some miles further, the current carried them close on shore, and brought them in contact with a considerable body of people, some bathing, some sitting on the bank. Dhunna Sing was immediately recognised; and the natives earnestly warned him not to proceed much further down the river, as he would in that case inevitably fall into the hands of the "gora logue," who were in force at Bithoor, and would kill all in the boat. The chief, whose tact had been previously evinced in escaping the solicitations of his personal friends to come on shore or receive them into his boat, affected great alarm at the intelligence. Probyn and Edwards caught up the children, placed their hands over their mouths, to prevent the utterance of a word which might yet be fatal, and listened in breathless anxiety while Dhunna Sing, coolly giving a side-glance at them as they lay crouched inside the covering, inquired of the natives where the British were posted; and, on being told, remarked that he could avoid that point by crossing to the Oude side of the stream; and called to the rowers to give way. The order was instantly obeyed; the boat shot rapidly on till it reached Bithoor, which the fugitives believed to be occupied by the British troops. They were happily undeceived in time. A native hailed them from the bank, and, in reply to the questions of Dhunna Sing, stated that he was a sepoy in the service of the son and successor of Jussah Sing, who had died about a fortnight previously of wounds received in action. When Bithoor was occupied by

the Feringhees, the Nana had fled in all haste. That place being now evacuated by its captors, he had sent a party (including the speaker) to search for the property he had left behind, and bring it to him at Futtehpoor Chowrassee, where he was in hiding, a few miles off. Several hundred armed men were seen congregated in and around the buildings; yet the sole boat which had appeared for nearly two months on the river, did not seem to attract the attention of the rebels; at least, they made no effort to question the passengers. The three Europeans were accustomed to look to a special providence for succour during their prolonged trial; and they considered this instance of preservation as "truly

miraculous." About three hours later (that is, at 2 P.M., 31st August) they stepped on shore at the Cawnpoor ghaut, where a picket of H.M. 84th was stationed. With eager joy the soldiers welcomed Probyn and Edwards—insisted on carrying the children, and tenderly waited on their almost exhausted countrywoman, leading her to the tent of the magistrate (Sherer), past the slaughter-house where every other Englishwoman who had escaped from Futtehghur and reached Cawnpoor alive, had perished horribly.

In following this remarkable series of adventures during three months spent in the jungles of Oude, the course of the narrative has been anticipated.

CHAPTER XVI.

GWALIOR AND INDORE.—MAY, JUNE, AND JULY, 1857.

THE origin and progress of the Maharatta States of Gwalior and Indore have been already related; their history being closely interwoven with that of British India. In past times, Sindia and Holcar were honoured as brave foes; but the present representatives of these warriors have earned for themselves the nobler distinction of stanch friends, bold and true in the darkest hour of peril and temptation.

Before the outbreak, Sindia had given indications of inheriting something of the warlike spirit of his ancestors;* and all the Europeans conversant with the affairs of the principality, spoke of the prime minister, Dinkur Rao, as a man of rare ability and integrity. To him we certainly, in great measure, owe the prompt and unwavering fealty displayed by the Gwalior durbar. On the first evil tidings from Meerut, the maharajah hastened to place his body-guard at the service of Lieutenant-governor Colvin. The Gwalior contingent was, of course, entirely under British control; for the reader will remember, that this force was in reality part and parcel of the Bengal army. The young rajah had not the slightest control

over the troops enlisted in his name, and paid out of his coffers. The men had not even the usual ties of mercenary troops; but, while they received the money of one master, they obeyed the orders of another. They had been employed by Lord Ellenborough to coerce the native government in 1843—a proceeding not calculated to increase their respect for either of the parties at variance, or to elevate their own principles of action. Sindia had never placed the slightest reliance on their loyalty; but had plainly told the British resident at his court (Major Macpherson), that these troops would follow the example of their brethren at Meerut and Delhi. Aware of the danger, the maharajah exerted himself strenuously to avert it. The name he bore would have been a rallying-cry for the Hindoos, far more exciting than that of the Nana of Bithoor; and the mutineers waited anxiously for some turn of affairs which might enlist Sindia and Holcar on the side of revolt. It was the bond of nationality, of creed and caste, which, at the commencement of the mutiny, gave them influence with the Bengal army. This lasted until it became evident

* "On one occasion, when his then newly raised artillery hesitated to fire upon a body of the old levies who had refused to disband, Sindia jumped

off his horse, seized a lighted portfire from the hand of a gunner, and himself discharged the first gun." —Bombay correspondent: *Times*, August 1st, 1857.

that, for good or for evil, the chiefs had cast in their lot with the British government: then the troops set them at defiance, and fraternised with the great mass of their fellows. But the stanchness of the young Mahratta princes, and the energy, tact, and vigilance of their native advisers, kept back many thousand men from joining the revolt during the first epoch of panic and massacre, when their co-operation might have involved the loss of the North-Western Provinces, and of the mass of Europeans stationed there. Sindia's contingent numbered about 10,000—artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The men were of great stature, and admirably disciplined; the cavalry were well mounted, the artillery thoroughly trained. In fact, the Native contingents (and especially that of Gwalior) were the most inflammable of the numerous combustibles which the Supreme government had laid ready for ignition, within easy communication of each other, throughout India. Gwalior and Indore had not yet been annexed: their reigning princes were both adopted heirs—the ancient law having been suffered to remain in force, though somewhat under protest; and these, with a few other surviving states, acted as boundaries to revolt and insurrection. But the current was too strong to be turned backwards by such obstacles: for the time, at least, it had strength to surmount what it could not destroy, and both Sindia and Holcar shared the perils which they had vainly striven to avert.

Detached portions of the contingent had mutinied at Hattrass, Neemuch, and Nusseerabad, at the end of May and beginning of June;* but the main body, at Gwalior, continued apparently firm up to a later period. Several of the English officers expressed strong confidence in their men. The native government understood them better; and felt that, unless Delhi were speedily recaptured, the spread of the mutiny was only a question of time. Dinkur Rao appreciated aright the feeling of the contingent, and likewise that of the small force maintained by the state on its own account. Both, he knew, sympathised with the sepoys, and differed from each other only in the superior attachment of the latter to the person of their sovereign. The troops on whom the maharajah could alone rely,

were the Mahrattas and the Gwalior Hindoos. The complicated circumstances of his position were well set forth by the *Friend of India*, an authority which has never been accused of favouring native courts, or making undue allowance for their difficulties. The chief danger which menaced Sindia, arose, according to this journal, from the current of public opinion, which became almost irresistible under the excitement of the period, and which "pointed distinctly to the downfall of the British empire, and the necessity of adopting measures in time for the aggrandisement of Gwalior." The position of affairs was understood by very few of even the European residents; and "the first view in India, we believe, and certainly the view in England, was, that Sindia had only to declare for or against us," and "either hunt down or aid the mutineers."† As it was, he took so decided and uncompromising a position on the British side, that his life was in jeopardy, and he was actually driven from his capital by troops in his own pay; but, before this happened, he had succeeded in gaining a long interval of quiet, and had saved Agra by protracting the inevitable struggle until the Supreme government were fully forewarned and forearmed. The *Friend of India* admits, that the native court displayed "striking ability" and "really keen sense," "acting on a definite policy, and not on the vague, half childish impulses we are sometimes apt to ascribe to all ruling Asiatics;" adding, that the proceedings of the Mahratta durbar augur well for "the success of that policy of confidence which must be the key to any successful policy of the future." British functionaries, competent judges both from position and ability, have expressed themselves in yet stronger language regarding the important service rendered by the maharajah and his minister. Of the latter, Colonel Grove Somerset, who served in the Gwalior contingent for several years, speaks most highly; declaring, "I look upon Dinkur Rao as a gentleman, an honest and faithful man, and my friend."‡ It is remarkable how generally the most experienced servants, both of the Crown and of the E. I. Company, have concurred in bearing testimony to the ability and integrity which they had witnessed in native

* See pages 193 and 195.

† *Overland Friend of India*, November 22nd, 1858.

‡ Letter dated November 15th, 1858; written by

Colonel Grove Somerset, to whom the author gratefully acknowledges himself indebted for much valuable information regarding Gwalior.

courts. General Lowe, the "anti-annexation" member of the Supreme Council, holds the same language in the present epoch, when, in Mr. Disraeli's words, the rule is "to destroy nationality;"* as, of old, General Wellesley held, under the wiser and more honourable system of respecting it. The latter authority was little given to enthusiasm in feeling, or warmth of expression; yet his despatches afford declarations of esteem and friendship for Purneah, the dewan of Mysoor, such as few European ministers elicited from his iron pen; and in describing to Sir John Malcolm the character of the wiliest of the continental diplomatists with whom his wonderful career had brought him in connection, he compared the famous Frenchman to their old Mahratta acquaintance, Sindia's ambassador at the famous conferences which preceded the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, in 1803; remarking, that Talleyrand was "like Eitel Punt—only not so clever."

The present maharajah, the representative and heir, by adoption, of the Sindia of half a century ago, is more fortunate than his predecessor; for Dinkur Rao appears to unite the tact of Eitel Punt with the judgment and integrity of Purneah.

The officer in command at Gwalior, in May, 1857, was Brigadier Ramsay. On the 30th of that month, he reported to government the circumstances which had occurred during the four previous days. On the 26th instant, the men of the contingent had insulted Dinkur Rao on his entry into cantonments, and had given him so much reason to apprehend personal violence at their hands, that he returned to the Lushkur (the part of the town in which Sindia resided) on horseback, instead of the carriage in which he had come, and by a bye-road, to avoid observation. The reason of this strong feeling against the dewan was, the searching inquiries instituted by him to discover the originators or propagators of a report current in Gwalior, as in most other stations at that period, of the arrival at the bazaar of a large quantity of opium, which was being sold at a very low price, with the view of destroying the caste of the purchasers by means of the

bone-dust secretly mixed with the flour. The exposure of the false and malicious character of this rumour, had rendered Dinkur Rao extremely unpopular. On the morning of the 27th, the maharajah urged that all the ladies in the station should be sent to the Residency for protection, as he had reason to believe that the contingent was altogether wrong and mutinous, and that the men had sworn on the Ganges-water and the Koran to stand by each other. In the event of the outbreak which he considered imminent, he advised the officers at once to mount their horses and ride off. The political agent, Major Macpherson, entirely concurred with Sindia, and moved that evening from cantonments into the Residency, taking the ladies with him; from thence they were sent on, at the earnest request of Sindia, into the palace, for greater security. The party consisted of thirteen ladies, four sergeants' wives (almost all with one or two children), the political agent, and the chaplain, Mr. Coopland. A telegraphic message was immediately dispatched by Major Macpherson, informing Lieutenant-governor Colvin of what had occurred, and requesting the immediate return of the maharajah's body-guard, to assist in escorting the ladies to Agra. A copy of this message was sent by the political agent to the brigadier, whereupon the latter neutralised its effect by dispatching another; in which he states—"I took on myself to report to Mr. Colvin, that we [the European officers] had slept in the lines the previous night, that all was quiet, and confidence increasing; and that I considered Sindia was disposed to enhance his own services at the expense of the contingent."†

The immediate effect of the brigadier's message was a telegram from Agra, desiring that the ladies should not be sent thither till the mutiny really broke out at Gwalior. The result was, that when the crisis came, the unmarried officers rode off and escaped; the married ones stayed to protect their wives, and were massacred.‡ In the evening of the 28th, Mrs. Meade and Mrs. Murray, "in opposition to the most urgent solicitations of Major Macpherson, returned to cantonments;"§ and the other ladies followed their example on the 30th, at the brigadier's express desire. There were about £6,000 in the treasury; and the brigadier, instead of sending this sum to the Residency or

* India debate.—*Times*, July 28th, 1857.

† Brigadier Ramsay's despatch, dated "Gwalior, May 30th, 1857."—Further Parl. Papers on the Mutinies, 1858 (No. 6), p. 162.

‡ Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 107.

§ Brigadier Ramsay's despatch.—P. Papers, p. 163.

the palace for security, and thus removing one incitement to revolt, contented himself by increasing the guard of the 4th regiment over it, with a view, he says, to lead the men to think that he feared danger from without, and not from within. Although thus thwarted, the native government and the political agent continued to exert themselves strenuously to keep down mutiny, bearing quietly the odium unjustly raised against them, and hoping for nothing more than that their anticipations of evil might prove unfounded. The news of the mutiny of the detachments, in concert with the other troops at various stations, increased the difficulty of retaining the main body in allegiance; the bearing of the native population expressed ill-will; and even the servants became insolent in their demeanour. This last circumstance, however, rests on the testimony of Mrs. Coopland, the wife of the chaplain of the station; a witness whose strong prejudice against the natives, evinced in her observations on them before the mutiny, tends to invalidate the credit due to her otherwise keen perceptions. The maharajah, the lady admits, "in some way prevented the women from being killed at Gwalior"—a service which, if it did not inspire gratitude, might have prevented the publication of an uncourteous comment upon his "limp, cold hand, just like all natives;"* and apostrophes in connection with the name of the man who had saved the writer's life, re-

* Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 83.

† Mrs. Coopland speaks of Calcutta as "the capital of a country called the Queen's penal settlement for paupers" (p. 14); and of India as "Scotland's grave-yard." Then she relates the efforts of herself and her husband at scolding their attendants in Hindustani; and how, not being sufficiently fluent in that language, they had recourse to English, which, they "had been told, natives disliked more, as they did not know what it meant." Lest any of her readers should find themselves at a similar disadvantage, Mrs. Coopland adds, that "the most opprobrious epithets in Hindustani, are 'khala sour,' 'hurrumzadu,' and 'mourgeu' (black pig, infidel, and fowl)." (p. 19). To Sindia she took a strong dislike, on first arriving at his capital, for the following reason:—"Unfortunately, the rajah was a Hindoo, therefore the cow being sacred in his eyes, we were not allowed any beef except it was brought occasionally from Agra. * * * I wish the rajah had known what a grudge I owed him for this troublesome prejudice." (p. 48). Mr. Coopland's letters to England suggest sanguinary and impracticable measures for the suppression of the mutiny. They afford evidence of the conflicting opinions of the Europeans at Gwalior, and the manner in which, while one party endeavoured to conciliate the sepoys, another, including the Agra press,

guarding the impossibility of finding out the motives of a "doubly-dyed traitorous Mah-ratta." The unreasoning antipathy to all natives, entertained by both Mr. and Mrs. Coopland,† rendered their position infinitely worse than that of the Europeans in general, either at Gwalior or elsewhere; for while these latter trusted implicitly (and were justified by events in so trusting), that their own household would, if they could not serve, certainly not injure them; the Cooplands believed every Indian their sworn foe, and anticipated treachery even from their ayah and punkah coolies. The chaplain, Mrs. Coopland writes, "seldom undressed at night; and I had a dress always ready to escape in. My husband's rifle was kept loaded (I learnt to load and fire it), as we were determined not to die without a struggle."‡

According to this authority, rifle-shooting was, even before the mutiny, a favourite accomplishment among a portion of the European ladies in India. Scarce as tigers are becoming in the more populous parts of the country, Mrs. Coopland "knew some ladies who had shot them;" and she makes disdainful mention of women who "faint at the sight of blood, and are terrified at a harmless cow." There may be some exaggeration in this; but if the ladies at Gwalior were really preparing to defend themselves, as early as the middle of May, with loaded pistols,§ the measure was sure to be reported, by the native servants, to adopted a tone calculated to alarm and infuriate them. Writing from Gwalior, May 16th, Mr. Coopland declares the Meerut and Delhi outbreak to be a divine "punishment upon all the weak tampering with idolatry, and flattering vile superstition [not killing beef in a Hindoo state, for instance]. Of course we are alarmed here. There are only about twenty English officers, with their wives and children, in the station, and about 5,000 Native troops; so that we are entirely at their mercy. * * * Instead of remaining to have our throats cut, we ought to have gone to Agra long ago, or towards Bombay; all the European regiments should have been drawn together; and every Native regiment that showed the least sign of disaffection, at once destroyed, or at least driven away: for, as a leading article in the Agra paper of this morning observes, what Native regiment can now be trusted? I would leave for Bombay at once, but it would be death to be exposed even for an hour to the sun." Sooner, therefore, than encounter the heat of the journey, the chaplain remained at Gwalior to meet the death he anticipated at the hands of those whom he had prejudged as "the brutal, treacherous, Native soldiers."—(p. 85.)

† *Ibid.*, p. 111

§ Captain Campbell, we are told, before starting with the reinforcement to Agra, "gave his wife a brace of loaded pistols."—*Ibid.*, p. 88.

the troops, and was not calculated to increase the chance of escape for the women in the event of a mutiny.

Lullutpoor.—The mutiny in the contingent, which immediately preceded that at Gwalior, occurred at Lullutpoor, a military post, where the head-quarters and right wing of the 6th infantry were stationed, the left wing being at the fort of Aseerghur. On the morning of the 12th of June, forty-five troopers arrived from Nowgong. They belonged to the 12th irregular cavalry, the regiment which had been conspicuous at Jhansi for its ferocity. The detachment had been sent for, for the reinforcement of Lullutpoor, by order of Captain Skene, immediately before the outbreak at Jhansi; but the news of the massacre at that place, and the conduct of the 12th, had reached Lullutpoor, where, however, all remained quiet until the very moment of revolt. Dr. O'Brien, the regimental surgeon, remarks, regarding the mutiny of the 6th, on the night of the 12th of June—

"It was rather a sudden affair, and unexpected by me. Captain Sale, who commanded, and I and the sepoys, parted good friends. They told us they were the servants of the king [of Delhi], and that we might go: we saluted each other, and parted. The native sergeant-major, Ungud Sookool, was a man of vast influence in the regiment—in fact, he commanded it; and, had he been loyal, the regiment would not have mutinied. On the march of the right wing from Lullutpoor, the Boondelas thought they would catch them crossing the bridge, pour a volley into them, and get hold of the treasure; but Ungud Sookool was too wide awake: he threw out skirmishers on each side of the bridge, and swept the nullah. The mutineers had to fight their way from Lullutpoor to the Betwa river, which they did in good style, inflicting severe loss on the Boondelas. The wing was not more than 300 strong, as a portion of the men were on leave; the Boondelas were in thousands. After they crossed the Betwa they were in the Jhansi territory, and the firing ceased. On their march from Jhansi towards Oorai and Calpee, they fell in with a lot of Christian prisoners, whom they liberated and caused to be escorted to some place of safety. So that, on the whole, they behaved well to the Christians. Had one Native officer remained firm, three-fourths of the corps would have remained with him."^{*}

Dr. O'Brien states, that but for the presence of the cavalry detachment, he should have remained at Lullutpoor until the morning; as it was, he prevailed on Captain Sale to join him in seeking the protection of the rajah of Baupore, a neigh-

bouring chief whom he had known for years. The two Europeans, accompanied by several faithful sepoys, proceeded to Mussoorah (a small fort, four miles from Lullutpoor), and there found the rajah, who, at their request, sent off a party of horsemen to bring away from the station Deputy-commissioner Gordon, Lieutenant Gordon (6th infantry), his wife and children; the quartermaster-sergeant and his wife, and a Salt patrol. The rescue was quietly effected, and the fugitives were kindly received at Baupore. Yet it was subsequently discovered that the rajah had been tampering with the men for some time before they mutinied. He was deceived in the amount of money in the treasury, believing that it contained three lacs, instead of only 20,000 rupees. Buksh Bullie, the rajah of Shahghur, like the rajah of Baupore and many other chiefs, protected fugitives, but still joined in the revolt. Of the former, Dr. O'Brien, who was first sheltered and afterwards imprisoned by him, says, "I know the rajah of Shahghur was a long time wavering:" he was "a weak, vacillating man, easily led astray;" but, "had he or the rajah of Baupore had such a man as Dinkur Rao to advise them, they would not have rebelled; neither would they have done so, had Sleeman been at Saugor."[†]

At Aseerghur, great fears were entertained that the left wing of the 6th would follow the example set at Lullutpoor, and, seizing on the fortress entrusted to their charge, give dangerous assistance to the rebel cause, by the *prestige* attached to the possession of the famous old fortress. Happily, the inhabitants of Aseerghur, and of the neighbouring country, were well affected towards the British government; and the commandant, Colonel le Mesurier, considered, that by embodying for temporary service 100 to 150 active men, the safety of the fortress might be secured until reinforcements of Bombay troops should arrive. At the same time, he exerted every effort to prevent the men from hearing of the various mutinies taking place among the scattered portions of the contingent. The sepoys remained obedient and orderly throughout June; but early in July, the determined attitude assumed by the mutinous contingent, seriously alarmed the colonel, who felt that his men could not be expected to fight against, and would probably fraternise with, their own kindred.

^{*} Letter from Dr. O'Brien, 28th October, 1858. Communicated by Colonel Grove Somerset.

[†] *Ibid.*

He therefore induced the entire left wing to evacuate the fort, on the plea of being encamped in readiness to join the field force then daily expected at Aseerghur. The men murmured, but obeyed; and at sunrise on the 6th of July, the regiment paraded and marched out in a quiet and orderly manner; immediately after which, a party of eighty-five men, who had been quietly got together a day or two previously, and warned to be in readiness, were marched into the fortress; and in another hour, the regimental guards were relieved, and joined their comrades at the encamping-ground.

To return to Gwalior, where the British continued to manifest an implicit confidence in the contingent, which Sindia declared to be "incomprehensible." The time, he said, for reasoning with, or professing confidence in, the sepoys was past, and any attempt to do either would be ascribed to false motives. Again and again he reiterated a formal warning, that the contingent troops had ceased entirely to be servants to the British government. The treasure from Oorai* was brought in by a party of the 2nd (contingent) infantry on the 12th of June; and Major Macpherson sent it at once to the treasury of the maharajah, as the sole chance for its preservation.

On the 13th, a wing of the 2nd infantry was ordered to proceed to the Persa and Seekurwaree districts, near the Chumbul. The commanding officer (Major Blake) was compelled to report that the men had refused to march; but he hoped they would yet obey. The 14th fell on a Sunday; and several of the Europeans, who were never to see another sunrise, left their homes early, to witness the funeral of an officer's child, the little son of Captain Murray. Major Blake and his lady, Major Sherriff, and Captain Hawkins, were among those who, after the funeral, attended church and partook of the Lord's Supper.

It must have been a solemn and deeply affecting service to all who took part in it; but to none more so than to Captain Hawkins, an excellent and very popular officer of twenty-five years' standing, then in command of the artillery of the Gwalior

contingent. He was one of those who had upheld the trustworthiness of the contingent, or at least of his own men, in opposition to the maharajah, the resident, and Dinkur Rao; but he had other causes of anxiety. His wife had joined him from Seepree (the nearest station), in the middle of the preceding week, with her four children: a fifth had been born an hour after her arrival; and from the effects of hurry and excitement, the life of the mother was almost despaired of on that Sunday morning. Mrs. Blake, in a painfully interesting account of what she witnessed,† remarks—"The sepoys were, as usual, most respectful as we passed, both in going and returning to the burial-ground." In the afternoon, an unoccupied bungalow, in the very centre of the cantonments (the property of a native), was discovered to be on fire. A few minutes later flames burst forth from the mess-house, which was about eighty or ninety yards from the former building; and both were soon totally destroyed. The mess bath-house also caught fire, and was burned; and Captain Stewart's bungalow was only saved by the exertions of the sepoys. These fires caused alarm and mistrust among some of the ladies and officers; but others, again, so entirely rejected the idea of danger or treachery, that fears were allayed, and no plans made for the escape of either women or officers in case of an outbreak.‡ In the evening, shortly before nine o'clock, a report was brought up from the lines, that the Native artillery had turned out and loaded their guns. Captains Hawkins and Stewart hastened to the lines, and found their men preparing for action. When asked the meaning of their conduct, they replied they had been told they were about to be attacked, and had heard "that the Europeans were upon them." It was no time for discussion; and the officers were glad to do what they could to quiet the men, and induce them to disperse; after which, Captains Hawkins and Stewart proceeded to the brigadier's to report the circumstance.§ While sitting with him, some sepoys rushed in, exclaiming that the troops were in actual revolt. The alarm was sounded; and the officers, leaving the brigadier, returned to their lines. Most of the

* See *ante*, p. 318.

† Mrs. Blake's *Escape from Gwalior*. Printed for private circulation.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ "Notes of events at Gwalior, from the 11th of

May;" published in the *Mofussilite* newspaper, August 19th. These notes are evidently extracted from a journal kept by one of the Gwalior community; but the name and position of the writer are carefully withheld.

Europeans had retired to rest, and were awakened by their servants. Bugles were heard sounding an alarm; voices cried, "To arms! to arms! the Feringhees are come." Major Blake rose immediately, dressed, took a hasty leave of his wife, and galloped to the lines. On arriving at the quarter-guard of his regiment, he was shot through the chest, and fell with his charger. Lieutenant Pierson, the adjutant of the 2nd infantry, was the next officer on the ground. He had been roused by the intelligence that the whole of the troops had mutinied, and were lining the main roads of the cantonments, with the intention of shooting down all the Europeans who should approach them. It must have been a hard trial to leave a young wife alone to meet death or worse, and to go, as it were, in search of danger in another quarter; and the young officer rode gloomily away, to join the mutinous body he had till now proudly called his regiment. "I knew what I had to expect," he writes; "and yet it was my duty to go and do my best; so I went away from my home, which I never saw again." He had not proceeded far on the road before he met Dr. Mackellar and Lieutenant Ryves, who had just escaped from Jhansi; and the three Europeans "were regularly hustled down to parade by crowds of sepoy." Four volleys of musketry were fired at them; and a ball, during the last one, shot Pierson's horse through the heart. The animal fell; the rider extricated himself with difficulty, expecting a bayonet in his back every moment. Wrenching his leg from beneath the dead horse, and leaving his boot behind, he went on parade, and there saw Major Blake lying mortally wounded. He knelt beside the dying man, unfastened his coat, placed his head on his shoulder, and tried to make him speak. Mackellar and Ryves stood by; and though the Europeans were surrounded by hundreds of mutineers during their attendance on the major, no attempt was made to injure them: indeed, the men of the 2nd Foot professed great sorrow for what had occurred, declared vehemently that the 4th Foot had done the deed, and seemed anxious to save their commander, if it were yet possible. But it was too late: the brave, kind heart that could not harbour suspicion or distrust, had nearly ceased to beat; consciousness was quite over; and his poor widow, when she learnt the manner of her bereavement, comforted herself by reflecting, that since

her husband had lived "to fear the grave as little as his bed," "she might look upon his end as more of a translation than death, so rapid must have been the exchange from earth to heaven."

Some of the sepoys made an attempt to carry away the body of the dead or dying officer to the hospital; and, by their advice, the other three Europeans endeavoured to make their escape. The Jhansi fugitives rode off towards Agra; but Pierson, being on foot, could not accompany them. Three sepoys saw his position, and, catching hold of him, said they would try and save him. They threw off his hat, tore off his trowsers and remaining boot, rolled him in a horsecloth, and, while two carried the mummy-like burden, the third walked in front, and by dint of energy and resolution, by knocking up one rebel's musket, and declaring it was one of their wives they were carrying, they bore their burden safely past all the sentries, and crossed the river. Then they wished him to start for Agra, assuring him that the chances were ten to one that his wife had been killed by that time; but he was firm in refusing to attempt to escape without her; and, after much persuasion, the sepoys were induced to take him down the banks of the river (the opposite side of which was lined with guards to arrest fugitives), until they arrived opposite the house Pierson had so lately left. Then one of the sepoys said, "Now I will go and bring your wife, if she is alive." He did go, and, in twenty minutes, husband and wife met again. The house had been robbed by the sepoy guard: the money left with a faithful native servant for her use, had been taken from him, and the watch and chain snatched from her hand; but she was personally uninjured, though terrified and unable to walk. The three sepoys "behaved splendidly." The horsecloth, in which they had before swathed the lieutenant, was now tied "bag-fashion on to a musket," with the lady in it; and placing the but and muzzle on their shoulders, they carried her thus seven miles to the Residency, her husband walking barefoot by their side all the way. Three other European fugitives had reached the same place just before Lieutenant and Mrs. Pierson; and having procured an elephant, they all mounted on it, and started afresh, with the intention of seeking protection with the maharajah in the Lushkur, which was about five or six miles from the Mora, or British

cantonments. They had not proceeded above half a mile, before they met nearly a dozen carriages, the horses at full gallop, attended by an escort of Sindia's body-guard. The party consisted of Major Macpherson and his sister, Mrs. Innes (whose husband was at Lucknow), Brigadier Ramsay, Captain and Mrs. Meade and child, Captain and Mrs. Murray and two children, the Piersons, and seventeen other persons, of whom the majority were women and children. Some of them had escaped with great difficulty from the cantonments. Brigadier Ramsay and Captains Meade and Murray, finding it useless to attempt going to the lines, fled directly to Sindia with their families, under the escort of a havildar and some faithful sepoys.

On hearing of the outbreak, Major Macpherson had hastened to join the maharajah, and found him at his palace, the Phoolbagh, surrounded by his troops under arms. The brigadier and officers, with several ladies and children, had already arrived; and they believed that all left behind in cantonments must have perished. Patrols of picked men of Sindia's troops were, however, sent to search for fugitives. The maharajah and the dewan considered it perfectly clear, from the attitude of the rebels and the feeling of the durbar troops, that the Europeans could not be protected in Gwalior. Carriages, palanquins, and an escort of the body-guard, had therefore been prepared to convey them to the Chumbul, or, if necessary, to Agra.

Then followed an anxious discussion on the policy to be adopted by Sindia. The rebels were known to expect, that in the event of his refusing to enrol and lead them against the rich and weakly garrisoned fort of Agra, he would gladly purchase their departure with a large sum of money. Failing this, they threatened to bombard Gwalior, in which case it was probable that the maharajah's troops would coalesce with them; and, with their artillery and magazine, the nominal sovereign would be entirely at their mercy. It was evident that, under these complicated difficulties, the simplest course for the Gwalior court was to get rid of the mutinous contingent at once, and at any rate; but the arguments of Major Macpherson were successfully directed to inducing Sindia to act for the benefit of the Supreme government, and rely on its strength and generosity to uphold and reward him for any temporary sacrifice or peril to his more immediate interests. The

part which he was to play was difficult and dangerous, as double-dealing always is, however good the object in view. It was to hold the contingent in check until Agra could be reinforced, or Delhi should fall. To this end it was deemed indispensable that Sindia should give no decided answer to the rebel deputations, by which (as was foreseen) he was subsequently besieged, but should lead them to believe that he was at heart one with them, and only waited a good opportunity of throwing off his allegiance to the British.

Sindia and Dinkur Rao were assured, that whatever the outer Anglo-Indian world might think of their conduct, the governor-general, understanding its true bearing, would approve any concessions that might be necessary for the all-important object—the detention of the contingent. This question being decided, the Europeans quitted Gwalior. On reaching Hingonah, a village twelve miles from the Chumbul, they found a band of 200 Ghazis, drawn up under a Mohammedan named Jehangeer Khan, who had once been a havildar in the contingent. Leaving the British service, he entered that of Sindia, and became one of his favourite captains; but the mutiny suddenly transformed him into a Ghazi leader of the highest pretensions to sanctity. The word must have sounded ominous of evil to such of the Europeans as had any acquaintance with the history of the Mohammedan conquest of India. The present "holy warriors," chiefly rebels from the British and Sindia's ranks, being novices, seem to have been irresolute as to their plan of action. The leader, after some preliminary discussion, approached Major Macpherson, arrayed in green; and, while fingering his beads, mingled his prayers with protestations of the absence of any intention on his part of injuring the Europeans. But the listeners were incredulous; for the captain of the body-guard pointed out to them a body of plunderers in evident concert with the Ghazis assembled in the ravines on the way to the river. Happily, Dinkur Rao, knowing the road, had foreseen that some difficulty might occur at this point; and in obedience to his summons, Thakoor Buldeo Sing, chief of the Dundowteeah Brahmins—a robust and warlike tribe—arrived at midnight, with a strong body of followers, just as the resident was preparing to abandon the carriages, and start the ladies and children on horseback,

by a bridle-path, towards Rajghaut, lower down the Chumbul. Buldeo Sing reminded the resident of a visit he had once paid them, and of his intercession with the dewan, regarding some tanks and wells for the people. "We have not forgotten this," he said, "and will defend you with our lives." He set one-half of his men to watch Jehangeer Khan, and, with the other, escorted the Europeans to the river, avoiding a band of mutineers stationed in one of the roads, by turning out of the usual path. It was well for the fugitives they had so staunch an escort; for the body-guard and the Paegah (or household) horse, alarmed at the prospect of being brought in contact with their mutinous brethren, refused to enter the ravines, and, deaf to all remonstrance, turned back to Gwalior. The Europeans crossed the Chumbul by the aid of Buldeo Sing; and, on the opposite shore, the elephants and escort of the rana of Dholpoor were in readiness, in compliance with a requisition sent by Major Macpherson in the course of the previous day's march.

Dholpoor,—is the capital of a small subsidiary state of the same name, 1,626 square miles in extent, with a population of about 550,000 persons, chiefly Jats. The prince (also a Jat) is the representative of that rana of Gohud, the breach of faith with whom, in 1805, excited the indignation of Lord Lake.*

The reigning prince showed the fugitives every kindness; and, guarded by his troops, the remainder of the journey, although through a very disturbed country, was safely performed, and Agra reached on the 17th. Major Macpherson had received a slight sun-stroke in crossing the Chumbul; which, together with the anxieties of the time, occasioned a severe illness: owing to this, his early reports were very brief. He nevertheless maintained an active correspondence with Gwalior, through various channels, including an almost daily missive to and from Dinkur Rao, written in Persian cipher. The Dholpoor durbar also regularly communicated to Major Macpherson the news sent by their vakeel at Gwalior; and thus the Agra community, during their protracted season of anxiety, had the consolation of uninterrupted and reliable information regarding the chief danger by which they were menaced.

On Friday, the 19th of June, a party of women and children (all of whom were

supposed to have been massacred) arrived from Gwalior, consisting of Mistresses Blake, Campbell, Raikes, Proctor, Kirk, Coopland, some sergeants' wives, and other European women, with their little ones.

The journey had been disastrous and wearisome in the extreme: several had even been widowed by the way. At the outbreak, Dr. and Mrs. Kirk, Mr. and Mrs. Coopland, and Mrs. Raikes, had taken refuge with Mrs. Blake. They listened in terror to the firing, which lasted about three-quarters of an hour; and, when it ended, were told by the sepoys on duty to go and hide themselves in the garden. They did so, and spent many hours sitting on the ground, under some citron trees, amid the glare of burning bungalows, the flames and smoke sweeping over them in clouds. The worst of the rebels, joined by the budmashes of the town, and maddened by bhang and excitement, smashed the windows and the china, burst through doors, forced open boxes, smashed scores of bottles of beer, brandy, and wine; and, by drinking the contents, stimulated themselves afresh to the deadly work of pillage and destruction. Mirza, the kitmutgar of Mrs. Blake, took his post beside his unhappy mistress. The sentry, who was also faithful, came to tell her that "the sahib was shot;" and she would fain have remained to meet her fate where she was, for "the bitterness of death seemed past;" but the two natives dragged her away to Mirza's hut, which was with those of the other servants at the end of the compound. Dr. and Mrs. Kirk, with Mrs. Raikes, her nurse and baby, had taken refuge elsewhere; but Mr. Coopland and his wife accompanied Mrs. Blake. They remained in a little inner room, while the rabble brought carts into the garden, and filled them with plunder. The greater number then went off; but a few came down to rob the servants of the kitchen utensils and other property, and to search for Feringhees. Mirza induced them to leave the place, under pretence of pointing out the hiding-place of some Europeans; and, upon returning to the refugees, he hurried them away, before the insurgents could return, to the mud hut of another of Mrs. Blake's faithful servants. Here they were joined by Mrs. Raikes, who had been previously concealed in the stable, with her ayah and infant; and they all lay crouched on the ground till about six in the morning, when a party of sepoys came back to search for

* See vol. i., p. 404.

officers. Hearing the wailing of the baby, they called to the ayah, who was near the door of the hut, to hand them any property that was inside, and show them the child. She was compelled to obey; and a general shout arose—"Feringhee ke baba" (it is the child of the foreigner); followed by a piercing shriek from the mother. The sepoy did not rush in, for they expected to find the missing officers in the hut, armed with the dreaded "revolver," carried by most Europeans; but they began to untile the roof, and fire on the wretched group crouched down in a dark corner. Mrs. Coopland had snatched up a log of wood "as some means of defence,"* but dropped it at the first shot; and her husband exclaimed, "Let us rush out, and not die like rats in a hole."† The terrified women threw themselves upon the mercy of the sepoy, exclaiming with clasped hands, "Mut maro, mut maro" (do not kill us). "No," was the reply; "we will not kill the mem-sahibs, only the sahib." The ladies surrounded the chaplain, and begged for his life; but in vain: they were dragged away; and he fled, pursued by the sepoy, who slaughtered him near the cantonments; but not before he had killed two of them with his rifle.‡ A young sepoy of the 4th Foot approached the terrified ladies, and told them to give up any jewels they had. The lives of women, he said, were not wanted; but they must obey orders; for the rule of the Feringhee was over, and the rajah would soon be in cantonments. Then he thrust them into a sweeper's hut, and left them. They lay down; and the stillness of their grief and terror was such, that Mrs. Coopland says, a little mouse crept out and looked at them with its bright eyes, and was not afraid. Presently Mrs. Campbell rushed in with her hair dishevelled, and in a native dress. She had been alone in her compound all night, and was half-distracted with fear. Next came Mrs. Kirk, the widow of the superintending surgeon of the Gwalior contingent, who had just been killed in her presence. The wretches had torn off her bracelets so roughly, that her wrists were bruised and swollen—even her wedding-ring was gone; but her child, a

boy of four years old, was safe in her arms. He had been spared by the sepoy, who, deceived by his long curls, had exclaimed one to another—"Don't kill the little one; it is a 'missie baba'" (a girl). A crowd of natives gradually gathered round the hut, and made their comments on the poor women. The beauty of Mrs. Campbell, once known as the "Rose of Gibraltar," was conspicuous even at this moment; and the gazers observed how well her feet looked in Indian slippers. Mrs. Blake, they remarked, was dying already. At length some of the 2nd infantry came in, and carried the miserable party to their lines. On arriving there, several of the men said to Mrs. Blake, in a faltering voice, "We will take you to the sahib." A dead charger lay on the road near the quarter-guard; the poor lady sickened at the sight. The sepoy placed her on a charpoy, and gave her some water. When she recovered, a subahdar of her late husband's regiment bent on one knee before her, saying the colours were gone. All sense of danger was lost in grief; and she exclaimed—"It is your own faults; where is he? and why did you kill him?" The subahdar replied, that the major had fallen by the hands of the 4th Foot, and that his own men had buried him: the latter statement was certainly true. At this moment, Mrs. Gilbert and her child arrived, with Mrs. Proctor: Lieutenant Proctor had been killed almost in their sight.§ They were followed by some of the grenadiers, and carried off to their lines. The men of the 2nd told Mrs. Blake they would order her carriage to take her where she pleased. It was a landau, calculated to hold only two persons; and the horses had been harnessed since the previous night, ready for flight. The five ladies, a nurse, two sergeants' wives, and some children got in, with Mirza as driver. The sepoy put beer, camphor-water, and plain water into the carriage; and two of them escorted Mrs. Blake half-way to the Lushkur, protesting their regret for the loss of the sahib, and offering her money, which, however, she did not need, having her purse and rings of value with her. On reaching the palace of the maharajah, the party were desired to hurry on at once to

* Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 125.

† Mrs. Blake's *Narrative*, p. 4.

‡ So, at least, Mrs. Coopland was afterwards assured by several natives.—*Escape, &c.*, p. 120.

§ Mrs. Gilbert, the wife of an absent contingent officer, had been staying with Lieutenant Proctor:

her state of health rendered flight almost impossible. Her host and hostess (although they had planned to escape on horseback) would not abandon her; and the party lay concealed through the night; but being discovered in the morning, the lieutenant was taken away and murdered.

Agra, and were provided with bullock-carts for the purpose. The journey lasted three days, and the disaffection of the villagers rendered it perilous. Mrs. Gilbert, Mrs. Proctor, and Mrs. Quick, a sergeant's wife, joined them on the road; and their number was further increased by a European belonging to the Telegraph Company, with his wife (an Eurasian) and her baby. This man, instead of a support, was an additional burden, on account of his excessive cowardice. But for the vigilance and tact of the native, who even Mrs. Coopland calls "the ever-faithful Mirza," the journey could scarcely have been accomplished; but he proclaimed everywhere that the ladies were under the protection of Sindia, who would punish any injury done to them. They halted for the night at a large village near the Chumbul river: the natives gathered round them, and, looking at the ladies in succession, remarked that they were not worth a pice (a farthing) each, except Mrs. Campbell, who was declared to be "burra kubsoorut" (very handsome), and worth an anna (about three half-pence). Mirza had procured for his helpless charges, chudders, or large white veils, such as the natives use to wrap round their heads and the upper part of their persons. Mrs. Campbell strove to conceal her face in the one she wore; but the villagers drew it aside, saying, "We will look at you." At another time the party were pursued by some troopers, and Mirza almost despaired of escape. He made the women quit the carts and sit on the ground, bidding them pretend to sleep. They did so, and five sowars soon overtook them, and, on seeing the carts drawn up, stopped and dismounted. Mirza met the troopers; and Mrs. Blake and Mrs. Campbell, who were well acquainted with Hindustani, heard him pleading piteously for mercy. "See how tired they are," he said; "they have had no rest. Let them sleep to-night; you can kill them to-morrow: only let them sleep now." The men went away a little distance; but as it grew darker (for it was evening), they crept nearer again, and began loading their matchlocks, and unsheathing their tulwars. Mirza asked the ladies for any ornaments or money they had about them, with which to propitiate the sowars. Mrs. Campbell and Mrs. Kirk had been already robbed. Mrs. Coopland had left her purse and jewels in Gwalior; but she drew her wedding-ring from her finger, and tied it round her waist. Mrs. Blake took off all her rings and other

ornaments, and gave them, with her money, to Mirza, who handed them to the troopers. The small amount of booty was a disappointment, and they pointed a loaded pistol at his breast, and made him swear that there was nothing withheld. Mrs. Campbell came forward, and offered them £40 to take a note from her to Captain Campbell at Agra. They hesitated; but at last refused, saying it was a plot to be rid of them, and to betray them into the hands of the authorities: they did not, however, further molest the fugitives, who proceeded safely to Dholpoor, the chief town on the route between Agra and Gwalior, thirty-four miles south of the former, and thirty-seven miles north of the latter town.

Although the rana himself proved a most valuable ally, the feeling of his subjects was strongly hostile to the British; and the party of European women, in passing through the town of Dholpoor, which extends on either side of the river Chumbul, could not but observe the angry manner in which they were regarded. They crossed the river in a rude boat, scarcely better than a raft, and were compelled to leave the carts behind; but soon after reaching the further bank, a trooper on a camel rode up, and gave Mrs. Campbell a note. It was addressed to Sindia; and had been written by Captain Campbell in the greatest distress of mind, under the belief that all in Gwalior, not of Major Macpherson's party, had perished. He begged that the slain in Gwalior might be decently interred, especially his own wife. This she herself read. The trooper offered to take her to Captain Campbell, who had come a few miles out of Agra, and was at the dāk bungalow at Munnia, resolved, at any hazard, to learn his wife's fate. Mrs. Campbell would not, however, leave her companions, who depended much on her, from her knowledge of the native language, and her helpful, hopeful spirit, happily not bowed by recent bereavement like that of Mrs. Blake. Taking a pin, she pricked on the back of her husband's note—"We are here, more than a dozen women and children; send us help:" and the trooper returned to Captain Campbell with the welcome missive. Encouraged by the prospect of speedy aid, the poor women resumed their journey on foot: some of them had neither shoes nor stockings, and a birth and a death were hourly expected. Mrs. Quick, the sergeant's wife, was excessively corpulent, as Europeans are apt to become in India. One

cart, a small frail one, had broken down under her before reaching the river, and she had toiled along slowly on foot, until room had been made for her in another. The intense heat of the walk on the sands of the Chumbul accelerated her end; she fell down in a fit of apoplexy, amid a group of natives, who crowded round, laughing at her immense size, and mocking her. She died in about a quarter of an hour, and her companions were compelled to leave the body, entreating the natives to bury her.* It was a sad death for one of "the most gentle and kind-hearted creatures that ever existed."† The rest of the party reached Munnia in safety, where they found Captain Campbell; and halted for a few hours, on account of Mrs. Gilbert, who gave birth to a child. She and the infant were placed on a charpoy, and carried to Agra, which city the weary band reached at six o'clock on the Friday morning, when they separated to take up their abode with different friends, or in the house appointed for the reception of the Gwalior refugees, where Major Macpherson and Mrs. Innes resided. Mirza continued in faithful attendance on his mistress until her departure for England. For his reward, "government gave him only £25, though he had lost more than that at Gwalior.‡

The artillery officers and their families were supposed to have perished; but, happily, some even of these had escaped. Captain Stewart had been wounded on the night of the outbreak by the infantry mutineers, but had been carried away, concealed, and attended to till morning, by a faithful servant, his bearer. Captain Hawkins might have escaped with his four elder children; but he could neither leave nor remove his wife and her infant, of three days old. The artillerymen offered to conceal them in the battery; and Captain Hawkins sent a message desiring his wife and Mrs. Stewart to come to the lines. Mrs. Hawkins was carried thither on a bed by some men of the artillery, accompanied by her nurse with the infant; and a large party of servants followed with the four other children. Mrs. Stewart set off in her carriage with her children, and was in much grief; for her husband's horse had just dashed into the compound without a rider, and she had learned that his master was lying concealed, and badly wounded. The party remained

in safety during the Sunday night; but, on the following morning, the infantry mutineers discovered that some Europeans were hidden in the battery; and rushing into the sort of yard where they were, fired a volley, and then laid about them with their tulwars. Captain Hawkins stood beside his wife, holding her hand, when he and Mrs. Stewart (who was clinging to his arm) were killed by the same bullet. The nurse was shot, and the infant in her arms is supposed to have been killed by the fall. Two boys, the children of Mrs. Stewart and Mrs. Hawkins, were slain by a tulwar; but Mrs. Hawkins, with her three other children and little Charlotte Stewart, a girl of six years old, were not injured.

The sepoys, from their furious onslaught, evidently expected to find several officers assembled; otherwise, they would have taken care to spare the women and children, according to the rule observed throughout the Gwalior mutiny; for although there were no less than six ladies and eight children in the cantonments at the time, without any male relatives to assist their flight (their husbands and fathers being on duty elsewhere), they all escaped. Mrs. Ferris was one of these. She, Mrs. Hennessy, and Mrs. Christison, heard the alarm bugle while undressing for the night, and fled to Sindia's palace without shoes or bonnets. Their only protector was young Hennessy, a brave lad of seventeen, who had several children (including his own sister) to care for. All the party joined the political agent safely; but Major Ferris, who was in command at one of the out-stations, in trying to come into Gwalior with another young officer, was stopped by the villagers, dragged from his gharry, and so severely flogged that he died in consequence. His companion was similarly treated; but he made his way to Agra, and, after a long illness, eventually recovered.§

It is beyond a doubt, that generally, throughout the insurrection, womanhood and infancy found in sex and weakness their best defence; the mass of widows and orphans who have escaped untouched by fire or the sword, or fouler wrong, affords strong proof of this: and the fact is the more remarkable, when it is remembered that the maddened multitude had little prospect for the future, save the alternatives

* Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 142.

† Testimony of Lieut.-colonel Somerset Grove.

‡ Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 247

§ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

of starvation or a halter, and that a leading class of the insurgents at most of the stations were released convicts, many of whom were actually under sentence of death.

Captain Stewart is said to have been shot by the mutineers on the Monday morning. After learning from his faithful servant the death of his wife, he said he no longer cared to live. The bearer concentrated his devotion on his master's orphan, and assisted her in escaping to Agra with Mrs. Hawkins and her three children. That this poor lady should have survived the frightful excitement and fatigue she underwent, is one of the marvels of the time. In her night attire, prostrate and helpless, she had witnessed the massacre of her kind and brave husband, her two children, her nurse, and friend, with the additional anguish of feeling herself the cause of hindering their flight on the previous evening. The danger of her surviving children compelled her to wrestle with both grief and weakness. She was acquainted with Colonel Filose, who lived with his brother in the Lushkur, and held the command of the rajah's personal troops; and to him she wrote, asking for assistance. These brothers were descended from the well-known French officer of the same name—one of the successful continental adventurers who trained the Mahratta troops of former times, and rendered them so dangerous to British power, until the ground was cut from under their feet by Marquis Wellesley's system of subsidiary alliances. Colonel Filose sent a bullock-cart for Mrs. Hawkins; and after staying two nights in the cavalry lines, the sepoys procured some clothes for her and her children, and they started for Agra, accompanied by little Charlotte Stewart and the faithful bearer. On the 22nd of June, the fugitives reached their destination, after encountering some perils and extreme fatigue.

Besides the females already named, a Mrs. Burrows was killed at Gwalior. She was the widow of a commissary of ordnance, who had risen from the ranks, and saved a great deal of money. He died a short time before the mutiny, and his widow buried his hoards. The sepoys,

aware of this, commanded Mrs. Burrows to point out the hidden treasure, and shot her because she refused to reveal the secret.*

In all, twenty Europeans perished at Gwalior, including five sergeants, a corporal, and a drummer. The bodies (except that of Major Blake, which was immediately interred in the grave-yard by the men of his own corps) were buried by order of the maharajah. None of them had been stripped or mutilated.†

Indore and Mhow.—The city which gives its name to the state was built in 1767, by the good and gifted princess, Ahalya Bye, the widow of Mulhar Rao Holcar.‡ The palace of the maharajah, and the British Residency, are at Indore; but the principal British force for this part of India is cantoned thirteen miles to the south-west of Indore, and a mile and a-half from the town of Mhow. The troops in the Mhow cantonments, May, 1857, consisted of—

One company of Artillery—*Europeans*, 91; *Natives*, 98. Right wing of the 1st Light Cavalry—*Europeans*, 13; *Natives*, 282. The 23rd N.I.—*Europeans*, 16; *Natives*, 1,179.

Holcar's troops, the number and payment of which were regulated by treaty, consisted of about 642 artillerymen, 3,820 cavalry, and 3,145 infantry, including the contingent of horse, which he was bound to furnish to the Supreme government. He likewise contributed annually to the maintenance of the Malwa Bheel corps; and a further sum to the Malwa contingent, supported at the expense of the various dependent princes and chiefs of Malwa, but nevertheless a part of the Bengal army, with which all the contingent and subsidiary troops soon proved their identity of feeling. Of the troops on duty at Indore there is no official record;§ but, from private accounts, there were, on the 1st of July, a regiment of Bhopal contingent cavalry, three companies of Bhopal contingent infantry, with two guns; two companies of the Malwa Bheel corps, and a body of Holcar's troops, infantry and cavalry, with three guns.

Bhopal itself is a native dependent state of Malwa, bounded on the south-west by the territories of Holcar and Sindia. The reigning family are Patans, but the great

* Mrs. Copland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 155.

† Report of Dr. Christison, Gwalior, 4th July, 1858.

‡ See *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 391.

§ The returns quoted regarding the mutinous regiments, give only those of the Bengal army, not

the contingent and subsidiary troops. Neither is there any circumstantial account in the Blue Books regarding the revolt at Indore; though there are three separate ones, by Major Cooper, Captains Hungerford and Brooks, of that at Mhow.

mass of the population are Hindoos. The contingent, the principal station of which was at Sehore (twenty miles from the capital), consisted, in all, of about 800 men, including forty-eight artillerymen and four European officers.

Holcar, like Sindia, early recognised the little reliance which could be placed on the Bengal or contingent regiments either at Mhow or Indore, or even on the troops in his own service. Of his personal fidelity no apprehension was entertained by those who knew him thoroughly; but his youth and inexperience, his energy of mind and body, his popularity, the name he bore, and the traditions of his race, were temptations which sound judgment and high principle could alone resist. He had been from boyhood of an adventurous turn, and loved to spend whole days in the saddle, examining every part of his dominions; and to ramble about his capital at night, *incognito*, like Haroun ul Raschid; gaining information, without any intermediary, of the condition and temper of his subjects. The resident, Sir Robert Hamilton, had filled his arduous and delicate position with rare ability; and the strong affection which subsisted between him and the young prince, was no less honourable to them personally than conducive to the welfare of Indore. Unhappily, Sir Robert was in England at the time of the Meerut outbreak. Holcar wrote immediately, urging his return; and bestirred himself in every possible way to prevent revolt, taking his stand in the most unequivocal manner on the side of the British.

In the middle of May, incendiary fires* gave evidence of disaffection; but the excitement subsided; and the Europeans, both at Indore and Mhow, were hopeful that their isolated position, and the zeal and ability of the native government, might preserve the troops from the contagion of mutiny. Colonel Platt, of the 23rd N.I., had been upwards of thirty years in that regiment; and, in the previous year, when an opportunity occurred for his joining a European corps, the men had united in entreating him not to leave them. The news of the mutiny at Neemuch on the 8rd of June, again unsettled the troops at

Mhow; but the colonel exerted himself strenuously to restore tranquillity, and with some success. On the 16th, the officers were ordered to sleep in turn in the lines, "more to reassure the men than from apprehension of their mutinying."† This measure, though generally adopted during the crisis, seems to have involved the exposure of the lives of the officers to a degree of danger not warranted by the amount of benefit likely to be obtained. In cases where they volunteered sleeping in the lines, the offer showed a degree of confidence in the men, which was in itself presumptive evidence of the influence they were capable of exercising: but where they did not volunteer, it was unreasonable to exact from them service certainly perilous, and probably unavailing.

It appears that about 200 of Holcar's infantry, and three guns, which had been for some time stationed at or near the Residency, in compliance with the express request of Colonel Durand,‡ suddenly broke into mutiny at eight o'clock on the morning of the 1st of July, and, attended by a rabble from the city, fired on the Residency. A messenger was immediately dispatched from thence to Mhow, with a request for aid. The majority of the troops were evidently as much taken by surprise as the Europeans themselves: an outbreak had no doubt been regarded by both parties as probable; but a few determined malcontents brought matters unexpectedly to an issue. A lady (probably Mrs. Durand) who was at the Residency, remarks, that on the first firing of the rebel guns, the various irregular troops seemed panic-stricken; and that "neither the Native officers nor the Europeans had any influence over these men; and (though on our side) they were wholly unmanageable for any defensive operations."§ The testimony of their officer in command (Major Travers) is to the same effect. The number of the mutineers was so insignificant, that he prepared to charge them with a few troopers, in the hope of capturing the guns and cutting up the infantry. "My only cavalry at the moment available, were," he writes, "a few always kept saddled

* Appendix to Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857; p. 321.

† Return of regiments which mutinied (Commons), March 15th, 1859; p. 6.

‡ Letter of Omeid Sing, a leading native functionary, dated "Indore Palace, July 8th, 1857,"

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and evidently addressed to Sir Robert Hamilton, although his name is withheld.—*Times*, Aug. 25th, 1857.

§ Letter dated "Mhow, August 5th, 1857;" published in *Times*, September 26th, 1857, as written "by the worthy daughter and wife of soldiers."

in the square of the stable-yard: the others being in the Mahidpoor* cavalry lines, were in a measure cut off, and required time to saddle and come round. The Mahidpoor infantry were neutral, and our own (Bhopal) nearly in as bad a state."† Placing himself at the head of about twenty troopers, the major led the way, but found that only six or seven of these were following him. The rebels were quite undecided how to act; the gunners threw themselves behind the guns; but Major Travers felt that to persist in advancing would be madness: he therefore withdrew, escaping unhurt himself, though his horse was wounded in three places. The enemy then moved their guns to a more convenient position for attacking the Residency; but a subahdar, named Seo Lal, and the gunners attached to two of the British guns, behaved nobly, and repulsed the assailants, disabling one of their 9-pounders.

The rest of Major Travers' cavalry then came up, asking to be led to the charge; but he could find no bugler, neither could he get the men in proper order. "They seemed," he considered, "uncertain whom to trust; and to lead them on as they then were would have been destruction." The whole of the infantry, except the Bheels, who were posted inside the Residency and in the verandah, were tacitly, and, at last, openly mutinous, at first refusing to load, and finally threatening to shoot their officers. At the expiration of an hour and a-half from the commencement of the mutiny, the evacuation of the Residency was resolved upon. It might probably have been held for some hours; but the large proportion of women and children among the Europeans, was a strong argument for retreat, before the frenzy and numbers of the mob should increase and render flight impracticable. Besides, the cavalry were anxious to depart. The acting resident, therefore, gave the order; and he, with Mrs. Durand, Captain and Mrs. Shakspear and child, Mrs. Dutton, and nearly all the other Europeans (about thirty-two persons), quitted Indore—the ladies and children on the ammunition waggons; the gentlemen on an elephant, and some horses brought by their servants. The escort consisted of

nearly 300 of the Bheel corps, a few of the Bhopal infantry, and about 200 of the cavalry, under Major Travers, bringing up the rear. The Europeans retreated slowly over the plain, looking back upon the smoke and flame of burning bungalows. They reached Bhopal in safety, and took refuge with the begum in the fort; but they did not make any long stay there, as she plainly told them that their presence was a source of weakness to her, and endangered the tranquillity of the state. The fugitives therefore recommenced their travels; but, before the close of the month, the advance of a British column, and the firmness and tact of the native government, enabled them to return to Indore.

A few Europeans, and the mass of Eurasians and native Christians connected with the post-office, telegraph, and various departments, fell victims to the first fury of the mob.

Mhow.—A pencil note from Colonel Durand reached Colonel Platt at half-past 10 A.M. (July 1st), with intelligence of the attack on the Indore Residency. No precautionary measures had (Captain Hungerford states in his official report‡) been taken until that very morning; when, at his earnest request, Colonel Platt allowed him to occupy, with his artillery, the fort at Mhow; the only place where Europeans could find refuge in the event of mutiny. In compliance with Colonel Durand's desire, the battery, under the command of Captain Hungerford, was at once sent off towards Indore; but after proceeding about half-way on the road thither, its advance was arrested by a sowar bearing a note from Major Travers, with tidings of the evacuation of Indore. Captain Hungerford marched back to Mhow. In the meantime, a troop of the 1st cavalry, under Captain Brooks and another officer, was directed to proceed on the Bombay road, and recover the guns belonging to Holcar, which had passed unheeded through the cantonment about two hours before, and which were now supposed to have been sent on by the mutineers to occupy the passes, and obstruct the advance of a movable column of troops, daily expected for the reinforcement of the British in Malwa. Some few of the troopers

* Mahidpoor, or Mehidpore, the town from which the head-quarters of the Malwa contingent take their name, is situated in one of the outlying possessions of Indore, on the right bank of the river Seepra, fifty-three miles from the capital.

† Letter dated "Sehore, July 4th, 1857;" published in *Times*, October 5th, 1857. Not signed, though evidently written, by Major Travers.

‡ Dated "Mhow, July 4th."—Further Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857 (No. 4), p. 120.



demurred, and lagged behind; but afterwards followed well. On nearing the guns, the cavalry charged and captured them, but did not attempt to disarm the artillerymen (about twenty-five in number), until they were reinforced by two flank companies of the 23rd N.I., under Captain Trower and Lieutenant Westmacott; after which the gunners were disarmed, and the guns brought back to cantonments. There was no loss in either killed or wounded on the side of the British, nor does Captain Brooks state what he did with the disarmed troopers; but, from private accounts, it appears that some, at least, were slain. The result of the expedition was calculated to increase the confidence reposed in the Native troops; and it appears to have done so; for the officer who accompanied Captain Brooks, states, that after consultation among themselves,* it was agreed that the European officers should all sleep in their lines; and Brooks himself remarks, that the ladies had resorted to the fort wholly from an apprehension of an attack from the Indore mutineers; in expectation of which, the sepoys were bidden to hold themselves in readiness to turn out at a moment's notice, and were allowed to sleep each man with his arms beside him.† An officer of the 23rd‡ (probably Captain Trower) bears contrary evidence with regard to the infantry; declaring that, on the return of the men with the guns, he noticed their sulkiness. When proceeding to the lines, to see the ammunition lodged, the men told him they had an order to keep forty rounds in their pouch. This he resolutely overruled; and although he was obeyed, it was with evident dissatisfaction. While the officers were at dinner, a light was seen on the roof of the mess-house. It was put out at once by the cook. Soon afterwards, another roof was seen to be alight. The witness, whose account has been just quoted, went up and extinguished it with his cap, with the assistance of a sepoy of the guard attached to his own house. Then he returned to table; and the officers were about to separate, when one of them remarked, "The report is, the regiment will rise at ten." It then wanted but a few minutes of that hour; and, before the clock struck, shots were heard in the cavalry lines, and a voice exclaimed that the cantonment was attacked

in the rear by the Bheels. The officers hurried to their companies, but soon discovered the true state of the case; and, being fired on, were glad to escape to the fort. Private letters throw light on the matter, which, in the public reports, seems purposely withheld. The companion of Captain Brooks in the morning's expedition of the 1st cavalry, says that he and Captain Brooks, on their triumphant return to cantonments, after seeing their horses in readiness for an emergency, had had their tent pitched two or three yards in front of the main-guard, and had lain down side by side in the same bed at half-past nine. Before they had time to fall asleep, they were roused by a small bungalow close by having caught fire. It was extinguished; but the troopers stood together, talking angrily about the men killed that morning. The witness last quoted, describes with much force the vengeful feeling by which the rebels were actuated, and the manner in which his appeal for help was responded to by some noble-hearted natives, who saved his life at the hazard of their own, and then fled from the Europeans, filled with either fear or aversion.

"The adjutant, Lieutenant Martin, was in the centre of all the men, talking to them. I joined him, and observed one man in my troop, a villain; he had his carbine, and began to cavil with Martin about some men Brooks and I had killed in the morning. I, feeling sleepy, said to Martin, 'I'll turn in; but, good God! I had hardly turned my back and got to Brooks' side, when an awful shriek arose from the men, and the bullets whizzed around us in torrents. The man I had observed lifted his carbine first, and fired either at myself or Martin. I leaped out of my tent, and saw Martin rushing across the parade-ground, the wretches shrieking after him. I reached him, and Brooks followed. We felt our last moment was come, but we ran for it. I led, and only screamed 'To the fort!' a mile off. The men kept following us, and the bullets fell thick. Having got across the parade-ground, about 500 or 600 yards, we came to the hill with the church at the top, and, when at the top, Martin caught hold of me, exclaiming, 'For God's sake, stop!' I caught hold of his arm, and said, 'Only keep up, and follow;' but at this moment I felt I was done. We parted, as I thought, only to meet in death. But, thank God! I rushed on and reached a bungalow about a quarter of a mile from the fort. By this time the infantry had all risen; and, as I ran, the ground was torn up with bullets, and they fell thick around me. Their lines were in a direct line between the fort and ours, so that we, poor fellows, had to run the gauntlet of both fires. I felt, when I got to the bungalow, quite sick and done.

* Letter published in the *Times*, August 20th, 1857; by an officer of the 1st cavalry.

† Captain Brooks to the Deputy Adjutant-general,

July 5th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers on the Mutiny, 1857 (not numbered), p. 133.

‡ Letter published in the *Times*, Aug. 19th, 1857.

Wonderful Providence! I saw two natives, and rushed up to them, and simply took their hands, hardly able to speak, and said, 'Save me!' They did. To them I owe my life. At the moment the infantry were coming screaming around. They hid me in a small house. Oh, those moments! for I could not trust the man, and felt sure he would give me up. Some sepoy came, but did not find me. At last there was a lull. I opened the door and ran for the fort, my nigger friend having wrapped me in his own clothing to disguise me. Can I ever make you feel the deep thankfulness that was in my heart as I ran across the open plain, up the hill, to the fort? The artillerymen were manning the walls, and the sentry's call was never more thankfully received; and I cried 'Friend, friend!' and found myself safe, safe inside. My native friend had escorted me safely; but when I turned, as soon as I recovered, he was gone, and I have never seen him since."

Major Harris was the only officer killed while endeavouring to escape. Colonel Platt was in the fort when the officers arrived one by one, breathless and exhausted. The men on duty at the fort gate were immediately disarmed and turned out by the artillery; and four guns of the horse battery were made ready to proceed to the lines. The colonel would not wait for them; but, desiring Captain Fagan to attend him, rode off to the lines. All night the return of the two officers was anxiously expected in the fort; but the next morning, their bodies, and those of their horses, were found on the parade-ground, riddled with bullets. It is supposed they were shot down by a volley while Colonel Platt was addressing the men, before the guns under Captain Hungerford could come up. Their death was speedily avenged. Grape and canister were poured into the lines: many rebels were killed; the rest fled in wild confusion to Indore. Dr. Thornton, of the 1st light cavalry, had hidden himself in a drain, from whence he emerged on the appearance of the artillery.

Strong proofs were given, at Mhow, of the fascination with which the cause of the mutineers was invested in sepoy eyes. For instance—two men of the 23rd N.I., who were out with Lieutenant Simpson on picket duty, escorted him safely to the fort on the morning after the outbreak; yet, although Major Cooper promised to reward their fidelity by promotion to the rank of havildar, they subsequently deserted and joined their comrades. The policy adopted at Mhow was not calculated to diminish the

growing unpopularity of the British cause in Malwa.

Captain Hungerford, the commandant of the fort, hastily concluded that, because the Indore Residency had been attacked by Holcar's troops, the maharajah himself must needs be our enemy. Therefore, while the life of the prince and of his ministers were in extreme jeopardy, on account of their uncompromising adherence to the British cause, Captain Hungerford commenced the system so recklessly pursued at Allahabad, of punishing the innocent with the guilty, by proclaiming martial law, and sending for the guns, supported by flanking parties of officers, to destroy the villages surrounding Mhow,† without the slightest reference to the native government, whose revenues and authority were thus cruelly injured at the very moment when it was most important to strengthen both. But Holcar's straightforward and fearless policy placed his integrity beyond a doubt. After having made a noble stand at Indore, he sent a vakeel to Mhow, desiring to forward thither British treasure to the amount of £120,000, which he had partly saved from, and partly recovered after, the outbreak, together with notes of his own, to the value of about £245,000. Still, it was not until the Europeans learned the detention of the expected Bombay column by mutiny on the road, that they duly appreciated the value of Holcar's friendship, inasmuch as on him alone depended their preservation from being blockaded "in a weak fort, utterly untenable against an enemy with guns for any length of time, with only a handful of Europeans in the midst of a country risen all around."‡ Another officer of the 23rd, writing with the freedom of private correspondence, describes the fort as a mere "store-place for spare guns," dependent for water on a well outside. The state of the little garrison he speaks of as deplorable. The twenty-one officers released from regular duty by the mutiny of their men, formed themselves into a volunteer corps, and relieved the artillerymen of their night-watching, snatching sleep and food at intervals; the ladies, "huddled together" in the fort, found employment in sewing bags of powder for the guns; and showed themselves ready to do anything in their power to help the common cause, even to keeping watch on the bastions. The writer proceeds to describe the gallows erected outside the fort

* *Times*, August 20th, 1857.

† Report of Captain Hungerford; Mhow, July 4th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 121.

‡ Major Cooper's despatch; Mhow, July 9th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, p. 45.

gates; and gives expression to the general feeling of the Europeans, by declaring—"Mercy is a word we have scratched out of our memories; in fact, mercy to them is death to us." These words were written on the 6th of July, in a station where no woman or child, and only three males, had been injured by the hands of the mutineers, and where some remarkable evidence had been afforded of generosity and fidelity on the part of the sepoy.* The first Cawnpore massacre was then not known; the second was perpetrated ten days later—long after the English had taken vengeance for their motto, and resolved on ignoring every suggestion of mercy as incompatible with their own safety. Women and children would have had a very different prospect of safety and good treatment at the hands of the rebels, had they been viewed as hostages, or any offer of amnesty held out in connexion with them: but in too many of the scattered stations, the first phase was blind security; the second, unreasoning panic; the third, martial law, or, in other words, indiscriminate slaughter.

The tone adopted at Mhow complicated the difficulties of Holcar, who found himself between two fires. Early on the morning of the 2nd of July, the mutineers from Mhow arrived at Indore, and fraternised with their brethren. For two days the utmost riot and disorder prevailed. The rebels strove to intimidate the maharajah, and demanded from him the heads of some Europeans, or Eurasians and native Christians, who had taken refuge in the palace, together with those of his advisers who were considered most in the interest of the Kafirs (infidels)—namely, Omeid Sing, Ram Chundra, Khooman, and Gunish. This he indignantly refused. On the 4th, the mutineers and the rabble growing bolder, commenced a general plunder of Indore. The maharajah seems, up to this time, to have remained quietly watching the progress of events, which he was powerless to control; but now, finding that no British reinforcement came to his aid, and that his peaceful subjects were being trampled on by armed ruffians, he mounted his horse, and, with a very few staunch followers, rode to the rebel camp. The scene which ensued reads like an extract from the graphic

pages of the Mahratta historian, Grant Duff. The young chief addressed his eager listeners with force and dignity. With regard to the refugees in his palace, and his unpopular retainers, he declared that—alive, he would protect them; dead, he would not even surrender their bodies. The troops had previously set his orders at naught by attacking the British, on the ground that religion was the cause of the mutiny, and they would not act against their brethren. Holcar now bade them, in the name of religion, cease from plundering Indore, or he would take arms against them, and die discharging his duty as a ruler. The rebels changed their ground—reminded the young chief of his famous ancestor, Jeswunt Rao Holcar, and urged him to lay the spear on his shoulder, and lead them to Delhi; for the star of the British in the East had set, owing to their pride and faithlessness. As an irresistible motive, the spokesman added, that his highness must not prove himself a coward. Holcar was superior to the taunt, and brave enough to bear the imputation of cowardice from his own troops. He replied, with singular tact and courage, that he had not inherited the strength of his forefathers; moreover, he did not think rapine and the murder of women and children a part of any religion, and he was no fit companion for those who did. (In fact, the majority of his hearers knew that these crimes were utterly opposed to the spirit of the Brahminical creed; and Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire, had decreed that, even in war, cows, cultivators, and women were never to be molested).†

Holcar returned to his palace; the plundering of the city ceased; and the ring-leaders, and the mass of the mutineers, with some guns and treasure, marched off to Delhi. The maharajah succeeded in rescuing a portion of the treasure, and, in accordance with his previous intimation, sent it, and all over which he had any control, with the Christian refugees, over to the fort at Mhow, under a strong escort. Omeid Sing, from whose graphic narrative, dated "Indore palace, July 8th, 1857," and evidently addressed to Sir R. Hamilton,‡ the particulars of Holcar's conduct are chiefly obtained—states that, on the previous evening, a letter had been received at the palace

* Letter of an officer of 1st cavalry; already quoted.—*Times*, August 20th, 1857.

† *Indian Empire*, vol. i., p. 148.

‡ *Times*, August 25th, 1857.

from Captain Elliot,* alleging that Lieutenant Hutchinson (the Bheel agent) and his wife (the daughter of Sir Robert Hamilton) had fled from Bhopawur in disguise, and were in captivity at Amjherra. A portion of Holcar's troops had remained with him; and although, of these, many were disaffected, and all more or less compromised, he immediately sent a considerable detachment of picked men, comprising 300 foot, 200 horse, and two guns, to attack Amjherra, and release the Europeans. In conclusion, Omeid Sing entreated Sir R. Hamilton to return with all speed; declaring that his presence would be equal to five regiments. "Pray do come out soon, or Malwa is gone. Should I survive this row, I will write again; but there remains very little hope: his highness's troops are completely disorganised and disaffected."†

Bhopawur,—is a town in Amjherra, a petty Rajpoot state in Malwa; the rajah of which maintained 1,000 infantry on his own behalf, and paid a subsidy to the Supreme government, in the form of an annual contribution, towards the maintenance of the Malwa Bheel corps, which, as has been said, was only a local name for a portion of the Bengal army, maintained at the expense of the princes and chiefs of Malwa, but wholly independent of their control. On the 2nd of July, tidings reached Bhopawur of the attack on the Indore Residency by Holcar's troops; and it was asserted, that the maharajah had himself joined in the revolt. The effect of the intelligence on the petty chiefs around was immediate; and the few Europeans located at Bhopawur and its vicinity, learned, with alarm, that the station was menaced by an attack from the Amjherra troops. The detachment of the Bheel corps stationed at Bhopawur, consisting of about 200 men, seemed firm; and Lieutenant Hutchinson and the medical officer (Dr. Chisholm),

after consulting together, resolved to make a stand at the lines. In the middle of the night, an express arrived from Dhar (a Rajpoot principality adjoining Amjherra), with the news that some Mohammedan troops there had revolted, and were marching in force on Bhopawur. At this time only about thirty Bheels remained in the lines; the others had stolen away from fear; and those who had not deserted, were evidently little disposed to brave a struggle with the expected enemy. Had they been alone, the two Europeans might have been disposed to wait the event; but there were women and children to be protected. Therefore, after disguising themselves in native clothing, and directing their servants to speak of them as Parsee merchants and their families going to Baroda, they commenced their flight: Mrs. Stockley (the wife of the colonel of the Bheel regiment), her ayah, and her four children, in one cart; Lieutenant and Mrs. Hutchinson, their ayah and baby, in another; with Dr. Chisholm on horseback, started for Jabooah, attended by several servants.‡

Jabooah,—is a small subsidiary native state, between Indore and Amjherra. The reigning family claim descent from the Rahtore princes of Joudpoor; but the population (returned at 132,104 persons) consists chiefly of a civilised class of Bheels. The fugitives dispatched a horseman to the young rajah, asking for an escort to meet them; but had scarcely arrived within his territory, before they learned that a party of troops from Amjherra were at their heels. The timely arrival of a hundred Bheels from Jabooah changed the aspect of affairs. After halting for awhile at a village, where the head man gave up his own dinner to them, they started afresh, and proceeded some distance to the house of a liquor vendor, where they passed the night. Early in the morning, Lieutenant Hutchinson overheard the Bheels talking among

* The Captain Elliot referred to, is probably the person mentioned by Mr. Cumming, the brother of the Gordon Cumming of lion-hunting notoriety, as having been staying with him at Maunpoor (fourteen miles from Mhow, and twenty-eight from Indore) at the time of the mutiny. "Elliot, of the Thuggee department, and his wife, had," he writes, been staying with him for some time; "but they went to Indore on the morning of the 1st of July, intending to return in the evening;" and, of course, on learning what had occurred, took refuge with the other Europeans in the fort. Mr. Cumming, however, although the only European functionary at

Maunpoor, resolved on making an effort to retain his position, and assembled round him a motley force of "road police, armed with carbines; Bheels, with bows; and Bundelcund men, with long matchlocks (some 200 men in all), and a few sowars." With these auxiliaries he held his ground.—*Times*, September 2nd, 1857.

† Letter of Omeid Sing.—*Times*, August 25th, 1857. The letter is evidently not a translation, but written in colloquial English, with a sufficient admixture of Indian turns of thought and expression to attest the extraction of the writer.

‡ Letter of Dr. Chisholm.—*Times*, Sept. 2nd, 1857.

themselves in a most murderous strain. He sprang up, and roused his companions, saying it was time to start. The journey was resumed, and terminated safely at Jabooah early on the 5th of July.*

The rajah, a good-looking youth of sixteen, received the Europeans very kindly. In consequence of his minority, the management of affairs rested in the hands of his grandmother; and she, in the true spirit of a Rajpootni, exerted herself in every possible way for the safety and comfort of her way-worn guests. "To protect us," Dr. Chisholm writes, "was as much as she could do; for there were a number of Arabs and men of that class in the employ of the chief; and these fanatics loudly demanded our surrender, that they might put us to death. The family themselves are Rajpoots, and had fortunately a number of Rajpoot retainers about them. To these they assigned our protection; and faithfully did they execute their trust. Not a Mussulman sepoy was allowed to approach our quarters in the palace."†

On the 8th of July, a messenger arrived with a communication from Holcar, who had dispatched an expedition against Jabooah, under the impression that the Europeans were forcibly detained there; but on discovering the true state of the case, the expedition was recalled, and an escort sent, which reached its destination on the 10th; and, on the 12th, the fugitives quitted their kind protectors. Lieutenant Hutchinson had received a letter from Holcar, entreating him to repair to Indore forthwith, that the kingdom might be preserved during the absence of Sir R. Hamilton. Hutchinson writes—"I had such implicit faith in Holcar's friendship, that I did not hesitate to place myself and family under the protection of his troops, for the purpose of proceeding to Indore, to assume charge of the agency during the absence of Colonel Durand; and, by my presence and advice, to assure and guide Holcar through the crisis." Repeated warnings from the Europeans at Mhow, induced Lieutenant Hutchinson to relinquish the idea of residing at Indore; and he wrote to the maharajah, explaining that the excited state of the Native troops, who had not yet absolutely revolted, ren-

dered the presence of a European inadvisable, as it was the best policy to ward off, as far as possible, a second outbreak, until the arrival of British reinforcements. He, however, came to Mhow, and assumed charge of the agency, and the people appeared reassured by his presence.

On the 30th of July, the long-expected column reached Mhow; and Colonel Durand, who accompanied it, resumed his duties as acting resident (without, however, venturing to join Holcar at Indore), until Sir Robert Hamilton returned from England—to the joy of the maharajah, and the great advantage of the British commissariat.

Augur,—is a large town in the dominions of Sindia, about thirty-six miles from Oojein. The 5th infantry regiment, Gwalior contingent, commanded by Captain Carter, was stationed here, together with a field battery, and some of the Gwalior cavalry. Besides the officers on duty, three others, namely, Major Macpherson (not the Gwalior resident), Captain Ryall, and Dr. Sillifant, had taken refuge at Augur, when expelled from *Seepree* by the mutiny of the 3rd regiment of the Gwalior contingent on the 18th of June.

The outbreak at Augur was very sudden. Shortly before it took place, Captain Carter had obtained 1,353 rupees, and a promise of 500 more, to enable the men to rebuild their huts, which had been for the most part washed down by the first fall of rain (thirty-six hours in duration). He had been earnest in encouraging them to work hard, and restore their habitations before the next downpouring, and they had laboured with industry and cheerfulness. Up to 9 P.M., July 3rd, the men were reported "loyal and obedient as ever;" but, after that time, much excitement prevailed in the lines. It appears that Captain Carter had applied to the Gwalior authorities for pay for the men. The orderlies sent on this errand, on reaching Gwalior, were taunted by the mutineers with wearing the British uniform. The answer returned is not on record; but a mounted orderly from Gwalior arrived, with directions to withhold the pay of the 5th infantry. The news created great dissatisfaction, which was reported to Captain Carter on the evening of the 3rd; and, soon after daybreak on the following morning, his native orderlies brought word that the men were running to and fro, as if bewildered. Springing

* Letter of Lieutenant A. B. E. Hutchinson, Bheel agent, and political assistant at Bhopawur.—*Times*, September 10th, 1857.

† Letter of Dr. Chisholm; published in the *Times*, September 2nd, 1857.

from his bed, Captain Carter called to the adjutant, Lieutenant O'Dowda, to dress and accompany him to the parade. The horse of the adjutant stood ready saddled; he mounted it, and galloped alone to the lines, which he had scarcely entered before he was shot down; at the same time, the havildar-major and the pay havildar, both of whom were known to be thoroughly staunch to the British, were killed.

While the horse of Captain Carter was being saddled, a report was brought him that a large body of cavalry and infantry mutineers was advancing on the parade-ground. Believing this to be true, he mounted and rode over to the house of Captain le Marchand, the artillery officer, to request him to take charge of two guns of the Mahidpoor contingent, in position at the quarter-guard. Then he proceeded towards the lines; and, on the way, met a European sergeant, who said that the regiment was in open mutiny, and had warned him away. Still the captain pressed on till stopped by four sepoy, who with raised hands implored him to return, or he would be shot. Lieutenant Macdougall also came up: he had seen the men of the different companies loading their arms; they had not been insolent, but had quietly warned him away. It was evidently useless to persist further, and the officers turned back, and prepared for flight. Dr. and Mrs. James had already quitted the station. Their horses stood saddled for a morning ride, and they mounted and rode off. Their fate was long uncertain; but the most reliable account describes them as having been murdered at a village about eight miles from Augur. The other Europeans were more fortunate, at least those whose position gave them means of escape; but the sergeants, half-caste clerks, and others, were sacrificed, as was too commonly the case, to the fury of the rabble. The party who escaped comprised twenty persons, of whom the majority were women and children. The wives and infants of two absent officers—Captains Burlton and Harrison, of the 2nd cavalry—were among those who most required protection. Dr. Wilson, the medical officer in charge of the station, had a double-seated curricule with fast horses: in this he placed the two ladies, each of whom had a baby in her arms; one of these was just twelve days old. The servants threw in some blankets and bedding while the horses were being harnessed; but not a

single native, either sepoy or servant, would accompany the fugitives. The departure was most hurried; for the sight of two burning bungalows, and the sounds of pillage and destruction, warned the Europeans of the necessity for instant flight. A bullock-cart was procured for the remainder of the ladies and children; the gentlemen mounted their horses; and the fugitives set forth on their journey, ignorant of the road, with nothing but the clothes they wore; and those of the scantiest description; for some persons were in night-dresses, bare-footed and bare-legged, as they had risen from their beds.* On the 14th, the whole party reached the British station of Hooshungabad in safety;† and Mrs. Harrison had the relief of meeting there her husband, the officer second in command of the 2nd cavalry, Gwalior contingent, who was supposed to have perished.

The journey had its remarkable incidents, not the least interesting of which was the kind reception given to the wayfarers at Echawur—a town in the Bhopal territory, twelve miles south of Sehore. The governor, John de Silva, commonly known as Jan Sahib, wore the dress of a Mussulman; but was a Portuguese by birth, and a Christian by creed. His grateful guests pronounced him a Christian by practice also, for he manifested every care for their wants, and treated them with a respectful sympathy, which was very soothing after the contemptuous indifference evinced by the natives, who had shown no pity for their distressing position, but had regarded them as “despicable Feringhees, whose reign was over.” Dr. Wilson draws a pleasant picture of Jan Sahib, and the little community over which he presided, in a very patriarchal fashion. Several old Frenchmen (Bourbons) resided at Echawur, who had emigrated in the days of the revolution. Some of these had served under the British government, and were among its pensionaries; but all had adopted Mussulman names. There was an intelligent young man, named Nicholas Reilly, who called himself an Irishman, having been born of Irish parents at Cawnpoor. He, with a number of other Christians, had taken service under the begum, Doolan Sahib, the jaghiredar or ruler of the Echawur district, who was herself a Christian, but was absent at the time, having been summoned to Bhopal by the reigning

* Account by Dr. Wilson, dated July 16th, 1857.

† Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), 1857; p. 15.

begum. Notwithstanding his foreign extraction, Jan Sahib was a popular governor. "Easy and affable in manner, deeply versed in the knowledge of drugs and disease, he commanded the respect of all around him as a man of wonderful attainments. He exhibited with honest pride his medicine chest, which contained phials of calomel, jalap, essence of cinnamon, and oil of lemon-grass, with which he successfully ministered to the wants of thousands."* Dr. Wilson adds, that every member of the little band would "long cherish in grateful recollection the worthy governor of Echawur." Perhaps some of them learned a lesson in the art of ruling, which they might hope to profit by in happier times.

Alighur.—The 1st cavalry of the Gwalior contingent joined the mutiny, as if impelled by some irresistible fascination. At mid-day on the 3rd of July, the Native officers waited on their commander, Captain William Alexander, and, with tears and lamentations, told him that the regiment must be broken up; for they had received an order

from the King of Delhi, and letters threatening the most terrible vengeance on their families in the event of their not abandoning the service of the British; therefore Captain Alexander and his countrymen must start at once for Agra. Resistance was futile; Captain Alexander, Lieutenant Cockburn, and Dr. Christison, mounted their horses; while the whole of the men crowded round them, and insisted on shaking hands. The regimental banker had disappeared, and the servants of the officers were in distress for money, as the bunneahs (traders) would not let them follow their masters without first paying their bazaar debts; whereupon a Native officer brought out a bag of rupees, and gave some to all the servants. A non-commissioned officer, and twenty sowars, assisted in lading the baggage; and the Europeans started, attended by a regular escort, and "accompanied for some distance by Native officers and men, all clinging to them, and crying bitterly." They reached Agra, with their baggage, on the following day.†

CHAPTER XVII.

TERRITORIES OF THE NIZAM, AURUNGABAD, AND HYDERABAD.—MAY TO AUGUST.
AGRA.—JUNE TO SEPTEMBER. SAUGOR: THE PUNJAB, JULLUNDUR, JHELMUM, PHILLOUR, UMRITSIR, AND SEALKOTE.—JUNE AND JULY, 1857.

THE recent history of Hyderabad formed an important feature in the introductory chapter, regarding the causes of the mutiny. Had the proud prince, from whom the three finest districts in his territory were wrested in 1853, for the maintenance of a British contingent, lived to see the mutiny of 1857, he might have been sorely tempted to listen to the passionate entreaties of his fanatical and disaffected subjects, to hoist the green flag of Mohammed, and write in blood and flame a refutation of one of the most inexcusable insults ever offered by a British governor-general in council to an old and faithful ally—"Remember you are but as

the dust under my feet."‡ But the Nizam slept with his fathers when the sword on which the E. I. Company relied was turned against them, as it were, by an unseen hand, and the despised native princes, after being trodden under foot, were appealed to with eager respect as honourable and powerful allies. Happily for all parties, two excellent advisers were beside the young Nizam when the crisis came; and he had the good sense to listen to their counsels, and turn a deaf ear to the popular clamour. One of these was the venerable Shums-ool-Omrah;§ the other the dewan, Salar Jung.

The troops stationed at Aurungabad were

* The *Bombay Times* gives this narrative at length. The *Friend of India*, in commenting thereon, remarks, "that it is eminently instructive; and will go far to disprove the assertion, that the revolt in Hindoostan was caused solely by a discontented soldiery."—August 27th, 1857; p. 817.

† Manuscript account by Captain W. Alexander.

‡ The actual words of the despatch sent to Hyderabad; which were suppressed in the Blue-Book version prepared for parliament. See Introductory Chapter, p. 55; and Mr. Bright's speech in the House of Commons, June 24th, 1858.

§ See Introductory Chapter, p. 55.

the 1st regiment of irregular cavalry of the Nizam's contingent, and the 2nd infantry, which corps had only recently arrived there. The officer in command of the cavalry, Captain Abbott, had seen no symptom of disaffection; but, on subsequent inquiry, it appeared that rumours were abroad of the intention of government to send the regiment to join a column which was to be composed almost exclusively of Europeans. Captain Abbott, in ignorance of these reports, intimated, early on the morning of the 12th of June, his intention of coming to the lines in the afternoon to look at the horses. The men concluded the intended examination to be preparatory to a march; and, at mid-day, while Captain Abbott was presiding over a court of inquiry at the mess-house, a non-commissioned officer and his brother (Seiks) came and informed him that the men were in a state of mutiny; that they declared they had been enlisted for service in the Deccan, and would not march beyond it; and that many, both Mussulmans and Hindoos, had taken an oath not to fight against their padshah, or emperor, meaning the son of the old King of Delhi, who had been set up by the mutineers. It was further intimated, that if Captain Abbott, Lieutenant Dowker, and the senior risaldar, proceeded to the lines that afternoon for the purpose of giving marching orders, they would be shot. The three officers went on parade, and assured the cavalry that they were not aware of any intention on the part of government such as they suspected.*

The resident at Hyderabad (Davidson), when informed of these proceedings, approved of them, as at present no succour could be sent to Aurungabad; and desired Captain Abbott to assemble the 1st cavalry, and assure the men from him,—

"Both in his capacity as British resident, and as their old friend and brother-officer, that he is satisfied that their present conduct arises from the pernicious counsels of bad and designing men.

"That the government have no intention to call for their services to act against the King of Delhi, who is himself a supplicant for the protection of the

British government; but, wherever their services are required, it will be necessary for the regiment to obey.

"The resident trusts that by the early return of the corps to fidelity, he will be able to induce government to overlook their present proceedings; but, at the same time, to point out the ruin and disgrace that a persistence in their present conduct must inevitably have.

"You will be pleased to mention that the resident had hoped to be able proudly to point out to government, that every corps in the contingent was stanch and loyal. The 3rd cavalry are now in the field against the mutineers; the 2nd are in charge of the Residency; and the whole corps have volunteered to march to suppress the revolt of Delhi."†

Of this strangely-worded and compromising message to the mutineers, the governor-general in council approved, excepting the intimation that, in the event of future good conduct, their past proceedings would be overlooked;‡ but this was, in fact, the only portion which was likely to make any impression on the sepoys; for although the King of Delhi might be, and actually was, a supplicant, yet he was publicly spoken of as a rebel and a leader of rebels; not as an old man in his dotage, who had fallen on evil times, and become the puppet of a revolutionary army.

The resident's assertion regarding the loyalty of the rest of the Hyderabad contingent, was likely to provoke discussion; for one of the reports, mentioned by Captain Abbott as circulated and credited by his men, was, that the 3rd cavalry had been entrapped into the service on which they had been sent, and intended to desert: moreover, that one of their most influential Native officers had already done so.§ The men of the 2nd infantry showed no sympathy with the cavalry, but remained perfectly quiet.

On the 13th of June, a report was spread by a syce that the infantry and guns had been ordered out against the cavalry; and so much excitement was thereby caused, that, on the Sunday afternoon, the ladies and children were sent off to Ahmednugger,|| sixty-eight miles to the north-east, under the charge of Captain Mayne; and a

* Captain Abbott's Report, dated "Aurungabad, June 18th, 1857."—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), pp. 83—85.

† Despatch of Major Briggs, secretary to resident; June 16th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, pp. 85, 86.

‡ Despatch of secretary to government (Colonel Birch), June 29th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, p. 86.

§ Captain Abbott's Report.—*Ibid.*, p. 86.

|| Some of them had already started. One of these, the wife of an officer of the 2nd infantry,

gave a very interesting account of her flight, which was published in the leading London journals. On the night of the 12th June, it was reported that the cavalry were arming, and intended to murder the officers of the 2nd infantry. The lady in question, with her children, was entrusted by her husband to the care of Booran Bucksh (a trooper of the 3rd Hyderabad cavalry), in whose zeal and integrity of character they had perfect confidence. He pitied the distress of the European officer, and

request was made to the commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, to march the movable column assembling at Malligaum for the reinforcement of Indore, upon Aurungabad. In the course of the same evening another explanation took place between the European officers and the troopers, which induced Captain Abbott to believe that the regiment would now, as a body, become quiet and orderly: he therefore wrote to countermand the assistance he had requested from Ahmednuggur, as the 1st cavalry did not need coercion. But the resident had, with equal rapidity, changed his view of the case; and declared himself, on the 19th of June, "determined to admit of no compromise with these men,"* who were, however, to be temporised with till the arrival of the British force. The question of how the European officers were to maintain tranquillity in the interim, and keep their own heads on their shoulders, without making concessions which should tie their hands afterwards, was passed over in silence.

After the usual amount of ordering and counter-ordering, the column, under General Woodburn, marched for Aurungabad. A civilian who accompanied the force, "because none of the officers knew the road," describes the line of march:—14th dragoons first, then the general and his staff; then the 28th N.I., and a battery under Captain Woolcombe; the rear brought up by a pontoon train, and some twenty elephants and the baggage—the whole extending about two miles in length.

The cavalcade entered Aurungabad on the morning of the 24th of June. Captain Abbott and the officers came out to meet the troops, said that affairs were in a very unsatisfactory state, and urged that the general should march at once on the cavalry intrenchments, and surprise them. The civilian before quoted, who was an eye-witness to these proceedings, says—"The general consented to do so at last." On reaching

bade him be under no apprehension for the safety of his family, or for that of his guest (the wife of an absent European, to whom Booran Bucksh was greatly attached), for every provision was made for their retreat. And so it proved. When the alarm, happily a false one, was given on the night of the 12th of June, and the officer proceeded to his dangerous post between the infantry and cavalry lines, the faithful trooper placed the ladies and children in a country cart, and covering the open front and back with sheets, in the manner practised by the natives, armed himself and rode by their side for several days, till they reached Ahmednuggur, striving,

the cavalry lines the bugles were sounded, and the men ordered to fall-in on foot. The guns were loaded with canister, and drawn up within thirty yards of the troopers. General Woodburn, with his aide-de-camp, Macdonald; the deputy-adjutant-general, Coley; Captain Mayne, of the Hyderabad contingent; Captain Abbott and the civilian, rode up to the ranks; and Abbott began to harangue the men on their conduct, and its coming punishment, when a jemadar exclaimed—"It is not good; it is all false!" Abbott drew his pistol, and would have shot the speaker; but the general turning round, quietly desired him not to fire upon his own men, whereupon the officer put up his pistol and continued his address. The jemadar again interrupted him—"It is not true; it is all false. Brothers, prime and fire!" Pistols were drawn forth by several of the men in front of the ranks, and, had they been fired, the six Europeans, standing not five yards from the troopers, must have fallen. But the event showed the propriety of General Woodburn's prohibition to Abbott. The foremost troopers, without firing a shot, rushed to their horses, and proceeded to saddle them; while the Europeans rode back behind the guns. Captain Woolcombe had dismounted, and was pointing a gun at the panic-stricken multitude; the portfire was lighted; and "one word only," it is said, "was wanted to blow every soul of them to the four winds." Woolcombe asked impatiently, "May I fire, sir?" and the civilian, who reports the scene, blames the general for not giving the instant assent,† which would have been a sentence of extermination against the very men who had spared the Europeans not two minutes before. An officer present, in describing the same circumstance, remarks, that "the general could not give the order to fire, as he feared to knock over the good men with the bad;" and Captain Abbott, in his report, states, that "every endeavour was made to stop

"by the most vigilant attention and kindness, to lessen the discomforts of the road." The ladies entreated him to take some money, if only in repayment of the expenses of the journey; but he persisted in refusing, on the ground that it would disgrace him to accept money under the circumstances; and that he only desired that his name might be good among the English. After his return his dwelling was burned to the ground by some of his countrymen, in revenge for his devotion to the Feringhee.

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 82.

† Letter in the *Times*, August 22nd, 1857.

the men, and induce them to remain and hear what was to be said to them. With great difficulty a large portion of the men were separated, and ordered to fall back in the rear of the force. The rest dispersed among the lines, refusing to return, though frequently called upon to do so. They mounted their horses, upon which General Woodburn ordered the guns to open on them. They all then immediately fled, and were pursued by the dragoons. The whole of the bad men were among them."* The officer whose testimony (published anonymously in the *Times*) has been given as showing the reason why the general prevented the wholesale butchery of a mass of men, who, mutinous or not mutinous, had been diplomatised with, in a manner not much in accordance with British straightforwardness, up to the very moment when the guns of the column could be brought to bear on them—thus describes the proceedings which followed the flight and pursuit of the mutineers:—

"Two of our companies afterwards went all through the lines, and we fully expected a slight struggle there; but they were not game; and such as did not run away gave themselves up quickly. We took their standards. These mutineers are, without exception, the finest body of men I have seen in India—immense fellows, of sixteen or seventeen stone each, and scarcely one of them under five feet ten inches. We have already disposed of a goodly number of the ninety-four prisoners we took in the first haul of the net. One has been hung, four shot, one blown from a gun—a frightful sight indeed! his head ascended about twenty yards into the air, and his arms were thrown about eighty yards in either direction. I was astonished to see how coolly they received intelligence that they were to suffer death. The man who was blown away only said, 'that witnesses against him would have to answer for this in the next world;' and begged of them not to tie him to the guns, as he would not flinch at all. The fellow who was hung said, that 'having washed his hands of life, he had washed away all his sins, and the sooner he went to paradise the better.' We have yet plenty of this work before us."

Of the prisoners taken in this affair, two were blown from guns; seven shot by the dragoons; four cut down in the charge; several hung; between thirty and forty transported; one hundred disbanded and turned out of the station; and some fifty or sixty others flogged and otherwise punished.

Hyderabad.—While the events just recorded were taking place at Aurungabad, affairs at Hyderabad were in a most critical

* Captain Abbott's Report, June 24th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 87.

state. The Moolvees, or Mohammedan priests, scarcely disguised their exultation at hearing the news from Meerut and Delhi (which happily did not reach the city for nearly a month after the perpetration of the massacres); and the fakirs, or religious mendicants, went among the lower orders of the people, using the most inflammatory language. The fidelity of the resident's escort, consisting of two companies of Native infantry, 200 troopers, and five guns, was strongly suspected, as also that of the troops in the Secunderabad cantonments; but happily the Arab guards stood firm on the side of order. A member of the European community at Hyderabad, who has given a well-digested account of the able and fearless manner in which the native government breasted the storm—remarks, that the fidelity of the Arabs might be partly accounted for by the regular payment they received from Salar Jung; and further, by their being, as a class, wealthy and avaricious, acting as the soucars or bankers of the city, and therefore naturally disinclined to take part in a struggle in which, win who might, they were sure to lose. At an early period, the Arab jemadars assured the resident of their resolve to stand by the government; and they had repeated opportunities of proving their sincerity. There were, however, disorderly bands of Deccanees, Rohillas, and Afghans in the city, whose voice was ever for war; and it was impossible to foresee how long even the watchful and resolute sway of Salar Jung would suffice to keep down disaffection. On Friday, the 12th of June, an attempt was made in one of the chief mosques to raise the cry for a Jihad, or holy war. The Moolvee (Akbar Ali) was interrupted by a voice demanding the extermination of the infidels: a second speaker took the same tone; and but for the timely arrival of the Arabs sent by the minister, an immediate outbreak would probably have occurred. The preachers of sedition escaped, for it was impossible to detect them amid an assemblage of 5,000 persons. Placards were thenceforth daily stuck up in the mosques, and Salar Jung became the object of popular hatred and virulent abuse. Unmoved, he tore down the placards; placed Arab guards at all the gates and mosques; warned unruly characters; watched suspected men; summoned Seiks and others, whom he could trust, to the city; and broke up all tumultuous assemblies. The British functionaries zealously co-operated

with the native minister. General Cotton, and the indefatigable police magistrate, Captain Webb, were incessantly on the alert; the post-office was watched, fakirs were deported, suspicious characters imprisoned, newsmakers flogged, and every means taken to prevent mischief entering the cantonments from without. But there were counteracting influences at work—the Wahabees were busily inciting the sepoy to revolt; and rumours gained ground in the city, that they would not stand the strain much longer. On the 20th of June, the intelligence of the disturbances at Aurungabad arrived, and caused great excitement in the city and cantonments. Five days later, the false but generally believed report that Delhi had fallen, gave rise to a different feeling. The writer already quoted, whose statements supply the deficiency of official records, observes—

“The effect upon the masses of the people was very marked. We then saw that Delhi was everything; it was a name, a cause, a locality, a something tangible to fight for. Many, even of the better classes, scarcely knew Cawnpoor, Lahore, Allahabad, &c., by name; but all knew Delhi. Our defeats and successes elsewhere were moonshine; at Delhi they were of overwhelming importance: with Delhi we held India; without it we were conquered. In a few days the real truth was known—Delhi had not fallen, and every native raised his head again higher than ever. Rumours of further mutinies and massacres, of further misfortunes, created intense satisfaction here, and evidently the heaving was beginning to look uncomfortable once more.”*

On the 12th of July, thirteen of the Aurungabad mutineers were apprehended and handed over to the resident. On the 17th (Friday), a band of Rohillas, headed by a jemadar, named Toora Baz Khan, and a Moolvee, burst into the Begum bazaar, and proceeded to attack the Residency, calling out for the release of the Aurungabad prisoners, and the looting of the treasury. The Residency and bazaar are divided from the city by the Moossi river. The former, planned and executed by Major Oliphant in 1831, is a superb pile of building, built of squared granite stone, and far better calculated to stand a siege than that at Lucknow. Its occupants were not taken by surprise: guns were posted in readiness; and when the turbulent mob commenced breaking down the garden gates, the horse artillery opened at 300 yards' distance with double charges of canister. When the

smoke dispersed, the assailants were found to have disappeared likewise. The greater part had fled out of reach; the rest had broken into a neighbouring house for shelter. The night came on, and “watch was set to hinder their escape, but in vain: they dug through a wall, and fled.” Toora Baz Khan was eventually captured through the exertions of Salar Jung; but the Moolvee remained at large, and was supposed to be concealed by some influential city noble. The failure of the attempted *emeute* was very serviceable to the British cause. The Aurungabad mutineers were tried, transported, and sent off with all speed to Masulipatam. There were still difficulties to be met by the Hyderabad government, caused by the progress of the rebellion in Central India; the long interval which elapsed before the capture of Delhi; and especially the celebration of the Mohurram (ending on the 31st of August), at which time Mohammedan bigotry attains its highest pitch. But the preparations made to meet the danger, sufficed to avert it: no disturbance took place; the native authorities were stanch in this trying, tempting hour, as they ever had been; and in opposition to the clamorous popular voice, the court of Hyderabad continued, throughout the mutiny, the most valuable ally of the Calcutta government. The peril is past now (at least people think so); and many Indian, and some few English, voices are asking—What is to be done for the Nizam? Are the “temporarily assumed” districts to be restored to him? And by what honours and rewards is the Crown of England to show its gratitude to the venerable Shums-ool-Omrah, and the able and unflinching Salar Jung? English infirmity and incapacity are shelved with a retiring pension from Indian revenues: Indian annuities and British honours are showered abundantly on men who have not seldom made the mischief they have the credit of mending: but is there no provision in our system, our new system of national government and national responsibility, for fitly rewarding native statesmen, who have served us ably, heartily, successfully, in the severest trial we have ever had in India? If not, our present, and ostensibly reformed, plan must needs have for its main-spring the same short-sighted selfishness which was the radical defect in the policy of the old E. I. Company; a policy that has borne the fruit of

* Letter dated “Hyderabad, Deccan, October 12th, 1857.”—*Times*, December 3rd, 1857.

bankruptcy and disgrace, an empty treasury, and a heavy national debt tied round the necks of a people whose consent was never asked for its imposition; incurred, too, not in improving the country, but in making war, and supporting enormous bands of mercenaries, whose revolt has brought the sway of "their honourable masters" to a speedy conclusion, and deluged India with English and native blood. These are the results of governing on the principle of India for the E. I. Company. It remains to be proved whether the British parliament is aware of the necessity of a change in practice as well as in theory—in performance as well as in promise—in things as well as in names.

Agra.—The mutinies detailed in preceding pages, rendered our tenure of the capital of the North-West Provinces very precarious. The men of the two regiments (44th and 67th N.I.) disarmed at the close of May, had, happily for all parties, quietly availed themselves of permission to return to their homes; but the Neemuch mutineers took up a position on the high-road to Agra, and threatened to attack the city.

At first sight, few places would have appeared better capable of resisting a siege than the stately fort, rebuilt by Akber in 1570, and long considered impregnable. It stands on the right bank of the river Jumna; and the high, red sandstone walls, deep ditch, and drawbridge, form, in their massive strength, a counterpart of the magnificence within the fort, which contains the palace, with its gilded cupolas, and rich tracery of gold and blue enamel—on which Akber lavished millions; the Motee Musjid, or Pearl Mosque, of pure white marble; the arsenal, and other public buildings. The acting commander-in-chief, Sir Patrick Grant, as late as the 25th of July, took the popular view of the strength of the fort of Agra, and appears to have imperfectly appreciated the danger to be apprehended in the event of a siege by the Gwalior contingent. "We may lose," he writes from Calcutta, "perhaps have lost, the country round Agra; but it would be hard to convince me, that any number of mutineers and insurgents that can possibly be congregated before the place, can ever succeed in capturing the fort of Agra—a strong and regular

fortification, thoroughly armed with heavy guns of siege-calibre; manned by a European garrison of at least 1,000 men, including the volunteers; and with a principal arsenal, thoroughly supplied with every munition of war, within the walls. If the authorities have neglected to collect and store provisions, the garrison may be starved into submission, of course; but otherwise, the fort of Agra is perfectly safe."*

The lieutenant-governor did not take so sanguine a view of affairs. The fort he described as an old native one, with some weak points about it. The European battery was not well manned; it was deficient both in officers and men, but possessed an excellent commander in Captain d'Oyly. Provisions for six months had been secured, through the intervention of a famous commissariat contractor, Lala Jotee Persaud. The British commissariat officer—being, it is said, very inefficiently supported, if not absolutely contravened, by the Agra magistrate, in his efforts to purchase stores of grain from the disaffected dealers—was in despair; when recourse was had to the Lala, whose previous most important services in the Sutlej campaign had been requited by an action for embezzlement. Happily for us, he had been acquitted, and the money due to him repaid at last. Perhaps, as a writer in the *Quarterly Review* suggests, "he forgot our ingratitude in our justice."† The fact of his being an extensive proprietor of government paper, doubtless tended to make him desirous of the maintenance, or rather restoration, of British rule: but it is certain that he stood almost alone, loyal and friendly, in the midst of a disaffected population; never wavered even when our fortunes and exchequer were at the lowest, and continued to inform the authorities of the intelligence he received by means of the regular communication kept up by him, on his private account, with Delhi and Gwalior,‡ at a time when Agra was the one remaining stronghold of the North-West Provinces, and stood "surrounded, as it were, by a perfect sea of mutiny."§

The lieutenant-governor resisted its encroachments to the uttermost, while himself dying by slow degrees, from the effects of unrelenting anxiety and fatigue. His position was as cruel a one as that which

* Memorandum by Sir Patrick Grant, the acting commander-in-chief.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 18.

† *Quarterly Review*, October, 1858.

‡ Letter of one of the Agra garrison.—*Times*, April 4th, 1857.

§ See communication already quoted, made by Umballah correspondent to the *Times*, Oct. 26th, 1857.





Sir Henry Lawrence then held at Lucknow. The cry of help arose on all sides from subordinate stations, and he had none to give. Very different was the situation of Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab. When the cartridge mutiny commenced, he found himself with twelve European regiments, and an untainted local army, in the midst of a population of 13,000,000, quite indifferent to nice questions of caste; while Mr. Colvin had three European regiments wherewith to meet the revolt of a trained and numerous army, and the passive, and often active, hostility of 40,000,000 of people, who had, for years, been complaining of the oppressive nature of our taxation, and "disliked, for very sufficient reason, our system of civil procedure."* The faults of which Mr. Colvin was accused, were those of "over-governing" and undue clemency. The former might have been forgiven; but the latter was the most unpardonable sin a European could commit in the sight of his countrymen during their first paroxysms of rage and terror.

Raikes writes—"The fine frame of Mr. Colvin was sinking under the ravages of disease, yet he persisted in attending to every detail of business. While he acknowledged to me, that the load of responsibility, the agony caused by the suffering and dangers of his officers at every station in Upper India, was too much for human endurance, he resolutely watched every detail of public business. Even now, if I wanted a sword or a pistol from the magazine, Mr. Colvin's counter-signature was necessary."† It is possible, that the reason of this may have been the lieutenant-governor's desire to exercise some check on the village-burning expeditions; the impolicy, as well as cruelty of which he must have appreciated; and likewise of the means adopted at this period for the obtainment of revenue. Mr. Colvin never confounded ferocity with vigour. He saw clearly that we were "not in a position to refuse to receive submission from, and accord pardon to, the large section of sepoys who had but followed their leaders;" and he knew that "the confident European cry, that Delhi should be taken forthwith, and not one of them should escape, was, in fact, but ignorance and folly. A division among the mutineers, and the partial submission of the least guilty, was, of all things,

most to be desired."‡ But he was in a very small minority; and he could do little to counteract the system of indiscriminate vengeance pursued by the Europeans, wherever they were in sufficient numbers to attempt it, notwithstanding its evident tendency to diminish the chances of escape for the European fugitives. Yet he never ceased to feel, and to avow his sense of, the responsibility incurred by the government towards the people, over whom it had assumed the rights of sovereignty. "He could not bear to give up station after station to anarchy, neither could he quietly see his trusted friends and officers butchered like sheep. The struggle consumed him. 'The wrath of God is upon us,' he exclaimed, 'if we retire into the fort.'" During the night of the 23rd of June, the gaol guard, which formed the protecting force of the large central prison, deserted with their arms. A guard from the 3rd European regiment supplied their place. On the 25th, a fire occurred within the gaol, by which some workshops were destroyed, and the large ranges of separate cells endangered. The prisoners confined in them were removed, during the conflagration, to a distant part of the precincts, and the flames were subdued. After this, arrangements were made for the release of minor offenders; but there still remained 3,500 convicts to be guarded; and, to increase the danger, the gaol was in the immediate vicinity of the civil lines, where the higher functionaries, with their wives and children, held their ground up to the end of June, being unwilling to exchange their spacious and sumptuously furnished houses for the close quarters within the fort. Day after day fugitives came pouring in, reporting the mutiny of regiments or detachments previously considered sound. The gradual defection of the Gwalior contingent was especially alarming. On the morning of the 3rd of July, the officers of the 2nd cavalry, Gwalior contingent—Captain Burlton, Adjutant Salmond, and the regimental surgeon, rode in from Sansee, a station some forty miles distant, where the sepoys had quietly told the Europeans they must go, but that no insult or injury would be offered them.§ The Neemuch mutineers had been for some time approaching Agra; and as they drew nearer, the Europeans, in expectation of

* Raikes' *Revolt in the N. W. Provinces*. † *Ibid.*
‡ Letter from Umballah.—*Times*, Oct. 26th, 1857.

§ Letter of Lieutenant Salmond.—*Times*, September 1st, 1857.

an attack, for the most part retired within the walls. Colonel Fraser, the second in command (Brigadier Polwhele being the first), declared the Candaharee Bagh—a palace in the civil lines, where the volunteers kept watch—no longer tenable; and took up his position in a small house, under the walls of the fort. Mr. Raikes, and several other civilians, persevered in sleeping at the Candaharee Bagh as late as the night of the 3rd of July. Raikes, being himself restless from fever, watched the sleepers around.

"There lay the member for Agra (Haringford), of the legislative council of India—half dressed, a sword by his bedside, a gun in the corner, and a revolver under his pillow. Those gaunt, unshaven, weary-looking men by his side, are the judges of the Sudder Court. For six weeks they have been watching the rising flood of revolt, which had now risen more than breast-high. Will they ever sleep under a roof of their own again?"

The Kotah contingent—700 men in all; cavalry, infantry, and a battery of six guns—showed no signs of mutiny up to the 4th of July. The men had, for the previous month, been employed "in collecting revenue for us, burning disaffected villages, and hanging mutineers and rebels;"* and their co-operation was relied on against the rebel force, posted twenty-two miles off, and believed to consist of the 72nd N.I., 7th infantry, Gwalior contingent, three troops of 1st Bengal light cavalry, the cavalry of the united Malwa contingent (who had mutinied at Mahidpoor), and a battery of Native horse artillery. It was expected that the enemy, being so strong in cavalry, would send their troopers to plunder and burn the cantonments; and notwithstanding the result of a similar attempt at Lucknow, the military authorities resolved on marching forth that evening to attack the mutineers. The main body of the Kotah contingent was ordered to take its station half-way between government house in the city, and the European barracks. The cavalry no sooner reached their encampment, than they fired on their officers, and killed their sergeant-major; the infantry and artillery fled in confusion, to join the Nee-

much mutineers; all but two faithful Native gunners, who spiked the guns they could not defend. A detachment of forty men, under a subahdar, on guard at the government house, remained at their post, and rescued the political agent attached to the Kotah contingent, who describes himself as having fallen into the hands of some Kerowlee natives, previously employed by one of the subordinate European officials in raising revenue and "plundering villages;" but who were now as ready to kill a Feringhee as a Hindoo, and to pillage British bungalows as native habitations.†

The 3rd Europeans were ordered to bring back the guns of the Kotah contingent. They went out for the purpose; and returned safely, with six guns, having been absent about two hours, exposed to drenching rain. It was then nine o'clock, and the intended night march was abandoned; but on the following morning (Sunday, July 5th), a force, consisting of 650 of the 3rd Europeans, a battery commanded by Captain d'Oyly, and 200 militia volunteers (composed of officers of mutinied regiments, civilians, merchants, and writers), set forth, under the command of Brigadier Polwhele and Colonel Riddell. There seems to be no second opinion regarding this expedition. It ought never to have been attempted, inasmuch as the hazard of losing the fort of Agra, was a much greater evil than the chance of dispersing the Nee-much mutineers could counterbalance: yet the peril was incurred, and grievous loss sustained; and, after all, the dearly bought victory was turned into an ignominious retreat, because the military authorities neglected the ordinary precaution of providing the force with spare ammunition.

The troops marched from cantonments to meet an enemy estimated as being ten times their number, leaving three companies of the 3rd Europeans in the fort for its only garrison. After passing through the village of Shahgunge, just outside the civil lines, they advanced on the road to Futtehpoor Sikree, until, between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, they reached a

* Letter of an officer of the 3rd Europeans.—*Times*, September 2nd, 1857.

† The Bengal civilian, who describes himself as having "joined the Kotah contingent, as political agent, in the districts of Muttra, Agra and Alighur," states, that at the beginning of June, a Moham-medan, named Sefula Khan, "brought into the Agra district a lot of wild-looking men from Kerowlee, as he said, to help D— [Daniells, assistant under-

commissioner of revenue for the Agra division?] to get in his revenue—about 500 men in all, regular cowards, but good fellows to plunder villages, &c."—*Times*, October 9th, 1857. It is to be regretted that the &c. is not explained. After the revelations of the torture commission, it is important to know what means of obtaining revenue, besides plundering villages, are sanctioned by European magistrates in cases of difficulty.

village named Sussia, immediately in the rear of which, the mutineers were strongly posted. The British force formed into line, with three guns on each flank—the 3rd Europeans in the middle, the mounted militia in the rear. The infantry were ordered to lie down while the artillery opened on the village, at about 600 yards' distance. The mutineers fought irregularly, but with unusual determination; and a rifle company of the 72nd N.I. inflicted severe loss on the British, who had two tumbrils blown up, and a gun dismounted. An attempt was made by the rebel cavalry to surround the British, and seize the baggage and ammunition; but the volunteer horse beat them off. The village was then stormed in two columns, and carried at the point of the bayonet. Some resistance was made; and the women of the village were seen loading the muskets, and handing them to the men to fire.*

Lieutenant Salmond, who was acting as aide-de-camp to Colonel Riddell, seeing the enemy retreating in confusion, galloped back from the village to the brigadier, to carry him the welcome intelligence, and was ordered instantly to bring up the guns. The lieutenant obeyed; "but, alas! not a round of ammunition remained." The information sounded like the death-warrant of the Europeans. "I certainly thought," writes Lieutenant Salmond, "that not a man would reach Agra alive."† Another officer writes—"One thing is certain; if their cavalry had had one grain of pluck, they might have cut us up almost to a man."‡ But it happened that the rebels themselves laboured under a disadvantage in regard to shot, and actually fired pice (farthings) at the close of the action, which lasted less than two hours. The Europeans burned the village, formed in line, and retreated, with some of their best officers severely or mortally wounded, and their ammunition exhausted. One vigorous charge from the rebel cavalry would have carried the day; the Europeans would have been crushed by the sheer force of overwhelming numbers; and then, even supposing the rebels not to have at once besieged Agra, how long, after such a disaster, would Sindia and Dinkur Rao have been able to restrain the Gwalior contingent from bring-

ing against the fort the siege-train which, humanly speaking, seemed alone needful to secure its downfall? Happily no charge was made: the enemy had no leaders, and fought in the old desultory Mahratta fashion, hanging on the flanks and rear of the retreating force, but neglecting every opportunity of striking a decisive blow. The Europeans were chased into Agra by the rebels, with a 6-pounder gun (probably the only one left that the mutineers could move about, or had ammunition for), and harassed by cavalry. The British loss was terrible. The casualties amounted to 141; more than one man in six: and of these, forty-nine were killed or mortally wounded. Captain d'Oyly was among the latter, and his death was a calamity to the garrison. His horse was shot under him at the commencement of the action; but he was himself unhurt till some time later, when, while stooping down to assist in extricating the wheel of a gun, he was struck by a grape-shot in the side. Supporting himself on a tumbril, he continued to give orders till he sank, exhausted by pain and weakness, exclaiming as he fell, "Ah! they have done for me now: put a stone over my grave, and say I died fighting my guns." He was, however, carried back to the fort, and lingered until the following evening. Lieutenant Lambe, another artillery officer, languished a whole month, and then died of his wounds.

The loss of the enemy was estimated as exceeding 500; but had it been many times greater, the effect of this ill-judged expedition could not have been otherwise than injurious to the British cause. On the 4th of July, an attack of illness had deprived the Europeans of the lieutenant-governor's supervision;§ and, after the battle, panic prevailed in Agra, both within and without the fort. A party of the residents had watched, from the Flagstaff—an elevated position at one of the gates of the fort—the retreat of their countrymen, pursued by the rebels. The alarm was given; and the Europeans not already within the walls, rushed in. The retreating troops hurried through the city; the men on guard at the gaol, fled with them into the fort; the gates were closed in all haste; and, on every side, the cry was heard in Agra—"The rule of the

* The testimony of an eye-witness, a young officer of the 3rd Europeans.—*Times*, Sept. 2nd, 1857.

† Letter.—*Times*, September 1st, 1857.

‡ *Times*, September 2nd, 1857.

§ "Mr. Colvin has been, for the last two days, totally unfit [ted] for any public duty, by an attack of his head."—Official report of Civil Commissioner Muir, Agra, July 6th.

Feringhee is over!" The budmashes rose to fraternise with the rebels; the prisoners were set free; and the frantic mob began to pillage and burn the cantonments, and hunt all Christians to the death. It does not appear that the persecution was on account of religion, as such, but because the interests of the native Christians were viewed as identified with their instructors. The Agra authorities, acting for Mr. Colvin, had refused them admission into the fort; and at "the last hour, when the wounded and the troops were returning from the field of battle, and entering the fort, the poor Christian families were standing before the gates, imploring the guards to let them in; but in vain." However, Mr. French and Mr. Schneider took advantage of the entrance of the troops to bring in the women and children, to the number of about 240. The men were afterwards also suffered to come in; on the understanding that they should make themselves useful as servants, gunners, and in any way which might be required. They were so harshly treated, that one of the missionaries "thought, that should they turn rebels, it would be no very great wonder."* Another declares, that "the policy of the Europeans was, for a time, such as to force them to become rebels, if they could have been forced. But they could not. They were stanch men and true. They were more—they showed their fellow-Christians, bearing the name of Englishmen or Scotchmen, that they were men of principle. They showed them how they could endure persecution."†

The native Christians proved a great assistance to the Europeans: the men did a good work on their entrance, by saving medical stores from a house nearly a mile from the fort; by carrying sick and wounded, and taking service wherever they found it; for, in the hasty closing of the gates, the mass of the native servants had been left outside; and though many of them would willingly have cast in their lot with their masters,‡ they dared not approach, because "the soldiers shot at every black face that came in sight."§ No escort was sent out to scour the city and rescue Europeans,

or natives actually in the service of government. The list of persons killed is suggestive of either selfishness or incapacity on the part of the authorities; for the victims did not perish in a general massacre by mutineers, but were killed in one's, two's, or three's in the city, on the 5th and 6th of July, by the revolted city guard, the budmashes, and released convicts; and although the murders were committed within sight and hearing of a stronghold garrisoned by an entire European regiment, not a shot was fired—not a blow struck in defence of these thirty British subjects.

The names are thus given in the *London Gazette*:—

Christie Leveret.

Alexander Derridon, from Alighur, with his wife and three children.

B. A. Piaggio, clerk in the civil auditor's office.

J. Hawkins.

Louis Maxwell, a government pensioner:

Zacharias Parsick, clerk in the secretariat, and his mother.

John Anthony, clerk in the secretariat.

J. Lamborne, and his daughter.

H. Hare, and his son, government clerks

J. Danselme, junior.

Mrs. Nowlan.

Mrs. Mathias, burnt to death.

C. R. Thorton, assistant patrol.

Major John Jacob, late of Sindia's service.

F. C. Hubbard, professor at the Agra college, and brother to the clergyman killed at Delhi.

T. Delisle, drummer, 9th N.I.

G. Turvy, bandmaster.

J. Allen, pensioner.

Mr. Gray's mother-in-law.

R. Dennis, compositor, *Mofussilite* press.

Mrs. Dennis.

Peter, a catechist, and two other native Christians, living at the Kuttra church.

The day following the battle was one of great excitement, it being generally expected that the mutineers would take up their position in Agra; instead of which, they marched off, on the very night of the battle, to Muttra, from whence they sent a deputation to Gwalior, conjuring the contingent to join them in attacking the fort. But the policy of Dinkur Rao prevented the proposed co-operation; and, on the 18th of July, the Neemuch rebels started for Delhi. It was known that they had little or no ammunition, and scarcely any

* Rev. J. L. Scott, of the American Board of Missions.—*Sherring's Indian Church*, p. 95.

† Rev. J. Parsons, Baptist missionary.—*Ibid.*, p. 88.

‡ Mr. Raikes says the servants generally were well-conducted. "One of my own old favourites behaved ill amongst about fifty: the rest were de-

voted and faithful.—*Revolt in the N.W. Provinces*, p. 64.

§ Letter of civilian attached to Kotah contingent.—*Times*, October 9th, 1857. Mrs. Coopland says, the soldiers fired at every black face that showed itself within range, and even threw two shells into the city.—*Escape from Gwalior*, p. 183.

money. Their departure was a great relief to the motley crowd assembled within the fort. A body of troops was sent out to make a demonstration in the city; rows of gibbets were erected, and many natives hanged.

The relatives or friends of the sufferers were at first allowed to take away the bodies: the permission was rescinded because they were carried round the walls, decked with garlands of flowers, and revered as the relics of martyrs.

Apprehensions were expressed by many persons regarding the consequences of the compression of so large and heterogeneous a multitude within the fort, at the worst season of the year; but the excellent arrangements made by Mr. Colvin,* prevented much of the suffering which must otherwise have arisen. The want of bread was severely felt at Lucknow: women and children, the sick and the wounded, grew to loathe the sight of chupatties. But at Agra, after the battle, the first objects seen "entering the gates, when the panic-stricken authorities ventured to open them wide enough to admit a mouse, were carts of bread, that the Lala [Jotee Persaud] had baked at his own house in the city, for the troops and people who were shut up."†

The death, by cholera, of Captain Burlton, of the Gwalior contingent, on the 12th of July, excited considerable alarm; but there were not many fatal cases or much disease; and for the next four months, the life of the Europeans in Agra, though strange and startling at first, became wearisome from its monotony. Mr. Raikes writes—

"Whatever remained unscathed, from Meerut to Allahabad, either of Englishmen or of their works, was conglomerated here. Here were the remnants of the record of survey and revenue settlement—that great work on which heaps of money, and the best energies of our best men, had been lavished for a quarter of a century. Here were the only muni-

* Mr. E. A. Reade, the senior member of the Sudder Board of Revenue, assisted Mr. Colvin in many ways, especially in framing measures for the relief of the local government from its financial embarrassments. † At the request of Mr. Colvin, Mr. Reade commenced negotiations for a loan of five lacs of rupees with the principal merchants and bankers of Agra, purposely excepting from the number Jotee Persaud, who was pouring provisions into the fort, and had agreed to take a large amount of the cost in supply-bills. Unhappily, Mr. Colvin was induced to alter his plans, and orders were given to levy a compulsory loan of twenty lacs. Mr. Reade's protest was disregarded; the merchants were summoned, and made to sign an engagement to the desired effect. Several of them left the city in disgust, and not a rupee was realised by the pro-

tions of war, the only instruments of art or materials of science, which remained to us. In huts hastily prepared, among the galleries and gateways of the old palace of the emperors, a motley crowd assembled. Matted screens were set up along the marble corridors which, in Akber's time, were hung with the silks of Persia and the brocades of Benares.‡ Under this shade, not only was every part of our British isles represented, but we had also unwilling delegates from many parts of Europe and America. Nuns from the banks of the Garonne and the Loire, priests from Sicily and Rome, missionaries from Ohio and Basle, mixed with ropedancers from Paris and pedlars from Armenia. Besides these, we had Calcutta Baboos and Parsee merchants. Although all the Christians alike were driven by the mutinous legions into the fort, the circumstances of the multitude were as various as their races. There were men who had endured more than all the afflictions of Job, who had lost like him not only their sons, daughters, and everything they possessed, but who also mourned over the fate of wife, mother, and sister! Reserved, silent, solitary among the crowd, they longed either to live alone with their grief, or to quench the fire within by some hurried act of vengeance or despair. Some few there were, on the other hand, who secretly rejoiced in the troubles of the Christian race, who fattened on their spoil, and waited only to betray them if opportunity should offer. The mass had lost their property: the householder his houses, the merchant his money, the shopkeeper his stores. Part, however, was saved: you could buy millinery or perfumery, but not cheese, beer, wine, nor tobacco. In short, we had to rough it at Agra, to bear discomfort and privation; but as the bazaars soon opened, and generally remained open, we had no real hardships to undergo. If our army retired from before the walls of Delhi, or if the Gwalior contingent, with their artillery and siege-train, made up their minds to attack us, as was constantly threatened, then we might be subjected to a siege."

The advance of the Gwalior contingent was, of course, the one great danger that menaced Agra. Major Macpherson maintained, as has been stated, an incessant correspondence with the Gwalior durbar; his sister, Mrs. Innes, acting as his secretary, and striving to keep down, by ministering to the comfort of those around her (especially the Gwalior fugitives), her

ceeding. The opposition offered to it by Mr. Reade, subsequently induced the citizens of Agra to listen to him, and enter into transactions which enabled the authorities to meet the expenditure of the subsequent months.

† Letter from "one of the late garrison at Agra." —*Times*, April 4th, 1858.

‡ As if to heighten the contrast between Oriental barbarism and European civilisation, the unwilling tenants of Akber's marble halls, decorated the narrow limits allotted them according to their peculiar ideas. Dr. Christison, for instance (a surgeon attached to the 1st cavalry), "having a taste for pictures," adorned the apartment of his sick wife with a portrait of Madeleine Smith, cut out of the *Illustrated News* (Mrs. Cooland; p. 210), as a refreshing and edifying subject of contemplation.

cruel anxiety regarding the position of her husband, Lieutenant Innes, at Lucknow. Mrs. Blake, and other widowed ladies, forgetting their private griefs, devoted themselves to nursing the sick and wounded.

The report of the battle of July 5th, furnished to the Supreme government, was probably much less detailed and explicit than that given here by the aid of private letters; but its immediate consequence was the supersession of Brigadier Polwhele by Lieutenant-colonel Cotton of the 69th N.I., passing over the head of a senior officer (Lieutenant-colonel Fraser, of the engineers).* Mr. Drummond was removed from the magistracy to a judgeship, and Mr. Phillips made magistrate in his stead. The new brigadier, as his *sobriquet* of "Gun-cotton" denoted, was a man of considerable energy, and a sense of duty sufficiently strong to lead him to incur responsibility and unpopularity, in controlling, by stringent measures (including flogging), the excesses of the militiamen and volunteers. It is no wonder that these auxiliaries should have been disorderly: the only marvel is, that the regular troops did not become utterly disorganised by the species of warfare in which they were employed. The official records throw little light on this subject; and again it becomes necessary to seek elsewhere the missing links in the narrative. Mrs. Coopland relates the manner in which she and other ladies sat on the towers of Agra, "watching the sun set, and the flames rising from the villages round Agra, which our troops burnt. One village which they destroyed in this way was not gained without a sharp fight with the villagers, who offered resistance: sixty villagers were slain, amongst whom were two women, accidentally killed, who were loading guns, and otherwise assisting their party."

In the extensive destruction of villages which took place at this time, it cannot of course be expected that the women could escape uninjured. There is no reason to believe they did so, even before the fate of the Cawnpoor and Futtehghur fugitives was known: after that, the vengeance of the soldiers spared neither sex nor age. One of the garrison, writing from Agra on the 22nd of August, says—

"A force was dispatched, some days ago, against an insurgent Jhat village across the Jumna, and about twenty miles from this. It consisted of eighty men of the 3rd Europeans, two guns, and thirty mounted militia (Europeans and East Indians), under Captain Pond. They stormed the village, and killed at least 400 men: 313 dead bodies were counted in the streets, besides those killed by the guns in front of the village, and sabred by the cavalry in the field when trying to escape. It is significant that none of the enemy were merely wounded, and not a prisoner was taken. Our men fought like savages, and spared none; but crying out, "Remember our women at Cawnpoor!" they shot and bayoneted without mercy. After they had slain every man they could find, I lament to say they did what infuriated soldiers too frequently do when they take cities by assault—they ravished the women. The officers were unable to control their men; and till the village was set on fire, these scenes were repeated.†

Perhaps if Mrs. Coopland and her friends could have seen all this somewhat closer, instead of having only a bird's-eye view of the flames, they would have preferred remaining in their dull quarters, where they "forgot the days, except when the Baptists held their meetings every Wednesdays and Fridays in a place in our square." The gaieties which are described as taking place in other parts of the fort—the balls and musical parties, the gay weddings, brides in veils and lace dresses, officers in full regimentals, and the ladies in gay attire, scarcely, however, afforded a stronger contrast to the sufferings of the villagers, than to the precarious position of the merry-makers themselves, who must have felt very much as if they were dancing beside a yawning grave; the officers having arranged, that in the event of a siege and an unsuccessful defence, they would all blow themselves up in the powder-magazine.‡ This witness, however, gives only one side of the picture, or rather a highly coloured view of one of its many sides. Her knowledge could be but very superficial regarding the proceedings of the 4,289 persons§ who, on the 25th of August, 1857, occupied the fort. There were men there—Major Macpherson, Mr. Raikes, and Mr. Reade, among others—capable of looking beyond the provocations of the moment, and incapable of viewing, without anxiety and grief, the increasing alienation fast ripening into

* Despatch of Lieutenant-governor Colvin, August 5th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 142.

† *Morning Star*, October 29th, 1857.

‡ Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 215.

§ Of these, including the European regiment and the artillery, 1,065 were male adult Europeans, 443 Eurasians, 267 native Christians, and the remaining 2,514, women and non-adults of the aforesaid classes.

hatred between the two races. None felt this more painfully than the lieutenant-governor. The last letter sent by him to England affords a melancholy insight into his position and feelings. "My authority," he writes, "is now confined to a few miles near this fort. The city is quiet, and gives supplies. Collection of revenue quite suspended. The bankers will give small sums at very high rates in loan. I send my affectionate regards to all my old friends. I cannot shut my eyes to what is probably before me. If I have erred in any step, hard has been my position; and you will all bear lightly on my memory, and help my family* as far as you can. Let Trevelyan see this."

These are the words of a broken-hearted, disappointed man. And such John Colvin was. Worn and weary, he sank into the grave on the 9th of September, at the age of fifty. The Supreme government lamented the loss it sustained in his "ripe experience, high ability, and untiring energy,"† and the personal friend he valued most, Sir Charles Trevelyan, the present governor of Madras, responded to his last touching message, by laying before the European public a sketch of his life and labours, drawn up in the very spirit of tenderness and discrimination.‡ But, after all, the system of government established in the North-West Provinces, was far too radically wrong to work well, even under so upright and industrious a man as John Colvin: and evidence is wanting to show how far he struggled against the evils he must have daily witnessed; or that he was willing, like Henry Lawrence in the Punjab, to be set aside, sooner than be instrumental in perpetrating injustice or oppression.

Saugor,—the chief place of an extensive tract, known as the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, was held in May, 1857, by the 31st and 42nd N.I., the 3rd irregular cavalry, and a company of artillery. The officer in command, Brigadier Sage, considering all the Native troops disaffected, removed from cantonments on the 29th of June, with the European officers, into the fort—a ruinous

old building, the walls of which would, it was expected, "fall from concussion of guns,"§ in the event of attack. The garrison, after this decisive move, is thus stated by the brigadier:—"Sixty-eight artillerymen, fifteen conductors and sergeants, the officers of the 31st and 42nd, and civilians, drummers, sergeants, &c.; seventy-six in all: including sick, 131." Besides these, there were 159 women and children: giving a total of 290 persons.|| When the Native troops were left to themselves, the 41st, and all but sixty of the 3rd cavalry, hoisted the green flag, and began to loot the cantonments, and burn the bungalows and bazaar. The 31st opposed them, and sent to the brigadier for assistance, which he refused. The conduct of the brigadier was considered to require explanation, and the commander-in-chief called for a "full detail of all the circumstances connected with his quitting cantonments, and of the subsequent proceedings at Saugor."¶ The order was obeyed in a report, which is naturally a vindication against censure, rather than an unbiassed narrative of events. The gist of the matter is given in the following quotation from the account written on the spur of the moment by the brigadier, for the information of his friends in England.

"The 31st sent to me for guns, but it suited not my policy to give them. I sent them sixty troopers to assist them, and then they were rather over-matched, as the 42nd had drilled the spike out of an old 12-pounder the artillery officer left behind, and this they fired ten or eleven times with balls made by blacksmiths. Night [July 7th] closed the combat, with a message I sent them that victory would come with the morning! With the morning the battle recommenced, and the 42nd and mutinous cavalry were beaten out of the cantonments by one-half their numbers, expecting the Europeans would be upon them. They left their colours, magazine, and baggage, and are now flying over the country. All the public cattle they had stolen has been recaptured; they are without tents or shelter, and the rain has been pouring down a deluge all day."

The official report ends with the brigadier's declaration of "having saved all his officers, and made the good men drive out the mutineers." He does not, however, mention that the appeal of the 31st for help was not

* Mrs. Colvin was at Geneva, with her younger children. An elder son, Elliott, attended his father's death-bed.

† Government notification; Fort William, September 19th, 1857.

‡ See *Times*, December 25th, 1857. The well-known signature of "Indophilus" is affixed to the article.

§ Telegram from Colonel Neil, Allahabad, 11th July, 1857.

|| Quoted from a diary extending from June 28th to July 16th, 1857, dated "Saugor," and evidently written by Brigadier Sage.—*Times*, Sept. 2nd, 1857.

¶ Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 114.

wholly in vain; for the deputy commissioner (Captain Pinckney), Lieutenant Hamilton, Mr. Bell, collector of customs, three patrols, and a large body of police, went to their assistance. The telegram from the Benares commissioner, which conveyed this additional intelligence to Calcutta, added—"The mutineers were completely routed; many killed and wounded, and several taken prisoners. The 31st N.I. retook the large signal gun, and six commissariat elephants, and gave them up to the authorities. Next day the mutineers were chased, and there is not a man of them left in Saugor. Well done 31st! This is worth all the volunteering in the world."*

The 31st was, after all, a fortunate regiment in not being dispersed at the cannon's mouth, through the misconduct of a mutinous minority, or driven into revolt by the cry, "The Europeans are on us!" Forty-six men joined the rebels; while above 800 continued "to behave in an exemplary manner." The mutineers marched into the Dooab, *en route* for Delhi: and thus ended the Saugor outbreak.

The Punjab.—While the events just narrated were occurring in Northern and Central India, several portions of the Bengal army, stationed in the Punjab, broke into mutiny.

Jullundur, and the neighbouring station of *Phillour*,† were held, in the beginning of June, by H.M. 8th regiment, with some artillery and a strong native brigade, composed of the 6th light cavalry, and the 36th N.I. and 61st N.I. Incendiary fires had given warning of disaffection, and the Brigadier (General Johnstone) was urged by the civilians to take advantage of the presence of a European regiment, and disarm the natives. His own officers, on the contrary, interceded on behalf of the men: and the brigadier, who is described as a most amiable, zealous, and brave, but vacillating man, hesitated; took the treasure from the native guard; restored it again; declined to comply with the wishes of government that it should be placed under the Europeans; settled to disarm the sepoys on the 7th, and then postponed the execution of the painful measure until the following morning. During the intervening night the cavalry galloped into the lines of the infantry, crying that the Europeans and

artillery were upon them. The two infantry regiments rose, burnt several bungalows, wounded some officers, made a feeble attempt on the guns, and went off to Phillour. The only European killed was Lieutenant Bagshaw, the adjutant of the 36th, who, while apparently (as he said before he died) almost successful in restoring order, was mortally wounded by a 6th cavalry trooper.‡ The mutineers made for the Sutlej river, a distance of thirty miles; and reached Phillour on the morning of the 9th of June. The 3rd N.I. were stationed there. A company had gone on duty to Delhi, and 150 were absent on furlough. The fort was garrisoned by 100 men of H.M. 8th Foot. The officer in command, Lieutenant-colonel Butler, had entered the service of the E. I. Company in 1820, and had never been out of India from that time. The telegraph wires were cut, and no information was received of the approach of the mutineers until they were close at hand. The ladies and children were hurried from the cantonments into the fort, and the colonel, and other officers of the 3rd, endeavoured to induce the sepoys to rally round them: but in vain. So soon as a few men were got together here and there, the rest went back to the lines; and the Europeans, seeing the case to be hopeless, joined their families in the fort, retiring slowly and on foot. Colonel Butler writes—"Our men had always said, 'Happen what would, not one of us should be hurt while they lived.' This is all I can say for my men: they kept their word; for had they liked, they could have murdered every man, woman, and child, before I got them out of the cantonments." About eighty Hindoostanees of the 3rd remained in their lines, as did also seventy-five Seiks: the remainder of the regiment joined the mutineers, and marched off to endeavour to cross the river higher up. Their passage was opposed by Mr. G. H. Ricketts, the civil officer of Loodiana; who, on receiving intelligence of what had occurred (not direct from Jullundur, but by telegraph from Umballah), cut down the bridge over the Sutlej, and went to intercept the rebels with three companies of the 4th Seik regiment, and a small force (two guns, a hundred foot, and fifty troopers) furnished by the Nabha rajah, a neighbouring chief. Mr. Ricketts acted in direct opposition to the proverb,

* H. C. Tucker, Esq., to the governor-general.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (not numbered), p. 115.

† See *ante*, p. 200.

‡ Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 84.

which recommends a bridge of gold to be made for a flying enemy: but he considered it certain that the mutineers would be hotly pursued by a force from Jullundur, and thought to catch the rebels between two fires, and ensure their complete destruction. The pursuit, however, was not commenced until about seven o'clock on the morning of the 8th: and when the brigadier reached the Sutlej, he found that the mutineers had beaten the force opposed to them, spent thirty hours in crossing the river in three boats, raised some tumults in the outskirts of Loodiana, released the inmates of the gaol, and marched on. The pursuit was recommenced, but without effect, for natives can always outstrip Europeans. A well-informed writer remarks—"It is singular that, instead of doing all the damage they might have done, or approaching the great cantonment of Umballah (then held by a small party in the church), they did not even plunder or offer violence to any man; but, making tremendous marches, they quietly travelled by the most unfrequented cross-country route to Delhi, where they have since especially distinguished themselves. In defence they were much too strong for any force that could have intercepted them; and, indeed, they went so swiftly and quietly that their route was hardly noticed. Thus were four regiments added to the Delhi force."*

Brigadier Johnstone was fiercely censured, by the Anglo-Indian press, for tardiness in pursuing the mutineers. He asked for an inquiry into his conduct; and the result, as stated by Lord Hardinge, in answer to the question of Lord Paunmure in the House of Lords, was, that the brigadier was "fully and honourably acquitted of all the accusations brought against him."†

Jhelum.—The 14th N.I. were quartered alone at Jhelum, at the commencement of July. No overt act of mutiny had been committed; and Colonel Gerrard, and the other European officers, had confidence in their men: but the chief commissioner, Major Browne, was convinced of the advisability of disarming the regiment; and, in accordance with his requisition, a detach-

ment of 250 of H.M. 24th, under Colonel Ellice, three horse artillery guns, and some irregular Mooltan horse, marched from Rawul Pindee. It is alleged that the true object of the expedition had been withheld from Colonel Ellice, his only orders being—"When you get to Jhelum, half-way to Lahore, telegraph your arrival."‡

The Jhelum authorities hoped that Europeans would arrive before daybreak on the 7th of July, and take the 14th N.I. by surprise; instead of which, the sun was up, and the regiment, fully armed, on parade, when the British column was seen approaching. A shout of rage and terror rose from the ranks; the men fired wildly on their officers, but without effect, and then fled to their barracks; a strong party taking possession of the quarter-guard, round the roof of which was a loopholed parapet, which commanded the entire line. According to Mr. Cooper, the sepoys had been informed of the arrangements of the authorities, and had resolved on resistance. Hence it was that "every inch of way had to be fought by the Europeans; and the mutineers, fully armed, had to be bayoneted (like rabbits from their burrows) out of their huts, from which they were firing with telling effect on the men in the open space, through loopholes obviously of long preparation."§

Another authority, an officer of the 24th, who, though not actually present, had from his position equal, if not superior, opportunities of obtaining authentic information, makes no mention of any evidence of hostile preparation on the part of the sepoys. Whatever their previous intentions may have been, they evidently broke up in panic, and rushed pell-mell to any cover from the European guns. The work of clearing the lines involved a desperate and protracted struggle. The Mooltan cavalry showed much determination; the Seiks|| in the 14th likewise fought on the side of the Europeans, in conjunction with the police, under Lieutenants Battye and Macdonald. Colonel Ellice himself led a charge on the quarter-guard, and carried the place, though with considerable loss:¶ he was twice severely wounded, and had his horse shot under him.

* Letter from Umballah, August, 1857.—*Times*, 26th October, 1857.

† Mr. Cooper, in his *Crisis in the Punjab*, gives a letter written by Brigadier Johnstone to the editor of the *Lahore Chronicle*, explaining why the pursuit of the mutineers could not have been undertaken earlier, or carried on with greater speed.—pp. 94 to 97.

‡ Letter dated "Murree, July 13th."—*Times*, September 3rd, 1857.

§ Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 126.

|| Mr. Cooper says, that during the early part of the engagement, the Seiks were "eliminated" from the 14th N.I.

¶ Captain Spring, of the 14th N.I., was among those who were mortally wounded at Jhelum.

Driven from the cantonments, the mutineers took refuge in an adjacent walled village. The outworks were soon taken; but the sepoy defended themselves with desperation. Three guns were brought against them; yet they are described as fighting "like fiends, disputing every inch of ground"—"with halters round their necks"—"like stags at bay."†

At length the Europeans desisted from attempting to clear the village. The sepoys, at the commencement of the action, were 702 in number: the three companies of the 84th comprised only 247 men; of the latter, seventy-six were killed or wounded: the others were exhausted with twelve hours' fighting, twelve hours' marching, twenty hours under arms, and thirteen of these without food. Captain Macpherson (the senior officer, not wounded) determined on bivouacking on the bare ground for the night, under the impression that the mutineers would disperse quietly in the darkness; which they did. The next morning 150 dead bodies were counted on the field, and thirty were brought in the day after. The police dispatched numbers on islands; and 116 were executed by shooting, hanging, and blowing from guns.‡ The officer of the 24th Europeans (before quoted), speaks of "the satisfaction" afforded by shooting forty-eight sepoys one evening, and blowing twenty-five away from the cannon's mouth next morning. The government offered a reward of thirty rupees (about £3) for every fugitive sepoy.§

Rawul Pindée.—The remaining companies of the 24th Europeans, stationed at Rawul Pindée, were ordered to disarm the 58th N.I. on the 7th of July. The Europeans took up their position on either side of the horse artillery, and the sepoys were directed to surrender their arms. They heard the order—paused for a moment, looked at the guns, and turned to fly. An officer of the 24th says—"Our men were with the greatest difficulty prevented by the officers from firing, as also the artillery. Had we fired, we should have done so right into a body of staff officers, who were between us." Happily their violence was restrained, and the sepoys were induced to give up their weapons quietly.||

Sealkote,—a town bordering on Cash-

mere, and situated on the left bank of the Chenab river, sixty-three miles from Lahore—was one of the places where detachments from different native regiments were sent to practise firing with the Enfield rifle and the greased cartridge.

At the time of the Meerut outbreak, Sealkote was one of the largest military stations in the Punjab; but on the formation of the moveable column, H.M. 52nd light infantry, the European artillery, the 35th N.I., and a wing of the 9th irregular cavalry, were detached; leaving only the 46th N.I. and a portion of the 9th irregular cavalry. The brigadier (Brind) in command of the station was an experienced officer, and had seen much service as a sepoy leader. He remonstrated strongly against the total removal of the European troops, and urged that at least 250 should be left behind. In reply, he was requested to disarm the Native troops. This he refused to do, alleging that they would not mutiny unless driven to it; and, in concert with his officers, the brigadier maintained an attitude of confidence towards the sepoys. The authorities evinced similar reliance by the withdrawal of the European force, notwithstanding the vicinity of Maharajah Goolab Sing of Cashmere, and the fact that that powerful chief had been recently severely censured by the Lahore government for his conduct towards his nephew, Rajah Jawahir Sing: and the result justified the trust reposed in these native allies; for both uncle and nephew proved active and faithful auxiliaries. With regard to the sepoys, a decided advantage was gained in point of time; but it was purchased with valuable lives.

The Sealkote residents were far from sharing the feeling of the officers towards the sepoys. Many Europeans sought refuge at Lahore: the remainder wore "a hopefully hypocritical aspect,"¶ which but thinly veiled aversion and distrust. Although "the band played as usual, and society partook of its evening recreation," undisturbed by insolence or incendiarism; the tacit truce was but the result of a temporising policy, while each party watched the movements of the other. As early as May, a vague fear was known to have possessed the minds of the sepoys regarding

* Letter by an officer of the 24th Europeans.—*Times*, Sept. 19th, 1857.

† Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 127.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

§ *Times*, September 19th, 1857.

|| Letter dated "Camp, Gujerat, July 15th."—*Times*, September 19th, 1857.

¶ Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 136.

certain orders, alleged to have been issued from London, to ruin their caste. A proposition had been actually entertained to massacre a large party assembled at the house of the brigadier; but the discussion was postponed, until it should be shown whether government really intended to enforce the biting of the filthy cartridges.* Up to the date of the Jhelum mutiny, no overt act of disaffection had been committed; and on the evening of the 8th of July, Dr. James Graham, the superintending surgeon, begged a friend with whom he was dining, who had expressed himself doubtfully regarding the sepoys, "not to let his fears get the better of his senses." The desperate resistance offered at Jhelum, on the 7th of July, by the 14th N.I., was not then generally known at Sealkote; for although the distance between the stations was only seventy miles, the communication was interrupted, in consequence of the authorities having broken down the bridges across two intervening rivers, the Jhelum and the Chenab, and seized all the ferry-boats.† Still some of the leading Europeans knew what had occurred. Mr. Monckton and family, and the joint assistant-commissioners, Mr. Jones and Lieutenant M'Mahon, who were living together in Mr. Monckton's house, in the civil lines, situated between the fort and the cantonments—"fearing what was coming, sent for the chaplain of the station (Mr. Boyle), and made him stay the night." Mr. Jones, in his account of the outbreak, adverts to the expected effect of the Jhelum news, as his chief cause for immediate alarm; but does not state the channel through which the intelligence reached him.

Mr. Boyle describes himself as having accepted an ordinary invitation to breakfast and dinner, and says that he was not informed of the special reason until eight o'clock in the evening, when he rose to depart, and was told that he must not return to cantonments. He asked, "Why?" The reply was, "The brigadier has bound us to secrecy." He was, however, told of the news from Jhelum, upon which he broke into fierce invectives against "those brutal devils!" (the sepoys), and against the brigadier, for having "miraculously main-

tained confidence" in them; adding, "I now assert, and if he and I live, shall repeat it, that he alone will be responsible for all the blood that, in my opinion, will be shed to-morrow." The brigadier had no opportunity of vindicating himself from this charge; for he was in his grave (and Mr. Boyle probably read the service over him) before these words were penned. Mr. Boyle states, that after "thinking and cooling down as became his clerical character," he asked (with an adjuration which it is more reverent to omit), "Are the women and children to be butchered? Are the valuable lives of God's creatures to be lost—lost without one word of caution? Must no hint be given? Cannot they be brought away in the night to the fort?" Notwithstanding this vehement expression of sympathy, Mr. Boyle neither gave the "one word of caution" he thought so important, nor returned to share the peril of "the women and children;" but spent the night a mile and a-half from cantonments, in a house guarded by thirty-five men of the new Seik levies, and thirty of the mounted police.‡ In the meantime, meetings were being held in the lines, probably to discuss the Jhelum affair, and certainly to canvass the grievances of the 33rd and 35th N.I., which regiments had been disarmed by General Nicholson. One or two of the 9th cavalry troopers, who had obtained leave of absence from the moveable column at Umritsir, brought reports from thence, which are said to have been the proximate cause of the Sealkote mutiny.§

Captain John H. Balmain, of the 9th cavalry, a thoroughly brave and self-possessed officer, learned, before daybreak, the prevailing excitement. He rode down instantly to his troop, and was warned by the Hindoos to return to his house, and remain there, or he would certainly be killed. The Mussulmans were then saddling their horses; and a party of them mounted and galloped off to the infantry lines, where they shouted "Deen!" cursed the "Feringhee Kaffirs!" flashed off their pistols, and "intentionally committing themselves, committed the best-intentioned others."|| Balmain galloped to the

* Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 134.

† Letter of Mr. Jones, Sealkote, July 13th.—*Times*, Sept. 2nd, 1857.

‡ Letter not signed, but evidently written by the Rev. Mr. Boyle, dated from the fort, Sealkote, July

14th; and letter from Mr. Jones.—*Times*, September 2nd, 1857.

§, Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 137.

|| "Their powers of locomotion alone achieved more than the most elaborate persuasion."—*Ibid.*, p. 138.

compound of the brigadier, and found him with Mr. Chambers (the magistrate) and Adjutant Montgomery, who were endeavouring to induce him to fly with them to the fort. At length he reluctantly assented, and the Europeans rode off, pursued by a party of cavalry. The gallant old brigadier could not be induced to retreat with undignified haste; and had nearly fallen into the hands of the mutineers, when Balmain, who, with Montgomery, was far in front, called out to his companion, "Stop, and make a stand, or the brigadier is lost!" They both turned, and waited for him; but it was too late; he was already mortally wounded. They succeeded, however, in bringing him safely to the fort, where he died on the 10th; and they themselves escaped without injury. The cavalry were, throughout the affair, far more murderous than the infantry: the latter must have fired intentionally over the heads of most of the officers who rode into their lines, or none of them could have escaped. Besides the brigadier, six Europeans were killed by the sowars, and several natives. Captain Bishop, of the 46th N.I., left cantonments in his currie, with his wife and children, and had actually reached the walls of the fort, when the carriage was surrounded by a party of troopers, who fired into it. Seeing himself the object of attack, he jumped out, and was shot. The horses started off at full speed, and upset the carriage; but the mutineers did not attempt to injure the poor lady or her children, and they were taken into the fort. Dr. John Colin Graham, medical store-keeper, perished in a similar manner: he was deliberately shot in his own carriage, in the presence of his wife and another lady (Mrs. Gray) and her children. The ladies begged for mercy; and the troopers told them they had no intention of hurting them, but only the sahib logue (gentlemen). Mrs. Graham drove back to cantonments in the hope of obtaining surgical aid; but her devotion was in vain: the doctor expired at the medical dépôt in about an hour.

The case of the Hunter family was a peculiar one. On the night of the 7th, Mrs. Hunter had a dream of murder, which, though easily accounted for at an isolated

station in the Punjab in the autumn of 1857, so impressed her, that she persuaded her husband, a missionary of the church of Scotland, to seek safety in flight. A warning received in the course of the following day,* confirmed their resolve, and they left their own house, with their child, and passed the night with the Rev. Mr. Hill, at his bungalow in the Vizierabad road. When the mutiny broke out, instead of starting along that road, they adhered to their original plan of proceeding to Lahore, and for this purpose had to pass through Sealkote. On arriving in front of the gaol, they found a party of forty troopers engaged in releasing the prisoners. The carriage was immediately surrounded; a trooper shot at Mr. Hunter, and he and his wife were hit by the same ball; and they were both, with their child, dragged out and massacred by the cutcherry and gaol chuprassies.†

Mrs. Hunter was the only female killed at Sealkote. A Patan, named Hoonunt Khan, attached to the magistrate's office, was the principal instigator of her murder; and a reward of 1,000 rupees was vainly offered for his apprehension. It is supposed that the poor lady "had offended the fanatical Mohammedans by establishing a small female school—a crime, in their eyes, deserving death."‡

Dr. James Graham had scarcely quitted cantonments, with his daughter, in his buggy, before he was shot in the head by a sowar, and fell dead in the arms of the poor girl. She was taken to the cavalry guard, and there found Colonel and Mrs. Lorne Campbell, surrounded by a few faithful troopers, by whom the three Europeans were safely escorted to the fort. There were some remarkable escapes. Lieutenant Prinsep, 9th cavalry, a brave lad of seventeen, galloped down to the lines, and supported his superior officer (probably Balmain) in trying to keep their troop faithful. But it was in vain: their own men entreated them to quit, as they could not protect them. Both officers escaped; but the younger was hotly pursued by six troopers, whom he found drawn up on either side of the road, half-way between the fort and cantonments. He was fired at, hit on

* The French sisters of charity, established at Sealkote, are said to have been warned by the natives to fly on the evening before the mutiny. They did not, however, quit their position until the outbreak, and then escaped to the fort with their

pupils unharmed, after having protected them at every hazard.—*Courrier de Lyons*. Quoted in *Times*, September 23rd, 1857.

† *London Gazette*, May 6th, 1858; p. 2245.

‡ *Sherring's Indian Church*, p. 326.

the sword-arm, and nearly overpowered; but he contrived to escape, and eluded further ambush by striking across country and making his way to Vizierabad, which he reached at 11 A.M., having started from Sealkote at half-past four, and ridden thirty miles.*

Captain Saunders, Dr. Butler of the 9th cavalry, and Mr. Garrad, the veterinary surgeon of the regiment, with the wives and children of the two former gentlemen, and two native nurses, spent thirteen hours crouched in an out-building. The whole house was pillaged in their hearing, fired at, and riddled with shot. A faithful chokedar, or watchman, brought them food, and contrived to mislead the party of 46th sepoy, who, at the instigation of a cavalry trooper, had come to search for concealed officers. One plunderer looked in at the grating of their hiding-place. Dr. Butler shot him through the head. He fell with a single groan, but never spoke, or the male Europeans would have been massacred. The danger was so imminent, that Mrs. Butler's infant in arms was sent away with its nurse, in hopes that, if the rest perished, the little one might be carried to the fort. Mrs. Saunders took her baby in her lap, and disposed her other three children behind her in a row, so that haply one bullet might kill all at once. At length, at seven o'clock in the evening, the faithful chokedar told them they might proceed to the fort, which they reached in safety.

Three officers of the 46th N.I. came in about the same time, whose fate had also occasioned much anxiety. Captain Caulfield had been out on picket duty the night preceding the rise; and, on returning in the morning, he observed a body of troopers riding down to the infantry lines. His own men became uncontrollable, and, instead of following him on parade, rushed after the sowars. Captain Caulfield galloped to his bungalow, roused his wife, placed her in a buggy, in charge of a sepoy (Maharaj Missur), and bade him take her to the fort. Then, despite her arguments and solicitations, the officer rode to the lines, where the grenadier company seized and forced him into a hut, declaring that he would be killed by some of the sepoys if seen during the first excitement. Soon after this, Colonel Farquharson (in command of the regiment) and the sergeant-major were brought in. The

men were respectful and attentive. Nearly the whole corps gathered round the officers, said that the raj of the Feringhee was over, and proffered the colonel and captain, respectively, 2,000 and 1,000 rupees a-month if they would retain their positions, promising that their health should be cared for, and they should go to the hills in the hot weather.† Although these propositions were rejected, the officers were not the less carefully protected.

The party at Mr. Monckton's, guarded by a Seik escort, reached the fort unmolested. The danger, however, did not end here; for the crowded, miserable building was ill-fitted to resist the force which the mutineers could bring to bear against it; for a signal-gun, left in the station, had fallen into their hands. They mounted it on a carriage drawn by sixteen bullocks, and fired it at noon as if nothing had occurred.

The Europeans meanwhile were not idle. There was a terrible preponderance of women and children; but some of the foot police corps, and 300 new Seik levies, were stanch. Without staying to break their fast, the garrison laboured, under a burning sun, to throw up an earthwork on the approach to the gate, to prevent its being blown open; served out muskets and ammunition, and manned the bastions. Then, mounting the ramparts, they watched the movements of the enemy. Detachments of infantry and cavalry were seen round the gaol, engaged in releasing 350 ruffians, who immediately set to work plundering and murdering; commencing their work by destroying the Cutcherry, with all the documents stored therein. The sepoys plundered the treasury of 14,000 rupees, and divided among themselves 35,000 more, which had been left in their charge. The market-place and town were then burned down; two large magazines blown up (far more completely than the gallant Lieutenant Willoughby had done at Delhi); after which the plunder of the houses commenced. About four in the afternoon, the mutineers, to the inexpressible relief of the Europeans, got together all the horses, buggies, and carriages they could find—laded them with plunder, and, with bugles sounding and banners flying, moved leisurely off for Delhi, marching about nine miles that night, towards the Ravee river.

* Letter of Lieutenant Prinsep, dated "Goorjanwalla, July 14th, 1857."—*Times*, Sept. 1st, 1857.

† Letter of Mrs. Caulfield.—*Times*, October 24th, 1857. Letter of civilian.—*Times*, Sept. 22nd, 1857.

Their triumph was brief. The command of the moveable column at Umritsir was in the hands of an officer young in years, but old in experience. John Nicholson* was one of three Irish brothers sent to India by their uncle, Sir James Weir Hogg. He served as an ensign in the Afghan war, and was with Colonel Palmer at Ghuznee, at the time of the discreditable capitulation of the fortress; on which occasion he surrendered his sword with bitter tears.

In the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns he served with distinction; and afterwards exerted himself so successfully in the settlement, or rather administrative subjugation, of the country, that Lord Dalhousie called him "a tower of strength." The Seiks applied to him the name formerly given to Runjeet Sing—"the lion of the Punjab:" but except in their mutual ability for war, no similarity existed between the little shrivelled old Seik (pitted by small-pox, and blind in one eye, the other gleaming like a basilisk) and the young Irishman, whose stature and bearing have been described as "fit for an army or a people to behold;" but who in private life was gentle and most kind, "unselfish, earnest, plain, and true."† The high praise has been claimed for him of being a favourite pupil of Sir Henry Lawrence, and worthy of his master: yet in tracing his later career, there is evidence of the prompt and pitiless policy of Sir John; but little, if any, of the horror of indiscriminate slaughter which characterised Sir Henry.

In the crisis of 1857, such a leader as Nicholson was invaluable; and none questioned the benefit to be derived by the government from his rapid promotion, when he became a brigadier-general and a C.B. at five-and-thirty. His influence with the Seiks was almost unbounded. In the Bengal army he had no confidence, and carried the disarming policy to the uttermost. On the 8th of July, the exemplary 59th N.I. were disarmed by him, as a precautionary measure, but with deep regret. On hearing of the Sealkote mutiny, he disarmed the wing of the 9th light cavalry; and mounting such riders as he could on the

vacant horses, he marched off with H.M. 52nd light infantry, a troop of horse artillery, three guns, some Punjab infantry, a company of a police battalion, and two newly raised risallahs, to intercept the Sealkote mutineers. The station of Goordaspoor is forty-one miles from Umritsir: the distance was accomplished in a forced march of twenty hours,‡ though not without considerable loss from exhaustion, apoplexy, and sun-stroke. On reaching Goordaspoor the column halted, and obtained, by means of reconnoitring parties, intelligence of the movement of the rebels, who were suffered to approach the Ravee, and commence crossing at the Trimmoo ferry. The river, never before known to have been fordable at this time of the year, was rapidly swelling, and proved a powerful auxiliary to the British, who came upon the mutineers at mid-day on the 12th. After a very brief attempt at resistance, they broke and fled in confusion, throwing away arms, uniform, accoutrements, booty—everything which could impede their escape. The enemy left 120 corpses on the ground; and as many more were swept away by the river. The want of cavalry, the depth of the water in the ford, and the fatigue of the Europeans, checked the pursuit; and about 300 of the rebels took post on an island in the middle of the river, where they remained hemmed in by the rising flood (in what manner subsisting does not appear) until the 16th, when Nicholson, having procured boats, advanced against them. The mutineers had retained the 12-pounder gun taken by them from Sealkote, and it was now turned against the English by the khansamah (house-steward) of the late Brigadier Brind; who appears to have been the only man among them capable of managing it. A few resolute mutineers "died manfully at the gun;" the rest gave up all thoughts of resistance, and flung themselves into the water, where they were drowned, or shot "like mud-larks, on sand-banks and small islands."§ The few immediately taken were put to death. Scarcely any would have escaped but for the want of cavalry on the part of the British: as it was, the neighbouring

* One of the three brothers perished at the Khyber Pass; the third is still in the Indian army.

† Epitaph on his grave in India.

‡ Nicholson's despatch; Goordaspoor, July 19th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers, 1858 (No. 6), p. 53.

§ Letter from a civilian of rank, who accompanied the expedition.—*Star*, September, 17th 1857. Probably Mr. Roberts, the commissioner at Lahore;

for in a letter from that place, dated July 17th, written by a lady residing with Mr. Montgomery, the judicial commissioner, mention is made of a description given of the expedition by Mr. Roberts, who "liked the excitement of his first and brief campaign, better than listening to appeals."—*Morning Advertiser*, Sept. 2nd, 1857. Mr. Roberts' presence and assistance is noted by Nicholson.

villages were burned, and numbers hunted to death. A large proportion of the plundered property was recovered; and fines were levied on the natives on account of the remainder.

About 600 sepoy were seized in Cashmere; and detachments of the new levies were sent there to take them from the native government. In one day seventy-eight of these were received and shot,* the Native officers being reserved for execution at Sealkote, whither two commissioners were sent from Lahore, to investigate the circumstances of the mutiny. The commanders of the foot and horse police were convicted of having betrayed their trust. They were Seiks; and grave apprehensions were entertained regarding the effect of their trial, conviction, and execution, on the minds of their countrymen. The European officers looked on the faces of the Seik levies assembled round the gallows, with an anxiety which increased when the ropes broke, and an order had to be given to the guard to shoot the half lifeless bodies.

It was, however, obeyed; and the brief excitement having passed over, the Europeans and Seiks returned to the ordinary work of hanging, shooting, and flogging Hindoostanees with entire unanimity.

A civilian, writing from Sealkoté, July 23rd, states—"Lots of servants who went away with the mutineers, have been punished. In one day we had to flog 125 men; forty lashes each. We have some to hang every day, from one to six in number. I shall be very glad when all this shooting and hanging is over; it sets people's minds more or less against us, and keeps us all in a state of excitement." In fact, there were various evidences of disaffection, each of which was watched with fear and trembling, as the possible precursor of a general rising among the Seiks. At Sealkote, as throughout the Punjab, affairs were in a most critical state; and the event desired by every European in India, as indispensable to the establishment of tranquillity—namely, the capture of Delhi—seemed further off in July than it had done in May.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ALLAHABAD; SUCCESSFUL ADVANCE OF HAVELOCK'S COLUMN; MASSACRE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN AT CAWNPOOR; FLIGHT OF THE NANA, AND REOCCUPATION OF CAWNPOOR.

On the 2nd of July, a message from Sir Henry Lawrence to Brigadier Havelock reached Allahabad, to the effect, that there was every reason to believe, that on the 28th of June, at 10 p.m., the Cawnpoor force had been entirely destroyed by treachery. Sir Henry added—"You must not now move with less than 1,000 Europeans. The Nana will probably join the rebels at Lucknow; but we can stand them all for months. Civil or other officers, of tact and temper, ought to join each regiment."†

Havelock and Neil expressed their decided disbelief of the fall of Cawnpoor; and the latter declared himself confident that "Wheeler still held out," and that Renaud's force‡ was "strong enough for anything that could be brought against

it;" and even if Cawnpoor were in the hands of the rebels, ought to move on steadily to Futtehpore, to be there overtaken by the general.

Sir Patrick Grant, the acting commander-in-chief, sent a telegram from Calcutta, roundly asserting, that "the report about the fall of Cawnpoor is a fabrication, and therefore to push on thither."§ Thus the information and counsels of Sir Henry Lawrence, when Cawnpoor had fallen, were as little regarded as his solicitations for speedy help had been before the capitulation. The fact of its fall was confirmed by Cossids, employed in carrying letters from Lucknow to Allahabad; who witnessed the evacuation. From the tone of Brigadier-general Havelock's telegram to Calcutta,|| it is

* *Times*, September 22nd, 1857.

† Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 97.

‡ See previous page, 303.

§ *Journal* of Major North, 60th Rifles; p. 38.

|| Dated July 3rd, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), 1857; p. 98.

evident that he gave to the Cossids the credence which he had refused to Sir Henry Lawrence; but it is surprising that the incompleteness of the massacre was not ascertained from the alleged eye-witnesses, and that overtures were not made for the rescue of the women.

Colonel Neil, previous to his abrupt supersession in the command by Brigadier Havelock, had made arrangements for the departure of the column on the 4th of July, and for the immediate dispatch of a small vessel up the Ganges, with provisions and stores. The steamer *Berhampootra* left on the 3rd, with Lieutenant Spurgin and a hundred of the 1st Fusiliers on board, two guns, and twelve artillerymen. The first proceedings of the party were not satisfactory. They had no coals, and were compelled to forage for fuel every day. It appears the lieutenant viewed Oude as altogether an enemy's country; and, on this presumption, opened fire on the village of a loyal zemindar, who had protected and entertained fugitive Europeans.* The zemindar's people armed and followed the steamer, firing upon it from the banks, but without effect, except that of bringing on themselves a more telling volley. Apologies were afterwards made to the zemindar from Allahabad.

Some differences regarding the guns and artillerymen to be left behind for the security of Allahabad, arose between Neil and Havelock,† and appear to have delayed the departure of the main force, which took place at 4 p.m. on Tuesday, the 7th of July. It consisted of about 1,100 men, of whom 800 were English, 150 Seiks, and 80 of the 13th irregular horse, with six guns. The rains had set in some time before, and had been incessant during the two days preceding the march, so that the tents and baggage were completely soaked, and the draught bullocks were greatly overladen. On the morning of the 4th the weather had cleared a little, but darkened as the day advanced, and the rain fell heavily as the force moved off; few in its number of fighting-men, but long and straggling, even on the present occasion, from the followers and baggage inseparable from an Indian army. The first two miles of the march lay through the densely populated city of Allahabad. The inhabitants lined the streets, and looked down from the house-tops in gloomy,

silent crowds; and it was remarked by a European who has written a graphic narrative of the expedition, that the Hindoos appeared to be either indifferent or apprehensive; but wherever a Mohammedan was seen, there was a scowl on his brow.‡

That night the troops camped in a snipe swamp, with the rain still pouring down on them. For the three following days, they proceeded by regular marches through a desolated country; the charred remains of villages, and dead bodies hanging by fours and fives on the trees by the road-side, giving evidence of the zeal of the precursors of the avenging column. General Havelock, not foreseeing how long and costly an operation the subjugation of the revolted provinces would prove, declared that Major Renaud had "everywhere pacificated the country by punishing the ringleaders in mutiny and rebellion, wherever they had fallen into his hands." Unfortunately, the insurrection in Oude was but commencing. The ringleaders of the mutiny were little likely to be caught at this stage of proceedings by an English force in defenceless villages; and the peasants executed by Major Renaud were chiefly accused of having helped, or not hindered, the destruction of the telegraphic communication in their vicinity, or been found guilty of possessing (through the exertions of the booty-hunting Seiks) some article of English apparel, or a coin or two, of more value than it was supposed they could have honestly obtained.

On the 10th of July, General Havelock learned that the rebels had dispatched a formidable force, said to consist of 1,500 infantry and artillery, 500 cavalry, 1,500 armed insurgents (in all, 3,500 men), and twelve iron and brass guns, to the vicinity of Futtehpoor, within five miles of which place Major Renaud expected to arrive on the morning of the 12th. The Grand Trunk road offered facilities for rapid progress. The wet weather had given place to intense heat. The general advanced by forced marches, until, by moonlight on the night of the 11th, he overtook Major Renaud, and the united forces marched on together to a fine open plain, about four miles from Futtehpoor. The main body had marched twenty-four miles; Renaud's men nineteen; and the hope was for breakfast rather than a fight. "Men and officers," writes a member of the force,

* *Journal of Major North*, p. 30.

† *Further Parl. Papers*, 1857; p. 108.

‡ Letter dated "Oude side of the Ganges, July 26th."—*Saturday Review*, Sept., 1857.

"had lighted their pipes; and a cluster of us were assisting at the manufacture of a brew of tea; when one, who had been employing himself with his field-glass, drew the attention of his neighbours to our small party of volunteer horse [sent on under Quartermaster-general Tytler, to reconnoitre in advance], who were returning before their time." A moment afterwards, a large body of cavalry, in white, emerged from the distant trees on the edge of the plain, in pursuit of the Europeans, followed by infantry and artillery. The British ranks fell in; and the enemy perceived, with dismay, that the junction of the forces had been accomplished, and that, instead of surprising a detachment, they had burst upon a prepared army, comprising 1,400 British bayonets and eight guns, besides 600 native auxiliaries.*

"In ten minutes the affair was decided;† for in that short time our Enfield rifles and cannon had taken all conceit of fight out of the mutineers." The Enfield rifles were thoroughly effective at more than 300 yards' distance; while the smooth-bored musket, with which alone the rebels were armed, was comparatively useless.‡ Resistance was futile; they broke and fled, and the British artillery and skirmishers pushed on in pursuit, leaving the reserve columns far in the rear, owing to the impediments of the ground. On reaching Futtehpoor, the entrance of the main street was blocked up by a barricade of carts and baggage, which was so firmly and advantageously placed, that it was at first supposed to be a defence purposely raised by the foe, and artillery was brought to bear on it; but it was soon discovered to be a mass of baggage, which had been jammed up between the houses in a hasty attempt to carry it away. The only casualty, among the Europeans occurred at this juncture. A wounded bullock broke loose, and, rushing wildly forwards, flung Major North into the air, and afterwards tossed a Highlander, who rushed to the

assistance of the officer. In the midst of the heap were found two new 6-pounders, with limbers and ammunition complete, besides large stores of gun and musket ammunition; and a little beyond, two tumbrils of treasure, "one of which fell into the hands of those astute plunderers the Seiks, and was no more seen."§ The "loot" realised by both Europeans and natives, was various and considerable. Of the hostile force the cavalry alone fought well. They were regular troopers, mounted on regular horses, but armed and equipped after the native fashion; and, in consequence of this alteration, they moved about the field with a rapidity of which they would have been incapable had they been weighed down by the weapons and accoutrements required by the Bengal system. It appears that they hoped to induce the Native cavalry to join them, and kept hanging about the flanks of the British force. At one time, a party of them having approached closely, General Havelock exclaimed, "I should like to see the irregulars draw blood;" upon which Lieutenant Palliser, calling to the 13th to follow him, dashed forward to the charge, accompanied by three of the volunteer cavalry. About a dozen sowars (chiefly officers) galloped after their leader; the rest followed him slowly. One of the volunteers (a civilian) says that, for the moment, he fully expected that the irregulars would join the rebel party, consisting of about thirty of the 2nd cavalry, and abandon him and his three companions to their fate. Just then Palliser was unseated by his horse swerving suddenly. The mutineers tried to get at him; but "his Native officers closed round to save him," and "fought like good men and true." The main body of rebel cavalry advanced to support the detachment, and the Europeans and irregulars retreated at full speed. Nujeeb Khan, a risaldar, who had been chiefly instrumental in saving Palliser, was left dead on the field, with six other sowars.|| The irregular cavalry were disbanded some days

* 1st Madras Fusiliers, 376; H.M. 64th, 436; 78th Highlanders, 284; H.M. 84th, 190; Royal Artillery, from Ceylon, 76; Bengal Artillery, 22; Volunteer Cavalry, 20.—Despatch of Havelock, July 12th.—*London Gazette*, October 9th, 1857.

† General Havelock to his wife, July 15th, 1857. It was in writing to his wife, on the 12th of July, that Havelock used the expression already referred to (see previous page, 276). "One of the prayers oft repeated throughout my life, since my school-days, has been answered, and I have lived to com-

mand in a successful action." In the same letter he states, that he addressed the troops thus:—"There's some of you have beheld me fighting; now try upon yourselves what you have seen in me."—Brock's *Havelock*, pp. 162, 163.

‡ Vide Nicholson's despatch.—Parl. Papers (No. 6), p. 54. His style of narrating an easy triumph contrasts forcibly with that of Havelock.

§ Article in *Saturday Review*, Sept., 1857.

|| Letter of civilian, dated "Camp, Kullianpoor, July 15th."—*Times*, Sept. 29th, 1857.

later. Two other natives were killed in the course of the action, and three or four wounded. Twelve British soldiers died from sun-stroke. No prisoners were taken. The loss of the rebels was estimated at about 150 in killed and wounded.* It was probably greater; for, in the words of General Havelock, "the enemy's fire scarcely reached us; ours, for four hours, allowed him no repose."†

The rebels, on evacuating Futtehpoor, left behind them twelve guns, which the victors gladly appropriated, and then gave way to exhaustion. Men and officers threw themselves down wherever a morsel of shade was to be found from the fierce rays of the mid-day sun, and went off into a deep sleep. After a short rest, grog and biscuit were served out. Then "the town was sacked by the Europeans, Sykeses (as the soldiers call the Seiks), and camp-followers; some of the principal houses were blown up, and thatched houses burnt."‡

The following order was issued:—

"G. O.—July 13th.—General Havelock thanks his soldiers for their arduous exertions of yesterday, which produced, in four hours, the strange result of a real army being driven from a strong position, eleven guns captured, and their whole force scattered to the winds, without the loss of a British soldier. To what is this astonishing effect to be attributed? To the fire of British artillery, exceeding in rapidity and precision all that the brigadier-general has ever witnessed in his not short career, or to the power of the Enfield rifle in British hands, and to British pluck—that good quality which has survived the revolution of the hour, and gained in intensity from the crisis; and to the blessing of Almighty God, and to the most righteous cause of humanity, truth, and good government in India."§

On the 14th, the force marched fourteen miles to Kullianpoor. On the 15th they started afresh; and after proceeding about five miles, found the rebels in position at a village named Aong, with two guns. Here, also, an easy victory was obtained by the British artillery and riflemen, aided by the handful of volunteer horse. The want of cavalry was again severely felt. The rebel troopers made an attack on the baggage, and would have cut it up, but for the gallantry of the hospital sergeant of the 78th, who, collecting all the invalids and stragglers in the rear, formed a small rallying square of about a hundred

men, and received the mutineers with such a fire of musketry, that they rode off discomfited, leaving many dead behind them. After capturing the guns and driving off the foe, the force halted to breathe and drink water, and then marched on three miles further, to the Pandoo Nuddee, a river spanned by a masonry bridge of three arches, which was said to be mined. The enemy had formed a second intrenchment on the further side of the river; and as soon as the foremost of the British column emerged from among the mango groves, through which their road had lain, a couple of 24-pounder shot, accurately thrown, fell in their midst, wounding men and gun-bullocks. The British artillery advanced with all speed; the guns rapidly unlimbered and opened fire. The effect was instantaneous. The first discharge of shrapnel bullets smashed the sponge-staffs of the enemy, so that they could no longer fire their guns; and they turned and fled, leaving the bridge and the guns in the hands of the British. It was generally remarked that the mutineers fought more closely and fiercely than at Futtehpoor, and that a competent leader would have rendered them formidable. Two Europeans (a Highlander and a bombardier) were killed, and twenty-five wounded, Major Renaud mortally. (He sank rapidly after the amputation of the left leg above the knee, but was brave and cheerful to the last). It was fortunate that the British had passed on so rapidly; for the enemy had attempted to destroy the bridge, and had failed for want of time. The explosion of their mine had thrown down the parapet walls, but left the arches uninjured.

Five guns had been taken during the day. The tired troops bivouacked on the spot from which they had last fired. That night a rumour spread through the camp, that the Nana himself, with the whole of the Cawnpoor mutineers, estimated at 4,000 infantry and 500 horse, had formed an intrenchment at the village of Aherwa, at the fork of the Grand Trunk road, about four miles from Cawnpoor, where one branch runs on to cantonments, and the main line continues to Delhi. The intelligence was true; and the general, finding that the mutineers were stationed, with heavy guns, so as to command the road and sweep it with a flanking fire, resolved to make a *détour*, and attack them from an unguarded point. For this purpose a most trying march was undertaken. The distance to be

* Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 24.

† Despatch of General Havelock, Futtehpoor, July 12th.—Further Parl. Papers, p. 137.

‡ Letter of volunteer.—*Times*, Sept. 29th, 1857.

§ Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 132.



accomplished was about twenty-two miles. Fourteen were traversed in the morning of the 16th of July; then the troops halted, took food and rest. At 2 P.M. the march was recommenced. The men were fully armed and accoutred, each one carrying sixty rounds of ball ammunition. Just before starting a supply of porter was issued, "and the pernicious effects of this heavy drink were too speedily manifested."* The scorching glare of the mid-day sun was intolerable: at every step a man reeled out of the ranks, and threw himself fainting by the side of the road; the calls for water were incessant along the line. At length the point for the flank movement was reached; the column turned off into the fields; and the overworked, ill-fed cattle toiled heavily over the freshly ploughed ground for about half a mile, when the British came in sight of the enemy, and were greeted by a fierce fire from their guns, the range of which was happily too high, or heavy loss must have been suffered by the infantry, as yet unsupported by their own batteries. The 1,400 British bayonets, on which Havelock had relied at Futtehpoor, were greatly diminished; besides many deaths, there were "cartloads" disabled by sore feet and sun-strokes.†

The Seik regiment had not yet come up, so that it was estimated that there could not be more than 900 men of all sorts brought to bear against above five times that number.‡ There was no opportunity for the guns and artillery to carry everything before them as on previous occasions; and after a few rounds, at different ranges, fired by our cannon, it was found that those of the enemy were so well sheltered by the walls and houses of the series of small villages in which they were posted, that there was little chance of stopping, by this means, their continuous discharge. The British infantry lay prostrate to avoid the unceasing volleys poured upon them by the rebels, whose bands were playing, as if in derision, the favourite British airs; and the soldiers ground their teeth with rage, as "Cheer boys, cheer!" was heard in the intervals of the firing.

The clear, peculiar-toned voice of Havelock gave the order to the 78th to take the foremost village. "The Highlanders, led by Colonel Hamilton [an eye-witness writes],

rose, fired one rolling volley as they advanced, and then moved forward with sloped arms and measured tread, like a wall; the rear rank locked up as if on parade, until within a hundred yards or so of the village, when the word was given to charge." The pipes sounded the pibroch, and the men burst forward "like an eager pack of hounds racing in to the kill, and in an instant they were over the mound and into the village. There was not a shot fired or a shout uttered, for the men were very fierce, and the slaughter was proportionate. 'I've just got three of 'em out of one house, sir,' said a 78th man, with a grin, to me, as I met him at a turn of the village."§

The enemy's skirmishers, driven from the village, were hunted out of the plantation by the Madras Fusiliers; but notwithstanding these advantages, the event of the battle was still far from being decided. The want of cavalry disabled the British from protecting their rear; and the enemy, strong in this arm, and skilful in its use, enveloped our flanks in the form of a crescent, showing such unusual resolve, that the best narrator of the contest declares, "if there had only been a head to guide them, we must have fought hard for our bare lives."|| Wanting this, they were driven from one position after another: still their fire, though diminished, was not silenced; and, in the lengthening shadows of evening, their line seemed to grow more dense, while their drums and trumpets sounded the advance in quick repetition. A feeling of depression and uncertainty gained ground among the British; they were again exposed to the fire of the enemy, and those in front lay down to avoid it. Deceived by the waning light, Major Stephenson was leading on the Madras Fusiliers, in close column, to a point where a round shot, or discharge of grape, would have involved the noble regiment in destruction, when Major North, who was prostrate on a narrow ridge of earth with the Highlanders, sprang to his feet, and, rushing across the plain, gave a hurried warning to Major Stephenson, who deployed his regiment into line, and lay down beside the 78th.

At this moment Havelock appeared riding a hack, his own horse having just been shot under him, and gave the order for the line

* Major North's *Journal*, p. 60.

† Letter from one of the volunteer cavalry.—*Times*, Sept. 29th 1857.

‡ Major North's *Journal*, p. 67.

§ Article in *Saturday Review*, Sept., 1857.

|| *Ibid.*

to advance. When the word "forward" was given, the space between the hostile lines was so inconsiderable that a general *mêlée* seemed inevitable. The exploit which turned the scale in favour of the British, was performed by the 64th. The enemy had only one battery left, but they were using it with effect.

A civilian, one of the gallant score of volunteer cavalry, was with the infantry when Havelock addressed them thus:—"Get up, my lads, and take those ——— guns." "Up we got with a cheer; it was more like a howl; and charged up, giving them a volley at eighty yards, and ran in."* The enemy fled across the plain, carrying off two horse artillery guns. The British collected their wounded, and, as night set in, formed up and bivouacked on the plain, just beyond the grand parade-ground of Cawnpoor. The total casualties, including natives, were 108. Those of the enemy were estimated at 250. Among the Europeans, the 64th were the chief sufferers, having three officers, one sergeant, one corporal, and thirty privates wounded. One officer (Captain Currie, of the 84th), five soldiers, and a sepoy, were killed or mortally wounded. "Hungry, thirsty, and cold, the troops had nothing but dirty ditch-water to drink; but it was like nectar."† Their fast was of twenty-one hours' duration: from noon on the 16th of July, till 9 A.M. on the following morning, not a man of the force had any refreshment.‡ No wonder that disease overtook them speedily. Cholera and dysentery attacked the column. One of the ablest officers, Captain Beatson, bore up, by sheer "pluck," through the Cawnpoor engagements, and bivouacked with the troops at night, sinking only when the place was reoccupied. But surely a sadder reoccupation was never effected. Frightful as had been the fatigues borne by the troops on the march from Allahabad, their efforts had been too late to redeem the expedition from the censure of "insufficient, and too late." On the road, the column had learned that the majority of the women and children of the Cawnpoor and Futtehghur garrisons were yet alive; and "the thought of releasing them from their cruel bondage, had been a matter of happy speculation throughout the camp." But they never strove to ransom, and were too late to rescue, these innocent victims, or even to avenge their deaths on

the Nana Sahib and his fiend-like counsellor, Azim Oollah. These great criminals fled, proclaiming their departure by an act of policy and defiance. At daybreak, while the troops were craving food of any description, and waiting for the baggage to come up, preparatory to encamping; as they "lay idly looking towards the belt of trees and houses across the parade-ground," a huge pillar of smoke rose slowly in the air, followed by a loud report. The Nana had blown up the grand magazine and arsenal at Cawnpoor, before retreating to his own palace-fort of Bithoor, only nine miles distant. Next came the tidings of the final massacre. In the course of the morning the troops marched into cantonments, and looked with amazement on the mud wall so wonderfully defended, and, with grief and horror unspeakable, on the evidences of the closing scene of the most terrible tragedy of modern times. One account, and only one, out of the multitude written on the subject, affords an adequate idea of the depth and variety of wretchedness endured by the Englishwomen; and that is Mowbray Thomson's *Story of Cawnpoor*.§ It was sad enough to think of the innocent victims, as they were depicted in the graceful "In Memoriam," which attracted so many gazers, in the Royal Academy Exhibition of 1858: but had the picture truly represented the persons and surrounding circumstances of the 200 women and children at the moment of the slaughter, it would have been turned from with horror and loathing. Except, perhaps, under the hatches of a slave-stealing clipper, during the "middle passage," human nature has rarely borne up against such intense, accumulated, and protracted suffering as was endured by the English at Cawnpoor. Let it be remembered, that when the garrison and resident population, including 750 Europeans, were blockaded in the intrenchment, very few had secured a single change of raiment; some were only partially dressed; and, in the beginning of the defence, "all were like a band of seafarers who had taken to a raft to escape from a burning ship."

The thermometer ranged from 120° to 130° Fahrenheit; and once or twice muskets went off untouched, either from the sun exploding the caps, or from the fiery

* *Times*, Sept. 29th, 1857.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Major North's *Journal*, p. 88.

§ Published since the issue of the account of the siege, given at pages 247—263.

heat of the metal. "Across the plain, the mirage, which only makes its appearance in extremely hot seasons, painted its fantastic scenes:" sometimes forest trees, sometimes a wide expanse of water, mocked the sufferers huddled together in that place of torment. "Not even a pint of water for washing was to be had from the commencement to the close of the siege." It was at the cost of many lives that a little was obtained to appease the maddening cravings of thirst, or to prepare the half-pint of split peas and flour*—the daily rations† that afforded the porridge on which strong men and delicate women supported existence; varied, indeed, at rare intervals, by horse or dog broth, the animals being obtained in some of the sallies of the garrison, or having strayed within reach.‡

The destruction of the thatched bungalow, besides the other suffering it occasioned, drove 200 women and children into the trenches for shelter, where they passed twelve days and nights on the bare ground. Idiocy and madness were not wanting to increase the horrors of the scene—"the old babbling with confirmed imbecility; the young raving, in not a few cases, with wild mania;"§ the heart-sickness of hope deferred producing the first form of insanity, as surely as physical suffering the latter. "At all times of the day and night," eager ears were listening for the sound of the hourly expected relieving force from Calcutta; and

* The drawing of water from the single well within the intrenchment (the other just beyond it, but under cover of the guns, being dry, and used as a burying-place), was, it will be remembered, a service of imminent danger; for the creaking of the tackle immediately drew down a shower of grape on the spot, even in the dead of night. The gallant John McKillop, of the civil service, styled himself the Captain of the Well; and the piteous cries of the children for water never met his ear in vain. After many hair-breadth escapes, he was killed by a grape-shot wound in the groin. His last words were an earnest entreaty that somebody would go and draw water for a lady to whom he had promised it.—*Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 87.

† As long as provisions lasted, "the youngest recruit had the same rations as the old general; no distinctions were made between civilians and military men; and there was not a solitary instance in which an individual had lost sight of the common necessity, and sacrificed it to self-interest, by hoarding supplies."—*Ibid.*, p. 32.

‡ "Captain Halliday, who had come from the pukka barrack to the main-guard, to visit Captain Jenkins, was shot dead while returning, carrying back soup made of horse-flesh, for his wife."—*Ibid.*, p. 85.

§ The Rev. Mr. Haycock (sent out by the Propagation of the Gospel Society) used to bring

even to the last, each one would remind his neighbour, that "the governor-general had promised to send reinforcements promptly." When the intrenchment was evacuated, some of the women had gowns, some had not; few had shoes, and fewer stockings: for the guns had been injured by the enemy's shot, and the canister could not be driven home: "consequently," Mowbray Thomson writes, "the women gave us their stockings, and we charged these with the contents of the shot-cases." Scarcely any of the men had shirts; these had all gone to bandage the wounded, or, it may be, to afford swaddling-clothes for the three or four children born during the siege.¶ Yet if, in its details, Cawnpoor forms the darkest page in the mutiny of 1857, there is a sense in which it is the brightest of our triumphs. The survivor who has so touchingly depicted the scenes he witnessed, declares that, "in looking back upon the horrible straits to which the women were driven, the maintenance of modesty and delicate feeling by them to the last, is one of the greatest marvels of the heartrending memories of those twenty-one days." Never was the spirit of Englishmen, women,¶ and children, more terribly tested; never did it shine forth in purer brightness. With a few inconsiderable exceptions, the garrison** evinced a patient fortitude, which could hardly have been derived from any meaner source of

his aged mother, every evening, into the verandah, for a short relief from the fetid atmosphere within the barrack walls. She was shot; and the sight of her agony so affected her son, that he died a raving maniac.—*Ibid.*, p. 105.

¶ Mrs. Darby, the wife of a surgeon who died at Lucknow, was one of those wretched mothers! She perished at the time of the embarkation.

¶ Among many heroines, Thomson distinguishes Mrs. Fraser, the wife of an officer of the 27th N.I., who escaped from Delhi to Cawnpoor by travelling dāk. The native driver, who had taken her up in the precincts of the city, brought her faithfully to the end of her hazardous journey of 266 miles. "During the horrors of the siege, she won the admiration of all by her indefatigable attentions to the wounded. Neither danger nor fatigue seemed to have suspended her ministry of mercy. Even on the fatal morning of embarkation, although she had escaped to the boats with scarcely any clothing upon her, in the thickest of the deadly volleys poured on us from the banks, she appeared alike indifferent to danger and her own scanty covering, while with perfect equanimity and unperturbed fortitude, she was entirely occupied in the attempt to soothe and relieve the agonised sufferers around her. She was recaptured in the boats, and is said to have died of fever."—*Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 28.

** Eurasians and natives all behaved gallantly.

strength and comfort, than the assured hope of another and a better life. There is no record of fierce invective against natives, or even sepoys; no project of suicide, to detract from the uncompromising, undoubting tone of Christian confidence. Nothing in the world could have given peace under such circumstances, and nothing in the world could take it away: not the certain misery of the present, not the looming horrors of the future, not the cruelty of fiend-like foes, not the broken promises of dilatory friends, who, after General Wheeler's agonising cry for "help! help! help!" left the garrison to sicken with hope deferred. They did not die in despair, as they must have done had their trust been on an arm of flesh. Prolonged life on earth, amid scenes of blood and vengeance, with mutilated frames or shattered nerves, and the memory of the fearful past—its bereavements and its complicated miseries—would have been a doubtful boon to the majority of the scantily clad, half-starved crowd, who, at the time of the capitulation, begrimed with powder, and covered with dirt, dragged their emaciated limbs, or waded with their yet feebler companions through the water to boats, where already charcoal was hidden in the hatches for their destruction.

Thus far (to the commencement of the first massacre) the account of Mowbray Thomson supplies authentic details regarding his fellow-sufferers. After his escape, he joined the force under General Havelock, and made inquiries regarding the fate of the women and children. Official investigation was also instituted into the circumstances connected with the mutiny, and into the proceedings of the Nana. The witnesses were about fifty in number, including natives of various positions, connected with Cawnpoor; and from their testimony, carefully compared and sifted, important evidence was obtained.

No trace of any conspiracy was detected before the 22nd of May, 1857; and then Bala Sahib, the brother of the Nana, and Azim Oollah, used the sensual, indolent, apathetic Nana as their instrument. Various proclamations were issued, some of which show that Azim Oollah had learned, during his residence in London, to distinguish between the Crown and people of England, and the East India Company. During the siege, a document was read in the bazaars, and distributed among the people, inform-

ing them that a traveller, just arrived in Cawnpoor from Calcutta, had stated, that a council had been held there for the purpose of considering the best means of abolishing the Mussulman and Hindoo systems of religion. That the enforcement of polluted cartridges upon the army was resolved on; it being considered that it would be easy to Christianise the people afterwards. A petition was sent to Queen Victoria, requesting that many thousands of English soldiers might be dispatched to India, to put down the resistance which it was foreseen would be made to the cartridges; and it was estimated that 50,000 natives would have to be destroyed before India could be Christianised. The petition was granted; and the authorities at Calcutta, pending the arrival of reinforcements, began to issue the cartridges. The secret of the materials used in their preparation was divulged through the natives employed in the manufacture; and of these men, one was killed, and the rest imprisoned. Then followed an account of the manner in which the vakeel of the Sultan of Roum (Constantinople) had sent news from the court of England to his master, and of a firman issued by the sultan to the King of Egypt; the result of which was, that when the army of London arrived at Alexandria, the ships were fired on, sunk, and destroyed, and not a soldier escaped.* All this, which to English ears sounds like the veriest rigmarole, was cleverly concocted for its lying purpose. After the fall of Cawnpoor, the Nana informed the people, that as by the Divine blessing and the good fortune of the emperor, the "yellow-faced and narrow-minded English had been sent to the infernal regions," it was incumbent on both ryots and landed proprietors to render cheerful obedience to the new government. A few days later (July 1st), another proclamation was issued, and read in every street and lane of the city, to the effect, that regiments of cavalry, infantry, and batteries, had been dispatched to Futtehpoor, to resist the advance of a European force.

The tidings of the second defeat of the rebels, struck terror into the camp at Cawnpoor; the more so, as Bala Sahib had been severely wounded in the right shoulder. Azim Oollah persuaded the Nana that the British forces were advancing for the sake of rescuing the women and

* Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 60.

children; and that if these were killed, the expedition would be abandoned* (as had been the case at Jhansi). A hurried council was held by a numerous assemblage, including a large number of persons who, by loans of money and otherwise, had committed themselves to the rebel cause, which they intended to desert. These persons considered that all hope of escaping punishment would be lost if any victims were allowed to escape and give evidence regarding the blood already shed. Mrs. Greenway, and other old residents, were especially obnoxious on this account; and the fears of the compromised persons were quickened by the discovery of an attempt made by one of the unfortunate ladies to communicate with the approaching force. Their complete destruction was at length decreed.

The number of the wretched company of women and children about to be sacrificed, has not been exactly ascertained. Mowbray Thomson estimates it at 210, of whom 163 were survivors from the Cawnpoor garrison, and forty-seven from that of Futtehghur; but according to one of the most trustworthy witnesses (Myoor Tewarree),† only 122 were saved on the 27th of June; and other authorities place the number much lower.

A native of influence in Cawnpoor, who is also a government official, has related a strange circumstance regarding the first massacre. He states, that during its perpetration at the ghaut, a sowar of the 2nd cavalry reported to the Nana, then at the Sevada Kothee, that his enemies, their wives and children, were exterminated. Some one present remarked, that the statement was true; for an infant of a year old had been seen floating down the stream. On hearing this, the Nana replied that there was no necessity for the destruction of women and children; and directed the sowar to return and stay their slaughter. He was obeyed; and the poor creatures were parted from their husbands and made prisoners. The fact of the indiscriminate massacre having been stayed by an order from the Nana, is confirmed by several witnesses.

When the Futtehghur fugitives arrived,

* Thomson's *Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 213.

† See p. 262, ante.

‡ "All accounts agree in the statement, that the fêted, honoured guest of the London season of 1854, was the prime instigator in the most foul and bloody massacre of 1857."—Thomson's *Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 213.

the men were at once separated and shot, except four, who were reserved for some inexplicable reason; these were Mr. Thornhill, magistrate and collector of Futtehghur; Colonel Smith, 10th N.I.; and Brigadier Goldie. The fourth person was not identified. They were sent, with the women and children, to the Sevada Kothee (sometimes called Salvador House), which was an enclosed residence, with a courtyard in the centre. It had been originally built for, and used as, a zenana, though afterwards occupied by a native clerk, and comprised two principal rooms, each twenty feet long. The captives were cruelly neglected as regarded food and clothing; and a list of them, found in the house of a native doctor after the reoccupation of the place, shows that a number died from their wounds, and from cholera, which broke out in their midst. At half-past four on the afternoon of the 15th of July, a message was brought to the four Englishmen, that a Native officer of the mutineers desired to see them at a certain place. They proceeded quietly along the road towards the spot indicated, were followed, attacked, and cut down near the Assembly-rooms. Azim Oollah‡ found it more difficult to procure the murder of the women and children. The cavalry refused to incur the defilement; the infantry shrank from the task: and at length, the 6th N.I., sepoy on guard at the Sevada Kothee, were compelled, by the threat of being exterminated by artillery, to enter the house and fire on the helpless crowd within. Immediately before the entrance of the sepoy, at about 6 P.M.,§ the Christian drummers of the 6th N.I., who had been confined with the Europeans, were removed to a shed or stable, fifteen paces off; and from whence they could see something, and hear much, of the tragedy enacted in the Sevada Kothee. The sepoy fired|| once wildly at the ceiling, and then rushed out, refusing to have anything more to do with such devilish work. The order to the guard for the massacre of the prisoners, is said to have been conveyed to them by a slave-girl, called the Begum, who had been sent to attend on the prisoners. Her mistress,

§ The wives of drummers, and native children from three to ten years of age, were spared by the mutineers throughout the siege and massacre.

|| One of the sepoy, named Diddie, being reproached by the drummers for firing on the Englishwomen, said, "his own family had been killed; he did not care."

Adla, a professed courtesan, had lived with the Nana from 1850, and is reported to have obtained from him the jewels belonging to the Peishwa's widows, valued at £50,000. Whether the slave-girl had any cause of enmity against the poor ladies, does not appear; but, in the native evidence, her name frequently recurs as instrumental in their destruction. When the sepoy of the 6th N.I. refused to obey the order, she fetched five men armed with swords. The witnesses did not agree regarding these murderers. Some said that they belonged to the Nana's guard, and that the Begum's lover, one Sirdar Khan, was among the number; but Fitchett,* whose account is the most consistent of any, declared that, of the five men, two were butchers, and two villagers. One of the butchers he described as a tall, stout, dark man, much pockmarked, with a small beard; and he noticed the short, stout figure, and hairy hands of the fifth man (a belaittee). From his position he could see the murderers enter the Sevada Kothee at sunset, and the lady nearest the doorway cut down. He saw nothing more of what was passing within; but heard "fearful shrieks;" and soon the belaittee came out with his bloody sword broken; went into the compound of the hotel in which the Nana was then residing, for another sword; came back with it; broke that also, and fetched a third. In about half-an-hour, the executioners quitted a scene the remembrance of which might well make life and death terrible to them. The work was not completed. Incessant groans were heard by the drummers during the night, and the butchery had to be consummated on the following morning; the avenging (alas! not the rescuing) force being then within twenty miles of Cawnpoor. The end of this great crime is thus told by Fitchett:—

"At about eight o'clock the next morning, the sweepers living in the compound (I think there were three or four), were ordered to throw the bodies into a dry well near the house. The bodies were dragged out, most of them by the hair of their head; those whose clothes were worth taking were stripped. Some of the women were alive; I cannot say how many; but three could speak. They prayed that, for the sake of God, an end might be put to their sufferings. I remarked one very stout woman, a half-caste, who was severely wounded in both arms, who entreated to be killed. She and

two or three others were placed against the bank of the cut by which bullocks go down in drawing water from the well; the dead bodies were first thrown down. Application was made to the Nana about those who were alive; three children were alive. I do not know what orders came, but I saw one of the children thrown in alive. I believe the other children and women who were alive, were then thrown in. I know that I am on my oath; but I swear that I saw all this. I was about 110 paces from the well; there was a great crowd looking on; they were standing along the walls of the compound—principally city people and villagers, but there were also sepoys there. The children that were still alive were fair, apparently Europeans; the eldest I think must have been six or seven. It was the youngest thrown in by one of the sweepers. The children were running round the well: where else could they go to? and there was none to save them."†

The only ray of comfort which, humanly speaking, breaks the gloom of this black deed, is, that searching investigation has proved that the women suffered no violation, the children no torture, at the hands of their unrelenting foes. On these points, the testimony of many witnesses, subjected to sharp cross-examination, is conclusive.

Mowbray Thomson accounts for the immunity of the women from the most indefensible of the outrages perpetrated by victorious troops even in nominally Christian countries, by a suggestion which happily is not applicable to the other Indian stations, in which no attempt was made by either sepoys or villagers on the honour of defenceless Englishwomen. "Fidelity," he writes, "requires that I should allege what appears to me the only reason of their being thus spared. When the siege had terminated, such was the loathsome condition into which, from long destitution and exposure, the fairest and youngest of our women had sunk, that not a sepoy would have polluted himself with their touch."‡ Some of the officers, and many of the soldiers, visited the Sevada Kothee on the morning of the 17th of July. Major North was one of the number. The floor of the inner room was ankle-deep in blood,§ and the plaster on the walls was scored with sword-cuts—"not high up, as if men had fought; but low down, and about the corners, where the poor crouching creatures had been cut to pieces."|| Long tresses of hair, fragments of women's apparel, children's little shoes and toys, were lying about in terrible confusion. Two scraps of paper, written on with a pencil, were found. One,

* See p. 262, *ante*. † Evidence, taken Oct. 10, 1858.

‡ *Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 213.

§ Major North's *Journal*, p. 76.

|| *Saturday Review*, September, 1857.

by Miss Caroline Lindsay, contained a record of the date of the deaths of the writer's mother (Mrs. G. Lindsay), brother, sister, uncle and aunt (Major and Mrs. Lindsay). The other bore no signature, and named no individual, but briefly noted the progress of the siege and surrender.

A Bible, which bore on the fly-leaf the inscription, "For darling mamma—from her affectionate daughter, Isabella Blair;"* and a Prayer-book, sprinkled with blood at the Litany, terminate the list of these books and papers with writing found in the slaughter-house; and in none of these was there one cry for vengeance, or reproach for neglect. There was no inscription of any kind on the walls at the first entrance of the Europeans; but soon, "Avenge us!" and other sentences were scribbled about on the Sevada Kothee and the barrack within the intrenchments, most of which were vulgar, slandering forgeries, wrong in their dates,† and utterly at variance with the feelings of the sufferers, as described by one of the two surviving officers of the garrison.

The moral of Cawnpoor, as deduced by him, was this—"If nearly two hundred millions are to be held in subjection by a few thousand Englishmen, the day is past when it could be done by mere physical force."‡

Major North, too, coming fresh from the gory chamber and the choked-up well, where the mangled limbs of his countrywomen protruded in ghastly disorder, declared—"The blood of those innocents cries

out from the earth, in reprobation of a system which, from its slothfulness, led to this catastrophe."§ An apocryphal anecdote went the round of the English and Anglo-Indian papers—of the Highlanders finding the head of one of General Wheeler's daughters; dividing the hair among them, and swearing that, for every hair they held between their fingers, a mutineer should die.||

A much nobler tribute to the memory of the dead, was really paid by twenty men of H.M. 32nd, who, marching through Cawnpoor in the subsequent November, raised a stone tablet to the slaughtered women of the regiment, in the form of a Maltese cross within a circle of stone. In the quadrants of the circle are inscribed, in red letters, and in the old English character—"I believe in the Resurrection of the Dead."

The Nana, it was thought, intended to defend himself in his palace-fortress at Bithoor (nine miles from Cawnpoor). He was alleged to have forty-five guns and 5,000 armed followers at his command. Havelock did not march against Bithoor till the 19th, and then found (as might have been expected) the place evacuated. The Nana and his counsellors were hardly likely to brave a siege when they could escape unmolested. The soldiery, unable to wreak their vengeance on the great criminals, gave vent to their passions in the sack of Cawnpoor. With fiend-like cunning, Azim Oollah had left spirits, wine, and beer in

* Mrs. Blair, daughter of the late General Kennedy, resided at Cawnpoor. Her husband, a cavalry officer, was believed to have perished at the Khyber Pass; but as no precise account of his death had ever been received, she persisted in hoping he might yet be alive in captivity among the Afghans. Her sister (Dr. Newnham's wife) died in the trenches; her elder daughter, Isabella, by fever; and the younger and herself are supposed to have been brought back to endure the second captivity and its sad close.—Thomson's *Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 120.

† For instance, on the wall of one of the barracks, was written—"Countrymen and women, remember the 15th of July, 1857! Your wives and families are here, misery! and at the disposal of savages, who have ravished both young and old. Oh! my child! my child! Countrymen, revenge!"—*Times* (Russell), March 29th, 1858.

‡ Thomson's *Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 124.

§ Major North's *Journal*, p. 92.

|| The *Bombay Telegraph* and *Courier* published this tale among many similar ones. Had it been founded on fact, Major North, who was serving with the Highlanders, would hardly have omitted to mention so striking an incident. The well was covered over, undisturbed. It would have been a

fresh desecration to have dragged forth to light the stripped and mangled bodies. A Miss Wheeler was probably fixed on as the heroine of the tale, because of the popular name she bore. Mowbray Thomson has touchingly described the sudden misery which overwhelmed this family. Just before the mutiny, he saw the old general on the parade-ground. He was small, spare, and very grey, with a quick intelligent eye, and a military bearing; and, at seventy-four years of age, still a first-rate equestrian: his son and daughter rode beside him, and were surrounded by Scotch deerhounds, for the party were going jackal hunting. A few weeks later, and the scene had changed to the close pestilential barrack. Young Wheeler was sitting upon a sofa, fainting from a wound he had received in the trenches; his sister was fanning him, when a round shot entered the doorway, and left him a headless trunk; while one sister at his feet, the father, mother, and another sister in different parts of the same room, were witnesses of the appalling spectacle. Thomson saw the general, his lady and daughters, walk down to the boats; but of their fate there is no authentic information, except that already mentioned regarding the daughter, alleged to have been rescued by a trooper. (See p. 263, *ante*).

abundance in all directions: the soldiers, half-starved, but too excited to care for food, drank eagerly; and then—the scenes which followed may well be passed over in silence. The provocation was terrible. The English and Anglo-Indian journals, for the most part, refrained from giving any estimate of the numbers slain at Cawnpoor by the avenging force; but some of them talked loosely of 10,000 of the inhabitants* having been massacred; and the continental journals† took up the statement of that number of men, women, and children having perished, as if it had been authenticated, overlooking the fact that the population were panic-struck by the approach of the British; on being assured of which, “every man that had a hand in the rebellion took to his heels.” From noon till midnight, nothing but immense mobs were seen rushing away as fast as possible towards the west. Some went to Lucknow; others to Delhi; while many hid themselves in the neighbouring villages.‡ The booty captured was very considerable, especially at Bithoor. A large portion of the Nana’s plate was found in the wells around the palace: gold dishes, some of them as much as two feet in diameter; silver jugs, spittoons of both gold and silver, were fished up, and proved glorious prizes for somebody. The Seiks had the credit of carrying off Bajee Rao’s state sword, which, in consequence of its magnificent setting with jewels, was valued at £30,000. “One ruby, of great size and brilliancy, cut with sharp edges, is said to have been carried by the Nana about his person, intending to use it for suicide, as its acute points would, if swallowed, cut through the vitals. After his flight he sold it for 10,000 rupees.”§

To stop the intoxication among the troops, Havelock followed the example of Neil at Allahabad, and ordered “all the beer, wine, spirits, and every drinkable thing, to be purchased by the commissariat: it will then,” he remarks, “be guarded by a few men.” If it remained at Cawnpoor, it would require half my force to keep it from being drunk up by the other half. I should not have a soldier in camp. While I was winning a victory on the 16th, some of my men were pillaging the commissariat on the line of march.”||

The easy and repeated triumphs obtained over the Nana’s forces, induced Havelock to form an inadequate idea of the difficulties yet to be encountered. In a general order, dated July 20th, he informed the troops, that Lucknow was in peril, Agra besieged (which was happily not the case), and Delhi still the focus of mutiny and rebellion: then he added—“Three cities have to be saved, two strong places to be disblockaded. Your general is confident that he can effect all these things, and restore this part of India to tranquillity, if you only second him with your efforts, and if your discipline is equal to your valour.”

Havelock appears to have anticipated being permanently entrusted with the management of the Oude campaign, in consequence of the death of Sir Henry Lawrence. Before that calamity became known in Calcutta, an order had been dispatched, constituting Sir Henry a major-general,¶ and desiring that the command should be placed in his hands so soon as the relief of Lucknow should set him at liberty. His death left the command indefinitely with Havelock, who wrote a most pressing requisition to General Neil to send 300 Europeans to occupy Cawnpoor, and thereby place the column at liberty to advance on Lucknow. Neil (just made a brigadier-general) received the request on the 15th of July, and forthwith dispatched above 200 of H.M. 84th, with orders to march twenty-five miles a-night, and reach Cawnpoor in five days. On the following day he started himself, overtook the men, and, with them, joined Havelock on the morning of the 20th.

A man of strong feelings, yet a stern disciplinarian, Neil was scarcely more infuriated by the sight of the loathsome evidences of the tragedy of the 16th, than by the excesses of the troops, which could not but have a moral and physical reaction. General Havelock crossed the Ganges on the 24th of July. On the following day, Neil writes to Calcutta regarding the measures he had taken to stop plundering and restore tranquillity; and suggests, among other means of supplying the want of cavalry, that all horses, private property of deceased officers, be taken by government at a

* For instance, *Scinde Kosseid*, Aug. 18th, 1857.

† For instance, *Milan Gazette*, November, 1857.

‡ Shepherd’s *Narrative*: Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 184.

§ Thomson’s *Story of Cawnpoor*, pp. 49, 50.

|| Despatch, Cawnpoor, July 18th.—Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), 1857; p. 143.

¶ Telegram from governor-general, July 12th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, p. 115.

fair valuation, for mounting dragoons and horsing batteries. "A stringent government order should be issued on this head to all forces, particularly to General Havelock, where there is that disposition to plunder; also a government order, stringent against plundering also."* In a private letter of the same period, he writes—

"Since I arrived here I have been hard at work to get order re-established. I have now put a stop to the plundering I found going on, by reorganising a police. I am also collecting all the property of the deceased, and trying to trace if any have survived; but as yet have not succeeded in finding one. I find the officers' servants behaved shamefully, and were in the plot—all but the lowest caste ones. They deserted their masters, and plundered them. Whenever a rebel is caught he is immediately tried, and unless he can prove a defence, he is sentenced to be hanged at once; but the chief rebels or ringleaders I make first clean up a certain portion of the pool of blood, still two inches deep, in the shed where the fearful murder and mutilation of women and children took place. To touch blood is most abhorrent to the high-caste natives; they think, by doing so, they doom their souls to perdition. Let them think so. My object is to inflict a fearful punishment for a revolting, cowardly, barbarous deed, and to strike terror into these rebels. The first I caught was a subahdar, or Native officer, a high-caste Brahmin, who tried to resist my order to clean up the very blood he had helped to shed; but I made the provost-martial do his duty, and a few lashes soon made the miscreant accomplish his task. When done, he was taken out and immediately hanged, and, after death, buried in a ditch at the road-side. No one who has witnessed the scenes of murder, mutilation, and massacre, can ever listen to the word 'mercy,' as applied to these fiends. The well of mutilated bodies—alas! containing upwards of 200 women and children—I have had decently covered in, and built up as one large grave."†

It does not appear on what authority the assertion regarding the native servants is based. Neil was not then sure that

any European had escaped, and could not have received any direct information. Afterwards, one of the survivors declared, that "a large number of the natives shared with us our sharp and bitter troubles." Some were killed in the intrenchment; several outlived the siege, and died at the time of embarkation; two or three escaped at the time of the capitulation; and a few faithful ayahs‡ remained with the ladies and children, and are believed to have been flung with them into the well, which, however, from its size, could not have held nearly 200 bodies.

The brigadier's proceeding with regard to the "pool of blood," occasioned some discussion. Could he have compelled the Nana, Azim Oollah, or any well-known and proved instigator or perpetrator of the crime, to perform this loathsome act, it might have altered the case. As it was, the perdition of the soul, supposed to have been occasioned thereby according to the creed of the Hindoos, did not touch the equally, if not more, guilty Mohammedans. But it is well known that modern Brahminism attaches importance to the violation of caste, rather as involving excommunication in this world, than perdition in the next; and the manner in which many even of the mutineers declared that the Nana Sahib had brought a curse on the cause by the Cawnpoor atrocity, proves that they could appreciate, as well as a European, between the punishment due to those who shed innocent blood, and the entirely external and compulsory act of cleansing the polluted earth. Again—since the rallying-cry for rebellion had been the preservation of caste, was it wise to do anything which should lend weight to that plea?

CHAPTER XIX.

OPERATIONS, IN OUDE, OF MOVEABLE COLUMN UNDER GENERAL HAVELOCK; LUCKNOW AND CAWNPOOR.—JULY AND AUGUST, 1857.

THE Ganges was crossed by the moveable column, unopposed by any foe. The operation is described as difficult and tedious; and it would have been still more so, but

for the ability of Colonel Fraser Tytler (assistant quartermaster-general), and the foresight of Neil, in providing a small steamer to keep open the river communica-

* Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 18.

† *Ayr Observer*, September, 1857.

‡ The ayahs are mentioned in a list of the Cawn-

poor and Futtehghur captives, found, after the re-occupation of Cawnpoor, in the house of a native doctor, who had attended them in the Sevada Kothee.

tion. Still Havelock was sanguine of success—brilliant, rapid, and uninterrupted success, in Oude, Agra, and Delhi. Sir Patrick Grant, on the 25th of July, acquainted the governor-general with the contents of a telegraphic message he had just received, in which General Havelock expressed a confident hope that Lucknow would soon be in his hands; and requested early orders whether he should remain in Oude, and thoroughly reconquer and pacificate the province, or recross the Ganges, march on Agra, join the force there, and “assist in the reduction of Delhi.”

On the same day the Lucknow garrison received a letter from Colonel Tytler, to the effect that the general’s force was sufficient to defeat the enemy; that the troops were then crossing the river, and hoped to be in Lucknow in five or six days, the distance between Cawnpoor and Lucknow being somewhat above fifty miles. The letter was conveyed by Ungud, a pensioned sepoy, who stole in through the besieging force at midnight, and poured forth tidings of the outer world to the eager ears of the Europeans. Mr. Gubbins describes the entrance of Ungud into the low room on the ground-floor, with a single light carefully screened on the further side, lest it should attract the bullets of the enemy; the anxious faces of the men; the indistinct forms of women in their night attire, listening in breathless silence to the promise of speedy rescue for themselves, followed by tidings of the final Cawnpoor massacre. Ungud also told them that the risaldar of Fisher’s Horse, the first rebel commander of the force besieging Lucknow, had been killed by a rifle-ball while reconnoitring from a loophole; that an infantry subahdar, named Ghumunda Sing, was their present leader; that a boy of eleven or twelve years of age, a member of the Oude royal family, had been proclaimed king; his mother, the Begum, being regent; while some authority was still exercised by the Moulvee, who had accompanied the mutineers from Fyzabad. After a day’s rest, Ungud again set forth on his perilous enterprise, bearing despatches and plans of Lucknow, and of the roads leading to it, from Brigadier Inglis, for General Havelock, to whom the garrison now looked for speedy rescue.

The tidings of the Cawnpoor massacre, terrible as they were, relieved the minds of the garrison from that worst fear, which the false or grossly exaggerated accounts of the

Meerut and Delhi mutinies had inspired. The men ceased to discuss the propriety of killing the women and children, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy—a practice which, in the case of Hindoos and Mohammedans, had been denounced by the British as barbarous and heathenish in the extreme. Nevertheless, Mr. Gubbins relates, that an officer who resided in his house during the siege, offered, in the event of the enemy taking Lucknow by storm, to shoot Mrs. Gubbins; and required a similar pledge on behalf of his own wife. Mr. Gubbins replied, that “the necessity had not arisen; and there was, therefore, then no need to provide for it.” He adds, in the manly, honest tone that characterises his narrative—“and besides, I could not do it.”*

Mr. Polehampton asserts that Colonel Inglis asked him, whether Mrs. Inglis would be justified in killing her own children, rather than let them be murdered by the mutineers? He replied, “No; for the children could but be killed.” Major Banks asked him, “as a clergyman,” for advice what to do, if it were certain that the women would be captured, and treated as they were alleged to have been at Delhi and Meerut. The answer was, that in that case, he (Mr. Polehampton) would shoot his wife.†

Neither the chaplain nor the commissioner lived to see the issue of the siege. The former was wounded while attending the sick in the hospital (which he had done zealously and kindly), and eventually died of cholera. The latter received a bullet through the temples, while reconnoitring the enemy from a loophole of Mr. Gubbins’ house, on the 21st of July. Mr. Ommaney, the judicial commissioner, had been previously killed by a cannon-ball, which hit him as he sat in his chair, after passing over the body of Sergeant-major Watson, who was lying down, and who, though not touched by the ball, died at the same moment.‡

The first sally made by the garrison was against Johannes’ house, so called from having been the property of a merchant of that name. From a loopholed turret near the roof, the double-barrelled rifle of an African eunuch, formerly in the service of the King of Oude, commanded the Cawnpoor battery; and the bullets swept down the main street, frequently entering the

* Gubbins’ *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 349.

† Memoir of the Rev. H. S. Polehampton; p. 271.

‡ Rees’ *Lucknow*, p. 128.

windows of the hospital. The eunuch's aim was so sure, that the soldiers called him Bob the Nailer. A sally was made on the 7th of July, and the house was entered by blasting open a little doorway. A number of the enemy were found asleep, and bayoneted. The rifleman himself, seated at his elevated post, and engaged in returning the fire specially directed by the garrison to divert his attention, was unconscious of the approach of the British up to the moment in which he was surrounded and slain.

Through inadvertence the house was left standing, and was speedily reoccupied by sharpshooters. Six weeks later it was undermined by Captain Fulton, and seventy or eighty rebels were killed by the explosion; after which the captain sallied forth, and drove the insurgents from several of the adjacent buildings, which were then destroyed.

The besiegers, although for the most part cowardly and unskilful, proved themselves able and persevering in the construction of mines; and had not the Lucknow garrison contained engineers remarkable for skill and courage, the repeated attempts of the enemy could hardly have been ineffectual. Captain Fulton was a host in himself. He organised a small body of miners, comprising a few Cornishmen (the 32nd was raised in Cornwall) and some Seiks. One of the officers has sketched with his pencil, and another with his pen,* the gallant Fulton, in the perilous position and cramped attitude in which he passed whole hours, lying at the end of a narrow subterranean passage, during the stifling heat of an Indian July, listening to the enemy's miner coming nearer and nearer, until his pickaxe actually pierced the gallery, and exposed the disconcerted workman to the view and ready pistol of the solitary sentinel.

The first, and most serious general attack, was made by the rebels on the 20th of July. They sprang a mine, intending to destroy a battery constructed by Captain Fulton,

called the Redan, which commanded the whole of the river side, and the buildings on the opposite bank. The enemy had miscalculated the distance, but the smoke hindered their seeing their failure; and, on hearing the loud explosion, they concluded that a breach had been effected, and, with fixed bayonets, advanced to the attack. Hundreds were shot down; but still, after discovering their mistake, they were unwilling to retreat; and one of their officers, waving his sword, on the point of which he had placed his cap, shouted—"Come on, my braves!" Again they advanced; but their leader being killed, and terrible gaps made in their ranks, they retreated in confusion, under a deadly fire from the British guns and muskets. Similar assaults were made on various points; but happily the weakest were avoided, because supposed to be undermined. Two lesser posts, almost entirely defended by non-military men, were fiercely assaulted by a body of sepoys and matchlockmen, led by a fanatic dressed in green, carrying the Moslem flag in his hands, and shouting "Deen! deen!" He was shot, and fell into the ditch: fifty or sixty of his followers were likewise killed; and, after some hours' hard fighting, the survivors retired, carrying off their flag, and nearly all their dead.

The affair commenced at nine o'clock in the morning, and the firing did not cease till four o'clock in the evening. The rebels then sent a flag of truce, and begged leave to remove the slain and wounded, whom they had not been able to bear away. This permission was readily granted. The loss of the enemy was estimated to exceed 1,000 men. The Europeans had four killed and twelve wounded, and about ten natives killed and wounded. The sanitary arrangements at this time are said to have been much neglected. Mr. Rees refers to causes of effluvia to which it is not pleasant to advert, but which must have fearfully aggravated the sufferings of the besieged, and contributed to produce that plague of flies, which was generally complained of as

* Lieutenant Meham and Mr. Couper. *Vide Sketches of Lucknow*, already quoted. "It was not a very easy matter," Mr. Couper writes, "for an unpractised hand to reach the end of a mine in a dark night. The shaft itself was generally not less than twelve feet deep, and the usual means of descent was a rope. On reaching the bottom, the neophyte crawled on his hands and knees till the narrowing of the passage compelled him to abandon that mode of progression, and wriggle

on, worm fashion, as best he could. Then, having arrived at the end, he composed himself to listen, and would probably hear some noise, such as a cock scratching the earth or the chopping of wood, which to his inexperienced and bewildered ear would sound suspicious; then he would hastily wriggle out of the mine to report his observations, much to the disgust of a more practised hand, who of course was immediately sent down, to return with the information that there was nothing going on."

far exceeding the sufferings inflicted by the mosquitoes at night, or anything which could be conceived as arising from apparently so minor an evil. "They swarmed in millions," Rees declares. "Our beef," he adds, "of which we get a tolerably small quantity every other day, is usually studded with them; and while I eat my miserable dall and roti (boiled lentil soup and unleavened bread), a number of scamps fly into my mouth, or tumble into the plate."

The want of bread was severely felt. The flour, kneaded with water, made into thin cakes by clapping between the hands of the native servants, and then baked on iron plates over the fire, proved unwholesome, and the sick and children grew to loathe the sight of the chupatties. The native bakers had all fled at the commencement of the siege; but Mr. Gubbins confesses himself unable to explain why, when yeast, and printed instructions for bread-making were procurable, no woman of the 220 within the intrenchment could be found capable of acquiring the knowledge of so rudimentary an operation in cookery. Ignorance was not, however, the sole cause of the deficiency; for it is added, that "the men were too much engaged in sterner duties; and to have baked for the whole inmates of each garrison, would have been too severe a labour for the ladies." Or the ladies'-maids either, it would appear; for Mr. Gubbins speaks of "our English maid, Chivers, presiding at the tea-table,"* when she might have saved some valuable lives by presiding at the flour-tub, and teaching herself first, and then the soldiers' wives and native servants, how to prepare digestible bread. If Cobbett had lived to hear of the bread-want in Agra, what a homily he would have preached on the defective training, and consequent domestic incapacity, of English-women, especially of soldiers' wives.

By the end of July, the strength of the garrison had materially diminished. In the 32nd regiment alone, the loss was 170, by death or wounds. One great deliverance had marked this month, the danger itself being overlooked till it was past. A quantity of "bhoosa" (chopped straw for bullocks' fodder) had been left in an open space of ground before the hospital battery. A few yards distant there was a large underground powder-magazine. The enemy succeeded in setting the fodder on fire unobserved; and the flames must have heated

the ground, ignited the gunpowder, and blown up the garrison, but for a heavy shower of rain (July 7th), which fell in time to prevent a conflagration. The fire smouldered for a whole week. Had it once blazed forth, the British could scarcely have extinguished it; as, from its exposed position, every person who had approached the spot would have been killed by the rebel sharpshooters.†

August arrived. On the 5th the firing of cannon was heard in the city. The besieged believing that the British troops were come, shook hands with one another in extreme delight, and rushed to the tops of the houses, heedless of danger, to catch the first glimpse of their deliverers. The short-lived joy gave place to bitter disappointment. The rebels perceived the mistake; and either from Johannes' house, or at the Baillie guard, where they had taken up a position so near the intrenchment as to be easily heard, taunted the Europeans, telling them the caannonade was a grand salute, fired at various points, in honour of the Oude prince whom they had proclaimed king.

On the 15th, Ungud returned with a note from Colonel Tytler to Mr. Gubbins, dated "Mungulwar, August 4th." It ran thus:—

"We march to-morrow morning for Lucknow, having been reinforced. We shall push on as speedily as possible. We hope to reach you in four days at furthest. You must aid us in every way, even to cutting your way out, if we can't force our way in. We are only a small force."

Brigadier Inglis, and the leading authorities, were scarcely less disconcerted by the misappreciation of their position, which the communication revealed, than by the information given by Ungud, that subsequent to its date the force had advanced towards Lucknow, won two easy victories at Oonao and Busserut Gunj, and then retired for some unknown reason. A letter was sent by the brigadier to General Have-lock, of which the following is an extract:—

"It is quite impossible, with my weak and shattered force, that I can leave my defences. You must bear in mind how I am hampered; that I have upwards of 120 sick and wounded, and at least 220 women, and about 230 children, and no carriage of any description; besides sacrificing twenty-three lacs of treasure, and about thirty guns of sorts. * * * If you hope to save this force, no time must be lost in pushing forward. We are

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, pp. 205, 206.

† Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 129.

daily being attacked by the enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their mines have already weakened our post. * * * My strength now in Europeans is 350, and about 300 natives, and the men are dreadfully harassed; and owing to part of the Residency having been brought down by round shot, many are without shelter. Our native force having been assured, on Colonel Tytler's authority, of your near approach some twenty-five days ago, are naturally losing confidence; and if they leave us, I don't see how the defences are to be manned."

Ungud's information was correct in the main, although the victories at Oonao and Busserut Gunj were not so easily gained, at least not so cheaply purchased, as he represented. The facts were these. General Havelock, on crossing the Ganges, encamped at the fortified village of Mungulwar, six miles from Cawnpoor; and on the 29th of July he marched thence for Lucknow. Nothing could have been less promising than the starting of men already struggling under the collapse consequent on fierce excitement, amid torrents of rain, to wade knee-deep through swampy plains, without tents, scantily fed, fever-struck by the sun by day, smitten with deadly sickness by the moon at night, yet expected to force their way through mud-walled villages inhabited by a warlike population, whose hostility there was reason to anticipate.* General Havelock set forth in ignorance (whether culpable or otherwise is a distinct question) of the dangers and difficulties to be encountered. The talookdars of Oude had as yet, for the most part, remained neutral; many of them had sheltered and protected European fugitives; but causes of hostility were not wanting: the forcible deposition of Wajid Ali without the concurrence, asked or given, of his subjects, was an ostensible ground of disaffection: our law, revenue, and governmental proceedings; our exactions and our omissions, especially our unfulfilled promises, had given many influential chiefs deep personal offence; while the peasants, alarmed by the village-burning system, were quite ready to defend their hearths and homes, as they had been accustomed to do when banded together to resist excessive taxation under native rule. It would have been politic, and moreover just,

in a general entering a country under such circumstances, to have issued a manifesto to the people at large, stating the object of the expedition, asking their co-operation, and promising protection to families, and fair remuneration for any service they might be able to render. Instead of this, General Havelock started as if entering an enemy's country, and met the opposition he had taken no pains to deprecate.

The troops had not advanced above three or four miles from Mungulwar, when they came upon a fortified village called Oonao. Here a small force, chiefly villagers, defended themselves with desperation, after their three guns were captured. The Europeans were engaged in firing a particular enclosure, as the only way of dislodging its defenders, when the field-engineer of the force, who had ridden round to the front to reconnoitre, galloped back, with the information that a very large force of infantry, cavalry, and guns, was rapidly advancing, from the other side, upon Oonao; whereupon the work in the village was left half done, for the Seiks to finish; while the column regained the main road, and beheld 6,000 men, with their guns in advance, at a distance of about 1,500 yards. An artillery officer describes himself as looking forward at the vast masses of infantry and cavalry with which the plain swarmed in front, and then backward at the small, thin line of men, struggling on knee-deep in swamp: yet in that line none quailed for fear; only a groan ran along it—"Oh, that we had cavalry to cut the dogs up!"†

The English artillerymen had happily the sun at their backs, and they opened on the rebel infantry with effect; while the Enfield rifles rapidly emptied the saddles of the cavalry. The enemy wavered, then turned, and fled pell-mell to a village across the plain, leaving the English masters of the field. It was past 2 P.M., and the victors stopped three hours to cook and eat. After this, they marched eight miles to Busserut Gunj, a large walled village, surrounded by swamps, where three guns had been placed in position. These were soon silenced by the fire of the British

* A non-commissioned officer of the 84th writes, that "during the passage of the river it rained almost incessantly; and my party, which was the last, had no shelter; for on a march like ours, no tents are brought, so some of the men had to wander about all night in the rain without a roof to shelter them;

the consequence was, that a good many took the cramps and died."—*Times*, September 29th, 1857.

† Letter published in *Saturday Review*, November, 1857. Evidently written by the same pen that ably described the march from Allahabad to Cawnpoor—previously quoted.

artillery; and the sepoys, after a feeble defence, were driven out of the village; the Nana Sahib, it was afterwards said, being with them, and the first to fly: but the matchlockmen fought desperately, and house after house had to be separately stormed before Buserut Gunj was evacuated. One villager occupied a little mud fort (which was almost the first post carried), and he contrived to hide himself, and thus escape the fate of his comrades, who had been all bayoneted. When the main body had passed on, the villager, instead of continuing to lie concealed, emerged from his lurking-place, and plied his solitary matchlock with effect against the guns, the baggage, the elephants, or anything that came within range. The rear-guard, struck with his contempt of death, desired to spare him, and called to him to desist; but he would not; and then a party of Seiks lit a fire round the fort, and shot him through the head, as he leant over the parapet to take a last aim at his foes.*

The English troops lost twelve killed and seventy-six wounded during the day. The loss of the enemy was calculated to have been 500 at Oonao alone. Twenty-one guns were captured, including two complete 9-pounders, quite new from the Cossipoor foundry. An important victory had been gained; and the officers and soldiers, notwithstanding the discomfort which surrounded them as they encamped that night on the causeway beyond the village, congratulated themselves on being within a forced march and a-half of Lucknow. The next morning an order for a retrograde movement was issued. General Havelock gave no explanation of the grounds of a measure at once unpopular, and totally at variance with the sanguine hopes he had so lately expressed. The occupation of nearly all the available carriage for the wounded and the sick, and the question of how to provide for casualties in the event of another action, was supposed to be a main cause of the retreat. Neither officers nor men appear to have recognised the necessity for this humiliating step; on the contrary, one of the general's aides-de-camp notes in his journal, that the very idea of a retrograde movement filled the force with consternation, and the order drew forth the first

murmurs he had heard; adding, the "almost universal feeling in our little band, is one of indignation at not being led forward."† Another officer (an anonymous but able writer, and a keen observer), after balancing the difficulties on both sides, thinks the advance should have been persisted in. He argues, that by following close upon the heels of the beaten foe, the English might have calculated on meeting with but slight opposition at the only dangerous place on the road—the Bunnee bridge, twelve miles from Buserut Gunj; and from thence to Lucknow the road was clear. At the city itself there would probably have been a sharp fight; but it was known that the guns of the advancing force could be placed in such a position as would enable them, in conjunction with the guns of the Residency, to shell the city. The troops were most anxious to make the attempt. "If," it was argued, "the force be now considered too small to effect its object, why was not that considered and decided on the other side of the river?" Having once crossed the Ganges, caution was out of place; and Danton's motto, "*L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace*," was the best rule of action in so desperate an undertaking.‡

Certainly our power in India was, as it ever had been, based on opinion; and the retreat at this crisis being viewed by the rebels as a sign of weakness, more than counterbalanced the effect of the previous victories. On returning to Mungulwar, the general began to strengthen that position, so as to make it an intrenched camp; and there the troops remained, waiting for reinforcements. At this unpropitious moment, a manifesto was issued, explaining why the British had entered the country in arms, and deprecating hostility on the part of the Oude population. It was too late; the protestations were not believed, and only tended to confirm the waverers in the idea that the English were now striving to gain by diplomacy, what they had failed in obtaining by force. The rebel ranks were strengthened by many chiefs of note immediately after the first retreat of Havelock.

It may be imagined that the "fiery Neil" chafed at the news; but when Havelock applied to him for reinforcements, requiring a battery, two 24-pounders, and 1,000 European infantry, he sent him half a battery and the two guns fully equipped, with about 150 infantry, leaving himself

* *Saturday Review*, November, 1857.

† *Major North's Journal*, p. 112.

‡ *Saturday Review*, November, 1857.

with 250 available men to hold Cawnpoor, and take care of about as many sick sent back from Mungulwar. Writing to England, in evident disapproval of the retreat of Havelock, and his requirement of another full regiment, Neil remarks—

"If he waits for that, he must wait reinforcements from Calcutta, and a long delay, during which time Lucknow may share the fate which befel Cawnpoor. The rebels, flushed with victory, will return on this, reoccupy Cawnpoor, and I have no troops to keep them out. I must be starved out. The influence, too, on Agra may be most disastrous; but I hope General Havelock, who has been so successful, will now advance again and relieve Lucknow."

The general made a second attempt. Starting afresh on the 4th of August, he found Oonao unoccupied, and bivouacked there that night. Next morning the troops marched on Busserut Gunj, with the intention of proceeding from thence to Nawab Gunj, a place five miles further on the road to Lucknow, said to be held in great force by the enemy. But Busserut Gunj proved to be reoccupied by guns and matchlockmen; and although the village was cleared, and the rebels driven from an adjacent plain (where large tents, especially a pretentious one, striped red and white, bespoke the presence of recognised leaders), the state of affairs was so unpromising, that a consultation was held on the propriety of retreating; and, this time, the force almost unanimously acknowledged its necessity.

On the 6th of August, the British lost two killed and twenty-three wounded; the enemy had 300 casualties. Still, Colonel Tytler, whose despatches are succinct and explicit, writes to the commander-in-chief—

"The whole transaction was most unsatisfactory, only two small iron guns (formerly captured by us, and destroyed, in our ideas) being taken. It became painfully evident to all that we could never reach Lucknow: we had three strong positions to force, defended by fifty guns and 30,000 men. One night and a day had cost us, in sick and wounded, 104 Europeans, and a fourth of our gun ammunition: this does not include our killed and dead—some ten men. We had 1,010 effective Europeans, and could, consequently, parade 900 or so; the men are cowed by the numbers opposed to them, and the endless fighting. Every village is held against us, the zemindars having risen to oppose us; all the men killed yesterday were zemindars."

The artillery officer recently quoted, expresses similar opinions; only that, writing in the freedom of private correspondence, he explains circumstances to which

the quartermaster-general could not allude. After showing the difference between the present and former expedition, and the manner in which the people now openly espoused the cause of the mutineers, he described the troops as being disheartened by sickness, exposure, and unremitting fatigue, and also "by a late order, containing an insinuation against the courage of an unnamed portion of the force," which had, "as a matter of course, been taken to itself by each individual regiment, and created a feeling of universal dissatisfaction."†

So the troops marched back to Mungulwar, and remained for three or four days inactive. A letter written by General Havelock on the 9th of August, shows how completely his sanguine anticipations had fallen to the ground. "Things are in a most perilous state," he tells his wife. "If we succeed in restoring anything, it will be by God's especial and extraordinary mercy." "I must now write as one whom you may see no more, for the chances of war are heavy at this crisis." "Thank God for my hope in the Saviour. We shall meet in heaven."§

At length it was resolved to recross the Ganges. A place was chosen for the embarkation of the force, where the river was much narrower than opposite Cawnpoor; but, to reach this spot, a succession of swamps and creeks had to be crossed. Causeways were thrown across the swamps, and bridges of boats over the creeks, with all speed, the engineers working manfully. On the 11th, the necessary preparations being completed, and the commissariat stores sent over in advance, the troops hoped to enjoy, that night, "the shelter of a tent, or the comfort of a bed," luxuries from which they had parted on entering Oude.

But a further delay arose. At 3 P.M. the bugle sounded, and orders were given for a third advance. The reason was, that the general had received false information that the enemy had come to Oonao with the intention of attacking the Europeans while crossing the river. About 200 men were left to guard the bridge; the remainder, which could not have greatly exceeded 800, started "with their arms in their hands, and their clothes on their backs; not another thing." On reaching

* *Ayr Observer*, September, 1857.

† Thus in *Parl. Paper*.

‡ *Saturday Review*, November, 1857.

§ Brock's *Havelock*, p. 189.

Oonao, there was not a soul to be seen; but correct intelligence came in, to the effect that the enemy, under the impression that the general had crossed the Ganges two days before, had encamped, with 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, one horse battery, and some native guns, in front of Buserut Gunj. That night the tired and hungry men bivouacked on the swampy plain; and the next morning they arose at dawn, wet with a heavy shower that had fallen in the night, to attack the foe a third time at nearly the same place, but more strongly posted than on previous occasions. The hostile artillery was well manned. "In five minutes after we came into action," says an artillery officer, "every man at the gun I was laying, was wounded with grape, except the sergeant and myself; and four of our gun cattle were knocked over by round shot."* Owing to the deep and wide morasses which defended the front of the enemy, there was difficulty and delay in bringing the British guns to bear on the opposing batteries. Eventually one of these was taken in flank, and both were silenced, partly by some "lucky shrapnel," but mainly by one of the magnificent charges of the Highlanders, who rushed on the guns, captured two, and turned them against the flying foe. The others were carried off by the enemy. The exhausted victors were quite incapable of pursuit. They had lost five killed, and thirty wounded. The casualties on the other side were estimated at 300.

After halting to take breath, the Europeans returned to Oonao, "where they cooked food;" and thence, in the cool of the evening, back to Mungulwar. On the following day the Ganges was crossed, and Havelock rejoined Neil, with the remnants of his shattered forces. The "victories" he had gained, read well in his despatches: but what were the facts? He had thrice driven the enemy from the same ground; had captured the same cannon over and over again: but he had retreated three times; and, being finally defeated in the sole object of the campaign, had returned to Cawnpoor with the loss of a fourth of his men. The estimate of native casualties was very uncertain: but even if

these were reckoned by thousands, the rebel ranks were being constantly recruited. There was scarcely a second opinion on the subject throughout India. The operations in Oude were declared, even by an authority† strongly favourable to General Havelock, to have been "complete failures," and very costly ones; for the troops had been exposed, from the 20th of July to the 13th of August, without tents, and had made a three weeks' campaign of what was expected to have been but an advance of a few days. Major North declares, that what was endured in marching from Allahabad to Cawnpoor, was light in comparison to the sufferings encountered in the advances and retreats in Oude.‡

On returning to Cawnpoor, a great difference was observable in the place, through the exertions of Neil. He had felt the necessity of conciliating the shopkeepers; and every morning, at daybreak, he went among them, and endeavoured to reassure them regarding the expected advance of the mutineers, whose appearance, in overwhelming numbers, was daily expected. Another measure of his has been much discussed. Captain Bruce, the superintendent of police, in searching the house of a nawab said to be engaged in besieging Lucknow, found that his female relatives had been left behind, and immediately seized them; giving them at the same time to understand, that they would alone be protected so long as any English women or children who might fall into the hands of the Oude rebels should be uninjured.§ In extenuation of this and other harsh measures, it must be remembered that Neil was in a most arduous and critical position. The departure of the moveable column had encouraged the mutineers to reassemble at Bithoor. With his small force, aided by the little steamer *Berham-pootra*, Neil repeatedly dispersed them; but it was to no purpose: they returned again immediately; for their numbers and their desperate case left them no alternative but armed rebellion.

The motley horde at the town of Bithoor, consisted of some of the 2nd and 4th cavalry, portions of Nana Sahib's followers, and of the rebel infantry from Saugor; numbering, in all, 4,000 men with two guns. Havelock marched against them on the 16th of August, took the guns, and drove them off; but could not attempt pursuit,

* *Saturday Review*, November, 1857.

† *Friend of India*—the proprietor of the journal (Mr. Marshman) being the general's brother-in-law.

‡ Major North's *Journal*, p. 120.

§ *Friend of India*, Sept. 10th, 1857.]

not only from the want of cavalry, but also from the exhausted condition of his own troops. The loss of the enemy was estimated at 250 killed and wounded; the British had eight rank and file killed, and forty-one wounded;* twelve died from sun-stroke,† and many others from cholera and the effects of exposure and fatigue.

On this occasion, the ill effect of marching Englishmen in India by day instead of by night, was particularly manifest. The men came into action so fagged with the heavy road and hot sun, that even the excitement of fighting scarcely sustained them. Strangely enough, the sepoys were equally exhausted; for a Hindoo fast, which had fallen on the previous day, had been strictly kept by them, and scores were bayoneted as they lay fainting on the ground; while others, having fled beyond the reach of the guns, flung themselves down, incapable of further movement.

The Europeans were surrounded by depressing circumstances. It was about forty days since they quitted Allahabad in high health and spirits: during that time they had been engaged with the enemy, on an average, every fourth day. Changed in appearance, no less than diminished in numbers, were they now. "It was really pitiable," the anonymous chronicler of the proceedings writes, "to see the regiments marching back from Bithoor. The 78th left Allahabad over 300 strong; it is now reduced to less than 100 fighting-men. The 64th, that started a few months ago for Persia 1,000 strong, is now reduced to the size of two companies, and the rest in proportion."‡

The troops with which General Havelock had, on the 23rd of July, talked of "relieving Lucknow, and reconquering and pacificating Oude," were, on the 15th of August, described by him as in process of "absorption by disease;" and by Neil, as "much used up; imperative they should be rested and not exposed; not equal to a few miles' march;" "total, seventeen officers and 466 men, non-effective." On the 23rd of August, Havelock telegraphed to Calcutta, that unless immediate reinforcements could be sent, he must abandon Cawnpore, and fall back on Allahabad.§ There is no record in the public papers of

this date, to show in what manner Havelock fulfilled those duties regarding the food, shelter, and appointments of the troops, the details of which fill so many hundreds of pages in the "Wellington Despatches," and explain why Colonel Wellesley conducted the guerilla warfare which succeeded the capture of Seringapatam with such complete success, amid the jungles and fortified villages of Malabar, and the trackless forests of Wynaad. Havelock commanded men admirably in the field; but what were his commissariat arrangements? Did he, or did he not, habitually overrate his resources and his victories, and expose the men to fatigues and hardships which, by greater vigilance and judgment, might have been avoided or mitigated? The *Life*, announced by his brother-in-law, Mr. Marshman, may explain how far Havelock struggled against the force of circumstances; and what his reasons were for acts which are at present inexplicable, especially that strongly commented on by the Indian press, of changing the quarters of the troops after the Bithoor affair of the 16th, from the comparatively dry and comfortable houses in cantonments, to tents pitched upon a swampy flat. The first night of the alteration the rain fell in torrents; and though the tents were good and did not leak, the absence of drainage covered the ground with a carpet of mud. "During the day, the soldiers were allowed to go to the stables for some protection; but at night they were compelled to sleep on the wet ground: and what with wet feet and wet clothes, the consequences may be imagined." They were subsequently "permitted to remain in the stables;" but these were built on a dead flat, with swamps of mud between each range, so that the men made paths of bricks, in order to reach their quarters dryshod. The *Friend of India*, after stating these and other circumstances, adds, "but General Havelock is a most energetic officer."|| No one will deny this; yet, if the other assertions of the editor be correct, the general lacked qualifications indispensable in the person entrusted with the care of such costly and perishable articles as European troops. Under the circumstances, it is not sur-

* Brigadier-general Havelock's despatch, August 17th, 1857.—*London Gazette*, Nov. 24th, 1857.

† Neil's telegram to commander-in-chief.—Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 102.

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‡ Artillery officer.—*Saturday Review*, November, 1857.

§ Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 113.

|| *Friend of India*, September 10th, 1857.

prising that, on the 20th of August, he should have been compelled to inform the commander-in-chief, that the troops "had been assailed in the most awful way by cholera, and were reduced to 700 in the field." Two officers died that day of cholera.*

In another respect, the conduct of Havelock was injudicious. His tendency to favouritism gave rise to much angry discussion in the force. He praised the Highlanders in general orders, despatches, and telegrams, in the most glowing terms; and well he might: but the services of other portions of the column, of the Fusiliers, and especially of the 64th, were acknowledged in a much less gratifying manner. After adverting to the conquest of Cawn-poor by Lord Lake, in 1803, and making the extraordinary assertion that the Nana was the nephew of a man whose "life was, by a too indulgent government, spared in 1817;" the general order complimented the Highlanders on a charge equal to that by which Assaye was won; and concluded with the following paragraph:—

"Sixty-fourth! you have put to silence the jibes of your enemies throughout India. Your fire was reserved until you saw the colour of your enemy's mustachios—this gave us the victory."

Probably the gallant 64th would rather have dispensed with the praise, richly as they had earned it, than have been humiliated by the suggestion that their recent bravery had been necessary to silence jibes, which, to notice, was to envenom.

The allusion to Lord Lake was unfortunate, for it drew attention to the contrast between the rare and slight notice taken in that general's despatches, of the services rendered by his beloved son and aide-de-camp, Major Lake; and the persistence with which General Havelock "begged specially to commend his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Havelock, 10th Foot, to the protection and favour of his excellency the commander-in-chief."

The death of Captain Beatson enabled Havelock to gratify his parental affection by nominating his son to the post of assistant adjutant-general, the talents evinced in the action of the 16th of July being mentioned in justification of the appointment,† and reiterated in a subsequent des-

patch,‡ as the ground for a recommendation for the Victoria medal. On the latter occasion, the brigadier-general described his son as having led the 64th to the capture of the last hostile gun, the commanding officer being in front, dismounted. When this despatch returned to India, in the columns of the *London Gazette*, both Havelock and Stirling were dead; the latter having fallen at the head of his men, in the act of spiking a hostile gun. Lieutenant-colonel Bingham, who had succeeded to the command of the 64th, addressed the commander-in-chief (Sir Colin Campbell) on the subject, declaring, that "the despatch was so worded, as to make it appear that the late Major Stirling, who afterwards became a lieutenant-colonel, was not properly leading his regiment;" whereas the officers maintained, that he had acted, "as he did on all such occasions, most nobly and gallantly, and that he was on foot at the time, because, in consequence of a shell bursting, his horse had become unrideable. In short, it was very painful to the regiment, that the memory and reputation of their late gallant commanding officer should have been so unfairly tampered with."§ Sir Colin Campbell recognised the importance of the case as a dangerous precedent; and, after drawing the attention of the Duke of Cambridge to the foregoing circumstances, he added—

"I confess to have a strong feeling of sympathy with the officers of the 64th regiment; and it would be a matter of great satisfaction to me, if you would have the goodness to move his royal highness to give a gracious expression towards the memory of the late Lieutenant-colonel Stirling, for the benefit of the 64th regiment. This instance is one of many in which, since the institution of the Victoria Cross, advantage has been taken by young aides-de-camp and other staff officers to place themselves in prominent situations for the purpose of attracting attention. To them life is of little value, as compared with the gain of public honour; but they do not reflect, and the generals to whom they belong also do not reflect, on the cruel injustice thus done to gallant officers, who, besides the excitement of the moment of action, have all the responsibility attendant on this situation. We know that the private soldier expects to be led by his regimental officers, whom he knows and recognises as the leaders to whom he is bound to look in the moments of the greatest trial and danger, and that he is utterly regardless of the accidental presence of an aide-de-camp or other staff officer, who is an absolute stranger to him. There is another point, also, having a great importance. By such despatches as the one above alluded to, it is made to appear to

* Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 107.

† Brigadier-general Havelock, July 20th, 1857.—Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 14.

‡ August 18th, 1857.—*Ibid.*, p. 103.

§ Sir Colin Campbell to the Duke of Cambridge, March 30th, 1858.—Parl. Papers, June 8th, 1858.

the world, that a regiment would have proved wanting in courage, except for an accidental circumstance. Such a reflection is most galling to a regiment of British soldiers—indeed almost intolerable; and the fact is remembered against it by all the other corps in her majesty's service. Soldiers feel such things most keenly. I would, therefore, again beg leave to dwell on the injustice sometimes done by general officers when they give a public preference to those attached to them over old officers, who are charged with the most difficult and responsible duties.—I have, &c.

"C. CAMPBELL, Commander-in-chief.
"The Adjutant-general, Horse-Guards, London."

The Duke of Cambridge responded to Sir Colin's appeal, by declaring that—

"H.R.H. enters fully into the feelings of Lieutenant-colonel Bingham, who has, in vindication of the character of his late commanding officer and of the 64th regiment, so honourably appealed to your sense of justice; and he has much gratification in now recording his entire satisfaction with the whole conduct of Lieutenant-colonel Stirling, and of the excellent regiment which he commanded with so much credit to himself and advantage to the service."*

In this painful affair, no blame could of course attach to young Havelock, who was popular with the troops, and is mentioned in the private correspondence of the period, as a brave soldier of the Charles O'Malley stamp. He would have made a first-rate commander of irregular corps; and that is no light praise.

That the officers of the 64th were justified in considering the despatch in question calculated to mislead the public regarding the services of Major Stirling, is evident from the manner in which the passage was quoted by the chancellor of the exchequer, when proposing to extend the annuity of £1,000 a-year settled upon the general with his baronetcy, to his next heir, Lieutenant Havelock. The chancellor spoke of the lieutenant as taking the lead on account of the death of Major Stirling; whereas the major was unhurt on that occasion, but fell at Cawnpoor four weary months later.

CHAPTER XX.

CALCUTTA; ARRIVAL OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL FROM ENGLAND, AND REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE COLONIES; REVOLT IN BEHAR, PATNA, AND DINAPOOR; RELIEF OF ARRAH; THE VENGEANCE-CRY; GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MUTINEERS; KOLAPOOR AND SATTARA; BERHAMPOOR, ROHNEE, AND BHAUGULPOOR.—JULY TO OCTOBER, 1857.

THE incident just narrated, has brought Sir Colin Campbell somewhat abruptly before the reader, or rather brought him back again;† for Sir Colin was a veteran Indian as well as Peninsular campaigner. Decisive intelligence of the character of the sepoy mutiny reached England on the 27th of June, and created extraordinary excitement, among all classes throughout the United Kingdom. Hundreds of voices trembled as they uttered, "Who can tell what horrors are being enacted even now?" And these fears were realised; for that baneful 27th of June witnessed the first Cawnpoor massacre. Troops could not be dispatched at a day's notice, nor (for the most part) officers either; but twenty-four hours sufficed for the preparations of the hardy Scot, to whom the gov-

ernment and the nation appealed with one accord in the emergency. It is singular how many distinguished men have returned from India in disgrace or in disgust, and gone out again amid the most enthusiastic admiration of qualities which had been previously ignored. Sir Colin was one of these. He had held the command on the Punjab frontier after its conquest, and had differed on material points from Sir John Lawrence, regarding the military operations to be conducted there. "A guerilla war, carried on by civilians," was his especial aversion; and when Lord Dalhousie, on being referred to regarding some point in dispute, decided in favour of the Punjab authorities, and expressed himself in "sufficiently cutting terms" with respect to Sir Colin, the latter resigned his position, and returned to England. His sword had no time to rust in its sheath. In the Crimea he did good service; but it was as a general

* Dated "Horse-Guards, May 17th, 1858."

† Indian debate.—*Times*, February 8th, 1858.

‡ See Introductory Chapter, p. 104.

of division only.* He was passed over, in a marked manner, until the Indian storm burst forth; and then, because the government needed a good man for the office of commander-in-chief, even more than a good office for a "Dowb," and knew of no one who united warlike and oligarchical qualifications, the latter were dispensed with, and Colin Campbell returned to India, to cope with the greatest perils that ever menaced British India. Had the character of the new commander-in-chief been thoroughly appreciated by the public in 1857, it is possible that his popularity would have been for the time much diminished. He was not rabid against sepoys; he knew them well; had never thought them free from the vices and defects common to a host of mercenaries; and did not now view them as demons. His character as a commander was misunderstood; for being, in all that concerned himself, hardy and energetic, brave to excess where his own life was concerned—it was said in England, that he was "too rash to be entrusted with the command of an army."† In India, the very opposite was asserted: it was feared that he would be too chary of the health and life of the troops; and that (in the words attributed to Lord Dalhousie) he would "carry caution to the verge of something else."‡

A glance at the person of the weather-beaten soldier, was calculated to moderate these extreme views of his character. The organ of caution might be strongly developed underneath the gray curls; but no evidence of indecision, or want of self-reliance, could be found there, nor any weakness traced in the spare and compact figure, in the broad and vigorous forehead, seamed with many a furrow; in the kindly but keen blue eye, glancing from beneath the shaggy eyebrow; or the well-cut mouth, screened by a short moustache, the only hair suffered to remain on his face, even under an Indian sun.§

Sir Colin landed at Calcutta on the 13th of August, 1857, when things were at their very worst. Oude in arms; Rohilcund revolted; the Doab in the hands of the enemy; Central India in confusion; one

great magazine captured; the gun manufactory lost at Futtehghur; communication with the Punjab cut off; the force at Delhi (the last accounts of which were dated the 18th of July, and had come by Bombay) "struggling to hold a position of observation, not siege," before Delhi; Lucknow blockaded; Agra threatened by the Gwalior contingent; Cawnpore again in danger from foes without and pestilence within. Yet all this seems to have failed to rouse the Calcutta authorities to energetic action. A writer who had ample means of knowing the facts of the case, asserts, that when the new commander-in-chief arrived in Calcutta, everything was deficient, and had to be provided. "The first arrivals from England would, ere long, be coming in, and for their equipment nothing was in readiness; means of transport there were hardly any; horses for cavalry or artillery there were none; Enfield rifle ammunition was deficient; flour even was running out; guns, gun-carriages, and harness, for the field batteries, were either unfit for active service, or did not exist. Great and immediate were the efforts now made to supply these various wants. Horses were purchased at an immense price (£80 for each trooper, on an average); those of the 8th Madras light cavalry who had refused to embark for service in Bengal, were taken from them and sent up to Calcutta; rifle-balls were manufactured at Calcutta, at Madras, and sent for overland from England; flour was ordered to be procured, with the least possible delay, from the Cape; field guns were cast at the foundry at Cossipoor; gun-carriages and harness made up with all possible haste; the commissariat departments stimulated to a degree of activity hitherto not even dreamt of. * * * The whole military machine was set agoing with a high steam pressure."||

The great error of the Calcutta authorities, and the one which was most inexcusable, inasmuch as they had refused to listen to the suggestions and entreaties of Sir H. Lawrence on the subject, regarded the transit of troops. Sir Patrick Grant had initiated certain arrangements; Sir Colin developed a system by which 200 men

* Russell.—*Times*, June 4th, 1858.

§ See an able, though not unprejudiced, summary of *Sir Colin Campbell's Campaign*, by "A disabled Officer;" dated "Dublin, July 15th, 1858."—*Times*, August 5th, 1858.

† Speech of Lieutenant-colonel Alison.—*Times*, May 28th, 1858.

‡ *Times*, August 5th, 1857.

|| *Lord Clyde's Campaign in India*. Understood to be written by Lieutenant-colonel Alison, the elder of the two brothers (the only sons of Sir Archibald Alison) who went out, the one as military secretary, the other as aide-de-camp, to Sir Colin.—*Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, October, 1858.

a-day were regularly forwarded along the Great Trunk road to Allahabad (500 miles distant), in covered carts drawn by bullocks, which were relieved at regular stages; the men, on arriving at each halting-place, finding their meals prepared for them, as if they had been travelling on an English railway; while the road was kept clear of the rebels by small columns of infantry and artillery moving along it at irregular intervals. Until the end of October, the commander-in-chief remained at Calcutta, ceaselessly employed in the preparations on which his subsequent successes were based.

The first succour came, as has been already shown, from the colonies. The wide-spread power of England, and the ready response given in each province within reach to the cry for help, materially contributed to save the mother-country her Indian empire. The colonial governors behaved with admirable decision. Sir Henry Ward instantly forwarded to Calcutta almost every British soldier in Ceylon; and the reinforcement was most opportune, although it consisted only of a few companies of H.M. 37th, with a small proportion of artillery. Lord Elphinstone (whose energetic and successful administration of the Bombay government has received the imperfect appreciation which commonly attends the policy of those who study to prevent, rather than to quell revolt), upon his own responsibility, sent vessels to the Mauritius and the Cape for troops. Sir James Higginson unhesitatingly surrendered the garrison of his island, consisting of the 5th Fusiliers, the 4th and 33rd regiments; and Sir George Grey answered the appeal by forwarding four seasoned regiments to India. In fact, every horse and man available at the moment were dispatched from the Cape to the transports which were waiting for them. The colonists seconded the governor with hearty zeal. In order that every soldier might be spared for India, the inhabitants of Cape Town and its vicinity cheerfully took upon themselves all the duties of the garrison; and as the demand for horses was especially urgent, the studs of private stables (including that of the governor himself) were freely yielded for the service of the expedition, without any such enhancement of price as the occasion would naturally bring about.*

The diversion of the Chinese expedition

* *Times*, October 20th, 1857.

from Hong Kong to China, was the fruit of Lord Elgin's clear view of the manner in which one duty might be overbalanced by another, and of his moral courage in risking the success of his own mission, for the sake of affording efficient co-operation to the Indian government.

The unexpected arrival of 1,700 troops was a joyful surprise for the people of Calcutta; and the society of Lord Elgin for a month, must have been welcome to the harassed governor-general; for they had been friends from boyhood.

The *Shannon*, moreover, brought, in the person of its captain, a first-rate artillery officer. The commander of the naval brigade in the Crimea, was sadly wanted in a country whose abundant rivers could not boast a single gun-boat. William Peel was the very man for the emergency. At three-and-thirty he had attained a reputation which would have gladdened the father whose career of statesmanship had been so suddenly closed, and which had been as a spring of new life to his widowed mother. Circumstances had developed his peculiar gifts, especially the "mechanical aptitude"† indispensable to a sailor. He had also the unflagging energy, the dogged persistence needful in that most onerous position—the command of marines.

Scarcely had his vessel cast anchor in the Ganges, before he commenced organising a naval brigade; and on the 18th of August, the government were able to announce that Captain Peel, with 400 seamen and ten 68-pounders, had left Calcutta for Allahabad.

The timely close of the Persian expedition has been already noticed. It was in many points important, but especially as it placed at the disposal of government the services of an able commander, thoroughly acquainted with Indian affairs. This was Sir James Outram, who, it will be remembered, had taken a prominent part in the annexation of Oude as chief commissioner. In 1857 he had returned to England, "bowed down by sickness and continual pain, which almost deprived him of sleep;" but, at the outbreak of the Persian war, he accepted the command of the expedition, and, at its successful close, returned to India, where he arrived on the 1st of August, and was nominated to the united command of the troops in the Dinapoor and Cawnpoor divisions, and reappointed chief commissioner in Oude. It was intended

† Russell.—*Times*, December 31st, 1858.

that he should at once proceed to Cawnpore with reinforcements, and march thence to the relief of Lucknow; but a fresh delay arose, in consequence of the outbreak of mutiny and insurrection in the province of Behar.

Patna, the chief city, contains upwards of 300,000 inhabitants, a large proportion of whom are Mussulmans. It is situated on the Ganges, which river separates the Patna district from those of Sarun, Tirhoot, and Monghyr. The small civil stations of *Gya*, fifty miles to the south, *Chupra*, forty miles to the north, and *Arrah*, thirty-five miles to the west, of Patna, were, in June, 1857, under the control of the commissioner, Mr. William Tayler, whose conduct, as a commissioner of revenue, had led his colleagues to intimate, that unless it were changed, they could not continue to work with him. He was still more unpopular with the natives, having, in the matter of raising funds for an industrial institution at Patna, "excited much dissatisfaction and scandal in his division." His proceedings were being inquired into at the time of the mutiny. At such a crisis, the lieutenant-governor naturally desired to avoid a change in the head executive office of the district, and trusted that the intelligence, energy, and local knowledge of the commissioner, might, under the close supervision practicable by means of the electric telegraph, be made useful to the public. The military station of *Dinapore*, ten miles to the westward of Patna, was garrisoned by H.M. 10th Foot, the 7th, 8th, and 40th N.I., one company of European, and one of Native artillery. Major-general Lloyd, the officer in command of the station, has been already mentioned. He had seen fifty-three years' service; and though of course an old man, had been chosen, as lately as 1854, for the suppression of the Sonthal insurrection; and his conduct on that occasion had given entire satisfaction to Lord Dalhousie. He was liable to attacks of gout, which at times unfitted him for field service. Still, it will be seen, when the subject is reviewed with the calmness which is rarely evinced in discussing recent events, whether the major-general, notwithstanding his seventy years and his "gouty feet," does not deserve credit for the policy with which he so long kept back the Native regiments under his command from open mutiny, and for the

arrangements which were (as he avers) rendered unsuccessful by the incapacity and selfish terror of those who should have carried them out.

Unfortunately, the military and civil authorities acted on different plans. Conciliation was the motto of the major-general; "unlimited hanging," of the commissioner. The latter found a zealous coadjutor in Major Holmes, who commanded the 12th irregular cavalry at Segowlie, about a hundred miles distant. A detachment of the 12th had been located at Patna, and constant intercourse was maintained between that city and Segowlie. Marked contempt was evinced by the commissioner and the major for superior authority. Major Holmes took upon himself, in the middle of June, to declare a large tract of country under martial law, and wrote to the magistrates of the various districts, acquainting them with his determination, and desiring to proclaim a reward of fifty rupees for the capture of every rebel sepoy, or for information which might lead to the conviction of any persons guilty of speaking seditious words against the government. All petty rajahs were to be informed, that for concealing any sedition or any rebels, they would be punished as principals. The style of this communication was as extraordinary as the matter. The letter to Mr. McDonnell, of Sarun, dated "Segowlie, June 19th," began as follows:—"As a single clear head is better than a dozen confused ones in these times, and as military law is better than civil in a turbulent country, I have assumed absolute military control from Goruckpoor to Patna, and have placed under absolute military rule all that country including the districts of Sarun, Chumparun, and Tirhoot."

The magistrates appealed to Mr. Halliday, the lieutenant-governor of Bengal, for instructions how to act with regard to Major Holmes; and were informed, in reply, that his proceeding was to be repudiated as wholly illegal and unauthorised, nothing whatever having occurred in Behar to justify the proclamation of martial law. An explanation was required from Mr. Tayler, as to his reasons for not informing the lieutenant-governor of what had occurred; to which he answered, that although he knew Major Holmes had acted illegally, he had intentionally avoided noticing it; feeling that, "however the formalities of civilised society might be violated, the

essentials of all society, life, property, and order, were most effectually preserved by the military despotism thus established, and that the end fully justified the means.”*

Mr. Tayler was following out, at Patna, a course of policy identical with that attempted by Major Holmes on the Segowlie frontier; and, by “constant arrests, and an unceasing use of hemp,” was gaining great credit “from the planters and mercantile community—even from the fettered press of India.”† But while private correspondence and public journals furnished full accounts of these vigorous steps, the orders and inquiries of the lieutenant-governor were utterly disregarded. At length he learned, from private sources, that, on the 21st of June, Mr. Tayler had caused the four leading members of the Wahabee sect of Mohammedans in Patna to be arrested, and had taken steps to disarm the city. When compelled to account for his conduct, the commissioner admitted, that the only evidence against the prisoners “was that of an untrustworthy informer, who produced letters to substantiate his charge, of which one only was genuine; and that his statements regarding the distribution of money, the entertainment of fighting-men, and other preparations of revolt, proved incorrect from subsequent discoveries.” He had, however, deemed it “politic to detain the principal Wahabee gentlemen, as hostages for the good behaviour of the sect, which is said to be numerous, and peculiarly formidable from its organisation, and to be ready to merge all its differences with other Mohammedans, to join in a crusade against the Christians.”‡

In consequence of the order for disarming, a large amount of weapons was produced; but, in the search subsequently instituted, “few, if any, were found,” and none in the houses of the Wahabees. A reign of terror had commenced for the natives; a scaffold was erected on the parade; “all inhabitants were warned to remain at home after nine at night;” and many loyal subjects were arrested in their own homes at midnight, on the

accusation of some revengeful servant or treacherous relative. Mr. Tayler brushed aside all forms of law as if they had been so many cobwebs, and used the despotic powers he had assumed, in such a manner as to irritate the whole of the native population, and engender a dangerous feeling of insecurity among the respectable portion of the inhabitants.§ At length, on the 3rd of July, an *émeute* took place. At about eight o’clock in the evening, 200 men, with flags, music, and guns, broke into the premises of the Roman Catholic Mission, and destroyed some property, but stole nothing, and injured no one. Dr. Lyell, assistant to the opium agent, with nine Seiks, proceeded to the spot: he was on horseback; and, having distanced his support, rode alone to the mob, and was shot. Captain Rattray, with a detachment of Seiks, soon arrived, and the rabble dispersed. Thirty men, said to be concerned in the outbreak, were arrested and tried by the commissioner and the magistrate, Mr. Lewis (who was subsequently removed from office by Mr. Tayler, for not seconding with sufficient energy his anti-native proceedings). Fourteen of the prisoners, including Peer Ali, a Mussulman bookseller|| (who is said to have shot Dr. Lyell), were condemned to death, and executed the same day; the remaining sixteen were sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. The mode in which convictions were obtained may be understood from the following circumstance:—A police jemadar, named Waris Ali, had been arrested on suspicion during the night of the 23rd of June. He begged earnestly for life, and asked if he could do anything to obtain it. The reply and commentary made by Mr. Tayler, were as follows:—“I told him—‘I will make a bargain with you; give me three lives, and I will give you yours.’ He then told me all the names that I already knew; but could disclose nothing further, at least with any proof in support. He was evidently not sufficiently clever to be Ali Kurreem’s confederate.”¶ And, on the 6th of July,

* Government Narrative of Events.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 5), p. 20.

† *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 177.

‡ Further Parl. Papers (No. 5), p. 3.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

|| Among the letters found in the house of Peer Ali, was one written by him, in which he says, “I require the assistance of your prayers to obtain my end; if not, I value not life.” On the same sheet of

paper, another hand had written—“The state of affairs at Patna is as follows. Some respectable parties of the city are in prison, and the subjects are all weary and disgusted with the tyranny and oppression exercised by government, whom they all curse. May God hear the prayers of the oppressed very soon.”—Appendix to Parl. Papers (No. 5), p. 21. The house of Peer Ali was razed to the ground, by the commissioner’s order.

¶ Further Parl. Papers (No. 5), p. 16.

Waris Ali was hanged. Mr. Tayler was not to be thus foiled. He had made up his mind that some wealthy person must have been concerned in the conspiracy, and that an example was required from the influential classes. The destined victim was Looft Ali Khan, the richest banker in Patna, who chanced to be at the time at law with his nephew, Velayut Ali Khan. The nephew appears to have played into the hands of Mr. Tayler, and Looft Ali was arrested by the order of the commissioner, and committed for trial on the ground of having knowingly harboured a deserter named Mohabet Ali, who was the nephew of one of his servants. The case was tried by the sessions judge, Mr. R. N. Farquharson, and the prisoner was acquitted; but the conduct of Mr. Tayler was so extraordinary, that Mr. Farquharson laid the entire case before the lieutenant-governor, and, at the same time, "transmitted several private letters, sent him by the commissioner; in which, with a very indecent disregard of ordinary propriety, Mr. Tayler had continued, during the trial, to endeavour to influence the mind of the judge, and almost to urge him to condemn the prisoner." Mr. Farquharson further mentioned—

"Reports being current that some of the men, punished as being concerned in the city outbreak, were convicted by the commission presided over by Mr. Tayler, on evidence less reliable than that which he had rejected in Looft Ali's case. The judge was not in the least cognizant of what the evidence was, but considered it his duty to report the common opinion on the subject, for the government to take such steps as might be thought fit to test the truth of statements damaging to the civil service, and to the European character at large."

Of course, a functionary whose "constant, indelicate, and illegal interference"† with the course of justice was always on the side of severity, would be sure to alienate the minds of the zemindars from the government. Mr. Tayler was not the person to confirm the wavering allegiance of Rajpoot nobles. Among those who had suffered deeply from our revenue proceedings, was Kooer Sing—a chief whose "honourable and straightforward character"‡ stood high even among Europeans; but who, although between eighty and ninety years of age, was

an object of suspicion on account of the influence he exercised as the head of an ancient family; from his personal ability; and from "his peculiar position as the ruined owner of vast estates, who would become supreme in the district on the occurrence of disorder, but who, as long as law and order prevailed, could barely find the means to pay the interest of his debts."

Therefore, Alonzo Money, the Behar magistrate, suggested the adoption of a conciliatory policy with regard to Kooer Sing, and, indeed, to the people generally. "One or two executions" might, he writes, "strike terror and do good;" but "the daily repetition of such scenes (where the people are against us) only hardens and aggravates;" and he added, that if "one of the influential zemindars, like Kooer Sing, be suspected and pushed hard, he may very probably prefer rebellion to hanging; and his example would be contagious."§

Mr. Tayler could not appreciate this reasoning; and though he repeatedly mentions the aged chief in terms of respect, most unusual with him, he nevertheless sent a Mussulman agent to the palace of Kooer Sing, at Jugdespoor, near Arrah, to intimate the suspicions entertained of his loyalty, and to bid him repair in person to Patna, to give an account of himself. "The native agent was at the same time directed to scrutinise everything connected with and about Kooer Sing, and to submit a confidential report regarding it to the commissioner." An ordinary proprietor, in the midst of his tenantry, might have been successfully treated in this manner; but the present zemindar chanced to be a Rajpoot, in the heart of his clan; and the government agent came back as wise as he went. Kooer Sing received him lying on a bed, and pleaded age and infirmity in reply to the commissioner's summons, but pledged himself to repair to Patna as soon as his health would permit, and the Brahmins could find a propitious day for the journey. From other sources the government were told, that he had declared he would not go to Patna, and would resist if sent for. The secret inquiry made on his estate did not elicit information as to any preparations having been made for revolt; "nor did there appear to be reason to suppose that his people were particularly disaffected. It was well known that they would follow him as their feudal chieftain, in the event of his raising the standard of

* Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 5), p. 18.

† *Ibid.*, p. 24.

‡ Mr. Tayler. Letter dated July 23rd, 1857.—Appendix to Parl. Papers (No. 5), p. 142.

§ Mr. Wake expressed a similar opinion.



THE CHINESE EMPEROR



rebellion; but beyond this nothing was ascertained."*

Leaving the Patna commissioner and Major Holmes to pursue their course of "hanging right and left,"† by reason of the powers of life and death extended to them and twelve other persons in Behar, or its immediate vicinity, between the 17th of June and the 10th of July;‡ it is necessary to turn to Dinapoor, where Major-general Lloyd was maintaining order by the opposite system of confidence and conciliation. For many weeks he was successful. The ill-conducted disarming at Benares, the news of which caused instant revolt at Allahabad and Fyzabad, created great excitement at Dinapoor on the 7th of June; and Major-general Lloyd asserts, that had it not been for the influence and exertions of their European officers, the three native regiments would have deserted with their arms that night. His conviction was, that the sepoys, being on the watch for the slightest evidence of an attempt to disarm them, would have fled with their weapons on the approach of the guns and Europeans; and their dispersion, armed or unarmed, was deprecated by him, on the ground that it would be followed by the disorganisation of the surrounding country, and would necessitate the detention of troops whose presence was needful to save the garrisons of Lucknow and Cawnpoor. Still, viewing an outbreak as a probable contingency, he made arrangements to meet it with the officers of the station and functionaries of the surrounding districts, and the boats on the Soane river were ordered to be collected on the further bank, in readiness to be destroyed or sunk in the event of mutiny, so as to hinder the crossing of the rebels.

The course taken certainly gained time. The native regiments, especially the 40th, behaved well throughout the remainder of the trying month of June, and up to the 25th of July. The question of disarming them was publicly canvassed; for the mercantile community of Calcutta were largely interested in the indigo-producing district of Tirhoot, of which Patna and Dinapoor were the two chief stations; and a revolt at this period, while the plant was still uncut, would have ruined many capitalists. With the

government, also, the tranquillity of Behar was a financial question; for at Patna alone (a city of eight miles in extent), the opium godowns were valued at £3,000,000; and at Ghazipoor there was nearly £2,000,000 of the same property, besides one of the largest government studs in India. The 5th Fusiliers, 800 strong, arrived at Calcutta, from the Mauritius, on the 5th of July, and were dispatched by a steamer, on the 12th, up the Ganges. It was calculated that they would be off Dinapoor about the 22nd; and the European planters, interested in the indigo trade, petitioned Lord Canning to order the Fusiliers to disembark and disarm the native regiments, in conjunction with H.M. 10th Foot. Lord Canning refused, and persisted in leaving General Lloyd free to disarm the sepoys, or not, as he thought fit. General Lloyd, encompassed by difficulties; with nothing left him but a choice of evils; harassed by the railing of the Europeans, yet unwilling to see the troops whom he had so long commanded, pass through the now hackneyed phases of panic, revolt, and dispersion or extermination—resolved, in an evil moment, on a half measure, which excited the fear of the sepoys without allaying that of the Europeans. This was to suffer the sepoys to retain their muskets, but to render them useless by taking away the percussion-caps from the native magazine, leaving fifteen caps per man. Accordingly, on the morning of the 25th of July, two bullock-carts were sent for the caps, and were loaded without opposition; but while passing the native lines, on the way to the European portion of the cantonment, the 7th and 8th regiments caught sight of the carts, and rushed forward to seize them. The officers went among the men, and the carts were suffered to proceed. "The 40th N.I. made a decided demonstration towards the cause of order and discipline, being ready to oppose any attempt to rescue the caps."§

The withdrawal of the remaining caps was immediately resolved on. The Native officers were ordered to collect them, it being considered that the men would feel it quite madness to attempt resistance. But panic is a form of madness; and the example of scores of regiments should have shown that resistance might be expected under certain circumstances, although even temporary success might be hopeless. The 7th and 8th N.I., when asked for their caps, rose in open mutiny: "the 40th did

* Further Parl. Papers (No. 5), p. 38.

† *Times*, August 19th, 1857.

‡ Further Parl. Papers (No. 5), p. 10.

§ General Lloyd's Letter.—*Daily News*, October 30th, 1857.

not at first join; but being fired on by men of the 10th, from the roof of the European hospital, they went off and joined the mutineers.* General Lloyd was suffering from an attack of gout. He had no horse at hand. He had previously given full instructions for the attack and pursuit of the sepoy by the guns and H.M. 10th, and had received from the colonel of that regiment a promise not to "be caught napping." Therefore, believing that he could do nothing further regarding the land operations, the general went on board a steamer which had arrived at Dinapoor that morning, and proceeded in it along the rear of the native lines; for the river being only some 200 yards distant from the right of the advancing column of guns and Europeans, General Lloyd "expected to get some shots at the sepoy on shore, or escaping by the river."

The guns, notwithstanding the arrangement that the bullocks were to be kept ready for harnessing, were tardy in approaching the native lines. At length they opened at a long range on a body of mutineers assembled near the N.I. magazines. H.M. 10th and 37th fired, "also, at impossible distances; and the whole of the three regiments fled *en masse*: even the sick in the hospitals went."† Several boats, laden with fugitives, were run down and sunk by the steamer; but the majority of the rebels escaped; for they fled across the swampy fields, behind the magazines, across a full nullah; beyond which the Europeans, under Colonels Fenwick and Huyshe, found pursuit impracticable. The troops "burnt down some villages and the native bazaar,"‡ did some work in the shape of "loot," and then returned to their quarters. General Lloyd, believing he saw some sepoy further up the shore, pursued them in the steamer, but found only unarmed villagers, on whom, he adds, "of course I did not fire." This last sentence is important, for it accounts for the general's unpopularity with the anti-native faction. To understand the difficulties of the case, it must be noticed, that the narrow strip of land on which the Dinapoor cantonment stands, bounded on the north side by the Ganges, and on the south by a deep muddy nullah and bay, was at this time a perfect swamp, by reason of the heavy

rains of the preceding month. The main body of the sepoy having crossed the swamp and nullah, took up their position on the road from Patna, *via* Phoolwaree, towards Arrah, with the road to Gya open in their rear. Fearing that Patna might be attacked, the general sent off a detachment thither, retaining only 500 men and four guns at Dinapoor. Cavalry he had none. The road between Dinapoor and Arrah was hardly practicable for European soldiers, and impassable for guns; only a small party could have been spared that evening for the reinforcement of Arrah; and it was hoped, that even should the mutineers resolve on attacking that place, the boats on the Soane would be destroyed by the person entrusted with that duty (a Mr. Pahlen, of the railway works), in time to hinder their crossing the river. But, by a seeming fatality, every arrangement at Dinapoor was contravened by the incapacity of individuals, or the force of circumstances. The age and physical infirmities of the general have been harshly dwelt on; but his manly and succinct account of the whole affair is his best vindication from the blame heaped upon him, the chief part of which he shows would have been more justly bestowed on his apathetic or incapable coadjutors and subordinates. When the time came for action, Pahlen thought only of his own safety, and fled, leaving the mutineers the means of crossing to the Arrah side of the river. The day after the mutiny (Sunday, the 26th), a detachment of riflemen were sent off in a troop-boat attached to a steamer, up the Soane, to be landed at a point nine miles from Arrah; but the water was not deep enough, and the steamer returned in the evening without having effected anything. The next day a second attempt was made; but the *Horungotta*, after three hours' steaming, grounded on a sand-bank, and could not be got off. There was no other steamer available till the following evening, when the *Bombay* arrived; and the general determined on sending her and the flat attached, with 250 men, to the headquarters of the 10th Foot, to go and pick up the stranded flat (which had 250 men on board), and tow both to the appointed spot. The expedition was to start on the next morning, commanded by Colonel Fenwick. When the time came, the commander of the steamer had changed his mind, and said he could not tow two flats; consequently the party had to be reduced by

* Gen. Lloyd's Letter.—*Daily News*, Oct. 30, 1857.

† *Ibid.* See also the general's despatches, in Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4.)

‡ Letter of Lieutenant Robertson, 7th N.I.—*Times*, September 22nd, 1857.

a hundred men of the 10th Foot. Colonel Fenwick refused to accompany the diminished force, which now consisted of 410 men, of whom seventy were Seiks; and sent Captain Dunbar in his stead—an officer, General Lloyd writes, “of whose unfitness for such a command I suspect Colonel Fenwick may have been unaware.” The party landed at 7 P.M., without “getting their dinners, or even a drop of grog,” although they had three days’ provisions on board. A few harmless shots were fired by some sepoys guarding the boats at the ghaut, and then the Europeans marched on unmolested to a bridge about a mile and a-half from Arrah. Here they halted for half-an-hour; and the second in command (Captain Harrison), and some volunteers who had accompanied the expedition, urged Captain Dunbar to remain there for the night, as their movements were being watched by native horsemen; and, in the dim light of a setting moon, nothing was more probable than an ambuscade. But Captain Dunbar, having heard from the magistrate (Wake) that it was improbable any opposition would be offered, thought it preferable to move on—the want of food for the men being probably a reason against delay. A volunteer who accompanied the expedition (Macdonell, magistrate of Chupra), states that, up to this time, the troops had thrown out Seik skirmishers as they advanced; but now they marched on in a body; Dunbar, Macdonell, Lieutenant Ingilby, 7th N.I., who had volunteered, and was in command of the Seiks, with about twenty of the latter, being some 200 yards in advance of the column. After proceeding to within half a mile of Arrah, they entered a tope, or thick grove of trees, and were nearly through it, when a volley of musketry flashed like lightning along the line; and another and another, in quick succession, showed the troops that they were surrounded. Captain Dunbar was among the first to fall; then there was much desultory firing from among the trees—as many of the Europeans being killed by one another as by the enemy. At length, with great difficulty, the officers succeeded in reforming the men in a field some 400 yards from the tope; and here they remained till morning, the rebels firing into them, and

the men, in defiance of orders, returning the fire, by which means they revealed their exact position, and wasted shot which could be ill spared.

Next morning the panic still prevailed: the men were only half a mile from Arrah; yet, instead of proceeding thither, they started back for the steamer, a distance (by the road they took) of twelve miles.* The mutineers, emboldened by the manifest exhaustion and insubordination of the Europeans, followed them with a sharp running fire, taking advantage of every tree and inequality of ground, and inflicting severe loss, which would have been still heavier had not the rebels been short of ammunition. There were no dhoolies for the wounded, who trailed along their injured limbs, or were left to perish; for the only doctor who accompanied the party was himself hit, and incapacitated for his duties; but the Seiks obtained a bed in a village, and carried some officers on it. On reaching the ghaut, the Europeans became perfectly uncontrollable, in defiance of commands and entreaties, they rushed into the boats, threw arms and accoutrements into the water, and exposed themselves as a mark to the rebels, who sunk two boats, and set fire to a third. Officers and privates stripped to the skin, and sprang into the water. Three officers and sixty-three men, all wounded, were among those who reached the steamer: seven officers and 184 men were left for dead. A French volunteer (apparently connected with the railway), who had remonstrated against the retreat, gave valuable assistance at the time of embarkation, though himself hit and lamed; managing, “through his good manners towards the people [that is, the villagers],” to obtain a boat, and get sixty of the wounded safely on board; after which, writes one of the party, “our Frenchman remained behind, forgetting himself to save more lives. He was the last of all who swam across the river, and happily he saved his life. As soon as he came on board, he washed our wounds and our faces all round, and procured us a most welcome drop of rum.”†

When the steamer regained Dinapoor, she anchored opposite the hospital, and the spectators learned at once the extent of the disaster. No blame could in justice attach expedition, by a private soldier; published in the *Star* (December 2nd, 1857); a journal remarkable for the variety and accuracy of its Indian intelligence.

* Captain Harrison's Report; Dinapoor, July 31st. — *London Gazette*, November 24th, 1857.

† See a simple and intelligible narrative of the

to General Lloyd; but popular clamour fixed on him as a scapegoat; and the Calcutta *Phoenix* inserted the following statement, without explanation or comment:—

"A scene of a most painful character took place at Dinapoor, on the arrival there of the remnant of the forces sent against Arrah. As soon as the news of the repulse and consequent loss spread among the women of the 10th regiment, they rushed in a body to the bungalow of General Lloyd, and would have literally torn him to pieces, had he not succeeded in barricading his bungalow."

Meanwhile, the Arrah residents held their ground manfully; resistance having been rendered possible by the foresight and energy of Mr. Boyle, the district engineer of the railway company, who, some weeks before the Dinapoor mutiny, had fortified a small detached two-story house, with a flat roof, previously used for billiard playing, which stood in the compound with his main dwelling-house, and provisioned it with meal, corn, biscuit, water, wine, and beer. On the evening of the 25th of July, an express from Dinapoor announced that a disturbance was apprehended. Subsequent messengers were sent, but intercepted by the Dinapoor mutineers, who crossed the Soane the next day at a point eight miles from Arrah, and, on the Monday morning, marched into that place and released 400 prisoners. They were joined by a large number* of Kooer Sing's people; and the combined force took possession of the government treasury, containing 85,000 rupees; after which they charged the bungalow, where Mr. Boyle, Mr. Wake (the magistrate), and his assistant, Mr. Colvin, Mr. Littledale, the judge, and some sub-officials and railway men, including a Mohammedan and several Eurasians (sixteen in all), with fifty Seiks, had taken up their position. There were no women or children to be considered, and the besieged were resolved to defend themselves to the last. Most of the Europeans, besides revolvers and hog-spears, had two double-barrelled guns, or a gun and a rifle, with abundance of ammunition; and, providentially, a large surplus, from which, when the Seiks' supplies began to run short, they made some thousand cartridges. The mutineers, astonished at the vigour with which

their assault was repelled, changed their tactics; and, from the trees with which the compound was filled, from the out-buildings, and from Mr. Boyle's dwelling-house, they opened a galling fire on the bungalow-fort. Two small cannon were brought to bear on it, and shifted daily, according to what seemed the weakest points; being fired as frequently as shot could be prepared, with which the mutineers were at first unprovided. Every endeavour was made to induce the Seiks to abandon the Europeans; but to the nightly treacherous harangues, the answer agreed on was invariably given by a volley of bullets, directed, at the first pause, towards the speaker's hiding-place. The Seiks never wavered for an instant in loyalty or in discipline, and their untiring labour met and prevented every threatened disaster. Water began to run short; a well of eighteen feet by four was dug in less than twelve hours. The rebels raised a barricade on the top of Mr. Boyle's house; that of the bungalow-fort grew in the same proportion. A shot shook a weak place in the defences; it was made twice as strong as before. The rebels were found to be mining; a counter-mine was quickly executed. The besieged began to feel the want of animal food; and making a sally at night, brought in four sheep. In fact, they accomplished things which, had they not succeeded, it would have been deemed madness to attempt, and which could not have succeeded but for the ignorance and disunion of the enemy, whose plans, if only one of them had been energetically carried out, must have overpowered the little fort. They tried to smoke out the Europeans by burning large quantities of chillies (red pepper) to windward;† they drove the horses of the besieged, including Mr. Boyle's Arab, up to the building, and left the carcasses, together with the dead bodies of several sepoy, to putrefy within fifty yards of it. The worst trial the garrison endured during the seven days' siege, was on Thursday, the 30th, when they heard the sudden and heavy volleys fired at Dunbar's force; and as the sound grew fainter, guessed that their countrymen had fallen into an ambush, and that they themselves had lost their best and almost only hope of succour. But help came from an unlooked-for quarter. Major Vincent Eyre, an artillery officer of repute, on his way to Allahabad, landed at Ghazipoor (where the 65th N.I. had been

* Mr. Boyle says there were 3,000 mutineers, and as many dependents of Kooer Sing; but this seems scarcely possible. Letter dated "Dinapoor, August 15th."—*Times*, October 6th, 1857.

† Letter of Indophilus.—*Times*, October 24th, 1857.

quietly disarmed on the 10th of July) on the 28th of July, and there learned the state of affairs at Arrah. Taking it for granted that a relieving force would be sent from Dinapoor, he prevailed upon the authorities to allow him to make an attempt at co-operation from Buxar, for which place he started with only sixty men; but, on arriving there on the 30th of July, he found a steamer and flat, with 150 of the 5th Fusiliers on board. Major Eyre wrote from thence to inform General Lloyd of his intention to march on Arrah; but the Dinapoor detachment had started on the previous day; co-operation was therefore impossible, and ought to have been needless.

On the evening of the 1st of August, Eyre marched from Buxar with little more than 200 men, two guns, and a 24-pounder howitzer. On reaching Shahpoor, a village eighteen miles from Buxar, he learned the news of Dunbar's disaster. He pushed on determinedly, yet with all caution, under cover of skirmishers armed with the dreaded Enfield rifle, until, on arriving at a place called Beebee Gunj, the rebels attempted to obstruct his passage, but were dispersed by a general charge of the European infantry, leaving the road to Arrah clear. The siege was raised forthwith, and the station abandoned by the enemy. On examination, a hostile mine was discovered to have been just completed, and the gunpowder lay ready for the explosion; but it was a clumsy attempt, and would hardly have succeeded, for the powder was bad, and another stroke of the pick would have broken into the counter-mine. Only one of the besieged (a Seik) had been badly hurt: of Major Eyre's force, two men had been killed, and sixteen wounded. The part acted by Kooer Sing is not clear. Probably he was carried away by the torrent, and feeling himself compromised, preferred (in Mr. Money's words) "rebellion to hanging;" death in open fight, rather than by the rope. Terms were offered to the garrison, not in his name, but in that of the rebel leader, a subahdar of the 8th N.I. It is stated by Major Eyre, that Kooer Sing fled with the defeated mutineers, to save his family,* which makes it probable that the chief's revolt was unpremeditated, otherwise he would have taken a previous opportunity

of placing his women in safety, according to the invariable rules of Rajpoot honour. It is remarkable how little we know of the other side of the Indian mutiny: the blinding effect of our ignorance of the native language and character, is apparent in every page of the despatches, especially in the way in which rebel leaders of note are spoken of. "Put a price on their heads—confiscate their estates"—was the sentence indiscriminately pronounced on all real and many alleged rebels. The first direction was useless, even in the case of such a creature as the Nana; the second, while it gave little relief to a government which never yet gained increase of territorial revenue without more than proportionate increase of governmental expenditure, created a swarm of enemies; for our system of confiscation, unlike that of the Hindoos and Mohammedans—not content with levelling an ancient family with the dust, in punishment for the offences of its chief—extinguishes the mortgages with the estates, and ruins the tenants as well as the landholder.

Thus the government, in munificently rewarding Mr. Boyle, by conferring on him a jaghire of £1,000 a-year, and settling £500 a-year on his heirs for ever, destroyed the merit of the act by carving this imperial gift out of the property, not of Kooer Sing, but of his creditors.†

Kooer Sing's palace at Jugdespoor was said to be held by 3,000 men, of whom half were sepoys. Major Eyre, reinforced by 200 of the 10th from Dinapoor, marched from Arrah on the 11th of August; drove the enemy from an intrenched position at the village of Dulloor, back through the dense jungle extending from thence to Jugdespoor, and entered the palace almost unopposed. Six men wounded formed the total loss of the British; the enemy's casualties were estimated at 300. On this occasion, the 10th were as ungovernable from fury as their comrades had before been from panic. Major Eyre had previously adopted the village-burning system; nor did he neglect the present opportunity of following out the same incendiary policy on a larger scale. He states, apparently without any fear of censure, that after pillaging the palace, where "much promiscuous property fell into our hands," he destroyed the town, and blew up the

his conduct at Arrah. Probably this was the Frenchman whose good offices are so gratefully noticed in the account of a private soldier, quoted at p. 403

* Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 76.

† A donation of 1,000 rupees was also given by government to a railway *employé*, named Victor, for

palace and principal buildings around it, including a new Hindoo temple, on which Kooer Sing had recently lavished large sums; the reason for the latter act being, that the Brahmins had instigated the chief to rebel. At the time this destruction was committed, Kooer Sing had fled, the sepoys had dispersed, and the surrounding country was quite quiet. Kooer Sing had another palace at Jutowrah, some little distance from Jugdespoor; which was destroyed by a detachment sent by Eyre for the purpose; as were also the residences of Oomar Sing and Dhyal Sing, the two brothers of the old chief.*

The above facts are stated in the accounts published in the *London Gazette*: there were probably other and fuller ones; for a letter dated "Dinapoor, August 18th," speaks of an official despatch, which declared that "the behaviour of the men of the 10th was beyond all praise, and that they fought like demons." The writer adds—

"Our men served the sepoys after their fashion towards our unfortunate men at Arrah, for they hung up the wounded and the bodies of the killed upon trees along the road, a mile and a-half, and then proceeded on towards the palace of the rajah, where they found about fifty more of the scoundrels concealed, the whole of whom were shot down by the 10th men, who hung the bodies of the sepoys with their own blue shirts over the walls, and left them to wither in the sun. In this palace (if it could be called one), two boxes of rupees were found, each containing about 4,000. The whole were divided among the men, who afterwards burnt the palace to the ground, as well as all the villages in its vicinity, and killed a number of the people belonging to Kooer Sing."†

Whether private as well as public accounts reached head-quarters, is matter for conjecture; but the commander-in-chief, after praising the judgment evinced in the military movements of the major, expressed, in a short but significant paragraph, his regret at having "to disapprove of the destruction of the Hindoo temple at Jugdespoor by Major Eyre, under a mistaken view of the duties of a commander at this present crisis."

Lord Canning and his council were already alarmed at the thirst for vengeance manifested by individual officers, the soldiers of a few regiments, and especially by certain civilians and planters. Some of the latter, like Venables of Azimghur (the "terrific severity"‡ of whose policy was

admitted by his warmest admirers), could yet plead that their presence preserved a whole district from disorganisation; and that the new ropes to hang rebels, so largely indented for, were used at the bidding of men who were imperilling their own necks by remaining at their posts, and upholding the authority of their government, when officials of weaker nerve had mounted their horses and ridden off for dear life, abandoning public and private property, and leaving the peaceably disposed at the mercy of the insurgents. A mistake was at first made in accepting the lavish shedding of native blood as a guarantee for vigorous and decisive action. Mr. Tayler, the Patna commissioner, had a reputation of this kind, which he might have retained, had he been less publicly and severely tested. On the 23rd of July, his special coadjutor (Major Holmes) was murdered at Segowlie. The major and his wife (the brave Lady Sale's daughter) were driving out in the evening. About two miles from the lines, six 12th Irregulars seized the reins of the horses, and beheaded both the major and Mrs. Holmes; then, proceeding to the house of the assistant-surgeon, they killed him, with his wife and one of their children; and Mr. Bennet, the postmaster. The regiment then rose, and after the usual course of plundering and burning, quitted the station.

Mr. Tayler is further stated to have been influenced by the tidings from Hazareebagh,§ where two companies of the 8th N.I. mutinied (July 29th), robbed the treasury of cash, government paper, and bank notes, to the amount of 74,000 rupees; and released all the prisoners, both in the penitentiary and district gaol, to the number of 800. The Europeans fled uninjured in one direction, and the sepoys in another.||

Notwithstanding these outbreaks, the majority of the stations in the Patna division were tranquil; and it was with surprise that the officials at Chupra, Mozufferpoor, and Chumparun, received from the commissioner an order to abandon their respective posts, leaving treasury, gaol, and district to their fate; Mr. Tayler's object being to concentrate the strength of the province at Dinapoor and Patna. The order was unconditional; and when, under

* Major Eyre, August 14th.—*London Gazette*, December 4th, 1857.

† *Times*, October 7th, 1857.

‡ See *Times*, October 16th, 1857.

§ *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*: p. 177.

|| Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 52.

a sense of the humiliation involved in obedience to it, the judge of Behar remonstrated, it was reiterated in a still more positive form. The magistrate of Mozufferpoor (near which station "a large number of available English settlers" resided) likewise tried to convince Mr. Tayler of its impropriety; but failing, returned at once to his station, in direct disobedience of the order, and was rewarded by finding the government treasure (£90,000) still safe, the Native guards having defended it against sixteen of Major Holmes' Irregulars, who had been beaten off from the gaol, treasury, and town, by the guards and inhabitants.

Chupra was threatened by a strong party of the 12th Irregulars. There were, however, "forty-five European soldiers and a hundred Seiks, with Shergotty and its little garrison close at hand;" and but for the commissioner's peremptory order, the officers would hardly have fled as they did, with a precipitation "apparently injudicious and pusillanimous." The ill effects of their flight were averted by the loyalty and spirit of a Mohammedan gentleman, whose good-will was previously doubted, named Cazi Ramzan Ali. He assumed the command on the departure of the English; kept everything tranquil, and held cutcherry in the accustomed manner; and when, their recall being repudiated, the civilians returned with all speed to their post, he delivered over to them the station, courts of justice, prisons, prisoners and all, in perfect order.

At the civil station of *Gya*, the troops consisted of forty of H.M. 84th, and 116 Seiks. The residents, in obedience to Mr. Tayler's order, quitted the station on the morning of the 31st of July, abandoning their houses, property, the government stores, and money, to the amount of £70,000. They had proceeded about three miles on the road to Patna, when Mr. Alonzo Money,* the collector, and Mr. Hollings, an opium agent, having had some conversation on the subject, resolved on returning to *Gya*. No

one chose to accompany them; but they found all quiet—the native police doing duty at the gaol and treasury as when they left, and the respectable inhabitants ready to welcome their return. The reported advance of Kooer Sing, and the position of *Gya*, on the direct route from Hazareebagh to the north-west, induced Mr. Money again to quit the station (August 5th), bearing with him the treasure, which was safely forwarded to Calcutta by the aid of a detachment of the 64th Foot.

The commissioner was pronounced to have issued an order, under the influence of a panic, as discreditable as it had proved disastrous. He was instantly removed, and Mr. Farquharson, the judge, directed to fill his place until Mr. Samuells could arrive to take the duties of officiating commissioner.

At this time matters were very gloomy in Behar. Mr. Tayler's "ill-judged and faint-hearted order"† had spread alarm in every direction. The relief of Arrah was not known at the time of his supersession; and, in fact, he had counselled Major Eyre "to retire, and abandon the gallant garrison to their fate."‡

In the city of Patna great uneasiness existed; but the removal of the commissioner was viewed with satisfaction by nearly every respectable and well-disposed resident in that city.§ The restrictive and coercive measures enforced by him were abandoned by Mr. Farquharson, from a conviction of their impolicy and inutility; the parade was freed from the ugly gallows; and the political prisoners were released, "because there was literally nothing against them." Still, so much intrigue and party spirit had been engendered among the natives of Patna and its neighbourhood, including the principal Native officers, that the lieutenant-governor, not satisfied with securing in Mr. Samuells "the best man available to restore order and confidence among the people," felt it important that he should have a respectable and

* In the course of an Indian debate (see *Times*, February 9th, 1857)—for which both Lords and Commons had "crammed" somewhat hurriedly, studying newspapers and Red pamphlets, rather than Blue Books—the Earl of Derby lauded "the splendid act of insubordination" performed by Alonzo Money, in maintaining *Gya* in opposition to "the orders of his superiors." His lordship, in the same speech, mentions "Commissioner Tayler, of Arrah," with praise, for having taken "a more enlarged view of affairs than the government itself." The opinion thus pronounced rests upon a palpable misconception

of the point at issue. Mr. Tayler was commissioner, not of Arrah, but of Patna, of which Arrah is but a district; and he was the authority disobeyed by Mr. Money, and other subordinate officials, whose conduct was praised and rewarded by Lieutenant-governor Halliday, and the Supreme government.

† See *Indophilus* (Sir C. Trevelyan) able comments on Mr. Tayler's order and its consequences.—*Times*, October 24th, 1857.

‡ "Narrative of Events," by government of Bengal.—Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 77.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 78

trustworthy native subordinate, unconnected with the local disputes, to assist him in the crisis. The appointment of Mr. Samuells himself was only temporary, for he was an officiating judge in the Sudder Court; and he recommended that government should take advantage of the services of Moonshee Ameer Ali, a member of a highly respectable family in the Patna district; a vakeel of the Sudder Court, in large and lucrative practice; and for many years confidentially employed by the government as their vakeel in resumption suits before the special commissioner.

Accordingly, Ameer Ali was, on the 5th of August, appointed special assistant to the commissioner of Patna. The salary of 700 rupees per mensem, which was the highest that the lieutenant-governor had power to assign him, was avowedly a very imperfect compensation for the loss of practice he would undergo during his temporary absence from the Sudder Court; but he was gratified by the title of Khan Bahadoor, and was also, in order to give him a position and consideration in the division, appointed a deputy magistrate in all the districts of the Patna division.

"The nomination was received with a shout of indignation from those who are called the Calcutta public:"* nevertheless, it answered all the desired objects; and through the Moonshee's influence and exertions, the Mohurram (a festival which always dangerously stimulates the bigotry and belligerence of the Mussulmans) passed off more quietly than it had ever been known to do in Patna, and that without any coercion of the people, or display of military force. Much apprehension was entertained regarding "the chance of a collision between the European soldiery and the townspeople; but every means were taken to prevent it by closing all spirit-shops within reach, and by constantly ascertaining the presence of the men by roll-call."†

Another good result of the Moonshee's brief but avowedly successful tenure of office was, that it mitigated the alarm excited in the minds of the Mohammedan community by the violent tone adopted towards them by the majority of Anglo-Indian journals. At all the stations passed

by Mr. Samuells on his way up the river, from Calcutta to Patna, he found the Mohammedans "in dread, lest the government should issue an edict of proscription such as the Calcutta papers advocated;" for the natives "not unfairly argued, that under the present licensing system, when the government allows writings of this kind, which are manifestly in violation of the conditions of the license, to continue unchecked, it must be supposed to view them without displeasure."

The remarks of the commissioner were corroborated by the lieutenant-governor. The latter, in adverting to the violent censure heaped by the press on the appointment of a native and a Mohammedan to a post for which those very circumstances helped to qualify him, observed—

"To persons of any sense and knowledge of affairs it cannot be needful to offer any refutation of objections so founded. They come from a class of persons who have made themselves ridiculous in the present day by supposing and suggesting, that both in regard to civil and military operations, we can, and ought to, act in future by European agency alone, without reposing any trust or confidence on native aid—a thing impossible, even if it were desirable; and who are ignorant or forgetful, that even in the midst of all the infamous treachery, cowardice, and cruelty by which so many of our Indian fellow-subjects have disgraced their name and nation, there have been not a few signal instances of courage, fidelity, and humanity, on the part of both Mohammedans and Hindoos; and that on more than one occasion, natives of both religions have remained to face danger in defending stations and positions unoccupied or abandoned by Europeans, and have evinced a loyalty and constancy in the service of the British government, which it would be as impolitic as ungrateful to overlook or to undervalue."‡

Mr. Samuells, after remarking that the English papers had, for many years past, formed the source to which the native news-writers looked for intelligence, adduced, from his personal knowledge, evidence in support of his assertion, that "since the revolt commenced, the greatest anxiety had been manifested to learn what the English papers said; and every one fortunate enough to get hold of an English paper, is called upon to translate it for the edification of large circles of listeners, who again retailed the news and comments of the journals in their villages."§

Let any reader turn over a file of the *Times*, during the first few months of the

* Duke of Argyll.—Indian debate, February 10th, 1858.

† "Narrative of Events," by government of Bengal.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 5), p. 50.

‡ "Narrative of Events."—Further Parl. Papers (No. 5), p. 25.

§ Despatch of Mr. Samuells.—Further Parl. Papers, 1858 (No. 7), p. 101.

mutiny, and judge the effect its Indian articles were likely to produce, serving, as they did, as texts for the leaders of the *Friend of India*, a journal which abated little of its personal hostility to the leading officials after the departure of Mr. Mead, and increased, rather than diminished, in violence against the natives.

"There are no measures," it asserted, "which the government of India can adopt, provided they be of the extremest severity, which will not be cordially supported at home." And in support of this doctrine, the *Friend* especially dwelt on the cry for vengeance uttered in England, "at a time when the Cawnpoor massacre was still disbelieved." "The humanitarians" had, it declared, disappeared;* and "the only man in England who ventured to object to vengeance, was stoned off the platform."

The latter assertion needs no refutation to English readers: the former was one of those perverted truths which do more mischief than direct falsehoods. Certain intelligence regarding Cawnpoor had not been received; but such circumstantial accounts were current, of fiend-like crimes perpetrated by natives on the persons of English women and children, that the story of Cawnpoor, when truly told, was less painful, and incomparably less disgusting.

The credulity displayed in England almost rivalled that of the Calcutta community; but it was more excusable, inasmuch as certain high authorities in England, being misled themselves, gave the sanction of popular name and high social rank, to reports which, without this support, would have neutralised their own venom by their inconsistency and want of corroboration.

No one contributed more to inflame the passions of the masses, and drown the remonstrances of better-regulated minds, than a nobleman, whose zeal for religion, and active sympathies for the wretched of his own land, gave him wide-spread influence. Lord Shaftesbury took the very gloomiest view of the native character; and when the first excitement was over, and most persons began to feel that even a sepoy might be painted too black; the earl stated, at a public meeting in October, 1857, that *he had himself seen* a letter from the highest lady in India, describing how, "day by day, ladies were coming into Calcutta, their ears and their noses cut off, and their eyes put

out;" and "that children of the tenderest years have been reserved to be put to death, under circumstances of the most exquisite torture, &c., &c."†

For a long time no one ventured to doubt that Lord Shaftesbury had actually seen this most appalling statement in the handwriting of Lady Canning. At length, when crowds of widows and orphans returned to England un mutilated, and for the most part without the slightest wound or bruise from a native hand; and when Englishwomen were suffered to go out to India, as many as forty-three in one ship,‡ and some of them as brides—people began to question how far their credulity had been imposed upon.

The weathercock on the top of Printing-house Square, veered round from the vengeance point about Christmas, 1857; and early in February, letters found place in the columns of the *Times*, from "Lovers of Truth," and "Lovers of Accuracy," questioning the assertions made at various public meetings, and calling upon Lord Shaftesbury to reiterate or retract that volunteered by him three months previously. His lordship gave a prompt and manly reply. He owned to having been wholly in error regarding the alleged letter; said that, in the heat of speaking, he might have used the words, "I saw," instead of "I heard of;" and that when the speech was brought to him for correction, before being issued in a separate form, he corrected it hastily, to "I heard," instead of "I heard of."§ What is this but a version of the story of the Three Black Crows?—only, unhappily, the blunder, fabrication, or hoax, whichever it may have been, was not a harmless jest. The explanation came too late to blunt the edge of the swords it had sharpened; too late to prevent England from disgracing herself in the eyes of continental Europe, by the excess of her rage.

Some few statesmen, like Sir John Pakington, strove to allay the popular ferment, by suggesting, that even if the sepoys had committed the crimes attributed to them, "our hands were not clean." India had not been well governed: and he spoke with fearless rectitude of the existence—

"Of official proof, that in collecting the revenue of India, there had been practised, in the name of England—he would not say by the authority, but he feared not without the knowledge of Englishmen—

* *Friend of India*, October 15th, 1857.

† *Times*, November 2nd, 1857.

‡ *Daily News*, November 5th, 1857.

§ *Times*, October 2nd and 4th, 1857.

THE VENGEANCE-CRY OF THE "TIMES."

and been practised tortures little less horrible
those which we now deplored. This must be
in mind in the day of reckoning."

But such reasoning was little heeded; for the war-whoop uttered by the *Times* had found so loud an echo, that Mr. Disraeli declared, he had heard and read things of late, which made him suppose that the religious opinions of the people of England had undergone some sudden change, and that they were about to forsake the worship of Him whose name they bear, for that of Moloch. He protested against "meeting atrocity with atrocity," and taking Nana Sahib as a model for the conduct of the British soldier.†

This language hardly seems too strong, when such stanzas as the *Liberavimus Animam* of *Punch* were copied at full length in the London journals, declared by the *Friend of India* to be "worth five battalions," and published in the columns of that journal, at the Mission Press at Serampoor, with every trick of type, capital letters, and italics, to attract attention. The rhythm would be lost in the translation; but the spirit is too terribly earnest not to affect a native auditory. The threat of "A vengeance—aye, darker than war ever knew," for instance, is sufficiently intelligible; so is the sentiment of the following verses:—

"Who pules about mercy? That word may be said
When steel, red and sated, perforce must retire,
And for every soft hair of each dearly loved head,
A cord has dispatched a foul fiend of hell-fire.
* * * * *

"But woe to the hell-hounds! Their enemies know
Who hath said to the soldiers that fight in His
name,

"Thy foot shall be dipped in the blood of the foe,
And the tongue of thy dogs shall be dipped in
the same."

The poet (for no ordinary rhymers wrote these fierce lines) also spoke of "a world" which would—

"Behold with acclaim,
That hecatomb slain in the face of the sun."

But this idea was soon negatived by the indignation expressed by the leading continental journals, at "the spirit of revenge which they assume to be rampant in British hearts." These are the words of the *Times*, which, as early as October, 1857, began to modify its language, and offer a clumsy vindication of its vengeance-cry; asserting, that the British, whose opinions it was supposed

to represent, "are not a cruel people; and, "as conquerors and colonists, we are not jealous of our imperial rights:" in proof of which, it cited "associations organised for the express purpose of maintaining the claims of aborigines against British settlers;" which associations had never before been adverted to in the journal, except in the language of censure or contempt.

The fabrication of the Highlanders dividing Miss Wheeler's hair,‡ is alluded to in the first of these verses. The concluding scriptural quotation is taken from a Psalm, which contains a prophecy concerning "the people who delight in war," which the *Times*, or *Friend of India*, would not care to quote. As to puling about mercy, the tendency of the moment was in an opposite direction; not "maudlin humanity"§ or sympathy (at least, not for native suffering) was in fashion, but rather maudlin ferocity. The *Friend* gave its readers, Indian and English, some verses quoted from the *Daily News*; remarking, that the "Martin F. Tupper who would cover India with 'groves of gibbets,' is the man who, as the author of *Proverbial Philosophy*, sees his writings on every lady's work-table;" adding, that "the almost feminine weakness which renders those writings unreadable by men, does but intensify his present expression of opinion." The opinion, heralded in a manner so uncomplimentary to the author and his lady admirers, was to

"Hang every Pariah hound,
And hunt them down to death in all the hills and
cities round."

The "Hamans of high caste" were to have lofty gibbets; the Baal priests to be bound with "fetters hard and fast;" and as to Delhi—that imperial city, whose miserable inhabitants an apathetic government had suffered to fall into the hands of a horde of rebellious mercenaries—its fate, if Mr. Tupper had had the ordering of affairs, would have been as follows:—

"But—Delhi?—Yes, terrific be its utter sack and
route:
Our vengeance is indelible—when Delhi is wiped
out,
And only so; one stone upon another shall not
stand,
For England swears to set her mark upon that
traitor land!
Her mark, the hand of justice, the Cross—a cross
of flame, &c."||

* Right Hon. Sir J. S. Pakington's speech at Worcester, October, 1857.

† Mr. Disraeli.—*Times*, October 1st, 1857.

‡ See page 383. § *Times*, August 8th, 1857.

|| *Friend of India*, October 22nd, 1857. *Daily News*, Sept. 2nd, 1857.

The *Friend of India* agreed with Mr. M. F. Tupper, that Delhi should be "wiped out," not simply for the sake of vengeance, but as a proclamation to the whole of the East, that England "will not tolerate the existence even of a city which can advance an ancestral or traditionary claim, to be the seat of any other dynasty."* With regard to the general conduct of the war, the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* quoted the following sentences from the *Friend*, as being "understood to represent the universal idea of the course to be followed:"—

"1. That in districts under martial law, and during actual warfare, the loss of life and property should be regulated by military necessities alone.

"2. That every mutineer who has taken up arms, or quitted his ranks, should die.

"3. That every rebel who has taken up arms should die.

"4. That in every village where a European has been murdered, a telegraph cut, or a dāk stolen, a swift tribunal should exercise summary justice.

"5. That every village in which a European fugitive has been insulted or refused aid, should be heavily fined."

The writer added—"It is believed the government measure will fall short of this as regards the villagers, but not as regards the mutineers."†

The early government measures had sanctioned greater severities than these, in the hanging commissions, freely granted to any and every European. The *Times* eventually admitted this; declaring that, "by its two acts on the subject, the Indian legislature made every indigo-planter in the country virtually a military officer;" and the governor-general soon found reason to regret the abuse of the "enormous powers" confided to many unfit persons, of punishing real or alleged rebels "by death, transportation, or imprisonment, and by forfeiture of all property and effects."‡

Before the close of July, the government became convinced—

"That the powers above referred to had been, in some cases, unjustly and recklessly used; that the indiscriminate hanging, not only of persons of all shades of guilt, but of those whose guilt was at the least very doubtful, and the general burning and plunder of villages, whereby the innocent as well as the guilty, *without regard to age or sex*, were indiscriminately punished, and, in some instances, sacrificed, had deeply exasperated large communities not

otherwise hostile to the government; that the cessation of agriculture, and consequent famine, were impending; that there were sepoys passing through the country, some on leave, others who had gone to their homes after the breaking up of their regiments, having taken no part in the mutiny, but having done their utmost to prevent it; others who had risked their lives in saving their European officers from the sanguinary fury of their comrades; and that all of these men, in the temper that at that time generally prevailed among the English officers and residents throughout the country, and still unhappily prevails in some quarters, were liable to be involved in one common penalty; and, lastly, that the proceedings of the officers of government, had given colour to the rumour, which was industriously spread, and credulously received, in all parts of the country, that the government meditated a general bloody prosecution of Mohammedans and Hindoos, in revenge for the crimes of the sepoys, and only waited for the arrival of European troops to put this design into execution."§

Allahabad and its vicinity was the locality where the greatest excesses were committed; and, in July, there appeared many indications of the outbreak of a servile war. Mr. Moore, magistrate of Mirzapoor, had been "particularly active in burning down what he considered disaffected villages;" and "he had been warned, that if he persisted in such extreme measures against the natives, they would at last turn in self-defence."||

He did persist;—caused zemindars to be hung before their own doors, and went on shedding blood like water, until, on the 4th of July, a zemindar, named Jorye Sing, with several of his followers, surprised Mr. Moore and two planters, named Jones and Kemp, while bathing at Parlay indigo factory, and put them to death. They cut off Moore's head, and carried it away. That evening Lieutenant-colonel Pott, with fifty faithful 47th N.I. sepoys, "scoured the country, and burnt some villages,"** but failed to capture Jorye Sing or his associates. An officer who accompanied the expedition, has described the conduct of the civilian who accompanied it as the acting magistrate.

"When villagers were brought in as prisoners, in order that they might be questioned, he would commence conversation by walking up to them as they squatted on the ground, and kicking their naked bodies with his heavy riding-boots. At another time he would, with his fist, strike the unresisting wretches in the face; and these gentle persuasives failing, he would have them tied up to a tree, and whipped with a stick or piece of rope,

* *Friend of India*, October 8th, 1857.

† *Times*, November 30th, 1857.

‡ Governor-general in council, Dec. 11th, 1857.

§ *Ibid*, Dec. 24th.—Parl. Papers, Feb., 1858.

|| Letter from European officer, dated "Allahabad, July 16th, 1857."—*Star*, September 3rd, 1857.

¶ See p. 302.

** Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 129.

until they would give the information he required. This appeared to me very like the old mode of putting people to torture to extract evidence."*

On the 11th of July, application was made from Allahabad, for rockets of all sizes, to clear villages with.† Whether the request was granted or refused, does not appear; but the government found it imperative to take speedy measures to "impress civil officers invested with power under the penal acts of 1857, with a more just sense of their duties and responsibilities; to save innocent men from shameful death, and innocent families from the destruction of home and property; to prevent the fields from remaining untilled, and the crops unsown; and to assure the people generally that, notwithstanding all that has passed, justice—and not vengeance—is the policy of the British government." With this view, detailed instructions were drawn up by the governor-general in council, on the 31st of July, forbidding civilians from punishing any unarmed man as a mere deserter, and prohibiting the indiscriminate burning of villages. Several commissions were withdrawn, including those held by Messrs. Irvine, Palmer, and Sandys, at Allahabad.‡ As a further check on the vindictive spirit displayed in that city, Mr. Grant was sent thither, on the 28th of August, as lieutenant-governor of the Central Provinces. A loud outcry was raised against these proceedings; and "clemency" Canning, and "anti-hangman" Grant, were very unpopular. The latter was compelled to defend himself, officially, against a wholly unfounded charge of having released 150 Cawnpoor rebels imprisoned by General Neil.§

Before long, even the *Times* admitted, that "the indiscriminate slaughter of the sepoys might perhaps have led to the revolt of the Bombay and Madras armies."||

Indeed, circumstances occurred in the Bombay presidency, on the very day on which the "clemency" instructions were dated, calculated to create great doubt as to the soundness of the Bombay army.

Kolapoor is a native state, bounded on the north and north-east by Sattara; on the east and south by the British collectorate of Belgaum; and on the west by Sawunt Warree and the British collectorate of Rut-

nagherry. In 1844, the management of this state was forcibly assumed by the British government, the queen-mother set aside on the plea of misgovernment, and affairs carried on in the name of the young rajah, "whose authority (Mr. Thornton writes in the last edition of his *Gazetteer*) remains in abeyance." The family of the rajah, whose rights were thus summarily dealt with, trace their descent from Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire: the inhabitants of the state are chiefly Mahrattas and Ramoosees, the class in which Sevajee found his best and staunchest adherents.

On the 31st of July, the 27th Bombay N.I. (a regiment mainly raised in the turbulent native state of Sawunt Warree, in 1844) was quartered at Kolapoor. The mutiny commenced as many others had done. At night, just as the officers were separating after mess—some to play billiards, some going quietly home to bed—the Native officers rushed in a body to their commander, Major Rolland, to tell him there was a partial mutiny in the regiment. The Kolapoor irregular infantry, and a portion of the 27th N.I., remained faithful; but when the officers tried to form them into line to oppose the mutineers, each man looked at his fellow with distrust; and in the darkness, the heavy rain, noise and confusion, the Europeans carried off the ladies and children to the Residency, about two miles from the native lines, and left the rebels to loot the native bazaar, rob the quarter-guard of 50,000 rupees, and pillage the store-room of all the available ammunition. The next morning 140 men were found to have absconded. Three young officers, the eldest of whom (Lieutenant Norris) was only twenty-four, were also missing. It appears that they had fled to the jungle, thinking the whole regiment had risen; and were overtaken and killed by the mutineers on the 2nd of August. In the course of the first day after the mutiny, seventy-four rebels were captured, but could not be brought to trial, on account of the critical state of the regiment, until the arrival of European troops. News of the rising had been telegraphed to Sattara; and Lieutenant Kerr, the adjutant of the South Mahratta Horse, instantly started for

* Letter of officer.—*Star*, September 23rd, 1857.

† Further Parl. Papers, 1857; p. 114.

‡ *Friend of India*, August 27th, 1857.

§ The *Times*' leader (Oct. 29th, 1857) which contains this and other unfounded charges against Mr.

Grant, is followed by an article on the "extreme facility" of lying, as a contrivance for creating facts—or what are as good as facts for the time—without the smallest difficulty.

|| *Times*, February 6th, 1858.

Kolapoor with fifty troopers, reaching his destination on the morning of the 3rd, having ridden seventy-six miles in twenty-four hours, and not lost a single man or horse by the way, although they had swam three deep and rapid rivers, usually deemed impracticable in the rains.* Kolapoor was saved. European reinforcements were sent from Bombay and Poonah. The regiment was disarmed, and courts-martial held; the result of which was, that sixty-three sepoy were executed, sixty-six transported for life, eighteen sentenced to imprisonment, four reprimanded and admitted as evidence, and fourteen acquitted.†

The Kolapoor mutiny caused great excitement at Sattara. The annexation of that state has been already narrated. Perhaps no Indian prince was ever worse treated by the East India Company, than the good and able ruler deposed by them in 1839.‡ The people felt his wrongs deeply, and the lapse of years had failed to reconcile them to British rule. The testimony of Lord Elphinstone is decisive on this point:—

“The annexation of Sattara was far from being popular among the people of that province. The upper classes, especially, regarded the introduction of British rule with dislike; and all classes of Maharrattas looked with regret upon the extinction of the line of the great freebooter, who delivered them from the Mohammedan yoke, and laid the foundation of that wide-spread confederacy which has been called the Mahratta Empire.”§

In the course of the mutiny, the British had been repeatedly taunted with their ill-treatment of the rajah of Sattara; and fears were entertained that an attempt might be made to restore the state to independence, under a representative of the House of Sevajee. The widows of the last two rajahs, with their adopted sons, had been permitted to occupy the royal palaces, and to keep up as much state as their limited means would allow. Mr. Rose, the chief civil officer in Sattara, saw reason to believe that a plot was being formed “for the restoration to the gadi of the adopted son of the elder branch;”|| and, as the speediest mode of counteraction, he caused the two Ranees and their sons to be seized by night, removed them to Butcher’s Island,¶ and re-

solved on their detention as state prisoners (although there was no accusation of connivance on their part) until tranquillity should be restored. The fragmentary information furnished in the official or other gazettes and journals, does not afford the means of framing a connected account of proceedings at Sattara; but it is certain that a number of lives were taken at various times, as the penalty for conspiring to restore the native raj. A singular circumstance was connected with one of these executions. On the 8th of September eighteen men were brought out to die, of whom five were to suffer death by hanging, seven to be shot, and six to be blown away from guns. One of the guns, to which a native was fastened, could not be fired, although primed and loaded twice: therefore, after some delay, the wretched man was unbound, and shot by a file of the 3rd Europeans.** Throughout the mutiny, Lord Elphinstone was warmly supported by the governor-general of Portuguese India—the Viscount de Torres Novas. In permitting the British troops to land at Goa, in the monsoon of 1857, he acted in opposition to his council, and in violation of the Portuguese laws. His conduct was, however, approved in Portugal, and a bill of indemnity passed, absolving him from any penalties he had thereby incurred.††

After the mutiny at Kolapoor, symptoms of disaffection were noticed in several portions of the Bombay army; and on the 13th of September, the men of the 21st N.I. were disarmed at Kurrachee.

The mode of dealing with the disarmed sepoy was fiercely discussed in the closing months of the year 1857. It was a difficult question; for several regiments (like the governor-general’s body-guard at Calcutta, after the Dinapoor affair) had been deprived of their arms, under the most positive assurances that the measure was purely a temporary precaution. The ultra-vengeance party showed special rancour against these men, and recommended, that “every disarmed sepoy should be put in irons, and made to work on the roads.”‡‡ Another suggestion was, to send them to Saugor Island (a

* Letter from officer of 27th N.I.—*Daily News*, November 3rd, 1857.

† Parl. Papers regarding regiments which have mutinied; p. 70.

‡ See vol. i., p. 432.

§ Minute by Lord Elphinstone, August 18th, 1859.—*London Gazette*, October 7th, 1859.

|| Minute by Lord Elphinstone, August 18th, 1859.—*London Gazette*, October 7th, 1859.

¶ An islet in the Bombay Harbour.

** *Friend of India*, October 1st, 1857.

†† Minute by Lord Elphinstone.

‡‡ *Englishman*. Quoted in *Friend of India*, October 1st, 1857.

barren island at the mouth of the Hooghly), and let them shoot tigers with greased cartridges, until they volunteered to serve in China; and several regiments were eventually sent thither, although foreign service was expressly excluded by the terms of enlistment. The wild and exaggerated expressions used by newspaper correspondents, would probably have produced little effect on educated Europeans, who incline, more or less, to Mr. Russell's view of those "curious exponents of diseased ideas, called newspapers;" but the sepoys looked to them for information of the intentions of the Feringhee: and the otherwise inexplicable mutiny of disarmed regiments, is accounted for by their belief that, as their ruin was resolved on, they had better die at once in open revolt. Except for the sake of those dependent on him (and they are always numerous, for celibacy is scarcely known in India; and our government makes no provision for the aged, the destitute, or the incurably sick), the sepoy, whether Hindoo or Mussulman, has little fear of death: the creeds of both teach them too much, and too little, to leave room for the mystery which shrouds the Dark Valley in the mind of civilised infidels (if such there be), or the fears which make it terrible even to Christians. The only point on which the mutineers were sensitive, was as to the mode of execution. The sepoys had a half aristocratic, half superstitious shrinking from the halter, or the barbarous and disgusting process of blowing from guns. The *Times* exulted over this weakness, and declared that there were "few persons who would not think a simple extermination of the sepoys on the field of battle rather a tame conclusion of the affair." In the same leading article, an assertion was made (which needs no other contradiction than the public speeches reported in its own columns), that "ladies and gentlemen, preachers of all persuasions, and speakers of all platforms—every tongue, every pen, demands the destruction of 70,000 sepoys;" condemning "all who are ever so remotely compromised in these crimes, as fallen below the level of humanity—degraded to a low class of brutes, fit only to be knocked on the head, or crushed under the foot."*

Times, October 21st, 1857.

† *Ibid.*, October 24th, 1857.

‡ Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 39.

§ *Daily News*, October 16th, 1857.

|| The Europeans tried for murder were even-

The journalist out-Tuppered Tupper; for the latter made an exception in favour of the "Abdiels of our guard," the faithful few who had resisted "the will of the army," and, amid general defection, stood firmly by their officers. The *Times* made no such exceptions, but defended, as "wild justice,"† an onslaught on them by British soldiers, which had been publicly denounced by the highest military authority as "cold-blooded murder."

The outrage in question was committed at Dinapoor, after General Lloyd had been removed from the divisional command, and threatened with a trial by court-martial, "for his conduct connected with the mutiny of the troops."‡ His disgrace deprived the natives (whether citizens or sepoys) of a friend; and the 10th became daily more drunken and insubordinate. About a hundred of the unfortunate 40th N.I. had remained stanch, and refused to accompany their mutinous companions. The men of the 10th, on their return from the Jugdespoor expedition (which, with its slaughter, burnings, and plunder, was not calculated to improve their discipline), went to the place where the faithful sepoys were encamped, dragged them into the barrack yard, and commenced slaughtering them with bullets and bayonets. At the sound of the firing, the whole station turned out in alarm: the authorities hastened to the spot, and beheld a scene which one of the witnesses describes as not easily to be forgotten. "Wounded sepoys, dead and dying; one sepoy had five bayonet thrusts; one shot just in the centre of the forehead; another's mouth shattered by shot: all groaning pitifully in their agonies."§ Before the massacre could be stayed, five victims had been killed and twelve wounded, including a woman. The affair would probably have been hushed up, had not Sir James Outram arrived at Dinapoor (August 17th) while the court of inquest was sitting.|| He issued a general order, expressing "the utmost horror and indignation" at the conduct of the men of the 10th, and left a hundred men of the 5th Fusiliers "to perform the town duties, which could not safely be entrusted to the 10th regiment, under the

usually acquitted, in default of legal evidence. Sir Colin Campbell approved the finding of the court, but blamed the "haste and carelessness" with which it had been drawn up.—*Times*, December 2nd, 1857.

lax discipline and exasperated feelings it displays towards natives of all classes."* Neither was General Outram satisfied with the conduct of the Dinapoor functionaries, who, influenced by causeless alarm, had recalled the 90th regiment, which had passed up the river four days before, on its way to Cawnpoor. The panic was occasioned by the defection of the 5th irregular cavalry at Bhaugulpoor; and that defection had itself originated, or been hastened, by a similar cause. The steamer and flat, with General Outram on board, anchored off Bhaugulpoor on the 15th of August; and a report was spread by two mutinous sowars, that the 5th cavalry would be surprised and disarmed in the night. Therefore the men mounted and fled, leaving all their property, except the horses, which were their own, behind them. Half of the Native officers remained stanch. The head-quarters of the regiment had been recently changed from Rohnee to Bhaugulpoor, in consequence of an event which occurred at the former place on the 12th of June.

There were then no troops except the 5th irregular cavalry at Rohnee, and no suspicion was entertained of their disloyalty. The three European officers, Major Macdonald, Sir Norman Leslie (the adjutant), and Dr. Grant, were taking tea in the verandah of the major's bungalow, when a rush of feet was heard, and three men, with drawn swords, sprang upon the Europeans. Macdonald, starting from his chair, seized it by the arms, and after receiving three sword-cuts on the head in quick succession, and finding himself as "neatly scalped as any Red Indian could do it,"† he contrived to give "an ugly poke" to his opponent, "which appeared to disconcert him, and he at once bolted, followed by the others." The doctor was severely wounded; but the adjutant was covered with gashes. The first thrust, which he received sitting in his chair, "cut clean through his back into his chest, so that he breathed through the wound in the lungs." But he was quite sensible; and when his companions, with their own wounds scarcely stanch, bent over him, he exclaimed, "It is very hard to die in this manner. My poor wife and children! what will become of them!" He then "applied himself to make his peace

with God, and breathed his last in about half-an-hour."‡ The struggle was brief and silent. The major did not call for help, believing that the assassins were men of his own regiment, and would be seconded by other mutineers. But he failed in recognising them; and the doctor thought that they were not troopers. The Native officers concurred in endeavouring to trace the criminals, and three 5th men were seized, two of whom "were found with bloody clothes;" and the third "confessed that he had done for Leslie;" and this was evidence enough. The major had them ironed, held a drum-head court-martial, and sentenced them to be hanged the next morning. It is strange that neither the major nor the doctor could verify the convicts. One of them was "of very high caste and influence," and a low-caste man was chosen to hang him. The other two were recruits. The regiment was drawn out, and the major stood by with his loaded pistol in his hand, while an elephant was brought up. One of the doomed men mounted this novel scaffold, and the noose was slipped over his throat. The animal was then driven off. Three times the process was repeated; after which the corpses were left dangling, and the men retired quietly to their lines, leaving the major scarcely able to believe that his head was still on his shoulders.§

Altogether, this affair forms one of the strangest episodes in the whole mutiny. It seems doubtful whether the men who were executed for the crime were the actual perpetrators. The surrender of the criminals was demanded, as needful for the honour, probably for the existence, of the corps; and the character of both Hindoos and Mohammedans, renders it easy to believe that three men might be chosen by lot, or tempted by the pledge of provision for their families, to die, for the sake of preserving their comrades. "It was boasted at the time, that one of the assassins was hung by his own father, in order to show the loyalty of the regiment."||

The writer (an American missionary from Allahabad) who mentions this unnatural proceeding, adds, that it was "only a blind," and that the regiment was biding its time. But this supposition does not account for the neglect of a tempting opportunity of

* Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 153.

† Letter by Major Macdonald.—Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), 1857; p. 23.

‡ *Ibid.*—*Daily News*, August 5th, 1857.

§ Extract of a letter written by Major Macdonald. —*Times*, September 10th, 1857.

|| Statement of Rev. Mr. Hay.—*Times*, September, 1857.

revolt; and it is more probable that the eventual defection of the 5th cavalry was (as Major Macdonald asserted) occasioned by sheer panic. Not that it was to be expected that this or any other corps could be safely employed in hostile operations against their own countrymen and co-religionists, at the bidding of a foreign master. They might, in an extreme case, have stood on the defensive; but that they should take an offensive part in such a struggle, was opposed to all natural feeling, all conventional usage. That fathers should hang their own sons, and brothers fight against brothers, was rather more than the sternest military code could exact.

Certainly the 5th I.C. had no desire to imbrue their hands in the blood of their officers; for, instead of taking the lives of the wounded and defenceless Europeans, they sat up all night after the assault, watching round them, and were, for the two subsequent months, obedient and loyal. The major had perfect confidence in them; and, notwithstanding the pain he suffered from the injury he had received in the head, and the danger of fever he would not delegate his duties to other hands, declaring he would stay and die, rather than trust any strange officer with the men.* At his suggestion, the head-quarters were removed from Rohnee, which was an isolated position, surrounded by nullahs, to Bhaugulpoor. After the mutiny at that place, the detachments at Rohnee and Doomkee absconded also; and thus another efficient cavalry regiment was added to the hostile ranks. It is quite possible that the 5th Irregulars were alarmed by the treatment of other regiments, and especially by the seizure of the horses of the 11th Irregulars at Berhampoor.

Berhampoor had been, it will be remembered, the scene of the first mutiny.† At the end of July it was held by the 11th cavalry and the 63rd N.I. These troops could hardly be expected to resist the example of mutiny, after it had come so near to them at Dinapoor. Therefore Colonel Campbell, C.B., the officer in command of H.M. 90th, being sent with his regiment up the Ganges, was directed to disembark

at Berhampoor quietly and expeditiously, and to disarm the Native troops, including some artillery. He landed, under heavy rain, on the 1st of August, and had paraded and disarmed the infantry before the cavalry reached the ground. They came from a distance of five miles, and expected to meet only a detachment of H.M. 35th. Colonel Campbell, who had been but a few days in India, looked with admiration at the troopers, and afterwards declared that, as regarded riders, horses, and equipments, he had never seen their equal. They were splendid men, but savage beyond expression, and with swords like razors.‡ They might well be savage at being compelled to surrender their valuable horses and arms, which, being irregular troops, were their own property; and this without any compensation, simply on the ground that they might not be tempted to revolt. Colonel Campbell says—"They had no idea that their fine horses would be taken from them; if they had thought so they would have gone off in a body." Some of them put their feet in their stirrups to remount; but the colonel seeing this, advanced a line of skirmishers, and cut off their retreat.§ "They told the sepoy afterwards," he writes, "that they were cowards to give up their arms, and that if they had waited until they came up, they would have fought us; but that my men were so placed, they could not escape. When ordered to disarm, they obeyed; but some broke their swords; others threw their pouches into the air; and when their horses were led from the field, they pulled off their long jack-boots and spurs, and pitched them away."|| Colonel Campbell accomplished his painful task with much tact; made allowance for the excitement of the troopers; and, "of course, treated them as a regiment having committed no crime."

The 90th left Berhampoor on the 3rd of August, and arrived off Dinapoor on the 12th. They passed on up the river; but the Dinapoor authorities, on hearing of the defection of the 5th Irregulars, had recalled them in the fit of panic already mentioned. They also detained the 5th Fusiliers. General Outram learned this on his own

* Further Parl. Papers (not numbered), 1857; p. 23.

† See page 129.

‡ Colonel Campbell's Letter.—*Times*, October 15th, 1857.

§ Letter by "Instructor of Musketry;" present with the 90th at Berhampoor.—*Daily News*, October 24th, 1857.

|| Colonel Campbell's Letter.—*Times*, October 15th, 1857.

upward journey, and, anxious to avoid any delay in relieving Lucknow, and to prevent the disease which he foresaw would be engendered by needlessly detaining the troops on board crowded boats during intensely hot weather, he sent his private secretary and aide-de-camp (Messrs. Money and Sitwell) on foot, at ten o'clock at night, from where the steamer had anchored, to the city of Patna, a distance of seven or eight miles, to dispatch an express to forbid the detention of the reinforcements. But it was too late; the 90th had received their recall, and the consequences foreseen by General Outram took place. Owing to mismanagement at Calcutta, the troops had already had "a perfectly miserable voyage; black biscuit, and stinking meat" for food; no place to lie on but the bare deck, exposed to the weather night and

day, and almost eaten up with sandflies and mosquitoes. They had left Dinapore five days, and had reached Buxar, a distance of about 120 miles, when they were suddenly recalled. The troops could not understand the reason of this vacillation,* which was much censured by the press, and ascribed to the very man who had striven to prevent it. Before the 90th revisited Dinapore, cholera and fever had broken out; a doctor and three men were dead; and it was needful to land the men, cleanse the vessels, and add some comforts for the sick before the voyage could be resumed. They started again in four days, and reached Allahabad on the 4th of September, after losing nearly thirty men coming up the Ganges. "The voyage," writes one of the party, "would have been very delightful if we had had proper accommodation."

CHAPTER XXI

REINFORCEMENT OF LUCKNOW BY OUTRAM AND HAVELOCK.—SEPTEMBER, 1857.

THE original plan of General Outram was to collect a force of about 1,000 infantry and eight guns at Benares, and march from thence, by the direct route, to Lucknow, a distance of about 150 miles; thereby turning, or taking in the rear, the numerous nullahs between Lucknow and Cawnpoor. The force under General Havelock was to cross the Ganges at Futtehpoor, and the river Saye at Bareilly, and join General Outram (with his assistance) beyond the latter place. This arrangement was rendered impracticable by the reduced numbers and miserable condition of the troops under General Havelock, who, so far from being able to advance alone even part of the way towards Lucknow, was anticipating (August 21st) the necessity of abandoning Cawnpoor, and falling back on Allahabad. Therefore General Outram had no resource but to hasten on with all speed to Cawnpoor.

As Neil, when about to start from Allahabad, had been unexpectedly superseded by Havelock, so now Havelock would have

been superseded by Outram, but that "the modern Bayard" thought it would be, in his own soldier-like phrase, "unfair to assume the command" under the circumstances. He therefore telegraphed to General Havelock, that he intended to accompany the expedition in his civil capacity, as chief commissioner of Oude, and offered his military services as a volunteer; adding—"To you shall be left the glory of relieving Lucknow, for which you have already so nobly struggled." Havelock, it is said, "was not a demonstrative man; and, in his reply to that communication, he did not allude in the least to the generous act which left him so much glory."† However, in announcing to the troops his continuance in the command, he of course mentioned the reason in grateful terms; and the whole Anglo-Indian army, with Sir Colin Campbell for their spokesman, were enthusiastic in their admiration of an act of self-sacrifice and generosity, "on a point, of all others, dear to a real soldier."‡

* "Instructor of Musketry."—*Daily News*, October 24th. † Russell.—*Times*, June 7th, 1858.

‡ General Orders of Commander-in-chief; Calcutta, September 28th, 1857.

General Outram might abnegate the honour of leading the relieving force, but the merit was none the less his. There was, in effect, no other man in India so fitted for the task: he was thoroughly acquainted with Lucknow and the whole surrounding country; and the troops knew well that such knowledge, possessed by such a leader, was in itself a guarantee against their being exposed to needless or fruitless danger. An artillery officer has drawn a life-like sketch of the noble soldier, who "served when he might have commanded;" as "a short, strongly-built man; black-haired, with a keen twinkling eye, and a cheerful bright smile, and a kind word for all; dressed in a blue frock-coat, and everlastingly puffing away at a cheroot; quiet in manner; cool, unwavering, determined—one whom neither the hottest and most deadly fire, the gravest responsibility, or the most perilous and critical juncture, can excite or flurry."*

It was quite true that Sir James Outram had a kind word for all, especially those who needed it most; and in September, 1857, a more wretched and friendless class than the sepoys could hardly be found under the sun. For them he raised his powerful voice, recommending government to institute tribunals for the trial of such as might surrender, and had not been guilty of murder. He said, in a letter to Mr. J. P. Grant—"It is high time to show we do not propose to wage war to the knife and to extermination against all Hindoos, or against all sepoys because they are sepoys."†

The reinforcements under Sir James Outram, comprising about 1,400 bayonets, marched from Allahabad to Cawnpoor without obstruction; but Sir James Outram learning, while on the road, that a party of insurgents from Oude, with four guns, had crossed the Ganges into the Doab, dispatched Major Eyre to clear the country, at the head of a well-chosen "party, consisting of 100 of H.M. Fusiliers, 50 of H.M. 64th regiment, mounted on elephants, with two guns, and completely equipped with tents, two days' cooked provisions, and supplies for three more."‡ This was the way to organise victory. The troops, including forty of the 12th irregular cavalry, under Captain Johnson, came upon the enemy, not fasting and footsore, shiver-

ing with ague, or parched with fever, as Havelock's force had done repeatedly; but fresh and strong. They marched by moonlight; and, at daybreak on the 11th of September, overtook the insurgents, who fled precipitately to their boats, flung their guns into the river, and strove to escape; but were nearly all killed by the fire of the guns and musketry poured into the crowded vessels from the bank above. The rebels blew up one boat on its being boarded, and thereby killed one, and wounded five, Europeans, and as many natives. No other casualties occurred.

Sir James Outram reached Cawnpoor on the 15th of September. The head-quarters, and the greater part of H.M. 64th, were left, under Lieutenant-colonel Wilson, at Cawnpoor, to garrison the strong intrenchment which had been thrown up upon the bank of the river; and, on the 19th of September, the rest of the army crossed the Ganges by the bridge of boats, constructed by Major Crommelin, of the engineers. The force was as follows:—

European Infantry, 2,388; European Volunteer Cavalry, 109; European Artillery, 282; Seik Infantry, 341; Native Irregular Cavalry, 59. Total Europeans, 2,779; Natives, 400. In all, 3,179.

These were divided into two brigades—the one under General Neil; the other under Colonel Hamilton, of the 78th. Sir James Outram took, or rather shared, the command of the volunteer cavalry with Captain Barrow.

The passage of the river was accomplished almost unopposed; but the troops, on reaching Mungulwar on the 21st of September, found the rebels in position, with six guns. They were speedily driven thence by the infantry and Major Olphert's battery, and fled, hotly pursued by Outram and the volunteer cavalry, through Oonao, to a spot between that village and Busserut Gunj. Here two guns were abandoned by the large retreating force to a hundred horsemen. With these guns, and a third before taken, a standard of the 1st N.I., and some camel-loads of ammunition, the volunteers rejoined the main body. The rapid movements of the Europeans prevented the foe from defending or destroying the three-arched bridge which crosses the river Saye at the village of Bunnec, the very point the dread of

* Lt. Majendie's *Up among the Pandies*, p. 159.

† Russell.—*Times*, June 7th, 1858.

‡ General Outram's despatch, September 11th, 1857.—Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 229.

which had led to Havelock's first ill-omened retreat. The force reached the bridge on the 22nd, at the close of a fifteen miles' march under torrents of rain, and halted on the Lucknow side. On the 23rd, after advancing ten miles, they found the rebels strongly posted in one of the spacious country residences of the ex-king of Oude.

The *Alumbagh*, or World's Garden (a summer residence of the late queen-mother), consists of a very fine strong mansion, a mosque close by, an *Imaum-barrah* for the celebration of the *Mohurram*, and various other buildings, situated in the midst of pleasure-grounds, walled in with stone bastions at the angles. The masses of rebel infantry and cavalry were supported by six guns, two of which opened on the British volunteer cavalry and Olphert's horse battery; but were speedily silenced; and, after an attempt at a stand in the inner enclosed garden, were driven out in confusion, and pursued by a portion of the force, with Outram at their head, as far as the Charbagh (four gardens) bridge, across the canal, which forms the southern boundary of Lucknow. But guns from the city were sent out to support the enemy, and the victors were glad to fall back on the *Alumbagh*, pitch tents, and obtain a day's rest.

On the 25th, at 8 A.M., the troops marched for Lucknow, leaving the sick and wounded with the baggage and tents at the *Alumbagh*, under a guard of 250 infantry and guns.

The Charbagh bridge, injured, though not cut through, defended by a battery of four guns, with the houses close behind it loopholed and full of riflemen and musketeers, was carried with heavy loss. From this point, the direct road to the European fortifications traversed a densely populated portion of the city, the distance being rather less than two miles. It was believed that this road had been cut through and strongly barricaded in several places. Instead, therefore, of attempting to force an entrance thereby, General Outram, who had at this time taken the command of the first brigade, led the troops, by a circuitous by-road, towards the Residency, leaving the 78th Highlanders to hold the entrance of the main street while the baggage passed. The main body pressed on, and encountered little opposition till

they reached the gate of the Kaiserbagh (King's Garden) palace, from whence four guns opened fire, and volleys of musketry were poured forth from an adjacent building—the mess-house of the 32nd. Two heavy guns, directed by Major Eyre against the Kaiserbagh battery, twice temporarily silenced it during a brief halt made there, in consequence of a message from the 78th Highlanders, reporting that they were hard pressed; for, being impeded by the litters and baggage, they had become entangled in the narrow streets, and were in danger of being cut off in detail.

Darkness was coming on; and Outram suggested to Havelock to halt within the courts of the palace of Fureed Buksh for the night, so as to afford the rear-guard and the wounded the opportunity of closing up.* But, unhappily, Outram had delegated his authority to Havelock until the reinforcement should be effected; and “that gallant officer was of opinion that he ought to hasten to the Residency, and that he would be exposed to severer loss if he halted.”†

Major North also states, that “the opportunity to rest, though at first acceptable to the wearied soldiers, soon became irksome, so great was their eagerness to reach our desired goal, the Baillie guard.” The men murmured at being exposed to the enemy's fire; and “young Havelock, nephew to the general, unable to resist the excitement of the moment, suddenly exclaimed, ‘For God's sake, let us go on, sir!’”‡ whereupon the order was given to resume the advance. Outram had been previously wounded by a musket-ball, but he tied a handkerchief round his arm to stay the bleeding; and when entreated to dismount and have the hurt properly dressed, replied, “Not till we reach the Residency.” On hearing the decision given in opposition to his counsel, at the prompting of an impetuous youth,§ Outram placed himself at the head of the column, and was the first man to enter the intrenchments. The consequences of Havelock's ill-advised resolve are thus described by a writer recently quoted:—“The advance was pressed with such haste, that the enemy became emboldened by the appearance of precipitation. They returned to the houses overlooking the streets, and to the Kaiserbagh. When our rear-guard appeared they were met by a heavy fire; our baggage-guard was charged

* Havelock's despatch, Sept. 30th, 1857.—*London Gazette*.

† Russell.—*Times*, June 7th, 1858.

‡ Major North's *Journal*, p. 199.

§ *Ibid*.

by cavalry from the open ground; our dhoolies were burnt; the wounded and sick were massacred—*saute qui peut*—a panic—a rush to the Residency took place. We lost a 9-pounder gun, hackeries, and baggage; seventy-seven wounded and sick met a cruel death, and sixty-one men of the rear-guard were killed; making a total of 138 casualties.”*

The actual entrance to the Baillie guard is well told by a “civilian,” who had volunteered to accompany the force. After describing the manner in which the troops hurried pell-mell through the illuminated streets, with “sheets of fire shooting out from the houses,” and passed under the walls of the Kaiserbagh while the natives hurled down stones and bricks, and even spat on the heads of the Europeans; he proceeds—

“Suddenly we found ourselves opposite to a large gateway, with folding doors, completely riddled with round shot and musket-balls, the entrance to a large enclosure. At the side of this was a small doorway, half-blocked up by a small mud wall, and the Europeans and Seiks were struggling to get through while the bullets were whistling about them. I could not think what was up, and why we should be going in there; but after forcing my way up to the door, and getting my head and shoulders over the wall, I found myself being pulled over by a great unwashed, hairy creature, who set me on my legs, and patted me on my back; and to my astonishment I found myself in the long-looked-for Baillie guard. What an entry compared with the one we had promised ourselves! We expected to march in with colours flying and bands playing, and to be met by a starving garrison, crying with joy; ladies waving handkerchiefs on all sides, and every expression of happiness; but instead of that, we entered as a disorganised army, like so many sheep, finding the whole of the garrison at their posts, as they always remained, and a few stray officers and men only at the gate to meet us.”†

The great unwashed, hairy creature, who helped to pull the “civilian” in, and then patted him on the back, was probably “burly Jack Aitken,” who with a band of sepoy of the 13th N.I., held the Baillie guard during the entire siege. A sad mistake was made here by the 78th, who seeing the sepoy, and not knowing that they were within the precincts of the garri-

son, bayoneted three of the 13th N.I. The poor fellows made no resistance. “One of them waved his hand, and crying ‘*Kooch purwani* (never mind); it is all for the good cause; welcome friends!’ fell and expired.”‡

These men were fit comrades for Henry Lawrence. God grant them to be fellow-workers with him in the life beyond the grave! It was the day of days for an heroic death. Many a man, during the eleven hours which elapsed between the departure of the column from the Alumbagh to the entrance of the main body in the Residency, cheerfully gave up his life for his friends. The reinforcement of Lucknow stands out in strong relief, as one of the most interesting features in the history of the mutiny; not because it cost more lives than all Havelock’s other engagements put together; but on account of the noble spirit which impelled the troops to spend their blood freely for a worthy end. They sought neither vengeance, glory, nor loot; but to rescue a crowd of women and children from the hands of cruel foes. Husbands, fathers, brothers, uncles were among the breathless, eager host that swept through the fire-lit streets. The archway leading into the Khas Bazaar is now called “Neil’s gate,” for he fell there; but his lifeless body was carried into the Residency. Major North, whose horse had just been struck by a bullet, was trying to push forward the dhoolie of a friend (Captain Johnson, 5th Fusiliers) who was wounded to the death; when General Neil, turning round on his horse, said, “I shall see the rear of my brigade forward; it is getting dark.”§ He passed on under the arch, and was shot through the head. His men fired a volley against the wall from which the fatal bullet issued, hoping that some of their shots might enter the loopholes and avenge them for the loss of their leader; and then pressed forward, their numbers diminishing beneath the iron hail, and their progress impeded by the bodies of the dying and the dead. At length they reached the

of the time, and also in the *Memoir of Havelock*, by the Rev. William Brock, who had access to that general’s private letters. Nevertheless, Rees affirms, that General Neil had “actually arrived within our intrenchments, when he heard that some of our heavy guns were in jeopardy. He galloped out again; but scarcely had he done so, when a bullet struck him on the head, and he fell. Our guns were, however, saved by the intrepidity of our Madras regiment and Highlanders.”—*Siege of Lucknow*, p. 238.

* Russell.—*Times*, June 7th, 1857.

† Letter of “civilian.”—*Times*, Feb. 1st, 1858.

‡ Rees’ *Lucknow*, p. 243. The *Quarterly Review* (Murray’s) also states this fact:—“It is but too true that several faithful soldiers were bayoneted at their guns, in the Baillie guard battery, by the infuriated soldiers of the 78th, who confounded them with other natives.”—April, 1858.

§ *Journal*, p. 200. Major North does not further state the manner of Neil’s death. The statement in the text is the one given in the private correspondence



THE DEPARTURE OF THE GREAT EASTERN

Residency, and were received with a burst of eager, grateful welcome, which for a time banished every feeling but that of uncontrollable delight.

Most musical were the notes of the bagpipe to every European ear in Lucknow; most gladdening the loud hurrah which echoed and re-echoed from the various distinct garrisons within the defences. "From every pit, trench, and battery—from behind the sand-bags piled on shattered houses—from every post still held by a few gallant spirits, rose cheer on cheer—even from the hospital."* Officers and men, friends and strangers, shook hands indiscriminately; but when the soldiers saw their countrywomen pouring forth to meet them with their babes in their arms, and looked upon the fair young faces flushed with excitement, yet attenuated by the perils and privation of an eighty-eight days' siege; the big, rough-bearded men, who had never quailed before the foe, sobbed with emotion as they seized and kissed the children, and passed them from one to another to be caressed in turn, exclaiming, "Thank God, this is better than Cawnpoor!" "God bless you!" "We thought to have found only your bones."† Afterwards, the first burst of enthusiasm being over, they mournfully turned aside to speak among themselves of the heavy loss they had suffered, and to inquire the names of the numerous comrades who had fallen by the way.

A large number of the wounded, with the rear-guard of H.M. 90th, under Colonel Campbell, had been left in dhoolies in the walled passage in front of the Motee Munzil palace. Nothing could be done to rescue them on the night of the 25th, although General Havelock's son was among the number, having been badly wounded in the arm. There was a path through the palaces skirting the river, screened, in all but two places, from the enemy's fire; and on the morning of the 26th, Mr. J. B. Thornhill, a young civilian whose wife was cousin to Lieutenant Havelock, volunteered to guide the escort sent out by Sir James Outram, who had now assumed the command. Unhappily, Thornhill became confused, and, in returning to the Residency, missed his way, and led the

dhoolie-bearers and their escort through the very gate where General Neil had fallen, into the streets of the city. Many bearers were killed; but a few of the litters were carried safely through the fire, including that of Lieutenant Havelock. Thornhill reached the Residency mortally injured. The majority of the wounded officers and men were massacred in the fatal spot now known as "Dhoolie Square."‡

The memory of a gallant exploit relieves the gloom of this painful transaction. Nine unwounded men of the escort, including Dr. A. C. Home, of the 90th regiment, together with five wounded officers and men, being cut off from advance or retreat by the enemy, took refuge in a small building which formed one side of Neil's gateway, and there defended themselves during the whole day of the 26th and the succeeding night, though surrounded by large bodies of the enemy, and almost hopeless of relief. Private McManus (5th Fusiliers) killed numbers of the foe, and the dead bodies outside the doorway, formed in themselves an impediment to the enemy's making a rush on the little garrison. Private Ryan, of the Madras Fusiliers, could not be prevented from attempting to rescue his officer, Captain Arnold, who was lying wounded in a dhoolie at some distance. McManus, though hurt in the foot, joined Ryan; their companions removed the barricade; and the two heroes rushed forth, dashed into the square under a heavy musketry fire, dragged Captain Arnold out of his litter, and carried him into the house. They escaped unhurt; but Arnold was shot through the thigh while in their arms. Another sally was made, and a disabled soldier brought in. He also was mortally wounded, while his bearers remained uninjured. Private Hollowell, of the 78th, was an efficient member of the brave band. The assailants showed themselves only at intervals, when they would come forward as if resolved to storm the place; but Hollowell repeatedly killed the foremost man, and the rest fell back. At length he had an opportunity of taking aim at their leader, an old man dressed in white, with a red cummerbund (or waistband), who died on the spot; after which the insurgents went away, and left the Europeans an interval of quiet. They looked forth on the deserted street, and seeing several of the headless trunks of their countrymen, were strengthened in their resolve

* *Diary of a Staff Officer.* Quoted in Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 300.

† *Diary of Mrs. Harris*, p. 120. Gubbins' *Oudh*, p. 161. Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 224.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 323.

of holding out to the last gasp. Soon the enemy reappeared, and, advancing under cover of a screen on wheels, scrambled on the roof of the building in which the Europeans had taken refuge, and attempted to set it on fire with lighted straw. The besieged, seizing the three most helpless of their wounded, rushed into the square, and took refuge in a shed on the opposite side, filled with dead and dying sepoys. The enemy dug holes in the roof, and fired down on the Europeans, who, snatching up two pots of water, broke through a mud wall, and fled across a courtyard back into the building they had originally occupied. "At this time," says Dr. Home, "hope was gone." Including himself, six men remained capable of using arms, and three more of standing sentry. Of the wounded, some were delirious; while others were on the eve of becoming so from the horrors of their position. The dead bodies of sepoys, and of a horse killed that morning, hemmed them in: above their heads, on the roof, they heard the footsteps of the foe pacing backwards and forwards; and, worse than all, the moans of their unhappy countrymen, perishing in the half-burnt dhoolies, were distinctly audible. The night closed in, and the enemy ceased firing. The Europeans had now only seven rounds left for six men. Death stared them in the face. Were they to perish by fire, by the sword, or by starvation? Almost worn out, the nine men capable of keeping watch were told-off in three reliefs, and the others fell asleep—starting up at every noise, from terrible dreams to a more terrible reality. At 2 A.M. they heard the sound of heavy firing; and, with a sudden revulsion of feeling, such as shipwrecked men on a raft feel at sight of a vessel, they roused themselves and shouted, "Europeans! Europeans!" But the volleys ceased; the hopes of the listeners expired also; and the few still strong to suffer, resigned themselves to their fate; for they could not carry away the wounded, and would not leave them. Time passed on. Shortly after daybreak, distant firing was again heard. But it made no impression on the heart-sick party till the approaching sound grew so distinct, that a quick ear caught the sharp "ping" of the Enfield rifle; and Ryan sprang up, shouting, "Oh, boys! them's our own chaps." Then all joined in a loud cheer, and began to take aim at the loopholes from which the enemy were firing on the advancing deliverers.

In three minutes, Captain Moorsom and his party (who had come to rescue the guns left at the Motee Munzil) were in sight; and by his good management, the besieged, with their wounded and their dead, reached the Residency. Mr. Gubbins states that McManus, Ryan, and Hollowell were presented with the Victoria medal by General Outram; but he does not mention their receiving any more substantial reward. The services of Dr. Home were eventually acknowledged by the home government in a similar manner.* It is not often that medical officers receive this kind of decoration. Yet no class of men are more useful in their vocation. None do harder duty and bear greater privations, with fewer prizes to stimulate and more blanks to depress their energies, than our army and navy surgeons. Theirs is a noble calling, and needs a brave heart, a clear head, and a skilful hand. The soldier has indeed his trials in the perils of the battle-field, the exhausting marches, the dreary night-watches. But the life of the army surgeon is spent among the sick and the dying, fighting inch by inch a battle in which he is perpetually worsted; constantly seeing the black side of war, while others look on its pageants and its prizes; braving death, not in a whirl of excitement, with flags flying and trumpets sounding, but following in the rear with the muffled drum and the dead-cart—striving to rescue a yet living though mutilated form from human or carrion foes, or to save a few victims prostrated by pestilence—snatching them like brands from the fire, at the risk of perishing unheeded in the effort.

The unflinching courage with which Dr. Home stood by the wounded during the day and night of the 26th of September, forms one of the noblest records in the history of the Indian mutiny. Yet probably he, and many others of his fraternity, could tell of days and nights spent in a crowded hospital, amidst sights and sounds as horrible; or in the streets of a fever-stricken city; or in those worst dens, where vice and disease combine to make a hell on earth. Who would not rather meet the noisy terrors of cannon and the sword, than inhale, for days and weeks together, the poisonous vapours of a pest-house? Certainly, war medals and prize-money are not fit rewards for men whose lives are devoted to the alleviation of human suffering; and their virtue (as far as the British

* *London Gazette*, June 18th, 1858.

government is concerned) is left pretty much to be its own reward.

General Outram, once established in Lucknow, was in a position to estimate the condition and resources of the garrison. The original defenders numbered 1,692 persons; of whom 927 were Europeans, and 765 Natives. Before the 25th of September, 350 Europeans had been killed, and the number of natives was diminished by 363 deaths and desertions. There remained, including sick and wounded, 577 Europeans, and 402 Natives. The reinforcement had been effected at a cost to the relieving force, of 119 killed, 339 wounded, and 77 missing: in all, 535, including Colonel Bazely (Bengal artillery), killed at his guns; Colonel Campbell,* of H.M. 90th, mortally, and Lieutenant-colonel Tytler severely, wounded. This loss, together with the detention of 250 effective men at the Alumbagh, took away all reasonable prospect of carrying off the women and children, the sick and wounded, from Lucknow; for the total number of these was no less than 1,500. Want of carriage alone rendered the transport through five miles of disputed suburb an impossibility. There were two alternatives—the one to strengthen the exhausted garrison with 300 men, and retire with the remainder of the infantry on the Alumbagh; the other (on which Outram resolved), to stay at Lucknow, and institute a vigorous defence.† Costly as the reinforcement had been, it had saved the garrison, though not in the sense of entire rescue or raising the siege. Since the failure of Havelock's attempts to reach them in August, the position of the besieged had become far more critical. They had lost defenders whose skill, general character, or tact, had exercised a peculiar influence on the community. Major Bruère, a very popular officer of the 13th N.I., had fallen, and been carried to his grave by his faithful

sepoys—a rare honour for a commander of Native troops at this epoch. Captain Radcliffe, the leader of the volunteer cavalry at Chinhut, lay mortally wounded; and Lieutenant Graham (4th light cavalry) had committed suicide. Deprat, a French merchant, who had served as a Chasseur d'Afrique in Algeria, was shot in the face by a musket-ball. The enemy specially hated him; for Azim Oollah, on the part of the Nana, had made the Frenchman offers which he had indignantly rejected. But all these losses were light in comparison with one which took place on the 14th of September, and is described as an irreparable calamity, the news of which "was received by all classes of the community with a degree of grief second only to that caused by the death of Sir Henry Lawrence."‡ Captain George Fulton, while visiting Mr. Gubbins' battery to examine the enemy's movements, was killed by a cannon-ball, which, entering by an embrasure, carried away the back part of his head. He had a painless death and an honoured grave; but he left a widow and a large family. After his loss, the mining of the enemy was prosecuted with better chance of success; and Sir James Outram, on obtaining access to the exterior of the intrenchments, found that six mines had been completed in the most artistic manner (one of them from a distance of 200 feet, under the principal defensive works of the garrison), which were ready for loading, and the firing of which would have placed the garrison entirely at their mercy. The delay of another day, therefore, might have sealed their fate.§

The chief drawback from the value of the reinforcement, was the fact that the newcomers had brought no provisions or stores with them; no clothes of any kind but those they wore; no grain; but gun-bullocks only. The number of patients in hospital

* Colonel Campbell suffered amputation, and lingered until the 12th of November, when he died. Mrs. Case relates an anecdote, simple in itself, but interesting as illustrating the straitened circumstances and self-denial of the brigadier and his good wife. "A white fowl had been brought to Mrs. Inglis for sale; but she thought the price, five rupees (ten shillings), was much too high. However, Colonel Inglis bought it: its legs were secured, and it constantly hopped about before our door. Mrs. Inglis thought it was too bad that it should be eating our rice, and was just going to order it to be killed and cooked for dinner, when little Johnny (Inglis) comes running into the room—'Mamma, Mamma, the white fowl has laid an egg!' This

saved its life. Colonel Campbell was very fond of an egg; it was the only thing he could take well. The white fowl, from this notable day, laid an egg daily till Colonel Campbell died; after which it never laid another. We have brought the fowl away, and maybe it will some day be in England."

—*Day by Day at Lucknow*, p. 73.

† Outram's despatch; Lucknow, September 30th, 1857.—*London Gazette*, February 17th, 1858.

‡ Gubbins; p. 289. Rees; p. 211. The "covenanted civilian" and the "interloper" are quite agreed on this point: and on other matters, their valuable books, while often differing as regards opinions, concur in almost all material facts.

§ Outram's despatch, September 30th, 1857.

was raised from 130 to 627; and the supply of bedding and medical stores was insufficient to meet the unexpected demand. No servants, except the cooks of the regiment, had been allowed to accompany the force; and the discomfort of the first few days was excessive. The auctions of deceased officers' property were most exciting affairs; and a brush and comb, or a piece of soap, were objects of active competition. Flannel shirts were especially coveted. A very old one of poor Captain Fulton's, which had seen service in all the mines about the place, and was covered with mud and dirt, sold for £4 10s. Brandy fetched £2 10s. a bottle before the end of the blockade. A handsome new uniform went for twelve rupees. Beer and sherry were alike purchased at £7 per dozen. Tobacco was almost unattainable. Cigars were worth 5s. a-piece: but both men and officers smoked the dried leaves of the Neem tree and of several shrubs. Opium, and occasionally other articles, the Seiks obtained through Native deserters from the garrison, with whom they maintained a stealthy intercourse. A month before the arrival of the reinforcements, the original troops had been put on half meat rations; namely, twelve ounces for each man, and six ounces for each woman. The rum was soon exhausted, and no spirits or malt liquors were served out. When the stores of tea and coffee failed, roasted grain was used as a substitute. It must not, however, be supposed that all in Lucknow endured equal hardships. "It was known," says Mr. Gubbins, "that there were some families where bottled beer and porter were daily enjoyed, as well as some other rare comforts."* The *table d'hôte* in his own establishment was certainly not on a starvation scale. The bottled beer was reserved for the sick and the "nursing ladies," of whom there were four among Mr. Gubbins' guests. The general allowance was a glass of Sauterne at luncheon; and, at dinner, "one glass of sherry, and two of champagne or of claret, were served to the gentlemen, and less to the ladies." The meat-rations were stewed with spices and vegetables, being rarely eatable as plain boiled or roast; and two rice puddings, made with milk and eggs, were daily placed on table. Tea, with sugar and milk, was distributed thrice a day. This bill of fare was varied occasionally by preserved salmon, and

sometimes by a plum or jam pudding, the appearance of which "always caused great excitement at the dinner-table;" and such was the demand for these delicacies, that there was "often none left for the lady of the house, who helped them."† Happy were the individuals who found refuge in Gubbins' house, whether nursing mothers or wounded officers, like Major Vincent Eyre: happy even those from other garrisons invited to share the Sauterne, salmon, roly-polly puddings, and tea with milk and sugar in it. Their good fortune contrasted strongly with the utter wretchedness endured in other posts, where ladies "had to gather their own sticks, light their own fire, knead and make their own chupatties, and cook with their own hands any other food which formed their meal."‡

"We often leave off dinner as hungry as when we began," writes Mrs. Harris, the wife of the excellent chaplain, who was in the house of Dr. Fayer, where Sir James Outram and his staff had taken up their abode. "Nothing for breakfast this morning," she notes in her journal, "but chupatties and boiled peas;" and, on the following day, there is the entry—"Our store of wine and beer is come to an end."§

The establishment of the commander of the garrison (Brigadier Inglis) had few luxuries. One of his guests (the widow of Colonel Case) remarks in her diary, on the 3rd of August—"Mrs. Inglis weighs out everything for our daily consumption with her own hands; and so good is her management, that she is always able to give a little arrowroot or sugar to a sick child, and has, two or three times, succeeded in making little puddings for invalids, with but a very limited quantity of sugar." Moreover, the brigadier's wife never went empty-handed to the soldiers' wives. Her own table was scantily furnished; and "a fruit pie for dinner," is noted, on the 15th of November, as "a thing we have not had for four months; and the poor children enjoyed it greatly." The sugar was reserved for the children; but Mrs. Case being unable to drink her tea without it, took one cup at breakfast, and "got a bit of sugar for it," until the 28th of September, when the poor lady sorrowfully writes—"I gave up taking sugar to-day; and we are using our last piece

* Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 261.

† *Ibid.*, p. 205.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 206.

§ Mrs. Harris's *Diary*, p. 134.

of soap.”* At a very early period of the siege, both officers and men had given up using white shirts, jackets, or caps, and dyed their linen, not exactly the famous Isabella colour, but a peculiar reddish-slate, formed by a mixture of black and red ink. Some surprise was at one time expressed as to how a sufficiency had been obtained, until it was discovered that the public offices had been robbed of almost all their stores.

The soldiers of the relieving force suffered more than others from hunger. The cold night-work, and the absence of the accustomed stimulants, quickened their appetites; and, not satisfied with their rations, they would constantly run into the kitchens when baking was in progress, seize a chupatty, and leave a rupee in its place.†

Sir James Outram's first act was to extend the position—a measure which was needful for the accommodation of the increased garrison, and also to keep the enemy at greater distance. The so-called defences (which deserved that name only in comparison with the Cawnpore mud-bank) were little more than a number of buildings of various kinds, scattered over a large garden; but, unhappily, so far were they from being encircled by a stout brick wall, that there were numerous points where a dozen men abreast might have entered with less effort than would be needed to cross an ordinary fence in England. The only thing which kept out the mutineers, was the belief that these places were mined. Therefore, in their repeated attacks, they chose spots where ladders were necessary.‡

There was much advantage attendant on the location of the British troops in the palaces of Tehree Kothee, Chuttur Munzil, and Fureed Buksh, which extend along the river, from the Residency nearly to the Kaiserbagh. Two of the palaces had been evacuated by the enemy; the third, the Tehree Kothee, or *House of the Stars*, although the nearest to the European intrenchment, was occupied, till the 27th of September, by some sepoys and other armed men, who were then bayoneted

or shot by the British. Between this building and the Fureed Buksh was the General's House, so called from being the residence of the King of Oude's brother, absent with the queen-mother in England. This was forcibly taken possession of, and a large number of ladies and female servants were made prisoners, with two sons of the general. The women of inferior rank were set at liberty; the others were domiciled with the family of Mr. Gubbins' native butler. Considerable plunder was obtained in the palaces; but it was chiefly in the shape of jewels and native arms, rare china and embroidered clothes; though some few prizes of tea, grain, and tobacco were carried off in triumph by the soldiers.

At this juncture the conduct of Maun Sing was a serious cause of uneasiness. He was still playing the game of fast-and-loose already described, waiting evidently to see which side was the stronger; but, on the whole, inclining to the British, and willing to throw in his lot with theirs, provided he should receive a heavy and specific consideration for his services.

Sir Henry Lawrence, aware of the power of this chief and his family, had commenced negotiations which would probably have insured his early and cordial co-operation; but at Sir Henry's death (July 4th), those negotiations fell to the ground; and it was not until the 12th of September that Lord Canning, in a strangely indited message, empowered General Outram to assure Maun Sing, that if he continued to give effective proof of his fidelity and good-will, his position in Oude should be at least as good as it was before the annexation; while the proprietors in Oude, who had deserted the British government, would lose their possessions. Here is a plain announcement of the policy the Calcutta government intended to pursue towards the talookdars of Oude. This was published in the Indian Blue Books for 1857;|| but could hardly have been read by either Lords or Commons, otherwise so much surprise would not have been expressed at Lord Canning's confiscating proclamation in 1858. But the Oude barons

* *Day by Day at Lucknow*, pp. 130, 213.

† Mrs. Inglis's *Journal*, p. 24. Mrs. Case, p. 268.

‡ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 348.

§ Maun Sing was offered "a perpetual jaghire, secured on land, of £25,000 per annum," if he remained faithful and rendered active aid. A like offer was made to Rajah Nawab Ali, of Mohuma-

bad, and to Rajah Goorbux Sing, of Ramnugger Dhumeeyree; with many others. "Their replies were generally evasive, promising generally well, but complaining that they now neither possessed followers nor guns with which they could assist us."—Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oudh*, p. 169.

|| Further Parl. Papers (No. 4), p. 232.

may be inclined to exclaim, "All's well that ends well;" since the announcement of the governor-general's matured scheme of wholesale confiscation, has served them better than any clement half-measure on his part could have done. If King John had been less despotic, Magna Charta might not have been signed at Runnymede. If Lord Canning had not laid the axe at the root of all proprietary rights, the barons of Oude would hardly have heard from the lips of the Indian viceroy, an admission, even "under conditions," of their previously unrecognised claims.

To return to the narrative. The promise to Maun Sing was as vague as the denunciation against the mass of the great proprietary body of Oude for "deserting"—not actively opposing, but deserting—the government, was clear and definite. It is impossible to judge to what extent this letter may have affected Mehndi Hossein, of Goruckpoor, and other chiefs, who, though politically compromised, had yet a claim on the British government, as the protectors of fugitive Europeans. The blockade of the Lucknow Residency was resolutely carried on, notwithstanding the strengthened and extended position of its defenders; and it is a significant fact, that the ranks of the besiegers were frequently augmented

during nearly three months after the arrival of Outram and Havelock.

Maun Sing was supposed to have some 10,000 men under his orders. None of these were known to aid the other insurgents, but appeared to maintain an armed neutrality. When subsequently called to account for his proceedings, their leader said that he never intended to have gone to Lucknow had not the widow of his late uncle, Buktawur Sing, fallen into the hands of the rebels. He found an opportunity of rescuing her in the confusion of the reinforcement of the British garrison, and had made arrangements to move back with his troops forty miles, when he suddenly learned that the British had attacked the palace, and were about to disgrace the seraglio of the King of Oude. He at once marched to protect the ladies, for he had eaten the king's salt. In reply, Maun Sing was informed that the British never injured helpless women and children; and was desired at once to withdraw his adherents from Lucknow, and communicate with General Outram; but no reward was offered in the event of obedience. The result may be easily guessed. After long hesitation, Maun Sing, from a doubtful friend, became a secret foe, and at length assumed a prominent place among the rebel leaders.

CHAPTER XXII.

AFFAIRS IN THE PUNJAB; BATTLE OF NUJUF GHUR; CAPTURE OF DELHI; SURRENDER OF THE KING.

ON the 28th of September, 1857, the following intelligence was published by the Foreign Office, London, regarding the capital of the Punjab:—

"The 26th N.I. mutinied at Lahore on the 30th of July, and murdered the commanding officer, Major Spencer; but the mutineers were totally destroyed."

There was nothing remarkable in the announcement. "Cut up," "accounted for," and "totally destroyed," were understood to be convertible terms, and expressed the ordinary mode of dealing with mutinous regiments before the Calcutta instructions of

the 31st of July came into force; and after that period, where, from distance or interrupted communication, the governor-general's authority was practically in abeyance. The instructions themselves affected only the dealings of civilians in the matter of runaway sepoys and village-burning. The Calcutta government did not attempt to interfere with the military authorities in these matters.

The exterminator of the 26th N.I. was Mr. Frederick Cooper, the deputy-commissioner of Umritsir. His proceedings, fully and frankly told, were entirely approved by the governor-general, Sir John Lawrence,

Mr. (now Sir R.) Montgomery, and the Anglo-Indian press. Mr. Cooper evidently considered that he had acted in an exemplary manner, and that his conduct deserved the praise it met with, as prompt, spirited, and thorough. Impressed with this conviction, he wrote a book, which is invaluable as affording an insight into the state of feeling, or, to speak more charitably, frenzy, which characterised this terrible epoch. The following details, so far as they regard Mr. Cooper, are given on his own authority, and, as nearly as possible, in his own words: certainly no others could be found more graphic and explicit. Mr. Montgomery, indeed, praises Mr. Cooper's actions, but blames his description of them. The general public will probably reverse this censure, and think the utter absence of what in polite language is termed "diplomatic reserve," the redeeming feature of the narrative.

It will be remembered, that on the 13th of May, all the Native troops at Lahore, amounting to about 3,800, had been disarmed as a precautionary measure. Five months elapsed, during which the Seik levies, and about 400 Europeans, kept watch night and day over the sepoy, who exhibited a "great sullenness." Whether they had formed any scheme for a general attempt to escape from their unpleasant position, is not known:† but on the 30th of July, some commotion was observed in the ranks of the 26th N.I., stationed, under surveillance, at Meean Meer; which British officers affirm to have been the result of a mere panic—the immediate cause being a dust-storm:‡ and this is not improbable, because the natives of India are affected by the accidents of climate to an extent few Europeans can conceive.§ There is no circumstantial account of the assassination of the commanding officer (Major Spencer), the sergeant-major, and the native havildar. Mr. Cooper writes—"It is feared that the ardour of the Seik levies, in firing when the first outbreak occurred, precipitated the murders, and frightened all [the 26th N.I.]—good, bad, or indifferently disposed—to

flight." It is, he adds, "concurrently admitted, that a fanatic, named Prakash Sing, rushed out of his hut, brandishing a sword, and bawling out to his comrades to rise and kill the Feringhees, and selected as his own victim the kind-hearted major."|| Sir R. Montgomery states that the Seiks had not reached the lines of the regiment when the murders were committed,¶ in which he considers the whole body concerned: but he admits, that "subsequent inquiries seemed to point to a particular man, as having dealt a fatal blow to Major Spencer."** On witnessing the fall of the major, the 26th took to flight, under cover of the dust-storm, which was still raging. A few stragglers remained, and perished in the lines when these were furiously cannonaded by the Seiks and Europeans, to the alarm of the residents in the station. No one at Meean Meer knew what road the mutineers had taken, and they were pursued in a wrong direction. But news reached Umritsir the next day, that they were trying to skirt the left bank of the Ravee, and had met with unexpected opposition from the Tehsildar, with a body of police, at a ghaut twenty-six miles distant. Mr. Cooper, with about eighty or ninety horsemen, at once started from Umritsir in pursuit. An abstract of his proceedings is given in small type, to economise space.

"So cool was the day, that no horses were knocked up, and the troopers reached their destination without accident. The villagers were assembled on the bank, flushed with their easy triumph over the mutineers, of whom some 150 had been shot, mobbed backwards into the river, and drowned inevitably; too weakened and famished as they must have been after their forty miles' flight, to battle with the flood. The main body had fled upwards, and swam over on pieces of wood, or floated to an island about a mile off from the shore, where they might be descried crouching like a brood of wild fowl." Two boats were dispatched laden with troopers, the Hindoostanees being carefully excluded, lest their presence should lead to accidental escapes among the mutineers. The boats reached the island in about twenty minutes. "The sun was setting in golden splendour; and as the doomed men, with joined palms, crowded down to the shore on the approach of the boats, one side of which bristled with about sixty muskets, besides sundry revolvers and pistols—their long shadows were flung far

* Letter in vindication of Mr. Cooper; by Sir R. Montgomery: written on learning "that the punishment inflicted on the 26th N.I., has been seriously impugned in the House of Commons:" dated "Lahore, 29th April, 1859."—Parl. Paper, 29th July, 1859. In reading this letter, it must be remembered that the writer was himself gravely compromised.

† Cooper, p. 152. ‡ *Star*, March 11th, 1859.

§ At Lucknow, an eclipse of the sun afforded the Europeans a respite from the fire of the besiegers. While it lasted, no native would shoulder a musket. They viewed the phenomena with consternation, and considered that it foreboded famine.

|| Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 153.

¶ Montgomery's *Letter*; p. 2. ** *Ibid*.

athwart the gleaming waters. In utter despair, forty or fifty dashed into the stream; and the sowars being on the point of taking pot-shots at the heads of the swimmers, orders were given 'not to fire.' The mutineers, taking this for an indication of humane intentions on the part of Mr. Cooper, at once surrendered themselves. "They evidently were possessed of a sudden and insane idea that they were going to be tried by court-martial, after some luxurious refreshment. In consequence of which, thirty-six stalwart sepoy submitted to be bound by a single man, and stocked like slaves into a hold into one of the two boats emptied for the purpose." By midnight, 282 sepoy of all ranks were safely lodged in the police-station. There were, also, "numbers of camp-followers, who were left to be taken care of by the villagers." A drizzling rain came on, and it was found necessary to delay the execution until morning. A reinforcement of Sikhs, with a large supply of rope, arrived, and enabled the commissioner to dismiss the portion of his force which he feared might prove refractory. "The 1st of August was the anniversary of the great Mohammedan sacrificial festival of the Bukra Eed. A capital excuse was thus afforded to permit the Hindoostanee Mussulman horsemen to return to celebrate it at Umritsir; while the single Christian, unembarrassed by their presence, and aided by the faithful Sikhs, might perform a ceremonial sacrifice of a different nature." Trees were scarce, and the numbers of the prisoners too great for hanging; they were therefore pinioned, tied together, and brought out ten at a time to be shot. On learning their fate, they were filled with astonishment and rage. "One of the executioners swooned away," and interrupted the "ceremonial sacrifice," presided over by "the single Christian;" but the proceedings were soon resumed; and after 237 sepoy had been put to death, a native official announced to the "solitary Anglo-Saxon magistrate," that the remainder refused to come out of the bastion. Mr. Cooper proceeded thither. "The doors were opened, and, behold! they were nearly all dead! Unconsciously, the tragedy of Holwell's Black Hole had been re-enacted. * * * Forty-five bodies, dead from fright, exhaustion, fatigue, heat, and partial suffocation, were dragged into light." The whole of the corpses were flung by the village sweepers into a deep dry well, within 100 yards of the police-station; and Mr. Cooper triumphantly remarks, "There is a well at Cawnpoor; but there is also one at Ujnalla!" And he appends the demi-official letters of Sir John Lawrence and Mr. Montgomery, in proof of their cordial approbation of the whole transaction. The former of these was merely a general congratulation on a successful enterprise; the latter is at greater length, and contains the following paragraphs:—

"MY DEAR COOPER, Sunday: 9 A.M.

"All honour to you for what you have done; and right well you did it. There was no hesitation, or delay, or drawing back. It will be a feather in your cap as long as you live. * * * * *

"The other three regiments here [at Lahore] were very shaky yesterday; but I hardly think they will now go. I wish they would, as they are a nuisance; and not a man would escape if they do."*

It is startling to know that one of the leading advocates for the propagation of

* *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 168. † *Ibid.*, p. 164.

Christianity in India, should regard the above transaction as a feather in a man's cap. Still more, that the revolt and extermination of three other regiments, should have been anticipated by him as a desirable mode of getting rid of "a nuisance," and winning, perhaps, a blood-red feather for another cap. Mr. Cooper has compared the Black Hole of Calcutta and the Well of Cawnpoor with the Bastion and the Well of Ujnalla: and the comparison is so far correct, that the leading characteristic of the three massacres (Surajah Dowlah's, Nana Sahib's, and the Anglo-Saxon magistrate's) was an utter recklessness of human suffering. The wretched captives of the Nana were preserved as long as was consistent with the safety of their gaolers. When it was seen that they were not sufficiently valuable, as hostages, to be worth the risk and trouble of preserving, they were put out of the way in haste—cruelly, clumsily. The sole extenuation for such deeds, is their being perpetrated by persons whose own lives are at stake.

But the severest censure passed upon Surajah Dowlah, was for the cold-blooded indifference he displayed towards the survivors of the Calcutta prison. It seems, from Mr. Cooper's account, that there were survivors in the Ujnalla bastion tragedy; but of their fate no special mention is made. A severely wounded sepoy was reprieved for Queen's evidence. Every other prisoner was put to death; and it is said, that "within forty-eight hours of the date of the crime, there fell by the law nearly 500 men." What crime? what law? the reader may ask, demanded the extermination of a helpless multitude, described by the very best authority as unarmed and panic-stricken, famishing with hunger, and exhausted with fatigue? Mr. Cooper answers—"The crime was mutiny; and had there even been no murders to darken the memory of these men, the law was exact. The punishment was death."† Concerning the reprieved sepoy, Mr. Montgomery wrote—

"Get out of the wounded man all you can, and send him to Lahore, that he may himself proclaim what has been done. The people will not otherwise believe it." He adds—"There will be some stragglers: have them all picked up; and any you get, send us now. You have had slaughter enough. We want a few for the troops here, and also for evidence."

The request was complied with. The sepoy, when sufficiently recovered, was sent,

with forty-one others subsequently captured, to Lahore, where they all suffered death by being blown away from the cannon's mouth. Thus, in the emphatic words of Mr. Cooper, "the 26th were both accounted for and disposed of."

The terror inspired by the mode in which disarmed regiments were dealt with, and the "confiscation" by government of horses which were the private property of troopers dismounted as a matter of precaution, caused so much excitement as to precipitate other corps into revolt, and thus gave the desired plea for getting rid of "the nuisance" of their existence. Mr. Montgomery, on his own showing, contemplated the extermination of the 3,000 remaining sepoys at Lahore as a desirable event; and there is no reason to suppose the feeling was not general in the Punjab.

Ferozpoor.—On the 19th of August, a portion of the disarmed and dismounted 10th light cavalry broke into revolt. Mr. Cooper considers it just possible that the news had reached them that their horses were to be taken away.* They rushed forth at the dinner-hour of the European troops, jumped on all available horses bare-backed, and seized the guns, overpowering the gallant resistance of the artillery guard. Private Molony was mortally wounded—in fact, nearly hacked to pieces by the mutineers, who had managed to procure and secrete swords, pistols, and spears. A party of the 61st and of the artillery came up, and recaptured the guns before the mutineers could fire. An interval of great confusion ensued. The Europeans were hurrying to the fort; while the rebels "were bent more on flight than aught else;"† and their escape was favoured by the mismanagement of "a gun, placed originally to command a bridge leading from the barracks to the Native infantry. It was fired into the rows of cavalry horses; and while it hardly disturbed the mutineers, it killed and wounded thirty-two horses."‡ Veterinary Surgeon Nelson was killed while endeavouring to escape to the fort. Mr. Cooper does not mention the number of the 10th cavalry who mutinied; but the revolt is officially stated to have been confined to a portion of the regiment.§

* Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 172.

† *Ibid.*, p. 174.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

§ Parl. Return regarding regiments which have mutinied; p. 8.

Peshawur.—A fanatic of high family, named Seyed Ameer, who had recently returned from Mecca, was known to have been striving to excite the Afghans of the Khyber Pass to a "holy war." The wise and steady rule of Dost Mohammed, although the chief was old and ill, sufficed to maintain the tranquillity of this dangerous frontier. Seyed Ameer failed with the native tribes; but his letters and messages to the Peshawur troops caused so much excitement, that on the 28th of August, General Cotton deemed it necessary to institute a fresh search for weapons in the lines of the disarmed regiments.

A considerable amount of arms was discovered; and the 51st N.I., exasperated "by the taunts of the newly-raised Afreedee regiments, who were carrying out the search, rushed upon the piled arms of the 18th Punjab infantry," and, in their madness, attempted resistance. The three European officers were overpowered by numbers, and driven into a tank, but not injured. General Cotton (gun Cotton) was in readiness for the emergency. The indiscriminate flight of the mutineers had scarcely begun before there opened on the unarmed masses a "fusillade, which commenced on the parade-ground at Peshawur, and ended at Jumrood. * * * Every civil officer turned out with his '*posse comitatus*' of levies or police; and in a quarter of an hour the whole country was covered with the chase;"|| which Mr. Cooper describes as having been "long, keen, and close. Standing crops were beat up, ravines probed as if for pheasants and hares; and with great success."¶ On the following day, 700 of the 51st N.I. "lay dead in three deep trenches."**

The pursuit commenced at noon, and Colonel Cooper, of the 51st N.I., died from the heat. A large proportion of the fugitives were taken prisoners, and tried by drum-head court-martial. Neither extreme youth, nor peculiar sufferings, nor any other extenuating circumstance, was held to offer grounds for the non-infliction of capital punishment. Truly enough has it been said, that "severity and distrust have been the rule in the Punjab."

Cooper mentions the following incident

|| Colonel Edwardes' Report.—Parl. Papers on the mutiny in the Punjab; published April, 1859; p. 77.

¶ Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 177.

** Colonel Edwardes' Report, p. 78.

connected with this sanguinary transaction:—

"One sepoy literally died two deaths, and the first time was buried. When the fatal volley was discharged, he fell with the others, and feigned death; his body was flung rather high up in the chasm, and covered over with lime. He managed to crawl out at dark and escape to the hills; but was caught and brought in. He pleaded previous demise, but ineffectually; and this time he moulders with the forms of his mutinous comrades."—(page 178).

In August, 1857, Sir John Lawrence was, to all intents and purposes, a dictator in Northern India. His policy was, from first to last, daring, desperate, determined. The speedy capture of Delhi was his watchword: to relinquish the attempt, would be to sacrifice the life of every European in Northern India. While his right hand laboured efficiently for the extinction of the portion of the Bengal army within his reach, his left was employed in raising another Native force, as costly, and possibly more dangerous. In the month of August, a growing sense of the precarious character of Seik and Goorka loyalty prevailed; and though the public despatches maintained the confident tone which appeared expedient, even high functionaries, civil and military, could not always conceal their distrust of the new auxiliaries, who dealt death so relentlessly for the lust of gold and revenge, but whose weapons might be turned—who could say how soon?—against the Europeans. "The capture of Delhi had become the turning-point of our fate," Mr. Cooper writes. "Every day had become fraught with danger: even our *prestige* was waning. Seiks had come back to the Punjab, and declared they were fighting our battles. One old Seik had thought it just as likely they might be fighting against us in a year hence! Peshawur was waxing more feverish every day. Six per cent. government paper was twenty-five per cent. discount. Lahore and Umritsir were equally excited."* The blood lavishly poured forth in the Punjab had produced a deep pause of terror and suspense. But the probability of a strong and terrible reaction was too evident to be overlooked; and in the meantime, the army of observation, stationed before Delhi, was dwindling away, and being reinforced from the Punjab, until the very last troops that could be scraped together were sent off under the command of Brigadier-general Nicholson,

* Cooper's *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 190.

an officer whose age and rank forbade his taking the lead, although the troops would have joyfully hailed him as their chief.

Delhi.—The proceedings of the force before Delhi have been detailed up to nearly the close of June.† On the 1st and 2nd of July, the Rohilcund mutineers arrived at Delhi, marching across the bridge of boats, within full view of the spectators from the British camp posted on the ridge. The Jhansi rebels, the Neemuch brigade, the Kotah contingent, and other smaller reinforcements poured into the city, until, by the middle of August, the enemy were believed to number at least 30,000 men. Their free access to the left side of the Jumna was ensured by the aforesaid bridge of boats, which was under the close fire of their ordnance in the Selimghur, or Selim's fort, and fully 2,500 yards from the nearest British gun. So that while the British were near enough to see the flags flying, and cart-loads of treasure carried into Delhi, and to hear the rebel bands play "Rule Britannia," our artillery could not check the triumph of the foe by so much as a single effective volley.

On the 5th of July, Sir Henry Barnard was attacked by cholera, and died in the course of the day. His want of experience in Indian warfare had told against him as a commander; and his brief tenure of power hardly gave opportunity for a fair judgment to be formed of his military capacity; but his character as a high-minded, true-hearted gentleman, was beyond all question. "Tell them at home," he said, "that I die happy." Then his mind wandered: and his last words were, "Strengthen the right!"—evidently thinking the British position attacked. The gun-carriage which served for his hearse was followed by many gallant officers, who sympathised with the bitter grief with which Captain Barnard declared, as he stood by the open grave—"I have lost the very best of parents, and the most intimate and endearing of friends." General Reid assumed the command; but resigned it from ill-health on the 17th of July, and retired to Umballah, accompanied by Colonels Congreve and Curzon.

General Archdale Wilson was his successor. He had been thirty-eight years in the service of the E. I. Company; and it is a curious fact, that most of the guns employed on either side, both in attacking

† See page 211.

and defending Delhi, had been cast by him when holding the appointment of superintendent of the Calcutta foundry. He was one of the twelve sons of a clergyman. When he took command of the Delhi field force, he was fifty-five years of age; and is described as "a tall soldierly-looking man, with a small brow, quick eye, and large feeble mouth."* His antecedents as the brigadier commanding the Meerut station on the 11th of May, were unfavourable. He was distinguished neither for brilliant ability nor fertility of resource: not a general whose name, like Nicholson's, would, under any circumstances, have struck terror into the rebel camp, and inspired confidence in his own; not a strategist, like Campbell; not a *preux Chevalier*, like Outram; not an enthusiast, brave and true (though vacillating and egotistical), like Havelock; not a disciplinarian like Neil; not a leader such as Sir Hugh Rose afterwards proved to be; but just a slow, cautious, pains-taking artillery officer, whose leading characteristic was an exaggerated estimate of the importance of his own arm of the service.

It was afterwards said of him, that he was born to take Delhi. It would have been more honourable, though less advantageous to him in other points, had it been written in his horoscope, that he should save the imperial city by forestalling "the thirty troopers who revolutionised India."† But as no account of his proceedings in the Meerut crisis has yet been laid before the public, it is not easy to determine the extent to which he is responsible for "the cardinal errors and fatal incapacities which pre-eminently marked the conduct of the authorities in command of the Meerut division, at a period when errors and incapacity were by no means unfrequently conspicuous."‡ Little information has, even after the lapse of two years, transpired regarding that fatal night, when tyrannical incapacity on one side, and fear and rage on the other, with panic (*i.e.*, temporary insanity) on both, opened the flood-gates for the ocean of blood and tears which has since desolated India. The latest writer on the subject, who visited Meerut, and made all possible inquiries on the spot, remarks, that "every one talks of the incapacity of the aged veteran, on

whom the whole affair produced the effect of a hideous night-mare;" and he adds, "what was Sir Archdale Wilson, of Delhi, doing?"§

In the freedom of the mess-table, officers are alleged to assert, that General Hewitt requested the then Colonel Wilson to act for the best; and that he (not from any want of personal bravery, but from sheer bewilderment) did nothing, and would sanction nothing; but shared the surprise which was the prevalent feeling among the Meerut Europeans on the morning of the 12th of May, at finding their heads remained on their shoulders—that is, in a literal sense; for, in a figurative one, they had certainly either lost them, or had none to lose.

It is difficult to conceive why Wilson was trusted to head the Delhi force; but, besides the little choice left by the conventionalities of our military system, it is possible that Sir John Lawrence (who, directly or indirectly, must at such a moment have had a voice in the matter), knowing the jealous and impetuous spirit which pervaded the camp, was decided by similar considerations to those which induce both branches of the church militant, Romish and Protestant, to choose safe second-rate men for popes and archbishops. So far as is known, there was only one first-rate general, both safe and brilliant, in Northern India—namely, Nicholson; and he could not then be spared from the Punjab.

The first view taken by the new commander was not a cheerful one. The personal honours and advantages consequent on the capture of Delhi, dazzling as they were in perspective, did not blind him to the perils and difficulties massed together in the foreground.

Three days before General Reid's resignation, the mutineers had sallied forth in great force, and attacked the batteries on the Hindoo Rao ridge. They were driven back with a loss estimated at 1,000 men. The British had fifteen killed and nearly 200 wounded. Brigadier Chamberlain received a wound, which it was said would keep him "on his back for six weeks at least." The want of his services was not so sensibly felt as might have been expected from his reputation. His youth and energy, which had conduced to his

come & agree together, they might bestow a kingdom."—*Siyar ul Mutakherin*, vol. ii., p. 418.

† Russell's *Diary*, vol. ii., p. 256. § *Ibid.*, p. 257.

* Russell's *Diary*, vol. i., p. 192.

† Strangely enough, there is a saying of Mustapha Khan's, current in India, that "if forty sabres should

success as a *sabreur* and leader of irregulars, led him to act with an impetuosity which was not suited to the present phase of the siege. It is asserted by a keen observer, that "in two or three actions after his arrival, we lost, by pushing too far, more men than formerly, and many more than we could spare, and by leading an advance party under the walls of Delhi, where they were mowed down by the enemy's grape."* Hodson, who had so joyously hailed the brigadier's arrival in camp,† admits that he erred in "too great hardihood and exposure in the field, and a sometimes too injudicious indifference to his own life or that of his men." Thus, on the 14th, "seeing a hesitation among the troops he led, who did not like the look of a wall lined with Pandies, and stopped short, instead of going up to it; he leaped his horse clean over the wall into the midst of them, and dared the men to follow, which they did; but he got a ball in his shoulder."‡

A great oversight is stated to have occurred on this occasion.§ The enemy brought out, and abandoned, six guns, which the English neglected to seize, and suffered the rebels to recover.|| Altogether, the results of the engagement were far from satisfactory, and assisted in producing the depression manifest in Brigadier Wilson's letter to Sir John Lawrence, of the 18th of July, which was written in French for more security. Colonel Baird Smith, chief officer of engineers (styled, in the

letter, "*l'officier de Génie en chef*"), the brigadier says, "agreed with him that an assault would be dangerous and disastrous." There were before Delhi, 2,200 English, and 1,500 Punjabees, constantly besieged and daily attacked by a "numberless" foe; and Sir John Lawrence was urged to send forthwith to Delhi a complete English regiment, and two of Seiks and Punjabees. The request was supported by the declaration—"If I am not very quickly reinforced, I shall be compelled to retire to Kurnaul."¶

This was the turning-point in the war. Then it was that Sir John Lawrence put forth all his strength. His powerful intellect comprehended the whole danger: his moral courage was equal to the occasion. The men about him were for the most part of his own school—the John Lawrence, as distinguished from the Henry Lawrence school; the main-spring of the one system being fear; of the other, love. Sir Henry's exercise of authority had been always patriarchal, paternal. He could not, and he would not, bend to conventional notions of government. His public, like his private life, was ever grand, simple, and consistent. The word "Christian" is too hackneyed to be applied to such a man. In all humility, it may be said that he was Christ-like—specially so in "the love of the people of the country, with which he inspired" his coadjutors and subordinates.** After all, the tender reverence in which his memory is uniformly held by Anglo-Indians,†† speaks

* Letter from Umballah.—*Times*, October 26th, 1857.

† See page 211.

‡ Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 335.

§ Another engagement took place on the 19th of July, in which, according to Hodson, great loss had nearly been incurred through the incapacity of the officer in command—"a fine old gentleman, who might sit for a portrait of Falstaff, so fat and jolly is he; Colonel Jones, of the 60th Rifles." Hodson's vanity, which, notwithstanding his disclaimers, was a conspicuous feature in his character, renders him a doubtful authority, as he is apt to praise himself at the expense of other people; but he distinctly asserts, that Colonel Jones, having driven the enemy back into Delhi, found himself in turn pursued, and gave an order to retreat "in a heap:" but when Hodson remonstrated on the cruel loss which would thereby be incurred, he received, in reply, *carte blanche* to act as he saw best, and succeeded in drawing off the men in order, under the protection of the guns. (*Twelve Years in India*, p. 238). The conduct of Colonel Jones on the day of the storming of Delhi, tends to invalidate this disparaging testimony.

|| Rotton's *Siege of Delhi*, p. 183.

¶ Further Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1857; p. 63.

** Raikes' *Revolt in the North-West Provinces*, p. 33.

†† Any one who has had occasion to examine the piles of books, pamphlets, and newspapers, filled with Indian intelligence, published in the eventful years 1857 and 1858, must have been struck not simply with the frequent recurrence of the name of Henry Lawrence, but with the halo which surrounds it. No one seems to have known without loving him; and none name without praising him. Men who differ in every other point under the sun of India, and whose anti-native feelings would alone appear sufficient to incapacitate them from in any degree appreciating Henry Lawrence, speak of him with a reverent tenderness as honourable to them as to him. For instance, Frederick Cooper, in a few graceful, touching lines, dedicates his book on the Punjab (of all books in the world!), not to the living Sir John, but to the memory of Sir Henry, though he knew nothing more of him "than was patent to the world—the example he set." The dedication of Hodson's *Letters* is another stone added to the same cairn. But perhaps the most striking testimony is that borne by Mr. Russell, who, after hearing the varied opinions of men who had known Sir Henry long and intimately, and many of whom must have been frequently opposed to him, was "led to think

strongly for the sound judgment and right feeling which lie at the bottom of English hearts, even when placed in the trying position of a "superior race"—even when lashed to fury by a terrible, unexpected, and most painful check—the more humiliating, because none but the ignorant, the apathetic, or the blindly prejudiced could consider it wholly undeserved. The deliberate persuasion of Henry Lawrence, expressed to Robert Montgomery as the result of long and varied experience, was, that, "on the whole, the people were happier under native government than under our own."* The writer who records this memorable speech, excuses himself from entering upon the causes of the revolt; but this brief sentence comprehends them all. Our civilisation and our Christianity have failed; and why? Because the civilisation, real, to a certain extent, in England, has been but as a varnish in India: and as to our Christianity—that, to be effective, must begin at home. When English clergymen and laymen in India concur in showing forth, in their daily lives, a desire to follow in the footsteps of their Divine Master, and become, like him, "holy, harmless, undefiled," they may reasonably expect the attention of the heathen to be drawn to the means which have wrought so miraculous a change. Until then, our so-called enlightenment must fail to make us the "lights of the world" we aspire to be; and our skin-deep civilisation can serve but to disguise the true character of the material beneath the glaze. Besides, if our standing as individual Christians were ever so high, it is the beneficence of our government which must be the test of our merits as rulers with the mass of the people. It is a mockery to teach the Bible in our schools, unless, as rulers, we harmonise our example with our precepts; and, not in cant or in enthusiasm, but in sober reliance on the Divine blessing, endeavour for the future "to do justice, to love mercy, and walk humbly with our God." It would be infidelity to doubt that an administration conducted on these principles must succeed, even in the lowest and most worldly point of view.

Sir Henry Lawrence did great things in the Punjab as a peace-maker; but his

that no such exemplar of a truly good man can be found in the ranks of the servants of any Christian state in the latter ages of the world." These grave and thoughtful words have peculiar force as coming

rare powers were always cramped by his subordinate position. The clever, resolute, and unscrupulous policy of Lord Dalhousie was in perpetual opposition to Sir Henry's principles of action; and he had no resource but to quit the Punjab. Sir John remained. Supported by a heavy expenditure of money, and backed by European troops assembled together from all parts of India, he subjugated the turbulent chiefs. A rough-and-ready administrative system, widely different from that under which the North-West Provinces writhed, was initiated; and Sir John Lawrence, himself a picked man, surrounded by picked men, succeeded in establishing a despotism, which will probably last so long as the present men, or others equally efficient, are found to man the life-boat which alone has a chance of living in such a stormy sea.

In one sense it is quite true, that in the Punjab John Lawrence found the means of regaining Delhi. But it is no less true, that Lucknow, Allahabad, Benares, Cawnpore, and Dinapore, had been almost denuded of European troops, for the sake of concentration in the new province, from whence they could not be spared even when needed for the accomplishment of a newer annexation—that of Oude. Lord Dalhousie was always hampered by a deficiency of the troops necessary to the success of his aggressive policy; and this paucity has pressed with double force on his successor. Bitter experience has proved the value of the friendship of the sovereigns of Oude in all our former wars; of the subsidies with which they replenished our treasuries; the men whom they sent to fill our ranks—never false to us till we were false to Oude; for false, and nothing less, were the whole of those "suppressed treaty" proceedings which led to the downfall of Wajid Ali. His misgovernment, his incapacity, have nothing to do with the question. He was a faithful ally; and bad as his rule was, the people preferred it to ours. We took no pains to reconcile them to the change, and no precautions to overawe the disaffection our revenue proceedings excited.†

Could Sir John Lawrence have been spared from the Punjab, and sent at once to Oude with a band of the sternest and

from the brilliant pen of the *Times'* special correspondent.—*Diary*, vol. ii., p. 139.

* Russell's *Diary in India*, vol. ii., p. 414.

† See Introductory Chapter, p. 88.

shrewdest men in both services, and a strong military force, he would probably (had Providence been pleased to permit it) have accomplished a successful usurpation. Sir Henry Lawrence, with a body of his picked men, without any troops at all, and the smallest possible amount of red-tapists, might have carried through a bloodless annexation, by conciliating, as he only could, the good-will of chiefs and people. But the opportunity was lost, either through the wilful blindness or the procrastination which are the besetting sins of the present Indian administration. The annexation or usurpation of Oude (the terms are synonymous) has proved a clumsy failure; while the conquest of the Punjab has been a success, though costly, and it may be, temporary: but the abilities of both the Lawrences—the fear inspired by the one, and the love by the other—had been brought to bear in the latter case. Sir John has proved himself to possess the strong nerve, the indomitable energy, the master-policy needful to constitute a subjugator. The sharpest sword ever fashioned in Damascus is not more superior to the weapons which our officers irreverently term “regulation spits,” than it is inferior in power to the iron sceptre wielded by his strong right hand. Of his conduct at this crisis but few particulars are known. Some of his letters, or half-a-dozen pages indited by a worshipping Boswell (not an ordinary biographer who sees through spectacles or writes with reservations), would be invaluable. But at present there is nothing of the kind available. The reports on the administration of the Punjab are valuable in their way; but besides the inevitable drawback, that the writers naturally put their own acts in the most favourable light, and that all facts are, to a great extent, at the mercy of the describer—it happens that the official records pass over, without attempting to explain, several of the most important features of the epoch. In

one much canvassed question regarding the Delhi royal family, uncertainty still prevails. It appears that, during the brief tenure of command by General Reid, the miserable king, in his anxiety to escape from the tyranny of the sepoy who pretended to be fighting for his throne, proposed, through native agency, to open one of the gates of his palace (which led through the town wall, and thence into the palace) to our troops, on the sole condition that the British general should guarantee his life and his pension. Brigadier Chamberlain suggested that the king should make the offer in person, and that his power to perform it should be clearly established; and General Reid requested the opinion of Sir John Lawrence on the proposition. The reply was sent by telegraph; and it was to the effect that, if the king could prove he had no share in the murder of any European, his life and pension might be guaranteed, on condition of his placing the British in possession of the city; in which, however, he could not be suffered to remain. Sir John Lawrence concluded by stating—“I have no idea what orders government has given; but those are my views.” He then addressed Lord Canning on the subject, urging that the speedy occupation of Delhi, with the smallest possible loss, was sufficiently important to render the proposed arrangement with the king desirable, provided he really possessed the means of executing his part of the contract. This power he did not possess, being literally a helpless puppet in the hands of the sepoy, just as his immediate ancestors had been in the grasp of the Mahrattas, Rohillas, and other successful adventurers or ruling factions. Consequently, the repeated overtures made by the king, by his favourite queen, Zeenat Mahal (whom Mr. Greathed speaks of as “a great political personage”), by the princes, and chief persons in the city, were rejected* or temporised with by Hodson’s spies.† The interrupted

* Greathed’s *Letters*, pp. 205—217.

† Hodson, as head of the intelligence department, appears to have encouraged the leading men in the city in making these applications, for the sake of compromising them with their party. His *Memoirs* contain only general laudation of the extent of the information he obtained; but not how he obtained it. Mr. Cooper, however, is more explicit, and gives a full description of the manner in which Moonshee Rujub Ali “diplomatized, under the guidance of the accomplished Hodson.” A Hakeem, or Moham-medan of eminence, was selected for the experiment;

and a letter was written, couched in terms which, if it fell into the hands of the sepoy, would “infallibly lead them to infer the treachery of the Hakeem; but if it reached the Hakeem, might induce him to betray his companions.” This letter specially invited the friends of the king to negotiate on his behalf, and “not to suffer the lamp of Hindoostan [i.e., the King of Delhi] to be extinguished, but to communicate in person, or by writing, with the British camp.” This letter was received by the Hakeem; and the suspicions of the sepoy being roused against him by the destruction

communication between Calcutta and North-Western India, combined probably with the dilatoriness and procrastination which characterised the Supreme government, prevented Sir John Lawrence from receiving any instructions regarding the policy to be pursued towards the King of Delhi until the 6th of September. In the meanwhile, Sir John had steadily urged that the siege must be maintained at all costs, and that the troops must "hang on to their noses" before Delhi. It is asserted that he "was urging the assault with the utmost importunity on the reluctant General Wilson," when he received a telegram from Calcutta, addressed to Madras, Bombay, Agra, and Mr. Greathed at Delhi; which ran as follows:—

"Calcutta, August 20th, 2.10 P.M.

"Rumours have more than once reached this government, that overtures have been made by the King of Delhi to the officer commanding the troops there, and that these overtures may be possibly renewed upon the basis of the restoration of the king to the position which he held before the mutiny of Meerut and Delhi. The governor-general wishes it to be understood that any concession to the king, of which the king's restoration to his former position should be the basis, is one to which the government, as at present advised, cannot for a moment give its consent. Should any negotiation of this sort be contemplated; a full report of all the circumstances must be submitted to the governor-general in council before the government is committed to anything."

The instructions bore the Calcutta postmark before referred to—*insufficient and too late*. They were nothing more than the expressions of a general policy on the part of a government "as at present advised;" in other words, having no specific knowledge of the actual state of affairs. Yet on them Lord Granville subsequently founded an eulogium on the governor-general, at the expense of the chief commissioner of the Punjab, by stating that "even Sir John Lawrence was willing to make terms with the king; but Lord Canning, a civilian, had the courage to take upon himself the responsibility of absolutely refusing these propositions."† The dates prove that Lord Canning had no more to do with the "absolute refusal" given to the king in July, than Lord Granville himself; and

of a powder-magazine, with which he was suspected of being connected, they searched his house, found Rujub Ali's letter, became furious against the Hakeem, and burnt his house to the ground. He fled to the palace, and was supported by the king. "Great divisions," Mr. Cooper adds, "were the result of

had little better information regarding the exigencies of affairs at Delhi than Mr. Vernon Smith. If the viceroy had had an opportunity of regaining Delhi through the efforts of the old king, without bloodshed, as early as the 5th of July, and had rejected it; then, indeed, the life and money needlessly wasted in consequence of that refusal, would have been a serious charge against him. It is possible he might have refused to sanction any such negotiations, or at least delayed and doubted to a degree which would have been equivalent to a refusal; for the Delhi force constantly complained that their labours and position were not understood at Calcutta. The commissioner (H. H. Greathed) speaks very plainly on the subject; remarking, that the difficulty in taking Delhi must be a sore point with Lord Canning, for by it would be measured the extent of the mistake of leaving Delhi and its magazine in the hands of Native troops, when a spirit of mutiny was known to be abroad. Mr. Greathed received the message of the 20th of August on the 5th of September, and evidently thought it unimportant. He remarks, that "it had been telegraphed to Cawnpoor, then by coast through Agra. It was only to warn me against receiving any advances from the palace people."‡

The months of July and August, as spent by the force before Delhi, were marked by few events. The engineers were employed in improving and extending the position of the troops, especially by clearing away the old buildings, walls, and gardens in the Subzee Mundee suburb; and the attacks of the mutineers grew feebler. They were evidently much disheartened, and fought with gradually decaying energy.§

Of the state of affairs in "Pandemonium" (as Delhi was called in camp), information was obtained through various persons. One of the Native officers of the Guides entered the city in disguise; and after remaining there four days, returned to camp. The mutineers and tradespeople were at open strife. "The 9th N.I. had already decamped, and thousands would follow if they dared."||

The following account of a durbar, held

this adroit piece of tactics."—*Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 207.

* Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 106.

† *Times*, October 5th, 1858.

‡ Greathed's *Letters*, p. 250.

§ *Twelve Years in India*, p. 242. || *Ibid.*, p. 219.

on the 7th of July, is given by Mr. Greathed, on the authority of an eye-witness:—

"Each speaker adduced some story of the ferocity and cruelty of the English. One said a council of war had been held to discuss the propriety of putting every Hindoostanee soldier in the camp to death; another, that our misdeeds were drawing down the displeasure of Providence, as many of our chief people in Calcutta and London are dying of disease, and two commanders-in-chief had been driven to commit suicide; a third, from Loodiana, said the Hakeem (chief authority) at Loodiana (Ricketts) had gained the appellation of Kikkus (vernacular for demon), on account of his cruelty. At last the king gave a great sigh, and said, 'Whatever happens, happens by the will of God:' and the durbar broke up."

Mr. Cooper also gives accounts, furnished by spies, regarding the internal condition of Delhi; and quotes their letters, expressing their hope that actual rebels, and all who had shed blood or been plundering, would be severely punished; but that the government would compassionate the king, the nobles, and the citizens of Delhi, who were innocent and helpless.†

An officer serving before Delhi, writes, that the mutineers "have not attempted to capitulate, because they know that nothing but death will satisfy English soldiers;" and he adds—"Nought else shall they have at our hands."‡

Another officer, serving in the Punjab, states—"Part of my old regiment that mutinied and went to Delhi the other day, left it again, and gave themselves up. This is the only regiment that has done so. I don't know what has been done with them. For my part, I would destroy them all."§

A third officer, writing from Meerut, applauds the justice of the Highlanders and others, who, in passing through Cawnpoor, had killed every native they could find.|| A fourth, writing from the Delhi camp, has "every reason to believe, that when our troops enter Delhi, a fearful massacre of the inhabitants will take place. The officers, as a body, will do nothing to check it."¶

The exasperation manifested by the Europeans against the natives generally, materially increased the fatigues and perils of the force before Delhi. Sir John Law-

rence declared that the Europeans were perishing for the want of natives to assist them in the day-work; that is, minor duties performed in the sun.** It was absolutely necessary to check the excesses of the soldiery, especially as regarded their conduct towards the camp-followers; and Brigadier Wilson published a general order on the subject, which the *Friend of India* holds up to admiration, as a marked contrast to that issued by Sir James Outram upon a similar subject. "It had come to the knowledge of Brigadier Wilson, that numbers of camp-followers had been bayoneted and shot by European soldiers. He pointed out that a continuance of such reckless conduct would cause the army to degenerate into an undisciplined rabble;†† and dwelt on the great inconvenience which would result from the desertion of the camp by the natives, some of whom, alarmed by the fate of their companions, had "thought it prudent to decamp."‡‡ Certainly, Sir James Outram would have held different language, and would have found many voices to echo his sentiments; for even at this period, occurrences were not wanting to show the nobler side of the native character, or the appreciation it received. For instance: among many Englishwomen and children, brought to the Delhi camp as helpless fugitives, was a Mrs. Nunn, the wife of a European in the customs' department. When the mutiny broke out at Goorgaon, her husband was absent; but the people of the neighbouring village carried her off with her children, and fed, clothed, and concealed the helpless family for three months, regardless of the threats of the mutineers, or the offered bribe of a hundred rupees for her surrender; until, at the expiration of that time, an opportunity occurred for bringing her safely into camp. The officer at whose picket the party appeared, said that "the woman spoke most gratefully of their kindness and devotion; and her little boy seemed to have the greatest affection for the grey-headed old man on whose shoulder he was perched."§§

* Greathed's *Letters*, p. 102. † *Crisis*, &c., p. 211.

‡ *Times*, October 24th, 1857.

§ *Ibid.*

|| *Ibid.* A Captain (McMullin?) in the 23rd N.I., writing from Mhow, after describing the village-burning, and the "fiendish delight" with which, in his magisterial capacity, he had officiated as "hangman;" adds, that if matters were left in his hands, "every Mohammedan should be strung up for his faith."—*Daily News*, Sept. 11th, 1857.

¶ Letter from Delhi camp, August 11th, 1857.—*Times*, October 1st, 1857.

** Telegram from Sir John Lawrence during the crisis of the siege. Quoted by *Times*' Lahore correspondent.—*Times*, June 19th, 1858.

†† *Friend of India*, September 10th, 1857.

‡‡ Rotton's *Siege of Delhi*, p. 171.

§§ Letter of Officer; Delhi, August 9th, 1857.—*Times*, October 3rd, 1857.

Another incident which created some sensation in the camp, was the capture of a female leader, a Mohammedan, who led a sortie out of Delhi. Mr. Greathed compares her to "Joan of Arc," Hodson says she sallied forth on horseback, and "fought against us like a fiend;" and by his advice, General Wilson, who had at first released her, caused her to be recaptured and sent to Umballah.* As the month of August advanced, both officers and men began to exhibit signs of extreme weariness at "the waiting race"† in which they had been so long engaged. The monotonous and fatiguing character of their duties was increasingly felt, and told in the hospital lists; yet so little injury was inflicted by the constant firing of shot and shell by the rebel garrison, that the meanest follower in the British camp did not turn from his work at hearing the balls rattling along the protecting ridge, well knowing the enemy could not pass it.‡ "We are," Mr. Greathed writes, "as secure against assaults as if we were in Delhi, and the mutineers outside." There were pony-races, cricket, and quoits in the lines; and the officers kept up their spirits by "genial, jolly mess dinners," where mirth was promoted by "very good Moselle," but regulated by the presence of a clergyman; which, Mr. Greathed states, was working a reform, inasmuch as "Colonel ———, whenever he forgot himself and used the word 'damnable,' corrected it with that of 'devilish,' the effect being to give two *jurons* instead of one."§ The state of affairs was unsatisfactory to the bolder spirits in camp. If "the prince of free lances" may be accepted as their spokesman, General Wilson was losing the confidence of the force as regarded his judgment, and had become nervous and alarmed, and over-anxious even about trifles. In fact, after Wilson had exercised the chief command for above a month, his young subordinate writes of him as "an old gentleman who meant well,|| but would probably break down like others of his class, who, though personally brave as lions, had not big hearts or heads enough for circumstances

of serious responsibility."¶ After all (he adds, in allusion to the retreat of Havelock, which was keenly felt at Delhi), "Nicholson is the general after my heart."**

On the 8th of August, Brigadier-general Nicholson reached the camp, as the precursor of 4,000 troops sent to Delhi by Sir John Lawrence. The hilarity of the mess-table was considerably diminished by the stern and taciturn bearing of the new-comer;†† but the tone of the army was raised: and to the Seiks especially, the presence of "Nikkul Seyn" was at once a check to insubordination, and a stimulus to zeal.

The first considerable success obtained over the enemy, was achieved by him at Nujufghur: but shortly before this event, Hodson had given them a smart check by one of his daring expeditions.

The great advantage enjoyed by the British force, was its uninterrupted communication with the Punjab. This the mutineers never tried to cut off (although they had abundance of men and ammunition wherewith to make the attempt without endangering their hold on Delhi) until the 14th of August, on which day a body of troops, chiefly cavalry, left the city by the Nujufghur road, with the object, it was presumed, of interrupting our communications with Umballah and the Punjab, or of attacking Jheend, the rajah of which principality was a staunch and zealous British ally. Lieutenant Hodson was sent to watch them, and, as far as possible, to frustrate their intentions. His party consisted of 233 of his own newly raised corps, called Hodson's Horse, and nicknamed "the Flamingoes," on account of the scarlet turbans and sashes tied over the right shoulder, which enlivened their khakee (dust-coloured) tunics; 103 of the Guide cavalry, twenty-five Jheend horse, and six European officers. This little force had several skirmishes with scattered bands of the enemy, and came off victorious. Notwithstanding the flooded state of the country, they proceeded to Rohtuck, and, after procuring its evacuation, returned to camp on the 22nd of August.

* Neither public nor private records (so far as the author is aware) afford any statement of the fate of this dauntless woman.

† Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 259.

‡ Greathed's *Letters*, p. 50. § *Ibid.*, p. 176.

|| Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 270.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

** Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 275.

†† "General Nicholson was at dinner: he is a fine, imposing-looking man, who never speaks if he can help it, which is a great gift for a public man. But if we had all been as solemn and taciturn during the last two months, I do not think we should have survived."—Greaded's *Letters*, p. 179.

On the 24th, a large force of the enemy, with eighteen guns, left Delhi with the avowed intention of intercepting a siege-train known to be in progress from Feroz-poor, with a very slender escort. At day-break on the following morning, Brigadier-general Nicholson started in pursuit, with a brigade composed of 1,000 European and 2,000 Native troops, and sixteen horse artillery guns, under the command of Major Tombs, one of the bravest and most skilful officers in the army. After marching from daybreak till 5 o'clock P.M., a distance of eighteen miles, crossing "two difficult swamps,"* and an extensive sheet of water three feet deep, the general came upon the enemy, in a position stretching from the bridge over the Nujufghur canal, to the town of Nujufghur itself, an extent of a mile and three-quarters, or two miles. A very brief *reconnaissance* was all that the waning light permitted; but a plan of attack, hastily formed and executed, was completely successful, and the rebels were soon in full retreat over the bridge. The victory was thought to be wholly accomplished, with scarcely any numerical loss to the British: the whole of the enemy's guns (thirteen) had been captured, and the town of Nujufghur cleared by Lieutenant Lumsden and the 1st Punjab infantry, when it was discovered that a few men had concealed themselves in the little village of Nuglee, a few hundred yards in rear of the British line. Lieutenant Lumsden was sent to drive them out; but the sepoys, finding themselves surrounded, resolved to sell their lives dearly, and killed the lieutenant and several of the Punjabees; so that Nicholson was obliged to send H.M. 61st to overpower this handful of desperate men; which, after all, the 61st failed to effect. The place "was not taken, but was evacuated by its defenders during the night."† The British casualties, chiefly incurred in the ineffectual attacks on Nuglee, comprised nearly a hundred killed and wounded. The baggage had been left on the road; and the troops were obliged, after fourteen hours' marching and fighting, to bivouac on the field without food or covering of any kind.‡ They bore these hardships with cheerfulness, encouraged by the presence of an able leader,

and also by the acquisition of "loot" in the shape of rupees, of which one man was said to have obtained 900 (£90).§ The bridge was mined and blown up; such of the captured waggons and tumbrils as could not be carried away were destroyed, and, soon after sunrise, the troops set forth on their return to the camp, which they reached the same evening. The object of the expedition was accomplished: the defeated mutineers returned to Delhi, and abandoned the idea of intercepting the communication or harassing the rear of the British force. During the absence of General Nicholson, the insurgents came out of the city in great force; but after suffering severely from the British artillery, they retired without making any serious attack. The total British casualties were only eight killed and thirteen wounded.

By the 6th of September, all reinforcements that could possibly be expected, together with the siege-train, had arrived. The number of effective rank and file, of all arms—artillery, sappers, cavalry, and infantry—was 8,748; and there were 2,977 in hospital. The strength of the British troops was—artillery, 580; cavalry, 443; infantry, 2,294.

The European corps were mere skeletons, the strongest only having 409 effective rank and file; while the 52nd light infantry, which, three weeks before, had arrived with fully 600 rank and file, had now only 242 men out of hospital.¶ The necessity for a speedy assault had become indisputable.

The Cashmere contingent of 2,200 men and four guns (assembled by Gholab Sing, but sent on, after his death on the 2nd of August, by his successor, Rungbeer Sing); had also reached Delhi; and several hundred men of the Jheend rajah's contingent, which had previously been most effectively employed in maintaining our communication with Kurnaul, were called in, under the command of the rajah in person, at his particular request, to take part in the storm of Delhi.

To understand the nature of the operations now commenced, it is necessary to bear in mind the peculiar character of the place to be stormed, and the numbers and position of the attacking force. In the case of Delhi, all the ordinary conditions of a

* The words are those of Nicholson's despatch; and he is chary in the use of adjectives.—*London Gazette*, Nov. 24th, 1857.

† Norman's *Campaign of the Delhi Army*, p. 32.

‡ Nicholson's despatch, Aug. 28th.—*London Gazette*, November 24th, 1857.

§ Account published in *Times*, Nov. 7th, 1857.

¶ Norman's *Campaign of the Delhi Army*, p. 33.

siege were reversed. The garrison greatly outnumbered their assailants—could receive reinforcements and supplies—could come and go at pleasure. The defences were seven miles in circumference, and extended over an area of three square miles. They were modernised forms of those which existed when the city fell before Lord Lake's army in 1803, and were more formidable to an unprofessional eye than to that of a scientific engineer. The proportion of besieged to besiegers, the magnitude of the arsenal inside, and the impossibility of complete investment, constituted the real strength of the place.* Its weakness lay in the want of unanimity in its defenders, and in the absence of an able and recognised commander—in the angry feeling with which the unfortunate inhabitants regarded the mutinous rabble, whose presence inflicted on them so many miseries, and ruined the trade in gold and silver tissues and brocades, in jewellery, miniature-painting, and the engraving of gems, for which the ancient capital of the Moguls enjoyed a European celebrity up to the black-letter day, the 11th of May, 1857. It has been said that the attack on Delhi resembles that on Sebastopol, rather than those on Seringapatam and Bhurtpoor; but there is little ground for comparison in any of these instances. There were no Europeans in Delhi, skilled in military tactics, and backed by the resources of a powerful empire, as at Sebastopol—no Tippoo Sultan defending his fortresses in person to the death, supported by loyal veterans trained under Hyder Ali,† as at Seringapatam—no daring, resolute leader like the Jat rajah, who, in 1804, successfully defended his castle of Bhurtpoor against the British, and four times repulsed them from the battlements, in which the besieged chieftain declared his every hope was bound up.‡ The old King of Delhi, who had inherited the scholarly, but not the warlike, tendencies of his race, and had a heavy burden of years and sickness to bear in addition to the anxieties of his position, was incapable of feeling or inspiring this kind of resolve; and if any of his harem-bred sons and grandsons had evinced capacity for wielding either the sword or the sceptre, it would have been most marvellous. There are conditions under which

the vigorous development of mind and body is next to impossible: the palace-prison of Delhi combined all these.

The unremitting communications made by the king to the British, confirm his assertion, that his connexion with the mutineers was, on his part, always hateful and involuntary. Hodson's spies described the last of the Moguls as appearing before the durbar tearing his beard, snatching the turban from his hoary head, and invoking vengeance on the authors of his wretchedness.§ One of the princes, Mirza Mogul, was tried by court-martial in September, for favouring the British;|| another, Mirza Hadjee, had drawn upon himself much angry suspicion by concealing Christians. The queen, Zeenat Mahal, had always been unpopular for her efforts to save European life.¶

The disorganisation and disunion of the rebels more than counterbalanced their numbers; and the back-door of retreat open to them, probably served the British cause better than the power of complete investment could have done. Had the mass of sepoys in Delhi been once impressed with the conviction, that their death was inevitable, they would probably have turned and fought with desperation, as the handful of mutineers did at Nujufghur. As it was, the bridge of boats was left intact by our batteries; but whether from accident or policy, does not appear.

The leading features of the defences, and of the ground occupied by the force, are thus succinctly described by Colonel Baird Smith, the chief engineer of the Delhi field force:—

"The eastern face of the city rests on the Jumna; and during the season of the year when our operations were carried on, the stream may be described as washing the base of the walls. All access to a besieger on the river-front is, therefore, impracticable. The defences here consist of an irregular wall, with occasional bastions and towers; and about one-half of the length of the river-face is occupied by the palace of the King of Delhi, and its outwork—the old Mogul fort of Selimgur.

"The river may be described as the chord of a rough arc, formed by the remaining defences of the place. These consist of a succession of bastioned fronts, the connecting curtain being very long, and the outworks limited to one crownwork at the Ajmeer gate and Martello towers, mounting a single gun at such points as require some additional flanking fire to that given by the bastions themselves. The bastions are small, mounting generally three

* Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1858 (No. 6), p. 220.

† See vol. i., p. 380.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

§ Cooper's *Crisis in the Panjab*, p. 213.

|| Further Parl. Papers, 1857 (No. 4), p. 197.

¶ See Sherer's *Indian Church during the Great Rebellion* (p. 51), for further information regarding his unfortunate prince, Mirza Hadjee.

guns in each face, two in each flank, and one in embrasure at the salient. They are provided with masonry parapets, about 12 feet in thickness, and have a relief of about 16 feet above the plane of site. The curtain consists of a simple masonry wall or rampart, 16 feet in height, 11 feet thick at top, and 14 or 15 at bottom. This main wall carries a parapet loopholed for musketry, 8 feet in height, and 3 feet in thickness. The whole of the land front is covered by a berm of variable width, ranging from 16 to 30 feet, and having a scarp wall 8 feet high; exterior to this is a dry ditch of about 25 feet in height, and from 16 to 20 feet in depth. The counterscarp is simply an earthen slope, easy to descend. The glacis is a very short one, extending only 50 or 60 yards from the counterscarp: using general terms, it covers from the besieger's view from half to one-third of the height of the walls of the place. * * * * *

"The ground occupied by the besieging force exercised a most important influence on the plan and progress of the works of attack. On the western side of Delhi, there appear the last outlying spurs of the Aravelli Mountains, represented here by a low ridge, which disappears at its intersection with the Jumna, about two miles above the place. The drainage from the eastern slope of the ridge finds its way to the river along the northern and north-western falls of the city, and has formed there a succession of parallel or connected ravines of considerable depth. By taking advantage of these hollow ways, admirable cover was obtained for the troops, and the labour of the siege most materially reduced. The whole of the exterior of the place presents an extraordinary mass of old buildings of all kinds, of thick brushwood, and occasional clumps of forest trees, giving great facilities for cover, which, during the siege operations at least, proved to be, on the whole, more favourable to us than to the enemy."^{*}

The plan of attack formed by Colonel Baird Smith, provided for a concentrated, rapid, and vigorous assault on the front of the place, included between the Water, or Moree, and Cashmere bastions; arrangements being made, at the same time, for silencing all important flanking fire, whether of artillery or musketry, that could be brought to bear on the lines of advance to be taken by the assaulting columns. The exposed right flank of the trenches was shielded from sorties. The left was secured by being rested on the river, and by the occupation of the Koodsee Bagh—a beautiful garden, full of orange and lemon trees; surrounded on three sides with a high wall, and ending with a terrace beside the river. This strong post, only 250 yards from the city wall, was taken possession of by the British without opposition; as was also Ludlow Castle (formerly the residence of the unfortunate commissioner, Mr. Fraser).

* Lieut.-colonel Baird Smith's report; September 17th, 1857.—*London Gazette*, Dec. 15th, 1857.

† Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, pp. 284, 287.

The best information procurable, indicated that, on the front of attack, the fire of from twenty-five to thirty pieces might have to be subdued. To effect this, fifty-four siege guns were available, and were formed into various batteries, one of which commanded the only route open to the sorties of the enemy, and prevented any material injury being sustained from this source.

The mutineers beheld the operations carried on against them with astonishment and alarm. Hodson writes—"The sepoys in Delhi are in hourly expectation of our attack; the cavalry keep their horses saddled night and day, ready to bolt at a moment's notice—so say the news-letters. I suspect that the moment we make an attack in earnest, the rebel force will disappear. * * * There is, at present, nothing to lead one to suppose that the enemy have any intention of fighting it out in the city after we have entered the breach. All, I fancy, who can, will be off as soon as we are within the walls." On the 13th of September, he speaks of the rebels as "fast evacuating Delhi."[†]

The time for a decisive struggle at length arrived. On the night of the 13th, Captain Taylor, the second engineer officer (on whom, in consequence of the wound from which Baird Smith was suffering, much extra duty devolved), with Lieutenants Medley and Lang, Greathed and Home, stole down and examined the two breaches near the Cashmere and Water bastions; and both being reported practicable, orders were at once issued for the assault to be made at daybreak on the following morning.

The order issued by Major-general Wilson for the regulation of the conduct of the troops during the assault, if not vigorous, was at least pitiless. "British pluck and determination" would, the major-general felt assured, carry everything before them; and the bloodthirsty and murderous mutineers would be driven headlong out of their stronghold, or be exterminated. He considered it hardly needful to remind the force (and, in truth, it was worse than needless) of "the cruel murders committed on their officers and comrades, as well as their wives and children;" but he called upon them, notwithstanding this, to spare all women and children that might come in their way.

This peculiar phrase requires some explanation, which is given by Mr. Cooper,

who has the knack of telling just what the general public want to know, and officials, civil and military, carefully withhold. He states that, early in September, "the awful miseries of warfare, and the ghastly destitution of anarchy, were fully felt by the population, shopkeepers, and retail tradesmen of Delhi;" and they sought, at the hands of the British army, protection for their wives and children. No less than "2,500 women and children tried to leave, and about 600 carts blocked up the main streets; but all egress was prevented."* From this it would appear that the townspeople were anxious to separate from the sepoy rabble, and not compromise themselves by flying in the same direction. General Wilson had, however, no idea of dealing with the unarmed population as defenceless British subjects. His qualified compassion for the wretched women and children who, having been prevented from leaving the city, *might come in the way* of the soldiers, did not extend to their equally unfortunate husbands and fathers. Not one suggestion of mercy was made for age or youth. The license for slaughter was as large as could well be desired: the amount of life destroyed would proportionably increase the glory of the triumph; but the "loot" was another question altogether, and could by no means be left to the discretion of the soldiery. The subjoined paragraph is important, because it was naturally construed by the troops as affording a guarantee that the booty taken in Delhi would be divided among them; and much dissatisfaction was expressed at the non-performance of a promise which, directly or indirectly, ought never to have been made.

"It is to be explained to every regiment that indiscriminate plunder will not be allowed; that prize-agents have been appointed, by whom all captured property will be collected and sold, to be divided, according to the rules and regulations on this head, fairly among all men engaged; and that any man found guilty of having concealed captured property will be made to restore it, and will forfeit

* *Crisis in the Punjab*, p. 212. Mr. Cooper had the best means of obtaining both official and private information; and although the philanthropist may condemn the tone of his book, the historian must gratefully acknowledge the clear and comprehensive manner in which he states facts, according to his view of them, without arranging and garbling them to suit the public eye, or to shield himself from the displeasure of his superiors. There are two other books regarding the Delhi campaign (fre-

all claims to the general prize; he will also be likely to be made over to the provost-marshal, to be summarily dealt with."

In the course of the order, a prohibition against "straggling" during the assault was thrice repeated; and, like most reiterations, appears to have produced very little effect. Happily, the actual conduct of the assault was placed by Wilson in the hands of "that most brilliant officer, Brigadier-general Nicholson,"† whose excellent arrangements "elicited the admiration of all."‡ The troops were divided into five columns: the first four, destined to attack as many different points, were respectively commanded by Nicholson, Brigadier Jones, Colonel Campbell, and Major Reid; the fifth—a column of reserve—by Brigadier Longfield. There were 1,000 men in the first column; 850 in the second; 950 in the third; 860 in the fourth (besides the Cashmere contingent, strength not known); and 1,300 in the reserve.

In the dark but clear dawn of morning the columns assembled, marching with quiet measured tramp, the scaling-ladders in front, and the batteries firing with redoubled fury to cover the advance; while the answering shells, rockets, and round shot, as they burst, or hissed, or rushed over the heads of the troops, lit up the atmosphere with lurid flashes.§ The men watched in breathless silence for the signal for the general rush. It was to be given by Nicholson; and many an anxious eye was turned on him. The Europeans felt confidence in the leadership of a man of first-rate ability and proved success in Indian warfare—one, too, who was known to be singularly just and discriminating in officially recognising the merits of his subordinates. The natives equally admired his prowess and his luck (nujeeb); and the Seiks, who considered him peculiarly their own, were as proud of him as the Greeks of Achilles. His commanding presence has been already mentioned: even in ordinary society, the physical and mental vigour evidenced in every feature of his face, in every limb of his

quently quoted in preceding pages), which possess worth and interest of the same kind; but the merit in these cases rests with the editors rather than the authors; for had either Commissioner Greathed or Captain Hodson survived, their "Letters" would probably not have been published.

† Brigadier-general Wilson's despatch, 22nd Sept., 1857.—*London Gazette*, Dec. 15th, 1857.

‡ Parl. Papers on Mutiny, 1858 (No. 6), p. 219.

§ Medley's *Year's Campaigning in India*, p. 105.

body, attracted more attention than his unusually massive but harmonious proportions.* He was scarcely five-and-thirty years of age, but he looked older; and though his large beard still retained its glossy blackness, his curls had turned grey. Such was the man who led the troops against Delhi on the 14th of September. He rode forth in the strength and prime of manhood: a few hours later he was brought back in a litter, his whole frame quivering in mortal agony.

It was not, however, until the fortune of the day was decided, that Nicholson fell: the critical opening of the storm was conducted by him. He gave the word, "Forward!" and the Rifles dashed to the front with a cheer, skirmishing through the low jungle in front of the breach, so as to cover the advance of the first and second columns. Both officers and men fell fast under the bullets of the enemy while the ladders were being let down into the ditch to mount the escarp; but when this was accomplished the breaches were carried with ease, for the mutineers fled in confusion before the British bayonet.

Meanwhile, the third column effected an entrance by the Cashmere gate. At the head marched an explosion party, composed of Lieutenants Salkeld and Home, Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, Corporal Burgess, and Bugler Hawthorne, with fourteen Native sappers and miners of the old Bengal army, and ten Punjabees. Covered by the fire of the Rifles, the advanced party safely reached the outer barrier-gate, which they found open and unguarded. Home, Smith, Carmichael, Havildar Madhoo, and another Native sapper, passed over the partially destroyed drawbridge, and succeeded in placing powder-bags at the foot of the double gate. The enemy, on recovering their first astonishment at the audacity of the procedure, poured forth volley after volley through the open wicket. Carmichael was killed, and Madhoo wounded; but the powder was laid, and the four survivors sprang into the ditch; while the firing party, under Lieutenant Salkeld, proceeded to perform its perilous duty. Salkeld was mortally wounded while endeavouring to fire the charge, and

fell, handing the slow-match to Burgess, who succeeded in setting the train on fire, but was shot dead immediately afterwards. Havildar Tiluk Sing was wounded; and another Hindoo, whose name is given in the report as Ram Heth, was killed. Thus the most popular exploit of the day was performed by Europeans, Seiks, and Bengal sepoy, fighting, suffering, and dying side by side. Colonel Baird Smith names no less than six natives, as having shown the most determined bravery and coolness throughout the whole operation; and praises "the remarkable courage shown by the Native officers and men in assisting their wounded European comrades." While the train was being lit, Bugler Hawthorne, under a heavy fire, had carried the wounded Salkeld from the bridge into the ditch, and bound up his wounds: he then sounded the regimental call of the 52nd three times.† The troops scrambled across the fallen gates and over the bodies of a score of mutineers killed in the explosion, and gained the ramparts in time to echo the cheers of the two columns which had stormed the breaches in the Cashmere and Water bastions.

Unhappily, the fourth column had failed in performing its allotted task of clearing the Kishen Gunj suburb and carrying the Lahore gate. The Jummoo contingent commenced the attack; suffered heavily, and were driven back before the artillery arrived. Major Reid moved down with the Goorkas to renew the attack, but fell wounded in the head by the heavy fire opened by the enemy from the bridge over the canal, from walls and loopholed buildings. Captain McBarnet was killed. Lieutenant Shebbeare, with a few Guides and some Europeans, took possession of a mosque, and strove to re-form the troops and charge the enemy's position. Lieutenant Murray, of the Guides, was killed while gallantly seconding Lieutenant Shebbeare, who was himself struck by two balls; and Sergeant Dunleary, of the Fusiliers, was likewise slain while exhibiting conspicuous gallantry.‡ Major Reid and the senior engineer, both severely wounded, were the only officers well acquainted with the localities of the place.§ Between the want of a

* Brigadier-general Nicholson was six feet two inches in height.

† The Victoria medal was bestowed by General Wilson on Home, Salkeld, Smith, and Hawthorne. Salkeld died in the course of a few days; Home

was killed on the 1st of October, by the accidental explosion of a mine at Malaghur.

‡ Captain Muter's Report, Sept. 17th, 1857.—*London Gazette*, Dec. 15th, 1857.

§ Medley's *Year's Campaigning in India*, p. 110.



competent leader and the panic of the troops, the result was, that after losing a great number of men and four guns, they were "completely defeated, and fell back to camp."*

This failure impeded the advance, and embarrassed the proceedings of the other columns, by leaving the enemy in triumphant possession of the Lahore gate. General Nicholson proceeded thither, clearing the ramparts as he advanced. The road lay through a narrow lane, down which the rebels poured volleys of grape and musketry. The Europeans recoiled before the deadly fire; and Nicholson, in endeavouring to cheer them on, and induce them, by his example, to renew the advance, offered a too easy mark to the foe. He fell, shot through the body, the ball entering his right side, and coming out under the left armpit. He was carried off with some difficulty; and his favourite orderly, an Afghan, named Khajah Khan, who had stormed the breach with him, writes—"The general then desired to be laid in the shade; and said, 'I will remain here till Delhi is taken.'" But there were several anxious days to be spent before the capture was accomplished. The troops who hung back from Nicholson, would not follow any one else; and Captain Brookes, who succeeded to the command, relinquished the attempt to force them forward, and fell back on the Cabool gate, where he was joined by the column under Brigadier Jones. Meanwhile, the third column endeavoured, by Nicholson's orders, to advance upon and occupy the Jumma Musjid, that "chastest, grandest, and noblest temple ever erected by those great architects the Mohammedans;"† but, on examination, the gate was found to be too strong to be blown open without powder-bags or artillery. Colonel Campbell had neither, in consequence of the fall of Salkeld and the impracticability of bringing guns over the broken bridge at the Cashmere gate. The colonel, himself wounded, retired to the Cabool gate. The church and other structures were taken possession of by the troops; when General Wilson rode into Delhi, map in hand, and established his head-quarters in a strong building, called Secander's, or Skinner's House, from the famous Eurasian leader of irregular

cavalry, by whom it was erected. When the first tumult had subsided, much unsatisfactory information was obtained regarding the number of casualties, the condition of the remaining force, and the strength of the enemy's positions.

The portion of Delhi on which the assault was commenced, contained large quantities of wine and spirits (the produce of a long line of road on which those articles are the main staple of European commerce). The temptation to intoxication, to which the troops readily succumbed, was thought to be the result of deep strategy on the part of the mutineers; but of this there is no proof. The straggling and looting deprecated by General Wilson was extensively carried on: "men of different columns and regiments got mixed up together, shops and houses were broken open and completely gutted, and stores of beer, champagne, and brandy were found, and quickly appropriated."‡ Another eyewitness says, that "the army became disorganised to a degree which was highly dangerous when the battle was half won."§ And he further remarks, that it seems "as if the only common bond which unites the various races fighting under our standard, is the common love of liquor." The newly arrived Cashmere auxiliaries were not wanting in this essential part of good fellowship and bad discipline. "In their drinking and plundering propensities, and somewhat impaired discipline, they hardly differ from the Europeans, whom they allege to be their models in these particulars." Mr. Greathed, the Delhi commissioner, declares that the Sikhs had "no points of resemblance with Pandies, but took their lots of rum like true Christians."|| Certainly, if the love of strong drink is a proof of orthodox belief, Europeans, Sikhs, Goorkas, Afghans, and Cashmerians, evidenced theirs in strong contrast to the heathenish sobriety of the Hindoo mutineers. Usually, the fire-water of civilisation has been its most efficient weapon for the destruction of nations. On this occasion the two-edged weapon wounded the hand that wielded it. The disorganisation produced by drunkenness rendered our loss heavy and our progress slow, and augmented, if it did not originate, the

* Norman's *Campaign of the Delhi Army*, p. 44.

† Russell.—*Times*, Sept. 3rd, 1857.

‡ Medley's *Year's Campaigning in India*, p. 113.

§ See an able account of the capture of Delhi, by

a civilian (evidently not Greathed, Saunders, or Metcalfe); dated "Delhi, Sept. 26th, 1857."—*Times*, December, 1857.

|| Greathed's *Letters*, p. 176.

unexpected determination with which the mutineers, and especially some parties of armed fanatics, defended houses in the streets, after suffering the breaches to be made and won with but feeble opposition. Hodson asserts, that the troops were "utterly demoralised by hard work and hard drink." "For the first time in my life," he adds, "I have had to see English soldiers refuse repeatedly to follow their officers. Greville,* Jacob,† Nicholson,‡ and Speke were all sacrificed to this."§

A fourth eye-witness describes the English army, on Tuesday, the 15th, as still "drowned in pleasure;" and remarks—"With all my love for the army, I must confess, the conduct of professed Christians, on this occasion, was one of the most humiliating facts connected with the siege. How the enemy must have gloried at that moment in our shame!"|| Had the tactician, Tantia Topee, or that clever fiend, Azim Oollah; the gallant octogenarian, Koor Sing, or the resolute Ranee of Jhansi, been in Delhi, to take advantage of the suicidal excesses of the army, the whole field force might have been overwhelmed by the sheer weight of numbers. As it was, above a fourth part of the assailants had fallen in obtaining a fourth part of the city.

The total casualties, European and Native, of the 14th, were 1,145.¶ The list included the best known and most popular men in camp. Nicholson and his younger brother (a lieutenant in the 2nd Punjab cavalry) lay side by side in the hospital; Major Reid had been struck down at the head of the Goorkas; Major Tombs, of the horse artillery, had been hit, with twenty-four out of the fifty men he was leading at the time. Captain Rosser, of the Carabineers, the gallant officer who begged to be allowed to pursue the fugitive mutineers from Meerut on the 11th of May, was mortally wounded. The engineers, European and Native, had behaved nobly, and suffered heavily. Brigadier-general Chamberlain, though not sufficiently recovered to take part in the storm, had, on learning the repulse of the fourth column,

and the prostrate condition of its brave leader, hastened to the Hindoo Rao ridge, and performed essential service in restoring the troops to order, and superintending the reoccupation of the position.

All things considered, it is not surprising that General Wilson should have felt himself in a very precarious position on the morning following the storming of the breaches. A day-by-day chronicler of the siege declares, that the general "talked of withdrawing from the walls of Delhi to the camp again, until he should be reinforced;" but was overruled by the advice of men whose responsibility was less, and their hopes stronger than his.** The chief adviser referred to was undoubtedly Nicholson. The report circulated among the officers was, that on hearing of the proposed evacuation of Delhi, Nicholson declared he hoped to have strength enough to blow out the general's brains if he gave such an order. Happily the contingency did not arise; and General Wilson took an important step for the restoration of discipline, by the destruction of all the wine and beer found in the merchants' godowns, not leaving any (the chaplain to the force asserts) even for the use of the sick and wounded.††

While the main body of the troops were being reorganised, the artillery were slowly but surely gaining ground; though less by the actual havoc they committed on the admirably built structures in which the enemy made a last stand (for it is said that our mortar batteries were neither strong enough, nor sufficiently numerous to do effectually such extensive work),‡‡ than by the terror they inspired. A shrewd observer writes, on the 26th of September—"I do not think that the enemy were actually forced out by our shells. I was surprised to find how little damage was done by them. The walls of the palace are almost intact; so are by far the greater portion of the buildings inside; and it is quite clear that the chances were yet very much in favour of such as chose quietly to sit in them."§§

Missing, 10 Europeans. Lieutenant Gambier, who escaped with Colonel Knyvett from Delhi, joined the force a few days before the storm, and was mortally wounded in the struggle.—*Campaign of the Delhi Army*, p. 40.

** Rotton's *Siege of Delhi*, p. 303.

†† *Ibid.*, p. 304.

‡‡ Article on the capture of Delhi—*Times*, December 2nd, 1857.

§§ *Ibid.*

* Captain S. Greville, 1st Fusiliers.

† Major G. O. Jacob, 1st Fusiliers.

‡ Lieutenant E. Speke, 65th N.L., attached to 1st Fusiliers.

§ Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 296.

|| Rotton's *Siege of Delhi*, p. 303.

¶ The casualties were—Europeans killed, 8 officers and 162 rank and file; wounded, 52 officers, 510 rank and file. Natives killed, 103; wounded, 310.

The courage "to sit still" was the last quality the sepoys were likely to evince while a prospect of unmolested retreat remained open to them. The suburb of Kishen Gunj, so resolutely held on the 14th, was voluntarily abandoned the very next day, seven guns being left in position. The mutineers fled in disorderly crowds, the cavalry being the first to disappear. As the enemy retreated, the British advanced, but with a tardiness which was officially attributed to "the usual license which invariably accompanies an assault of a large city."*

The Lahore gate was taken possession of on the 20th; and, about the same time, the camp of a large body of mutineers outside the Delhi gate was also occupied. Captain Hodson and some cavalry entered the camp, and secured quantities of clothing, ammunition, and plunder of various descriptions; the late proprietors having evidently fled with precipitation. A number of wounded and sick sepoys had been left behind, and were all killed by Hodson's Horse.†

It was now suspected that the king and his family had fled; and Colonel John Jones, with a body of troops (including some of the 60th Rifles and Engineers), marched against the palace, which appeared deserted, save that occasionally a musket-shot was fired from over the gateway at the British troops stationed at the head of the Chandnee Chouk, or chief street. The gate was blown in (Lieutenant Home being the person to light the fusee), and the sole defenders were found to be two or three men, who are called, in the official report, fanatics; but who were more probably devoted adherents of the king, who sacrificed their lives in concealing his retreat. They were immediately bayoneted, as were also a number of wounded sepoys found lying on beds in the marble balcony of the Public Hall of Audience. An officer of engineers (not Home), in a letter published in the *Times*, writes—"I saw one man (sepoy) have both hands cut off with a tulwar; shot in the body; two bayonet wounds in the

chest; and he still lived till a rifleman blew his brains out. I did not feel the least disgusted, or ashamed of directing, or seeing such things done, when I reflected on what those very wretches perhaps had done." This work being accomplished, Colonel Jones (Hodson's Falstaff) seated himself on the throne, and drank the health of Queen Victoria, to which toast the troops responded with rounds of cheers.‡

Repeated attempts at negotiation were made on behalf of the king, who separated himself from the sepoys and adult princes; and, with Zeenat Mahal, her son (a lad of fifteen), and a body of his immediate retainers, betook himself to the mausoleum of his ancestor, the good Emperor Humayun. The walls of this structure are of red stone, inlaid with marble; the large dome is entirely of marble. In the interior is a large circular apartment, in the middle of which stands a white marble sarcophagus, containing the remains of Humayun; and around are smaller chambers, occupied by the bodies of his relatives and favourite nobles. Like most structures raised by a race of men "who built like giants, and finished their work like jewellers," the tomb was capable of being used for purposes of defence. The mausoleum itself rises from the centre of a platform 200 feet square, supported on every side by arcades, and ascended by four great flights of stone steps.

The queen induced the king to take up this isolated position as a preliminary step to surrender, in reliance on a distinct pledge of personal safety, which Hodson states he sent, to withdraw the king from the rebels, and from the stronghold (the Kootub Minar) which he had reached. The account of the circumstances connected with the surrender of the king, rests on the same authority; and that must be received with caution, inasmuch as it conveys grave implications on General Wilson; with whom the dashing leader of irregulars had about this time a misunderstanding on a point affecting his honour.§

The "backbiting," of which Captain

* Despatch of Adjutant-general Chamberlain, Sept. 18th, 1857.—*London Gazette*.

† Norman's *Campaign of the Delhi Army*, p. 45.

‡ Rotton's *Siege of Delhi*, p. 316.

§ In a letter dated October 23rd, Hodson authorises some person, whose name is left in blank, to "contradict the story about the rupees;" which, he says, "was born in Delhi, and was partly the cause of General Wilson's bad behaviour to me." The

money in question, amounting to £60,000, was brought to Hodson by his men, the night before he was starting on some minor service which detained him three or four days, and he locked up the money in the regimental chest for safety. On his return, he found that "a story had been circulated by the native who had disorged the coin, that I had kept the money for myself! Of course, the very day I returned, it was, with heaps of other

Hodson complains as impeding the performance of his duties, whether real or imaginary, would inevitably bias his judgment of the actions of the persons viewed as enemies. Of these, General Wilson was the head: the other names are left blank.

According to Hodson's account, it would seem that he, and he only, in all the camp, saw the importance of securing the persons of the king, queen, and prince. He dwells on the incentive to combination the warlike men of the north-west would have had "in the person of the sacred and 'heaven-born' monarch, dethroned, wandering, and homeless."* This is quite true: the history of India teems with evidence of the devotion of Rajpoot chieftains to unfortunate Mogul princes. Moreover, in consequence of the intermarriage (not concubinage) of the imperial house with those of the leading princes of Rajpootana, the best blood of those ancient families flowed in the veins of the "wandering and homeless" Mohammed Bahadur Shah. "General Wilson," Hodson asserts, "refused to send troops in pursuit of him [the king]: and to avoid greater calamities, I then, and not till then, asked and obtained permission to offer him his wretched life, on the ground, and solely on the ground, that there was no other way of getting him into our possession. The people were gathering round him. His name would have been a tocsin which would have raised the whole of Hindoostan."† It was expedient "to secure ourselves from further mischief, at the simple cost of sparing the life of an old man of ninety." General Wilson "at last gave

orders to Captain Hodson to promise the king's life, and freedom from personal indignity, and make what other terms he could:"‡ and thereupon Hodson rode to the tomb with fifty sowars, accompanied by the one-eyed Rujub Ali, and another Mohammedan. These two entered the building; and after two hours' discussion with Zeenat Mahal (who insisted on the life of her father being included in the government guarantee; which was done), the king, queen, and prince came out of the tomb, and surrendered themselves. The reader may probably expect that the British officer who received them (a man of some note, and, moreover, the son of one minister of the gospel, and the brother of another, who presents him to the public as a specimen of a sixth-form Rugbeian, and "a Christian soldier of our own day")§ would have been moved with compassion for the miserable family. The noble-hearted Arnold, or sturdy Tom Brown and his schoolfellows, would have had some reverence even for a great name, and much pity for "the very old and infirm"|| man whose misfortune it was to bear it: but Hodson had no weakness of this kind. A very different feeling acted as a drawback on his satisfaction: he dared not enjoy the triumph of slaying the last of the Moguls, and was obliged to encounter "the obloquy"¶ of having spared his life. He intimates, that his plighted word, as the representative of General Wilson, would not have sufficed to insure the safety of the royal prisoner. "The orders I received were such, that I did not dare to act on

things, made over to the agents."—*Twelve Years in India*, p. 340. The name of the native who "disgorged" the coin is not given; neither are the circumstances told under which such an immense sum was obtained from a single individual. But the subject of "loot" was an unpleasant one to Hodson. He complains of a report, at Simla, of his having sent some "magnificent diamonds" to his wife; whereas, the only ones he had obtained were set in a brooch he had bought from a trooper, a month before Delhi was taken (p. 336). One way or other, he had, however, been making money with a rapidity which deserved "the character given of him, as the most wide-awake man in the army" (p. 342). An anecdote recorded by his brother, in support of this assertion, also corroborates his comparison of the "captain of free lances" to a border chieftain; for it brings to mind the inseparable accompaniments of border warfare, freebooting, or cattle-lifting, which men who live by the sword, gain wealth by, at the expense, direct or indirect, of utter destitution to the wretched peasantry who live by the plough or by their herds and flocks.

The story is as follows:—In an expedition undertaken in October, Brigadier Showers had captured, at various places, much property in coin, and great quantities of cattle. On one occasion upwards of 1,700 head of cattle had been taken. The brigadier was going to leave them behind, when Hodson offered to buy them at two rupees a-head. He did so; sent them under an escort of his own troopers to Delhi, "where they arrived safely, and were of course sold at a large profit." Shortly afterwards he invested part of the proceeds in a house at Umballah, which happened to be then put up for a forced sale at a great depreciation (p. 342). A great many "cow-houses" in England, Ireland, and Scotland, have sprung up since the old Indian pagoda-tree has been forced into bearing by the torrents of blood spilt in 1857; but the owners are not Henry Lawrences, or Colin Campbells, or Outrams.

* *Hodson's Twelve Years in India*, p. 304.


† *Ibid.*, p. 315.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

§ See Preface to *Twelve Years in India*.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 316.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 324.





the dictates of my own judgment, to the extent of killing him, when he had given himself up; but had he attempted either a flight or a rescue, I should have shot him down like a dog.”* The king was utterly exhausted: flight was out of the question. On being brought out in his palkee, Hodson demanded his arms; and when the king hesitated, he was told, “very emphatically, that if any attempt were made at a rescue, he would be shot down like a dog.”† As the conditions of surrender included no mention of such a contingency, the latter threat of Hodson’s cannot be justified, though it may be excused on the plea of “expediency.” It was a breach of faith; and, indeed, Hodson’s whole behaviour was inconsistent with the pledge of protection against personal indignity given to the king. He might at least have left General Wilson to receive the costly weapons which the wearer had never used, and which were, in fact, state ornaments—a part of the regalia. But Hodson (to quote his own words) considered, that “I and my party [the fifty sowars] had a right to all we found on the king and princes.”‡ and desiring “to wear a sword taken from the last of the House of Timur, which had been girt round the waists of the greatest of his predecessors,”§ he made sure of the coveted property, by standing by the palkees with a drawn sword in his hand, until his mandate to “stand and deliver” had been obeyed, first by the king and then by the young prince, Jumma Bukht. When this was over, and other valuable property secured, the captives were carried to Delhi, and delivered up to the civil officer, Mr. Saunders, who swore, “by Jove!” that Hodson ought to be made commander-in-chief forthwith.|| General Wilson would not sanction Hodson’s wholesale appropriation of the spoil, but requested him “to select for himself, from the royal arms, what he chose.” He took two magnificent swords—one bearing the name of Nadir Shah; the other with the seal of the Emperor Jehangir engraved upon it: the latter he intended to present to the Queen.

The truthfulness which is the recognised characteristic of our Royal Lady, would

render such a present most distasteful, did she but know the circumstances connected with its attainment. Hodson, however, expected to get the Victoria medal in return.¶ Other honours he looked forward to from government. In fact, he plainly states, that his services “entitled him to have anything”** the authorities could give him.

Three other princes—namely, Mirza Moghul (the person said to have been tried by a sepoy court-martial), and his son Aboo Bukker, a youth of about twenty years of age,†† with a brother of Mirza Moghul’s, whose name is variously given—on hearing of the king’s surrender, followed his example, by proceeding to the tomb of Humayun, hoping to make terms for their lives. On hearing this, Hodson “set to work to get hold of them.”‡‡ He states—

“It was with the greatest difficulty that the general was persuaded to allow them to be interfered with, till even poor Nicholson roused himself to urge that the pursuit should be attempted. The general at length yielded a reluctant consent; adding, ‘But don’t let me be bothered with them.’ I assured him that it was nothing but his own order which ‘bothered’ him with the king, as I would much rather have brought him dead than living.”

Having obtained the necessary sanction, Captain§§ Hodson and Lieutenant Macdowell,||| with 100 picked men, rode to the tomb, and sent in Rujub Ali and a cousin of the princes (“purchased for the purpose, by the promise of his life”),¶¶ to “say that the princes must give themselves up unconditionally, or take the consequences.”*** There were about 3,000 Mussulman followers in the tomb, and as many more in the adjacent suburb, all armed. Two hours were passed in discussion before the princes were induced to throw themselves on the mercy of the British. This determination was taken in opposition to the entreaties of the majority of their adherents, who rent the air with shouts, and begged to be led against the two Europeans and the party of Seik cavalry, whom they detested with an hereditary and fanatical bitterness. At length the three princes came out, in a covered vehicle called a “Ruth,” drawn by bullocks; used by Indian

* *Twelve Years in India*, p. 324.

† *Ibid.*, p. 306.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

¶ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

†† Letter of engineer officer.—*Times*, November 19th, 1857.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 307.

§§ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

¶¶ *Twelve Years*, §2, p. 300.

§§ He became captain by the death of Major Jacob, mortally wounded on the 14th of September.

||| Mortally wounded at Shumsabad, January 31st, 1858.

¶¶ *Twelve Years in India*, p. 310.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 301.

ladies in travelling. The princes evinced no trepidation; but, bowing to Hodson, remarked that, of course, their conduct would be investigated in the proper court.* He returned their salute, and directed the driver to proceed to Delhi. The people prepared to follow the princes, but were prevented, and induced to surrender their arms quietly. This measure occupied some time: when it was accomplished, Hodson followed his captives, and overtook them about a mile from Delhi, or five miles from the tomb.

A mob had collected round the vehicle, and seemed disposed to turn on the guard. Hodson galloped among them, saying that the prisoners "were the butchers who had murdered and brutally used women and children." The fierce shouts of the hundred Seik troopers, armed to the teeth, effectually seconded this denunciation, and the crowd moved off slowly and sullenly. Hodson then surrounded the ruth with his troopers; desired the princes to get out; seized their arms; made them "strip and get into the cart: he then shot them with his own hand."†

After gathering up the weapons, ornaments, and garments of the princes, Hodson rode into the city, and caused the dead bodies to be exposed in front of the police-court (until, "for sanitary reasons, they were removed"),‡ on the very spot where the head of the famous Seik Gooroo, Teg Bahadur, had been placed, by order of Aurungzebe, 200 years before. The Seiks gloried in the coincidence. Hodson gloried, also, in having made "the last of the House of Timur eat dirt."§ Certainly, in that dirt the bitterness of death was mingled; whereas that which the captor swallowed with such zest, was gilt with what looked like glory, and sweetened with loot. Months afterwards, when the newspapers from England and the continent reached India—when one of his countrymen spoke of the worse mark than a bar sinister, which heralds rivet to the shield of the knight who slays his prisoner;|| and when the French, speaking of him in the lan-

guage applicable to an executioner who looked sharply after his perquisites, asserted that he stripped the princes "*pour ne pas gâter le butin*"¶—he changed his tone, and instead of confidently anticipating all conceivable honours, declared himself quite indifferent to clamour,** having made up his mind at the time to be abused. The same disappointment which befel him in regard to the king's property, recurred in the case of the princes. The general would not allow him to appropriate the spoil:†† and he states that he gave up (to the general stock of prize property) "all except some of the personal arms of the princes, which were both intrinsically and historically valuable. It is not, however, correct that he surrendered all; for his letters to his wife repeatedly advert to "the turquoise armlet and signet-rings of the rascally princes whom I shot;" which he sent to her by the hands of Colonel Seaton, in September.‡‡

There can be no doubt that, by preventing the king and queen from remaining at large, Hodson did good service; but he greatly exaggerated his own merit, by passing over the fact, that the king and queen were anxious to place themselves under British protection, on a bare pledge of security for life, and exemption from personal indignity. The three princes also rejected opportunities of escape, and voluntarily surrendered themselves, in the expectation (which Hodson at least, by a bow, encouraged them in entertaining) that their conduct would be fully and fairly investigated. What direct or indirect assurances were made to them by their cousin and the Moolvee, is not told; but it is not commonly reasonable to suppose that, except on some clear understanding, they would have been so infatuated as to separate willingly from 6,000 armed and zealous adherents, and give themselves up to two Englishmen, backed only by a hundred of their notorious enemies. General Wilson, in his despatches, mentions the surrender of certain members of the royal family, and the escape of others, with the utmost brevity.

It appears that a large number of royal

of the booty, but it must have been considerable. The correspondence of the period mentions elephants, horses, camels, carriages filled with royal property, and "lots of stores," as taken possession of by Hodson and his "Horse."

‡‡ *Twelve Years in India*, p. 323. Colonel Seaton was at first appointed prize-agent, but resigned the office in consequence of differences with General Wilson.

* Medley's *Year's Campaigning*, p. 141.

† Macdowell's account. *Twelve Years*, &c., p. 315.

‡ *Twelve Years in India*, p. 302.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

|| *Star*, November 27th, 1857.

¶ See Colonel Seaton's Letter. *Twelve Years in India*, p. 317.

** *Twelve Years in India*, p. 316.

†† Captain Hodson's biographer gives no account

prisoners were captured by, or surrendered to, a column under Brigadier Showers, at Humayun's tomb, on the 28th of September. Hodson remarks, that seven sons and grandsons of the king were made over to the "young civilian [query, Metcalf], sent to carry on political duties, and take charge of the different members and hangers-on of the royal family." They all escaped in less than two hours. Some were retaken, brought to Delhi, summarily tried, hung, and flung into the Jumna; others made good their flight, including Prince Feroze Shah, who has since proved so troublesome an enemy.

What Sir John Lawrence thought of the management of affairs, does not appear; but he is spoken of as "no friendly judge" of Captain Hodson, who, however, received the following note from Mr. Montgomery; which resembles, in its general tone, that in which the same authority (now chief commissioner in Oude) congratulated Mr. Cooper on the proceedings connected with the Ujnalla Bastion and Well:—

"MY DEAR HODSON,

"All honour to you (and to your 'Horse') for catching the king and slaying his sons. I hope you will bag many more!—In haste, ever yours,

"R. MONTGOMERY."

The peculiar terms used in the Punjab, grate harshly on English ears. Mr. Russell, who rarely quotes any words without providing for their correct interpretation by the uninitiated, explains, that to "make a good bag," meant to kill a great many natives; and says, that "potting a Pandy," or slaying a mutineer, "described one of the purest enjoyments of which Christians are or ought to be capable."* In this enjoyment the Delhi force were stinted, not by any fault on the part of their commander, but by the perversity of the "Paudies," who would not stop to be killed, but fled, it was supposed, to Muttra, intending to cross the Jumna at that point. On this head, the general's information

* *Times*, November 15th, 1858.

† See a Letter in the *Times* (Nov. 27th, 1857), announced as the production of "an officer in the 61st, who commanded the [storming] party which took the palace, and afterwards had the custody of the old king;" with orders "to shoot him" rather than suffer him to be carried off. This witness says—"We daily find hidden in the houses, sepoy who are unable to escape, from sickness or wounds: these are all put to death on the spot. On the 24th, I caught a fine tall sowar, or trooper, of some light cavalry regiment; dragged him out into the street, and shot him dead. * * * We have plundered all the shops, and all the valuables are

was, he admitted, "very defective;" but their destination (if they had yet recovered from their panic sufficiently to have decided the point) was the less important, because the state of the conquering force forbade any idea of immediate pursuit. The sepoy left behind were chiefly wounded or panic-stricken wretches, hiding about in holes and corners;† who, when found, entreated the "Sahib-logue" to shoot them at once, and not cut them up with cold steel.‡ Still Delhi was rich in materials for "making a good bag." To carry on Mr. Montgomery's simile, there were plenty of battues, only not of the favourite description of game—not pheasants, but barn-door fowls, which, however, had the advantage of having cost the sportsmen nothing in rearing, and were better worth plucking.§ Women and children were to be spared. A gentleman, whose letters, published in the *Bombay Telegraph*, afterwards went the round of the Indian and English papers—remarks, that "the general's hookum regarding the women and children, was a mistake," as they were "not human beings, but fiends, or, at best, wild beasts, deserving only the death of dogs." He then describes the state of affairs on the 21st of September:—

"The city is completely deserted by all the mutineers; and, in fact, there are few natives of any sort to be found, excepting those of our army. All the city people found within the walls when our troops entered were bayoneted on the spot; and the number was considerable, as you may suppose, when I tell you that in some houses forty and fifty persons were hiding. These were not mutineers, but residents of the city, who trusted to our well-known mild rule for pardon. I am glad to say they were disappointed."

Another writer remarks—"For two days the city was given up to the soldiery; and who shall tell in how many obscure corners the injured husband, son, or brother, took his blood for blood!"|| The allusion here is probably intended to apply solely to injured Europeans; but those who hold

being collected and sold for prize. Our vengeance cannot be appeased."

† *Daily News*, November 16th, 1857.

§ The plunder appropriated, in addition to that made over to the prize-agent, must have been very large. One witness remarks—"It is supposed the Rifles will go to England with upwards of £1,000 each, though General Wilson has issued an order that the prizes shall be all put together and divided. Most of our men [6th Carabineers] are worth upwards of a hundred rupees."—*Times*, November 21st, 1857.

|| *Mutiny of Bengal Army*; by One who has served under Sir Charles Napier; p. 214.

that "every medal has two sides," and wish to see both, will remember how unaccountably heavy our loss was on the first day of the assault, and how greatly it exceeded the first calculations officially rendered; the excess being from the number of Europeans slain in houses and sheds, which they entered in direct disobedience to the general's significant prohibition against "straggling." The number of men of the 61st regiment found "in holes and corners," is said to have been appalling.*

The total European loss in killed, wounded, and missing, from May 30th to September 20th, is thus officially stated by Major Norman:—

	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Killed	572	440	1,012
Wounded	1,566	1,229	2,795
Missing	13	17	30
Total	2,151	1,686	3,837

Of the total number, 2,163 were killed, wounded, and missing, prior to the 8th of September; 327 between that date and the morning of the storm; 1,170 on the 14th; and 177 from that day to the 20th.†

Of the number of men who died from disease, or retired on sick leave, no account is given. Neither has any detail been yet published of the expenses incurred before Delhi. The means of meeting them were found by Sir John Lawrence, "who supplied the military chest of the army before Delhi with £200,000; and contrived to borrow, from native chiefs and capitalists, a sum of £410,000 more."‡

It is not likely that the number of natives, whether sepoy or city people, who were slaughtered at Delhi, will ever be even approximately estimated. The Indians are not good accountants, and will probably be very inaccurate in this point of their record. But the capture of the city will, in all probability, find its historian, as the previous ones have done; and then some light will be thrown on the sufferings of the 69,738 men, and the 68,239 women, who inhabited Delhi before the siege. Meanwhile, we may rest assured, that "no such scene has been witnessed in the city of Shah Jehan since

the day that Nadir Shah, seated in the little mosque in the Chandnee Chouk, directed and superintended the massacre of its inhabitants."§

If an answer could be obtained to the question of how many women and children died of sheer destitution in consequence of the siege, or escaped starvation or dishonour by jumping into wells, rivers, or some other mode of suicide—where is the Englishman who would make the inquiry? That the European soldiers, maddened as they were with the thirst for vengeance, and utterly insubordinate through drunkenness, really refrained from molesting the women, is what many may hope; but few who have had any experience of military life, in the barrack or the camp, will credit. But granting that the Europeans separated the worship of Moloch from that of Chemos; is it conceivable that the Seiks, Goorkas, and Afghans concurred in exhibiting equal self-control in this single respect? If so, the taking of Delhi has a distinct characteristic; for never before, in the annals of war, did the inquirer fail to find "lust hard by hate." The truth is, that the history of the capture of Delhi has found no chronicler except as regards the exclusively military proceedings, which Colonel Baird Smith and Captain Norman have given with a fulness and precision not often found in official documents. Perhaps it is too early to expect a satisfactory narrative of any other portion. Those who know the facts, must needs be, for the most part, men whose position compels them to write in the tomb-stone style, and describe things "not as they were, but as they should have been;" or else to be altogether silent. The "Letters" of the commissioner, Mr. Greathed, afford information of unquestionable authenticity; but, unfortunately, stop short at the crisis.||

Writing on the 16th, he remarks, with truth, that the gradual occupation of the town would contribute much more to its effectual ruin than if it had been taken

* *Star*, November 21st, 1857.

† *Campaign of the Delhi Army*, pp. 52, 53.

‡ Editorial article on services of Sir J. Lawrence.

—*Times*, April 26th, 1857.

§ Bombay correspondent.—*Times*, November 16th, 1857. The writer is not borne out by facts in the contrast he draws between the "righteous vengeance of the British general" and "the sanguinary caprice of the Persian tyrant." Nadir Shah, under circumstances of extraordinary provocation, withdrew the protection he at first extended

to the citizens; but renewed it, and stopped the slaughter, at the intercession of the Emperor Mohammed.—(See vol. i. of this work, p. 165).

|| Mr. Rotton's *Narrative of the Siege of Delhi* is a useful book; and would have been still more so, had the writer habitually stated his authority for facts which he could only know by report. The test of "Who told you?"—so frequently applied in conversation—ought never to be forgotten by those who take upon themselves the labours of an annalist.

possession of at one blow. The whole population were being driven out, and had little chance of seeing their property again. He describes himself and his elder brother, Colonel Edward Greathed, in a European shop at the Cabool gate, which the troops were diligently looting. The commissioner took a wine-glass, to replace one which he had broken shortly before (belonging to an officer), and saw some chandeliers, to which he thought he had some right; but being "a poor plunderer," he let them alone. The instincts of a gentleman were too strong in the Delhi commissioner to permit him to share the general eagerness for "loot:" this, at least, is the construction most readers will put upon the above sentence, which occurs in a confidential letter to his wife. Two days later, he writes—

"If the king wishes to have the lives of his family and his own spared, he had better surrender the palace, and I should be glad to save that slaughter. Great numbers of women have thrown themselves on our mercy, and have been safely passed on. One meets mournful processions of these unfortunates, many of them evidently quite unaccustomed to walk, with children, and sometimes old men."*

The very day after these kindly and compassionate words were written, the hand that penned them lay cold in death. The whole army was appalled at hearing that the strongest and healthiest man in camp had been struck down by cholera. He was in the prime of life (just forty); active in his habits, moderate in his opinions, and on good terms with all parties. Had he lived, the treatment of the royal family would probably have been less distressing to them, and more honourable to us; and as he had no personal cause for bitter feeling against the people of Delhi, the powers of life and death might have been more safely deposited in his hands than in those of Sir T. Metcalfe, the young subordinate on whom they devolved, and who, though popular with the Europeans as a dashing free-lance, was the very last person who ought to have been thus trusted. The more so, since his inexperience, or want of judgment, had been manifested before the mutiny.† Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that a high-spirited young man who had been three days hiding about

the city, and had endured the misery and humiliation of a perilous and wearisome escape, should, on re-entering Delhi, empowered to exact "vengeance" for public wrongs, have acted under the evident incentive of personal and private grievances.

It was right to resort to Sir T. Metcalfe as a witness, but not also as a judge. It is contrary to English ideas of justice, that a man should be suffered to carry out his notions of retribution by hanging as many victims as he pleases on the beams and angles of his ruined mansion.

The fierce anger entertained by the Europeans in general against the natives, was warrant for severity; and the terrible office to be performed at Delhi, ought never to have been entrusted to an official of whom it could even be reported as possible, that he had said, that whenever he grew weary of his task, he went to look at his house to be invigorated. His energy never appeared to flag; and the natives soon learned to fear his name almost as much as their fathers had loved that of his uncle, the good and great Sir Charles Metcalfe.

Sir John Lawrence, notwithstanding the Draconian severity of his code, is stated, on good authority, to have been from the first "the opponent of blind, indiscriminate vengeance, and the strong advocate of an amnesty, to include all except the murderers in cold blood of our countrymen and countrywomen." And when, "after the capture of Delhi, he was placed in charge of the districts of Delhi and Meerut, his first act was to put a stop to civilians hanging from their own will and pleasure, and establish a judicial commission to try all offenders."‡

The fact, however, remains. Lord Ellenborough, the ex-governor-general of India, who has never been accused of an exaggerated horror of bloodshedding, and who deems our position in India analogous to that of the Normans in Saxon England—declared in parliament, on the 16th of February, 1858, "that, with the exception of a few days, since the capture of Delhi, there have been five or six executions every day. It is quite impossible to hope to re-establish civil government in that country, if the ordinary proceeding of law is to be the infliction of death."§

But, so it was; and day after day, week after week, month after month, the hanging went on; and the two large gallows in the middle of the Chandnee Chouk 'the Regent-

* Greathed's *Letters*, p. 285.

† See Introductory Chapter, p. 117.

‡ Speech of Captain Eastwick, deputy-chairman of the East India Company; August 25th, 1858.

§ *Times*, February 6th, 1858.

street, or rather Boulevards, of Delhi), with their ghastly burdens, contrasted strangely with the life and gaiety around them; with the English soldiers in their scarlet uniform or khakee undress; the Seik and Afghan irregular cavalry, on their prancing, well-groomed, gaily-saddled horses—the riders wearing small red turbans spangled with gold, their dark-blue tunics, turned up with red; red cummerbunds, light-yellow trousers, large top-boots,* and arms sharp for use, bright for ornament; Goorkas “dressed up to the ugliness of demons,” in black worsted head-gear (described as a frightful compromise between a Glengarry cap and a turban)† and woollen coats;‡ English ladies and children on elephants, and Englishmen on camels, horses, and ponies. A visitor—one of the many who poured into Delhi after the capture—notices as a characteristic feature of the scene, a prize-agent in a very pretty carriage, with servants in handsome livery, and his children after them, mounted on an elephant.§ The same witness adds—“I saw Sir Theophilus Metcalfe the other day; he is held in great dread here by the natives, and is every day trying and hanging all he can catch.”

Mrs. Coopland, the widow of the clergyman killed at Gwalior in June, relates the following anecdote in illustration of “this wholesome dread.” She was the guest of the Mrs. Garstin referred to, and therefore had means of knowing the fact.

“One day a native jeweller came to offer his wares for sale to Mrs. Garstin, who, thinking he charged too much, said, ‘I will send you to Metcalfe Sahib;’ on which the man bolted in such a hurry that he left his treasures behind, and never again showed his face.

The account given by this lively lady, of what she saw and did in Delhi, throws light

on several points which the authorities would have preferred leaving in darkness. The most popular amusements in the city were looting, and going to look at the old king and his family—much as country people in England used to go to the Tower of London, fifty years ago, to look at the lions. But the Delhi lion was extremely old; had neither teeth nor claws; was ill fed, and kept in a dirty cage—circumstances not very honourable to the humanity of his keepers.

The leading Europeans occupied the different portions of the palace, and their wives soon flocked to Delhi to join them. The royal apartments, the royal wardrobe, even to articles of daily use, were appropriated by the conquerors; while the king, queen, and prince were thrust into the upper part of a half-ruined gateway, with a British sentinel at the door, prepared to defeat any attempt at rescue which this treatment might provoke, by shooting the aged captive.

The reverend chronicler of the siege gives no account of the treatment of the royal family; but he calls upon his readers to admire “the piety of General Wilson, in suggesting that our successes should be celebrated on Sunday, September 27th, in a public manner, by a general thanksgiving.” Mr. Rotton and his colleague, having no “episcopal functions,” made some slight alterations in the morning service, and indited certain additions, as unlike those which the venerable Bishop of Calcutta¶ would have framed, as could well be conceived; in the course of which, certain (alleged) special providences were enumerated with a presumption which must have been painful to many present, notwithstanding that, in every other respect, “the rubrics and calendars were religiously observed.”** Had the sun stood

as having been decidedly evangelical. Though deeply respected, he is said not to have been popular; but popularity was little courted by a man who “stood up in the pulpit in Burmah, and roundly taxed the Europeans with their concubinage; and never hesitated one moment to reprehend any one, whatever his official or social rank.”—See Letter of Calcutta correspondent: *Times*, February 15th, 1858. In pecuniary matters he was liberal to the last degree. The “blameless purity” of his life, his great learning and fearless character, probably gave rise to the complaint, that his keen intellect was “sometimes a little sardonic,” and drew criticism on minor eccentricities which would else have passed unnoticed. Generous in death as in life, he left his splendid library, by will, to the Calcutta public.

** Rotton's *Siege of Delhi*, p. 325.

* Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 65.

† Russell.

‡ Letter from Delhi officer.—*Times*, October 1st, 1857.

§ Letter from Delhi.—*Times*, January, 1853.

¶ Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 273.

¶ A day of humiliation had been observed in India (as also in England) on account of the mutiny. The prayer framed by Bishop Wilson was characterised by humility; so also were those he wrote for the use of families; in which he deprecated the Divine wrath—acknowledging that it was due both for the sins of the present masters of India, and also of those who had gone before them in the land. He died at Calcutta, February 2nd, 1858; and although an octogenarian, remained to the last as active as if he had numbered but fifty years. In tone he is described



still in its course for General Wilson as for Joshua, a more specific acknowledgment could hardly have been offered, than that in which a body of protestants (professedly fallible, whether clergy or laity) presumed to recognise, in the unusually healthy season, a miraculous interposition on their behalf, and to thank the Most High "for the regulation of that season in such extraordinary manner as to favour Thy servants composing the army, which stood for so many months before Delhi;" also "for every triumph upon every occasion, and in every engagement, against the mutineers since we took the field."*

Apart from these extraordinary interpolations, there must have been something decidedly novel and exciting, something to talk about afterwards, in hearing the Church of England service performed on a Sunday morning in the king's private council-chamber—the far-famed "Dewani Khas"—and looking round on the numerous inscriptions, inlaid in jewels, including the Persian couplet, translated and adopted by Moore—

"And, oh! if there be an Elysium on earth,
It is this, it is this."

The train of thought likely to be excited might border upon profanity; but then what a lesson on the precarious tenure of human greatness might not the congregation receive from their afternoon's drive through the desolate streets, especially if they improved the occasion by looking in upon the late master of the Dewani Khas.

Several visitors have placed their observations on record: those of Mrs. Hodson (the captain's wife) were published in the *Times* and other papers.† She describes herself as being accompanied by Mr. Saunders (the civil commissioner) and his lady; and as passing through a small low door, guarded by a British sentry, into a room divided in two by a grass matting; in one half of which a woman was "cooking some atrocious compound; in the other, on a native bedstead (that is, a frame of bamboo on four legs, with grass ropes strung across it)," lay the King of Delhi. The writer proceeds to state—

"No other article of furniture whatever was in the room. I am almost ashamed to say that a feeling of pity mingled with my disgust, at seeing a man, recently lord of an imperial city almost un-

paralleled for riches and magnificence, confined in a low, close, dirty room, which the lowest slave in his household would scarcely have occupied, in the very palace where he had reigned supreme, with power of life and death, untrammelled by any law, within the precincts of a royal residence as large as a considerable-sized town; streets, galleries, towers, mosques, forts, and gardens; a private and a public hall of justice, and innumerable courts, passages, and staircases."

The name of his visitor being announced, "the old man raised his head, looked at her, and muttered something she could not understand; which, perhaps, was as well; since the unheard sentence was more likely to have been a curse than a blessing. Mrs. Hodson might surely have gratified her curiosity without intruding herself on the king as the wife of the man who had slain his unarmed sons, and threatened to shoot him like a dog in the event of an attempted rescue. After leaving him, the party entered "a smaller, darker, dirtier room than the first," inhabited by some eight or ten women, who crowded round a common charpoy, on which sat Zeenat Mahal. It seems probable that the fallen queen, who was known to be an able and courageous woman, thought her visitor a far more important personage than she really was, and suppressed her feelings for the sake of her only child; but she held a high tone nevertheless, and said, that if the life of the king and of her son had not been promised by the government, the king was preparing a great army which would have annihilated the British. Then she motioned to Mrs. Hodson to sit down upon her bed (there being no other resting-place). But this courtesy, Mrs. Hodson states, she "declined, as it looked so dirty;" and she adds—"Mr. Saunders was much amused at my refusal, and told me it would have been more than my life was worth, six months before, to have done so."

Probably, had the high-born wife of the governor-general, or Lady Outram (the noble mate of the Bayard of India), or the true, tender-hearted partner of the toils and perils of Brigadier Inglis at Lucknow, or hundreds of other Englishwomen, been asked by an imprisoned lady to sit beside her on her wretched pallet, they would instantly have complied; and, moreover, would have taken care to provide (if need were, out of their private purse) a clean coverlet

reason is evident; the object of the biographer being, to vindicate his brother's conduct towards the king and princes, and to refrain from giving details likely to excite sympathy for their sufferings.

* Rotton's *Siege of Delhi*, p. 325.

† This account, sent to the *Times* by the Rev. S. H. Hodson, is not given in the memoir of his brother, which he subsequently published. The

for the future. If Zeenat Mahal felt the mortification attributed to her, she had not long to wait before "the whirligig of time brought in its revenges." Widowhood is an overwhelming calamity in Oriental life; and the fallen queen must have started when she learnt (as she was sure to do, circumstantially, by native report) that Captain Hodson, while searching about for sepoys, or, in his own words, trying to "make a good bag,"* had been shot in a dark room full of fugitives, and had died in consequence, after many hours of intense agony.† When he prophesied on the 12th of March, 1858, regarding the King of Delhi, that "the old rascal will not trouble us long," he little thought that his own course was within a month of its termination; while the king had still years of life to endure.

To return to Delhi. Zeenat Mahal was not fortunate in the sight-seers who came to gaze on her misery; and being deprived of any other protection, she used her woman's weapon—the tongue—to rid herself of at least one of them. This one was Mrs. Coopland; who, after going about Delhi looking for loot, and having had very little success, pronounced it disgraceful to England that the old king had not been shot, and the city razed to the ground. Her interview with the king and prince (who, she says, looked about fourteen years of age), and with the queen (who was "dressed in a black cotton gown"), is told with unusual brevity; but it appears that the latter glanced at the mourning garb of her visitor, and asked what had become of her "sahib" (husband) in so contemptuous a manner, that Mrs. Coopland bade her be silent, and abruptly quitted the room, leaving Zeenat Mahal mistress of the field.‡

The following extract from a letter, dated "Delhi Palace, November 16th," supplies some deficiencies in the descriptions of Mrs. Hodson and Mrs. Coopland; and is written by a less prejudiced observer:—

"Desolate Delhi! It has only as yet a handful of inhabitants in its great street, the Chandnee Chouk, who are all Hindoos, I believe. Many miserable wretches prowl through the camps outside the city, begging for admission at the various gates, but none are admitted whose respectability cannot be vouched for. * * * We have seen the captive king and royal family; they are in ruinous little rooms in one of the gates of the palace. The old king looks very frail, and has a blank, fixed eye, as of one on whom life is fast closing. He certainly

is too old to be responsible for anything that has been done. * * * The youngest son we saw, looking like fifteen (they say eighteen); bold and coarse to look at. He is the only child of the queen. With her some of our ladies have had a long interview: they found her seated on a common charpoy (bedstead), dressed in white cotton clothes, with few and very trifling ornaments; all her grand things having been taken from her. She is described as short and stout, above thirty years of age, with a round, animated face, not at all pretty, but having very pretty little plump hands; she was cutting betel-nut to eat with her pawn. She professes the utmost horror of the 3rd cavalry, to whom she traces all her misfortunes. She says the king was helpless to control them; and that when their arrival had placed Delhi in rebellion against us, they were as ready to rob her as anyone else. She says the mutineers did rob the palace, and that all her jewels were only saved by being buried. Some of the women told them [the English ladies] they had had English women and children in the palace after the massacre, in hope of preserving them, but that the mutineers demanded them, and could not be resisted. Heaven knows if the royal family be clean in heart and hand or not. * * * If they are, as they say, innocent of any share in the rebellion, they are victims indeed. I trust all examinations may be judiciously and fairly conducted."§

There is no reason to suppose that the Calcutta government were aware of the petty degradations to which the Delhi family were subjected. On the contrary, the orders of the governor-general explicitly directed an opposite course of procedure. Provided no promise of life had been given to the king, he was to be brought to trial; and if found guilty, the sentence was to be carried out without reference to Calcutta. But in the event of his life having been guaranteed, one or two officers were to be appointed specially to take charge of him; and he was "to be exposed to no indignity or needless hardship."||

In fact, the impression entertained at Calcutta and in England was, that the royal family were treated with undue consideration; and this view of the case was fostered by certain journals. The *Friend of India* called "the attention of the government of India to the state of things existing in the city of Delhi;" and declared that the prince, Jumma Bukht, was in the habit of riding through the city "on an elephant, with two British officers behind him, to do him honour." With an evident misgiving as to the credit likely to attach to an assertion issuing from such a prejudiced authority, the editor adds—"The statement appears so incredible, that it may be set

* Hodson's *Twelve Years in India*, p. 330.

† *Ibid.*, p. 370.

‡ Mrs. Coopland's *Escape from Gwalior*, p. 277.

§ *Times*, December, 1858.

|| Secretary of government to General Wilson; Calcutta, October 10th, 1857.

aside as a mere newspaper report; but we entreat the government to believe that it is one which we would not publish without such information as produces absolute certainty."

The *Lahore Chronicle* went a little farther: described the king as surrounded with the insignia of royalty; attended upon by a large retinue; and stated, that he coolly insulted the British officers who visited him;—all of which would probably have passed unnoticed, had not the editor thought fit to point out Mr. O—— and Colonel H—— as delinquents, on whose heads to pour forth the "universal feeling of indignation and disgust" which had been "created in all Christian classes in the country."

Mr. Ommaney was one of the civil functionaries in Delhi. Colonel Hogge, the other gentleman denounced by the initial letter of his name, was a remarkably skilful and popular officer, whose services during the siege and storm, as director of the artillery dépôt, had been warmly commended in official despatches and private correspondence.* He at once addressed the editor of the *Lahore Chronicle*, and, in few and plain words, explained the circumstances which had led to the charge of "lackeying the king's son about the streets of Delhi." Colonel Hogge stated that he visited the king with the commissioner and several officers of rank; that Jumma Bukht, apparently a youth of fifteen or sixteen years of age, had asked "if he might be permitted to go out occasionally for an airing, along with any gentleman who would take him;" and as Colonel Hogge was in the habit of going out every evening on an elephant, the commissioner inquired if he would mind occasionally calling for the prince. An officer was present, who held high official rank in the army; but neither he nor any of the others could see any objection to the performance of an act of ordinary humanity; and the colonel twice took the lad, for a change from the close stifling atmosphere of his prison-chamber, into the air. The first time, having nothing but a pad on the elephant, the colonel put his companion in front, to prevent him from slipping off and

trying to escape: the second time he placed him behind; without, however, considering the point of any importance.

The letter concluded with the following remarks regarding Jumma Bukht:—"I found him a very intelligent lad. He gave me a good deal of information about the mutineers, their leaders, and their plans; and had I remained longer at Delhi, I should probably have taken him out oftener; but having returned to Meerut on the 26th of October, I had no further opportunity."†

People in England were greatly puzzled by the conflicting accounts received from India, especially from Delhi, regarding the condition of the royal family, and the cases of mutilation and torture alleged against the sepoys; not one of which had been proved, notwithstanding the efforts to identify and provide for any such victims, made by the committee entrusted with the enormous sums raised throughout the British empire, and liberally augmented by contributions from the four quarters of the globe, on behalf of the European sufferers by the Indian mutiny.

Mr. Layard, M.P. for Aylesbury, whose Eastern experience had rendered him incredulous of newspaper horrors, resolved to judge for himself. He visited Delhi; and on his return to England, gave, at a public meeting in May, 1858, the following description of his interview with the king:—

"I saw that broken-down old man—not in a room, but in a miserable hole of his palace—lying on a bedstead, with nothing to cover him but a miserable tattered coverlet. As I beheld him, some remembrance of his former greatness seemed to arise in his mind. He rose with difficulty from his couch; showed me his arms, which were eaten into by disease and by flies—partly from want of water; and he said, in a lamentable voice, that he had not enough to eat! Is that a way in which, as Christians, we ought to treat a king? I saw his women too, all huddled up in a corner with their children; and I was told that all that was allowed for their support was 16s. a-day! Is not that punishment enough for one that has occupied a throne?"

Of course, a torrent of invective was poured upon Mr. Layard by the anti-native party, both in England and in India; and every possible motive alleged for his conduct except the dictates of conscience and humanity. Moreover, he stated that, while

* Brigadier-general Wilson bears strong testimony to the voluntary service rendered by "that excellent officer, Lieutenant-colonel Hogge" (despatch, September 22nd, 1857). And Greathed, in writing to his wife, speaks of the formidable appearance of the ordnance park, and dwells on the exertions and

precautions taken to ensure efficiency; adding, that Colonel Hogge was the life of his department: every one worked cheerfully under him.—*Letters*, p. 251.

† *Times*, December 29th, 1857. The *Lahore Chronicle* is quoted at length in the *Star*, December 29th, 1857.

in India, he had tried to find a case of mutilation, but without the slightest success; and he believed the horrible and revolting cruelties ascribed to the natives to be utterly untrue; and asserted, that they "had never, even in a solitary instance, been authenticated."*

Mr. Russell, the special correspondent of the *Times*, who followed Mr. Layard to India (leaving London at the close of December, 1857); confirmed his statements, to a considerable extent,† as regarded the unfounded assertions made with regard to native atrocities, and likewise with respect to the king, who, in June, 1858, was still shut up in the same dreary prison, and clothed in "garments scanty and foul." Mr. Russell's interview with the old king took place while the latter was suffering, or rather just rallying, after a violent attack of vomiting. The privacy which would be allowed a condemned murderer in England, would have been deemed "maudlin sentimentality" in the present case; but the commissioner (Mr. Saunders) and his companions waited in an open court outside, till the sickness of the king abated. Then, while he yet gasped for breath, they entered the dingy, dark passage, which contained no article of furniture "but a charpoy, such as those used by the poorest Indians. The old man cowered on the floor on his crossed legs, with his back against a mat, which was suspended from doorway to doorway, so as to form a passage about twelve feet wide by twenty-four in length." Mr. Russell's picture of the king takes its character, in no small degree, from the surrounding circumstances of dirt and degradation. He probably did not see quite as clearly as Mr. Layard had done, the disgrace reflected on his custodians by the abject misery to which the aged king was subjected. The reason is obvious. Mr. Russell went in company with his host the commissioner, and other leading authorities, all of whom were anxious to secure the good word of the man who had the ear of Europe turned to him, and the *Times* for a speaking-trumpet. Nor is it wonderful that the frank hospitality of "the ruddy, comely English gentleman"—"the excellent commissioner," Mr. Saunders,

and the ready courtesy of "the fair English-woman," his wife, should have thrown a little dust even in the keen-sighted, honest eyes of the correspondent. The portrait of the king is, however, a veritable Russell; but painfully, not pleasantly, life-like—

"The forehead is very broad indeed, and comes out sharply over the brows; but it recedes at once into an ignoble Thersites-like skull; in the eyes were only visible the weakness of extreme old age—the dim, hazy, filmy light which seems about to guide to the great darkness; the nose, a noble Judaic aquiline, was deprived of dignity and power by the loose-lipped, nerveless, quivering and gasping mouth, filled with a flacid tongue; but from chin and upper lip, there streamed a venerable, long, wavy, intermingling moustache and beard of white, which again all but retrieved his aspect. His hands and feet were delicate and fine, his garments scanty and foul. Recalling youth to that decrepit frame, restoring its freshness to that sunken cheek, one might see the king glowing with all the beauty of the warrior David; but as he sat before us, I was only reminded of the poorest form of the Israelitish type, as exhibited in decay and penurious greed in its poorest haunts among us."‡

In one respect, at least, the king retained and exhibited the characteristic of his race. "The Great Moguls were their own laureates;" and Shah Alum, the blind emperor, uttered, from the depths of his misery and humiliation, sentiments second only in pathos to those of David, when he, too, lay humbled in the dust. "The tempest of misfortune," Shah Alum declared, "has risen and overwhelmed me. It has scattered my glory to the winds, and dispersed my throne in the air." But, he added, "while I am sunk in an abyss of darkness, let me be comforted with the assurance, that out of this affliction I shall yet arise, purified by misfortune, and illuminated by the mercy of the Almighty." The descendant of Shah Alum (the present Mohammed Bahadur Shah) solaced himself in a similar manner; and notwithstanding his physical and mental decrepitude, had, only a day or two before Mr. Russell's visit, "composed some neat lines on the wall of his prison, by the aid of a burnt stick." The pride of race still lingered in "the dim, wandering-eyed, dreamy old man;" and "when Brigadier Stisted asked him how it was he had not saved the lives of our women, he made an

* Speech at St. James's Hall, May 11th, 1858.

† Mr. Russell, after referring to Mr. Layard's speeches and lectures, which "have been received with a shower of dirty dish-clouts from the well-furnished Billingsgate *répertoire* of the convict Cleon of Calcutta"—states, "there are many of his

'facts' [apparently alluding to cruelties committed by Europeans upon natives] which we know to be true: as the colonel [a Bengal officer, whose name is withheld] said, 'I know far worse than anything he has said.'—*Diary in India*, vol. ii., p. 124.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

impatient gesture with his hand, as if commanding silence; and said, 'I know nothing of it. I had nothing to say to it.' Jumma Bukht betrayed the same feeling. He rose from the charpoy at the sound of European voices, and salaamed respectfully; but the commissioner, hearing that he was ill, bade him lie down again; and, with another salaam, he threw himself on his back with a sigh, and drew the coverlet of the bed over his face, as if to relieve himself from an unwelcome gaze.

Mr. Russell was not a servant of the E. I. Company; and although he studiously refrained from censuring individuals, he spoke freely of the meanness and injustice with which the king had been treated before the mutiny. In fact, no unprejudiced person could look back on the rise and progress of British power in India, without seeing that our recent charges against the King of Delhi could not, by the law of nations, entitle us to set aside the counter-charges of him who never once abandoned his claim as emperor of India, and lord paramount of every other power, the Company included. In the first instance, the Merchant Adventurers kotooed and salaamed to his ancestors for permission to build a warehouse or two; and then they repeated the process for leave to fortify their factories, and defend their goods from the marauding incursions of the Mahrattas—those disturbers of the peaceful subjects of the Great Mogul. That a body of humble traders, so very humble as their protestations, carefully preserved in Leadenhall-street, show them to have been, should covet sovereign power even for the sake of its accompaniment of territorial revenue, was quite out of the question; and this attitude of deprecation grew so fixed, that despite the pride of individual governors-general, the Company maintained to the last a most anomalous position with regard to native sovereigns, and especially towards the King of Delhi. In England this was not understood, simply because India was never viewed as a national question, or thought of at all by the British government, except in connexion with the Company's dividends and patronage; and

it was only when some new financial crisis arose, that a vague misgiving was entertained as to the probable mismanagement of the sovereign power, as the cause of the unsatisfactory state of the revenue. Mr. Russell truly asserts, that—

"There were probably not five thousand people, unconnected with India, in the country from which India was governed, who, two years ago, had ever heard of the King of Delhi as a living man; or who knew that even then, in the extreme of his decrepitude, and in utter prostration of his race, the descendant of Akhbar had fenced himself round with such remnants of dignities, that the governor-general of India could not approach him as an equal, and that the British officers at Delhi were obliged to observe, in their intercourse with him, all the outward marks of respect which a sovereign had a right to demand from his servants. * * * Our representative, with 'bated breath and whispering humbleness'—aye, with bare feet and bowed head, came into the presence of our puppet king. More than that—the English captain of the palace guard, if summoned to the presence of the king, as he frequently was, had not only to uncover his feet, but was not permitted to have an umbrella carried over his head, or to bear one in his own hand, while proceeding through the courtyards—a privilege permitted to every officer of the royal staff. This was the case in the time of the last resident, up to the moment of the revolt, and in the time of the last captain of the guard, up to the time of his assassination!"

Facts like these, once published in England, altered the tone of public feeling; but, long before they became generally known, the fate of the King of Delhi had been decided, and he was spoken of as having reaped the reward of disloyalty and ingratitude. In the earlier sections of this work, abundant historical evidence will be found, to show that no member of the House of Timur ever owed the E. I. Company either fealty as sovereigns, or gratitude as benefactors. These obligations were on the side of the Merchant Adventurers, who never did more than pay back to the Moguls, with a grudging hand, a very small and constantly diminishing proportion of the revenues of certain districts, the whole of which had been originally assigned by Lord Wellesley for the support of the House of Timur; which the Company affected to hold, purely by right of an imperial decree. A summary of our dealings with the Delhi

* Russell's Letter.—*Times*, August 20th, 1858. In a *History of the Indian Mutiny*, by Mr. Charles Ball, which comprises a valuable collection of the chief official and private documents published during the crisis, the quotation from Mr. Russell, given in the text, is thus commented on:—"Surely if we contrast this abject submission within the

walls of the palace, with the haughty and irritating assumption of superiority that pervaded European society without those walls, proclaiming hourly a living lie to the astute people of India, we have little cause to feel surprise at the consequences of our own conduct, characterised as it had been by duplicity and arrogance."—(Vol. ii., p. 379).

family, drawn up by Mr. Russell, is too important to be omitted here; for, besides the strong facts and the nervous style, there is additional weight attached to it, as being written in Delhi by the special correspondent of the *Times*, in 1858.

"To talk of ingratitude on the part of one who saw that all the dominions of his ancestors had gradually been taken from him, by force or otherwise, till he was left with an empty title, a more empty exchequer, and a palace full of penniless princesses and princes of his own blood, is perfectly preposterous. Was he to be grateful to the Company for the condition in which he found himself? Was he to bless them for ever, because Polyphemus, in the shape of the British government, snatched poor blind Shah Alum from the hands of the Mahrattas, and then devoured him piecemeal? * * * The position of the king was one of the most intolerable misery long ere the revolt broke out. His palace was in reality a house of bondage; he knew that the few wretched prerogatives which were left him, as if in mockery of the departed power they represented, would be taken away from his successors; that they would be deprived even of the right to live in their own palace, and would be exiled to some place outside the walls. We denied permission to his royal relatives to enter our service; we condemned them to a degrading existence, in poverty and debt, inside the purlieus of their palace, and then we reproached them with their laziness and sensuality. We shut the gates of military preferment upon them; we closed upon them the paths of every pursuit; we took from them every object of honourable ambition: and then our papers and our mess-rooms teemed with invectives against the lazy, slothful, and sensuous princes of his house. Better die a hundred deaths than drag on such a contemptible, degrading existence."*

"Within the walls of this palace there was a population of more than 5,000 souls, of which no less than 3,000 were of the blood-royal, and descendants of Timour-lung. * * * The king seldom stirred out of late years, or went beyond the palace walls; but inside their precincts he was subjected to constant annoyance from his numerous relatives: the Great Mogul Olivers were always 'asking for more.' * * * They were in a state of such poverty, that some of these royal families were in want of their meals; and their numbers had increased far beyond the provision made for them."†

Every word of the fresh, glowing summary of Mr. Russell will be valuable in the sight of those who have the honesty and the courage to face the truth. The responsibility for righteous dealing with the still-existing princes of India, and the vast population in general, now rests on the British nation. If the strong, warm, public heart be permanently interested in behalf of India, great benefit may arise from the connexion;

but, if not—if India sink into a purely financial or party question, the patronage in the hands of an oligarchy will be far more dangerous to the constitution of the governing country, than it ever could have been in that of a middle-class mercantile body; and the consequences to the governed will be worse, inasmuch as the wilful ignorance, the neglect and procrastination which were the conspicuous failings of the Company's administration, are the very ones of which the colonial department of the state has been most generally accused. The men of the bureau, and the men of the ledger, have much the same temptations to guard against, only that the thirst for power predominates in one case, and for pelf in the other. Patronage combines both. The danger is great that the ministers of the Crown will follow the well-worn track of the old directors, who wrote excellent despatches—calm, moderate, and didactic—with one hand, while with the other—

"Half ignorant, they turn'd an easy wheel,
That set sharp racks at work, to pinch and peel."‡

This was literally true in some parts of India, as was proved by the revelations of the torture committee, and figuratively so in the proceedings connected with the extinction of several native states, of which Mr. Russell's account of the dealings of the E. I. Company with the Mogul dynasty, may serve as an illustration:—

"When Lord Lake received the emperor after the battle of Delhi, he could not be less generous than the Mahrattas; and accordingly, all the territories and revenues which had been assigned by them for his support, were continued by the British to Shah Alum. His stipend of 60,000 rupees per mensem, and presents of 70,000 rupees per annum, making altogether less than £80,000 per annum, were in 1806, in compliance with promises made in 1805 by the East India Company, raised to £102,960 a-year; and, in 1809, to a lac a-month, or £120,000 a-year. But Akhbar Shah complained of the smallness of this allowance for himself, his family, and his state and dependents; and, in 1830, he sent an agent to England to lay his case before the authorities, whereupon the Court of Directors offered an addition of £30,000 per annum, on condition that the Mogul 'abandoned every claim, of every description, he might be at anytime supposed to possess against them.' The control of this £30,000 extra was to be taken out of the king's hands. He refused to accept the augmentation on such terms, alleging that he had a right, according to treaty, to expect a decent maintenance for himself and his family; and the money was never given, the grant being annulled in 1840 by the directors, in consequence of his refusing to comply with the conditions annexed to its acceptance. The present ex-king adopted the objections of his father; and thus, since

* Russell's *Diary*, vol. ii., p. 51.

† Russell's Letter.—*Times*, August 20th, 1858.

‡ Keats' *Isabella*.

1830, when the East India Company offered to buy up some visionary claims for £30,000 per annum, admitting that the sum then given to the king was too small—the state of Delhi, a mere pageantry, has been carried on with increasing debt and poverty and difficulty. But more than this. While they were weak and grateful, the Hon. East India Company presented nuzzurs, or offerings, to the king, the queen, and the heir, as is the custom of feudatories in India. In 1822 they began to take slices off this little lump of pudding. In 1822 the commander-in-chief's nuzzur was stopped. In 1827, the resident's offering, on the part of the British government, was suspended. In 1836, the nuzzurs usual on the part of British officers were curtailed; next the queen's nuzzurs were cut off; and, in lieu of those acknowledgments of a degrading nature, the king, although claiming the same sovereign rights, and asserting his pretensions as lord *in capite* of the lands which once formed his dominions, received the sum of £1,000 per annum. The king was not permitted to go beyond the environs of Delhi; the princes were refused salutes, or were not allowed to quit Delhi unless they abstained from travelling as members of the royal family, and were content to give up all marks of distinction. And yet these rules were laid down at a time when the royal or imperial family were our good friends, and when we were actually keeping up absurd and ridiculous forms, which rendered our contempt and neglect of others more galling and more apparent. We did all this, and yet suffered the occupant of the powerless throne to believe that he was lord of the world, master of the universe, and of the Hon. East India Company, king of India and of the infidels, the superior of the governor-general, and proprietor of the soil from sea to sea.*

The statements of a succession of witnesses, regarding the petty personal indignities to which the King of Delhi was subjected for many months, have occasioned the mention of circumstances not properly belonging to this chapter, which was intended to end with the complete occupation of the city.

The capture of Delhi was a splendid achievement: the mass of the army, officers and men, were not responsible for the causes which produced the fearful struggle; and there is no drawback on the admiration due to the dauntless resolve with which they held their ground during so many weary months. The triumph was great: but even the shouts of victory had a melancholy sound to those who looked on wrecks of regiments (the gallant 60th Rifles,†

for instance), and thought of the strong healthy frames, the genial, hopeful hearts that never would return to gladden English homes. In looking back over the despatches and letters written from Delhi during the first days of its reoccupation, it seems as if public and private grief for the fallen, found a focus in the person of Nicholson, who, struck down in the heat of battle, continued for several days, in the intervals of agony, to direct the conduct of military operations.

General Wilson bore cordial testimony to the extraordinary services and popularity of his comparatively youthful subordinate; and in communicating to government the success of the assault, he stated, that "during the advance, Brigadier-general Nicholson, to the grief of myself and the whole army, was dangerously wounded." It was the simple truth: the whole army felt like one man for him "who was confessedly, according to the testimony of every Indian tongue, the first soldier in India."‡ After all, there was a better tie than the love of liquor or of loot between the Europeans and Seiks—their mutual appreciation of a great leader: and assuredly it was a humanising feeling, that made knit brows relax, and proud lips quiver, according as the answer to the oft-repeated inquiry—"Is Nicholson better?"—was cheering or the reverse. On the 23rd, hope was extinguished: "and with a grief unfeigned and deep, and stern, and worthy of the man, the news was whispered—'Nicholson is dead.'"§ His faithful Seik orderly says, that the general expressed himself "greatly delighted" at having survived to witness the complete occupation of Delhi. He further adds, that when the spirit of the Sahib had taken its flight from this transitory world, General Chamberlain, and some English gentlemen, came and cut each a lock of hair from his head. "At sunrise, several of the horse artillery came and took the general's coffin, and placed it on a bier behind the horses, and carried it once more towards the Cashmere gate. They made him a grave by the two roads by which the

* Russell's Letter.—*Times*, August 20th, 1858.

† The corps most prominently engaged before Delhi, were the 60th Rifles, Sirmoor battalion, and Guides. The Rifles commenced with 440 of all ranks; a few days before the storm they received a reinforcement of nearly 200 men; their total casualties were 389. The Sirmoor battalion commenced 450 strong, and once was joined by a draft of 90 men. Its total casualties amounted to 319. The

Guides (cavalry and infantry) commenced with about 550, and the casualties were 303. The artillery had 365 casualties; the engineers, 293: two-thirds of the engineer officers were among the killed and wounded.—Norman's *Campaign*, p. 47.

‡ Russell.—*Times*, August 20th, 1858.

§ Report from Lieutenant-colonel H. B. Edwardes, March 23rd, 1858.—Parl. Papers on the Punjab, April 14th, 1859.

assault was made. Brigadier Chamberlain, and some other distinguished officers, and also Mr. Saunders, the commissioner, came and did reverence to the body, and, having taken up the coffin, placed it in the grave."

It is easy to understand the admiration with which Nicholson was regarded by the Europeans as a master in the art of war, and by the natives for his personal prowess. The warlike Seiks were especially devoted to him; and one of them, standing at the grave, bewailed the loss of a leader, "the tramp of whose war-horse was heard a mile off." There is less apparent cause for the strong affection with which this stern, silent man unconsciously inspired his seniors in age and rank, his equals and rivals, and, most of all, his inferiors and subordinates. His despatches exhibit him as a man of few words; hearty and discriminating in his praise; moderate, but equally discriminating, in his censure: in all cases unselfish, unpretending, and "thorough." But of his private life, his opinions and feelings, little is known. Unlike the chief civilian connected with the Delhi force, the chief warrior died unmarried. No widow remained to gather up, with loving hand, his letters and other memorials; but he has left brothers and friends: and one of the latter, Herbert Edwardes, could not better employ his graceful, ready pen, than by giving to England a memoir of the man whom he has always delighted to honour. Meantime the body of John Nicholson rests surrounded by a host of his companions-in-arms, and near that of Greathed, who, it will be remembered, perished in the fierce grip of cholera, while the bullet did its slow work on the iron frame of the warrior.

At this time, also, heaps upon heaps of nameless native dead had to be disposed of; and the first permission given to the wretched inhabitants to return to the city, was conditional on their performing this most needful service. Again, Delhi seemed destined to become one vast burying-place. The interment of the fallen Europeans was conducted with all honour; their wives and children were sure of protection and maintenance; while the bodies of the vanquished natives were huddled out of sight, and their families left to starve. Some proud Indians, in their despair, followed the Rajpoot custom; and sooner than suffer their wives or daughters to fall into the hands of the fierce soldiery, killed them

with their own hands. What a strange thrill must have passed through the stout heart of Brigadier Inglis, and others at Lucknow, who had contemplated a similar proceeding, when they learned, that but a few days before that joyful 25th of September (when a shout of welcome hailed Outram and Havelock's arrival in the Residency, and when, in the words of Mrs. Inglis' touching letter to her mother, "darling John kissed me, and said, I thank God for his mercies"), many husbands and fathers in Delhi had, in their wretchedness, slain their wives, and fled with them "anywhere—anywhere out of the world!" An engineer officer, writing from Delhi on the 23rd of September, gives a terrible instance of this procedure. He is not in the least a humanitarian; but, on the contrary, one of those who rejoiced in the increased severity of the conquerors, which he illustrates in the following manner:—"Two of our Native sappers were murdered in the city; so we went out, and hunted up about fifty or sixty men—thorough rascals; and our men have been shooting them ever since. I saw twenty-four knocked over, all tied together against the walls." This witness does not mention what the sappers were doing when they were killed; but his silence is significant, when viewed in connection with the following observation:—

"I have given up walking about the back streets of Delhi, as yesterday an officer and myself had taken a party of twenty men out patrolling, and we found fourteen women with their throats cut from ear to ear by their own husbands, and laid out in their shawls. We caught a man there who said he saw them killed, for fear they should fall into our hands; and showed us their husbands, who had done the best thing they could afterwards, and killed themselves."

It matters nothing now to the thousands who perished at Delhi, whether their bodies are decaying in coffins or in pits, burnt by fire, and scattered to the four winds of heaven, or dissolving in the sacred waters of the Ganges. They have passed into a world in which, according to Divine revelation, there is no such thing as caste; and must all appear before a judge who is no respecter of persons—at a tribunal where the mighty and the mean, generals and covenanted civilians, "Pandies" and "niggers," will have to account for the deeds done in the flesh. For them, as for ourselves, we can but pray that all may find the mercy which all will need.

• *Times*, November 19th, 1857.

CHAPTER XXIII.

RELIEF OF AGRA; RESCUE OF LUCKNOW GARRISON; EVACUATION OF LUCKNOW; WINDHAM BESIEGED AT CAWNPOOR, AND RELIEVED BY SIR COLIN CAMPBELL.—SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1857.

THE public mind in England and in India fastened on three points of absorbing interest in the Mutiny, to which all others were regarded as incomparably inferior—namely, Delhi, for its political importance; Cawnpoor; and Lucknow, for the sake of the European communities imprisoned there. The consequence of this concentration has been, that the details of the events connected with these three sieges, have been poured forth with the freedom which the certainty of a large and eager audience was calculated to produce: and the information afforded on these heads has been so discussed and sifted, that the harvest of knowledge, but yesterday cut down by the sickle of the journalist, is to-day fit for the storehouse of the historian. This is the case, also, in regard to the outbreaks at the various stations. The actors have, for the most part, furnished accounts of what they did and suffered in their own persons: and, after making due allowance for prejudice and inadvertence, there remains a most valuable mass of evidence; the arrangement and condensation of which, in the foregoing pages, have involved an expenditure of time and labour which only those who have attempted a similar piece of literary mosaic can appreciate. But while our information as regards the Mutiny is thus abundant, that respecting the Insurrection generally, and especially the tedious, harassing war in Oude, is far more scanty. The voluminous records of the commissioners of various districts (now at the India House), must, at least to some extent, be made public, and many *Despatches* and *Memoirs* be rendered available, before anything like a satisfactory or comprehensive account can be written, without the strongest probability, that the assertions of to-day will be contradicted by the revelations of to-morrow.

The author of this work has, therefore, deemed it best to devote the chief part of his limited space to the History of the Mutiny, noting briefly the leading facts connected with the Insurrection.

Relief of Agra.—Shortly after the capture of Delhi, the health of General Wilson broke down, and he resigned the command of the force, and went to the hills. Before his departure, he dispatched 2,650 troops, under Colonel Greathed (including 750 Europeans), in pursuit of a body of rebels, stated at 5,000 strong, who had proceeded to Muttra. They crossed the Jumna, and then marched right across the Doab towards Oude, which they succeeded in reaching; the attempt to intercept them proving unsuccessful. The British force quitted Delhi on the 24th of September, but made little progress for many days, being occupied in burning neighbouring villages (the inhabitants of which were accused of harbouring sepoys), and in seizing suspected chiefs. A stand was made on the 28th of September at Bolundshuhur, by a body of the 12th N.I., 14th irregular cavalry, and a rabble of burkandauzes and chupprassies, with some insurgent Mohammedans. They were dispersed, with the loss, it was said, of 300 men: the British casualties were, six (rank and file) killed, and forty-five wounded (including camp-followers). The fort of Malaghur (seven miles from Bolundshuhur) was precipitately abandoned by its owner, Wullydad Khan, on the approach of the British; and a halt was made there, because the number of sick and wounded already exceeded the means of carriage, which was sent for to Meerut, whither the patients were conveyed. The defences of Malaghur were destroyed on the 2nd of October, and the column moved off to Alighur, of which city they took possession without losing a life; as also of a village called Akraabad, fourteen miles further, where the cavalry (of whom about 500 were comprised in the column) surprised, and slew, two Rajpoot chiefs of some note—twin-brothers, named Mungul and Mytaub Sing—with about a hundred of their adherents. After destroying the village, Colonel Greathed resumed his march, in compliance with urgent requisitions from Agra to hasten to the protection of that city, which was

threatened by the Mhow and Indore mutineers, who, after vainly endeavouring to induce Sindia to become their leader, had quitted Gwalior in disgust; and would have attacked Agra some time before the capture of Delhi, but for the difficulties thrown in their way by the Maharajah and Dinkur Rao. The chief part of the contingent still lingered at Gwalior, under the impression that Sindia would be compelled, or induced, to raise the standard of rebellion: his own household troops were scarcely less clamorous against the British; and the influence of the Mhow and Indore mutineers was so powerful, that the Maharajah, dreading that they would return, and either seize on him or oblige him to flee to Agra, took the bold measure of sweeping the boats, in a single night, from both banks of the Chumbul, and thus cut off the communication between the declared rebels and the waverers. The fall of Delhi rendered the former desperate; and the Mhow and Indore mutineers, reinforced by several bodies of fugitives from Delhi, seized seven guns from our faithful ally, the Rana of Dholpoor, and prepared to attack Agra.

On the morning of the 9th of October, a vidette of militia cavalry, which had been sent out to reconnoitre, was driven in by the enemy's horse, and pursued to within two or three miles of cantonments. This occurrence, proving the proximity of the enemy, was at once communicated to Colonel Greathed, and the column hurried on to Agra, and entered the city (after a forced march of forty-four miles in twenty-eight hours) early in the morning of the 10th of October, crossing the bridge of boats, and passing under the fort, from whence the entire European community issued forth to witness the welcome spectacle. Mr. Raikes was standing at the Delhi gate, watching the troops as they slowly and wearily marched past, when a lady by his side, pointing to a body of "worn, sun-dried skeletons," dressed in the khakee, or dust-coloured Seik irregular uniform—exclaimed—"Those dreadful-looking men must be Afghans!" Although the soldiers whose appearance elicited this uncomplimentary remark, were within three yards of him, Raikes did not discover that they were Englishmen until he noticed a short clay

pipe in the mouth of nearly the last man.* Such was the unrecognisable condition of the survivors of H.M. 8th Foot.

It was eight o'clock when the tired troops encamped on the parade-ground. The mutineers, it was said, had threatened to cross the Kharee, a small river ten miles distant; but had failed in doing so, and were "making off on hearing of the approach of the column."† Notwithstanding what had occurred on the previous day, no vidette was sent out to see if the road was clear; and without taking the slightest precaution against surprise, the greater portion of the officers dispersed to see their friends in the fort, while the men bivouacked on the cantonment parade-ground, awaiting the gradual arrival of their tents and baggage.

At half-past ten o'clock, while breakfast was in every man's mouth, a big gun was heard—and another, and another, and many more. People started. Surely it must be a salute; though rather irregular." The fact was, that the enemy had quietly marched in, cannon and all; and the call to arms in the British camp was given after the first hostile discharge of artillery had knocked over several men and guns. Here, an officer was hit while in the act of washing himself; there, a soldier as he lay asleep. An eye-witness describes "the scene of wild confusion which ensued," declaring, "that there was no command, and no anything; and camp-followers and horses fled in all directions."

The despatches of Colonels Cotton and Greathed confirm this assertion. The former states, that when he hastened to the camp and took command, he "found that the enemy, completely hidden by the high standing crops, had opened a heavy fire from a strong battery in the centre, supported by several guns on each flank, and were sweeping our position with a powerful cross-fire." Colonel Cotton remarks, that Colonel Greathed was apparently not aware of his being on the field.‡ In fact, the only point of which the rival commanding officers were mutually aware, was the presence of an enemy. Happily, the British troops, both European and Native, exhibited remarkable readiness in preparing to repel the unexpected attack, without waiting for absent officers. Colonel Greathed states,

* Raikes' *Revolt in the N.W. Provinces*, p. 70.

† Letter from civilian, dated October 16th, 1857.
—*Times*, December 2nd, 1857.

‡ Lieutenant-colonel H. Cotton's despatch; Agra, October 13th, 1857.—*London Gazette*, December 15th, 1857.

that when, on hearing the hostile guns, he galloped to the front, which he reached three minutes after the assembly had sounded—he found the artillery already in action; the 9th Lancers in their saddles (in every variety of undress; some in jackets, but more in shirt-sleeves), formed up into squadrons; and the whole of the troops, without exception, drawn up on their respective alarm-posts, as if for parade.*

Had the enemy pushed in without giving the British troops time to form, the advantage on their side would have been great; but, native like, they waited to see the effect of their big guns. The delay was fatal to them. It was not until our artillery was at work, that the rebel cavalry charged right into the parade. They took a detached and disabled gun for a moment, and were so completely intermingled with the British, that the gunners could not fire on them. "But," writes a civilian who had galloped to the scene of action, "the tired Seiks, sitting on the ground, formed square with the utmost coolness, and fired well into them. The Lancers were ready, and charged at them as the Lancers can charge. They [the rebels] were broken and defeated; yet some of them did actually sweep right round the camp and cantonments, and created such a panic among the general population as scarce was seen—every one riding over every one else in the most indiscriminate manner: in fact, there never was, and never will be, so complete a surprise. But by this time commanding officers had come on the field, and every arm was in action. Our artillery fought nobly—in fact, all did; and though it was some time before we could find exactly where we were, and where the enemy was (and they attacked on three sides at once), eventually they were repulsed, and began to retreat."† The rebels at first retired in some order: but before they had proceeded far they abandoned three guns, and their retreat became a flight. Led by "Gun Cotton," the tired column continued the pursuit until the

rebel camp, which was within five miles of the city, was reached, the guns (thirteen in all) and baggage seized, and the Mhow and Indore brigades completely dispersed, excepting the fugitive cavalry. After a ten miles' chase, the victorious troops returned to Agra, having exhibited an amount of readiness, nerve, and persistence, unsurpassed in any of the brilliant episodes of the Indian Mutiny.

It is said that the surprise was on both sides, the mutineers having made the attack in ignorance of the arrival of the moveable column; but it is highly improbable that the native population round Agra, aggrieved as they had been by the village-burning system, would have allowed the insurgents to remain in ignorance of this event. The fact that, "for the first time in the history of beleaguered Agra, all the newsmongers were of one accord," is itself an indication of some latent motive. At all events, the peasantry were cruelly punished for their alleged disloyalty; for the troops are officially stated to have fired all the villages "which had allowed the rebels to pass without sending word to Agra."‡

The total casualties on our side, were eleven killed, fifty-six wounded, and two missing; the loss of horses was very severe, amounting to sixty-nine killed and wounded. No less than 2,000 natives were stated to have perished.§ That evening, the Motee Musjid, or Pearl Mosque, the most graceful building in India, received the sick and wounded. Mrs. Raikes and other ladies divided themselves into watches, attending night and day, at stated intervals, for several weeks; and never, during the whole time, was a word uttered by a soldier which could shock the ears of their gentle nurses.||

All immediate cause of anxiety regarding Agra being now removed, the column quitted that city on the 15th of October. On the 18th, Brigadier Hope Grant, C.B., of H.M. 9th Lancers, joined the force, and assumed the command. A halt was made at Mynpoorie; the abandoned fort blown up; the

* Lieutenant-colonel Greathed's despatch; Agra, Oct. 13th, 1857.—*London Gazette*, Dec. 15th, 1857.

† *Times*, December 2nd, 1857.

‡ Norman's *Campaign of the Delhi Army*, p. 63.

§ Letter from Agra.—*Daily News*, Nov. 30, 1857.

|| Raikes' *Revolt in the N.W. Provinces*, p. 72.

The efforts of several ladies at various stations, especially of Miss Tucker at Benares, appear to have contributed to the spiritual, no less than the physical, well-being of the patients. Several interesting narratives are given in a little book,

entitled *The British Soldier in India* (Dalton, 28, Cockspur-street, 1860); especially one regarding Campbell, a private of the 93rd Highlanders, whose attachment to the Coolie who nursed him with unwearying care, is touchingly told. The first thing he did on rising from his sick bed, was to go to the bazaar, purchase materials for a suit of clothes (including a very smart turban) for his friend, and have them made by a native tailor, under his own inspection. Then he purchased a pair of white kid gloves, as a Christmas gift for Miss Tucker.

rajah's property seized; and £25,000, left in the government treasury when the outbreak took place, were recovered and carried away. On the 26th, the troops reached Cawnpore, and there halted, awaiting the orders of the commander-in-chief.

Meanwhile Sir Colin Campbell had completed his onerous labours at Calcutta. The difficulties he had to contend with there, were of a nature peculiarly trying to a person of his active, resolute habit of mind. His first trial arose from the dilatoriness of the authorities in Leadenhall-street; through which, at the very height of the crisis, while the British public spoke of the commander-in-chief as having been sent out "under circumstances which made him very nearly a dictator," he was actually excluded from the Calcutta council for a fortnight, waiting the reception of the necessary forms; and when these arrived, and he was at length sworn in, he found himself only one of a council by no means inclined to espouse his views; but, on the contrary, opposed to many of them, and specially to the rapidity and vigour of his military arrangements, and to his conviction of the necessity of concentrating the troops in large bodies upon the most important points, even though such concentration might involve great immediate local sacrifices. There was another difficulty, the existence of which is clearly traceable in Sir Colin's despatches and general orders—namely, the relaxation of discipline among the European officers, which had arisen from the practical dissolution of anything like a central authority; the natural result being, that the commanders of garrisons and detached forts, became accustomed to reason upon, instead of to obey, an order; and disobeyed it altogether, if, in their opinion, and looking to the state of affairs around them, its execution was inexpedient. The loose reins were, however, gathered up by the new commander-in-chief with quiet determination; and at length, the most wearisome portion of his task being accomplished, he quitted Calcutta on the 27th of October, and travelled, day and night, by horse dâk to the seat of war. Between the Soane river and Benares, he narrowly escaped falling into the hands of a body of the mutinous 32nd N.I., who were crossing the road at the very moment he came up. On the 1st of November he reached Allahabad; and, on the 2nd, he arrived

at Futtehpore (half-way to Cawnpore), just as a body of British troops, consisting of H.M. 53rd Foot, 93rd Foot, the Naval Brigade, under Captain Peel, and a company of Royal Engineers, had defeated at Kudjwa, twenty miles distant, a considerable force, composed of the Dinapore mutineers. The action had been severe, and the victory for some time doubtful.*

The mutineers had retreated to Calpee, on the Jumna, to join a body of the Nana's adherents, commanded by Tantia Topee, whose name then, for the first time, took a prominent position in the accounts of our spies. Azim Oollah had been paramount while treachery and massacre were viewed as the means of elevating the Nana to a throne; but now that military ability was needful, the authority devolved on Tantia Topee, a Brahmin, born at Ahmednuggur, who had been from boyhood in the immediate service of the Nana. To the moment of his death he persisted in denying having borne any part in the Cawnpore massacre; and the probability is, that he spoke the truth; for his fearless, unyielding disposition rendered him indifferent to pleasing or displeasing the Europeans. As a Brahmin, the slaughter of women and children must have been utterly repugnant to his principles; and his study of the old predatory system of Mahratta warfare, would show him that such crimes were denounced by the greatest men of his nation. The zeal and fidelity which he evinced in the service of his hateful master, were extraordinary.

Tantia Topee was nearly fifty years of age; five feet six inches in height; stout, and well made, with an intelligent face and a large head, of great breadth from ear to ear. His piercing black eyes were surmounted by sharply-arched, grey eyebrows; and the hair, with which his head was abundantly covered—as well as that of his beard, moustache, and whiskers, was of the same colour. His look and bearing gave promise of prompt action, and dogged fixity of purpose. The mutineers rallied round him with a confidence they never evinced in any other leader; and it was under his banner that the Gwalior contingent placed themselves when, on the 13th of October, they broke away from Sindia, and, after destroying and defacing their late cantonments, quitted Gwalior, burning and wasting the country

* *Lord Clyde's Campaign*; by Lieutenant-colonel Alison.—*Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, October, 1858.

as they went, to revenge themselves on the Maharajah, whom they denounced as the great enemy and betrayer of their cause. They did not reach Calpee until nearly the end of November: but the prospect of their earlier arrival greatly increased the difficulties of the commander-in-chief, whose whole force, of all arms, did not exceed 4,200 men; and who had to choose between the rescue of the Lucknow garrison from the grasp of a strongly posted rebel army, numbering at least 60,000, and the safety of the intrenched camp at Cawnpoor, which covered the boat-bridge across the Ganges, and commanded the line of communication with Allahabad. At the same time, the reports from the Punjab were not satisfactory; an uneasy feeling was officially spoken of, which was privately explained as meaning, that the wild tribes round Mooltan had risen and interrupted, if not cut off, our communication with Lahore.

The position of Sindia, from being difficult, was fast becoming one of personal peril; the example of the Gwalior contingent going off in defiance, with a siege-train and abundant munitions of war, being almost irresistible to his household troops. Outram wrote from Lucknow (October 28th), expressing his anxiety "to prevent the force being hurried from Cawnpoor to the Alumbagh;" declaring, that it was obviously to the advantage of the state that the Gwalior rebels, then said to be preparing to cross into the Doab, should be first effectually destroyed, and that the relief of Lucknow should be a secondary consideration. The post at the Alumbagh had been strengthened and supplied with food; but of the Lucknow garrison, Outram could only say—"We can manage to screw on, if absolutely necessary, till near the end of November, on further reduced rations. Only the longer we remain, the less physical strength we shall have to aid our friends with when they do advance, and the fewer guns shall we be able to move out in co-operation." This letter was unfortunate in its effect on Sir Colin Campbell; for he, knowing of old the cheerful and unselfish spirit of Outram, concluded the relief of Lucknow a matter of more pressing necessity than was actually the case; for, as Outram afterwards avowed, he was much deceived as to the quantity of grain in store (which greatly exceeded the estimated amount). He added, however—"There was no doubt the few remaining gun-bullocks would not suffice; and I was

fully prepared to eke out the time by eating up our starving horses."* Sir Colin could not entertain the idea of exposing the brave garrison to this extremity: their speedy rescue was clearly a paramount duty. On the 9th of November he quitted Cawnpoor, and, by a forced march of forty miles, joined the troops then assembling near the Bunnee bridge. On the 11th, he reviewed his small force in the centre of a vast plain, surrounded by woods. There were H.M. 8th, 53rd, 75th, and 93rd regiments; the Highlanders (93rd) being 800 strong—veterans, experienced, but not wasted, by the Crimean campaign, and enthusiastically attached to their Scottish leader. There were the 2nd and 4th Punjab infantry, a small party of Native sappers and miners, H.M. 9th Lancers, detachments of Seik cavalry, and a squadron of Hodson's Horse, under the command of Lieutenant Gough. Captain Peel and his "blue-jackets" were an invaluable addition to the artillery. By great exertions, a small siege-train, principally manned by the sailors of Peel's Naval Brigade, had been prepared, and commissariat arrangements made, to overcome the difficulties under which Havelock had succumbed.

On the following morning the force started, and that same evening encamped at the Alumbagh; not, however, without some opposition on the part of the enemy, who came forth from the neighbouring fort of Jellahabad, and attacked, with horse, foot, and guns, the head of the column as it approached the British post. The assailants were quickly driven back, with the loss of two field-pieces, taken in a brilliant charge by Gough's squadron. On the 13th, Sir Colin destroyed the fort of Jellahabad, and communicated with Outram by means of a semaphore telegraph, erected at the Residency and the Alumbagh; while the natives watched the working of the long arms of the machine in Lucknow, and vainly fired volleys of musketry against its many-coloured flags.

It is said that Sir Colin originally proposed to cross the Goomtee, move up its left bank, opposite the Residency, and, under cover of his heavy guns, throw up a bridge, and withdraw the garrison. But Outram pointed out so many local difficulties in this route, that Sir Colin abandoned it, and adopted, instead, that suggested by

* Letter, 27th July, 1858.—Russell's *Diary*, vol. ii., p. 416.

Outram; which was, to make a flank march across country, and advance by the Dilkoosha, Martinière, and the line of palaces, upon the Residency.

A brave and able European guide, perfectly acquainted with the locality, and the relative position of besieged and besiegers, had joined the camp at Bunnee; and the information obtained from him was very important at this crisis.

A faithful Hindoo, named Canoujee Lal, was the destined bearer of the despatches from the Residency, as well as of plans of the city, and various directions calculated to facilitate the advance; when an uncovenanted civilian, named Kavanagh, who had been acting as assistant field-engineer, volunteered to accompany the native messenger. Colonel R. Napier, chief of Sir James Outram's staff, communicated the offer to the general. He hesitated to sanction so perilous an attempt; but at last yielded his consent. Kavanagh went home to his wife and children, and parted from them at seven o'clock in the evening of the 9th of November, leaving his wife under the impression that he was going on duty for the night to the mines. Half-an-hour later he presented himself to Sir James and his staff, disguised as a budmash—that is, one of the ordinary mutineers of the city, with sword and shield, native-made shoes, tight trowsers, a yellow silk koortah (or jacket) over a tight-fitting white muslin shirt, a yellow-coloured chintz sheet thrown round his shoulders, a cream-coloured turban, and a white waistband. His face, throat, and hands were coloured with lamp-black dipped in oil, no better material being obtainable. This, the most important part of the disguise, was the least satisfactory; but Kavanagh trusted for success to the darkness of the night, to his converseance with the native language, and, most of all, to the courage and tact of Canoujee Lal, to shield him from notice; and the event justified his confidence in his companion. The two men passed through the principal street of the city, and found it dark, dreary, and deserted by the best part of its inhabitants. They had to ford the Goomtee, and to wade through one of the large jheels or swamps common in Oude; and, in so doing, the colour was nearly washed off the hands of Kavanagh. The enemy were strongly posted round the Alumbagh; therefore Canoujee induced his companion to proceed to the camp at Bun-

nee; and Kavanagh, although his feet were sore and bleeding with the hard, tight native shoes, consented to do so. About four o'clock in the morning of the 10th of November they reached a British outpost, and were speedily ushered into the presence of the commander-in-chief.

Sir Colin fully appreciated the worth of a service at once brilliant and useful: and there is something characteristic in the cordial praise with which he mentions, in consecutive paragraphs of a despatch to Calcutta, the gallantry of the uncovenanted civilian, and that of a young nobleman (Lord Seymour), also a volunteer, who accompanied the force during the operations for the relief of Lucknow. Mr. Kavanagh received from government a present of £2,000 in money, and admission into the regular civil service of India.

The march from the Alumbagh commenced at nine o'clock on the morning of the 14th, the men having three days' food in their havresacks. An expected reinforcement of 600 or 700 men (including portions of H.M. 23rd and 82nd regiments) joined the rear-guard after the advance had begun; raising the total force to about 4,000 men, including 700 cavalry. The route taken surprised the enemy; and no opposition was made until the British advanced guard approached the wall of the Dilkoosha park, when a smart fire of matchlocks was opened, and a considerable body of skirmishers fired, under cover of a grove of old trees inside the park; their white dresses, and the bright flash of their musketry, being conspicuous as they glided from trunk to trunk. After a running fight of about two hours, in which our loss was very inconsiderable, the enemy was driven down the hill to the Martinière college, across the garden and park of the Martinière, and far beyond the canal. The Dilkoosha and the Martinière were occupied by the British troops; a bridge over the canal was seized, and a lodgment effected in a part of the suburb on the other side. The troops bivouacked for the night without tents, with their arms by their sides. The advance was to have been resumed on the following day; but the necessity of waiting for provisions and small-arm ammunition from the Alumbagh, which, by a misapprehension of orders, had not arrived in time, caused twenty-four hours' delay; and it was not till early on the 16th that the army was again in motion. The Martinière and Dilkoosha

were still to be held; and the consequent deduction of troops, left Sir Colin only 3,000 bayonets wherewith to cut his way through the 60,000 besiegers of the Residency. The first point of attack was the Secunderbagh—an extensive building, situated in a garden of 120 yards square, surrounded by a high wall of solid masonry, loop-holed all round, and strongly garrisoned; while opposite to it was a village, at a distance of about 100 yards, also loop-holed and filled with men. The British force approached the Secunderbagh by a lane, or narrow defile, through a wood; and the enemy was evidently again taken by surprise. So hazardous did the movement appear, that “a staff officer remarked to his right-hand comrade—‘If these fellows allow one of us to get out of this *cul-de-sac* alive, they deserve every one of them to be hanged.’”^{*} But the natives did not recognise their opportunity until too late. The guns were pushed rapidly forward, and the troops passed at a gallop, through a cross-fire, between the village and the Secunderbagh. With great labour and peril, Captains Blount and Travers brought their artillery to bear on the inclosure; and, at the end of about an hour and a-half, the building was carried by storm, by portions of the 53rd, 93rd, the 4th Punjab infantry, and a battalion of detachments under Major Barnston. The garrison had no means of escape; the only gate being held by the conquerors. Many sepoy fought to the last; but some begged for mercy. None was shown:† not a man escaped, and five or six women are said to have been killed.‡ The slaughter was terrific: it was carried on by the officers with revolvers, by the Seiks and Highlanders with muskets and swords, until sunset, when more than 2,000 native corpses lay, in weltering heaps, in that vast charnel-house.§

When an entrance to the Secunderbagh had been effected, Captain Peel went to the front with his naval siege-train, and advanced towards the Shah Nujeeff—a domed mosque, with a parapet at the top, inclosed in a loop-holed wall, with an entrance covered by a regular work in masonry. A heavy cannonade was commenced, and

maintained by the British for three hours; but at the end of that time, it was manifest that we were losing, not gaining ground. “The men,” Colonel Alison writes, “were falling fast; even Peel’s usually bright face became grave and anxious. Sir Colin sat on his white horse, exposed to the whole storm of shot; looking intently on the Shah Nujeeff, which was wreathed in columns of smoke from the burning buildings in its front, but sparkled all over with the bright flash of small arms.”

The heavy artillery proved insufficient to the task: the place, if carried at all, must, it was evident, be won by the aid of the bayonet. The attempt could no longer be delayed; the troops could advance no further—could not even hold their present position much longer, unless the fire of the Shah Nujeeff were subdued; and retreat through the narrow lane could only be effected with great difficulty, at a risk of fearful loss, little short of extermination.

There was no alternative, and the assault was made. Sir Colin, not contented with directing the movement, himself took the lead—a fact which he passes over in his despatch; giving the merit of the victory eventually gained, exclusively to others. In this reserve he showed much judgment; for his habit of taking himself and his staff into the thickest of the fight, was, in principle, his weak point as a commander-in-chief; yet, in practice, it became an element of success.

The seeming contradiction between his extreme economy of the lives of others, and readiness to imperil his own, was very conspicuous in the early operations in Oude. While young officers wrote home to their parents to be of good cheer, for Sir Colin “never expended a man where a bullet would serve his turn;” the more experienced watched, with unceasing anxiety, the manner in which, when men and not bullets were needed to do the work, the life which was incomparably of most value was instantly placed in jeopardy. For glory or loot the old Highlander cared little, if at all: he was free from any love of killing for its own sake;|| but he had no ordinary amount of that daring which “turns danger to

* Colonel Alison.—Blackwood, October, 1858.

† Gubbins, p. 397.

‡ Times, April 13th, 1857.

§ Sir Colin Campbell himself states, in his despatch (Nov. 18th, 1857), that above 2,000 of the enemy were carried out dead.

|| In 1839, when Sir Colin Campbell was sent to Hull to assist in quelling the disturbances among the colliers, Sir Charles Napier remarked, that he was precisely the character needed: “a hardy soldier, but gentle and just;” adding—“I want not bullies to join the civilians’ cry for murdering the people to

delight." He was never egotistical, and rarely selfish; but when peril was to be encountered, then he seized the lion's share, and eagerly took his place in front of his troops—a mark for the foe. That he should have escaped safe in life and limb is marvellous. It is, however, possible that he may have considered the hazard he encountered, justified by its effect on the troops.

"The Shah Nujeef [he writes] was stormed in the boldest manner by the 93rd Highlanders, under Brigadier Hope, supported by a battalion of detachments under Major Barnston, who was, I regret to say, severely wounded; Captain Peel leading up his heavy guns, with extraordinary gallantry, within a few yards of the building, to batter the massive stone walls. The withering fire of the Highlanders effectually covered the Naval Brigade from great loss; but it was an action almost unexampled in war. Captain Peel behaved very much as if he had been laying the *Shannon* alongside an enemy's frigate."

Only Sir Colin's knowledge of the weakness of Native troops without European guidance—or, to use his own comparison, of the inefficiency of the bamboo spear without the steel tip, could have justified him in an attempt to storm such a place as the Shah Nujeef. Just as a practised chess-player will overwhelm a novice with a stroke which he could not venture upon with a more equal adversary; so Sir Colin, accustomed to Indian warfare, knew that the danger of hurling his troops against those stone walls, was worth risking for the sake of the advantage which might be gained by the British, could they succeed in inspiring the enemy with the madness of panic.

These anticipations were realised: the natives succumbed at the very moment when the victory was theirs; but they lacked intelligence to see, and nerve to grasp it. The struggle was long and severe, as the following particulars will show. They are gathered partly from private sources, but chiefly from Colonel Alison's graphic narrative; the authorship of which is evidenced by the omission of any notice of the service rendered, and the wounds received, by himself and his younger brother. When the artillery failed, Sir Colin collected the 93rd around him, and told them that he had not intended to have employed them again that

make an example. One may be required—so much the worse; but let not soldiers seek occasion for it, as almost all the civil gentlemen seem to do: let us avoid that as we would sin and death."—*Life of Napier*.

* Despatch, Nov. 18th, 1857.—*London Gazette*, January 16th, 1858.

day; but that the Shah Nujeef must be taken by them with the bayonet; and he would go with them himself.

The Highlanders were ready, quite ready, to follow Colin Campbell to the death; and not they only: the whole of the troops recognised the calm courage of the leader who never exposed a man of them to any needless peril or fatigue: they knew he had counted the cost, and were willing to share with him a danger as great as that to which the six hundred rode at Balaklava. The object to be gained was incomparably greater. The lives at stake were not merely those of soldiers, who might well be ready to die sword in hand: it was to rescue women and children that Sir Colin now led the desperate assault.

At the word of command, the royal artillery (Middleton's battery) dashed forward with loud cheers, the drivers waving their whips, the gunners their caps, as they galloped past Peel's guns; and, in the teeth of a deadly fire, unlimbered, and poured in round after round of grape. Peel worked his pieces with redoubled energy; and under cover of this iron storm, the 93rd "rolled on in one vast wave." The commander-in-chief rode first with his sword drawn, his form as upright, his eye as keen, as when he led the stormers at St. Sebastian in 1812. His staff crowded round him. The men fell fast; but the column continued to advance without a check till it reached the foot of the loopholed wall, which was nearly twenty feet high. There was no breach, and the assailants had no scaling-ladders. Two of Peel's guns were brought to bear within a few yards of the wall; and, covered by the fusillade of the infantry, the sailors shot fast and strong; but though the masonry fell off in flakes, it left the mass behind, perpendicular, and inaccessible as ever. The muskets of the garrison did great execution; the officers on horseback were nearly all wounded or dismounted. Sir Colin was not touched at this time, but had been slightly wounded earlier in the day, by a ball which reached him after passing through the head of a 93rd grenadier. The elder of the Alisons, while riding a little in advance of Sir Colin, in the hope of shielding him, was struck in the elbow and wrist by two balls, fired from a wall-piece, which shattered his left arm to pieces. The younger, whose sword had been shivered to pieces in his hand while he rode up with the storming

party to the Secunderbagh, had a second narrow escape. He was struck from his horse by a ball in the breast, which glanced off round his ribs, and came out at his back, instead of passing through his heart. The remaining members of the staff—Baird, Metcalfe, and Foster, with the two gallant volunteers, Lord Seymour and Mr. Kavanagh, who were actively employed in conveying Sir Colin's orders, and searching along the wall for some breach at which the men might enter—all had their horses hit in two or three places. Brigadier Hope (whose "towering form and gentle smile" were eagerly watched by the Highlanders) and his aide-de-camp were rolling on the ground at the same moment.

Sir Colin's brow grew anxious and careworn. By his orders the dead and wounded were carried to the rear, and some rocket-frames brought up, and thrown with admirable precision into the interior of the building. Under cover of this movement the guns were drawn off; and no one, not Sir Colin himself, anticipated the degree of alarm produced on the garrison by the fiery projectiles. As the last throw of a desperate game, Adrian Hope, collecting some fifty men, stole cautiously through the jungle, and reached, unperceived, a portion of the wall, where he had noticed a narrow fissure. Up this a single man was, with some difficulty, pushed: he saw no one on the inside; and was quickly followed by Hope, Ogilvy,* Allgood,† and others. These pushing on, to their astonishment, found themselves almost unopposed, and, gaining the gate, threw it open for their comrades, who entered in time to see the white dresses of the last of the garrison before they disappeared at the back of the fortress, being soon hidden in the rolling smoke and the dense shadows of night. The destruction caused by the rockets, and the unexpected appearance of some of the British within the walls, had produced the evacuation of the fortress.

The day's operations were thus brought to a successful close. Once again the men bivouacked under the canopy of heaven. No tents had been brought, and no campfires could be lighted. Before the morning dawned, the bells of the city rang out loud and clear; the beating of many drums was heard; and in expectation of an impending attack, the British ranks were formed.

None such was, however, attempted; and preparations were made for the expulsion of the enemy from the buildings which intervened between the Shah Nujeeb and the Residency. Outram, on his part, was not idle. He blew up the enemy's works near him; brought artillery to bear upon a building, known to the Europeans as the Mess-house of the 32nd regiment, but which, under the native rule, was called the Koorsheyd Munzil, or Happy Palace; made vigorous sorties, and opened a heavy fire on the Tara Kohtee and the Kaiserbagh, from his heavy guns, howitzers, and mortars. By the afternoon the communication was open; and although the road was exposed to the musket-shot of the enemy, Outram and Havelock ran the gauntlet, and rode forth to meet their deliverer. A long glad shout rang forth from the troops as they watched the evident satisfaction with which Sir Colin received the hearty thanks and congratulations of Outram,‡ Mansfield, Hope Grant, Adrian Hope, Peel, Greathed, Ewart, Norman, Hope Johnstone, Baird (Sir David), Anson, Gough, the Alisons, and scores of other officers were individually welcomed; and the defending and relieving force shook hands in a tumult of joyous excitement. The gain was great, but the cost heavy. The total British casualties were 122 killed, and 414 wounded.

The relief of the Residency was speedily followed by its evacuation; for Sir Colin knew that his presence was imperatively needed at Cawnpore. He had resolved on seeing the women and children placed in safety; and, if possible, without subjecting them to the chance of a stray shot. Sir James Outram thought that if the Kaiserbagh were destroyed, two strong brigades of 600 men would suffice to hold the city. Sir Colin considered, that to leave another small garrison in Lucknow, would be "to repeat a military error;" and resolved on placing a strong movable division at the Alumbagh, as the best means of holding the city in check, and overawing the surrounding country. The Residency was, he said, a false position, and could not be reached without severe loss on the part of a relieving army: he further avowed his opinion, that the annexation of Oude was an impolitic measure, and unpopular with all classes.§

* Attached to the Madras sappers.

† Assistant quartermaster-general.

‡ Rees' *Siege of Lucknow*, p. 326.

§ Gubbins' *Mutinies in Oude*, p. 411.

The order for withdrawal was given by Sir Colin immediately after his arrival at the Residency; and everything was done to disguise from the enemy the preparations which were being made for the evacuation of the position so long and resolutely defended. The Kaiserbagh was bombarded on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd of November; and the rebels, in momentary expectation of the storming of the three breaches made in the walls, never dreamed of what was taking place within the Residency compound.

On the night of the 19th, the women and children, the sick and wounded, the state prisoners, the king's treasure and jewels, £240,000 in money, and all the guns worth taking away, were safely transferred from the Residency to the camp of Sir Colin Campbell at the Dilkoocha, without exciting the notice of the enemy. The removal was attended with extreme anxiety to the commander-in-chief; who, moreover, then ascertained that his movements had been needlessly hastened by the unfortunate mistake regarding the quantity of grain remaining in store, which was proved by the amount left behind for want of means of carriage. The proceedings, at this crisis, excited great interest in England, and every little detail was seized and dwelt on in the newspapers. Many of the alleged incidents were wholly fictitious. The anecdote related by Mr. Rees, and alluded to by other writers,* regarding the surprise with which Sir Colin beheld the dainties set before him at "Gubbins' house;" and his alleged inquiry, "why they had not been given to the starving garrison?"—had its origin in Lucknow; which was not the case with the tale regarding the Scotchwoman, who was alleged to have been the first to communicate to the Lucknow garrison the approach of the relieving force; she hearing the pibroch of the Highlanders playing the "Campbells are coming," when dull lowland ears could detect nothing but the accustomed roar of cannon. The "Jessie Brown" story†—for

such was the name of the fictitious heroine—like the writing on the Cawnpore slaughter-house, carried its own refutation with it; but the report regarding Sir Colin had more probability. It was incorrect; for he never visited Gubbins' house, much less dined there. His life was, however, one unvarying protest against luxury; and Mrs. Inglis, in describing him to her friends in England, remarks—"Sir Colin is much liked: he is living now exactly as a private soldier; takes his rations, and lies down whenever he can, to rest." The insight which the different narratives of the siege afford into the strangely varied phases of life in Lucknow (so opposite to the monotonous uniformity of misery endured at Cawnpore, where every vestige of conventionality had perished), renders it easy to understand Mr. Russell's account of the embarrassing ingredient which the care of so many ladies and children (not to mention ladies' maids) formed in the calculations of the commander-in-chief. "He was in a fever at the various small delays which they considered necessary; and, courteous as he is to women, he for once was obliged to be 'a little stern' when he found the dear creatures a little unreasonable." The prolonged discussion regarding the amount of luggage to be taken, and the pleading for "these few little clothes-trunks," must have been trying to the courteous, kindly old bachelor, whose own notions of necessities and comforts were almost Spartan in simplicity: but he "sustained his position with unflinching fortitude; till at length, when he thought he had seen the last of them out of the place, two young ladies came trippingly in, whisked about the Residency for a short time, and then, with nods and smiles, departed, saying, graciously, 'We'll be back again presently.' 'No, ladies, no; you'll be good enough to do nothing of the kind,' exclaimed he: 'you have been here quite long enough, I am sure; and I have had quite enough trouble in getting you out of it.'"[‡]

* See Captain Goode's (64th regiment) Letter, published in the *Times*, January 15th, 1858.

† It was originally a little romance, written by a French governess at Jersey, for the use of her pupils; which found its way into a Paris paper; thence to the *Jersey Times*; thence to the *London Times* (December 12th, 1857); and afterwards appeared in nearly all the journals of the United Kingdom.

‡ *Times*, April 13th, 1857. Mr. Russell added, that "in order to make a proper effect, most of the

ladies came out in their best gowns and bonnets. Whether 'Betty gave the cheek' a little touch of red or not, I cannot say; but I am assured the array of fashion, though somewhat behind the season, owing to the difficulty of communicating with the *Calcutta modistes*, was very creditable." Captain Goode states, concerning the evacuation of the Residency—"The ladies had to walk out; and I went to see them, expecting to find them looking very miserable. Instead of that, they looked quite well,

The retirement of the garrison commenced at midnight on the 22nd, under cover of Sir Colin's outposts: then these were quietly withdrawn; the pickets fell back through the supports; the supports glided away between the intervals of the reserve; the reserve, including the commander-in-chief, silently defiled into the lane; while the enemy, seeing the lights and fires still burning, and no particular change in the general aspect of the place, thought the Residency still occupied, and kept up the usual desultory night-firing of matchlocks and musketry.

On the morning of the 23rd, with the last straggler* safe within his camp, Sir Colin issued a general order, in which he expressed his gratitude to the force under his command, in the manner of a man who draws his breath freely after a tedious, perilous adventure. With regard to the arduous duty performed by the troops, Sir Colin used these remarkable words:—

"From the morning of the 16th, till last night, the whole force has been one outlying picket, never out of fire, and covering an immense extent of ground, to permit the garrison to retire scathless and in safety, covered by the whole of the relieving force. * * * The movement of retreat of last night, by which the final rescue of the garrison was effected, was a model of discipline and exactness. The consequence was, that the enemy was completely deceived, and the force retired by a narrow tortuous lane—the only line of retreat open in the face of 50,000 enemies—without molestation."†

The arrival at the Dilkoocha was clouded by the death of Sir Henry Havelock, who had borne that designation only four days, having learnt from Sir Colin the news of his nomination as a Knight Commander of the Bath. The honours and wealth in store for his family he could hardly have

dressed up with white kid gloves; and made me feel quite ashamed of my dirty appearance, as I had been sleeping on the ground, in the dirt, for several nights."—*Times*, January 16th, 1857.

* Captain Waterman was left behind asleep. He woke two hours after the departure of the garrison, and, terrified at his position, ran on and on through the darkness of night, till, breathless and exhausted, he at length overtook the rear-guard. The shock affected his intellect for some time.—*Rees*, p. 347.

† Sir Colin Campbell's despatch, 23rd Nov., 1857.

‡ When the news of Havelock's death reached England, many verses were written in honour of his memory. One of his biographers declared—

"The heralds have made search, and found his lineage of the best:

He stands amid the sons of God, a son of
God confess'd!"

Rev. W. Brock's *Havelock*, p. 273.

Funch also made some strong assertions; but

anticipated, much less the extraordinary, though ephemeral, enthusiasm felt for him in England—ephemeral, that is, in its exaggeration; for, beyond all question, its object was a good and gallant man, and will doubtless be esteemed as such, when the reaction caused by indiscriminate laudation shall have passed away. His career had been an arduous one; and he sank quickly, but gently, at the last; his complaint (dysentery) being aggravated by the "bread-want," so severely felt at Lucknow. Mr. Gubbins, who went to the general's tent the day before his death, approached the dhoolie in which he lay, and found young Havelock seated on the ground beside his father, with one arm powerless, in a sling, and with the other supplying the wants of the dying man, who would allow no one to render him any attendance but his son. Sir Henry expired on the 24th; and his remains were carried to the Alumbagh, and there interred.‡

The whole force—women and children, sick and wounded, treasure and baggage—reached the Alumbagh without molestation; and, on the 27th, Sir Colin, leaving 4,000 men with General Outram, started for Cawnpoor with about 3,000 men, and the women, children, and treasure rescued from Lucknow. He took with him the wounded of both forces. In all, 2,000 helpless persons had to be borne along by troops only one-third more numerous. Bunnee bridge was safely reached the same evening; the general encamped a little beyond it, and there heard heavy firing in the direction of Cawnpoor. No news had been received from that place for several days, and it was evidently necessary to press forward as quickly as possible.

they were limited in their scope to this present life; and ended with the following line—

"Dead, he keeps the realm he saved!"

Mr. Russell (who left England in December) was surprised at finding, that "among his fellow-travellers, the [Anglo] Indians on board did not, as a general rule, exhibit much enthusiasm about Havelock." Still greater was his astonishment at visiting the grave at the Alumbagh, and finding it in the unclean garden-ground, used as a halting-place by the drivers of sheep and oxen along the Cawnpoor road. The letter H, rudely carved on a tree, marked the spot; and at the foot of it was a trench, about six feet long and three broad, which was filled with mud. The ground had "apparently fallen in, as if the wood or brick which had been used to protect the coffin, had become decayed." Such was the condition of Havelock's grave, November 28th, 1858.—*Russell's Diary in India in the Year 1858-9*; vol. ii., p. 335.

Early on the following morning, the troops, convoy and all, were again in motion. Shortly after the march was resumed, two or three notes were successively brought to Sir Colin—first announcing that Cawnpoor had been attacked; secondly, that General Windham, the officer in command, was hard pressed; and thirdly, that he had been obliged to fall back from outside the city into his intrenchment.

Cawnpoor.—General Windham (an officer well known in connection with one of the most conspicuous features in the Crimean war—the attack on the Redan) had received intelligence of the advance of the Gwalior contingent, and had asked, and obtained leave, about the 14th of November, to be allowed to detain detachments instead of forwarding them to Lucknow, by which means his garrison was increased, until, on the 26th of November, it numbered 1,700 effective men. Among the officers was Captain Mowbray Thomson, one of the four survivors of the first Cawnpoor massacre. His exertions mainly contributed to the timely construction of the fort erected there; which, after all, was but “an indifferent *tête-de-pont*, covering the bridge which was thrown at that point over the Ganges.”* An eye-witness writes—“But for his working hand-to-hand with his men and artificers, from day dawn to dark, day by day, as though he had a frame of iron, nerves of steel, and an indomitable will, the most important works would have remained unfinished when the late fearful storm broke upon us.”† Captain Thomson’s knowledge of native character, and his kindly disposition, gave him great influence with the natives, 4,000 of whom were constantly employed; the digging being done by the men, who received twopence a-day for labouring from sunrise to sunset; the women and children, who carried away the earth in their hands, earning each a penny.‡

Sir Colin Campbell’s instructions to General Windham were, “not to move out to attack, unless compelled to do so by circumstances, to save the bombardment of

the intrenchment.”§ The difficulty lay in deciding what circumstances would warrant a movement which at Lucknow and at Agra had produced such disastrous results. General Windham considered that it would be better to run the risk of meeting, rather than of waiting, the approach of the conjoined force of the Nana’s troops and the Gwalior contingent. He was quite new to Indian warfare: he must have heard how easily Havelock had driven the Nana from his positions at Cawnpoor and at Bithoor; but he does not appear to have understood, that the Gwalior contingent, a compact and disciplined force, possessed of a siege-train, and the knowledge needful for its use, formed a new element in the rebel cause; and neither he nor any other person, at this time, suspected the ability of Tantia Topee, or his manner of handling the Nana’s beaten and dispirited troops. Moreover, the English force was composed of detachments which had never before acted together in the field; and some of them (just arrived from England) had been engaged, under Windham, in two unsuccessful attacks against the Redan—a circumstance which Sir Colin himself subsequently alluded to, in reference to the second series of disasters at Cawnpoor.||

On the morning of the 26th of November, Windham set forth with 1,200 infantry, 100 sowars, and eight guns, in the hope of repelling 20,000 men with 40 guns. After marching eight or nine miles, he came upon the advanced guard of the enemy, drawn up in the dry bed of the Pandoo Nuddee. Falling upon them without a moment’s hesitation, he carried their position at the first rush, and chased them through a village half a mile in the rear; but soon the main body of the rebels was seen advancing in such strength, that Windham gave the order for retreat; and, closely followed, but not attacked, by the enemy, fell back upon Cawnpoor, and encamped for the night in a plain outside the city.¶

The next morning, the enemy, led by Tantia Topee, suddenly surrounded and assaulted the force. Windham considering,

* *Defence of Cawnpoor in November, 1857*; by Colonel Adye, C.B.; p. 3.

† Letter dated “Cawnpoor, December 7th.”—*Times*, January 28th, 1858.

‡ Thomson’s *Story of Cawnpoor*, p. 221.

§ Colonel Adye’s *Defence of Cawnpoor*.

|| Sir Colin, in conversing with Mr. Russell at Cawnpoor, “laid the greatest stress on the all-importance of handling soldiers judiciously when

they are taken under fire for the first time. ‘It may take years to make infantry which has once received a severe check, feel confidence in itself again; indeed, it will never be done, perhaps, except by the most careful handling. It is still longer before cavalry, once beaten, recover the dash and enterprise which constitute so much of their merit.’”—*Diary*, vol. i., p. 200.

¶ General Windham’s despatch, Nov. 30th, 1857.

it would appear, that he had only natives to contend with, and quite unversed in the Mahratta tactics which his opponent had studied so zealously, left his flank exposed, and made no provision for the safety of his camp. At the end of five hours' fighting in front, he proceeded, in person, to ascertain the state of things in the intrenchments, and found that the enemy had turned our flank, penetrated into the town, and attacked the new fort. An order was given for a general retirement within the outer intrenchment. A panic ensued; the camp-followers fled; and the advanced camp, with much equipage and baggage, fell into the hands of the enemy. In the hurried flight, a 24-pounder was overturned and abandoned in one of the narrow streets in the city. Colonel Adye and Captain Austin crept out at midnight with a hundred men, and brought it in.

Still desirous of not entirely shutting himself up within the intrenchments, the general made arrangements for holding the broken and wooded ground between the town and the Ganges, where the church and assembly-rooms stood. These buildings contained nearly all the field-stores and luggage of the commander-in-chief's army; which, with unaccountable imprudence, Windham had neglected to remove within the works during the night of the 27th. On the following morning the enemy occupied the town, erected batteries in front of it, and carried on the attack with such vigour, that, before the close of the day, the garrison had everywhere fallen back into the intrenchments; leaving the commissariat stores, including 500 tents, 11,000 rounds of Enfield cartridges, a large quantity of saddlery and harness, and similar camp requisites (for the manufacture of which Cawnpoor is famous), with officers' and soldiers' baggage, and private property valued at £50,000, in the hands of the rebels. There had been much determined courage evinced during the day; but its results were marred by the want of effective combination. The Rifle Brigade long held its ground most bravely; but the palm of suffering and of daring on that calamitous day, is generally accorded to H.M. 64th.

The guns from the centre battery of the enemy were committing fearful havoc amongst Brigadier Carthew's brigade. Perceiving this, the colonel of the 64th, Brigadier Wilson, headed a successful charge on the battery; but being unsupported, the

advantage, dearly gained, was soon lost. It appears that the movement was made without the order of the general commanding; for Windham, in his despatch, speaks of Brigadier Wilson, as having "thought proper, prompted by zeal for the service, to lead his regiment against four guns, placed in front of Brigadier Carthew." The regiment (H.M. 64th) was represented by only fourteen officers and 160 men; but detachments of H.M. 34th and 82nd, raised the number associated in the attack to 300. The chief loss fell on the 64th: seven officers were killed, and two wounded; while of the men, eighteen were killed, and fifteen wounded. Brave old Brigadier Wilson (whose horse, wounded in two places, carried him with difficulty over the rough ground) was pushing on with all possible speed to the front, shouting, "Now, boys, you have them!" when he was struck down, mortally wounded. The men carried him to the rear, while he continued to urge them to maintain the honour of the corps. Major Stirling then took command of the 64th, and was killed in the act of spiking a gun; as was also Captain M'Crea, a very promising officer, who was surrounded and cut to pieces while spiking the enemy's fourth gun.*

It is said that the charge was not only unsupported, but that the British guns opened fire on the 64th;† and Brigadier Carthew mentions the fact of his own troops firing in the dark into each other, as one of the causes which rendered his position untenable, and obliged him to retire without permission, and without waiting for the reinforcements which, in compliance with his request, General Windham was then bringing to his aid—a precipitancy censured by the commander-in-chief.‡

The retirement of Brigadier Carthew was but a part of the circle of misfortune which seemed to be again closing round a British garrison in Cawnpoor. The total losses, during the three days, had exceeded 300 men; and, worse than all, the heavy plunge of round shot into the Ganges, near the bridge of boats, showed that the enemy understood the importance of endeavouring to intercept the communication with the force then on the road from Lucknow. The vexed and weary garrison looked forward

* Letter from officer attached to the 64th.—*Times*, January 16th, 1858.

† Letter from a civilian, dated "Cawnpoor, Nov. 28th."—*Times*, January 16th, 1858.

‡ Sir Colin Campbell's despatch, Dec. 9th, 1857.

anxiously to what the next morning, or even the coming night, might produce, when the clatter of a few horsemen was suddenly heard as they passed over the bridge, and ascended, at a rapid pace, the road which led to the fort. The soldiers on the ramparts joyfully announced the arrival of the fore-runners of the relieving force. The parapet was soon crowded; and when the foremost rider, an old man with grey hair, was recognised as the commander-in-chief (he having ridden on, with his staff, in advance of the column), cheer after cheer greeted his arrival; till the enemy, surprised at the commotion, for a few minutes ceased firing.

The warmth of the reception was gratifying; but the position in which Sir Colin found himself, was one of complicated peril and difficulty. The unauthorised retirement of Brigadier Carthew occurred immediately after Sir Colin's arrival in the fort, and left the town in the hands of the enemy, who took possession of it during the night, and were allowed to retain it, because the entire force was engaged in the protection of the families and the wounded. The passage of the river occupied thirty hours, and was effected with perfect safety; the fire of the Naval Brigade (superintended by Peel), and of all the field batteries, as well as the guns from the intrenchment, having succeeded in silencing the rebels, who then proceeded to the assembly-rooms and adjoining houses, appropriated what they could of the property stored therein, and made a bonfire of the remaining commissariat field-stores and baggage of the troops returning from Lucknow.

Sir Colin's mortification at being compelled to stand as it were with his hands tied, and witness the conflagration, must have been extreme. He had laboured strenuously, while at Calcutta, to make full provision for the troops, and now the work had to be done again in his absence. His telegram to Lord Canning, reveals his fear of the procrastination which had already aggravated his difficulties; and he entreats his lordship "to give the most urgent orders for the transmission of great-coats, &c., to supply the deficiency occasioned by the destruction of all the clothing of the eight or ten regiments here and at Lucknow."*

Cool-headed as Sir Colin was when the safety of others was concerned, the Highland blood was apt to tingle in his fingers,

even when holding the pen; and the caution of the commander overruling the daring of the man, is conspicuous in the following paragraphs of one of his most interesting despatches:—

"I am obliged to submit to the hostile occupation of Cawnpoor, until the actual dispatch of all my incumbrances towards Allahabad has been effected.

"However disagreeable this may be, and although it may tend to give confidence to the enemy, it is precisely one of those cases in which no risk must be run. I trust when the time has arrived for me to act with due regard to these considerations, to see the speedy evacuation of his present position by the enemy."†

On the night of the 3rd of December, Sir Colin got rid of his "incumbrances"—all the families, and half the wounded, being finally dispatched from the camp; and, in the course of the two following days, his arrangements were completed for consigning the remainder of the wounded to places of safety. Meantime the enemy had vainly striven to destroy the floating bridge by fire-boats, and had been defeated in an attack on the British pickets.

On the morning of the 6th, Sir Colin, with a force composed of 5,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 35 guns, issued from the intrenchments, to combat 25,000 men, with 40 guns; divided into two distinct bodies—that of the Nana Sahib, under the command of Tantia Topee and Bala Sahib, the Nana's brother, having its line of retreat on Bithoor; and that of the Gwalior contingent, whose retreat lay towards Calpee. Sir Colin's plan was to throw himself on the right of the foe, which "was both tactically the weakest, and strategically the most important, point to gain;" defeat it before it could be reinforced from the centre; "seize the camp of the Gwalior contingent, and establish himself, *à cheval*, upon their line of retreat; thus at once striking at his enemy's communications, whilst he preserved his own."‡

The plan was admirable, and successfully executed. The struggle was protracted through the day; but it terminated in the complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy, and the capture of thirty-two of their guns, with only ninety-nine casualties on the part of the victors. The battle was full of remarkable particulars; but Sir Colin specially called the notice of the governor-general to the "incalculable service" rendered by "Captain Peel and his

* Telegram, dated "Cawnpoor, December 2nd, 1857."

† Despatch, December 2nd, 1857.

‡ Lieut.-colonel Alison.—Blackwood, Oct., 1858.

gallant sailors," in clearing the front with their guns: adding, that "on this occasion there was the sight beheld of 24-pounder guns advancing with the first line of skirmishers." The rout was complete, and was most vigorously carried out. Sir Colin led the pursuit of the Gwalior contingent; and Colonel Alison, in his graphic description of the engagement, and of the condition of the abandoned camp (which proved that the onslaught had been unexpected), writes—

"For fourteen miles the cavalry and horse artillery rode at the gallop; at every step ammunition-waggons and baggage-carts fell into our hands; every body of infantry presenting any appearance of consistency was ridden down and dispersed; the slaughter was great; till at last, despairing of effecting their retreat by the road, the rebels, disbanding and throwing away their arms and accoutrements, dispersed over the country on each side, and flying into the jungle and the cultivation, shrouded themselves in its thick cover from the red sabres and lances of the horsemen. * * * So complete was the surprise, that, in the abandoned camp, the chupatties were found heating upon the fires; the bullocks

stood tied beside the hackeries; the sick and wounded were lying in hospitals; the smith left his forge, and the surgeon his ward, to fly from the avenging bayonets. Every tent was found exactly as its late occupants had sprung from it. Many arose too late, for the conquerors spared none that day; neither the sick man in his weakness, nor the strong man in his strength."*

The triumphant reoccupation of Cawnpoor was the last salient point in the eventful year 1857. Sir Colin was anxious to proceed against Futteghur, but was compelled to wait until the return of the bullock-waggons and camels employed in the transport of the women and children to Allahabad, should afford him means of transport to the army. Meantime, the remains of the Gwalior contingent reassembled at Calpee; and Tantia Topee, with wonderful energy and perseverance, betook himself to the oft-repeated task of gathering together the Nana's rabble retainers, who seemed to have been scattered to the four winds of heaven.

CHAPTER XXIV.

REOCCUPATION OF FUTTEGHUR; SIEGE AND REOCCUPATION OF LUCKNOW.— JANUARY, FEBRUARY, AND MARCH, 1858.

THE object which the commander-in-chief deemed most important, was the re-establishment of communication with Delhi and Agra, by the reduction and reoccupation of the Central Doab. A great concentric movement was therefore made, by sweeping, with several columns, the rebel masses from all sides of the Doab upon Futteghur, and thrusting them from thence across the Ganges, into Oude and Rohilcund. Colonel Seaton, with 1,900 men, marched from Delhi by the Grand Trunk road, through the Upper Doab, in the middle of December, and, after defeating a large rebel force at Gungeeree and Puttialce, took possession of Mynpoorie, after encountering and conquering Tej Sing, the rajah, outside the walls. The position was important; Mynpoorie being close to the junction of the Agra and Delhi roads with that to Cawn-

poor. Brigadier Walpole, with 2,000 men, swept through the Lower Doab, in the direction of Calpee and the Jumna, by Akbarpoor and Etawah, and joined Seaton at Bewur, near Mynpoorie, whence the combined force proceeded to Futteghur.

Upon this point, Sir Colin, at the head of the main body (about 5,000 strong), likewise advanced, quitting Cawnpoor on the 24th of December, and clearing the country on his flanks as he advanced. Apart from any immediate military object, he considered it necessary, for the re-establishment of authority, that the march of the troops should be deliberate;† and, in a military point of view, the execution of his plan required, not haste, but precision, and completeness of execution. Precision is not easily obtained from Indian troops; but Sir Colin, with the assistance of

* Blackwood, October, 1858.

† Sir C. Campbell's despatch, January 5th, 1858.

General Mansfield, secured it in an unprecedented degree, by exertions of which it would be impossible to calculate either the amount or the value. Sir Colin had no intention of marching to Futtehghur, or provoking an encounter with the nawab of Furruckabad's troops, until the columns under Seaton and Walpole should have joined the main body: but on reaching the iron suspension-bridge across the Kalee Nuddee (Black River) on the 1st of January, 1858, he found a party of the enemy actively employed in endeavouring to destroy the bridge. In this they failed: the damage done was repaired in a few hours; and, on the following day, the troops were preparing to cross it, when the nawab's force, consisting of about four battalions of regular infantry (41st N.I.), a large body of cavalry, and eight guns, appeared to obstruct the passage of the river. An engagement followed, in which the British, without losing a life, defeated the enemy, captured eight guns (several of which had never been fired, having come up too late), and slaughtered great numbers of sepoys; the cavalry, under Hope Grant, pursuing the fugitives for five or six miles, spearing and cutting them down at every step, till they found refuge in their camp close to Futtehghur fort. Pressing on the next day, Sir Colin found the camp and fort, as well as the town of Furruckabad, abandoned. The enemy had fled in such haste across the Ganges, that they had not even cut the boat-bridge in their rear, or destroyed the gun-carriage manufactory, or set fire to the great stores of seasoned wood which it contained; and thus property to the amount of £100,000 was saved to government. A rebel chief, named Najir Khan, had attempted to make a stand in Furruckabad; but he was given up, with some guns which he had seized, by the inhabitants themselves, under the threat of the destruction of the town. "He was executed," Colonel Alison writes, "on the 4th, with some

circumstances of needless cruelty, having been forced to eat hog's flesh, and flogged severely first—deeds unworthy of a great and victorious people." The newly reinstated magistrate, Mr. Power,* appears to have been the person responsible for this barbarity; and Mr. Raikes mentions, that two nawabs of Furruckabad† were hung on the 26th of January, by Mr. Power's order, for being implicated in the murders and robberies of the British at Futtehghur. Who these two men were, does not appear; for magistrates were not, at this time, very particular about establishing the identity of the men they hung: but the real nawab escaped, and eventually obtained a more formal trial, and more lenient sentence. His deserted palace was found to be full of luxurious appliances; mirrors, chandeliers, pictures, books, were in abundance: no human beings remained there, except two or three old women in the zenana; but cats, parrots, and pet dogs roamed through the spacious rooms, clamorous for food. Round the family mausoleum, starving animals wandered—always, till then, cherished for their rare beauty; an elephant had broken loose, and helped himself to food; but seven beautiful horses, less fortunate, were tightly fastened, and stood pawing the ground, and looking piteously for some one to give them the grain, ready steeped for their use, which stood within sight, but out of reach.

The reoccupation of Futtehghur being accomplished, Sir Colin desired to follow up his advantage by the immediate invasion of Rohilcund, and the destruction of the rebel government established by Khan Bahadoor Khan at Bareilly. He wished to secure every step as he advanced—to leave nothing behind him; but steadily pressing on, to roll back the rebel force on one point, and destroy it there. Lord Canning was of a different opinion; and, by the imperative orders of the governor-general in council, the commander-in-chief

* Mr. Power was afterwards suspended for "severity, and other causes."—*Times*, July 7th, 1858.

† Mr. Russell, writing at Futtehghur in May, 1858, states—"In this very place we hung a relative of the nawab of Furruckabad, under circumstances of most disgusting indignity, whilst a chaplain stood by among the spectators. It is actually true that the miserable man entertained one or two officers of a British regiment in his palace the day before his death, and that he believed his statements with respect to his innocence were received; but in a few hours after he had acted as host to a colonel in

our army, he was pounced upon by the civil power, and hanged in a way which excited the displeasure of every one who saw it, and particularly of Sir William Peel. All these kinds of vindictive, unchristian, Indian torture, such as sewing Moham-medans in pig-skins, smearing them with pork-fat before execution, and burning their bodies, and forcing Hindoos to defile themselves, are disgraceful, and ultimately recoil on ourselves. They are spiritual and mental tortures to which we have no right to resort, and which we dare not perpetrate in the face of Europe."—*Diary*, vol. ii., p. 43.

(recognised as the first strategist in the British army) was compelled to renounce his matured plan; and, instead of proceeding to reduce Rohilcund, for which his force was fully adequate, was obliged to attempt the subjugation of Oude, for which it was wholly insufficient, in consequence of the strong detachments necessarily posted at numerous important stations, especially at Cawnpoor and Futtehghur. This interference came at a most unlucky moment; for "the army was concentrated, and in the highest spirits; the weather cool, and admirably suited for military operations; the hot months coming on, when movement is death."* Sir Colin behaved admirably. Instead of quarrelling with Lord Canning (as Sir Charles Napier had done with Lord Dalhousie), he gave way; remarking, that "the governor-general has absolute control over, and command of, the army in the field, so far as the direction of the campaign and the points of operation are concerned."† The general at once altered his arrangements, and commenced concentrating his resources in men, stores, and guns, on Cawnpoor; while he continued at Futtehpoor—a position which, by threatening alike Bareilly and Lucknow, gave no indication of his intentions. Here he remained for nearly a month, to the astonishment of his own troops; bearing, with quiet dignity, the abuse of the Indian press, for a delay which was forced upon him in entire opposition to his own judgment.‡ Friends and foes were equally ignorant of his intentions; and, by various feints, he kept the great mass of the Rohilcund troops on the watch for his expected movements. The rebels heard that he had personally examined the broken bridge over the Ramgunga river; and soon after this, 5,000 of the Rohilcund troops, with five guns, crossed the Ganges twelve miles above Futtehghur, and seized upon Shumsabad, a village in which British authority had been re-established. On the 27th of January, Brigadier Hope marched out against them, drove them from Shumsabad, captured their camp and four of their guns, and pursued them for nine miles.

On the 4th of February, Sir Colin's preparations were sufficiently advanced to ren-

der him indifferent to further concealment; he therefore proceeded to Cawnpoor, and from thence paid a short visit to the governor-general, who was then at Allahabad. On returning to Cawnpoor, Sir Colin expressed himself ready to march on Lucknow. But Lord Canning again interposed an obstacle. Jung Bahadoor, at the head of 9,000 Goorkas, was on his way to join the army; and would, it was considered, feel slighted if the attack on Lucknow were made without him. Sir Colin, who had by this time made ample provision for doing his own work in his own way, bore this new impediment with manifest impatience; until at length, wearied by the repeated delays of the Goorkas (caused by their bad organisation, and deficient arrangements regarding transport, food, and ammunition), he obtained from Lord Canning an unwilling assent (given in very vague terms) to start without waiting for these auxiliaries. Towards the end of February the move commenced, and the army was seen massing itself all along the road between Calpee and Bunnee, like a snake gathering up fold after fold, in readiness for a spring. The enemy at Lucknow watched with affright the strength of the force which they saw gathering with such slow, sure, almost mechanical action. Huzrut Mahal, the Begum of Oude, with prayers and tears, besought the chiefs to drive Outram from the Alumbagh before the main army should join him. On one occasion, when indignantly haranguing the durbar, she suddenly tore the veil from her beautiful face, and denounced her astonished hearers for their indifference to the wrongs and sufferings of their countrywomen. Repeated, but wholly unsuccessful, attempts were made on the Alumbagh; and in one of these (25th of February), the Begum appeared in the field, mounted on an elephant. But her efforts were all in vain: her short, uneasy term of power was well-nigh over; and she was to be driven forth, a hunted fugitive, from her native city: she had little to hope from the chances of war; for Colin Campbell, with 20,000 men and 180 guns, was advancing, with the avowed resolve of crushing all opposition with artillery. "No matter how long it may take,"

* Colonel Alison.—Blackwood, October, 1858.

† Russell's *Diary*, vol. i., p. 211.

‡ The general order issued by Sir Colin Campbell at the close of the campaign of 1857-'8, contained a reference to the plan of operations, as having been ex-

clusively framed by Lord Canning. This order was commented on in parliament by the Earl of Ellenborough, Sir James Graham and others, as proving the extent to which the plans of the commander-in-chief had been overruled by the governor-general.

he said; "I am determined to have no street fighting. I'll not have my men shot down from houses."

The progress of the siege has been minutely described by Mr. Russell, in whom Sir Colin placed entire confidence. The "correspondent" reached the camp shortly before the march commenced; and even he was unable to find words in which to bring before the "mind's eye a train of baggage animals, twenty-five miles long; a string of 16,000 camels; a siege-train park, covering a square of 400 by 400 yards, with 12,000 oxen attached to it; and a following of 60,000 non-combatants." The baggage of the commander-in-chief was contained in a couple of small portmanteaux, and he lived in a subaltern's tent. The chief of the staff was, it is said, equally moderate in his personal requirements; and it is easy to understand, that Sir Colin and General Mansfield, overwhelmed by the mass of baggage indispensable to the efficiency of the healthy men, and the care of the sick and wounded, were anxious to set the officers an example of abstaining from needlessly increasing the burden.

The army, though large and well appointed, was of course not sufficient for the investment of a city twenty miles in circumference; but Sir Colin considered that by operating from both sides of the Goomtee, it would be possible to enfilade many of the enemy's new works, and to close the great avenues of supply against the town. Sir James Outram, who had been withdrawn from the Alumbagh, was directed to cross the river, advance up the left bank, and turn the first line of the works, formed by the rampart running along the cañal and abutting on the river, which he crossed by means of bridges of casks, previously constructed, and ready in the engineers' park. A column under Brigadier Franks, which had previously done good service in its march across Oude, finished its separate labours by freeing the banks of the Goomtee (February 19th) from a considerable body of mutineers, and from a still larger number of insurgents led by Nazim Mehndie Hossein, the chief who, with his uncle, Mohammed Hossein, had once protected British fugitives; but had since joined the flower of the Oude aristocracy in rallying round the standard of the Begum, when her cause was desperate. The assault on Lucknow commenced on the 2nd of March; the river was bridged over on the

5th; and, on the 16th, the city was completely in the possession of the British.*

The points where the fiercest struggles took place were not the same as on former occasions. The Secunderbagh and the Shah Nujeeb were easily gained; but, here and there, a few men died at their posts with a resolve which, in an Englishman, would have been called heroic, but which, in a native enemy, was called folly, fanaticism, or worse. The Chuckerwallah, or Yellow bungalow (a building occupying an important position on the race-course), was evacuated by the enemy; but some sepoys remained behind, and defended themselves so desperately, that their assailants, after losing several men in killed and wounded (including Lieutenant Anderson, an officer of the Seiks), withdrew, and, by order of General Outram, brought heavy artillery to bear upon the house; which, having had the desired effect, the Seiks rushed in, and slaughtered all but one of the defenders. He, faint and feeble with many wounds, was brought out with loud yells, and deliberately tortured. A British officer who saw the whole scene, has described it with fearful minuteness. Mr. Russell's account rests on the authority of another eye-witness. The Seiks, assisted by some Englishmen, first seized their victim by the legs, and strove to tear him in two. Failing in this, they dragged him along, stabbing him in the face with their bayonets as they went, till they reached a fire of small sticks, "improvised for the purpose;" over which they held him, and deliberately burnt him to death. Those who can endure to follow these details further, will find them in Lieutenant Majendie's book. His conclusion is, that the saddest part of the scene was the fact, that "in this nineteenth century, with its boasted civilisation and humanity, a human being should lie roasting and consuming to death, while Englishmen and Seiks, gathered in little knots around, looked calmly on."†

The Kaiserbagh, and a palace in its immediate vicinity, named the Begum's Kothee, were the buildings in and around which the chief force of the enemy was concentrated. The attack on the Begum's

* It was said that Sir Colin telegraphed to the governor-general—"I am in *Luck now*." Sir Charles Napier, on conquering Sinde, used a single word, with two true meanings—"Peccavi."

† Lieutenant Majendie's *Up among the Pandies*, pp. 180—188.







palace was made on the 11th of March. The order, written by General Mansfield, under Sir Colin's direction, was, as usual, "cold and precise, and exact as a bit of Euclid." Every conceivable contingency was foreseen and provided for; arrangements being especially made for feeding the troops. But, for once, Sir Colin was not there to superintend the assault. A telegram had announced the approach of Jung Bahadur, and his official reception was deemed indispensable. The Jung (Mr. Russell remarks) did not possess "the politeness of princes," and was one hour beyond the time he had appointed; and Sir Colin, in full uniform, paced up and down the state-tent fitted up for the occasion, and listened to the heavy, rolling fire of musketry which announced the commencement of the assault, "as a hunter does to the distant cry of the hounds." His patience was almost exhausted, when Jung Bahadur, his two half-brothers, and a staff of Goorkas, made their appearance, all richly attired "in a kind of compromise between European and Asiatic uniform."

The Jung had not been long seated before a commotion was heard among the dense crowd of spectators. Hope Johnstone, clad in a hodden gray tunic, and covered with dust, strode up the line of the Highlanders, and gave his message from General Mansfield, that the Begum Kothee was taken with very little loss to the British, while that of the enemy was estimated at 500. In the course of the evening, Maun Sing, who had not yet resolved to cast in his lot with the British, visited the Jung in the Goorka camp, and is said to have made an attempt to vindicate his conduct; but his harangue was cut short with the ex-

clamation—"Oh! don't make excuses. Had I not visited London, it is likely I should have been on the other side myself." Maun Sing did not, however, venture within reach of the British authorities,* but soon fell back on his own fortress of Shahgunje.

That night, thousands of sepoys fled from the city. The bombardment of the Kaiserbagh was brought to a close on the 14th, by its unexpected evacuation. The garrison had, apparently, been panic-struck, and fled, leaving some princesses of the Oude family in the zenana. Sir Colin, on hearing this, immediately took measures for their protection. Two or three of them, together with one of the Oude princes (a deaf and dumb youth, twenty years of age), had been killed by a discharge of musketry when the doors were forced in; but the others were gradually calmed by the assurances of the British officers sent to escort them to a place of safety. One of the ladies, when leaving the room, pointed out to Captain Johnstone a box which stood beside her, as containing jewels valued at £100,000. He hid the box, fulfilled his mission, and returned to the zenana. It was on fire; and the box was gone. That day the Kaiserbagh was given up to plunder, and this was one of the prizes. There must have been many fortunes found there. The Seiks and Goorkas were by far the best looters. The British soldiery did not understand the business, and sold the rich jewels which fell into their hands for very trifling sums of ready money, and rum; under the influence of which, they devoted themselves to the gratuitous destruction of everything not immediately convertible into money.†

The plunder which was accumulated by

uniform cases, which contain estates in Scotland and Ireland, and snug fishing and shooting-boxes in every game-haunted or salmon-frequented angle of the world." Some officers chose to loot for themselves; and two are named as having been killed while so doing. The occupation, even when successful, was apt to thin the ranks: a few carbons of crystal were found to necessitate leave of absence, on account of severe domestic affliction, among the officers; and the rupees and gold mohurs hanging heavily round the waists of the soldiers, acted injuriously on the liver. The process of looting has been described by the same graphic writer from whom the foregoing accounts have been taken. The "banditti of H.M. — regiment" are depicted with their faces black with powder, cross-belts specked with blood, and coats stuffed out with all manner of valuables. They smashed the fowling-pieces and pistols, to get at the gold mountings and the stones set in the stocks. They burned in a fire,

* *Times*, June 4th, 1858.

† The property taken during the day of legalised plunder must have been enormous; and also that accumulated by individuals after the appointment of prize-agents. Mr. Russell speaks of the "bargains" bought by officers on the spot, from soldiers hot from plunder. A silver casket, full of gems, was offered to him and another officer for two gold mohurs and a bottle of rum: unfortunately they could not accept the proposal, for in India no gentleman carries money in his pocket; and the soldier would not hear of delay. "Shure its not safe," he said, "to have any but redde money transactions these times." However, seeing the disappointment of the would-be purchasers, he left them a nose-ring, and a butterfly with opal and diamond wings, for a keepsake. Subsequently a jeweller bought the prize for £7,500. This incident adds force to the statement made by Mr. Russell, concerning "certain small caskets in battered

the prize-agents, was estimated, on the 5th of April, as worth £600,000.* Fresh discoveries were subsequently made; and a few weeks later, the amount reached a million and a quarter.†

The total loss of the force under Sir Colin, from the 2nd to the 26th of March, was 127 killed and 505 wounded. Captain Hodson was one of the sixteen British officers killed or mortally wounded. He was not with his regiment, but was serving as a volunteer, and assisting in a search for concealed sepoy, when he received his death-wound. The surgeon of his regiment, who had the account from the lips of the dying man, states that Hodson "said to his orderly, 'I wonder if any of the rascals are in there!' He turned the angle of the passage, and looked into a dark room, which was full of sepoy; a shot was fired from inside; he staggered back some paces, and then fell. A party of Highlanders, hearing who had been hit, rushed into the room, and bayoneted every one of the enemy."‡ This, however, the Highlanders would certainly have done, whether an officer had been touched or not.

Among the wounded was Captain Peel. He had not long before received news of his having been made a K.C.B.; and his own pleasure in receiving the distinction was heightened by the cordial congratulations of his comrades, and the proud joy of the sailors. He was shot through the thigh while placing his guns before the Dilkoocha. The wound, though dangerous, was not mortal; and when the army quitted Lucknow, Peel, who was then slowly rallying, was placed in a litter obtained from the hospital; and in this manner is supposed to have contracted small-pox, of which he died, April 27th, 1858. His loss was felt as a public and private calamity. In him had fallen the foremost naval officer of the day—a leader who combined the rare gifts of inspiring his men with confidence in his judgment, and un-

bounded attachment to his person. There was no drawback on the character of the gallant sailor. He was a cordial friend and a chivalrous foe. Though the son of a prime minister, he had fought his way, step by step, to the position which he had achieved, while yet but thirty-four years of age; and it was truly said of him, that "there were not many men among the humblest soldiers of fortune, who would have cared to incur risks similar to those which he seemed to court, day after day, as the normal occupation of his life."§ He had hoped to share in the capture of Delhi; and his detention on the road was a severe disappointment; still he never murmured, but imperilled his life just as freely in every obscure skirmish as at Lucknow.

The loss of the enemy was but vaguely estimated. Upwards of 8,000 bodies were buried by the conquerors; but the rebel leaders all escaped. The Begum held out after Lucknow proper was taken, in a large palace called the Moosabagh, situated on the right bank of the Goomtee. General Outram was dispatched to assault the place, while Brigadier Campbell was sent to cut off her retreat on the south of the Moosabagh. The Begum made overtures for terms of surrender; but failing to obtain them, she hastened to escape from the troops sent to intercept or pursue her, and fled to Bitowlie with her son, Birjis Kudder, her chief counsellor, Mummoo Khan, and a large body of adherents. The Moolvee also fled, with a considerable following, in a different direction—a heavy price being placed on his head.

An interesting episode in the reoccupation of Lucknow, was formed by the rescue of the three survivors of the Seetapoor fugitives. The party who found shelter in the fort of Lonee Sing, rajah of Mithowlee, in June|| (including Sir Mountstuart Jackson and his sister; Captain Orr, his wife and daughter; Sergeant Morton and little

which they made in the centre of the court, brocades and embroidered shawls, for the sake of the inwrought gold and silver. China, glass, and jade, they dashed to pieces in pure wantonness; pictures they ripped up or tossed on the flames. After alluding to "many a diamond, emerald, and delicate pearl," as having made their way to England, the "special correspondent" adds—"It is just as well that the fair wearers (though jewellery, after all, has a deadening effect on the sensitiveness of the feminine conscience) saw not how the glittering baubles were won, or the scenes in which the treasure was trove."—*Times*, May 31st, 1858 and *Diary*, vol. i., p. 331.

* *Times*, May 31st, 1858.

† *Star*, June 17th, 1858.

‡ Hodson's *Twelve Years*, p. 370.

§ *Times*, June 5th, 1858.

The writer of the present work once asked Captain Peel, whether the story told of his having leaped from the foreyard of H.M.S. *Blenheim*, on the voyage from China, was correct; and if so, why he did it? The reply was, simply to try the experiment. It must be remembered, that this occurred before his Crimean and Indian campaigns had taught him grave lessons of the value of life.

|| *Ante*, p. 223.

Sophy Christian), though harshly used, were still kept by the rajah, safe in life and honour, until the 20th of October. He then surrendered them, in compliance with the imperative demand of the Oude durbar; and they were taken to Lucknow, and imprisoned in the Kaiserbagh. There they learned, that on the day of the entrance of the relieving force into the Residency, nineteen prisoners, Europeans and others* (including Sir M. Jackson's younger sister, Georgiana), had been massacred by order of the Moolvee of Lucknow—a person concerning whose identity much confusion has arisen from mistakes regarding his name.† At the time of the mutiny at Fyzabad he was under sentence of death for sedition, and he afterwards rose to be a leader of some eminence, by dint of courage and military ability. His tenets as a Sunni, or Sonnite, were opposed to those of the royal family of Oude, and of their chief adherents; and he became the head of a rival faction at Lucknow. Huzrut Mahal had no desire to embark in a *jehad*, or holy war, against the English: her one aim was the restoration of the kingdom to her husband, or, failing that, to her son, Birjis Kudder. Her minister, Mummoo Khan, repeatedly requested the captive officers to inform Sir James Outram that the durbar was willing to release the prisoners, and to allow the garrison to leave the city unmolested, should the British consent to abandon Oude entirely. The refusal of the officers to communicate this proposition gave great offence; but similar negotiations were attempted through Maun Sing. Sir James Outram appears to have been instructed by the governor-general to offer money, and nothing else, for the ransom of the prisoners; and this was of course useless, when the rebel chiefs

knew that their own lives were considered forfeited, and, in fact, that blood-money was offered for their heads. On the 16th of November, the male captives were separated from the ladies; led forth, and shot by order of the Moolvee, by a party of the 71st N.I. Sophy Christian did not long survive the loss of her kind protector, Sergeant Morton: she sank on the 24th.‡ But the two ladies were not quite forsaken. A native official, named Wajid Alea, attached to the household of one of the princesses, had befriended the prisoners as far as he dared, without bringing on his own large family the wrath of the Moolvee; and he, together with Anunt Ram, the vakeel of Maun Sing, contrived a plan whereby Mrs. Orr's little daughter was rescued by a kind and brave native woman, who carried her in safety to Maun Sing's city residence, and thence to the Alumbagh. Wajid Alea persuaded Mummoo Khan that the health of the captives was affected by their residence in the Kaiserbagh, and succeeded in gaining leave to remove them to a house near one of the main roads, from whence they were rescued, on the 19th of March, by Captains McNeil and Bogle, and fifty Goorkas—all volunteers.§ At the same time, some other Christians, Eurasians, and descendants of Europeans, were saved, as well as the whole family of Wajid Alea.

Jung Bahadur and his troops had taken part in the concluding operations of the siege, and borne their full share in the sack|| of Lucknow. When it became indispensable that further outrages should be stopped, and the respectable inhabitants induced to return to the city,¶ a message was opportunely received from Lord Canning, requesting the Nepaulese chief to go down with his forces to Allahabad. As at this time stringent orders were issued for

* The native Christian community of Lucknow formed a *gunj*, or quarter of the city, containing perhaps 500 persons. Most of these, fearing ill-treatment from the rebel Mohammedans, concealed themselves during the siege; but it does not appear they were searched for or persecuted by the Begum's government; and it is to her credit, that on learning the evacuation of the Residency, she set at liberty 200 prisoners, most of whom had been in the service of the English.

† Captain Reid, a Fyzabad official, calls him Sikunder Shah; Captain Hutchinson says he was known as Ahmed Ali Shah.—Hutchinson's *Mutinies in Oude*, p. 34.

‡ Some medicine, procured for her use from a native doctor, was wrapped in the torn page of an English Bible; and contained Isaiah li., 12, 13, 14.

§ See Captain G. Hutchinson's *Official Narrative of Mutinies in Oude*, for fuller details.

|| Mr. Russell observes—"We hear, with regret, that the women are sometimes ill-used, and Hindoos commit suicide when they are dishonoured." He further speaks of the city as having been a place of terror, on account of "the license inevitable after the storm of a large town."—*Diary*; and Letter to the *Times*, May 6th, 1858.

¶ When the insulting manner in which the right of search was exercised, and other offensive proceedings were stopped, the respectable inhabitants began to return. Mr. Russell observes—"Thousands of citizens are returning; but tens of thousands will never return; for the court, the nawabs, and rajahs who maintained them are gone for ever, and their palaces are desolate."

the suppression of plunder and outrage, enforced by the introduction of an hourly roll-call, by the prohibition, to even British soldiers, of wearing side-arms, except on guard or duty, and the erection of triangles for the summary punishment of obstinate offenders—the Goorkas were quite willing to commence their return to their native hills. They quitted Lucknow on the 26th of March, and mustered 8,500 men, of whom there were 2,000 sick. Their baggage, carried in 4,500 carts, extended over sixteen miles; and, besides elephants and camels, they had no less than 10,000 bullocks: in fact, their whole force was a mere baggage guard. Their homeward journey was very slow, and the transit proved a heavy drain on the British commissariat and treasury. Eventually, Sir Colin Campbell was obliged to detach a British column to enable the Goorka force to pursue its way to Nepaul. Jung Bahadur had formed high expectations of the reward to which he was personally entitled, in the form of territorial concessions. The British government postponed the consideration of that question; but, in the interim, made the chief a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath—a step which, it was suggested,* might be accounted for on the supposition, that these old, quasi-ecclesiastical orders were considered proper subjects for strong practical jokes.

To return to Lucknow. The reoccupation of the city was scarcely commenced, before Sir James Outram received the orders of Lord Canning to issue a proclamation, which declared the whole territory of Oude confiscated, excepting only the estates of seven or eight small chiefs. Mr. Russell describes the alarm which this document created in camp; and declares that he did not hear one voice raised in its defence; even those who were habitually silent, opening their mouths to condemn the policy which was certain to perpetuate the rebellion in Oude.†

General Outram was not the man to retain office at the cost of carrying out a policy which he deemed unjust and im-

politic. Perhaps he had seen cause to change his opinion regarding the annexation of Oude: but whether or no, it is certain that he who, in 1855, as resident at Lucknow, had carried through the forcible deposition of Wajid Ali; now, in 1858, as commissioner of the revolted British province, felt himself bound to consider the position of the rebel chiefs in a very different light to that in which the Calcutta government thought fit to view them. Lord Canning made some concessions; but the same fatal dread of seeming weak, which had prevented the timely withdrawal of the greased cartridges, induced him now to believe, that in the present crisis, "any proclamation put forth in Oude, in a liberal and forgiving spirit, would be open to misconstruction, and subject to perversion."‡

Some startling statements and admissions were made in the course of the correspondence between the governor-general and the commissioner. General Outram declared that, before the mutiny, the landowners had been most unjustly treated under our settlement; and Lord Canning, in his guarded reply, was compelled to admit his fear that it was "too true, that unjust decisions were come to by some of our local officers in investigating and judging the titles of the landowners."§

Lord Canning evidently desired to do in Oude, what Lord Dalhousie had done in the Punjab. As Henry Lawrence and his school were made to give way, in the latter province, to John Lawrence and Robert Montgomery; so now Outram was superseded by Montgomery and a staff, willing to carry out the policy which every man (civil and military) in the British camp in Oude, in March, 1858, concurred in viewing as "too harsh and despotic."|| The few days in which General Outram exercised power were, however, beneficially employed. He issued the proclamation with a rider, the intended effect of which was to induce the Oude talookdars to read and run to, and not from us:¶ and he is likewise said to have used his personal influence, based on long and courteous

native chiefs and others. The former is for a large, and generous, and general amnesty, except in the cases of actual murderers; the latter is for the most vigorous prosecution and punishment."—Russell's *Diary*, vol. i., p. 363. Mr. Campbell is known as the author of a work advocating the extinction of native Indian dynasties; the annexation of territory; and the diminution of pensions.

¶ *Times*, May 6th, 1858.

* *The Times*, July 7th, 1858.

† Russell's *Diary*, vol. i., p. 356.

‡ Lord Canning's despatch, dated "Allahabad, March 31st, 1858."

§ *Ibid.*

|| Mr. George Campbell, financial commissioner for Oude, arrived on the 27th of March, preceding Mr. Montgomery by a few days. "General Outram and Mr. Campbell did not at all agree in the policy which should be adopted towards the rebellious

intercourse with the leading men, to convince them that they would find the bark of the governor-general worse than his bite. This assurance, though contrary to the long experience of landed proprietors in annexed or conquered provinces, was fulfilled in the way which Outram probably anticipated. The confiscation proclamation created great excitement in England: the annexation of Oude was inquired into, and generally, publicly and officially, denounced as an injustice; and Lord Canning was compelled to adopt (at least in measure) the very policy which Outram had sacrificed himself to promote. And not he alone; for, by a strange coincidence, Lord Ellenborough, who was at the time president of the India Board, breaking through the forms and delays of official life, wrote out to India a despatch, containing so strong and uncompromising a repudiation of Lord Canning's policy, that the document was immediately taken up as a party question, and Lord Ellenborough resigned his position sooner than compromise his colleagues. Certainly, nothing in his term of office "became him like the leaving it." It was alleged at the time, that Lord Canning's proceeding involved no greater injustice than had been practised towards the landowners after the annexation of Sind and the Punjab. But the system carried out in these two cases was totally different. In Sind one of the

first acts of Sir Charles Napier (supported by Lord Ellenborough), immediately after completing the conquest, was to proclaim the inviolability of private property, and secure the landowners in their estates; a measure which greatly facilitated the rapid and firm establishment of British power in the province. In the Punjab (as Mr. Baillie stated in parliament—detailing facts already mentioned in this work), Lord Dalhousie supported the confiscating policy of Sir John Lawrence, in opposition to that of Sir Henry, who resigned his position. The unpopularity of the spoliation system, necessitated the concentration of British troops in the Punjab, and thereby afforded both the opportunity and temptation for a mutiny of the Native army. Circumstances favoured the warlike talookdars of Oude, and enabled them, individually, to obtain better terms than could have been expected by persons acquainted with the history of British India. Still, many who have been compromised by our original injustice, are beyond the pale of our tardy generosity. Some of the bravest and best chiefs have fallen victims to their uncompromising fidelity to the Begum of Oude; and a *parvenu* and time-server like Maun Sing, pays state visits to the governor-general; while Rajpoot chiefs, like Bainie Madhoo and Nirput Sing, are hunted to death in the jungle like wild beasts.

CHAPTER XXV.

CAMPAIGN OF GENERALS ROSE, ROBERTS, AND WHITLOCK; CAPTURE OF JHANSI, KOTAH, BANDA, KOONCH, AND CALPEE; FALL AND RECONQUEST OF GWALIOR; RANEE OF JHANSI KILLED; AZIMGHUR AND JUGDESPUR; DEATH OF KOOR SING; GENERAL WALPOLE AT ROYEA; BRIGADIER HOPE KILLED; SIR COLIN CAMPBELL'S CAMPAIGN; GENERAL PENNY KILLED; BATTLE OF BAREILLY, AND REOCCUPATION OF ROHILCUND.—JANUARY TO JUNE, 1858.

WHILE the operations already narrated were being carried on by the force under the immediate command of Sir Colin Campbell, a series of important movements were performed, under his directions, by two efficient columns furnished from Bombay, under Generals Rose and Roberts, for the reduction of Central India; in co-operation with a brigade sent from Madras,

under General Whitlock. The proceedings of the Central India field force, under Sir Hugh Rose (consisting of two brigades; together, above 5,000 strong), were marked by skill, vigour, and perseverance, and attended with unvarying success. Unfortunately, limited space precludes their being detailed in these pages; but Sir Hugh's clear and powerfully written despatches

are before the public.* Sir Robert Hamilton, the resident at Indore, whose absence in England at the time of the mutiny was so bitterly regretted by Holcar, hurried back to his post,† and became an invaluable coadjutor to Rose; the cordial assistance of the young Maharajah, enabling him to effect commissariat arrangements which would otherwise have been impossible.

Ratghur (twenty-four miles from Saugor), one of the old hill-forts of Central India, was bombarded by Rose on the 26th and 27th of January, 1858; and before daylight on the morning of the 28th, the chief part of the garrison were discovered to have escaped, letting themselves down by ropes from the rocks. A rebel leader, named Mohammed Fazil Khan, who had assumed the title of prince at Mundesore, with another nawab and 200 rebels, were hanged over the principal gate of the fort.‡ Leaving Ratghur in charge of the troops of the Ranees of Bhopal, the British marched on towards Saugor, and once only encountered opposition; when, on the 30th, they carried, after an obstinate defence, a strong village twelve miles from Ratghur, called in the despatches, Barodia. A gallant young captain of engineers, Glastonbury Neville, who had served with distinction before Sebastopol, was killed by a chance round shot while acting as aide-de-camp to the general.

Saugor fort, in which upwards of 150 women and children had been shut up since June,§ was reached and relieved, without opposition, on the 3rd of February. The strong hill-fort of Garracotta, south-east of Saugor, held by a numerous body of Bengal Native infantry, was abandoned without a blow; and large supplies of wheat and grain, sulphur and saltpetre, with four cart-loads of ammunition, were found stored therein.

Jhansi, the richest Hindoo city, and most important fortress in Central India, was the next point of attack. Since the massacre in June, the Ranees had remained in undisturbed possession of the little principality; and the people were fully prepared to support her desperate struggle for the

rights of the adopted heir and the maintenance of a native government.

The difficulty of obtaining supplies, delayed the advance of Sir Hugh Rose. He had reason to anticipate resistance at the passes on the road to Jhansi; and the forts of Tal Behut and Chanderee (which, notwithstanding the fidelity and courage of the rajah of Punnah, had fallen into the power of the enemy) would, it was said, be defended by the rajah of Banpore—a chief who, after having been distinguished as the protector of English fugitives,|| had at length been unwillingly engulfed in the vortex of rebellion; and proved, in the words of General Rose, an “enterprising and courageous” enemy. By a series of masterly movements, Sir Hugh, with the second of his two brigades, made a feint at the Narut Pass, defended by the rajah of Banpore; and a real attack on the pass of Mundesore, held by the rajah of Shahghur, and forced his way, without losing a single life. Chanderee was captured on the 17th of March, by the first brigade, under Brigadier Stuart, with the loss of two killed. On the 23rd of March, Sir Hugh commenced operations against Jhansi. The fort is built of granite, and stands on a rock, within the city, which is four miles and a-half in circumference, and is surrounded by a wall from six to twelve feet thick—varying in height from eighteen to thirty feet. Seven “flying camps of cavalry” were established, as an investing force, round Jhansi, and every precaution was taken to blockade the city. Before Sir Hugh’s arrival, the cavalry pickets sent on by him, had overtaken and sabred about a hundred men, who were endeavouring to enter Jhansi, having been sent for by the Ranees to assist in the defence. On the first day of the siege, the shells of the assailants set on fire long rows of hayricks in the south of the city, and caused an extensive conflagration; but the garrison repaired their defences, reopened fire from batteries and guns repeatedly shut up, and struggled to the last with dauntless resolve against an overwhelming force. “The women,” Sir Hugh writes, “were seen

* See *London Gazette*, 1858, 1859.

† The measures adopted, under British direction, for the suppression of mutiny in Indore, cannot here be detailed. The rajah of Amjherra was put to death, as were also 200 men of the Bhopal contingent. Mr. Layard declares (on the authority of an eye-

witness, whose account was corroborated by statements in the Indian papers), that the execution of the mutineers was performed “in a manner repugnant to humanity.”—*Times*, August 25th, 1858.

‡ Telegram from Sir R. Hamilton; 3rd Feb., 1858.

§ See p. 366.

|| See p. 314.

working in the batteries, and carrying ammunition. The garden battery was fought under the black flag of the fakirs. Everything indicated a general and determined resistance."

The Raneë had reason to know that efforts were being made for her relief; and Sir Robert Hamilton had likewise been informed, from time to time, that Tantia Topee and the rajah of Banpore were engaged in organising a force, called the "army of the Peishwa," estimated at 20,000 men and twenty guns. On the 31st of March, the enemy crossed the river Betwa, took up a position in rear of the British camp, and lit an immense bonfire, as a signal to Jhansi of their arrival, which was welcomed by salutes from all the batteries of the fort and city, and shouts of joy from their defenders.

Notwithstanding the numerical weakness of his force,* as compared with that under Tantia Topee, Sir Hugh resolved on hazarding a general action, without relaxing either the siege or the investment. He therefore drew up his force across the road from the Betwa—a movement which was effected with silence and regularity, although not accomplished until long after dark. That night the hostile bodies slept on their arms, opposite each other. Next morning, before daybreak, Tantia Topee advanced against the British, but was defeated, pursued for nine miles, and driven (31st of March) across the Betwa, with the loss of 1,500 men, eighteen guns, and large quantities of stores and ammunition.

The dispersion of the auxiliary force, and the slaughter effected by the Shrapnel shells and Enfield rifles of the besiegers, destroyed the last hopes of the Raneë. Her garrison was diminishing at the rate of sixty or seventy persons a day. It is said that she made overtures for terms of surrender, and that the two messengers sent to treat on her behalf, were hanged.†

After the victory at the Betwa, Sir Hugh

* "Artillery—three siege guns, 16 light field guns; 14th Light Dragoons, 243 rank and file; Hyderabad cavalry, 207 sabres; H.M. 86th, 208 rank and file; 3rd Bombay European regiment, 226 rank and file; 24th Bombay N.I., 298 rank and file; and 25th Bombay N.I."—Rose's despatch, April 30th, 1858.

† *Times*, August 26th, 1858.

‡ In the quarters of the body-guard were found many standards, including the silk union-jack, given by Lord W. Bentinck to the rajah of Jhansi.

§ "A Velaitee, after an unsuccessful endeavour to blow himself and his wife up, attempted to hew her in pieces, so that she might not fall into our hands." *The Friend of India* (June 10th, 1858), after re-

gave his troops a day's rest. The fire from the fort was no longer serious, for the best guns of the Raneë had been disabled, and her ablest artillerymen killed. A practical breach had been effected in the city wall; and, on the 3rd of April, the palace and chief part of the town of Jhansi were taken by storm. There was some desperate hand-to-hand combats, especially at the palace. In one instance, some forty troopers, part of the Raneë's body-guard, maintained their post at the royal stables, fighting to the last, and struggling even when dying on the ground, to strike again.‡ The last men who held the palace set fire to trains of gunpowder, and perished in the explosion, which, though only partially successful, caused the death of many men of H.M. 86th regiment.

The Raneë and a large part of the garrison evacuated the fort during the night. She was pursued, and nearly overtaken. Lieutenant Bowker, with a party of cavalry, followed her to Bundere, twenty-one miles from Jhansi; and there saw a tent, in which was spread an unfinished breakfast. Pressing on, he came in sight of the Raneë, who was escaping on a grey horse, with four attendants: but at this point he was severely wounded, and compelled to relinquish the pursuit; while she was joined by an escort, sent to her aid by the vigilant Tantia Topee.

On the 4th of April, the fort and remainder of the city were taken possession of by the troops, who, maddened by the recollection of the massacre committed there, and by the determined resistance§ of the people, committed fearful slaughter. No less than 5,000 persons are stated to have perished at Jhansi, or to have been cut down by the "flying camps." Some flung themselves down wells, or otherwise committed suicide; having first slain their women, sooner than trust them to the mercy of the conquerors. Yet the British soldiers are stated to have shown kindness

ording this and other striking instances in which death was chosen rather than surrender, remarks, that it is impossible not to perceive, from the despatches of Sir Hugh Rose, "that other influences than bang, a love of plunder, and a dread of death, must have instigated so determined a resistance." The reason was sufficiently clear: the people of Jhansi fought for their queen and the independence of their country. Even after the city had fallen, Sir Hugh declared, that "the high descent of the Raneë, her unbounded liberality to her troops and retainers, and her fortitude, which no reverses could shake, rendered her an influential and dangerous adversary."—Despatch, April 30th, 1858.

to the desolate and famishing mothers and children, and to have been seen sharing their rations with them. Sir Hugh also gave orders that the starving families should be fed from the prize grain. The British casualties were thirty-eight killed, and 215 wounded. The plunder obtained in the fort and town is said to have been very great. A large number of executions took place daily, after the reoccupation of Jhansi. Among the captives tried and executed under the orders of Sir Robert Hamilton, was the father of the Ranees.

Kotah.—While General Rose was occupied in the capture of Jhansi, General Roberts was employed in wresting Kotah, the capital of a small Rajpoot principality of the same name, from the hands of the Kotah contingent—a force which had joined the revolt, and murdered the political agent (Major Burton) and his two sons, in October, 1857. The rajah was faithful to us. The murder of the three Europeans had been perpetrated against his will; and he recovered, and buried, the bodies of the victims. The head of the major had been cut off, and fired from a gun. The rajah remained besieged by the rebels in his palace-fort, situated on the eastern bank of the Chumbul, until the 27th of March, when the British force crossed the river, joined him at the fort, and from thence bombarded the town. At noon on the 30th, three columns, each of 500 men (72nd Highlanders, H.M. 95th, 83rd, and 10th and 12th Bombay N.I.), entered the town through a gate blown in by the engineers, and, spreading right and left, carried the walls, turned the barricades in the streets, and quickly, and with slight loss, took possession of the whole place. The British loss was sixteen killed and forty-four wounded. The casualties were chiefly occasioned by trains of gunpowder laid in various directions.*

Of the mutineers, about 400 were killed. Some threw themselves over the walls, and were dashed to pieces; many were taken prisoners, and subsequently executed; but the mass escaped, carrying with them much treasure, and their proceedings considerably embarrassed Sir Hugh Rose, who, leaving a garrison at Jhansi, marched upon Calpee, the great stronghold and

arsenal of the mutineers—held by the *Rac Sahib*.† Tantia Topce and the Ranees of Jhansi had again assembled their scattered troops, and strove to bar the advance of the British to Calpee, by intrenching themselves at the intervening town of Koonch. Sir Hugh carried the intrenchments by a flank movement; drove the enemy out of the maze of woods, temples, and walled gardens into Koonch, with his artillery; then cleared the town, and pursued the flying foe, with horse artillery and cavalry, for more than eight miles; when the victors, utterly exhausted by heat, thirst, and fatigue, could go no further. A great part of the troops were Europeans, and they had been marching or fighting for sixteen hours. The sun was 115° in the shade. Sir Hugh Rose (a powerful, active man of about fifty years of age) fell fainting from his horse four times; but cold water being poured over him, and restoratives administered, he was able to remount and resume the command he so well knew how to use. Only five men were killed, and twenty-six wounded in action; but forty-six men fell under sun-stroke.‡

Shorapoor.—While Rose and Roberts were engaged in the operations above described, the Madras division, under Whitlock, had been delayed in its advance by the necessity of sending a detachment to Shorapoor,§ a small native state, where considerable disaffection had been manifested. The rajah, a young man who, during his minority, had been under British tutelage, was compelled to dismantle his forts, dismiss his armed retainers, and surrender himself a prisoner. He was tried, and condemned to be transported. To a Hindoo, under such circumstances, death was the sole alternative from dishonour; and the rajah, seizing his opportunity, blew out his brains with the revolver of the British officer who was conveying him in irons to the place of deportation. His fate made a deep impression in Shorapoor, where his family had ruled for thirty generations.|| General Whitlock, when able to resume his march, moved on Calpee, by way of Chirkaree, Punnah, and Banda; of which last place he took possession on the 19th of April, after having fought a pitched battle,

* Five infernal machines (consisting of forty matchlock barrels fixed on frames, moveable on wheels) were found at the ends of the streets; but it does not appear that these came into operation.—Roberts' despatch, April 8th, 1858.

† The adopted son of the second adopted son of the last Peishwa, Bajee Rao.

‡ Despatch of Sir H. Rose, May 24th, 1858.

§ See p. 50.

|| *Times*, Oct. 7th, 1858.

outside the town, with the mutineers and insurgents, who had the nawab in their power. General Whitlock drove them off the field, and pursued them with horse artillery and cavalry; capturing four guns, and killing 500 men.

Calpee.—The nawab and his beaten troops joined the Ranee of Jhansi at Calpee, which it was expected would be stoutly defended by the Gwalior mutineers, in accordance with the urgent representations of the Ranee, who, while at Koonch, had charged them, in an intercepted communication, "to hold to the last Calpee, their only arsenal." But in vain. The place, though surrounded by a labyrinth of ravines, was extremely weak in its fortifications; and the natives have little confidence in any means of defence but strong walls. Therefore when, on the 23rd, the British troops advanced in concentrated force* on the city, the rebels fired a few ineffectual shots and fled, and their leaders were compelled to accompany them; leaving Sir Hugh Rose master of the place, with all its stores, including fifty guns, and large quantities of ammunition.

With the capture of Calpee, the labours of the Central India field force seemed to have come to an end; and Sir Hugh announced, in general orders, his own retirement to recruit his health, and the intended breaking-up of the division. In a spirited farewell address, he praised the energy which had upheld the men throughout a campaign, during which they had traversed more than a thousand miles; had crossed rivers, forced mountain passes, fought pitched battles, and captured fortresses: but still more highly he lauded the discipline, to which he attributed the unchecked successes of their march from the western shores of India to the waters of the Jumna. Sir Hugh organised flying columns, to move from the main body of the force, previous to its general dispersion; but, either from necessity or from inadvertence, from the exhaustion of the men, or the non-appreciation of the emergency, the reinforcement of Gwalior was delayed, notwithstanding the urgent entreaties of Sindia, and the anxiety of

the commander-in-chief; and thereby gave Tantia Topee an advantage, of which the Mahratta availed himself to play his master-stroke of skill and audacity.

Gwalior.—After the defeat at Koonch, Tantia disappeared. It was subsequently discovered that he had gone to Gwalior, and concealed himself in the bazaar, where he organised a plot for the deposition of Sindia, and carried the news of his success to the Calpee fugitives, who had assembled at Gopalpoor, on the road to Gwalior; upon which place they now advanced, sending assurances to Sindia and the Baiza Bye,† that they were coming with no hostile intentions, but only to get supplies and money, and go to the Deccan; that opposition was useless, for the troops and people of Gwalior were against the British; and they (the rebels) had received from the city 200 letters of invitation and assurance. Neither Sindia nor Dinkur Rao, nor the two chief officers of the army, knew anything of the visit of Tantia Topee—a concealment rendered possible by the general sympathy felt for the rebel cause, which was daily more evident. The zeal and ability of Dinkur Rao, and the dauntless bravery of the Maharajah—who declared that he had never worn bangles (*i.e.*, been a slave), and would not submit to be dictated to by rebels—failed to stem the torrent of disaffection. The Rao and the Ranee took a very bold tone in addressing their followers, declaring that they expected no opposition; but adding—"If there should be any, you may fly if you please. We shall die." At this crisis, an unfortunate difference of opinion is said to have arisen between Sindia and his minister. The latter was in favour of an exclusively defensive policy, pending the arrival of British reinforcements; the former, deceived by certain ring-leaders in the confidence of Tantia Topee, was led to believe that he might safely attack the rebels (who were reported to be dispirited and disorganised) at the head of his own household troops. The councils of the Dewan, however, prevailed up to midnight on the 31st of May: but after he had quitted the palace, the Maharajah was

* The Camel corps, organised by the commander-in-chief for the purpose of dispersing any body of the enemy assembling in the Doab, was ordered to cross the Jumna, and taken to Calpee by Sir Hugh Rose, who, finding his force daily diminishing from sickness, fatigue, and intense heat, seized on all available troops to strengthen his hands, at the

risk of incurring blame for absorbing, in one operation, the means intended for the accomplishment of purposes of less obvious and urgent importance.

† The grandmother of Sindia by adoption, known by her title of the Baiza Bye, was a person of considerable ability and influence in the Gwalior state.

prevailed upon to give orders for an instant march against the advancing enemy. Accordingly, the troops were assembled; and at daybreak (June 1st), without the knowledge of Dinkur Rao, Sindia led 8,000 men and 24 guns to Burragaon, eight miles from Gwalior. There he found, and attacked, the rebels: but the action had scarcely commenced, before his army melted like a snow-ball in the sun; some quitting the field, others fraternising with the foe; while very many went off to eat water-melons in the bed of the Morar. Sindia strove to induce his body-guard to fight, and about sixty of these were killed and wounded. He then ascended an adjacent hill, and saw his whole force marching homewards; whereupon he galloped straight to the Phoolbagh with about fifteen attendants, changed his dress, remounted, and rode towards Agra. The Dewan, on hearing of the Maharajah's flight, made arrangements for the escape of the Baiza Bye and other ladies; after which he hastened to overtake Sindia, and, with him, reached Dholpoor in safety before midnight.

The Baiza Bye and the Ranees proceeded to the fort of Nurwar, thirty miles off, except one of them named the "Gujja Raja," the mother of the Maharanee. Believing that Sindia was beleaguered at the Phoolbagh, she seized a sword, mounted her horse, and rode to the palace, summoning all to his aid, until she found that he was really gone. Then she followed the other ladies to Nurwar, where about 600 of Sindia's old irregular horse had assembled for their protection. The rebels earnestly entreated the Baiza Bye to return and take charge of Gwalior; but she made them no reply, and immediately forwarded their communications to Sir Robert Hamilton.

The rebel leaders entered the city in triumph, and declared the Nana its ruler as Peishwa, or chief of the Mahratta confederacy, which they hoped to restore to its former importance. The treasury of Sindia, and his jewels, fell into their hands; six months' pay was distributed among the troops, and every effort made to conciliate the citizens. But little preparation was made for the defence of the fort; and it is probable that both Tantia and the Ranee concurred in resolving to abide by the old Mahratta tactics, and avoid shutting themselves up

within walls. Therefore they disposed their forces so as to observe and hold the roads leading upon the city from Indoorkee, Seepree, and the north; the necessary arrangements being effected mainly "under the direction and personal supervision of the Ranee, who, clad in military attire, and attended by a picked and well-armed escort, was constantly in the saddle, ubiquitous and untiring."* Such was the employment of this extraordinary woman on the anniversary of the Jhansi massacre. Her own career was fast hastening to its close. When the news of the fall of Gwalior reached General Rose, he resumed the command he had just quitted; requested the Maharajah to join him from Agra, and the Baiza Bye and the Maharanee from Nurwar, and made instant preparations for marching against the rebels. General Whitlock took charge of Calpee: a portion of General Roberts' Rajpootana force, under Brigadier Smith, and the troops of the Hyderabad contingent (who had just received leave to return home), were ordered to aid in besieging Gwalior; while Colonel Riddell, with a light field battery, and reinforcements of cavalry and infantry, was dispatched from Agra by order of Sir Colin Campbell. The different columns were moved forward with the greatest celerity; the plan of attack being, to invest the city as much as its great extent would allow, and then assault the weakest side—the investing troops cutting off the escape of the rebels. General Rose anticipated that a successful attack on the enemy, outside or inside the city, would be followed, as at Calpee, by the easy capture of the fort. And so it proved. The Mora cantonments (so named from the stream on which they stand), four miles from the Lushkur, or city, were carried by storm on the 16th of June. The assault was made under the direction of General Rose, by two lines commanded by Brigadiers Stuart and Napier; and the mutineers were taken by surprise by the fierce onslaught made, although the sun was already high in the heavens, by troops wearied by a long night march, during the season when exposure to the heat was deemed fatal to Europeans. On the 17th, Brigadier Smith, with H.M. 95th† and the 10th Bombay N.I., a squadron of the 8th Hussars, two divisions of horse artillery,

men were disabled by sun-stroke, acting on frames weakened by hunger, extreme fatigue, and exposure in driving the mutineers from the hills.

* Letter from Bombay correspondent.—*Times*, August 3rd, 1858.

† Of the 95th alone, four officers and eighty-five

and a troop of the 1st Lancers, drove the enemy from the heights above the plain which lies before Gwalior, near the Phoolbagh palace. The Hussars subsequently descended to the plain, and made a brilliant charge through the enemy's camp; of which Sir Hugh Rose writes—"One most important result was, the death of the Ranee of Jhansi, who, although a lady, was the bravest and best military leader of the rebels." No English eye marked her fall. The Hussars, unconscious of the advantage they had gained, and scarcely able to sit on their saddles from heat and fatigue, were, for the moment, incapable of further exertion, and retired, supported by a timely reinforcement. Then, it is said, the remnant of the faithful body-guard (many of whom had perished at Jhansi) gathered around the lifeless forms of the Ranee and her sister, who, dressed in male attire, and riding at the head of their squadrons, had fallen together, killed either by part of a shell, or, as is more probable, by balls from the revolvers with which the Hussars were armed. A funeral pyre was raised, and the remains of the two young and beautiful women were burnt, according to the custom of the Hindoos.*

The general attack on Gwalior was made on the 18th, under Sir Hugh Rose in person. The Lushkur was carried with ease; and Brigadier Smith captured the Phoolbagh, killing numbers of the enemy, and seizing their guns. The fort was evacuated in the night.

Brigadier-general Napier pursued the retreating foe with much vigour; captured twenty-five pieces of cannon; and, after slaying many hundred men, "totally dispersed the enemy, with only one casualty on his own side." "Total dispersion" was, however, a part of Tantia Topee's system. The men fled in small numbers, or singly, and reunited at a given point.

On the 20th of June, the Maharajah re-entered his capital; and the population of

the half-empty, half-closed Lushkur, shouted congratulations as their prince passed, escorted by Sir Hugh Rose, Sir Robert Hamilton, Major Macpherson, and squadrons of Hussars and Lancers. The ceremonial was interrupted by a singular manifestation of fanaticism. Thirteen men (four contingent sepoy and nine Velaitees), with two women and a child, after proceeding some miles from Gwalior towards Agra, deliberately returned to die in the vacated fort. They fired, from the guns on the ramparts, four or five shots at the troops drawn out to receive the prince, and one ball struck immediately in front of Sindia and Major Macpherson. Lieutenants Rose and Waller were sent, with some Native troops and police, to destroy these desperate men, who had taken post upon a bastion, a gun of which commanded the line of approach. The gun burst at the third discharge, and the attacking party advanced. The fanatics slew the women and child, and then perished, fighting to the last—killing or wounding ten of their assailants, including Lieutenant Rose, a very promising young officer, who died in consequence. On reaching the Phoolbagh, Sindia expressed himself warmly grateful for the exertions of the gallant troops, in procuring his speedy restoration to Gwalior. Still, it is to be regretted that the safe policy of Sir Colin Campbell had not been adopted by the governor-general (under whose orders Sir Hugh Rose acted, in consequence of Sir Colin's absence in Rohilcund); and that the urgent entreaty of Sindia for British troops had not been complied with, and the reinforcement of his capital made to precede the capture of Jhansi, Kotah, and other places—a measure which, among other advantages, would have saved the Maharajah his humiliating flight from his capital, and preserved his money and jewels from the hands of the Rao and Tantia Topee.†

On the 29th of June, Sir Hugh Rose resigned his command, and retired to

* The above account is derived from the public papers of the period. Since then, a servant of the Ranee's, present at the time of her death, has furnished other and different particulars. The second lady (who, all statements concur in declaring, never left the Ranee's side) is said not to have been her sister, but a Brahmin concubine of the late rajah's. When the Hussars surprised the camp, the ladies were seated together, drinking sherbet. They mounted and fled; but the horse of the Ranee refused to leap the canal, and she received a shot in the side, and a sabre-cut on the head; but still rode

till she fell dead from her saddle, and was surrounded and burnt. The Brahminee had also received a long sabre-cut in front, of which she quickly died.

† The total amount of property stolen or destroyed, belonging to the Maharajah, was estimated at fifty lacs. The Residency, and the dwellings of Dinkur Rao, as well as those of Sindia's chief officers, Bulwunt Rao and Mohurghur (neither of whom had been permitted to accompany the Maharajah on his ill-fated expedition), were expressly given up to plunder by the rebel chiefs.

Poonah, to seek the rest which his health imperatively needed; and the forces that had co-operated in achieving the series of extraordinary successes, which had been crowned by the reconquest of Gwalior, were dispersed over various stations, pending the return of the cool season.

It is now necessary to revert to the operations carried on by Sir Colin Campbell and his lieutenants, in other parts of the great seat of war. Behar, the oldest British province, was remarkable for its deep-rooted hostility to British rule—a feeling which writers who differed on most other matters, agreed in attributing to resurreptions, commissions of inquiry, and interference with the tenure of land.* Kooer Sing, of Jugdespoor, was a remarkable example of the hereditary chief of a powerful clan, driven into rebellion by the force of circumstances;—an old man, unstained with the blood of women or children, yet chased from the home of his ancestors—his palace sacked, his villages burned; even the stately temple he had erected for divine worship, razed to the ground; and he hunted as a criminal beyond the pale of mercy, with a price upon his head. The sum, speedily raised from 10,000 to 25,000 rupees, showed the importance attached to his capture: but the offer had no other result than that of bringing hate and discredit on those who offered the blood-money. The starving ryots would not have betrayed the grey hairs of the brave octogenarian for all his confiscated estates; and, to the last, they favoured his repeated escapes, at the cost of being rendered homeless and desolate by the swift vengeance of the British troops. The extent of the influence exercised (consciously and unconsciously) by this single chief, may be understood by the panic his name occasioned at the seat of government; where, according to the *Times*, one of his latest achievements created so much alarm, as to give rise to the question—"What if Kooer Sing, who has feudal suzerainty over a fifth of the sepoy army, should make a dash southward, surprise Raneegunge,

seize the railway, and march upon Calcutta?"† Apart from exaggerations like this, the name of Kooer Sing was used wherever Bengal troops still remained loyal, as an incitement to revolt. In Assam, one night in September, 1857, a Hindoo rajah was arrested, with his mother and family, and his treasure seized, for alleged conspiracy; and all the troops in the district, except a few Goorkas, were said to be in the interest of Kooer Sing. In Berar, and the adjacent country, his influence was undeniable; especially in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories. At Jubbulpoor, where the 52nd N.I. was stationed, great excitement was observed among the troops towards the close of the religious festival, known as the Mohurram. A reinforcement of guns, Europeans, and Madras sepoys, was detached on the 7th of September, from a small moveable column organised from the Nagpoor force, for service in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories. On the 15th, an aged Gond rajah, named Shunkur Shah, who traced his descent through sixty generations, was, with his son and thirteen other persons, arrested, and thrown into the military prison in the cantonments. It does not appear that any correspondence was found, but only several papers "of a rebellious tendency;" one of which was placed on record by the deputy-commissioner, Mr. Clerk. It was a prayer, invoking the goddess Devi to listen to the cry of religion, to shut the mouth of slanderers, devour the backbiters, trample down the sinners, and—exterminate the British.

This invocation (written on the back of a government proclamation) was found in a silk bag, in which the rajah kept his fan, beside the bed whereon he was lying when arrested.‡ The rajah and his son were speedily tried, and condemned to be blown away from guns. An unsuccessful attempt was made for their rescue during the night of the 16th; but precautions had been taken; and the disappointed sepoys gave vent to their excited feelings by setting fire to some unoccupied bungalows. On the 18th the execution took place.

* The *Friend of India* (December 22nd, 1858) remarks, that during the whole "terrible rebellion," the effect of resumption, and of perpetual interference with tenure, has been severely felt. "It was the hope of regaining their lands which armed the aristocracy of the North-West against our rule. It was the hope of restoring the old possessors of the soil which, in so many districts, stirred the peasantry to revolt. It was the deep-seated discontent created by resurreptions in Behar, which

rendered the movement of Kooer Sing possible, and made that fine province, for months, the seat of a guerilla war. It is the hate created by the Enam commission, which renders the arrival of Tantia Topee in the Deccan, with a couple of thousand ragamuffins at his heels, a danger to be averted at any cost."

† *Times*, June 14th, 1858.

‡ Parl. Papers on the Mutinies in the East Indies, 1858 (No. 7); p. 293.

British officers and Native troops (rendered powerless by the position of the artillery) looked on in silence, as the old man, with his snow-white hair, iron fetters, and haughty bearing, took his place in front of the gun that was to annihilate him, praying aloud that his surviving children might be spared to avenge him; and his son echoed the vengeful petition. The signal was given; then the well-known muffled report followed, with its usual horrible consequences. The natives were suffered to gather together the gory, half-burnt remains, on behalf of the Ranee; while the European officers, according to the testimony of one of them, looked on with a smile of gratified revenge on their lips.*

Such a scene as that just described, could hardly fail in producing a speedy result on the already compromised 52nd. That night the regiment mutinied and left the place, with the exception of one Native officer and ten men. They carried off Lieutenant Macgregor, and offered to surrender him in exchange for the ten faithful sepoys. This could not, of course, be done; and no attempt was made for his deliverance, except an offer of money, which was instantly rejected. The mutineers had a skirmish with the Kamptee column on the 27th of September, in a jungle about twenty-five miles from Jubbulpoor, and retreated, leaving behind them the mangled corpse of Lieutenant Macgregor. Lieutenants Barton and Cockburn, who were stationed with a company of the 52nd at Salemabad, had been previously suffered to return to Jubbulpoor uninjured, the men even bidding them farewell with tears in their eyes. The 52nd went to Nagode, and were there joined by the 50th, who had mutinied on the 15th of September. The Europeans fled; the rebels took possession of the treasure, and placed themselves under the orders of Kooer Sing, who, it was expected, would march from Nagode into Upper India, through Rewah, a native state, the young rajah of which was related to the old Behar chief; and, it was supposed, would neither have the will nor the courage to offer any serious opposition. His situation had been a very painful one at the outbreak. The mutineers burnt his villages; and the British authorities at Allahabad, pronounced him

"a fox not to be trusted;" and treated his request for grape for his guns with contempt.† Nevertheless, the rajah, ably supported by the political agent (Lieutenant Osborne), and by Lieutenant-colonel Hinde (who commanded the Rewah contingent), refused to suffer the rebel force to traverse his country—posted troops at the mountain passes, and assumed so resolute an attitude, that Kooer Sing abandoned the attempt, and fell back on Banda. For six months longer the power of Kooer Sing and his clan was unbroken. In March, 1858, Goruckpoor was reoccupied by the rebels, and Azimghur threatened. Colonel Milman, the officer in command at Azimghur, repeated the error so frequently committed during the war, by quitting his own intrenchments to attack the advanced guard of the enemy. An engagement took place at the village of Atrowiee, twenty miles from Azimghur. The hostile troops came up in overwhelming numbers, and the British fled to their intrenchments, abandoning their guns and baggage. The Rajpoot chief followed up his advantage, and took possession of the town of Azimghur. The next day (March 26th), a sortie was made from the intrenchment, under Colonel Dames, on the town. The assailants were repulsed, one officer being killed (Captain Bedford), and eleven men of H.M. 37th killed or disabled. Sir Colin had foreseen the danger to which Azimghur would be exposed, and had detached a force for its relief, under Sir Edward Lugard, from Lucknow on the 20th of March; but Kooer Sing, by destroying a bridge over the Goomtee at Sultanpoor, impeded the advance of the column, which did not reach its destination until the 15th of April. In the meantime, Lord Mark Kerr, with 500 men, hastened from Benares, and, on the 6th of April, succeeded in joining the troops in the intrenchment, after a sharp conflict with the force posted to intercept his entrance. On the 13th of April, Kooer Sing, with some of his adherents, quitted Azimghur; and, on the 15th, the remainder of the enemy were expelled from the city, and pursued for several miles. One of the two lives lost by the victors on this occasion, was that of Mr. Venables, the planter, whose courage had been generally admired; whose "terrific severity" had been much applauded by the vengeance party; and for whose head the mutineers had offered 500 rupees. Happily he did not fall into

* Letter of officer of 52nd N.I.—*Daily News*, November 3rd, 1857.

† Parl. Papers on Mutiny (1857); p. 112.

their hands, but died of his wounds, among his own countrymen.

Koorer Sing retreated towards his hereditary possessions at Jugdespoor, hotly pursued by Brigadier Douglas on the east, and Colonel Cumberlege on the west, in the hope of closing upon him in the angle formed by the confluence of the Gogra and the Ganges. Brigadier Douglas overtook Koorer Sing at Bansdeh, a town midway between Ghazipoor and Chupra, and routed the rebel force, capturing a gun and four elephants. Koorer Sing himself was said to have been severely wounded in the thigh; but he succeeded, through the devoted fidelity of the peasantry, in escaping from the two regiments of Madras cavalry, with which Colonel Cumberlege strove to intercept him; and crossed the Ganges in boats, which were in readiness on the river, just in time to escape steamers sent with troops from Dinapoor and Ghazipoor, directly it was known that he had eluded his pursuers. Brigadier Douglas, on reaching the bank, fired a few rounds from his guns at the rearmost boats, and sunk one of them. It was asserted by the natives, after the campaign was over,* that the old chief was shot in the arm while crossing the Ganges, and that he had himself amputated the shattered limb. He reached Jugdespoor on the 20th or 21st of April, where he was joined by his brother, Umeer Sing, and several thousand armed villagers. On the night of the 22nd, part of the Arrah garrison, in an evil hour, moved out to seek and attack the old chief, as he lay dying in his native jungles. Captain Le

Grand was killed; the detachment repulsed with the loss of both their guns; and the casualties amounted to 130 out of 300 men. The bad news of this disaster—the second connected with the name of Arrah—was counterbalanced by the tidings of the death of Koorer Sing. A guerilla war was, however, maintained by Umeer Sing and others of the family, which long prevented the restoration of tranquillity in Behar.

Rohilcund Campaign.—After the reoccupation of Lucknow, the chief rebel stronghold was Bareilly (the capital of Rohilcund, the province adjacent to Oude), in which Khan Bahadoor Khan had established his authority. The defeated Oude rebels flocked thither; and, strangely enough, British troops now advanced to conquer, on their own account, the territory which they had once gained as mercenaries for the vizier of Oude, by the defeat and death of the ancestor of Khan Bahadoor. The chief was old, and his faculties were said to be enfeebled by the use of opium; but his proclamations and orders showed considerable sagacity.† One of his directions proved, that the description of warfare at this time generally adopted by the enemy, was the result of policy, not fear or indecision. "Do not," he said, "attempt to meet the regular columns of the infidels, because they are superior to you in discipline, and have big guns; but watch their movements; guard all the ghauts on the rivers; intercept their communications; stop their supplies; cut up their dâks and posts; and keep constantly hanging about their camps: give them no rest."‡

* The disaffection of the people is repeatedly mentioned in the military despatches of the period. For instance, Sir Edward Lugard complains of "the extremely scanty information procurable, every soul in the district being apparently against us."—*Friend of India*, December 22nd, 1858.

† A very remarkable appeal was made by Khan Bahadoor Khan, on behalf of the Mussulmans, for the cordial co-operation of the Hindoos. He asserted that the English were the enemies of both classes; that they had attempted to make the sepoys forfeit caste by biting suet-greased cartridges; and caused those who refused to do so to be blown away from guns. But the point most strongly urged, was the recent systematic annexation. "The English," Khan Bahadoor writes, "have made it a standing rule, that when a rajah dies without leaving any male issue by his married wife, to confiscate his territory, and they do not allow his adopted son to inherit it; although we learn from the Shastras, that there are ten kinds of sons entitled to share in the property of a deceased Hindoo. Hence, it is obvious that such laws of the English are intended to deprive

the native rajahs of their territory and property. They have already seized the territories of Nagpoor and Lucknow."—*Times*, March 24th, 1848. The Indian view of the treatment of native princes and aristocracy, put forth by an avowed enemy, as a means of instigating rebellion, is identical with that expressed in equally plain terms by many English writers. In a recent number of one of our most popular periodicals, the statement is made, that "it has been for many years our system to curtail the dominion, and to depress the influence, of the princes and chiefs of India. The aristocracy of the country have gone down beneath the chariot-wheels of the great Juggernaut which we have driven over them. Not only have we annexed and absorbed all the territory on which we could by any pretext lay an appropriating hand; but, after annexation and absorption, we have gone ruthlessly to work to destroy the local nobility. Our whole system has tended to this result."—*Blackwood's Magazine* for April, 1860; p. 510.

‡ Russell's *Diary*, vol. i., p. 276. Hyder Ali adopted the same policy. See vol. i. (*Indian Empire*), p. 355.



The struggle with a numerous enemy resolved on following this system, was necessarily tedious and harassing, and required an incessant watchfulness in even minor operations; the slightest intermission being followed by disastrous consequences. Sir Colin and General Mansfield—men whose minds and bodies were models of sustained, disciplined power—maintained admirable order and accuracy in all their proceedings; but officers in detached commands were occasionally betrayed into acts of fatal rashness.

Sir Colin, after amply providing for the tenure of Lucknow, divided his force into columns, which were ordered to proceed by different routes converging on Bareilly. On the 9th of April, General Walpole, at the head of about 5,000 men of all arms, marched from Lucknow for the purpose of clearing the left bank of the Ganges, and securing the passage of the Ramgunga at Aligunj, in anticipation of the arrival of the division under the commander-in-chief. On the 15th, General Walpole reached a jungle fort, named Royea, near the village of Rhodamow.

Nirput Sing, the Rajpoot owner of the fort, was an old man and a cripple. He had as yet shown no hostility to the British; but, according to the reports of our spies, he had just received a letter from the Begum, and had resolved on espousing her cause. On receiving the summons of General Walpole, he "did not come in, or send any satisfactory reply."*

The attack on the fort was immediately commenced. General Walpole states, that he "sent forward some infantry in extended order, to enable the place to be reconnoitred, when a heavy fire was immediately opened upon them, and an occasional gun." The consequence was, that the attempted examination was abandoned; and notwithstanding Sir Colin's prohibition of any attack on fortified places except with heavy artillery, part of the 42nd Highlanders and 4th Punjab regiment were suffered to attempt to storm the fort. It is said that they had nearly succeeded, and were desperately clambering up the walls, helping each other by hand and leg and fire-lock, when the general sent to desire them to retreat; and Brigadier Hope, while engaged

in restoring order and getting the men together to retire, was mortally wounded by a musket-ball, fired by a man posted in a high tree inside the walls. The brigadier said to his aide-de-camp, as he fell, "They have done for me: remember me to my friends;" and died in a few seconds. As many men were lost in the retreat as in the advance. Lieutenant Willoughby, the brother to the officer who took a prominent part in firing the small-arm magazine at Delhi, was killed at the head of the Seiks; and the 42nd left Lieutenants Douglas and Bramley behind, mortally wounded. Sergeant Simpson rushed back, and recovered both the bodies; and two men, in striving to rescue others of their comrades, were killed by the fire from the fort; which the triumphant garrison (whose numbers were stated, or guessed, at from 300 to 1,500) poured forth unceasingly, amid shouts and yells of victory. In this miserable business, above a hundred casualties occurred; forty-two Highlanders and forty-six Seiks were killed or wounded. The fallen leaders were all popular men, especially Adrian Hope; and the officers of the 42nd and 93rd, "themselves in a state of furious wrath, and discontented with their general," declared, "the fury of the men was so great, that they were afraid of mutiny, or worse, when poor Hope was buried!"† The "worse" than mutiny, here alluded to, is elsewhere explained as meaning personal threats against Walpole, for having needlessly sacrificed many lives.‡ Altogether, this first procedure against the mud forts of the chiefs of Oude, was extremely discouraging.

After the withdrawal of the storming party, preparations were made for investing the place, which was nothing more than a wall enclosing some houses, with loopholes for musketry, some irregular bastions at the angles, and two gates, both on the same face of the work. The enemy disappeared during the night; and in the morning the British marched in. "A few bodies which seemed to have been overlooked, and three large funeral fires, with the remains of the bodies smouldering,"§ afforded all the evidence that could be obtained as to the loss of life on the part of the enemy. Only five guns were found in the fort; but the track of wheels was followed to a deep well, down which other guns were supposed to have been thrown.

On the 22nd of April, General Walpole

* General Walpole's despatch, April 16th, 1858.—*London Gazette*, July 17th, 1858.

† Russell's *Diary in India*, vol. I., p. 393.

‡ Russell.—*Times*, June 17th, 1858.

§ Walpole's despatch, April 15th, 1858.

had a successful encounter with a body of Rohilcund rebels at Sirsa; and, on the 27th, he reached Tingree. Here the united force, under the commander-in-chief, crossed the Ramgunga by the bridge of boats which Walpole's victory had prevented the enemy from destroying, and British troops set foot in Rohilcund for the first time since the mutiny. Sir Colin was anxious to conciliate the country-people by just and considerate dealings. The most stringent orders were issued against plundering; and it was no unusual thing to see the veteran general, with the flat of his sword, or a cudgel, personally chastising the thievish camp-followers. At Jellalabad (the first halt made in Rohilcund) there was an old mud fort, which had been hastily abandoned by the enemy. A native official, who had acted as tehsildar (deputy-collector) to the Company, came in and surrendered himself, on the assurance of an officer (Captain Carey) that his life should be spared. Mr. Money, the civil officer with the force, seized the man, and ordered him to be hanged, which was accordingly done; the tehsildar meeting his fate "with calmness and even dignity;" but declaring, with his last breath, that he had been snared by the false promise of a British officer. "Sir Colin was extremely indignant at the transaction, which he characterised in the severest way;"* and spoke to Mr. Money in a sharp and decided tone, calculated to prevent such occurrences in the camp for the future.

The force reached Shahjehanpoor on the 30th of April, and found it recently evacuated by the Nana, who had gone to Bareilly to join Khan Bahadoor, the Begum of Oude, and Prince Feroze Shah of Delhi. The Moolvee of Fyzabad had proceeded to Mohumdee. Shahjehanpoor was half empty; and the church, the English cantonments, and stations had been destroyed by the mutineers. On the 2nd of May, Sir Colin marched thence upon Bareilly, through an almost abandoned country, where the fields but too often bore no promise of a second crop. A few very old and very miserable people were alone seen in the villages; the houses were all fastened up, bolted, padlocked, and deserted—a mortifying sight to a commander, who suffered no plunder and

no injury, that he could prevent, to be done to the unarmed natives; but a certain consequence of the conduct of the so-called "avenging columns," sent forth at an early stage of the war, when few distinctions were made between the innocent and the guilty. While Sir Colin marched from the north, Brigadier John Jones came south from Moradabad; and a third force, under Colonel H. Richmond Jones (lately commanded by General Penny), advanced from the west, to concentrate on what was now viewed as the metropolis of the revolt. General Penny was a good soldier and a careful leader; but, blinded by false intelligence, he, "for the sake of sparing his troops, neglected some common military precautions,"† and fell while leading a loosely-ordered night march through Budaon, at a village called Kukrowlee, from whence grape and musketry were suddenly fired by an ambushed enemy. Penny, whose bridle-hand was probably disabled, seems to have been carried by his frightened horse into the midst of a party of Ghazis hidden in a ditch, by whom he was killed, and several other officers and men were wounded. The village was shelled, and carried by the bayonet, and the dead body of the general was found stripped and covered with wounds.

Bareilly.—On the 5th of May, the united force advanced upon Bareilly; and an outlying suburb, two miles from the city, was attacked by some Seik companies, followed by the 42nd and 79th regiments. The Seiks pressed forward to explore a ruined mass of one-storied houses in front of the British lines; but finding themselves exposed to a heavy fire of musketry from 700 or 800 concealed matchlockmen, they fell back in disorder on the advancing Highlanders, closely followed by a body of Ghazis—grey-bearded, elderly men, who, sword in hand, with small round bucklers on the left arm, and green cummerbunds, rushed out with bodies bent and heads low, waving their tulwars with a circular motion in the air, and uttering their war-cry—"Bismillah Allah! deen, deen!" (Glory to Allah! the faith, the faith!) At first, the fanatics were mistaken for Seiks, whose passage had already disturbed the British ranks. But Sir Colin was close beside the 42nd, and had just time to say, "Steady, men, steady! Close up the ranks. Bayonet them as they come." A short but sanguinary struggle ensued. Colonel Cameron was pulled off his horse, and only saved by the

* Russell.—*Times*, June 17th, 1858. *Diary*, vol. i., p. 398. "Lord Canning subsequently approved of Mr. Money's act, as he proved the man was a ringleader in rebellion."—*Ibid.*, p. 399.

† Despatch of Adjutant-general, May 6th, 1858.

prompt courage of Sergeant Gardiner. Brigadier Walpole was also seized by two or three Ghazis, and received two cuts on the hand; but he was rescued by the quick bayonets of the 42nd; and, in a few minutes, the dead bodies of the devoted band (133 in number), and some eighteen or twenty wounded on the British side, were all the tokens left of the struggle.*

While the Ghazis were making their fierce onslaught in front, the hostile cavalry swept among the sick and camp-followers in the rear, and seemed as if they intended to make a dash at the baggage, but were soon driven off by the fire of the British guns. The movement had, however, created a panic among the camel-drivers and bazaar people; and elephants, bullocks, camels, and horses rushed wildly across the plain. Mr. Russell, Sir David Baird, and Captain Alison scrambled out of their dhoolies on to their horses, and rode off, very scantily elad, to the shelter of the guns, hotly pursued by the sowars, by whom "the special correspondent"† was severely wounded, but rescued through the devotion of his native servants.

* Sir Colin himself had a narrow escape. As he was riding from one company to another, his eye caught that of a Ghazi, who lay, tulwar in hand, feigning death, just before him. Guessing the ruse, he called to a soldier, "Bayonet that man." The Highlander made a thrust at him; but his weapon would not enter the thick cotton quilting of the Ghazi's tunic; and the impostor was just springing to his feet, when a Seik, with "a whistling stroke of his sabre, cut off the Ghazi's head with one blow, as if it had been the bulb of a poppy!"—Russell's *Diary in India*, vol. ii., p. 14.

† Mr. Russell was lame from the kick of a horse; Sir David Baird was ill of a fever; and Captain Alison suffering from small-pox. At this time Sir Colin had no staff: he had "used-up" more than one set of officers completely; and Captain Hope Johnstone alone remained with General Mansfield.—*Times*, July 6th, 1858.

‡ Despatch of Sir C. Campbell, May 8th, 1858.—*London Gazette*, July 28th, 1858. Sir Colin's approval was greatly valued, because of the conscientiousness with which it was given. He never courted popularity by lavish praise; and the manner in which he abstained from recommending officers for the Victoria medal, was often discussed as a grievance in his camp. It is probable that the spirit of the order seemed to him injudicious, as tempting men to seek for distinction by a single daring act, rather than by steady perseverance in ordinary duty. In his own breast, physical courage was an instinct which required repression rather than encouragement; and he sedulously checked every approach to fool-hardiness in both officers and men. At this time, moreover, there was a great tendency to vulgarise the decoration by its too hasty and indiscriminate bestowal. One man was

The enemy abandoned the suburbs; but it was believed they were concentrating upon some point in the city; and Sir Colin, not deeming it advisable to expose troops, exhausted with thirst and intense heat, to the fatigue and hazard of a series of street fights, secured the cantonments and advanced posts, and bivouacked for the night on the tentless plain.

Brigadier John Jones arrived with his column from Moradabad (which city the rebels evacuated at his approach), and took up his position on the north side of Bareilly, just as the conflict in the suburbs terminated. The commander-in-chief, when he advanced into the cantonment on the following morning, heard the welcome sound of the brigadier's guns; and declared that "this officer had obeyed his instructions with great judgment and spirit; defeated a portion of the enemy on the 5th instant, taking three guns; and finding himself resisted on his approach to the town on the 6th, took three more which were in position against him; entered the town, and took three advanced positions without delay."‡ On the morning of the 7th,

alleged to have received it for running his sword through the body of a dying Ghazi, who stood at bay in a patch of jungle. Another was recommended for it by his comrades, because he "was the sergeant who served out the grog."—*Times*, April 2nd, 1859. Among many instances of the unsatisfactory manner in which the Victoria Cross was given and withheld, may be cited the case of Major Anderson (25th N.I.), the assistant-commissioner of Lucknow, and one of the annalists of the siege. This officer maintained his own house, as an outpost, from the 30th of June till the 22nd of November, 1857. Until the relief in September, he, with only ten men of H.M. 32nd, and ten volunteers held a sand-bag breastwork four-and-a-half feet high, from which a 9 and an 18-pounder gun had been withdrawn, as artillerymen could not load them, on account of the deadly fire from the adjacent houses. General Outram, on his arrival, erected a battery on the spot, where Major (then Captain) Anderson continued till the end of the siege. The men were relieved every week. He remained there nearly five months, employed, day and night, in the defence; and having, besides, to chop wood, cook, wash his own clothes, and dig in the outworks; and all this in a building on which nine guns of different sizes were constantly playing. A desperate attempt was made by the enemy to escalate this outpost; but was most gallantly repulsed. Brigadier Inglis, in his memorable despatch, and the various chronicles of the siege, have borne testimony to the patient, unflinching zeal of Major Anderson; yet when an opportunity occurred for conferring on him an honourable distinction, his services were left unnoticed. The occasion was this. The pillars of the verandah of his house were shot away, and a civilian (Mr. Capper) was

the town was finally reduced, with trifling loss to the victors, except by sun-stroke, under which many more fell than by the tulwars of the Ghazis, of whom detached bodies remained in the houses, and fought to the last. The completeness with which the concentration of the columns was accomplished, excited much admiration for the commander-in-chief's power of organisation. All parties concurred in lauding the masterly manner in which the three columns were brought to bear on a great city, which, though without walls, was believed to be filled by thousands of men, who, hopeless of victory, only desired to die in a hand-to-hand struggle with the infidel. A powerful and well-organised force was needed to crush these dangerous foes, with little loss of the lives Sir Colin was so chary of imperilling. He succeeded in convincing Khan Bahadoor of the fruitlessness of protracting the struggle; and the consequence was, that he and the other rebel leaders fled, leaving the city to fall an easy prize into the hands of the British.

The great political advantage gained by the reoccupation of Bareilly, was enhanced by the precautions taken by the commander-in-chief to check plunder (for which there was comparatively but little opportunity, as the fugitives had removed all available property), and by the procla-

mation of an amnesty to all but notorious rebels—a measure which was only common justice to the people of Rohilcund; who had been left, ever since the outbreak of the mutiny, entirely in the hands of the recognised representative and legitimate descendant of their former rulers.

The chief events of this important campaign have now been narrated. At its close, the rebels had ceased to possess a single city or fortified town. The British flag had been replanted on the towers of Delhi, Lucknow, Cawnpoor, Bareilly, and numerous less important places, by dint of extraordinary efforts, which had been attended with no less extraordinary success. Mutinous troops, rebel princes, and revolted citizens, had been overcome by men fighting on a foreign soil, with frames tried by an uncongenial climate, and liable to be prostrated, amid the din of battle, by sun-stroke, fever, and pestilence. Compassed about by danger and discouragement, they had steadily held on their course—plodding wearily through sandy plains; wading through swamps, or groping among dense jungles often filled with ambushed foes; fighting battles and besieging cities, as it were, incidentally; until, in June, 1858, when no more pitched battles remained to be fought, nor cities to be besieged, the victors might well retire to rest in their cantonments for a short season.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CAMPAIGN IN OUDE; FATE OF LEADING REBELS; MOOLVEE OF LUCKNOW; LALL MADHOO SING, OF AMETHIE; BAINIE MADHOO, RANA OF SHUNKERPOOR; DABEE BUX, RAJAH OF GONDA; NIRPUT SING, OF ROYEA; TANTIA TOPEE; MAUN SING; MEHNDIE HOSSEIN; FEROZE SHAH, PRINCE OF DELHI; BEGUM OF OUDE, AND BIRJIS KUDDER; NAWABS OF FURRUCKABAD, BANDA, AND JHUUJUR; RAJAHS OF MITHOWLEE AND BULLUBGHUR; TRIAL, SENTENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE KING OF DELHI; SURRENDER OF KHAN BAHADOOR KHAN; PENAL SETTLEMENT FOR SEPOYS, FORMED AT THE ANDAMANS; TERMINATION OF THE RULE OF THE E. I. COMPANY; PROCLAMATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF QUEEN VICTORIA, NOV., 1858; CONCLUSION.

THE course of action adopted by Sir Colin Campbell, in July, 1858, for the reduction of Oude, was similar to that which he had

completely buried under the ruins. Major Anderson, with three other persons, immediately set to work to rescue the entombed man; and after labouring for three-quarters of an hour, under a heavy fire of round shot and musketry, succeeded in getting him out

followed in the Doab, after the battle of Cawnpoor. By never committing the troops to a forward movement until they could be

alive. A corporal who shared the perilous enterprise, received the Victoria medal as a reward. The major, who commanded and co-operated with him, remained undecorated. Of course, a case like this can only be accounted for as occurring through inadvertence.

supported on every side, he converted a march into a thorough process of occupation; and, at the beginning of the year 1859, was able to report to the governor-general, that there was "no longer even a vestige of rebellion in Oude."*

The campaign was wearisome to the troops; but at its close, nothing remained for them to do, except to continue the pursuit of the few insurgent leaders who seemed resolved never to be taken alive. This small number included the noblest, bravest, and ablest of the rebels—such as the Begum of Oude, with a small band of devoted Rajpoots; Prince Feroze Shah, of Delhi; and Khan Bahadoor Khan: it likewise comprehended the Nana, and his hateful associate, Azim Oollah; both of whom were of course beyond the pale of mercy. Their cruel treachery at Cawn-poor was denounced by the Begum, and Prince Feroze Shah, as having brought a curse on the native cause. Yet the offer of £15,000 failed to induce the people to betray the Nana; and when, at the close of 1858, his fortunes were utterly desperate, a hill chief, named the rajah of Churda, sheltered him and his family for weeks in his jungle fort, and, on the approach of the British troops, fled with him into the Terai, the atmosphere of which was pestilential to natives, and fatal to Europeans.

There were, however, exceptional cases, in which rebel chiefs fell through the treachery of two or three compromised individuals. The first of these betrayals was that of the Moolvee of Lucknow or Fyzabad, for whose apprehension £5,000 and a free pardon was offered. On the 15th of June, he arrived before Powayne, a small town, sixteen miles north of Shahjehanpore. The rajah of the place was, it is said, extremely anxious to improve his position with the British, which he had reason to

fear was a dangerous one; therefore he caused the Moolvee to be shot while engaged in a parley; delivered over the dead body to the nearest British magistrate, and received the blood-money.†

Among the chief leaders who surrendered themselves to the commander-in-chief, was the head of a powerful Rajpoot clan—Lall Madhoo Sing, of Amethie. Sir Colin (or rather Lord Clyde, for he had by this time been made a peer, in acknowledgment of the public service rendered by the relief of Lucknow) appeared before the fort of Amethie on the 11th of November, 1858; but hostile operations were stayed by the submission of the rajah, whose antecedents have been already related,‡ and who protested against the decree for the disarmament of his followers and surrender of his arms; urging, with truth, that his fort had sheltered English men, women, and children when in danger; and his arms, which were very few, had been used for the same purpose. He likewise complained boldly of the seizure of his property at Benares, and the refusal of all redress or explanation of the matter.

Bainie Madhoo, the Rana of Shunkerpore (another Rajpoot of similar rank to Lall Madhoo Sing, and whose son had married the daughter of Kooer Sing), abandoned his fort on the approach of Lord Clyde (November 15th), and marched off, with his adherents, treasure, guns, women, and baggage, to join the Begum of Oude and Birjis Kudder, who was, he said, his lawful sovereign, and must be obeyed as such. He proved his sincerity at heavy cost; for though offered his life, his lands, the redress of injuries, the full investigation of grievances—he rejected all, and became a homeless wanderer in the Terai, for the sake of the Begum and her son, to whom he had sworn fealty.§

* Lord Clyde's despatch of January 7th, 1859.

† Russell.—*Times*, February 11th, 1859.

‡ At page 233: where a mistake has been made in the name of the rajah, arising from the confusion which existed in the accounts sent home to England at the time the erroneous paragraph was published. Lall Madhoo Sing is the name of the Rajah of Amethie; Bainie Madhoo Sing, that of the Rana of Shunkerpore.

§ One of the causes which are said to have strengthened the resolve of Bainie Madhoo, is as follows:—"A kinsman and great friend of his resided, at the time of the outbreak, on his estates between Allahabad and Futtehpoor. The commissioner (Chester), aware of his character, wrote to him to say that he was to remain in his house, and give us such aid as

he could render. He did so: he provided coolies, transport, and stores for our troops. Some Sikhs quarrelled with his villagers; and in the fight, it is said, a few men lost their lives. The zemindar was called in to Futtehpoor, and he and his elder son were hanged. The second son fled to Bainie Madhoo for protection, and was assured that he would never be abandoned. Out of the 223 villages on Bainie Madhoo's estates, 119 were taken from him on the second revision, after annexation; but, as he was assured that any complaints of unjust treatment in former days, would be considered in the event of his submission, it must be supposed he had some strong personal feeling at work [to account] for the extraordinary animosity he has displayed against us."—Russell: *Times*, January 17th, 1859.

Dabee Bux, Rajah of Gondah, was another of the most determined rebels. A native chief predicated of him and of Bainie Madhoo, that they would not surrender—the latter because he had promised not to desert Birjis Kudder (and he never broke his word); the former because he was fond of fighting, and had done nothing else all his life.*

Nirput Sing, of Royea, a Rajpoot chief of inconsiderable rank before the mutiny, raised himself to eminence by the unflinching resolve with which he stood aloof from proclamations and amnesties; partly, perhaps, because they were so vaguely worded, and so tampered with,† as to inspire little confidence in the intentions of the British government for the better administration of India. It was currently reported of him, that he had vowed (alluding to his crippled condition), “that as God had taken some of his members, he would give the rest to his country.”‡

Tantia Topee held out, fighting as he fled, and flying as he fought,§ until the 7th of April, 1859, when he was captured while asleep in the Parone jungles, ten miles from Seepree, by the treachery of Maun Sing; heavily ironed, tried by court-martial, and hanged. His bearing was calm and fearless to the last: he wanted no trial, he said, being well aware that he had nothing but death to expect from the British government. He asked only that his end might be speedy, and that his captive family might not be made to suffer for transactions in which they had had no share.

* Since the above page was written, the prediction has been verified. In November, 1859, Jung Bahadur marched his forces into the Terai, and encountered Bainie Madhoo, who, with 1,200 men, withstood the Goorkas, but was killed with half his followers. The death of the Gondah Rajah, and the surrender of the Gondah Ranees, with eighty-nine followers, have been officially reported. Also the deaths of Bala Rao, of Cawnpore; General Khoda Buksh, Hurdeo Purshaud, Chuckladar of Khyrabad, and many others.—*Times*, January 21st, 1860.

† Certain leading civilians, although “old, valued, and distinguished” public servants, evinced their repugnance to the amnesty in a most inexcusable manner. Mr. Russell gives a case in point. “It will be credited with difficulty, that a very distinguished officer of the government, whose rank in the councils of the Indian empire is of the very highest, actually suggested to one of the officers charged with the pacification of Oude, that he should not send the proclamation till he had battered down the forts of the chiefs; and yet he did so. Had a military officer so far contravened the orders of his superior, nothing could save him from disgrace and the loss of his commission. A more disgraceful suggestion could scarcely have been made to a man

Maun Sing himself had been driven, many months earlier, from his pretended neutrality by Mehndie Hussein, who had summoned him, in the name of the Begum of Oude, to join her cause in person, at the head of his retainers; and not receiving a satisfactory answer, had besieged him in his fort of Shahgunj; whereupon the intriguer had been compelled to seek aid from the British, and decisively join the cause which, by that time (July, 1858), was beyond question the stronger. This chief and his brother, Rugber Sing, have played a winning game, in a manner quite consistent with the account of their previous lives, given by Colonel Sleeman. Mehndie Hussein, “a fine, tall, portly man, with very agreeable face;” his uncle, Meer Dost Ali, and several other of the Oude leaders, surrendered themselves into the hands of the commander-in-chief in January, 1859, encouraged by the conciliatory tone the government had gradually been induced to assume. “I was twenty-five years in the service of the King of Oude,” said Mehndie Hussein as he entered the British camp; evidently implying that he could not, as a man of honour, help fighting in the cause of one he had served so long. Lord Clyde behaved with frank courtesy to the fallen chiefs; invited them to be seated; and expressed his hope that they would now settle down as good subjects of the British Crown. “I have been fifty years a soldier,” he said; “and I have seen enough of war to rejoice when it is at an end.”

of honour; one more ruinous to our reputation, more hurtful to our faith, certainly could not be imagined.”—*Times*, December 21st, 1858.

‡ Russell.—*Times*, February 11th, 1858. Nirput Sing is said to have been slain at the same time as Bainie Madhoo.

§ Mr. Russell, December 4th, 1858, wrote—“Our very remarkable friend, Tantia Topee, is too troublesome and clever an enemy to be admired. Since last June he has kept Central India in a fever. He has sacked stations, plundered treasuries, emptied arsenals, collected armies, lost them; fought battles, lost them; taken guns from native princes, lost them; taken more, lost them: then his motions have been like forked lightning; for weeks he has marched thirty and forty miles a-day. He has crossed the Nerbudda to and fro; he has marched between our columns, behind them, and before them. Ariel was not more subtle, aided by the best stage mechanism. Up mountains, over rivers, through ravines and valleys, amid swamps, on he goes, backwards and forwards, and sideways and zig-zag ways—now falling upon a post-cart, and carrying off the Bombay mails—now looting a village, headed and turned, yet evasive as Proteus.”—*Times*, January 17th, 1859.

Other well-known Oude chiefs, including Pirthee Pál Sing,* had previously thrown themselves on the mercy of the government, and were, in several instances, treated with less severity than might have been expected. When the vengeance fever subsided, the Europeans began to draw distinctions between the insurgent leaders, and to admit, and even praise, the courage and steadfastness with which certain of them endured prolonged suffering. This change of feeling is very marked in the case of Prince Feroze Shah, of Delhi: his military daring, hair-breadth escapes, and skilful horsemanship, are spoken of with admiration; and even Anglo-Indian journals (the *Delhi Gazette*, for instance) plead his cause, urging his reported intercession on behalf of the European ladies and children massacred at Delhi by the mutinous sepoys of the East India Company. Few persons, now, but would regret to hear that the prince had perished either by jungle fever or the hands of the executioner. A still stronger interest attaches to the Begum of Oude; of whom it has been said, that she, "like all the women who have turned up in the insurrection, has shown more sense and nerve than all her generals together."†

The fate of the Nana and Azim Oollah is still a matter of uncertainty. It is said they are both dead of jungle fever; but nothing short of the identification of the bodies, will quench the desire for their capture cherished by the British public.

No estimate has been attempted of the number of insurgents who have perished by the civil sword; indeed, there are no records from which a trustworthy approximation could be framed. It is a subject on which few but those personally interested possess even limited information; and they, of course, are silent as the grave.

In the middle of the year 1858, Mr. Russell wrote—"Up to this time, there has certainly been no lack of work for the executioner. Rajahs, nawabs, zemindars, have been 'strung up' or 'polished off'

weekly, and men of less note daily." The conquests of the Great Moguls were marked by pyramids of heads, piled up like cannon-balls; our path may be traced by topees full of rotting corpses—not the remains of enemies slain in war; but the victims of "the special commissioners, who, halter in hand, followed in the wake of our armies," with excited passions, and "armed with absolute and irresponsible power."‡

At the close of the year 1858, their proceedings were denounced even in Calcutta, and they themselves became "the objects of incessant attack. Some of them, it is said, spilt blood like water. Many were inattentive to the rules of evidence. One stated, on a requisition made by government, that he had sentenced 'about' 800, but had kept no exact account."§ The excesses of civilians cannot, however, throw into the shade those committed by military leaders; some of the most notorious of which were perpetrated before the fearful provocation given at Cawnpore;¶ while others were prevented by the humanity of civilians attached to the forces.¶

The sentence of government on certain influential leaders, whose names have been mentioned in previous chapters, remains to be stated. The Nawab of Furruckabad came voluntarily to head-quarters. A price of £10,000 had been set upon his person; and he was expressly shut out, by proclamation, from all favour and amnesty, on account of his being deemed, in some measure, responsible for the massacre of women and children at Futtehghur. On being reminded by the commissioner, Major Barrow, of the position in which he stood; the nawab replied—"The best proof I can give that I do not consider myself guilty is, that I come here to take my trial, though you have already pronounced me guilty, and I have to prove my innocence." In this, however, he failed, notwithstanding the strongly favourable testimony of two Christian ladies (mother and daughter), the wives of British officers; who had been known to the nawab in former artillery, blamed Mr. Sapte, the civil officer with his column, for not calling on him to punish the town of Khoorja, on account of a headless skeleton found outside that place, near Alighur; which Colonel Bourchier took to be that of a European female, and Mr. Sapte that of a sepoy. The case gave rise to some discussion; and Mr. Sapte asked—"Even had the skeleton been that of a European, would it have been just to have shelled the town, and indiscriminately killed men, women, and children, the innocent and the guilty? An officer proposed this."—*Friend of India*, Nov. 11th, 1858.

* See p. 330, ante. † *Times*, Nov. 29th, 1858.

‡ Russell's *Diary*, vol. i., p. 214.—*Times*, July 19th, 1858; January 17th, 1859. An Umballah civilian boasted to Mr. Russell, that he had hanged fifty-four men in a few hours for plundering a village; enjoyed the work, and regretted that he had not had "more of it."—*Diary*, vol. ii., p. 82.

§ *Friend of India*, November 18th, 1858.

¶ See account of proceedings of Renaud, when he moved from Allahabad in advance of Havelock's force: p. 374, ante; and Russell, ii., 402.

¶ For instance, Colonel Bourchier, of the Bengal

times, and were received in his zenana at the outbreak. The special commission assembled for his trial at Furruckabad, found him guilty of being "accessory after the fact," to the murder of the Europeans, and sentenced him to be hanged; but the governor-general commuted the sentence to banishment from India for life, because the nawab had surrendered on the faith of the written assurance of Major Barrow, that he would be pardoned, if not personally concerned in the murder of English people. The life of the nawab was therefore spared: he was allowed to take leave of his children, but not of his wife; was heavily fettered, lifted into a covered cart, and £100* given to him, wherewith to provide for his future subsistence when he should arrive at Mecca, his self-chosen place of exile.

The life of the *Nawab of Banda* was spared by government, and a pension of 4,000 rupees per annum allotted for his subsistence. The *Rajahs of Banpore and Shahghur* surrendered, and were directed to reside at Lahore under official control. The *Rajah of Mithowlee*, a sick, old man, has been transported to the Andamans.

The *Nawab of Jhujjur*,† and the *Rajah of Bullubghur*, were both executed at Delhi, although they pleaded that they had aided the fugitive Europeans as far as they could, but had been powerless to resist the sepoys.

Khan Bahadoor Khan, of Bareilly, held out in the Terai until the close of 1859; and then, hemmed in by the Goorkas on one side, and the British forces on the other, was captured by Jung Bahadur. The Khan is described as an old man, with a long white beard, bent double with rheumatic fever. His life is considered forfeited by his alleged complicity in the Bareilly murders, but his sentence is not yet pronounced. *Mummoo Khan* surrendered himself, having been previously dismissed the service of the Begum, "for want of courage and devotion."‡ *Oomar Sing* (the brother of Kooer Sing) has surrendered; so also has

Jowallah Persaud, one of the Nana's chief leaders. At the close of the year 1859, the *Begum* and *Feroze Shah* were the only leaders of any note still at liberty. The prince was believed to have escaped into Bundelcund, with a very small following. The Begum had less than 1,500 adherents, "half-armed, half-fed, and without artillery."§

Into the history of British India, in the year 1859, the writer does not attempt to enter. The date of his conclusion is a twelvemonth earlier. He has narrated the rise and progress of the Mogul Empire and of the East India Company; and his task now terminates with the expatriation of the last of the Moguls in a convict ship to a semi-Chinese prison, and the extinction of the sovereignty of the Merchant Adventurers. The two events were nearly simultaneous.

After a protracted captivity, the King of Delhi was brought to trial. The guarantee given by Hodson for life and honourable treatment, was regarded just so far as to save an octogenarian from the hands of the executioner: how he survived the humiliation, terror, grief, hardships, insufficient food, and filth, of which Mr. Layard and others were eye-witnesses, is extraordinary. The trial was conducted by Major Harriott, of the 3rd Native cavalry—the deputy judge advocate-general, whose proceedings in connection with the Meerut outbreak have been noticed.|| The European officers, who desired to give testimony in favour of their men, had been then peremptorily silenced; and evidence, exculpatory of the King of Delhi, was now received in a manner which convinced his servants that, to offer it, would be to peril their own lives, without benefiting their aged master. Major Harriott announced, at the onset, his intention of leaving "no stone unturned" to present the evidence against the prisoner in its strongest light; and he kept his word.

Important statements—such as that noticed in the *Friend of India* (Oct. 8th,

* The forfeited pension of the nawab exceeded £10,000 per annum, besides accidental stipends accruing to him by lapses, as well as several houses, gardens, jaghires, villages, and lands, which were granted or secured to the family, in consideration of the cession of the province of Furruckabad to the Company in 1802.—Russell: *Times*, Aug. 20th, 1858.

† The Nawab of Jhujjur was hanged on the 23rd of September, 1857. A visitor, then staying in Delhi, enters in her diary, that her host, "Captain Garstin, went to see the execution, and said the nawab was a long time dying. The provost-mar-

shal who performed this revolting duty, had put to death between 400 and 500 wretches since the siege, and was now thinking of resigning his office. The soldiers, inured to sights of horror, and inveterate against the sepoys, were said to have bribed the executioner to keep them a long time hanging, as they liked to see the criminals dance a 'Pandies' hornpipe,' as they termed the dying struggles of the wretches."—Mrs. Cooplund, p. 269.

‡ *Times*, January 14th, 1860.

§ *Times*, January 30th, 1860.

|| See pages 144 and 264, ante.

1857), that the prisoner had endeavoured to interfere on behalf of the Cawnpore captives, and had "suggested to Nana Sahib, that he should treat them well"—were not inquired into: and the wretched king, prostrate in extreme weakness, was, for twenty-one days, compelled to attend the court, being occasionally roused by his gaolers from the stupor natural to extreme age, to listen to the charges brought against him. Among the witnesses was his late confidential physician, whose "life was guaranteed, on the condition of his answering, satisfactorily, such questions as might be put to him."*

The king's brief defence was, that he had been perfectly helpless in the hands of the mutineers; that he had opposed them as long as he was able, by closing the gateway under the palace windows; by giving warning to the European commandant of the palace guards; and by sending an express to the lieutenant-governor at Agra,† stating what had occurred: all of which he was admitted to have done.

With regard to the European massacre, he declared that he had thrice interfered to prevent it at the hazard of his own life, which, together with that of Zeenat Mahal, was threatened by the sepoys; and that he never gave his sanction to the slaughter. Of the greater part of the mass of orders and proclamations brought in evidence against him, he declared he had no recollection whatever. In conclusion, he reminded the court of his refusal to accompany the sepoys, and voluntary surrender.

Major Harriott commented on the evidence, in an address of three hours' duration; in the course of which he adduced much irrelevant matter; drew some deductions, which were evidently foregone conclusions regarding the cause of the mutiny; and endeavoured, at considerable length, to demonstrate, that neither "Musulman nor Hindoo had any honest objection to the use of the greased cartridges"—an assertion intended to vindicate his own conduct at Meerut.

The court found the king guilty, as a "false traitor" and a rebel to the British government; and as an accessory to the massacre. Sir John Lawrence concurred in the finding of the court; and suggested, that "the prisoner be transported beyond

the seas as a felon, and be kept in some island or settlement, where he will be entirely isolated from all other Mohammedans."‡ He refuted Major Harriott's assumptions respecting pretexts and causes of disaffection; declaring, that the cartridge question had been the proximate cause of the mutiny, and nothing else; that the Native army did really believe that a sinister, but systematic, attempt was about to be made on their caste; and he accounted for "the bitter mistrust" evinced at Meerut, by the fact, that the cartridges which the 3rd cavalry refused to accept, were enveloped in paper of a different colour to that previously used.

A difficulty arose, as to where to send the old king. The Andaman Islands were pre-occupied; for when the Draconian policy of death for every degree of mutiny gave place to a more discriminating system, transportation was substituted in the case of the less guilty offenders; and a penal settlement for sepoys was formed on those islands.

The propriety of isolating the king from any Indian community being much insisted on, British Kaffraria was proposed for his place of exile; but the Cape colonists (who had resolutely refused to receive European convicts) declined to admit even an Indian state prisoner. At length, a station in Burmah, named Tonghoo, 300 miles inland from Rangoon (represented as a most desolate and forlorn district), was selected; and the king, on the 4th of December, 1858, with Zeenat Mahal, Jumma Bukht and his half-brother Shah Abbas (a mere child), with some of the ladies of the zenana, embarked in H.M. steamship *Megara*. The destination of the captives was kept secret until after their departure.

The general impression at Calcutta appears to have been, that the Great Mogul had been very cleverly dealt with. The Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* (not Mr. Russell), after describing the manner in which the king was carried on board, remarked—"Two hundred years ago, the agents of the East India Company stood before this man's ancestor, then the absolute ruler of 100,000,000 of people, with folded hands, begging permission to exist at a single town upon the coast. As the natives say, it was the foothold granted to a from the E. I. mail-packet, in March, 1859. It was stated in the newspapers that £30,000 were found in his baggage; and that he left property to a nephew to the amount of £100,000.

* Sir John Lawrence's letter to governor-general, April 29th, 1858.

† See page 159, ante.

‡ Major Harriott quitted India shortly afterwards, and died suddenly at Southampton, on landing

giant." But the same storm which drove the last of the Moguls from Delhi, to die in exile, destroyed the power of the giant whose sovereignty had been founded on the ruins of the Mogul empire. The simultaneous increase of debt and revenue; the repeated financial crises; the undeveloped resources of India; the feeble commerce; the absence of suitable means of traffic and communication; and the abject misery of the mass of the people, had long been commented on in England, as proofs of ill-government. The defection of the Bengal army, followed by the insurrection of whole provinces, bringing great monetary difficulty upon the government, and destitution (to the extent of absolute starvation in very many cases) upon the agricultural population, decided the question. The "double government" of the Crown and the Company had failed, and the entire administration was therefore assumed by the nation. On the 1st of November, 1858, a royal proclamation, issued throughout British India, declared the sovereignty of Queen Victoria.

The decree for the transfer of power from the Company to the Crown, was passed by the British parliament, August 2nd, 1858, under the title of an "Act for the better government of India."

It was therein provided, that a principal secretary of state, with under-secretaries, should be appointed, and their salaries paid out of the revenues of India. A "Council of India" was likewise established, consisting of fifteen members, with salaries of £1,200 per annum, to be paid out of the Indian revenues.

Seven of the members were to be nominated by the Court of Directors of the E. I. Company, from their own body; and the remaining eight by the Crown. It was de-

clared indispensable that the major part of the council (nine at least) should have served or resided ten years in India, and should not have left that country more than ten years preceding the date of their appointment.

Every member was to "hold his office during good behaviour;" with the provision, that it should be lawful for the Crown to remove any one from his office upon an address of both houses of parliament. No member was to be capable of sitting or voting in parliament. The secretary of state might or might not consult the council on any proposed measure; and he might act in opposition to the expressed wishes of the council, recording his reasons for so acting. The members, also, were to be at liberty to record their opinions.

By this act the E. I. Company remained an incorporated body, without duties or rights, excepting the receipt of dividends, due from time to time, on the capital stock of the proprietors.

The difficulties and dangers inseparable from a foreign rule, have been fearfully aggravated by the rebellion. It is easier to conceive the means of meeting the additional monetary embarrassments caused thereby, than of bridging over the deep broad gulf which separates the Europeans and the natives. The royal proclamations and the conditional offers of amnesty promise well; but Indian statesmen concur in considering that these documents produce very little effect on the people at large, and are, at best, viewed as applying to the circumstances of the present moment, and conveying no guarantee for the future. There is much said of radical reforms, and initiation of measures; but the men, the departments, the detail, are the same.* And in India,

* *Times*, November 29th, 1858.—The author regrets that limited space precludes the quotation, at full length, of a proclamation issued by the Begum of Oude, with the object of counter-acting the effect of the amnesty proffered, on certain conditions, by the Queen of England, on assuming the sovereignty of India. The Begum asked, what there was in the supersession of the power of the E. I. Company by that of the Crown, which could benefit the people of Hindoostan, seeing that "the laws of the Company, the settlement [of land] of the Company, the English servants of the Company, the governor-general, and the judicial administration of the Company, are all unchanged?" She commented on the ill-treatment which native princes—Hindoo and Mohammedan—had met with; dwelt especially on the violation of treaties involved in the annexation of

Oude; warned the people against being deluded by a proclamation, couched in such vague terms, that "everything was written, and nothing was written" in it; and declared, in bitter despair, "No one has ever seen in a dream that the English forgave an offence." With regard to Christianity, the Begum seized on its most mysterious and complicated doctrine, and asserted—"That religion is true which acknowledges one God, and knows no other. When there are three gods in a religion, neither Mussulmans nor Hindoos—nay, not even Jews, Sun-worshippers, or Fire-worshippers, can believe it true." Then followed an attempt to prove that interference with the religion and caste of the people of Hindoostan had originated the rebellion. Altogether, the document deserves careful perusal, as a summary of native grievances, real and alleged.

where the power entrusted always greatly exceeds the responsibility imposed, the character of the official must materially affect the working of the measures he is appointed to carry out. The well-earned reputation of Lord Clyde for justice and mercy, has done more towards the pacification of Oude, than even his consummate military combinations have effected for its subjugation: proclamations and amnesties have been effective in his mouth, because the chiefs had faith in the truthful, fearless veteran—a master of strategy, but no diplomatist.

In the discussions regarding India, the real question at issue appears to be this:—On what principle is the future government to be based? Are we simply to do what is right, or what seems expedient? If the former, we may confidently ask the Divine blessing on our efforts for the moral and material welfare of the people of India; and we may strive, by a steady course of kind and righteous dealing, to win their alienated affections for ourselves as individuals, and their respect and interest for the religion which inculcates justice, mercy, and humility, as equally indispensable to national as to individual Christianity. The adoption question* is still open, and is viewed by the native princes as a touchstone of our future policy. The recognition of the ancient Hindoo law of adoption, not as a favour,

but as a right, would be received by every one of our Indian allies with unqualified pleasure.†

If, however, the "iron-roller" system is to be resumed, and we are to keep our footing—if we can—on the necks of the people, it is high time to count the cost of our past experiments, and estimate our future outlay.

Long before the late rebellion, the existence of a standing army, which swallowed up nearly half the net revenue, had been a chronic source of Indian deficit. The main part of that force—that is, nearly the whole of the Bengal sepoys, who were supposed to secure our military tenure of the country—revolted; and of these, at least 40,000 have perished. The amount of life sacrificed is not usually much considered by politicians: the native soldiers and citizens who perished, cost the state nothing; and by the revolt of the chiefs, pensions were forfeited, and estates confiscated; but every European killed, was a hundred pounds lost; and the new levies raised to replace the mutineers, were extremely costly in their details. The army, European and Native, is now larger than ever; and few will deny, that the hastily enlisted Seiks and Goorkas, gorged with blood and plunder, are less easily disciplined as mercenaries, and more to be dreaded as foes, than their predecessors, the ill-fated Poorbeahs.

* One of the latest tragedies in the mutiny is said to have been the direct consequence of the denial of the right of adoption to Baba Sahib, chief of Nurgood, a little place in the Southern Mahratta country, which had been in the possession of the same family for 200 years. Baba Sahib being childless, urged that he should be allowed to adopt an heir, in accordance with a treaty made with his ancestor in 1820; but his request was peremptorily rejected. He joined the rebels as late as June, 1858; and Mr. Manson, the political agent, who proceeded to the district to restore order, was killed, with all his escort. Nurgood was subsequently captured, and the chief was hanged.—*Bombay Times*.

† The annexation policy, though denounced in England by the highest authorities, is still clung to by the Indian government. Dhar is a case in point. This little principality was held by the Puar or Powar family until the year of the mutinies. In May, 1857, the last ruler, Jeswunt Rao Powar, a young and energetic man, was seized with cholera, and died, after having, in the intervals of agony, adopted his brother, Bala Sahib, as his heir, and entreated that the government would sanction his succession. The political agent declared, that the deceased prince "had secured the esteem and respect of the people and chiefs of Western Malwa, as well as the approbation of successive residents and agents;" and urged the granting of his last request. It was granted; and Bala Sahib, a boy of


twelve years of age, was proclaimed rajah. On the 2nd of July, the 23rd N.I. mutinied; and the contagion soon spread to Mhow, which was only thirty miles distant. The Dhar troops revolted against the boy-prince, and seized the city fortress, which they were compelled to surrender to Brigadier Stuart, November, 1857. The Bengal government directed that the principality should be immediately attached; and announced to the young prince, that "he must never hope to see it restored to his hands." The Court of Directors condemned the injustice of this proceeding; and declared, June 22nd, 1858—"We do not perceive how we could consistently punish this, or any other weak state, for its inability to control its troops, when it was patent to the whole world that the more powerful states of Gwalior and Indore, and even the British government itself, were unable to control theirs." The reinstatement of the native ruler was therefore decreed; but the Bengal authorities quietly ignored the command (as they had done many previous ones), leaving the directors either to conclude that it had been obeyed, or to satisfy their consciences with having made a well-sounding but unmeaning protest against an act of glaring injustice. However, as in March, 1859, the order for the restoration of Dhar was repeated by the secretary of state for India (Lord Stanley), it may be concluded it will be ultimately obeyed.—*Parl. Papers on Dhar*, April 8th, 1859.


The native officers are equally numerous, powerful, and ill-paid, as at the commencement of the year 1857. Altogether, the revolt is calculated to have increased the Indian debt by forty million sterling; this sum raising the total to one hundred million, spent by the E. I. Company almost exclusively in getting and keeping military possession of the country. Their stewardship is condemned by the fact of the millstone they have hung round the necks of the people. They, as foreigners, have resorted, without scruple, to the selfish expedient of modern times, whereby one generation relieves itself from the consequences of its own extravagance or mismanagement, at the expense of posterity. As individuals, the directors and servants of the Company have prospered, their salaries and pensions have been secured as a first charge upon the revenues of India, unconnected with the public welfare or adversity; war, famine, pestilence, or abject want might decimate the governed, without affecting the incomes of the governors.


The case is different with the English nation at large; for its commerce is seriously impeded by every cause which checks the demand for British manufactures.

The poverty of the Indian masses is admitted to be the result of misgovernment, ill-regulated taxation, and undeveloped resources. But the evil is not irremediable. The debt with which the E. I. Company has burdened the empire is oppressive, not on account of its intrinsic weight, but because of the paralysed condition, the unnatural depression of the labouring community. Under a wise and fostering administration, every one of the extensive countries we call provinces, could furnish its needful share of revenue with ease. A general and radical reform in our financial and administrative system, speedily initiated, and firmly carried through, is the only conceivable means by which the Crown and Parliament can be expected to grapple successfully with difficulties under which, in a less aggravated degree, the East India Company have succumbed.

THE END.







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